

HEADQUARTERS  
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
(PACIFIC)  
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO



INTERROGATION NO. 487

PLACE: Tokyo, Japan  
DATE: 23 Nov. 1945

DIVISION OF ORIGIN: Overall Economic Effects

SUBJECT: Personal views on social and economic developments during the war.

PERSONNEL INTERROGATED AND BACKGROUND OF EACH:

TAKAGI, SOICHI, Rear Admiral

Born in Kumamoto, Kyushu

1910: Entered Naval Academy

1915: Graduated from the Naval Academy

1928: Went to France for study

1930: Assistant Adjutant and Chief Secretary to Navy Minister

1933: Instructor in Naval War College

1936: Member Naval General Affairs Bureau; member research staff of Naval General Affairs Bureau

1937: Chief, Research Section, Naval General Affairs Bureau; promoted to Captain

1939: Instructor in Naval War College (on Naval Administration)

1940: Chief, Research Section of the Naval General Affairs Bureau; attached to the Ministerial Secretariat

June 1942: Chief of Staff, Maizuru Naval Station

1943: Appointed Rear-Admiral; attached to Naval General Headquarters

March 1944: Chief of Educational Bureau, Navy Ministry

September 1944: Again attached to Naval General Headquarters

September 15, 1945: Retired

(S. Minakawa, Secretary, also present.)

WHERE INTERVIEWED: Main Conference Room 712, Heiji Bldg.

INTERROGATORS: Mr. Bisson  
Colonel Terrill  
Lt. Dorr

INTERPRETER: Mr. Millard

ALLIED OFFICERS PRESENT: 2nd Lt. Wenner  
Ch. Sh. Clk. Ordell

SUMMARY:

In this interrogation, TAKAGI represents himself, even in 1940-41, as an objective research analyst whose moderate opinions were rejected or ignored, especially after Admiral Shimada became Navy Minister. He states that a study (Sept. 1943-Feb. 1944) of battle lessons convinced him that Japan had lost the war. He confided this opinion to Admiral Yonai. The latter, in Sept. 1944, attached TAKAGI to General Headquarters and directed him to make a secret study on means to end the war. TAKAGI then became the spark-plug of a secret organization which made contact with Navy men, civilian leaders, and even some Army men and sought to convince them that the war must be ended. When these disclosures began during the interrogation, TAKAGI ordered his secretary, S. Minakawa, to leave the room.

RESTRICTED

487-1

MR. BISSON

- Q. Could we begin by asking Admiral Takagi to give us some indication of the positions he has held so that we can get an appreciation of the background of his career?
- A. He entered the Naval Academy in 1910; graduated in 1915; in 1928 he went to France for studies; in 1930 he was concurrently Asst. Adjutant and Chief Secretary to the Naval Minister. And, in 1933, he was instructor in the Naval War College. In 1936, a member of the Naval General Affairs Bureau; in 1936, he became a member of the Research Staff of the General Affairs Bureau; and, in 1937, he became Chief of the Research Section; and in 1937, he was promoted to a Naval Captain. In 1939, he again became an instructor in the Naval College. He instructed in Naval Administration. In 1940, he again became Chief of the Research Section in the Ministerial Secretariat. In 1942 he became Chief of Staff of the Maizuru Naval Station. In 1943 he became Rear Admiral. In 1943 he was attached to the Naval General Headquarters. In March 1944, he became Chief of the Educational Bureau of the Naval Ministry and in September of the same year, he was again attached to the Naval General Headquarters. As of September 15 of this year, he retired.

LT. DORR

- Q. What were your duties when you were with the Naval General Headquarters in 1943?
- A. I made a special study of lessons from the war.
- Q. When was this special study undertaken? What date in 1943?
- A. 25 Sept. 1943.
- Q. How long did you continue on that?
- A. Until February of the following year.
- Q. Did you make a single report at the conclusion of that time, or did you make interim reports as you went along?
- A. No general report was made.
- Q. Were no reports whatever made?
- A. No.
- Q. Did you form any conclusions of your own as to what the most important points were that had been learned so far from the battles?
- A. Yes, there were some conclusions.
- Q. Didn't you reduce those to writing?
- A. No.
- Q. Did you discuss the conclusions with anybody?
- A. I took them up only with Admiral Yonai and Admiral Inouye.
- Q. What were your conclusions?
- A. The most important conclusion was that it would be a good idea to end the war as soon as possible.
- Q. Because?

RESTRICTED

- A. You are really getting into a big question there.
- Q. What was the basis of your conclusions?
- A. In a word, it was that there were no prospects for victory.
- Q. How about the prospect for holding out? How did you feel about that?
- A. There was no prospect.
- Q. You felt that Japan was beaten and should surrender unconditionally at that time?
- A. No, I wouldn't go that far, but I did feel that Japan should end the war on condition that the Japanese National polity would be preserved.
- Q. You thought Japan would go as far as giving up all occupied territories including Manchuria, Formosa and Korea?
- A. My own personal opinion was that that would be the thing to do.
- Q. What was the situation that made you feel it was so bad? We want both specific military and economic factors.
- A. I formed my conclusions on five general bases: Political, military, economic and industrial, social, and cultural, so it would not be complete to limit them simply to economic and military reasons for Japan's defeat.
- Q. What were the political reasons that you felt impelled Japan to seek an early peace?
- A. There were four general political reasons: First, Japan was governed by poor politics; second, political planning was based on unrealistic planning rather than on the actual situation.
- Q. In what respect was it unrealistic?
- A. For instance, one of the worse things was an outright copying of the German pattern for economic control, which was something that did not fit into the Japanese social pattern.
- Q. Did the fact that this control was unsuitable mean that the country was unable to fight further? How did that influence the recommendation looking toward surrender?
- A. The result of such control would be the separation of the people from the government with a resulting loss in production of commodities essential to the war effort.
- Q. You feel that there was sufficient political unrest at that time to adversely affect war production?
- A. I think that was present to a considerable extent.
- Q. Was there any other political factor present at that stage which you thought important?
- A. I think that another big weakness lay in the fact that Japan's government, i.e., the Premier and his Cabinet, are not appointed by the will of the majority of the people, but their authority comes from a relatively small group of people such as the elder statesmen or the Privy Council.
- Q. That is all very interesting with respect to the Admiral's personal views, but what we are anxious to get is the political elements which existed in 1943 and 1944. Was there any other political element which was important in your mind at that time?

RESTRICTED

A. Yes, what I have been saying is perhaps rather abstract. On the other hand, toward the end of the Tojo Cabinet, there was utter confusion in the country and the general sentiment was that Tojo should be let out.

Q. We understand that, but this was about six months prior to that time, and we are trying to investigate the reasons why the Admiral felt, in February 1944, that the war should not be continued.

A. This is not something which can be said in one breath. I have been connected with this Research Section for a number of years and from the beginning I studied American naval strength. I kept up my studies even when I was Chief of Staff of the Miazuru Naval Station. All through that period I had been assessing the facts, so that this conclusion that I came to at that time was really one that comes out of five or six years of study.

Q. We are not questioning the validity of the conclusion at all, but we do want the Admiral to make it a little more specific for us - what led him to reach these conclusions?

A. To answer that I would have to go into the military phase.

MR. BISSON

Q. Do these observations refer to September 1943? We are interested in the fact that these conclusions were reached in this early period, and would like to know whether these were reasons which influenced you at the time and not later.

A. To the period from September 1943 to February 1944, the political phase may seem somewhat abstract but the situation in the field of production also led to my conclusion. I don't have all the data right here. If I did, that would tell an eloquent story itself. In all phases - in production, in the shipping program, etc., my research led me to realize that the situation at that time with regard to these items was not bright and production was bound to drop off even more.

LT. DORR

Q. Why did you anticipate that production would drop off?

A. For one thing, Japan's industrial facilities were still in the "kindergarten stage". Furthermore, Japan was dependent on overseas sources for her materials - particularly on the South Seas. And, as a result of military developments, it became apparent that Japan could not hope to depend on the resources in the south.

Q. That is, Japan anticipated at that time that it would not be able to keep communications open with the south?

A. I knew at that time the defense situation in the Marshalls and the Mariannas and, with that knowledge, I knew we would not be able to keep our lines open to the south.

Q. Perhaps we are talking about two different "souths". Do you mean between Japan and Singapore, or between Japan and the Southwest Pacific?

A. What I mean by the southern areas is Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, and the Philippines.

Q. What would the Marshalls and Gilberts and Saipan situation have to do with keeping that line of communications open?

A. I meant to add that shortly in my explanation. Should the Mariannas fall into Allied hands, then they could easily cut off our communications with the south, and, furthermore, it would give them bases for air raids against Japan proper.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

- Q. You were anticipating both a lack of raw materials and air attacks in February '44?
- A. Yes, even with the loss of Palau, our aircraft production would be seriously affected for one-eighth of the bauxite used in production came from this source.
- Q. Did you feel that the attacks which were being made from China about this time on shipping from the south were a serious threat?
- A. No, that was not regarded as a serious threat.
- Q. Was the raw material situation considered as immediately pressing or as something which would become pressing in the future?
- A. It was felt that from then on it would become increasingly severe.
- Q. Was it anticipated that shipping losses would continue at the rate at which they were then occurring?
- A. I realized particularly that the further American bases advanced in China, the more shipping losses would be sustained.
- Q. What did the Admiral know about the possibilities of the Americans establishing long-range planes on the Mariannas to attack Japan? Did you believe at that time that the U. S. had such a plane and that it would be used?
- A. We had already heard, during the winter of 1943, that America had completed the B-29.
- Q. And, was the fact that such planes would be available to the U. S. considered important by you in arriving at your recommendations?
- A. Yes, that influenced the decision.
- Q. In what way? What was the anticipated effect?
- A. As a Navy man, I was particularly impressed by the danger of such long-range bombers, for their use would force the Japanese fleet farther west and, at that time, American submarines were carrying on concentrated operations which would put the Japanese fleet in a very serious situation and would cut off communications to the south. We feared this most because we did not yet know what the effects of long-range bombing on the Japanese homeland would be.
- Q. Do you mean that the primary consideration was not the effect which you anticipated the B-29's would have on Japan's war production and cities?
- A. It would be a mistake to say that we were not concerned over the possibility of the bombing of the homeland, for Japan's main industries are lined up along the southern shores and, therefore, vulnerable to attack. In addition, the communications which supplied these factories would be easily cut off.
- Q. But, I understood you to say a minute ago that you were primarily afraid of the effect the B-29 would have in restricting the naval operations.
- A. You people may divide these up into two categories. But with us, it was one thing. Our production depended altogether on our lines of supplies and without supplies, there could be no production.
- Q. Do I understand it then that there were really two factors -

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

one that Japan anticipated our airpower would attack its factories and home transportation, and two, that our submarines would cut off their lines of communications and thereby cut off their raw material?

A. Yes, that is correct. Furthermore, we should add to that the danger we foresaw in the expansion of American air supremacy so that not only our fleet but our bases as well would be threatened.

Q. And, you made this report verbally to Admiral Yonai and Admiral Inouye?

A. At that time, February '44, Admiral Shimada was Navy Minister and his opinions about the war differed considerably from mine, and because we did not see eye to eye, I presented my report in private to Admirals Yonai and Inouye, whom I trusted.

Q. Had you not discussed it with Admiral Shimada first?

A. I did not discuss it with him directly but I did take it up with the Staff.

Q. And, what were their views?

A. They were not too clear on the matter.

COLONEL TERRILL

Q. In other words, they did not agree with you?

A. They agreed that the situation was difficult but they seemed to think that Japan would be able to carry on in some way. They had no clear idea as to how, but they went on that basis.

LT. DORR

Q. Did they expect to be able to hold the Mariannas?

A. The Staff thought they could. I, myself, despaired of any such thing.

Q. Was that because of your knowledge of the relative strength of the Japanese and American navies, or was there some other element which you thought would be controlling?

A. I based my conclusions, for one thing, on the fact that American air strength was much greater than Japan's and on the fact that America was superior to Japan in aircraft carriers and I felt that the Mariannas could not be defended because of that.

Q. The Naval Staff in general disagreed with you on that point?

A. The Navy Ministers did not agree on that point.

Q. After you had told Yonai about your views, what did he say and do?

A. I don't know what he did up to the time he became Navy Minister.

Q. Did Yonai seem to agree with you on these conclusions - did he express any opinion?

A. Admiral Yonai made no declaration at that time, but he gave me the impression he did agree with my conclusion.

Q. After this episode, the Admiral returned to teaching at the Naval War College?

A. No, after that I became head of the Educational Bureau.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

- Q. You came back into Naval General Headquarters some months later I believe?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What was your position at that time?
- A. At that time, Yonai was Naval Minister and he called me in to start a secret study on ways to end the war. This was based on the conclusions I had presented to him earlier.
- Q. Can you explain some of the techniques which they considered - exactly what you mean by secret studies?
- A. Some of the problems that I took up to work on secretly were as follows:
1. There was the difficult proposition of getting the Army to agree to any such move.
  2. There was need of studying the demands which would be made upon Japan following the conclusion of hostilities - for instance, the question of reparations, political organization (safeguarding the national polity), etc..
  3. There was the problem of public opinion.
  4. There was the question of how to reach the Emperor to work through him to accomplish our purpose. That meant working through Marquis Kido.
- Q. How many people were in on this secret study to end the war?
- A. There were no others - just Yonai, Inouye and myself.

(At this point, the Admiral requested his secretary to leave the room because the things he had to say were of such a secret nature he did not want anyone else to hear them but the American officers present.)

Considerably later, Admiral Oikawa, Chief of the Naval General Staff, and also Admiral Ozawa, second in command of the Naval Headquarters, were taken into this secret.

- Q. What practical steps were proposed to deal with these four aspects?
- A. In order to work out these problems, I began visiting a number of men such as Prince Konoye, Marquis Kido, Marquis Matsudaira, Admiral Okada and a number of other leaders. My purpose was to acquaint them with the course of the war and the general situation so that they would come to the same conclusions that I had. Of course, I did not tell them of the secret organization which we had already started. Of these men, Prince Konoye was the quickest to size up the situation. In fact, he seemed to have come to the same conclusions as I before I talked with him.
- Q. Can you fix the approximate dates of these conversations?
- A. There were so many of these conferences and they covered some length of time, that I cannot tell you right off. However, if you would like to know, I would be glad to get the exact data and pass it on to you.
- Q. We would like to have it. Did you consult any people in the Army at all? Did you make any attempt to convince the Army of your point of view at this time?
- A. Yes, we attempted to contact them, but please don't push me on this unless you have to, because I feel that it would be perhaps unfair to the men concerned and might even be dangerous to them, but we did not get very far with them.
- Q. Was that because they could not be convinced or was it because they thought it was too dangerous to touch?

RESTRICTED

- A. We were able to convince quite a number of Army men of the situation and, in fact, many of them brought pressure to bear on the War Minister himself. However, in the meantime, the spirit in the War Department stiffened and with only a few exceptions, all of those men changed their attitude so that in the end, only one or two stood by their convictions. It is my own opinion, however, that these men, although they apparently retracted their stand, still agreed with me at heart.
- Q. Why do you think these men's lives would be endangered - because they would be considered war criminals or would someone take revenge on them?
- A. I don't think these men would be considered as war criminals. The big danger would be from reprisals from the fanatics in the War Department.
- Q. Leaving the Army problem - what conclusions did you come to as to what Japan should be prepared to yield?
- A. There were no formal talks regarding the things that Japan would give up although we did talk in private on that matter, i.e., individually. Even on this point, Admiral Yenai and I did not completely agree. Generally, it was felt that the occupied territories would be given up. However, there was a difference of opinion regarding Korea and Formosa. It was argued that these territories were vital to Japan as a source of food supplies.
- Q. How about public opinion?
- A. It was my conclusion that the only way to reach the opinions of the people would be through the Emperor. On this point, Japan is much different than America, where it might be possible to prepare public opinion.
- Q. In line with that, did you feel it was possible to approach the Emperor?
- A. We felt that the only way would be through Marquis Kido. Once we had him completely won over to our way of thinking, it would be easy to influence the Emperor since he, himself, was a man of peace and had from the first been against starting the war.
- Q. Did you feel it would be possible to go ahead with any such program in the face of Army opposition?
- A. We felt that the destiny of the nation was at stake and we were resolved to carry this through against Army opposition, even to the point of revolution if need be.
- Q. Did you approach Marquis Kido?
- A. Yes, we approached him frequently through Admiral Okada.
- Q. During what period?
- A. I don't remember the dates but this was kept up from the time I became head of the Administration Division (September 1944, ed.) clear up to the middle of August - to the end of the war.

MR. BISSON

- Q. Were some of these other civilian leaders convinced because these Naval men approached them, or were they already convinced of the need to end the war before the Naval men approached them?
- A. I think that Prince Kenoye was firmly of that opinion before I approached him. As for Kido, I don't know whether he was influenced by me or by others or perhaps even by the Emperor



himself. These men were probably also somewhat influenced from other sources as well.

LT. DORR

- Q. Did Kido ever express to you agreement with the idea of ending the war?
- A. I never heard it from him personally, but I did know well through Okada and Yonai that Kido was leaning toward peace.
- Q. When did he first show signs of leaning toward peace?
- A. I don't think I could say for sure.
- Q. There must be some date?
- A. I learned indirectly that the Emperor had made up his mind to end the war as early as the beginning of June, in which case Kido must have begun leaning toward peace earlier than that.
- Q. Did you feel that there was considerable difficulty in convincing Kido of this matter? It sounds as though a campaign was carried on for months to convince Kido.
- A. I don't think it was very hard to convince Kido. The biggest problem was that of winning over the Army to the danger of a revolution.
- Q. Were you aware, either directly or through a third person, of the discussions that were carried on with the Army? What points were made on each side and how did the matter progress? What do you know of the whole story - first directly of your own knowledge, and secondly, what you heard? We would like you to distinguish between the things you know personally, and the things you were told.
- A. I learned directly from certain Army officers that General Anami, the War Minister, might be led to agree with the proposition. However, Admiral Yonai learned that General Anami had taken a very stiff position and did not agree. And, it is my supposition that Kido - knowing the stiff attitude of the Army, and fearing the consequences, put off for some time the decision that he finally made.
- Q. Was the Army finally convinced or was the thing put over in spite of the Army?
- A. The Army was finally convinced by the Emperor on the condition that the national polity would be preserved - that the Emperor should remain Emperor.
- Q. What, if any, effect do you think the military and air operations during 1945 had on the attitude of the various groups that were involved in these decisions?
- A. These air raids and other operations had a profound effect upon these groups for they saw a threat to production and the possibility of unrest among the people, and feared that Japan would be brought into the same condition as Germany.
- Q. What condition do you refer to?
- A. Such a development would bring about unnecessary suffering and sacrifice to innocent women and children; it would threaten the 2,000 or 3,000 years of Japan's existence in history; and it would break up the country to the same degree in which Germany had been broken as a result of her policy.
- Q. Did you feel that political stability could be maintained under a continuance of the attacks which Japan was suffering?

- A. Do you mean the government or the Emperor?
- Q. I mean both. You may make a distinction if you care to.
- A. For one thing, I believe it would have been very difficult for the government to support the Army.

MR. BISSON

- Q. Would the government have been weakened to the extent it might have collapsed?
- A. Are you referring to the Cabinet itself?
- Q. We mean the Cabinet and also the governmental structure.
- A. I was not thinking particularly of the chances of a revolution but was thinking more of the government in terms of the existing Cabinet.
- Q. What was the unrest you referred to?
- A. I don't think that would have led necessarily to an actual revolution on the part of the farmers and laboring classes. More likely, it would have developed into indifference and a passive resistance and sabotage of the war effort so that the whole national strength, as far as the war effort was concerned, would come to nothing.
- Q. Going back into a little earlier period - during the early part of the discussion, the Admiral emphasized the strong power which the U. S. mobilized in the Pacific. Why didn't the Navy take account of this when it began the war in 1941?
- A. Beginning in 1931, Japan became mixed-up in troubles and incidents in Manchuria and China, and the U. S. adopted a stiffening attitude against this country, demanding at last that Japan withdraw her troops from China. This pressure and the conditions in the country led to a more and more serious threat and finally resulted in war. Admiral Yonai, Admiral Yamamoto and others of the Navy opposed the war and earlier opposed the alliance with Germany. However, they were unable to stop the trend toward war.
- Q. Why was their authority not great enough to stop the trend?
- A. The trouble which had developed in Manchuria as early as 1931 brought about military operations and gradually built up a momentum that was hard to stop. For instance, in trying to forestall the war, the Navy would have had to overcome the War Ministry and the Army Chief of Staff. They, in turn, would have had to deal with strong local Army organizations such as the Kwantung Army and the China Army and, as I said before, this represented a force which was not easily dealt with.
- Q. At this time, 1940 and 1941, the Admiral was the head of the Naval Research Section. What were the functions of this Research Section?
- A. This organization carried on general research to provide material for the Navy Minister to use in the various conferences.
- Q. Did this include research on only military subjects, or economic subjects as well?
- A. We took up political and economic topics, although in the economic fields the work was done by economic experts so that I am unable to tell you much about that field.
- Q. Did these economic experts make appraisals of the strength of the U. S. and the strength of Japan?

- A. Yes, such studies were made.
- Q. What did these studies indicate in the period before the war?
- A. The material we furnished was not necessarily made up for strategic purposes. The High Command prepared its own material. However, from our research the relative position between Japan and America would only give Japan 1/10th or even 1/20th of the economic power of America.
- Q. Were these studies prepared in written form?
- A. These reports were made up on a weekly or monthly basis but my guess is that they have all probably been destroyed by now.
- Q. Did the Admiral think that there were middle-grade officers engaged in these studies who were trying to show that Japan could conduct a war against the U. S. successfully?
- A. While it is probably true that there were certain men in other fields who, because they wanted war, painted a prejudiced picture of the situation, within the Navy, as far as I know, there was no such action.
- Q. Would you say that the research appraisals made in the Naval Research Section were thoroughly objective and scientific?
- A. At least during my time these investigations were strictly objective and not influenced by military or political thinking.
- Q. We would like you to comment on this situation about which we have information: It has been stated to us that at one time those who were against the war asked the Navy Minister to tell the Army Minister that the Navy did not support the war. However, the Navy Minister did not make that statement. Why do you think the Navy Minister did not want to make that statement?
- A. At that time, Admiral Oikawa was Navy Minister, a very moderate man. When the request came for the Navy to take such a stand that it did not support a war, he felt that with all the other Ministers so bent on war, it would be useless for the Navy to stand out alone and take full responsibility itself.
- Q. But, we understand the Foreign Minister and Premier were both against war.
- A. In the conference made up of the Premier, and the War, Navy and Foreign Ministers, the Navy Minister urged that all political affairs and diplomatic negotiations be left entirely to the Premier. The Army, however, opposed such a plan, and this eventually led to the collapse of the Kono Cabinet.
- Q. These conferences were in October, 1941?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, passing on to the Tojo Cabinet - I understand that the issue I am speaking of developed in that Cabinet and when it became a critical decision, there was a request that Admiral Shimada speak for a position against the war, and that he did not want to take such a position even though he may not have favored war. That is a point I am trying to get at - Why should the Navy Minister fear to express his opinion against war even though he was opposed to it?
- A. I was out of touch with Naval affairs at this time and do not know exactly what went on, but it is my opinion that Shimada, who was considerably different from the former Minister (Admiral Oikawa, ed.), probably decided to leave things up to Tojo.

RESTRICTED

- Q. How do you explain the fact that if the Naval Research Section had indicated the U.S.-Japanese strength was ten to one, that the Navy Minister did not oppose this decision?
- A. It is a very logical question, but this Research Staff was purely an objective organization and carried on its work on a scientific basis and while it did supply these facts, there were other organizations such as the Military Affairs Bureau - the Political Affairs Bureau - and such units, which had far greater power and authority. Their arguments and activities had far greater influence on the Minister than did the bare facts which the Research Staff presented.
- Q. Were those other groups that you speak of in the Naval Research Bureau?
- A. No, these were other organizations not connected with it.
- Q. But, were they within the Navy?
- A. Yes, they were all in the Navy.
- Q. To what extent would the Admiral say that these other units were urging war, even in defiance of the relative economic potential?
- A. I don't know what the arguments of these other men were or what was in their minds, but my opinion is that they argued that Japan had resources enough to carry on the war for two years and that by that time she would be in possession of the resources in the southern areas and with them be able to continue the war for several more years.
- Q. The Admiral was in charge then of the Naval Research Section. Did you present the point of view that the research in your section had developed, to the Navy Minister?
- A. Such a report was sent to him in report form, but I am somewhat of the opinion that he merely filed it away.
- Q. That is, the Admiral sent a written report to the Navy Minister?
- A. This was merely a report on the data we had collected and contained no views or recommendations, so I suppose it would be considered a rather weak instrument.
- Q. Did you speak in person, at this time, with the Admiral?
- A. No, I did not speak to him. This Admiral Shimada was not one who paid much attention to other people's opinions and I felt it would be useless to talk to him.
- Q. Well, he seemed to pay attention to those who influenced his judgment in trying to urge the war.
- A. I would say he was not greatly influenced by the staff under him; probably more by Tojo, himself.
- Q. Where would this report be on the data on the economic potentials?
- A. This was in the archives of the Navy, but probably among the things destroyed.
- Q. Do you mean destroyed by bombing or destroyed deliberately by the Navy men?
- A. The greater part was destroyed by fire on May 25th, as a result of the fire.

RESTRICTED

487-12

COLONEL TERRILL

Q. At the time of Pearl Harbor, did the Navy go ahead on its own, or were they ordered to do so?

A. That was on the basis of the Navy's own plans.

Q. In other words, the Navy did agree to conduct the war prior to Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, Admiral Shimada concurred in it.

LT. DORR

Q. Did you have anything to do during the war with the question of war production and the adequacy of supply of raw materials and the decision of what weapons should be given various priorities, etc.?

A. I had no connections with any such operations.

Q. Were you aware of the general problems which arose and did you hear discussions of them?

A. I did not know much about those in detail.

Q. Did you know about the negotiations concerning the alliance with Germany?

A. I did have connections with the problem while in the Navy at that time, but I don't remember a great deal about it. I would have to consult my notes to give anything about that.

Q. Do you know what selling points were used in favor of the alliance? Those who thought Japan should go into such an alliance must have suggested certain advantages that would accrue. What were their suggestions?

A. The Foreign Minister (Matsuoka, ed.) for one argued that such an alliance would help prevent a Japanese-American war. The Army and Navy had other arguments which were somewhat vague and I would not be able to recall them or to state them.

Q. Is there any way to refresh your recollection on that?

A. Prince Konoye stated, as I recollect, that such an alliance would have some meaning were the Soviet to be included in it. The Germans, in fact, i.e., Ribbentrop, had apparently told Matsuoka that Russia was going to join. Therefore, it was felt that with these countries in the alliance, a war in the Pacific could be avoided. However, against Japan's counsel, Germany declared war on Russia and by so doing, virtually annulled the pact.

Q. Germany, Japan and Italy were already members of a pact which was directed against Russia - the Anti-Comintern Pact?

A. Yes, but even after that, there was an agreement between Russia and Germany.

Q. And, did Japan know about that in advance?

A. We did not know in advance.

Q. Did you approve of it?

A. I don't know about that.

Q. It was sort of out of line with the previous arrangement, was it not?

- A. To people thinking so logically as you do, that probably would look strange, but the situation was changing so rapidly in those days in the international scene that it is very difficult to explain everything. I don't know whether I could add anything to it or not.
- Q. Isn't it a fact that Admiral Yonai was against the alliance with Germany?
- A. Yes, both Yonai and Yamamoto opposed it to the very end.
- Q. Did you oppose it?
- A. Yes, I held the same opinion.
- Q. Why were they against it?
- A. They argued that such a pact would only increase the crisis in the Pacific, since it would likely preclude any agreement with England and America.
- Q. I think the Admiral told us a few minutes ago that the ones in favor of the pact said they thought it would prevent any war in the Pacific. Why did they think that?
- A. My opinion would be that their line of thinking, which greatly overestimated the strength of Japan, was that by lining up with Germany they would have such strength as to make America hold Japan in more respect and make her hesitate to encroach upon Japan.
- Q. Then, the issue was over the relative strength of Japan and the U. S. once more?
- A. Yes, that is right.
- Q. What was your own view?
- A. My own opinion, as I have outlined it in this discussion, was that the two countries were so unbalanced as concerns their relative strength that it would be foolish to adopt a policy which threatened America.
- Q. You remained as Chief of the Research Section until 1942 and then were sent to Maizuru? What date in 1942?
- A. I went to Maizuru on June 5th.
- Q. During the period after the war started, what were the activities of the Research Section?
- A. As I have explained, Admiral Shinada did not take much stock in the material we gathered. We got to the place where we did practically nothing.
- Q. Then, the Admiral had nothing to do with any plan to try to overcome the great disparity between Japan's strength and America's strength?
- A. My line was merely to find the facts. I was never called upon to put anything into practice.
- Q. Well, going back as far as 1940, wasn't one of the facts that you had to take into consideration the measuring of the relative strength of Japan?
- A. It was evidently studied, but not by me. Such data did not come into my hands. Just prior to the beginning of the war, such studies were made, but not by us; they were carried on by other departments in the Navy for such material was of such

a secret nature it was not entrusted to such departments as mine because the specialists we employed might have let the secrets leak out.

Q. What secrets would these be - what the Japanese production for the war was?

A. Such as oil, aircraft production, shipbuilding capacity, prospects for importation of the necessary supplies - all these things were known only to a relatively few persons, due to their secret nature.

Q. Well, then, how could the Admiral make a convincing comparison between the war strength of Japan and the war strength of the United States if he did not know of the expansion plans and what Japan would be able to do under the schedules which had been set up?

A. I merely supplied the information which was demanded of me. These other things, which were of a secret nature, were added to it in the proper departments and the actual comparisons of relative strength which involved strategy, of course, would be made on that level. These things were in fact so secret that much of it was not even passed on to the Minister, himself.

Q. The Admiral did know that large plans for expansion of industry - particularly heavy industry and aluminum - were contemplated?

A. Evidently there were such plans but as far as I know, they were not on a very great scale. The big expansion came after the battle of the Solomons and Guadalcanal.

Q. What sort of questions, precisely, were asked of the Research Bureau?

A. I did not operate under specific directives. The matter of gathering material was left largely in our own hands.

Q. I was thinking - what specific questions were they asked to answer - can you give us some examples?

A. I received practically no such questions.

Q. You told us earlier that you had begun to think about secret studies to get out of the war - that you had been studying the relative strength of Japan and the U. S., and that you knew very well that Japan could not stand up against the U. S. because of the studies you were making. It seems now that you claim you did not make any such study.

A. It may look paradoxical that I should make such statements - the fact is, these studies were made when I was in charge of the section when I was connected with military affairs, but things were left to our own judgment completely. We had a free hand and were not given specific problems to work on. From that standpoint, such research organizations in Japan may appear quite ridiculous to America, where things are done far more systematically, I believe.

Q. You were given a free hand as to what to do, but you were not given information on what to base a real estimate?

A. In some respects it would appear that the job given to this organization was rather meaningless but on the other hand we did have some idea as to what the Navy leaders would be interested in so that it was not absolutely impossible for us to give them what they wanted. However, no directives were sent to us telling us specifically what to work on. The Japanese Navy seems to be organized on a basis somewhat difficult to