HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
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INTERROGATION NO: 12 (Obtain from G-2)

PLACE: TOKYO.
DATE: 6 Oct 45

Division of Origin: Office of Chairman.

SUBJECT: SHIINA, Etsusabero.

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

SHIINA, Etsusabero:

1925 - 1929 In Ministry of Commerce and Industry, in various capacities.

1929 - 1939 1 year in Europe, 9 years in Manchukuo Gov't.

1939 - 1945 Ministry of Commerce and Insustry. (Head of Total Mobilization Bureau, 1943; became Vice Minister 1945)

Where interviewed (office):

Interrogator: Mr. NITZE, Brig Gen GARDNER.

Interpreter: Lt (jg) LANSNER.

Allied Officers Present:

Summary:

About 1920 a Resources Bureau was set up in the Cabinet. This became the Investigatory Board upon the opening of the Manchurian affair. This was superseded by a Cabinet Planning Board in 1937 with an advisery function in the allocation of the means of production. In 1943 the Total Mobilization Bureau, under the Munitions Ministry, took over these functions with Mr. Shiina as head. The Army and Navy ordered independently, however, and the Bureau had little control or even cognizance of their demands.

Loss of imports in 1939 and a shortage of machine tools made overall planning crucial.

1. Introductory:

This interview, conducted by Mr Nitze and General GARDNER with Lt (jg) LANSNER as interrogator, was primarily exploratory. As a result of the preceding interview of Admiral Toyoda, it became imperative to discover the main planning agencies of the wartime period and the men who knew of their activities and records. Mr. Shiina's name was suggested as a prospect, and today's interview achieved its purpose in determining that he had indeed been a key figure in Japanese economic planning and that the Cabinet Planning Board and its successor the Total Mobilization Bureau of the Munitions Ministry had been the main planning agencies and still possessed their essential records.

2. Personal History of SHIINA:

- Graduated from Imperial University. Entered the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce.
- 1925 Entered the newly formed Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
- 1925 to 29 Headed the department of industry and commerce in the prefectural government of Aichi (the Nagoya district).
 - Entered the Industrial Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry; soon transferred to the Labor Allocation Bureau. Visited Europe for a year, with three weeks in U.S.
 - Official in Manchukuo Regional Government, concerned particularly with labor and construction.
 - Returned to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry as head of the General Affairs Bureau.
 - 1941 In October, became Vice Minister to Kishi.
 - 1943 With formation of the Munitions Ministry in 1 November, became head of Total Mobilization Bureau.
 - 1945 Became Vice-minister under Suzuki. (April)
 - 1945 With re-activation of Ministry of Commerce and Industry, became Vice-minister.

3. Organizations and Persons connected with planning:

In the 1920's existed an organization named the "Resources" or "Necessary Materials Bureau" of the Cabinet. This developed into the "Investigatory Board" with the onset of the Manchurian Affair.

In 1937 (?) came the Cabinet Planning Board, composed of various Cabinet members and ministry representatives concerned with economic matters. The Board compiled overall statistics, prepared economic plans, and advised ministers. Its fields of investigation and recommendation included electric power, availability of raw materials, productive capacity and potential, shipping and land transport, labor planning and allocation between major sectors of the economy, textil trade, channeling of investment. Among Planning Board members were the head, Lt Gen Teichi SUZUKI (now a war criminal); Genki ABE, formerly Home Minister; and Hyotoro KACHIWABARA of the Railway Ministry.

With the formation of the Munitions Ministry in 1943, the Planning Board was superseded by the Total Mobilization Bureau, with essentially the same functions, headed by Mr Shiina. Shiina himself was primarily concerned with steel allocation. However, planning by the Army and Navy was carried on independently of each other and of the Ministry; Shiina did not even know of the Services' requirements or orders, since they ordered separately. Plants making tanks or ships got their steel from Army or Navy in the form of "chits" permitting purchase of the amount required for fulfilment of the orders for which they had committed themselves.

Thus Army and Navy procurement and planning agencies are of paramount importance independently. Recommended for the Army as a source of information was Col Hiro SATO, of the "Sembi Kyoku", a branch of the "Seibi Kyoyu".

4. Planning Bottlenecks:

with 1939, overall planning first became crucial. War preparations in the U.S. and Germany had led to reduction of imports. The great problem was thus that of getting materials for production in Japan-both to build up productive capacity and to feed industry once plant was set up. Virtually everything was short, but exact estimates of requirements were not in possission of civilian ministers, since the armed forces did not publish their plans and the economic requirement of their fulfilment.

A specific bottleneck at the time was in machine tools, because of the simultaneous cutting off of imports from U. S. and Germany and the attempt to expand productive capacity in many industries. Special attention was thus placed on increasing native production of machine tools and on expanding the machine tool industry.

The impending shortage of scrap was foreseen and efforts were made to build up stock piles. The technical measure of decreasing proportion of scrap to pig iron to 4:6 from 6:4 was also tried.

5. Miscellaneous:

Sample charts and statistics on shipping, materials import and stocks, steel and iron production, and allocations were displayed, and a meeting to go into them in detail confirmed for Tuesday 8 October at 1400 hours, also in the Vice-minister's office. In addition, another meeting to explore planning data on aircraft production was set for Friday 11 October.

In answer to the question of the availability of estimates of national income and national product, no specific agency computing these figures could be named, though it was considered possible that the Finance Ministry made such estimates.

There was reported to be in the Finance Ministry a "Temporary Military Financial Office" which financed expenditures of the armed forces after 1937. The total disbursements were reported as 200 billion yen during these years.