

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco

INTERROGATION No. 282

Place: Tokyo
Date: 8 Nov 1945

Division of origin: Strategic Air

Subject: Effects of American Radar Countermeasures.

Personnel interrogated: 1st Lt. SEKIGUCHI, Hq. 1st AA Division,
located at Ueno.

Where interviewed: Room 723, Meiji Building.

Interrogator: Capt. James H. C. Mulligan, 1st. Lt. Paul L. Harton.

Interpreter: Mr. T. Hara

Allied officers present: None

SUMMARY

Lt. SEKIGUCHI had been assigned to Hq 1st Anti-aircraft Division at Ueno from October 1944 to the termination of the war. Prior to that assignment he had been in charge of radar installations at Koywa and Shanhama for a period of 2 years. He received his radar training at the Chiba military school, where he was one of the early students of this subject.

The approximate number of radar installations used for gun-directing and searchlight control in the Kanto district were as follows.

type	wave length	no. in Tokyo area	no in/outlying areas
Tachi 1	1.5 meters	1	1
Tachi 2	1.5 meters	19	?
Tachi 3	3.85 meters	36	?
Tachi 4	1.5 meters	2	10
Tachi 4 modified	1.5 meters	8	?

The sets in outlying areas generally did not have guns nearby but were used for plotting the course of the bombers.

At Koywa were located 1 Tachi 2 and 1 Tach 3; at Shanhama 1 Tachi 3.

Almost all guns in the Tokyo area received information from radar whenever visual sighting was not possible.

The rope (RR-3/U) dropped by B-29's interfered with the radar at first but, after a period of training, operators could distinguish between rope and aircraft. It was estimated that this remedy from rope interference was about 80% effective. Toward the end of the war the Japanese were experimenting with a German anti-rope device known as Wurzlaus.

Jamming was the most serious trouble encountered by radar personnel. Jamming was present in the approximate ranges from 180 to 222 MC and from 73 to 88 MC. The interference on the latter band was about 60% as effective as on the former. When aircraft were close the jamming was effective regardless of the direction in which the antenna was turned. There were some spots in the 73 to 88 MC band in which there was relatively little interference.

In an attempt to avoid jamming a change of frequency was attempted. They would try to anticipate from previous raids what the jamming coverage would be and then to retune to a frequency outside that band. For this purpose jamming was monitored by means of receivers located at the various stations. The attempt was not successful.

DF'ing on the jamming signals was tried with little success.

Effects of American Radar Countermeasures SUBJECT (Cont'd).

About 2 weeks before the end of the war an experimental model of a 50 cm (Wurzburg) radar was set up at Kugayama where it was used in conjunction with a 150 mm gun.

It was estimated that about 50 B-29's had been shot down by radar directed guns in the Tokyo area and that jamming had reduced the efficiency of the radar system by about 90%.