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which was almost routine in nature and without the slightest known dissension either from Washington or Britain, would clean out the North Korean remnants and any token Chinese assistance, but failing in this, its objective was to expose the strength of forward opposition and, if possible, the political-military intentions of Communist China. It did just this. It threw off balance the Chinese Communist build-up operations and prematurely forced its commitment to offensive action. The enemy force then in position was sufficient to break through the ROK units on the Eighth Army's right flank, but lacked the power to carry out its planned envelopment movement. That this potentiality of enemy capability was not overlooked is reflected in the fact that a plan for our withdrawal was drawn up prior to launching the advance. The Army withdrew in accordance with such plan in complete order and unbroken cohesion. Far from representing a "military debacle" or "disaster", this withdrawal has been a movement of precision and coordination. Our units are all intact and over-all casualties have been held to a lower ratio than was experienced in our defensive fighting on the Pusan perimeter prior to Inchon. Far from the disaster which it has been so sensationally described, in relation to the broad implications involved the operation has served a very significant purpose--possibly in general result the most significant and fortunate of any conducted during the course of the Korean campaign. It gave us timely warning of the Chinese Communist political decisions and military build-up operations and intentions, at a very moderate cost. It protected the Eighth Army from the much more devastating offensive planned under the enemy's own time table or operations.

Concerning your question as to whether we should withdraw our forces from Korea or not, the answer lies largely in the decisions which are to be made concerning the war Communist China is now waging against us. If we recognize these acts of undeclared war and pick up the gauge of battle, as I firmly believe we should, taking such military measures against China as are within our capabilities and over-all strategic plans, we could withdraw our forces from Korea as a strategic movement rather than an evacuation, without too great a loss of prestige in Asia. Such action would be construed as an accommodation of our military strength to meet the military requirements of a new situation. Were we to withdraw our forces from Korea, on the other hand, without military retaliation against the Chinese Communists, the Oriental mind could only construe it as abject surrender and with it we would lose the faith of all of Asia. In other words, our position in Korea today involves moral considerations which can be strengthened by strategic dispositions but which can be compromised or yielded only at the cost of our leadership in Asia.

My views with respect to the strategic importance of Formosa have not been altered an iota. To the contrary, the action of Mao in recklessly committing his armies to war against the United Nations and the

United States in Korea should demonstrate to the most naive the use to which he would put the potentiality of such an offensive bastion as Formosa once in his control. With its threat to our littoral defense line, he could consolidate and advance his hold over Asia at will.

To assess the potentialities of Chinese Communist aggression, one must examine the changes in Chinese character and culture over the past fifty years. China up to fifty years ago was completely non-homogeneous, being compartmented into groups divided against each other. The war making tendency was almost non-existent as they still followed the tenets of the Confucian ideal of pacifist culture. At the turn of the century under the regime of Chan So Lin, efforts toward greater homogeneity produced the start of a nationalist urge. This was further and more successfully developed under the leadership of Chiang Kai Shek but has been brought to its greatest fruition under the present regime, to the point that it has now taken on the character of a united nationalism of increasingly dominant aggressive tendencies. Through these past fifty years, the Chinese people have thus become militarised in their concepts and in their ideals. They now make first class soldiers and are gradually developing competent staffs and commanders. This has produced a new and dominant power in Asia which for its own purposes is allied with Soviet Russia, but which in its own concepts and methods has become aggressively imperialistic with a lust for expansion and increased power normal to this type of imperialism. There is little of the ideological concept either one way or another in the Chinese makeup. The standard of living is so low and the capital accumulation has been so thoroughly dissipated by war that the masses are desperate and avid to follow any leadership which seems to promise the alleviation of local stringencies. I have from the beginning believed that the Chinese Communist support of the North Koreans was the dominant one. Their interests are at present parallel to those of the Soviet, but I believe that the aggressiveness now displayed not only in Korea but in Indo-China and Tibet and pointing potentially toward the South reflects predominantly the same lust for the expansion of power which as animated every would-be conqueror since the beginning of time.

Quezon once said to me in the darkest days of Bataan, "I have no fear that we will not ultimately defeat the Japanese, nor do I feel any dread of ultimate conquest by them. My great fear is the Chinese. With their increasing militarism and aggressive tendencies, they are the great Asiatic menace. They have no real ideologies, and when they reach the fructification of their military potential, I dread to think what may happen." Developments since he spoke have shown him to have been almost prophetic.

As to the rearming of Japan, you must understand that there are political and economic considerations which must be carefully assessed if we are realistically to pass upon this matter. In the first place from an economic standpoint, while Japan has an industrial machine she no longer has an Empire from which she can draw her raw material requirements as before. Now

almost all of such requirements must be imported from abroad, much of which would be denied her if the Pacific became engulfed in a global struggle. Because of this from the standpoint of practical economics, it is doubtful that from her own resource she could equip even the basic needs of a balanced modern war machine. How far then would the United States go with the heavy burden already upon her to build a new American Army and arm a good part of the rest of the world?

Apart from this, even if the Japanese people voted the rearm — a right denied by the Powers now on the Far Eastern Commission — unless we were able and willing to provide the necessary force to secure her during the rearming period, the Soviet might be expected to attempt to move his forces in under cover of legalistic right as a co-occupant of the country charged with enforcement of the surrender terms. True, this would be but the sheerest pretense as far as we are concerned. But would the United States Government or the British or French accept it as an act of war? — or would they not merely put it on the agenda of the United Nations to there search for the means to avoid war? These considerations must be given thoughtful attention. Meanwhile within the framework of my own existing authority, when the Korean War broke out I ordered the creation of a 75,000-man police reserve which has been organized along the lines of a light constabulary. Its purpose is to maintain internal order, but it is susceptible to expansion to any desired degree at any time.

This is written at some length, Roy, but I wanted to give you the full picture as it is here. Some criticism has been voiced over the optimism with which I launched our drive of November 24th. Such criticism by those who fail to understand the situation here is perhaps justified. But from this position, it was necessary for me to give final assurances to the Chinese Communists that once I had achieved my border goal, my intention was to withdraw the United States forces back to Japan leaving the ROK forces to police the country. Political reassurances to such end had failed and I was under constant pressure to give such military assurances. To avoid the impression of weakness, I felt I should give any such assurances incident to normal operations. Such assurances, indeed, were no less necessary to get maximum fight out of our own army, tired from months of continuous fighting and faced by the bitter cold of that northern latitude. Had there been a degree of sincerity in the Communist position as so many British and Americans held that there was, my effort would have been successful. Failing this, we at least achieved a comprehensive understanding of the motives and intentions of Communist China and destroyed the myths which had been woven to obscure the truth. Based upon this information, I have now redeployed our forces and our country is at long last moving towards mobilization. That some should still cling to the illusion that international Communism can be dealt with as a legitimate political force is one of the great wonders of this age. It defies explanation.

Los Angeles, 2 Jan 1951.

EDITORS ALL HEARST MORNING PAPERS (EXCEPT NY MIRROR) AND AFTERNOONS WHERE NO MORNINGS, BUT INCLUDING NY JOURNAL-AMERICAN:

CHIEF RELEASES THE FOLLOWING RODRIGUEZ EDITORIAL ON MACARTHUR.
WARDEN WOOLARD.

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(Begin editorial)

"LET MACARTHUR DECIDE"

In his New Year's message to the people of Japan, General Douglas MacArthur propounded a policy that tremendously encourages the community of nations, whose life is threatened by Communist aggression.

A policy, furthermore, that should give direction and forcefulness to the faltering diplomacy of the democratic powers now confronted by Russia's conspiracy against world peace.

General MacArthur bluntly told the Japanese that "if international lawlessness continues to threaten the peace and exercise dominion over the lives of men," it becomes the duty of Japan to "mount force to repel force".

That this violates in no way Japan's constitutional renunciation of war, for this ideal "must give way to the overwhelming law of self-preservation," was emphasized by General MacArthur.

Thus for the first time since Russia unmasked her implacable hatred of freedom and her design for world conquest, a statesman and strategist of supreme rank has plainly uttered what is clearly the desire and necessity of free nations.

It also makes evident the fact that General MacArthur is the only man among the leaders of the democracies who has position, the courage and

the commanding stature to grasp the problem and victoriously resolve it.

He should decide what is to be done, and he should have ample authority to enforce the decision.

It is one of the highest ironies of our time that General MacArthur, whose achievements are unique not only in the field of battle but in the councils of statesmanship, should be subordinate to the technical command of functionaries who are palpably his inferiors -- militarily, politically, and above all, in the sphere of patriotic responsibility.

The people of Japan realize and understand this to the full.

MacArthur arrived in that country a conqueror, but remained a liberator.

He sustained and led Japan with a firm, kind and understanding hand. He has upheld their right to freedom, peace and an honorable place among nations.

And by the standards of the justice that through him prevailed in Japan, he won the respect and admiration of other Asiatic peoples.

He stands thus as the only Westerner in the Orient who, once feared as a soldier, is now loved as a wise, merciful and far-seeing ruler.

It is General MacArthur certainly who should decide, not only the conduct of the war in Korea, but the entire course of policy to be followed by America to contain and repel Communist imperialism in Asia.

He is the one man whose talents and achievements can cope with the ominous current of events.

He has earned the right to a free hand. His country deserves and urgently needs the strong leadership he alone can provide in Asia.

EDITORIAL .. The Shreveport Times, Dec. 27, 1950

MacARTHUR'S COMMUNIQUE

With the retreating realignment of the Eighth Army and the Tenth Corps completed for the moment at least, General MacArthur for the first time has found himself free to reveal various military facts which complete the story of his own planned November drive to the Manchuria border and the Red Chinese invasion which turned it into full retreat. He has done so in "Communique No. 15," issued in Tokyo yesterday.

There is no direct references to critics, or to outright lies uttered by some of them, by the General in "Communique No. 15," covering the tragic period from November 24th to the now completed evacuation at Hungnam, but the facts given are overwhelming answer to the "civilian generals" such as the Elmer Davises, the Drew Pearsons, the Alsops, and other professional MacArthur haters who have sought to destroy the confidence of the American people in the man commanding their sons in tragic and bloody war.

The MacArthur communique answers specifically the charge (without mentioning the charge itself), that his own intelligence service was a flop in not knowing that the Chinese Reds were massed and planned invasion.

First, the communique points out, "political intelligence" (which is under the state department) "failed to penetrate the iron curtain and provided no substantial information of intent" (of the Chinese Reds).

Second, the political directors of the war denied to the field forces the best means of gaining intelligence on the field — air reconnaissance across the Manchurian border.

The only recourse left was "reconnaissa nce in strength" — the attack which the MacArthur forces launched on November 24th.

That attack, MacArthur's communique points out, "exposed before too late secret political and military decisions of enormous scope and threw off balance enemy preparations aimed at surreptitiously massing the power capable of destroying our forces with one mighty blow."

In other words, the much-criticized MacArthur attack that ended in retreat was a Godsend, instead of a blunder, because it flushed out the Red Chinese and their plans for a wholesale sneak invasion that might have destroyed the entire Eighth Army, and perhaps the Tenth Corps as well.

Had the American attack not thrown the Chinese off balance, there is little doubt that the Chinese invasion planned for a few days later would

have trapped the American-UN forces all across Korea in what might have become a massacre of unthinkable ghastliness.

All of this was apparent within a few days even at this distance -- except to the small group of MacArthur haters operating out of Washington who have pretended that the MacArthur attack was a blunder which created the Red invasion when the Reds "really were ready to make peace." On November 29th, five days later, The Times editorially pointed out that in war it often takes "tragedy to reveal the truth" and that the MacArthur attack and subsequent retreat had served that purpose -- of bringing to the world the truth of Red China's back-stabbing plans to engulf the American forces even as her envoys traveled to Lake Success, supposedly to make peace.

A few days ago, Bascom Timmons revealed in a press story in The Times how Lieut. Gen. Walker, now dead but then commanding the Eighth Army, told him in Korea that the MacArthur attack had saved the Eighth Army from annihilation.

And now, General MacArthur himself states in his communique that the attack "exposed before too late" the various secret political and military preparations of Red China to destroy the whole UN force in Korea in "one mighty extended blow."

Another point on which the professional MacArthur haters have tried to crucify the General is the fact that his forces were in two units -- the Eighth Army on the west side of Korea, the Tenth Corps on the east side. This, the critics spouted, was "dividing his strength", etc.

On the contrary, the MacArthur communique makes it clear that it was this very division which has made possible the successful and life-saving retreats up to now, including the Hungnam evacuation. This division forced the Red Chinese forces to split and made each UN column a threat to Chinese flanks unless the latter also split. The split enabled the entire UN force to be kept mobile and to retain its fluidity in relation to the entire Korean front. Again, the inference is clear that what the critics criticize is what made successful retreat possible. Further, MacArthur makes it clear that the retreat was fully planned as carried out, before his own attack was made; that his forces always were ready -- thus even expecting to some degree -- for what actually happened.

MacArthur's "Communique No. 15" may not be fully understood by those who have not followed the past 30 days of war in Korea step by step. To those who have, it is an historical document, everlastingly refuting a disgusting smear campaign that should have been wiped out at its inception - but which couldn't because of military factors involved.

(The text of Communique No. 15 is printed below).

From: Stars & Stripes - 30 November 1950

ATTACK SAVED ARMY -- WALKER

HQ, EIGHTH ARMY IN KOREA (INS) -- Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker, commander of the United States Eighth Army, said Wednesday night that the United Nations winter offensive launched on Friday saved his army from "possible destruction."

The commanding general of the UN forces on the northwestern Korean front asserted that 400,000 Chinese would have been deployed against his troops "had we waited passively."

General Walker's statement read:

"The assault launched by the United States Eighth Army in Korea five days ago probably saved our forces from a trap which might well have destroyed them. Had we waited passively in place, the 200,000 Chinese troops thrown against our lines would have increased within a short time to double that strength. From beyond the Yalu, they undoubtedly would have brought 200,000 additional Chinese troops known to be assembled there.

"We naturally had hoped to find at least some semblance of truth in the public assurances of the Chinese Communist authorities that no formal military intervention had been perpetrated. However, only by assault tactics could the actuality have been fully developed.

"In my opinion, this saved my army from possible destruction. The timing of our attack to develop the situation was indeed most fortunate."

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FROM US NEWS & WORLD REPORT, 22 December 1950:

THE "DEFEAT" THAT MEANS VICTORY
By David Lawrence

We have been reversed on the field of battle in Korea. We have left behind under the white crosses some of the bravest men of our times.

They have died in a great cause. They have aroused a disillusioned world to the sad fact that hypocrisy instead of sincerity has permeated the policies of certain countries which usually profess Christian attitudes. Alas, from governments pledged under the sacred Charter of the United Nations to uphold law and justice and to resist aggression has come now a craven desire to abandon principle to expediency. This is a worse defeat than we have suffered on the battlefield. For it means a compromise with evil, a willingness to offer up the whole population of South Korea to massacre, to admit that the crime of aggression does pay.

Let us go back to the fateful days of last June, when an aggressor army crossed the 38th Parallel in Korea to invade and attack. The United Nations resolutely declared that our armed forces must be mobilized to resist the aggressor. A mission of enforcement was given to General MacArthur—to defeat the aggressor and to liberate all of Korea.

Now it turns out that certain member nations didn't mean what they said. It is revealed that, all during the time that General MacArthur was pressing northward, he was being urged through diplomatic channels—and through sniping dispatches from Europe—not to antagonize the enemy, not to liberate Korea, not to use all the force at his command to achieve a military objective. He was supposed to hesitate somewhere along the way, first at the 38th Parallel perhaps, and then somewhere in North Korea. He was supposed to pause while the politicians of the U.N. waited to hear the faithless words of the Soviet and Chinese Communists as they were asked to withdraw and pledge themselves to accept U.N. rule in all Korea. The plea was broadcast. It was defiantly rejected by the Communists.

Instead, the Communist radio warned periodically that MacArthur must not cross the 38th Parallel with his forces and that all "foreign" troops must leave Korea at once. Some U.N. members behave now as if these warnings should have been heeded—that MacArthur should have ceased to regard himself as a military commander and should have moved his troops north only with the permission of the aggressors. In reality, our friends in the U.N. are saying that MacArthur should never have endeavored to complete his mission, which was to liberate all of Korea.

Certainly MacArthur's knowledge of what was happening in a military sense in the North was inadequate. The enemy which was concentrated across the Manchurian border didn't send him word of what was being planned. Should MacArthur, therefore, have refused to test out the enemy's intentions? Would the U.N. really have been satisfied to halt its forces of liberation indefinitely at the waist of Korea in manifest fear that the Soviet-Chinese Communist alliance might possibly attack us if we ever attempted to finish the assigned task?

General MacArthur had a right to proceed to the Yalu River to complete his mission. His orders, however, prevented him from sending planes to reconnoiter above the Chinese border. When Chinese "volunteers" arrived in North Korea in huge numbers as early as October 19, Communist China had forfeited any right to immunity from either attack or reconnaissance. We had a right on that very date to bomb the bases of supply of the enemy in Manchuria. General MacArthur has described the restrictions imposed on his freedom of action as "an enormous handicap without precedent in military history."

Again and again on the battlefield there must be an offensive to probe an enemy position. General MacArthur's advance was a huge maneuver attended with grave risks. It was a maneuver of detection. The revelations which flowed from it reached far beyond the battle zone itself. Most important of all is the detection of a real weakness among the U.N. member governments themselves.

We are back to 1936, when Britain and France equivocated and the League of Nations faltered as Hitler committed his aggression in the Rhineland.

We are back to vacillation and timidity--to fears of loss of commerce and unwillingness to face resolutely the facts of international life. We are at the low point where immorality breaks the promises that men are supposed to live by.

Like the bolt at Pearl Harbor, our "defeat" in Korea may turn out to be the stimulus to victory. It will alert the American people and all defenders of principle and morality in the world. For it has revealed where hypocrisy reigns and where morality survives. It has exposed the irresoluteness of our allies in a critical hour. Our troops in Korea have made a painful sacrifice, but they have stirred the conscience of the world--the forerunner of a victory for truth.

5 December 1950

Radio reply to Mr. Barry Faris, Editor-in-Chief, International News Service, New York, N.Y.:

Reference your radio of the 3rd, the entire effort to distort and misrepresent the causes leading to the existing situation in Korea represents one of the most scandalous propaganda efforts to pervert the truth in recent times. As to the direct quotations you ascribe to the broadcast you mention, they are characteristically slanted and false.

It is clearly apparent from the record that the United Nations Command at no time has deviated from the policies and directives given it. This has been publicly confirmed within the past few days not only by President Truman and Foreign Minister Bevin but from many other authoritative sources. Any impression that, as United Nations Commander, I am more than an agent to implement policies determined upon a much higher level is perfectly fantastic.

In the light of events it is now plainly evident that the intervention in the Korean conflict by Communist China was responsive to basic decisions reached even before the North Korean attack last June, Communist China unquestionably having pledged herself to use her full military resource in support of the North Korean effort should the necessity arise. Nor obviously could any incidents of the campaign have had the slightest influence upon the formulation of such decisions. The danger of their secret existence was inherent in the initial risks involved in the adoption by the United Nations of its resolution of June 27th. Thus it is perfectly clear now that whether our troops had crossed the 38th parallel or had remained south thereof, the Chinese forces would have been utilized to rectify the situation resulting from the North Korean defeat. Even were this not so the United Nations Command would bear no responsibility as it proceeded north in compliance with the United Nations' resolutions and implementing directives which the nations concerned had the full power at any time to modify had they so desired. The effort by some to attribute to the hydro-electric power facilities in North Korea the root cause for Chinese interest and consequent intervention is equally unrealistic. Engineers who have examined such of these facilities as have fallen into our hands have estimated they have been non-operative for some months and much of their vital machinery had been removed prior to the arrival of our forces.

The statement that agreement was made at Wake Island to a British proposal that the United Nations forces stop 40 miles south of the international boundary is a pure fabrication. There was no mention made of such a proposal at Wake Island. As a matter of fact when the Wake Conference took place our troops were barely across the 38th parallel and no proscription whatsoever upon their movement north was ever enjoined

upon the Command, other than that it should not violate the international border. Apart from this it would be naive indeed to believe that such an imaginary line would have influenced in the slightest degree the Chinese Communists in their monumental decisions.

The suggestion that I have ever personally deprecated the fighting qualities of the Chinese troops finds no more substantiation in truth. Quite the contrary is the case. Nor does the statement that the Eighth Army and the 10th Corps were uncoordinated rest upon any higher credibility. Their activities were coordinated in most complete detail by General Headquarters as is customary in the conduct of widely separated operations such as those involved. They were operating in different geographic compartments, one supplied from the east coast of Korea and the other from the west coast. Their coordinated power with reference the enemy has always been completely cooperative and in mutual support.

The use or non-use of the atom bomb is not a question which falls within the scope of my authority unless expressly delegated by the President.

MacARTHUR.

From: New York Times, 4 December 1950,
Editorial

RETREAT IN KOREA

In some respects the present grim military situation in Korea resembles that which existed shortly after the North Korean invasion last June. The United Nations forces are now greatly outnumbered by the enemy, just as they were previously. They are struggling, just as they did then, to retire to positions that can be made into a relatively stable defense line. The United Nations forces still have command of the sea and overwhelming superiority in the air, but those advantages are limited by the character of the ground warfare.

The United Nations forces have another advantage in that they are operating much farther up the peninsula than they were when they were withdrawing from Seoul. They have an apparent corresponding disadvantage in that they are being faced with much larger contingents of the enemy than those mustered by the North Koreans. The disparity in manpower is even greater now than it was then. It may safely be assumed that more than half a million troops are now committed against United Nations forces of less than a third of that number.

No contrast, however, is entirely accurate, since the large preponderance of Communist manpower existed from the beginning. It is plain now that the only reason that the original attacking force was limited to North Koreans was that the Communist high command thought them sufficient to finish the job. The Chinese reserves were always present in case they failed, as they did, and the staging ground in Manchuria was, and is, a sanctuary. The latest Chinese Communist intervention was obviously no improvisation, provoked by one or another of the United Nations moves. General MacArthur has done a service in making this plain when he stated:

"It would be a grave mistake to attribute to any incidents of the campaign the momentous action of launching war which has been taken by the Chinese Army. ***Conjectures that had the United Nations modified its mission of liberating and unifying Korea and stopped its campaign at some incidental phase the entry of the Chinese Communists into the war could have been avoided find no support in actualities. The momentous nature of the decisions and actions which have been taken clearly show them to be basic in design rather than of superficial impulse."

General MacArthur is merely repeating what should be fairly plain--that one does not move 600,000 troops on the spur of the moment. The "basic in design" refers to the fact that the North Korean Army, the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union base of supplies could act in complete accord because they were part of one directed program of aggression.

Similarly, the light shed on the ill-starred United Nations offensive is illuminating from the point of view of this "basic design." Some large-scale probing action was necessary to determine if the over-all Communist command was ready to commit all the readied Chinese Communist troops to action in Korea. An attack was a better way to do this than sitting it out and handing the initiative to the enemy. The attack was thrown back, but in the light of the now-revealed Communist strategy it was far from wasted. The only thing that seems unfortunate was the optimistic air in which it was announced.

The present military situation is grim just as the political situation that has produced it is grim. The troops are hoping to dig in for another long, hard fight. What they can gain in the time they win depends upon what can be accomplished in other spheres.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
Public Information Office

1600
2 December 1950

Immediate Release:

The following questions were submitted by the various members of the press to General MacArthur who has given the following categorical replies:

I How would you classify the over-all situation now existing in Korea?

A. A state of undeclared war between the Chinese Communists and the United Nations forces now exists. Chinese forces are supported by remnants of the defeated North Korean Army.

II What is the strength of enemy forces?

A. The immediate Chinese Forces engaged comprise approximately 500,000 men divided into two great echelons. The front echelon now engaged in attack upon our forces comprises something more than one-half of this force, with the rear echelon rapidly moving up from the Yalu River bases. In the Yalu River sector also are the remant North Korean forces now being rebuilt and reorganized under Chinese auspices amounting to an estimated 100,000 to 150,000 men. The total strength, therefore, which our forces face amounts to about 600,000 men. Whether additional forces will be brought up can not as yet be determined.

III How does this number compare with the Allied Nations ground forces in Korea?

A. This overwholmingly outnumbers our forces, the exact strength of which I would not care to give.

IV Is the enemy well equipped?

A. His forces are thoroughly equipped with modern and efficient weapons. Man for man our fire power is probably slightly greater than his, but this is compensated for by his simpler and less complicated organization which puts a greater number relatively in the combat echelon. His is a modern ground force in every sense of the term and capable of comparison with that of any other nation.

V How does your superiority in Naval and Air Force influence the situation?

A. Our air and naval forces furnish invaluable assistance, but under present conditions their potential is limited by the

fact that they can not operate against any element of the Chinese forces not immediately situated in North Korea. The air force is especially handicapped as its main strength --strategic bombing--is practically impossible of application in the narrow areas of North Korea. Similarly, the great potential of the navy can not be exerted as the supply routes of the enemy from China to Korea are overland. Its bombardment capacity is also narrowly limited to the coastal borders and can not reach the main battleground. Under these circumstances, the ground forces are the predominate factor. Our tactical air support is noteworthy as a supporting factor but can only be regarded as an auxiliary and not a decisive influence, which while of invaluable help does not fill the gap against overwhelming numbers.

VI To what do you attribute our recent reverses?

A. They are due entirely to the overwhelming strength of the enemy who completely outnumbers us on the ground.

VII Could this have been avoided?

A. I know of no way that this could have been avoided under the conditions which existed. The risk was inherent in the United Nations actions of June 27th. No nation or group of nations can avoid the risks involved in the launching of aggressive warfare against it by another nation or group of nations. It would be a grave mistake to attribute to any incidents of the campaign the momentous action of launching war which has been taken by the Chinese Army. It is quite manifest now that from the beginning the decision was taken and as a part of the onslaught of the North Korean forces in their attack on June 25 that they were assured of such practical support as they are now receiving. The early successes of the North Korean invasion into South Korea obviated the necessity at that time of the open support which is now being furnished. As soon as the tide of battle began to turn, the Chinese war machine started to be geared for the Korean battlefront. Conjectures that had the United Nations modified its mission of liberating and unifying Korea and stopped its campaign at some incidental phase the entry of the Chinese Communists into the war could have been avoided find no support in actualities. The momentous nature of the decisions and actions which have been taken clearly show them to be basic in design rather than of superficial impulse.

VIII Could this risk have been avoided by any manipulations of your forces different from those which transpired?

A. Not that I can see--the risk of attack from China was one which existed from the beginning of war and which the United

Nations Command itself had to accept from the start of operations. It was always inherent and always present but impossible to avoid by any field manoeuver or generalship. The risk was politically inherent with the initial resolution of the United Nations and quite beyond any military power of modification. In carrying out their mission against the North Korean forces, our troops had no other option than to proceed with their mission under the inherent danger of the calculated risks which the United Nations had accepted. As far as I can see no strategical or tactical mistakes were made of any basic proportion or of more than minor consequence. The opportunity of initial onslaught in overwhelming force of undeclared belligerency which has so frequently occurred in the past is inherent in war itself. It can not be avoided under present conditions of international relationship.

IX Has the military command ever exceeded its authorities?

A. No, it has acted in complete harmony and coordination with higher authority. The military does not make or attempt to make policy. It merely executes and administers those policies which are prescribed for it. So far as I am aware, complete unity has existed between the military command and its superior groupments.

X Have you recommended or asked for authority to bomb north of the Yalu River?

A. No. Any decision of this nature belongs to higher authority than my own.

XI Have you asked for authority to use the A-Bomb?

A. No.

XII What do you expect to happen in Korea?

A. I would not care to make any speculation as to the future.

XIII Are you entirely satisfied with the conduct of your command?

A. Yes. I am sure it has done everything that was humanly possible under conditions which existed.

XIV Do you regard the present campaign as a continuation of the North Korean aggression or representing an entirely new phase of aggression?

A. This in my opinion is a new war with a new opponent and a new army. The North Korean forces were destroyed and the mission of the United Nations Command practically fulfilled when this fresh aggression was launched.

XV How many prisoners do you now hold?

A. Nearly 145,000.

XVI What proportion of these are Chinese?

A. Less than 300 of them are Chinese.

XVII The statement has been made that had the Eighth Army not moved forward on November 24th uncovering the enemy's great build-up then under way, that it might well have resulted in being overrun in a short time. What is your opinion on this?

A. This probing movement was essential to develop the Chinese purpose and strength. The only other recourse would have been to resign ourselves to the possibility of a devastating strike in such power as to completely destroy the Eighth Army. It was the only chance we had to ascertain the truth or falsity of the Chinese contention that his intervention was merely on a volunteer and individual basis. The proximity of the main borderline to the battlefront, only a night's march separating them, and the impossibility of reconnoitering beyond the border lines by our planes made it imperative to develop the true state of affairs. I agree completely with General Walker's estimate that this probing effort was made none too soon. Had our forces remained indefinitely impassive it would not only have forgone all chances of concluding the North Korean campaign which would have signalled the withdrawal of main forces from Korea and the avoidance of a long winter stalemate but prolonged inertia would have greatly increased our jeopardy by permitting and indefinite build-up of the enemy force which might well have resulted in the complete destruction of the Eighth Army. The present adverse situation is not in the slightest degree due to our assault tactics but is the solo result of the enemy's predominant strength in numbers. In my opinion, it was a fortunate move.

XVIII Is there any truth in Soviet charges that you are using Japanese troops in the Korean conflict?

A. None whatsoever.

XIX Are you hopeful that the problem can be settled by negotiation?

A. I sincerely hope so. Settlement of international issues by peaceful rather than military means is always to be desired.

1 December 1950

General MacArthur received in a message today from Mr. David Lawrence, of the "United States News and World Report", Washington, D.C., fifteen questions. The questions, and General MacArthur's reply are as indicated below:

"Categorical replies to Mr. Lawrence's questions are as follows:"

QUESTION: "1. Were there any warnings from UNINATIONS or otherwise about dangers of winter offensive?"

REPLY: "1. There were no warnings nor were any warnings necessary. A winter offensive is as hard on the enemy as upon friendly forces. To have assumed defensive positions awaiting for spring would not have avoided the rigors of winter climate, for to hold those positions would require constant fighting during the winter months and it would have given the enemy the opportunity to mass his forces for a demolishing attack--with every assurance that he would jump off just as soon as a satisfactory military balance had been achieved, without waiting for the advent of spring."

QUESTION: "2. Was there adequate knowledge of Chinese strength?"

REPLY: "2. When the lines of battle moved northward following the Inchon landing the area of possible detection and interdiction of enemy movements contracted until there was ledt but a night's march from the border sanctuary for the Chinese Communist forces to the area of hostilities. This provided the means for the Chinese Communist authorities to move troops forward under cover of darkness and rugged terrain with little possibility of detection short of assault tactics with resulting unit identifications from prisoner of war interrogations. Air reconnaissance across the border is prohibited."

QUESTION: "3. In planning large operations is Washington as well as UNINATIONS kept advised in advance or is this planning entirely responsibility of area commanders?"

REPLY: "3. Major operations are all reported and approved prior to being launched."

QUESTION: "4. Did you expect winter offensive be lengthy or pushover?"

REPLY: "4. We had hoped that offensive launched on October 20th would prove decisive action. Had there been but an outer crust of enemy force in front of our lines the enveloping pressure from East and West would have effected its destruction. Had we failed to assault and uncover enemy strength and intentions the opportunity secretly to build up from the available resource of all China would inevitably encompass our own destruction."

QUESTION: "5. Was this estimate based on belief that Chinese strength was not more than sixty thousand?"

REPLY: "5. The tactical course taken was the only one which the situation permitted."

QUESTION: "6. Would you describe present situation as 'critical and serious but not hopeless?'"

REPLY: "6. Yes, definitely, unless one completely discounts the combined resources of the free nations engaged in the Korean conflict."

QUESTION: "7. Are Chinese supply lines vulnerable to air attack?"

REPLY: "7. Within Manchuria, Chinese supply lines are protected from our air attack. South of the border for many miles along the river line they can enter trails leading up through rugged terrain. Under the worst conditions troops and supplies could be moved forward under cover of night with little possibility of air detection, an essential to air interdiction."

QUESTION: "8. Are the limitations which prevent unlimited pursuit of Chinese large forces and unlimited attack on their bases regarded by you as a handicap to effective military operations?"

REPLY: "8. An enormous handicap without precedent in military history."

QUESTION: "9. Are there any signs of Russian divisions being mobilized on their border?"

REPLY: "9. No detection of such mobilization."

QUESTION: "10. What accounts for fact that an enemy without air power can make effective progress against forces possessing considerable air power?"

REPLY: "10. The limitations aforementioned plus the type of maneuver which renders air support of ground operations extremely difficult and the curtailment of the strategic potentiality of the air because of the sanctuary of neutrality immediately behind the battle area.

QUESTION: "11. Is there a significant lesson in this for UNISTATES planning?"

REPLY: "11. Yes."

QUESTION: "12. Nine out of ten persons on the street here and throughout the country are asking why atom bomb is not being used. Can anything be said as to the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of bomb in the type of operations in which you are now engaged?"

REPLY: "12. My comment inappropriate at this time."

QUESTION: "13. In type of warfare now going on in Korea are there large enough concentrations of enemy troops in any one area to make the bomb effective assuming all other objections to its use had been removed?"

REPLY: "13. Same as 12."

QUESTION: "14. Public information here is that Chinese troops became visible October 19 but no official recognition here of that fact. Was official information concerning build-up of Chinese troops transmitted here and to UNINATIONS during October?"

REPLY: "14. Daily intelligence reports are submitted to Washington."

QUESTION: "15. Argument being advanced here that war with China could be carried on by sea and air only and by giving moral and material support to Chinese guerrillas. Do you believe that such a war could be carried on successfully without substantial use of UNINATIONS troops?"

REPLY: "15. Modern warfare requires a combination and complete co-ordination of all three arms. I would not care to discuss the potentialities with respect to any particular area."

30 November 1950

Radio reply to Mr. Arthur Krock, New York Times, Washington, D.C.:

Reference query contained in your radio of the 29th, there is no validity whatsoever to the anonymous gossip to which you refer. Every strategic and tactical movement made by the United Nations command has been in complete accordance with United Nations resolutions and in compliance with the directives under which I operate, every major step having been previously reported and fully approved. I have received no suggestion from any authoriatative source that in the execution of its mission the command should stop at the 38th parallel or Pyongyang, or at any other line short of the international boundary. To have done so would have required revision of the resolutions of the United Nations and the directives received in implementation thereof. It is historically inaccurate to attribute any degree of responsibility for the onslaught of the Chinese Communist armies to the strategic course of the campaign itself. The decision by the Chinese Communist leaders to wage war against the United Nations could only have been a basic one, long premediatated and carried into execution as a direct result of the defeat of their satellite North Korean armies. Thanks for bringing this misleading anonymous gossip to my attention. Signed MacArthur.