

-2-

in trade and industry. Because we must import raw materials, while exporting finished products, we are in need of scientific planning for production. Trade must likewise be planned, and the advice of the Allied Powers must be sought on the details.

7. Controlled Economy.

We favor moderate economic control which will not blunt creative abilities or interfere with justifiable gains. Great industrial associations must be formed to ensure distribution of materials and the production of essential goods. Yet on behalf of the democratization of industry, an agency must be created with even greater powers than those of the American Trust Controlling Agency, so that the arbitrariness of capitalists may be checked.

8. Industrial Reconstruction.

This is the key to overcome all economic difficulties and must, therefore, be the object of our greatest efforts. This implies that adequate policies must be evolved for all related fields, such as the handling of labor-capital disputes, balance of production-costs and prices, etc.

9. The Food Problem.

This problem must be approached through distributing fertilizer and through appropriate measures.

10. Labor Policy.

A healthy development of the trade union movement must be supported and working conditions improved. Assistance must also be extended to consumers unions. Labor disputes should be settled by a general arbitration system; minimum wages must be guaranteed, and social insurance should be expanded. Workers should take part in the management of plants and should have their share of the profits.

APPENDIX V

Asahi Shimbun, March 17, 1946

Summary Translation

Public Pledge to the People, by IGAWA Tadao, Representative
Manager of the Cooperative Party

1. It is a strong conviction of our party that the only way of reconstruction left for our fatherland is the principle of cooperation, in which all the people live in mutual reliance and assistance in all phases of our lives, such as the political, economic, educational and cultural.

2. We must firmly hold to the spirit of cooperation, in other words, co-prosperity and mutual reliance must accompany the cessation of struggles. The establishment of a cooperative community, with liberty, equality and peace joined with labor, autonomy and fraternity; only in this can we find a way of establishing a new Japan. From such a point of view, our party should propose the following platform:

3. Establishment of a Democratic Political Structure: In the first place we must maintain the line of Emperors, unbroken for centuries. The Japanese policy must be led by the Diet representing the people's will, in close cooperation with the Emperor and the people. From this point of view, we agree on the whole with the recent government draft of the Constitution. However, from the standpoint of cooperation, we should like to advocate that since the House of Representatives is representative of districts, the chamber of Councillors must be representative of occupations. The principle of cooperation rejects a despotism by either, the Legislature, the executive or the judiciary. Above all, to protect the independence of the judiciary, preventing despotism by the legislature, more consideration must be given to the appointment and removal of judicial officers.

Further, we should like to invest the Emperor with a veto power like that of the President of the United States, which would be used when the Diet does not accurately reflect public opinion on important matters. The Emperor should also be invested with the power of appeal to a national election. On the other hand, we emphasize the necessity of a thorough-going public management of election, opening of the party expenses to the public view, and the establishment of a membership-fee system, to prevent corruption of party politics and the revival of plutocracy.

4. Establishment of a Democratic Economic Structure: The principle of cooperation will naturally demand the democratization of the economic organization. We absolutely reject state ownership of important enterprises after the dissolution of the Zaibatsu, expecting to realize quickly their management by the cooperative society. We mean that enterprise should be managed for the public welfare by publicly elected operators and financed by capital invested by laborers, capitalists and consumers who have an interest in it.

We intend

-2-

We intend to solve the unemployment and repatriation problems by allotting agricultural, forestry and fishing rights. Stress will be laid upon the reclamation of waste lands, the draining of swampy land and plantation and agriculture and fisheries. At the same time, more efforts will be made in the production or engineering fields, and war reconstruction.

5. Enforcement of Food Policy. As the food problem is the basis of all other problems, we advocate that all efforts should be concentrated to implement the food policy for the coming two years.

We are preparing measures regarding autonomic rice delivery, that can really be approved by the farmers, that envisage the distribution of fertilizer, farm-implements and other necessities which they eagerly want, through the activities of the cooperatives. On the other hand, we will let the people know the real food situation so that they can bear the shortage.

In order to give impetus to the increase of cocoons, which are very important as sources of foreign exchange with which to pay for imports, their price should be more than 450 "Kake"; and two "Sho" of extra rice should be distributed for the delivery of 1 "Kan" of cocoons.

6. New Establishment of the Peace Ministry: The Government is the greatest consumer. In view of preventing inflation and establishing a cooperative society and nation, the national expenditure must be curtailed to fit the present economic power of this country. We intend to found the Peace Ministry as an agency for conducting the business of demobilization and repatriation, planning the reconstruction of war-damaged cities and towns, and establishing a permanent peace policy of cooperation, thereby raising Japan from a fourth-class to a first-class power with a high standard of culture.

b7 5454619

(Only copy)

WJ

PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE WILL TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE MESSAGE:

Collect

Department of State

TOP SECRET

Charge Department:

Washington

Charge to

NO STENCIL - NO DISTRIBUTION

MAR 28 1946 8158

Copies to:

FE
S
U

AMEMBASSY,

CHUNGKING (CHINA).

550

You may inform the Chinese FONOFF, in reply to questions raised in your 535, MAR 21, 1 PM, as follows:

(1) It is impracticable at this time to make any determination as to the period it may be advisable to occupy Japan but you may add that an early termination of the occupation is not now contemplated.

(2) It has been the policy of this GOVT since the surrender of Japan to consult with and seek the collaboration of other interested powers in matters pertaining to the occupation of Japan and we would expect that any decision with regard to termination of military occupation would be arrived at after consultation with the interested powers.

DCR - NE Unit	
Anal.	7/7
Re.	
Cat.	
Dist.	

Richard

CR
MAR 28 1946 P.M.

FE:JCVincent:ALM

TOP SECRET

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 3-2846

TOP SECRET FILE
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DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES

MAR 28 PM 5 43

740.00119 Control
(Japan) / 3-2846

OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
APR 3 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JH
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PRIORITY - CONFIDENTIAL

DCIR

28 MARCH 1946 RECEIVED NCR 650

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 29 1946
DC
OFFICE OF CHIEF

FROM: COMMANDER NAVAL ACTIVITIES JAPAN
TO: CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
INFORMATION: COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC FLEET
UNITED STATES NAVAL ATTACHE MOSCOW

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 3-2846

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS HAS CLEARED ENTRY INTO JAPANESE WATERS OF 2 RUSSIAN FRIGATES. ESTIMATED TIME OF ARRIVAL TOKYO ABOUT 1 APRIL WITH MEMBERS RUSSIAN COMMISSION EMBARKED.

na *[Signature]*
Cat *[Signature]*
Dist.

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
APR 2 - 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

APR 5 - 1946

CS/LF

FILED

740.00119 Control (Japan) / 3-2846

ROUTED TO STATE DEPARTMENT FOR INFORMATION
PER OPO3 CWO 1601/29

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: April 8, 1946

TO : Mr. Vincent

FROM : JKEmmerson

SUBJECT: Attached letter from Milton Patterson
Thompson

My reading of this letter is that he wishes your comments on his Foreign Service Journal article regarding a general staff for the Department, rather than upon his letter to Gen. McCoy. You will note Mr. Thompson is described as a "personnel assistant" with the Federal Home Loan Bank Administration.

If you wish to comment on his proposal to Gen. McCoy, I should suggest something as follows:

"Your suggestions made to General McCoy proposing the implementation of the anti-war clause in the Japanese Constitution have been read with interest. Your comment that the abridgment of sovereignty is the heart of the question of prevention of war is in accord with General MacArthur's statement regarding the renunciation of war clause. He of course proposes the renunciation by all nations of the sovereign right of belligerency. While he does not specify sanctions against individuals, probably some such system of implementation under the United Nations would have to be devised."

FW

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THE ARMY AND NAVY CLUB
WASHINGTON

March 28, 1946.

Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 1 - 1946
Director
Department of State
al

Personal.

Dear Mr. Vincent:

As another Georgian (from Griffin) and a former Foreign Service officer, I have known of you for sometime. We have mutual friends, but I do not recall that we have met in person.

I wish you to have the enclosed cope of a letter I wrote to General McCoy, who is a former chief of mine, proposing the implementation of the anti-war clause of the revised Japanese constitution by providing sanctions for individual offenders, that is, personal accountability. Perhaps my thought is by no means original with me.

The Foreign Service Journal for January contained an article by me outlining a general staff for the Department and an advisory council on foreign policy. The April issue will contain my comments on the Journal's editorial, which was as favorable as could be expected. In fact, the general reaction has been far better than I had dared to hope. If you would care to give me the benefit of your own private views, which, of course, would be off the record, I should be glad to have them.

Sincerely yours,

Milton Patterson Thompson
Milton Patterson Thompson.

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/3-2846

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APR 16 1946

March 20, 1946.

General Frank Ross McCoy,
Chairman, Far Eastern Commission,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General McCoy:

While I have not examined the text of the new Japanese constitution, I have been wondering if its clause purporting henceforth to abolish war as an instrument of national policy implements such a prohibition with any punitive provision for Japanese subjects who might violate it.

This aspect would seem to be of the essence. Without appropriate sanctions or "teeth," any such prescription might well prove to be only a pious homily, capable of adroit circumvention in practice. It would afford an acid test of the bona fides of the professed outlawing of war by the Japanese. Of course, even the most rigid provision for the punishment of individuals would be no guarantee against the abuse of power by future megalomaniacs. It nevertheless would be a further salutary contribution to the creation of a sorely needed system of international morality. It must come to be recognized that a breach of the international peace is as much, or more, of a crime as disturbing the peace in municipal law. This is the great objective of the Nurnberg trials, as you know. Their task would be facilitated if there had been more established public law and precedents applicable to individuals in such cases.

My thought is that study should be given to the inclusion in the new Japanese charter of safeguards which would save it from the crippling defect of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The latter merely renounced war, with reservations. No penalties for violations were specified; neither was enforcement machinery provided. Its effectiveness naturally was so reduced as to make it of only nominal value, more moral than real.

The constitutional lawyers may interpose objections to such a clause as I propose. It would be an innovation, indeed revolutionary. It is inextricably interwoven with the abridgement of sovereignty, which is the heart of the whole question of preventing war. But it should not present insuperable obstacles. For one thing, the present is an unprecedented opportunity, which may never recur, when Japanese sovereignty is inoperative and that nation is under the complete control of the United Nations, to effectuate such a wholesome principle. Its application to Japan (and to Germany in due course) could serve as the most vital milestone in the, if not prevention, then restriction of war.

After defining crimes and fixing punishment, the next matter calling for careful consideration is the providing of facilities for the trial of Japanese citizens, including officials, who might offend in this respect. The error, either by silence or indirection, should be avoided of allowing them to be tried by their own national courts, which procedure made a farcical miscarriage of justice of the trials at Leipzig of presumably guilty Germans after World War I. An excellent solution might well be for any such future culprits to be tried by the International Court of Justice. This, also, would be promotive of the prestige and power of the United Nations Organization, to the support of which

- 2 -

we are pledged.

I do not hold with those persons who claim that the above doctrine is inharmonious with the duty of military and naval officers to obey orders. It is just such specious reasoning which has made possible the notorious activities of the predatory German General Staff and the pathological Shintoism and the Samurai. A higher standard must be established. The world must come to accept the Anglo-Saxon principle of jurisprudence that law is binding on all individuals, who must be amenable to it. Such law is illustrated by the Charter of the United Nations and, let us hope, the revised Japanese constitution.

Heretofore, no sooner would the hostilities of one war cease before the sand in the hour glass would begin running out anew, with another holocaust as the end result. That pattern must be broken. The foregoing proposal, while not a panacea, is another step in that direction, - in man's slow march from the law of the jungle to that of peace and security under law.

The preceding portion of this letter was drafted several days ago. I wished to review it before sending it. For I was aware of the vulnerability of my proposal. In consequence, I was most interested to read only last night a thesis put forward by Walter Lippmann which squares with and offers a means of implementing the foregoing question of providing sanctions for any individual Japanese who might violate the anti-war clause of their new constitution. Mr. Lippmann's idea is developed in a forthcoming book, "How To Enfore International Agreements," a condensation of which is available in "The Reader's Digest" for April, where I saw it.

His plan is aimed at the devising of means to prevent the improper use of the atomic bomb, a goal which goes hand in hand with the preceding one of preventing the future waging of war by the Japanese. Indeed, Mr. Lippmann postulates this means as a basis for the prevention of all wars. He, too, is concerned with the control of individuals, including officials, upon whom world laws would directly operate. As he reminds us, "The United Nations have embraced the principle that 'crimes are always committed by persons' and that 'only sanctions which reach individuals can peacefully and effectively be enforced.'"

Doubtless you saw the statesmanlike article of Mr. Stimson in the March issue of "Harper's Magazine" dealing with the opportunity offered by the atomic bomb to improve international relations.

With best wishes, I am

Faithfully yours,

Milton Patterson Thompson.

APR 11 1946

In reply refer to
FE

PERSONAL

Dear Mr. Thompson:

Thank you very much for your letter of March 28 with which you enclosed a copy of your letter to General McCoy. I too had heard of you but had not realized you were a fellow Georgian from Griffin.

You have of course read General MacArthur's recent address at the opening session of the Allied Council in Tokyo which seems quite pertinent to the comments you make in your letter to General McCoy. While he did not specify sanctions against individuals, it seems to me that some such system of implementation under the United Nations could be devised if, of course, there was general acceptance of the idea of anti-war constitutional clauses with the consequent abridgment of sovereignty.

Your article in the Journal appeals to me as a very useful contribution to the thinking here on organization for a more effective foreign policy. I may say that I had a talk with General Marshall the other day very much along the lines of your article.

Sincerely yours,

DCB	NE Unit
	<i>md</i>
	<i>[Signature]</i>
Dist.	

John Carter Vincent
Director
Office of Far Eastern Affairs

Mr. Milton P. Thompson,
The Army and Navy Club,
Washington, D.C.

APR 10 1946 P.M.
APR 11 1946

FE:JCVinvent:ead

4-10-46

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)
/3-2846

740.00119 Control (Japan) / 3-2846
CS/WJ

DANIEL J. FLOOD
11TH DIST. PENNSYLVANIA

HOME OFFICE:
1015 MINERS NATIONAL BANK
WILKES-BARRE, PENNSYLVANIA

COMMITTEE: ~~JK~~
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

Washington, D. C.

March 28, 1946

APR 11 1946 DCIR

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AND KOREAN
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
file
APR 16 1946

Honorable Dean Acheson
Under Secretary of State
State Department
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Acheson:

I am enclosing a copy of a memorandum sent by me to General Hilldring, who is still on leave. I have talked with his Secretary at the Pentagon Building and told her I was going to send this through immediately and asked her to have General Eckols take care of it in view of the fact that he is replacing Hilldring in the War Department.

In view, however, of the full and complete cooperation that we have been so fortunate to receive from you and your Department, I knew that you would want a copy of this communication.

Kindest personal regards.

Sincerely yours,

Daniel J. Flood
Daniel J. Flood, M.C.

DJF:ah
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FILED
APR 28 1946

DANIEL J. FLOOD
11TH DIST. PENNSYLVANIA

HOME OFFICE:
1015 MINERS NATIONAL BANK
WILKES-BARRE, PENNSYLVANIA

COMMITTEE:
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

March 27, 1946

Major General John H. Hilldring
Special Staff
Pentagon Building
War Department
Washington, D. C.

My dear General:

The following is a copy of a radiogram received by me from our mutual friend, Peter Magagna, who, you recall, was sent to Tokyo by you for the Army on assignment to the staff of General MacArthur.

"Many thanks your full cooperation stop please see Hilldring immediately and give him written memorandum for the record on following matter stop SCAP for some reason cabled Hilldring and states that I had advised I was representing State Department in this Japanese raw silk affair stop as you are well aware I am meticulously careful and positive on my statements and factual data stop I told SCAP that Hilldring had advised me that I was going to deal with the higher officials in SCAP including MacArthur and further that State Department assured me of their full cooperation and advised me that any plan along the lines I had discussed with them and Hilldring regarding silk they would go along with stop you were present at all these meetings and know the above to be factual stop therefore correct this matter with SCAP because I certainly know one cannot represent State Department and War Department at the same time and I do not want this matter to stand uncorrected stop incidentally thank Acheson stop his people out here have given me the fullest cooperation stop I will keep you informed of situation stop."

In view of the very apparent misunderstanding which somebody at SCAP in Tokyo has with reference to whom Magagna represents, what he is doing and who he is doing it for, I am taking the liberty of sending this memorandum to you in order that I may reaffirm my concurrence with the position taken by Magagna and express my concurrence with the statements made in the above-mentioned radiogram from him.

You will recall during the entire course of our conversations, just prior to Magagna's departure for Tokyo, that we all went to considerable pains to have it clearly understood that Magagna would go to Tokyo as an expert on silk on behalf of the Army; would be assigned to the staff of

Major General J. H. Hilldring

-2-

March 27, 1946

General MacArthur and would have the blessings of the State Department so that there would be no misunderstanding at any level as to what was being done and why. It was at my suggestion that the State Department was made acquainted with the purpose of Magagna's trip to Japan in order that every possible difficulty could be removed or misunderstanding prevented before Magagna reached Tokyo. The State Department assured me of their full cooperation and concurred in any plan consistent with the discussions held here in Washington, if it met with your approval and also met with their approval. At the time Magagna left for Tokyo I recall distinctly declaring that he was delighted with this arrangement whereby any future bickerings or misunderstandings would be cleaned up before they started; that the War Department and the State Department were in full agreement on Magagna's mission, his proposals and the determination that this was not to be a one-shot proposition, but would look to the re-establishment of the silk industry in the United States and a properly supervised and controlled silk industry in Japan.

At no time, any place, anywhere, did anyone think or suggest directly or indirectly that Magagna represented anyone or anything but the War Department. No one here at any idea that he represented the State Department. Any impression that SCAP now has that Magagna represents the State Department, or ever advised anyone that he did, is fully and completely erroneous.

I think it is of great importance that your office advise SCAP immediately of their error and suggest to them that Magagna was sent there by you to help them in this emergency and with specific reference to this very important matter of silk; that everybody here in both the War Department, the State Department and myself were concerned only with trying to help them and ask them for the general good of the purpose we are all trying to achieve that the lower levels of the SCAP headquarters discontinue their rather obvious practice of placing obstacles in the way of this man, Magagna.

Magagna advised me that so far he has not seen MacArthur. This certainly does not make sense. If there are any amateur diplomats or amateur economists who don't know the silk worm from the hook worm on MacArthur's staff interfering with the excellent work that everybody else is trying to do on this silk problem I, for one, want to know who they are and why they are acting in such an obstructionist fashion.

It was our understanding that the reason Magagna was sent to Japan by the Army was because the Army in Japan did not have an expert on silk. That being the case, I respectfully suggest that the Army take advice from the expert on silk. It is obvious that General MacArthur is not aware personally of the difficulties Magagna must be encountering with some of the people in Tokyo on MacArthur's staff. That being the case, and because I was so deeply impressed by your clear and immediate understanding of the whole problem, I urge that your very immediate attention be given to pointing out to SCAP at once, as requested by Magagna in the radiogram quoted above, that he represents the War Department - not the State Department; but that he was assured of full cooperation by the

Major General A. H. Hilldring

-3-

March 27, 1946

State Department and that it was my idea and not his, and that if they have any objections to my ideas I want to know who objects and why.

Colonel Gross, of your office, has a full and complete understanding of this picture and has been most helpful and cooperative from the very beginning. I have discussed this whole thing with him on several occasions, and I think you will find that he will confirm the understanding as outlined above.

Sincerely yours,

Daniel J. Flood, M.C.

DJF:ah

APR 11 1946

In reply refer to
JK 740.00119 Control
(Japan) 13-2846

My dear Mr. Flood:

Thank you for your letter of March 28, 1946, enclosing a copy of the memorandum you prepared for Major General Hilldring concerning the position of Mr. Magagna in Japan. I appreciate your keeping me informed about developments in this situation.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON
Under Secretary

The Honorable
Daniel J. Flood,
House of Representatives.

APR 10 1946

RH Whitman

JK:RHWhitman:aw 4-8-46

JK 740.00119 Control (Japan) 13-2846

[Handwritten mark]

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~~JA~~

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

SECRET - DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY Tokyo, Japan, March 29, 1946

DCR

No. 339

1946 APR 6 AM 4 47
DC/K
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SUBJECT: Intelligence Summaries, United States Army Forces, Pacific

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
APR 6 1946
DIVISION OF INTELLIGENCE
REPORTING SERVICES

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 3-2946

The Officer in Charge has the honor to transmit under separate cover single copies of Daily Intelligence Summaries prepared by the G-2 Section, General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific, during the period December 5, 1945, to January 31, 1946.

It is thought that these reports may provide useful reference material for intelligence agencies of the Department. Care should be taken to observe their security classification which, since December 20, 1945, has been "For American Eyes Only".

Accompaniment: *att. 3 pkts. jwb*

Intelligence Summaries, USAFPAC

Original and hectograph to Department

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Material sent to ORP

APR 11 1946

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Confidential *[Signature]*

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 29, 1946

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. J. C. Winckler, Second Secretary, French Embassy
Mr. Borton

COPIES TO:

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 3-2946

740.00119 Control Japan / 3-2946
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Mr. Winckler called at his request and left the attached note. He pointed out that the establishment of a French liaison mission had already been approved by General MacArthur, but that the French Embassy in Washington had just received word of the nomination of General Pechkoff as chief of the mission. I told Mr. Winckler that I noted they wished the Department of State to inform General MacArthur of the composition of the mission and of its anticipated date of arrival in the United States and of the desire of the French Ambassador that the Department take the necessary steps to arrange for the trip of General Pechkoff and his suite to Japan. I told Mr. Winckler that we would inform him when we had any detailed information in reference to General Pechkoff's travel and that we would ask the War Department to inform General MacArthur of General Pechkoff's imminent arrival.

HB
JA:HBorton:mp

DCB NE Unit
mrd

MAY 28 1946

FILED CS/A

The Clift
SAN FRANCISCO

Return to

JA/HBorton

3.29

Dear Hugh:

file

I am sailing on the good ship
USS General HASE, a Navy transport.
Tomorrow? I don't know. The voyage
takes 14 days. Would you kindly
send a telegram to Max Bishop.

I assume you have perused, + perhaps
pondered, Bishop's despatch 310, March 16,
re the new set-up. He sent me a
copy & I have had letters from both
and Service about further conversations
with ^{Col.} Gost. There is to be no press

telegram means that ends across the
Reg/Info + 2d. Section. There will be
no political parties report - a job
for 1st section. I really + truly do
not understand what MacA wants me to do

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 3-2946

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(Japan) / 3-2946

CS/H

for unless he starts I am a protocol expert,
which I am not & these letters have
not improved my morale (if any) about re-
turning. We will be merely a liaison
& protocol section except for the weekly
pol. & econ telegram which we will have
to fight through G.2, Govt & E+S
sections. It seems obvious that our
~~present~~ personnel plans should be
modified. We shall, of course, need:
one competent Japan expert and
political reporter; one executive officer;
one officer to look after claims,
American property interests etc. (This
latter might be Edwards who can be
detailled to Yokohama & that is where
I propose to keep our citizenship work);
~~one~~ two officers to handle SCAP diplomatic
relations with neutral diplomats. I
do not think, in good conscience, we
can now ask for an economic consul tant

~~Review~~ The Japan report + political
reports is our chief need. → We want
The Clift hold Fearey under this
set up. Sturgeon + Bruner can
do the dip. liaison. Subals +
Blakemore can, I suppose, help with
the weekly report, interview Japs, make
contacts, etc.. It's a sorry business. It
looks clearly as if SCAP had devised
the whole thing purely with the view
of keeping the State Dept. representatives
completely out of the picture as far
as Japanese political matters and
implementation of directives is concerned
& secondly of reducing itself if at
much as possible of the burden of holding
the hands of the neutral diplomats.
Serres + Buskys seem to feel that
there is little justification for having
Class IV, II + I officers for the job as
outlined + I do not from here see

grounds for disagreement with them. The West
bureau looks like a game - with no fun
in it. I shall report as soon as I
can learn the actual score. I wish I
were an expert on Mexico or Morocco

Please remember me to all the
colleagues.

With kindest regards -

Yours ever

Tracy

I hope that JCV + others of the higher
authorities will read MB's dispatch

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 4/6/46

TO : FE/Mr. Vincent

FROM : JA: HBorton

SUBJECT: Position of Political Advisor. SCAP.

As a possible substitute course of
action, would you approve
my sending a personal letter to
George along the lines indicated?

OK ✓

H/S -
Do these
comments
impress you?
JcV

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 4/3

TO : Col Davis ✓

FROM :

SUBJECT:

you will note that the boys are viewing with alarm. Personally I wonder if a wait and see policy is indicated — or have you something constructive to suggest?
just

Don't call fire department because an official boy bought a box of matches. Wait at least until one match ignites. JED

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : FE - Mr. Vincent

DATE: April 2, 1946

FROM : JA - Mr. Borton *HB*SUBJECT: Reorganization of Office of the U.S. Political
Adviser as Staff Section SCAP

From Tokyo's despatches No. 310 and No. 315 of March 15 and 19 respectively, it appears that SCAP is proposing to limit and restrict the functions of the Political Adviser and his staff to an extent not envisaged either in letter or in spirit in the agreement reached by the War and State Departments as stated in our telegram No. 27 of January 8, 1946 to Tokyo and in J.C.S. 1638.

1. The designation of the Political Adviser as "Chief of the Foreign Affairs Section" who "would advise the Supreme Commander on political affairs of Japan outside the domestic field" would reduce the functions of the Political Adviser to matters of protocol and such limited relations as Japan may be permitted to maintain with foreign powers. The interest of the State Department in the formulation of long range American policy toward Japan will not be adequately served if such restrictions are to be placed upon our office in Tokyo. If analysis of internal Japanese political developments is to be prohibited, as is envisaged in the plan proposed by SCAP, there is little of value which the Political Adviser will be able to contribute toward the making of necessary policy decisions and he will have no opportunity to give advice on political developments within Japan.

2. The section of the order requiring all diplomatic or political representatives of foreign powers to approach SCAP through the "Foreign Affairs Section" might raise objections from the Allied Powers as suggested in the despatch. They might prefer to have direct dealings with SCAP; furthermore, the terms of reference establishing the Allied Council in Tokyo provide for direct dealings by the members of the Council with SCAP.

For 740.00119 - Control (Japan) / 3-2947

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3. The despatches from Tokyo indicate that SCAP's proposed order makes no specific reference to paragraph D of the War and State agreement whereby our officers may transmit a) reports and information to the State Department through SCAP and the War Department, and b) such "particular views and recommendations on a special subject" as may be requested by the Department. It would seem extremely likely that, if the order establishing the new section did not specifically provide for reporting as described in paragraph D of the agreement our Political Adviser and his staff would not be allowed to make such reports. In fact, the weekly report on political parties prepared at the written request of SCAP, is now to be discontinued as is the Office's regular press telegram.

4. After a careful analysis of the two despatches from Tokyo and of Mr. Acheson's personal letter, I would agree with Mr. Acheson that if the plan as presented to Mr. Bishop by Lieutenant Colonel Yost is carried out without important modifications, the Political Adviser and his staff will function only as a liaison and protocol section, the tasks which they will be asked to perform by SCAP will not justify an officer of ministerial rank in charge of the section, and Mr. Acheson will be placed in an extremely anomalous position.

In conclusion it is recommended that:

1. The Department approve the despatch of a telegram to Mr. Acheson to the effect that the Department fully expects any order issued by SCAP establishing the Foreign Affairs Section to be consonant with not only the letter but the spirit of the joint agreement;

2. The proposed order of SCAP should make no provision requiring all diplomatic or political representatives of foreign powers to approach SCAP through the "Foreign Affairs Section";

3. No order establishing the Foreign Affairs Section be accepted by our Political Adviser unless it specifically contains the provision in Paragraph D of the War-State agreement whereby the Department of State representatives can report to the Department through SCAP;

- 3 -

4. If the Political Adviser feels the proposed order of SCAP establishing the "Foreign Affairs Section" is inconsistent with the letter or spirit of the War-State agreement, he should be authorized to refuse to agree to SCAP's proposal until he has had time to consult with the Department.

JA:HBorton:mp

✓
C1: Mr Ackson
Dear Dean -
You may
want to send
this letter to
George about
his travels, more
prospective
than present.
Jc v.

*file - Alchman George
HB Oakfile
J. G. Carter*

Personal

April 8, 1946

Dear George:

I assure you that your letter of March 29, 1946 from San Francisco was read with much interest and that Bishop's two despatches from Tokyo, No. 310 and No. 315 were studied with great care. You will be interested to know that they were circulated immediately to Jim and John Carter. J.C. is sending a copy of this letter to Mr. Acheson.

Everyone agrees that it would be a grave mistake to limit your office to liaison and protocol functions and that any plan of SCAP for the establishment of a new section under your charge should give you and your staff all of the authority granted by the State-War agreement. However, since the reports of Max Bishop on the plan presented by Colonel Yost do not indicate whether such a plan had the approval of SCAP or even his Chief of Staff, it would seem premature for us to take a definite stand on the matter now. I would assume that if, after your arrival, you find that the plan as presented by Colonel Yost has not been materially changed, you would first wish to determine whether the plan has the approval of the Chief of Staff and are convinced that it is not in line with both the letter and spirit of the State-War agreement but arbitrarily restricts your functions and duties, you should notify us if you feel the plan is at fault and submit to the Department the full text of any SCAP proposal before it is finally approved. We

will

Mr. George Acheson,
U. S. Political Adviser,
General Headquarters, SCAP,
Tokyo, Japan.

FW 740.00119-Contact (Japan) / 3-29-49

- 2 -

will be glad to take the matter up directly with the War Department and to support you in your discussions on the matter with SCAP.

To put the matter another way, it would seem inadvisable to raise the issue at this point if the plan of Colonel Yost proves to be only a first and unofficial attempt to set up the new section. On the other hand, if the plan of Colonel Yost represents high level views in SCAP we should be so informed and will then be in a position to act.

I hope that you realize you have our complete backing and support and that you will be able to work out a satisfactory arrangement and that at the same time you will feel free to call on us for official support if you think that is necessary.

With the hope that you had a pleasant and restful voyage, and with personal greetings.

Cordially yours,

Hugh Borton

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING TELEGRAM

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
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Moscow via War

Dated March 29, 1946

Rec'd 12:40 a.m., 30th.



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IZVESTIYA March 29 publishes three-column editorial by V. Kudryavtsev "Japanese Militarism behind Screen of Shidehara Policy". Article opens with statement that on eve of Japanese aggression against China in 1929 to 1931 Shidehara was assigned delicate task of conducting diplomacy of "mask and maneuver" which was necessary to militarists as means of preventing aggravation of relations with Great Powers. It is, therefore, no accident that Shidehara has risen again after Japan's defeat since Japanese reactionaries who capitulated in hope of maintaining their own positions must now maneuver and must mask their real aims under slogan of democracy. This is second edition of "Shidehara policy".

Article goes on to say that guarantee against further Japanese aggression is consistent democratization in accordance with Potsdam Declaration. Directives thus far issued by occupation authorities have been directed, although not always consistently, toward liquidation of causes of Japan's aggressive policy and their implementation would constitute certain step forward toward fulfillment of capitulation terms. However, Shidehara Govt, while it accepts these directives in words, is in fact holding up their implementation by every means. MacArthur's directive

on liquidation

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-2- #992, Twenty-ninth, from Moscow via War

on liquidation of Zaibatsu has thus far not been carried out. In agriculture quasi-feudal landowners are dominant as ever and quite modest land reform envisaged in MacArthur's directive is not being implemented. So far all arrest of war criminals have in effect been made by American authorities and government's quite original interpretation of MacArthur's purge directive of January 4 is that officials themselves must voluntarily decide whether or not they are subject to purge. Ministers of Justice, Internal Affairs, Finance, Trade and Industry and Minister without Portfolio, Matsumoto remain at their posts although they come under scope of this directive. Thus, practically half of government consists of persons implicated in war crimes. At same time Shidehara categorically opposes inclusion in Cabinet and other state organs of representatives of democratic circles. All speeches of government representatives are in essence glorification of military police, monarchy, agitation for retention of "special" national policy "inherent only in Japan".

Major political organizations on which Shidehara reactionary Cabinet relies are Liberal and Progressive parties. Goal of Progressive Party is "preservation of Japan's national structure", head of Liberal Party was formerly leader of pro-German faction of Seiyukai Party. Liberal Party is becoming more and more a center of reaction as result of MacArthur's directive on disbanding of ultra-chauvinistic or reactionary organizations.

One means employed by Shidehara government in struggle against democratization is prevention of unity of democratic elements. Strike movement has recently taken on more definitely political character with workers and employees demanding establishment of worker control in enterprises and democratization of administration of major branches of production. Movement for united popular front of

all democratic

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-3- #992, Twenty-ninth, from Moscow via War

all democratic elements has developed at initiative of Communist Party -- only party in Japan free from old traditions and not strained by participation in reactionary regime. Initiative of Communist Party has been taken up by democratically-minded strata of Japanese population. Mass of local members of Socialist Party, in spite of resistance from Right Wing of leadership, is establishing practical unity of action. But ruling circles have opened struggle against united democratic front by creation of whole system of small ultra-chauvinist and monarchist organizations which exploit prejudice still existing among masses concerning divine origin of Emperor.

Shidehara Govt is rushing to consolidate existing situation legislatively in order to prevent democratic elements from having decisive influence in determining Japan's fate. For this reason it called a general parliamentary election for April 10 calculating that partisans of democratization would not by that time succeed in becoming force capable of predetermining election results. Electoral law is aimed at creating illusion of democratic transformation. It gives vote to women and lowers minimum age but remaining clauses are so reactionary that these democratic beginnings come to nothing. Clause Six will exclude millions of voters under conditions of impoverishment of masses, destruction of living space and mass migration in search of work. Clauses Twelve and Seventeen introduce limitations of permanent residence and literacy and Clause Thirty deprives of voting rights all who have been imprisoned or sent to hard labor for political crimes against monarchy and legalizes police interference in elections.

Reactionaries have also included in electoral law provocative clauses which challenge victor powers since they contain crying violation of capitulation terms. Thus Clause Nine states that among officials, who by

character

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character of their service may not take part in voting, are those in governor generalships of Korea, Formosa, Kwantung and South Sea Islands. It also mentions "localities in prefecture of Hokkaido" as areas where elections will not be held "for time being" owing to "special circumstances". Among latter areas are several which are located on Kuriles and are part of territory of USSR.

Thus electoral policy of Japanese Government is in crying contradiction in terms of Potsdam Declaration. No less crying violation is drafting of new constitution. Fact that war criminal Matsumoto was made president of commission for revision of constitution speaks for itself. Draft constitution elaborated without popular participation differs from absolutist 1899 constitution only in phraseology. No mention is made of sovereignty of people and Emperor is said in first article to be symbol of state and national unity. Draft gives Emperor right to revise constitution, to summon and dissolve Diet, to appoint Premier and ministers, etc. It retains Upper House under new name and gives it control over universally-elected Lower House. As to rights of people there are only meaningless phrases. Article containing Japan's renunciation of war means nothing if foundations of military police, monarchy remain untouched. Draft itself and method of its elaboration have evoked indignation among democratic public which demands that broad circles of people be drawn into drafting of constitution so that it will reflect new democratic tendencies which alone can deliver country from blind alley into which it has been led by domination of Monarchist reaction.

Situation developing in Japan indicates that Shidehara government is making every effort to restore power of Japanese imperialism under cover of democratic phraseology. Continued possession of power by such government threatens Japan's fulfillment of capitulation terms. Elections being prepared for April 10 have object of legalizing existing situation through formal fulfillment of democratization clause of Potsdam Declaration. Therefore, in interest of Japanese people elections must be postponed to permit formation of democratic government. Only under

such a

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such a government can election law be drafted which will guarantee genuine expression of will of majority and new constitution which will end domination of reactionary monarchy.

Sent Dept 992; repeated Chungking 50, Tokyo for ACTPOLAD 12 and Frankfurt.

MESSAGE UNSIGNED

JT

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OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, March 30, 1946

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SUBJECT: Report on the Organization of the Japanese Government

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The Officer in Charge has the honor to refer to this Office's despatch No. 251, February 13, 1946, and to forward, under separate cover, two copies of a two-volume report on the "Organization of the Japanese Government (as of March 1, 1946)" prepared by the Government Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. It is believed that this report will be of especial interest to the Division of Japanese Affairs and the Interim Research Intelligence Service.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FOREIGN REPORTING SERVICES
APR 10 1946

Accompaniment:

Report on the Organization of the Japanese Government (as of March 1, 1946), in two volumes. (Two copies only)

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