

~~at HIROSHIMA,~~

1919 March 1 ~~Was~~ Relieved as ~~the~~ chairman of the Preparatory Committee ~~for management~~ for the Establishment of the Branch Depot of the KURE Naval Powder Depot, ~~at HIROSHIMA,~~

The Naval Department.

" April 1 ~~Was~~ Appointed as ^{member of} ~~an~~ ~~investigating~~ ~~the~~ committee of the Naval Merits Investigation Committee

- Do -

" June 25 ~~Was~~ Appointed as member of the Investigation the Standardization Committee for ~~controlling over~~ the ~~of~~ Weights and Measures and Industrial Goods. Became lapsed on March 31, 1921.

~~abolished on the 31 of March 1921.~~

1919	Nov.	7	<p>Was Appointed a temporary member Temporary of the Investigation Committee of Finance and Economy.</p>	<p>The cabinet.</p>
"	"	18	<p>Was Appointed a chairman of the Investigation Committee of Iron Manufacturing and ship-building.</p>	<p>The Navy Ministry</p>
1920	Sept.	30	<p>The principal post became void in accordance with a Imperial Ordinance No. 440, came to effect on and after the 1st of October.</p>	

1920	Oct.	1	<p>Was Appointed the chief of the Naval Technical Construction Bureau.</p> <p>Department.</p>	The Cabinet.
"	"	11	<p>Was Appointed a member of the flag officers' conference.</p>	- do -
"	"	14	<p>Was Appointed a member of the Munitions conference.</p> <p>Became lapsed as abolished by Imperial Ordinance NO. 474 of the 30th of Oct. 1922.</p>	- do -
1921	May	30	<p>Was Granted a set of silver cups in <u>gold distinguished</u> recognition of services regarding the revision of the Army and <u>Naval Code of Criminal Procedure</u> Law.</p>	The Bureau of Decorations
1920	Nov.	1	<p>Was Decorated with the 1st Order of Merit with the Order of the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun in recognition of services in the incident</p>	

Page

27,006

As to the possibility of a peaceful advance into south FIC, SUGIYAMA clarified his views in July that Japan did not take FIC for an enemy and the advance was not a military occupation. He stated that it was a favorable chance for France to admit a peaceful advance on condition that they be convinced of the purpose of Japan. This would not be an easy task.

27,007

Early in July he learned that Britain might march into FIC beforehand since she knew Japan's intention. Anxiety would prevail if this caused any incident at the time of occupation. He believed that if Japan's attitude was just and fair and firm there would not be any trouble with the British armies. The invasion of north FIC by China at this time is a matter of great concern for the authorities of the Army and for the forces in south China and FIC. Early in July they learned * that three China divisions formerly stationed near the border had received an order to enter FIC. To meet this, the operations section made a secret study to reinforce one infantry regiment and to dispatch one division then in Canton. Early in 1941, the General Staff gave out information that Chinese forces amounting to four armies, or sixteen divisions, were stationed facing FIC, in Chinese territory adjacent to the northeastern border of FIC. At the end of July when the advance of troops into south FIC was put into effect, the Vice Chief of Staff and the Chief of Operations were urged by the Chief of Staff to promote the study.

27,008

The results of the investigation * were the preparations at the time were put into practice within the limits of the fixed plan established early in the year. They were studies in various fields of operations, defensive plans to meet a critical situation and new investigations and preparations for defending FIC on the principle of the mutual defense agreement. Detailed accounts of preparations were made within the established policy including training, equipment, supplies and sanitation. There was an urgent need to make up for the loss suffered in the China operation. The decision of July 2 and the French-Japanese cooperation had its aim in protecting that area from the U.S. and Britain. The matter had never been thought of in past operational plans. It was a new thing requiring totally different study and preparation.

27,009

The armed forces in FIC after the southern occupation amounted to one brigade and one flying corps * for north FIC and one division was assigned for defending FIC from invasion by the U.S., Britain and De Gaulle or other aggressions from China. In order not to interfere with the diplomatic negotiations, no other forces except airdrome engineers were stationed there. The General Staff left further

47

Battle,
1915-1920 and ~~was~~ granted

YEN 2,800.

August 27, 1947

DEFENSE - Division V - Pacific

TANAKA - Direct

Page

crisis with the U.S. and Britain, considerable increase was needed in all Army quarters for defensive purposes in this direction amounting to at least a little more than ten divisions in the early period. They, therefore, should have had prepared about ten divisions for China, a little more than twenty for the Soviet and a few in reserve for Imperial Headquarters. The Chief of Staff recognized that the shortage of forces and materials would be much more acute and such a war would compel Japan to leave the China incident completely fruitless.

26,993

26,994

He concluded that Japan should keep up a policy of averting a wholesale war both politically and strategically. * The witness understood that the War Minister had agreed with the Chief. * In an interview with the Vice Chief of Staff, the question was how the strategy of Japan would be affected by the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance. A discussion was held in November 1940. The Vice Chief's view was that Japan should by every means avert any resort to arms insofar as justice and prestige could be maintained, however, imminent the compulsion of the pact. The witness agreed.

26,995

This conclusion was reached from a purely strategic point of view. The decision of resorting to arms or not was left to state policy. The question of whether or not the U.S. was attacked was a matter of future judgment to be decided in relation with the circumstances at that time from a fair and independent view. They must keep up this attitude * and make due judgment in view of the whole destiny of Japan. If Japan were attacked by the U.S., Germany would give military aid of some sort. However, since Germany was absorbed in the European war and her military power was not limitless and in view of the fact that Germany was not a big naval power and was remote from Eastern Asia, the Army could not expect strategic aid from Germany.

26,996

If Germany was attacked by the U.S., Japan would be obliged to aid by arms. She could not afford to engage in military operations against the U.S. solely to aid Germany. She had to devote herself to independent operations to keep a general national defense. In case of a war between the U.S. and Germany, they should find some measures to meet the circumstances, especially when the Japanese Army had no surplus force. * The Chief of Staff approved this conclusion and in an agreement with the Vice Chief made clear that the 1941 peacetime operations should be established independently, and should not be restricted or given any support from outside and should not be influenced in strategy by the Tripartite Pact. The witness recognized that the preparations for the 1941 peacetime operations plans were lacking in thoroughness

1920 Nov. 1 Decorated with the War Medal,
 1914-20

1922 Jan. 23 Appointed Government commissioner for matters under the jurisdiction of the Navy Ministry Cabinet

1922 Jan. 25 Appointed ~~Ordered~~ Acting ~~Navy~~ Vice-minister of the Navy while IDE Kenji, ~~Navy~~ Vice-Minister of the Navy has been confined to sick-bed Navy Ministry

1920 Nov. 1 Decorated with the War Victory Medal in accordance with the War Victory Medal Ordinance Bureau of Illustration

1922 Nov. 18 Relieved as temporary member of the Temporary Finance and Economic Investigation Committee of Cabinet

1923 Feb. 10 Promoted to the Senior Grade of Confessed with the 4th Court Rank, Senior Grade Imperial Household Ministry

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Work Order Desk

Apr.	18	Appointed chairman Ordered chief of the Special	
		Aviation Inquiry Committee	Navy Ministry
May	25	Relieved of current post and appointed full-time member of	
		Flag-Officers' the Council of Admirals	"
"	"	Appointed Navy Vice-Minister of the Navy	Cabinet
"	"	Promoted to the 1st Rank of the higher civil service	"
"	"	Appointed Ordered member of the Naval	
		Merits Investigation Committee	Navy Ministry
"	"	Appointed chairman Ordered chief of the Inquiry	
		Committee on the Conferment of the 1914-1920 War Medal	"
May	25	Appointed chairman Ordered chief of the Inquiry	
		Committee on the Conferment of the the Victory-Medal	"

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_____ Work Order Desk

May 30. Appointed member of the Central
 Statistics Committee, the ~~post~~
~~of membership~~ ^{became lapsed} ~~abolished~~ on June 11, 1924 Cabinet

" " Appointed member of the
 State Property Inquiry Committee,
 the ~~post of membership~~ ^{abolished}
 June 11, 1924 ^{becoming lapsed on}

June 4 Appointed member of the
 Regulations Adjustment Committee,
 becoming lapsed on,
 the ~~post of members~~ ^{hip} ~~abolished~~ June
 11, 1924

June 5 Appointed member of the
 Harbor Inquiry Committee,
 becoming lapsed on
 the ~~post of membership~~ ~~abolished~~
 June 11, 1924

" " Appointed member of the

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_____ Work Order Desk

Road Council.

Abolished on Apr. 17, 1924 in accordance with Imperial Ordinance No. 90

Appointed member of the Central City Planning Committee

June 7 Appointed member of the

Peers' School Board of Trustees

Imperial Household Ministry

June 4 Appointed member of the

Railway Conference, its membership becoming lapsed on ~~Abolished~~ June 11, 1924.

Cabinet

June 13 Appointed member of the

Maritime Affairs Committee.

Abolished on Apr. 17, 1924, in accordance with Imperial Ordinance No. 90

"

July 25 Appointed chairman, ~~Ordered~~ chief of the Inquiry

Committee on the Naval Educational System

Navy Ministry

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Work Order Desk

Sept 5
 Appointed chairman
~~Ordered chief~~ of the Naval
 Committee on the Earthquake Relief
 Work

Navy
Ministry

1923 Oct. 1 The Naval Committee on the Earthquake
 Relief Work ^{was} abolished in accordance
 with Paragraph 4 of Secretariat No. 3055.

Oct. 18 Appointed councillor to
 the ~~Imperial City~~ Metropolitan
 Reconstruction
 Board.

Abolished on Feb. 23, 1924, in accordance
 with Imperial Ordinance No. 25

Cabinet

Dec. 10 Appointed Government commi-
 ssioner for matters under
 the jurisdiction of the Navy
 Ministry

"

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Work Order Desk

57
1

Translated by T. AZUMA

Dec. 22 Ordered to ~~proceed to CHINA and~~ LIBERIA.Navy
Ministry" 25 Appointed government commissioner Cabinet
of ~~the~~ ^{matters} affairs under the

jurisdiction of the Navy Ministry.

1924 Feb. 2 Appointed member of the Committee -"

on Planning Special City,
becoming lapsed
membership ~~lapsed~~ on

June 11, 1924.

Apr. 19 Reported ^{the} Transfer of ~~his~~ permanent

domicile to the urban

Prefecture of TOKYO.

Jun. 10 ~~Abolishing~~ The Naval Educational
System ~~Investigation Committee~~

was abolished.

proceed

Page

26917 His chief stated it was not a question of going to war because they were sure of success or staying out of it because they were not. * They had to be ready for any eventuality for the sake of self-defense. They were not prepared for a war of their choice.

Following this warning, they prepared military operational plans for a self-defensive war, assuming it might occur. About the beginning of September, a month after occupation of South FIC, they began to formulate plans with a view to a possibility of conflict with the four powers, which ultimately developed into the Pacific War.

DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SHIMANOCHI,
Counsel for OSHIMA.

26919 * Asked whether he was connected with drafting operations plans of the Navy General Staff, the witness said he was principally in charge of air operations, but in modern warfare there were hardly any operations that did not include air operations, and he was therefore associated with all operations of every type.

26920 * He stated that between January and May, 1941, the Operations Section of the Navy Staff did not draft plans for soon carrying out attacks on Singapore, Hong Kong, and the Philippines, and was not making preparations for them.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. COMYNS-CARR.

26921 The attention of the Tribunal was called to exhibits 527 and 528, 552, 576, 536, 537, and 809. * The witness stated that it was not until after the Imperial Conference of December 6 that plans for preparations were made against the U. S., Britain, and the NEI.

26922 * He had no clear recollection that in January, 1941, there was an aerial reconnaissance and map prepared of the coast of northeast Malaya, including Kotabharu. His recollection was a very faint one, about some aerial reconnaissance having been conducted, but he did not recollect any map being made. In the past, the Navy had no operations plans for defense against Britain, and for that reason data for such operations were extremely incomplete. peacetime defense plans against Britain were studied from about November 1940, as part of an over-all defense plan. * Asked whether he called invasion of a distant country a defensive plan, he stated that if the British establish a super naval base close to Japan and come into Japanese home waters and that if Japan's line of communications with the south were cut off, that would be a very serious question.

1924 Jun 11	Promoted to Admiral.	Cabinet
"	Relieved of ^{the} current post as the Town	--
"	request.	The Navy Ministry
"	Relieved of ^{the} current post.	Direct Imperial
"	Appointed Supreme War Council. (Board of Trustees of	Appointment
"	27 Relieved as member of the Peers'	Imperial Household Ministry
"	School Conference.	Navy Ministry
27 Sep 1	Appointed Judge of the grand naval	Navy Ministry
"	manoeuvre of 1924.	
"	Oct. 1 The form of commission was	
"	revised by Navy, Personnel Affairs No. 79.	
"	Dec. 1 Relieved of ^{the} current post.	--
"	Appointed Commander in Chief (Commander-in-chief of	Direct Imperial Conferment
"	1st Fleet and concurrently the Com-	

Page

26946 When asked why FIC needed stabilizing, he stated that Japan was making every effort to successfully conclude the China Incident. Any disturbance in the south would have an unfavorable effect on that solution. It was Japan's idea for a long time before to maintain the stability of East Asia. Thirdly, rice and other foodstuffs imported from FIC, would be unavailable if conditions were unsettled there.
* These were very necessary for Japan.

As War Minister, he did think that FIC would be militarily useful in connection with the China Incident, but from the military point of view, there was a practical relation so far as north FIC was concerned. The supply route from north FIC was of aid to the Chinese, and Japan wanted militarily to establish air bases in north FIC so as to cut off the route from Burma. However, since French power had declined, there was required the stationing of troops not only in north FIC but also in the central and southern parts for maintaining stability.

26947 Asked whether troops in FIC would not have been of assistance in case of war between England, U. S., or Holland, TOJO stated that economic and military pressure from those countries was increasing.
* The stationing of troops was chiefly to maintain stability, but it did assist the China operations and help make peaceful commerce possible. He believed that the stationing of troops was an appropriate measure of national defense.

From exhibit 809, it was stated that available references documenting Japanese preparations were yet fragmentary, especially on specialized training operations in tropical warfare, which were reported to have taken place in the summer and fall of 1941. As the day of opening hostilities approached, pertinent references grow plentiful, until in November 1941 it is possible to piece together a fairly comprehensive picture of the military preparations.

26948 It was pointed out that according to the same exhibit, no general mobilization took place until October 1941.

With respect to the land operation practice, this document stated that little, if any, military advantage resulted, and it would appear that they had been intended solely for training.

		lined Fleet.	
1925 Jan. 31	Transferred to the MUTSU because of		1st Fleet
	the change of the flag-ship.		
Feb. 28	Promoted to Conferred the junior grade of the		Imperial Household Ministry
	3rd Court Rank.		
Apr. 28	Transferred to the YAMASHIRO		1st Fleet
	because of ^{the} change of the flag-ship.		
Jul. 2	Transferred to the MUTSU because of		"
	the change of the flag-ship.		
Oct. 15	Transferred to the YAMASHIRO		"
	because of the change of the flag-ship.		
Mar. 1	Granted a sum of 1,200 yen ^{for} on Navy Ministry		
	the account of his services rendered relating to		

Page

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF SATO, TAKEGORO.

26893

The witness stated he lived in Tokyo, and was secretary to the Archives Section, Secretariat of the Foreign Ministry. He identified exhibit No. 3019 as his affidavit and verified it. The affidavit stated * that on October 2, 1946, the witness issued a certificate concerning the authenticity and source of the document entitled "Outline of the Foreign Policies of the Japanese Empire" dated September 28, 1940, being exhibit No. 837-A. This document is in a file with three other documents under a cover entitled "Foreign Policies of the Japanese Empire". His certificate does not cover the other three documents.

26894

One of the three documents entitled "Tentative Draft of Japan's policies toward the southern regions", dated October 4, 1940, has no name of its compiler and bears no seal or signatures of the persons concerned or who examined the documents. It is not clear whether the original was prepared by the Foreign Ministry.

26896

* The witness stated that the original exhibit which he had examined contained four separate documents. The certificate he made on October 2 covers the document entitled "Outline of Foreign Policies of the Japanese Empire". * The document mentioned in his affidavit is the one called "Tentative Draft of Japanese Policies Toward the Southern Regions", October 4, 1940. He did not think there was any difference between documents No. 1 and 2.

26897

26898

* In the Foreign Office, official documents are documents filed in the Foreign Office, and any documents whose contents have something to do with the activities of the Foreign Office as a government organ are called official. Document No. 1 bears the seal "Very Secret" but has no signatures, although there are interlineations. Document No. 2 has no signatures or marking, and has only the seal "Secret".

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TAVENNER.

26901

26902

26903

* The witness stated that he had shown beforehand the three certificates introduced into evidence the day before. They were signed by his superior, HAYASHI, whom he assisted. * He thought them accurate. All four documents are documents of the Foreign Office. The other three documents also bear the seal "Very Secret". Each page of the document is on Foreign Office stationery, and each page contains the Japanese equivalent of the words "Foreign Office". There is an index which contains the topic and refers to the documents by numbers. The documents themselves do not bear numbers, but each separating sheet contains the number of the respective documents.

in) the affairs concerning the

despatch of troops to

Russian territory.

1925 Dec. 1 Transferred to the NAGATO because of 1st Fleet

the change of the flag-ship.

1926 Dec. 10 Relieved of ^{the} current and ^{the} concurrent ^{Navy} Ministry

posts.

" " Appointed ^{ant} Commander in-chief ^{Station} of the YOKOSUKA Naval District. ^{Direct} Imperial Appointment

" " Appointed concurrently ^{Navy} member Ministry of the Board of Admirals.

1927 Apr. 20 Relieved of ^{the} current and ^{the} concurrent " posts.

" " " Appointed Navy Minister. ^{Cabinet}

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
August 27, 1947
DEFENSE - Division V - Pacific
Naval Preparations

page 4130

Page

When asked why FIC needed stabilizing, he stated that Japan was making every effort to successfully conclude the China Incident. Any disturbance in the south would have an unfavorable effect on that solution. It was Japan's idea for a long time before to maintain the stability of East Asia. Thirdly, rice and other foodstuffs imported from FIC, would be unavailable if conditions were unsettled there.

26946 * These were very necessary for Japan.

As War Minister, he did think that FIC would be militarily useful in connection with the China Incident, but from the military point of view, there was a practical relation so far as north FIC was concerned. The supply route from north FIC was of aid to the Chinese, and Japan wanted militarily to establish air bases in north FIC so as to cut off the route from Burma. However, since French power had declined, there was required the stationing of troops not only in north FIC but also in the central and southern parts for maintaining stability.

26947 Asked whether troops in FIC would not have been of assistance in case of war between England, U. S., or Holland, TOJO stated that economic and military pressure from those countries was increasing. * The stationing of troops was chiefly to maintain stability, but it did assist the China operations and help make peaceful commerce possible. He believed that the stationing of troops was an appropriate measure of national defense.

From exhibit 809, it was stated that available references documenting Japanese preparations were yet fragmentary, especially on specialized training operations in tropical warfare, which were reported to have taken place in the summer and fall of 1941. As the day of opening hostilities approached, pertinent references grow plentiful, until in November 1941 it is possible to piece together a fairly comprehensive picture of the military preparations.

26948 It was pointed out that according to the same exhibit, no general mobilization took place until October 1941.

With respect to the land operation practice, this document stated that little, if any, military advantage resulted, and it would appear that they had been intended solely for training.

Arrived at ~~the~~ post on April 21

Imperial Household Ministry

1927 Dec. 15 Promoted to ~~conferred~~ the senior grade of the 3rd Court Rank.

Bureau of Decorations

1928 May 29 Got Imperial sanction of receiving

and wearing of the Order of the "Chevalier, Virtuti Militari" to be ~~the~~ ~~Stratice~~ ~~Virtute~~ Military

which had ~~been~~ given by ^{the} Polish Government

Government

Ordered ~~to be~~ a member of the Emperor's Cabinet
Oct. 29 Assigned to attend on the Imperial ~~Imperial~~ in his tour for the Coronation.
His

Nov 5 Ordered to ~~serve~~ ^{come out of mourning and} in his office. ~~resume~~ ^{the} office after his term of mourning.

Ordered to appear at office after mourning.

Page

26946 When asked why FIC needed stabilizing, he stated that Japan was making every effort to successfully conclude the China Incident. Any disturbance in the south would have an unfavorable effect on that solution. It was Japan's idea for a long time before to maintain the stability of East Asia. Thirdly, rice and other foodstuffs imported from FIC, would be unavailable if conditions were unsettled there.
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With respect to the land operation practice, this document stated that little, if any, military advantage resulted, and it would appear that they had been intended solely for training.

1928 Nov. 10

Decorated with the ^{(Medal in} ~~Grand~~
~~Ceremonial~~ Commemoration of
the Imperial Enthronement
~~Medal~~ in accordance with
Imperial Ordinance No. 188 of 1928

Bureau of Decorations

1929 July 2

Relieved of ^{the} current post
at ~~own~~ request

Cabinet

" "

Appointed Supreme War
Councillor.

Dec. 11

Appointed Councillor.

1930 Jan. 28

Got ^{the} Imperial sanction of

receiving and wearing the

Order of " Knight Grand Cross

Victoria " given by the King

~~Emperor~~ of Great Britain

Bureau of Decorations

Mar. 4

Got Imperial sanction of
receiving and wearing the

Bureau of Decorations

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			4th grade of, White Order of Naval Merit 1st class given by the ^{King} Emperor of Spain	"
1930	June	20	Appointed ^{Special} Inspector General	Navy Ministry
1930	Dec.	5	Decorated with the ^{Medal} Imperial City Reconstruction ⁱⁿ Commemoration of the Reconstruction of the Metropolis, Medal in accordance with Imperial Ordinance No. 148 of 1930.	Bureau of Decorations
1932	Mar.	28	Appointed ^{chairman} chief of the Committee for the Special Grand Festival of the Yasukuni Shrine of April, 1932	Navy Ministry
	May	26	Appointed Navy Minister. Arrived at the post on May 26	Cabinet
"	"	"	Relieved of ^{the} current post	Navy Ministry
June	1		Promoted to the Junior Grade of Conferred with the 2nd Court Rank, Senior Grade	Imperial Household Ministry

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Work Order Desk

1932 Aug. 4

Appointed member of the
Committee for the Compilation of
(the Meiji Restoration) Historical
Materials of 2

Cabinet

Aug. 18

Appointed chairman
~~Ordered chief~~ of the Inquiry
Committee on Naval Merits.

Navy
Ministry

1933 Jan. 9

Relieved of ^{the} current post at
own request.

Cabinet

"

Placed on the waiting list.
~~Ordered to await orders~~

Navy
Ministry

Jan. 21

Decorated with the Grand Cordon
Imperial Order of the
of the Rising Sun with the
Paulownia Flower.

Bureau
of Decorations

"

~~Ordered to be transferred to~~
the second reserve.

Navy
Ministry

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Work Order Desk

1933

Jan 26

Specialy granted the award of

~~given the special prize of~~

11,000 yon because of diligense

in duties

Yong Ministry

May 30

Get the Imperial sanction

of receiving and wearing the order

"Grand Officier de l'Ordre National

de la Legion d'Honneur" *
* given by the French government.

Appointed Prime Minister and

concurrently Minister of Overseas

Affairs

Cabinet

Oct 25

Relieved of concurrent post

"

Mar 1

Get the Imperial sanction of

receiving and wearing the

Empire Foundation Service Medal

given by the Emperor of Manchukuo

Bureau of

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1935	Sept.	9	Concurrently appointed Minister of Communications.	Cabinet
	Sept.	12	Relieved of ^{the} concurrent post.	"
1934	Apr.	29	Decorated with the War Medal in accordance with the 1931-34 War Medal Ordinance.	Bureau of Decoration
1935	Sept.	21	Got the Imperial Sanction of receiving and wearing the Medal in commemoration of the Emperor of Manchoukoo's visit to Japan given by Him.	"
1936	Mar.	9	Relieved of ^{the} current post at own request.	Cabinet
1934	May	9	Got the Imperial Sanction of receiving	

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1st Order of the
and wearing the Grand Cordon
of the Dragon Ray ~~of the~~

given by the Emperor of Manchoukuo Bureau
of
Decorations

1937 Apr. 29

Specially granted the
privileges of former post.

1938 Jan. 21

Placed on the retired list. Navy
Ministry

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Work Order Desk

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

9 January 1948

Dear Mr. Keenan,

Blakeney announced in court that he still had a witness in the TOGO case who was too sick to attend. Sir William asked him if he had a doctor's certificate, and Blakeney replied that he had one dated several days ago, but that he thought he could have his witness in court Monday. The witness is OKADA, and I am told by Mr. Sutton and Mr. Horwitz that you desire to cross-examine him.

After court adjourned, two of the defense attorneys asked me why I did not explain to the Tribunal the reason for the absence of OKADA. I said I would explain if he would give me the reasons, and then they decided to tell me the situation, and this is what they said: That a doctor's certificate had been received; that the witness was too ill to leave his home either yesterday or day before; that one of the attorneys went to his home and was told by his family that he was over at Atami as the guest of Mr. Keenan. There was no indication that any attempt would be made to embarrass you in any manner, but they are determined now to do everything that can be done to produce this witness. If I understood Blakeney correctly, he proposes to go out to the home of OKADA armed with proper process of the court and bring OKADA in.

I wanted you to know the angles abovementioned as well as to inform you that OKADA is likely to be produced Monday. There are several situations that could arise. If you have decided not to cross-examine him and were to call Blakeney and advise him as to that fact, there would be no reason to produce the witness and the affidavit could be read in his absence. If, on the other hand, you desire to cross-examine him, I wanted you to have the information at the earliest possible time so that you can make your arrangements accordingly. Not knowing of the importance of the point you desire to cross-examine on, I cannot make any suggestion as to whether or not it is better under all the circumstances to waive cross-examination.

Sincerely yours,

withheld

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al.



A F F I D A V I T

OKADA KEISUKE

He is all

Mr. Keisuke wants a
Cross Examination

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I came to know Mr. Tōgō Shigenori around 1934, when I was Premier and he was Director of the European-Asiatic Bureau of the Foreign Ministry. Since then I have talked with Mr. Tōgō on various occasions, and exchanged views on various problems. Especially after he became Foreign Minister in the Tōjō Cabinet in October 1941 there was frequent contact between him and me directly and indirectly not only while he was Foreign Minister but even after he resigned from the ministership. In April 1945, when Mr. Tōgō was entering the Suzuki Cabinet, he called on me to explain his position and requested my opinion.

2. At the time of the London Naval Disarmament Conference of 1934-1935 I was Premier and Mr. Tōgō was Director of the European-Asiatic Bureau of the Foreign Ministry. I learned at that time from the officers concerned that Mr. Tōgō was opposed to the position of the Navy and carried on heated arguments with the Navy over such problems as the common upper limit, the abrogation of the Washington Treaty, and the exchange of information on naval ship-building.

3. Toward the end of October 1941, Foreign Minister Tōgō urged that, as the opinion of the Navy was unyielding and it was likely that a Japanese-American war would ensue if things were left alone, I as a veteran of the Navy should contribute my efforts promptly to moderate the opinion of the Navy. Thereupon, I immediately requested Admirals Kobayashi Seizō and Toyoda Teijirō to come to my house, and conferred with them. I do not remember the result.

4. I have long recognized the importance of diplomatic affairs, and it has been my belief that the choice of Foreign Minister was the most important next to that of Premier. Especially after the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance in September 1940, it was my sincere desire to have a Foreign Minister who was a lover of peace and would be earnest in negotiations with the United States, in order that we might go through that critical period without becoming entangled in the war. After deliberation I came to the conclusion that Mr. Tōgō was the best, and I talked about it to my friends and acquaintances. Especially in October 1941, immediately before the establishment of the

Tōjō Cabinet, I told Lord Keeper Kido this. I recommended Mr. Tōgō because I had known that Mr. Tōgō, since the time when he was Director of the European-Asiatic Bureau, had entertained moderate opinions and favored international cooperation over such matters as European and American questions, the China question and the disarmament problem; that after he became Ambassador he had been opposed to the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact or the Tripartite Alliance, even though he was stationed in Germany; and that after he had returned from the Soviet Union he had been keenly interested in the success of the Japanese-American negotiations. When the Tōjō Cabinet was organized, Mr. Tōgō insisted that he could not accept the post of Foreign Minister unless the new Cabinet would strive for the success of the Japanese-American negotiations. He resigned from the post on account of his opposition to the establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry. Thereafter it was his sincere desire that the war should be terminated as soon as possible, and when the Suzuki Cabinet was formed, he contended strongly for the prompt ending of the war and entered the cabinet on that condition. These instances show how intense is Mr. Tōgō's aspiration for peace.

5. After Mr. Tōgō resigned from the Foreign Ministership in the autumn of 1942, he often related to me that the policy of war-direction of the Tōjō Cabinet was not proper and that therefore the continuation of the cabinet was not in the interest of the country nor favorable for the termination of the war.

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Okada Keisuke (Seal)

On this 2nd day of January, 1947

At Tokyo

Deponent Okada Keisuke (seal)

I, Nishi Haruhiko, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal hereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the Defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko

Tokyo
2 January 1947