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Interrogation

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CONTINUED INTERROGATION

- of -

SHIMADA, Shigetaro (Admiral)

Date and Time: 31 January 1946
Place : Sugamo Prison
Present : Admiral SHIMADA, Shigetaro
John Darsey, Esq., Interrogator
T/3 Rickey Yamaguchi, Interpreter
Miss Evelyn Cordell, Stenographer

- Q. On yesterday we were talking about the circumstances and conditions which existed in Manchuria immediately prior to September 1931. Will you tell us briefly and in your own way just what you consider to have created the Mukden Incident on the 17th of September, 1931?
- A. To begin with the Manchurian Incident, it occurred combustibly as a result of many instances of the more or less outrageous oppressions brought down on the Japanese nationals, causing an extreme irritation of feeling between the Japanese and the Manchurians. Chiang Hsueh Liang, son of Chang about which we talked on yesterday, was in power in Manchuria. It should be noted that the Japanese power in Manchuria had materiall expanded after having defeated the encroachment of Russia in Asia in Japan's self defense. In other words, it occurred when Chang Hsueh-Liang thoughtlessly attempted to take away the Japanese prerogative acquired with blood-shed in war against Russia. As for Japan, it was proper and obvious that she must endeavor to maintain safety and security of the rights of Japan for her future.
- Q. Where is your diary?
- A. It was burned up by bombs in May of last year.
- Q. Have you written any memoirs?
- A. No, I have none.
- Q. Do you have any written documents, written evidence of your public career?
- A. I lost it all by fire during the war.
- Q. Everything was burned up?
- A. Everything.
- Q. You don't have any records?
- A. No, I wrote down something especially during my career as Navy Minister, but it was all burned up and I feel very inconvenienced.

(Shimada, cont'd)

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- Q. Now, you say that Japan, at the cost of serious blood-shed in the war with Russia, acquired certain rights and privileges in Manchuria; is that right?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And that Japan naturally desired to develop and expand those rights?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And that during the regime of Marshall Chang Tso-Lin, as he gradually grew stronger, Japan's efforts to develop its rights in Manchuria became prejudiced; is that right?
- A. In some points we coincided with Chang, although he utilized Japanese power for himself and to expand and develop himself; but we did not coincide with him when he leaned to the Central Government in China. Finally he became generalissimo of entire China and moved to Peiping.
- Q. Now, in the beginning of Chang's career in Manchuria Japan was able, because of his need for Japan's support, to keep his policies in line with the interests of Japan, wasn't it?
- A. Yes; also for Japan Chang was very convenient.
- Q. But as Chang began to develop strength and influence on his own and began to become sympathetic with the Central Government in China, conflict of interest developed between Chang and Japan, didn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. In the last years of Marshall Chang's regime he developed a policy which Japan considered to materially limit its rights and privileges in Manchuria, didn't he?
- A. I don't know quite well that program, but I think it was something like that.
- Q. Japan felt that Chang should have desisted from lending any support to the Central Government, didn't it?

(Shimada, cont'd)

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- A. I don't know quite well in that point.
- Q. In any event Japan didn't like his leaning toward the central China government, did it?
- A. During that time Japan did not have much fear that Chang had very much leaning toward China, because during those times China was in a state of chaos, and there were few laws in central China itself and they made it very hard for Chang to go and establish himself in central China.
- Q. But after he defeated Chang Feng he became chief of the north militarists with the title of Great Marshall, didn't he?
- A. Yes.
- Q. That was about 1927 or 1928?
- A. Yes, something like that, but that means only in the northern part of China.
- Q. Now, it was then that Japan began to worry about Chang, his leadership and the Central Government, insofar as their rights and interests in Manchuria were concerned, wasn't it?
- A. I think by and by they did worry about Chang.
- Q. Now, in 1928 Chang suffered defeat at the hands of Kuomintang's army in the north, didn't he; that is, the army representing the government of Dr. Sun?
- A. Perhaps; there were many battles in China at that time, and this may possibly be true.
- Q. And didn't Japan advise him then to withdraw into Manchuria and to confine his efforts to the development of Manchuria?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, Marshall Chang didn't want to do this at first, did he?
- A. I don't know about that point.

(Shimada, cont'd)

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- Q. In any event, he followed Japan's advice and came to Manchuria and left Peking for Manchuria in June of 1928, didn't he?
- A. Yes.
- Q. He arrived in Mukden and was killed the next day for an explosion which wrecked his train, didn't he?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, it was the representatives of the very government which was urging him to leave China alone and to concentrate his efforts in Manchuria who were responsible for his death, wasn't it?
- A. I don't know in that point; I just know his death was caused by an explosion.
- Q. Don't you know that the Japanese caused the explosion?
- A. I don't think so. There were many movements in China at that time. Of course, Chang was a big man then; General Doihara knows very well about those matters in China. There were many persons who wished to kill Chang.
- Q. What is this General's name?
- A. General Doihara.
- Q. Sometimes he was advisor to Chang, wasn't he?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Was he a Japanese advisor?
- A. Yes. Chang always had a Japanese advisor. At the time of the explosion the Japanese advisor was also killed.
- Q. Where was General Doihara at the time of this explosion?
- A. I don't know, but I think at that time he was in Japan.
- Q. From what you have learned about it, what is your opinion as to who connived to bring about this explosion in which General Chang was killed?

(Shimada, cont'd)

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- A. I don't know; I think it was very skillfully planned. The train passed over the bridge, and the explosion occurred under the bridge. Therefore, it must have been very skillfully planned to have been successful, but as to who did it I don't know.
- Q. Now, you have said Japan maintained advisors all through the years to Marshall Chang?
- A. Yes.
- Q. It was their purpose and policy to endeavor to persuade Chang to collaborate with Japan's efforts to develop Manchuria rather than to lend any support to a Central Government in China, wasn't it?
- A. I think so.
- Q. And you say those advisors constantly tried to persuade Chang to collaborate with Japan in its program of developing its rights in Manchuria, didn't they?
- A. From the Japanese point of view it may be so, but Chang was the employer, and the advisors just worked for him. These advisors were not sent from Japan.
- Q. Where did the advisors come from?
- A. I think some of the advisors were from the Army as well as from civilians in Japan, and there may have also been advisors from other countries.
- Q. The Japanese advisors were loyal Japanese subjects, weren't they?
- A. Yes.
- Q. After the death of Marshall Chang Tso-Lin his son, Chang Hsueh-Liang, became the ruler of Manchuria, didn't he?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, he had the same national aspirations for a strong Central Government in China which his father had, didn't he?
- A. I think so.

(Shimada, cont'd)

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- Q. And he wanted to lend support of the unification of the powers in China, didn't he?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, when Marshall Chang's son came into power with those policies Japan became quite concerned about such influences penetrating into Manchuria, didn't it?
- A. I don't know about that.
- Q. You know that Japan strongly advised him not to lend support to a Central Government in China, don't you?
- A. I don't know about that.
- Q. Anyway, his relations with the Central Government became greater and closer, didn't they?
- A. It may be so; I don't know quite well.
- Q. You know that in December of 1928 he accepted the national flag and declared his allegiance to the Central Government of China, don't you?
- A. This is the first time I have heard about that.
- Q. He was made Commander-in-Chief of the Northeastern Army, wasn't he?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And he was confirmed as Chief of the administration of Manchuria with the addition of Jehol, part of inner Manchuria, wasn't he?
- A. It may be so.
- Q. Don't you know that he was confirmed as the administrator.
- A. I don't remember.
- Q. You think so, don't you?
- A. It may be so; I don't know quite well.

(Shimada, cont'd)

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- Q. The Committee system of government was introduced and the Kuomintang Headquarters were established, weren't they?
- A. Yes.
- Q. The projection of the influence of the Central Government in this manner into Manchuria created a great deal of concern on the part of Japan as to its rights and privileges in Manchuria, didn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And this union of Manchuria with the Central Government resulted in publications and propaganda on the part of the China Central Government supporting a program of the recovery of lost sovereign rights and the abolition of inequitable treaties with respect to Manchuria, didn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Under these circumstances Japan began to increase its military forces in Manchuria, didn't it?
- A. I don't know quite well; I think that it could not have been possible, because according to the peace treaties there should have been only a certain amount of men stationed there at that time.
- Q. Japan violated every peace treaty to which it was a party in connection with Manchuria and the China Incident, didn't it?
- A. I don't think so.
- Q. Where was the Kwantung Army located at this time?
- A. I don't know quite well, but in every station I think, and also in the Kwantung territory, Dairen, Port Arthur, and every main station along the railroad.

(Shimada, cont'd)

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- Q. Now, during this period isn't it a fact that the reason Marshall Chang accepted Japan's support was because of his fear of Russia in the North?
- A. I don't remember quite well, but it may be so.
- Q. Japan resented the opening of railways by Marshall Chang in Manchuria, didn't it?
- A. I don't know quite well.
- Q. Now, isn't it a fact that this difference in point of view between the China Central Government and Japan with respect to Japan's program in Manchuria brought about the Manchurian Incident on September 18, 1931?
- A. That was the main cause to start the anti-feeling between both countries.
- Q. And it resulted in this outbreak of hostilities on September 18, 1931, didn't it?
- A. As I said before, yes; I read in the newspaper that the Manchurian Incident was brought about like that.
- Q. All of the Japanese forces in Manchuria and some of those in Korea were brought into action simultaneously on the night of September 18, 1931, over the whole of South Manchuria Railway area from Changchung to Port Arthur?
- A. Yes.
- Q. The marshalling of troops over an area that large couldn't have been accomplished unless it had been anticipated by the leaders in charge of the troops, could it?
- A. At that time the situation was very irritated, and therefore the commanding officers must always be prepared.
- Q. Japan immediately occupied all of the principal points in Manchuria, didn't it?
- A. Yes.

((Shimada, cont'd)

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- Q. Now, when hostilities broke out in Manchuria with the Mukden Incident on September 18, 1931, where were you stationed?
- A. I was on board as Chief of Staff of the combined fleet and we were attending to the ground maneuvers off Okinawa.
- Q. Did you take any part in supporting the hostilities in Manchuria at that time?
- A. I did not know about it at all. Not even the Chief of the General Staff knew; he was in the ground maneuvers with us.
- Q. Did you receive any orders after September 18, 1931, to support Japan's interests in the Manchurian Incident?
- A. No, we continued the same maneuvers. Only the Chief of the General Staff returned to Tokyo.
- Q. Now, how long did this war which broke out on September 18, 1931, continue?
- A. I think to the end of that year.
- Q. How was it settled?
- A. It was settled by and by. Finally the Manchurian Government was set up.
- Q. What government was that? Was that the puppet government of Japan?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Then next came the Shanghai event?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Tell us about that.
- A. The Shanghai Incident broke out in January of 1932. Both Chinese and Japanese nationals were very agitated and irritated, and some Japanese nationals were killed. A naval landing force took off to protect the nationals, and the Chinese struck the landing force.

(Shimada, cont'd)

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- Q. Japan welcomed a reason to occupy Shanghai, didn't it?
- A. No, it did not. We were very troubled about Manchuria at that time, and had no intention about Shanghai.
- Q. Did you participate in the Shanghai Incident?
- A. After the Incident, yes. After it broke out I received an order from the Chief of Staff and the Navy Minister to become Chief of Staff at Kure.
- Q. Do you remember the date of your orders?
- A. I think it was the first of February, or maybe the second, 1932.
- Q. What was the nature of your orders, or what did they tell you to do?
- A. There were no particular orders to send me to Shanghai; the orders designated me as Chief of Staff, and told me to go to Shanghai.
- Q. In what manner did you physically support the Shanghai engagement?
- A. Admiral Nomura, Commander of my Third Fleet, received the order to settle as soon as possible the incident, and without force; therefore we did not send armed forces at all. We just went quietly into the Wampo River.
- Q. Did you make preparations to transport forces to the territory in the event that should be required?
- A. No, we did not prepare for that. For that reason the area of the army forces was very little. It took more than one-half a month for the army to arrive in Shanghai; I think they arrived on the 18 or 19 of February.
- Q. You ultimately occupied the territory?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And you drove out the Chinese?
- A. Yes.

(The interrogation adjourned at 1615 P. M.)