Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

GHQ/SCAP Records (RG 331, National Archives and Records Service)

Description of contents

(1) Box no. 278

(2) Folder title/number: (3)
Police Reorganization #15: Purge and Great Military Virtues Society

(3) Date: ? - Nov. 1948

(4) Subject:

Classification	Type of record
211, 340, 410	e, m, r

(5) Item description and comment:
i) Great Military Virtues Society: Dai Nihon Butoku Kai
ii) #14 Is Not Included

(6) Reproduction: Yes No

(7) Film no. Sheet no.

(Compiled by *National Diet Library*)

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

23 Nov. 48

Memo for Record:

Mr. Cardmer, S&A, interviewed Lt. H.H. BAERWALD, Gov't. Sec., this date, re butoku-kai purge. Following is summary of info. gained:

1) Purge was executed from Sep to Nov. '47, as scheduled.

2) Purge was executed per SCAPIN 550 instead of 548 — more discriminating.

3.) Each case carefully considered on its own merits.

4) Total of 433 officials removed; not more than 300 of them police officials. No pref. police chief was purged. Only 30 of the purged officials were above the police station level.

5.) Lt. Baerwald initiated, & claims full responsibility for its execution.

A.B.M.
(S&A)

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

6 Sept 47

Ann W:

1. A typical example of persons who do not care to make a decision.

2. Par 8, Tab B, answers C/N 1, from D C/S.

3. Gist of Tab B, was forwarded G-S by IOM, 3 Sept 45. HEP

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

Col. Pulliam:—

draft a reply on same C/S to Fox stating coordination has been attempted but failed. This list view of field commanders and force as decisions.

List of Gen W.'s typed note as I recall it.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

DRAFT

CAW/wme

Subject: Police Purge

From: G-2

To: D C/S (SCAP)

1. Forwarded for subject reconsideration and decision, for the following reasons:

2. a. The C.G. Eighth Army, charged with operational control of the Police, law and order through Japan is opposed to this blanket purge which seriously affects the efficiency of the police force.

(1) He has repeatedly voiced concern over the inexperience and length of service of higher police officials to cope with the growing lawlessness of gangster elements.

(2) He has consistently mantained that the police should be the stabilizing force for the civilian population.

(3) He maintains that judicial use of individual case action in this instance should be the guiding principle.

b. The Provost Marshal, Tokyo, is opposed to this purge due to the effects upon the Metropolitan force for the reasons that:

(1) The Metropolitan force has had five different superintendant generals since initiation of the purge.

(2) This purge will eliminate 75% of the top executives - the most capable and experienced police officials on the force.

(3) It is impossible to develop and maintain police efficiency under conditions of continual purge and insecurity of office.

(4) Individual case action is a sound approach to the problem.

2. Repeated effort to coordinate this subject with the GS has failed.

C.A.W.
HEP

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

~~UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC~~
FAR EAST COMMAND

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No: 27206.

Subject: Police Purge

Note No.	From: D C/S (SCAP) To: G-2 Date: 2 September 1947
1.	Returned for coordination with Government Section. 1 Incl: Staff Study, "Police Purge" A. P. E.

AFPAC AGO Form No. 37

SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

APO 500
29 August 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Police Purge - Dai Nihon Butoku Kai (Great Military Virtues Society)

1. Continued blanket purges of personnel previously screened and passed are resulting in constant personnel changes with complete deterioration of the efficiency of the Japanese police and their ability to perform the mission directed by SCAP.

2. During the period 1945-1947, 39,637 members of the Japanese police have been separated from the service, a loss of 45% from normal establishment (Tab A).

3. 5,073 key officials, experienced and most capable, have been lost by purge. 1,583 more key officials have been lost from other causes. This is an average yearly increase of 375% over the previous five year average (Tab A).

4. The present Butoku Kai purge sponsored by Government Section will remove about 1,004 additional key police officials, all in grade of inspector or higher, a total loss of 25.16% of all top bracket police by purge.

5. The activities of the Butoku Kai are roughly the counterpart of the U. S. National Rifle Association. Most police officials concerned were ex-officio officers of the Butoku Kai, similar to members of our state police forces who are ex-officio game, forest and fire wardens. Their activities were no more militaristic than our own police supervision over war-time civilian air raid wardens.

6. That this particular blanket purge adversely affects police efficiency and occupation tranquility, is the considered opinion of: (1) Civil Intelligence Section, Public Safety Division (Tab B); (2)

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009

3. 5,073 key officials, experienced and most capable, have been lost by purge. 1,583 more key officials have been lost from other causes. This is an average yearly increase of 375% over the previous five year average (Tab A).

4. The present Butoku Kai purge sponsored by Government Section will remove about 1,004 additional key police officials, all in grade of inspector or higher, a total loss of 25.16% of all top bracket police by purge.

5. The activities of the Butoku Kai are roughly the counterpart of the U. S. National Rifle Association. Most police officials concerned were ex-officio officers of the Butoku Kai, similar to members of our state police forces who are ex-officio game, forest and fire wardens. Their activities were no more militaristic than our own police supervision over war-time civilian air raid wardens.

6. That this particular blanket purge adversely affects police efficiency and occupation tranquility, is the considered opinion of: (1) Civil Intelligence Section, Public Safety Division (Tab B); (2) Tokyo Provost Marshal (Tab C); (3) Commanding General, 8th Army (Tab D).

7. Factors involved in the resolving of these opinions are:

a. Crime incidence has increased over 200% since the occupation (Tab E).

b. Loss of police personnel has exceeded recruitment of authorized strength (Tab B). On 1 May police personnel reached 97% of authorized strength.

c. Six million disillusioned and jobless repatriates may become an easy prey to subversive ideas and represent an element of social unrest (Tabs G, H).

d. Ninety-four per cent of foreign nationals in Japan are Koreans, a unified group of potential dissatisfaction and lawless characteristics (Tab I).

CTS/TED/HEP/ab HEP FILE

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

Memo for the C/S, subj: "Police Purge - Dai Niton Butoku Kai (Great Military Virtues Society)", dtd 29 Aug 47.

e. The present and future weakness of occupation strength in Japan is well known. The ratio of population density is approximately 1 U. S. soldier per 730 Japanese.

f. The average ratio of Japanese police to population is 1 to 807, which compares unfavorably with the United States ratio of 1 to 598 backed by a regular army and national guard.

g. Our total military, plus a semi-trained and largely unarmed Japanese police force, currently 92,495, represents an inadequate force for the control of seventy-three million people (Tabs F, K, L).

h. The low effectiveness of the forces of law and order, on the basis of numerical ratios, training and decreasing efficiency, could not prevail against organized blocks, millions strong, such as dissatisfied discharged military, with a highly trained nucleus to furnish command leadership.

i. Changes in the status of the police affecting its efficiency thereby affects the occupation and throws a potential burden on this shrinking manpower of the Occupation Forces.

8. When the Butoku Kai purge was discovered, unavailing contact was made with Government Section in an effort to postpone or minimize the effect on the Japanese Police (Tab B).

9. Continual purging of experienced police officials has, and will continue to be, reflected in decreasing police efficiency and domestic tranquility.

10. The practical aspects of the need for balance between blanket purges and efficiency must be recognized. Theory versus practicability can give divergent results (Tab B).

11. It is recommended that:

a. The Butoku Kai purge be immediately suspended from [illegible] application to the Japanese police forces.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

furnish command leadership.

7. Changes in the status of the police affecting its efficiency thereby affects the occupation and throws a potential burden on this shrinking manpower of the Occupation Forces.

8. When the Butoku Kai purge was discovered, unavailing contact was made with Government Section in an effort to postpone or minimize the effect on the Japanese Police (Tab B).

9. Continual purging of experienced police officials has, and will continue to be, reflected in decreasing police efficiency and domestic tranquility.

10. The practical aspects of the need for balance between blanket purges and efficiency must be recognized. Theory versus practicability can give divergent results (Tab B).

11. It is recommended that:

a. The Butoku Kai purge be immediately suspended from specific mass application to the Japanese police forces.

b. Further blanket purging of Japanese police be delayed to permit training of replacement personnel.

c. The practical effects of any blanket purge be considered and coordinated by the initiating staff section with other staff sections.

C. A. W.

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

SECRET

Memo for the C/S, subj: "Police Purge - Dai Niton Butoku Kai (Great Military Virtues Society)", dtd 29 Aug 47.

INDEX TO TABS

A. Effect of purge on police manpower. (Unclassified)
B. CIS, PSD Memorandum, subject, Police Purge. (Unclassified)
C. Check note, Provost Marshal, Tokyo, to PSD, subject, Police Purge. (Unclassified)
D. PSD Memorandum for Record. Contact 8th Army, subject, Police Purge. (Unclassified)
E. Chart, Crime Incidence. (Restricted)
F. Analysis of population, military and police strength by prefecture. (Secret)
G. Density of demobilized soldiers by prefecture. (Secret)
H. Geographical table of population of demobilized personnel by prefecture. (Secret)
I. Geographical distribution of Koreans in Japan. (Secret)
J. Number of people to one Japanese policeman by prefecture. (Secret)
K. Number of people to one ground armed soldier by prefecture. (Secret)
L. Number of people to one ground armed soldier and Japanese policeman combined by prefecture. (Secret)

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

SECRET

EFFECTS OF PURGE ON POLICE MANPOWER

(Purges of Oct. '45 and Jan. '46.

Actual Strength as of 15 October '46)

Rank or Grade	Actual Strength	Number Purged
Prefectural Chiefs	51*	49
Superintendents	947	114
Inspectors	1,773	196
Ass't Inspectors	6,594	1,000**
Police Sergeants	13,264	1,587**
Policemen	66,393	2,127**
Total	89,022	5,073

* A number of police officials presently hold the rank of prefectural chief but are assigned to duty as heads of sections in the Police Bureau or to other general duties. The chiefs of all prefectural police departments were removed by the purge.

** These represent the principal numerical component of the Special Higher Police (Tokko Ka).

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

Police Sergeants	13,264	1,[illegible]
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Total	89,022	5,073

* A number of police officials presently hold the rank of prefectural chief but are assigned to duty as heads of sections in the Police Bureau or to other general duties. The chiefs of all prefectural police departments were removed by the purge.

** These represent the principal numerical component of the Special Higher Police (Tokko Ka).

Tab A

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Civil Intelligence Section, G-2
PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION

APO 500
July 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

THRU: CIS

SUBJECT: Police Purge

1. During the years 1945-1946, 39,637 members of the Japanese police force have been separated from the service by reason of purge, voluntary retirement, cause and death; an average yearly increase of 374% over the 1940-1945 average. To date the force has lost 5,073 of its most capable experienced and key police officers by purge. In addition, 1,583 more of its most capable and experienced police officers have been lost from other causes.

2. The present Butokukai purge, now being sponsored and urged upon the purge board of the Japanese Government by the Government Section, SCAP, will remove about 1,004 additional police officers, all in the grade of inspector or higher. This purge will remove 10.3% of the remaining experienced administrators, resulting in the removal from the police force of all men of the rank of prefectural chief, two-thirds of superintendents, and one-third of the inspectors, or a total loss of 25.16% of all top bracket police officers by purge. All together this means that 60% of the present police force are men with less than two years of experience.

3. The civilian police are the only stabilizing force available to the Japanese Government to maintain civil law and order. Crime incidence has been upward since termination of hostilities. Recruitment and partial training of Japanese policemen has not kept abreast of losses. There are, as of 1 January 1947, 90,550 police as against an occupation authorization of 93,935. The average ratio of police to population for Japan is 1 to 807, which does not compare favorably with that of the United States of 1 to 598, supported by a regular army and national guard. There are approximately five million repatriated Japanese ex-soldiers, disillusioned and jobless,

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

2. The present Butokukai purge, now being sponsored and urged upon the purge board of the Japanese Government by the Government Section, SCAP, will remove about 1,004 additional police officers, all in the grade of inspector or higher. This purge will remove 10.3% of the remaining experienced administrators, resulting in the removal from the police force of all men of the rank of prefectural chief, two-thirds of superintendents, and one-third of the inspectors, or a total loss of 25.16% of all top bracket police officers by purge. All together this means that 60% of the present police force are men with less than two years of experience.

3. The civilian police are the only stabilizing force available to the Japanese Government to maintain civil law and order. Crime incidence has been upward since termination of hostilities. Recruitment and partial training of Japanese policemen has not kept abreast of losses. There are, as of 1 January 1947, 90,550 police as against an occupation authorization of 93,935. The average ratio of police to population for Japan is 1 to 807, which does not compare favorably with that of the United States of 1 to 598, supported by a regular army and national guard. There are approximately five million repatriated Japanese ex-soldiers, disillusioned and jobless, who may become easy prey to subversive ideas. Ninety-four per cent of the foreign nationals in Japan are Koreans. The current (and future) weakness of occupation strength in Japan is well known. Our total military, plus the semi-trained Japanese police force of 93,935, represent the physical force for seventy-three million people. The demobilized block or nationalistic elements can permeate and influence these vast millions and instantly create serious problems. Any change in the status of the Japanese police which affects its efficiency, thereby affects the occupation force and throws an increasing potential burden upon this shrinking manpower.

4. Further purging or a continual erosion of capable and experienced police officials, will remove the remaining remnants of key personnel and destroy the efficiency of this arm of government.

5. The activities of the Butokukai society as an organization were not entirely police functions in nature. Evaluating the pros and cons with respect to the society, it appears to have been about the counterpart of the National Rifle Association in the United States.

Tab B

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

That this society was used by the military as a civilian defense organization is true, as was every other organization which could contribute to or be utilized toward the national effort. Most police officials concerned were ex-officio officers of the Butokukai, similar to members of our state police forces who are ex-officio game, forest, and fire wardens. Their activities were no more militaristic nor ideological than our own police instruction or supervision of civilian air raid wardens who were utilized in the promulgation of our own war effort.

6. The Tokyo Provost Marshal is opposed to further blanket purges that will seriously affect the efficiency of the Metropolitan Police Board. This Board has had five different superintendent generals since initiation of the purges. These changes have not all been desirable, yet the efficiency of the force, as a result thereof, has been maintained only by the closest supervision and retention of other key officers. It is presently operating more efficiently than at any time since the beginning of the occupation. However, it is feared that the present purge will destroy the efficiency thus far obtained and the incentive responsible for the development. The metropolitan police force will be particularly hard hit and will lose about 75% of its top executives. Prior purges have eliminated the most capable and experienced police officers to the point where there are now no qualified replacements on the force. Police efficiency as it now exists is entirely dependent upon a few experienced executives. This purge will eliminate this group.

7. The Commanding General, Eighth Army, charged with the operation of the Japanese police, is opposed to further blanket purges that will seriously affect the efficiency of the police. From an operational point of view, police departments throughout Japan will be similarly affected as the Metropolitan Police Board. Today's effort should be towards strengthening police efficiency, not weakening it. Constant personnel changes brought about by purge, after personnel have presumably been screened and passed, are causing complete deterioration of police efficiency and the ability to perform the mission directed by SCAP.

8. When the Butokukai purge was known to be in the making, contact was established with Government Section to determine whether

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

feared that the present purge will destroy the efficiency thus far obtained and the incentive responsible for the development. The metropolitan police force will be particularly hard hit and will lose about 75% of its top executives. Prior purges have eliminated the most capable and experienced police officers to the point where there are now no qualified replacements on the force. Police efficiency as it now exists is entirely dependent upon a few experienced executives. This purge will eliminate this group.

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8. When the Butokukai purge was known to be in the making, contact was established with Government Section to determine whether or not the effect upon the Japanese police could be postponed and minimized. In general, the answer was that this organization fell in the category of undesirables, that Government Section had decided to eliminate personnel of this society, and that this purge will affect all personnel belonging to this organization, be they government officers, school teachers, newspaper men, etc. However, Government Section indicated they might consider individual cases, depending upon the individual and the time spent in the organization.

9. There are other purges under study by the Government Section which will affect members of the police force but the number involved and for what reason or affiliation is as yet unknown. Continual purging of experienced police officers has and will continue to be reflected in the general efficiency of the force. How long the Japanese police force will be able to sustain similar losses and maintain any degree of efficiency is a serious question. If policy requires continual purging of police officers the force cannot hope to rebuild as rapidly as it is destroyed. There must be a reasonable balance maintained between efficiency and purge with the practical aspects for the latter duly recognized.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009

Memo to Ass't C/S, G-2, thru CIS, subj: "Police Purge"

10. It is recommended that:

a. The practical effects of any purge affecting the police be considered and coordinated by the initiating staff section with PSD, CIS, G-2 and 8th Army.

b. The provisions of the Butokukai purge be suspended from application to the Japanese police.

c. Further blanket purging of Japanese police be terminated to permit adequate training of replacement personnel lost from all causes.

H. E. PULLIAM
Colonel, (GSC)
Chief, Public Safety Division

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

H. E. PULLIAM
Colonel, (USC)
Chief, Public Safety Division

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

HEADQUARTERS
METROPOLITAN PROVOST MARSHAL OF TOKYO, JAPAN

COPY

COPY

CHECK SHEET

Note No.	From:	To:	
	Provost Marshal, Tokyo	Chief, Public Safety Division GHQ	21 July 47

1 Herewith brief study on the effect of the proposed purge on the local MPB. I have sent a copy of this to G-2, including Exhibits 3 and 4, of which, I am sure, you have already received copies. They consist in reports from the MPB, #3 headed "OUTLINE OF THE BUTOKU-KAI", and #4 Letter dated 21 July 1947 to Chief of Public Peace Section, GHQ.

C. S. Ferrin

COPY

COPY

Lot C

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Civil Intelligence Section, G-2
PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION

APO 500
25 July 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Police Purge Dai Nihon Butoku Kai (Great Military Virtues Society)

1. Commanding General, 8th Army, is seriously concerned with respect to the far-reaching effect the Butoku Kai purge will have on the Japanese police. The force at present is dangerously low in experienced police officials of the higher grades and that further loss in this bracket would mean the difference between the preservation of law and order among the civilian population and the use of occupation troops to restore law and order.

2. The five million repatriated, demobilized ex-soldiers, disillusioned and jobless, are easy prey to subversive ideas and may well become a social problem. The occupation force, plus the semi-trained Japanese police of 93,935, represents the physical force for seventy-three million people. Further losses of capable and experienced police personnel serves only to aggravate the seriousness of this situation.

3. The Commanding General, 8th Army, is charged with operational control of Japanese police and for the preservation of law and order throughout Japan. He has repeatedly voiced concern over the inexperience and length of service of the higher police officials to cope with the growing lawlessness of gangster elements. He has consistently maintained that the police should be the stabilizing force for the civilian population and that further losses of experienced police by purge be reduced to a minimum.

4. The Commanding General, 8th Army, is opposed to any blanket action of purge affecting the Japanese police. Judicial use of individual case action should be the guiding principle.

5. The Commanding General, 8th Army, recommends:

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009

disillusioned and jobless, are easy prey to subversive [illegible] and may well become a social problem. The occupation force, plus the semi-trained Japanese police of 93,935, represents the physical force for seventy-three million people. Further losses of capable and experienced police personnel serves only to aggravate the seriousness of this situation.

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4. The Commanding General, 8th Army, is opposed to any blanket action of purge affecting the Japanese police. Judicial use of individual case action should be the guiding principle.

5. The Commanding General, 8th Army, recommends:

a. That the Butoku Kai purge, directed by the Government Section, SCAP, be suspended from specific application of the Japanese police force.

b. That individual case action only be applied in aggravated instances.

H. E. PULLIAM
Colonel, (GSC)
Chief, Public Safety Division

Tab D

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009

RESTRICTED

JAPANESE CRIME STATISTICS

A. JAPANESE CRIME STATISTICS
OFFENSES AGAINST THE CRIMINAL CODE

1. 1924 — 1946



2. JANUARY 1945 — MAY 1947

B. JAPANESE CRIME RATE
(OFFENSES AGAINST THE CRIMINAL CODE)
BY PREFECTURE
MAY 1947



MAY NATIONAL RATE: 152



C. OFFENSES REPORTED
BY OFFENSE, BY MONTH
1947



NUMBER OF OFFENSES REPORTED DURING
MAY 1947
BY TYPE, BY PREFECTURE

Prefecture	Against Criminal Code: Person	Property	Others	Total	Other Than Criminal Code	Grand Total
Hokkaido	77	4,751	374	5,202	2,146	7,348
Aomori	35	531	53	619	400	1,019
Iwate	20	651	72	743	995	1,738
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC No. 775009



C. OFFENSES REPORTED BY OFFENSE, BY MONTH 1947





NUMBER OF OFFENSES REPORTED DURING
MAY 1947
BY TYPE, BY PREFECTURE

Prefecture	Against Criminal Code: Person	Property	Others	Total	Other Than Criminal Code	Grand Total
Hokkaido	77	4,751	274	5,102	2,146	7,248
Aomori	35	231	33	619	400	1,019
Iwate	20	651	72	743	995	1,738
Miyagi	40	1,211	59	1,310	1,277	2,587
Akita	26	534	40	598	853	1,451
Yamagata	16	504	16	536	289	824
Fukushima	48	1,650	99	1,797	778	2,575
Ibaraki	74	1,287	243	1,404	484	1,888
Tochigi	31	1,036	100	1,167	435	1,602
Gunma	65	1,923	41	2,024	701	2,725
Saitama	56	3,156	70	3,282	634	3,916
Chiba	89	1,633	155	1,877	317	2,194
Tokyo	203	10,910	506	11,618	796	12,414
Kanagawa	62	2,900	102	3,064	342	3,406
Niigata	43	1,971	69	2,083	1,558	3,641
Toyama	18	563	26	607	1,682	2,289
Ishikawa	6	973	10	989	167	1,156
Fukui	16	690	15	711	190	901
Yamanashi	22	612	53	687	197	884
Nagano	39	1,566	102	1,707	721	2,428
Gifu	18	1,566	70	1,653	274	1,927
Shizuoka	28	2,474	106	2,608	553	3,161
Aichi	64	7,409	257	7,730	2,729	10,459
Mie	25	1,106	57	1,188	298	2,186
Shiga	3	485	100	588	285	873
Kyoto	73	4,960	75	5,098	993	6,091
Osaka	136	10,207	295	10,638	956	11,652
Hyogo	121	5,763	162	6,046	2,635	8,681
Nara	17	819	29	865	195	1,060
Wakayama	36	1,836	66	1,938	283	2,221
Tottori	15	561	19	594	324	918
Shimane	11	439	36	486	530	1,016
Okayama	72	2,724	103	2,899	679	3,578
Hiroshima	58	2,750	101	2,909	767	3,676
Yamaguchi	67	3,073	99	3,239	842	4,181
Tokushima	7	316	68	391	615	1,006
Kagawa	18	859	11	888	391	1,279
Ehime	40	1,225	40	1,305	401	1,706
Kochi	20	825	31	876	655	1,531
Fukuoka	102	6,593	127	6,822	1,785	8,607
Saga	22	706	45	823	460	1,283
Nagasaki	30	1,655	344	2,029	266	2,295
Kumamoto	59	2,222	67	2,348	692	3,040
Oita	37	1,206	59	1,402	471	1,873
Miyazaki	12	903	35	950	336	1,286
Kagoshima	40	1,837	98	1,975	638	2,613
TOTAL	2,148	104,089	4,724	110,961	32,087	143,048

SOURCE: MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS

GRAPH NO. I

RESTRICTED

PREPARED BY: PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION

Lot E

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JAPANESE POLICE

PREFECTURE	POPULATION	NUMBER OF POLICEMEN	NUMBER PEOPLE TO ONE POLICEMAN
HOKKAIDO (1)	3,488,013	3,595	970
AOMORI	1,089,232	953	1,143
IWATE	1,217,070	890	1,367
MIYAGI	1,462,100	1,384	1,056
AKITA	1,195,813	869	1,392
YAMAGATA	1,294,934	1,141	1,135
FUKUSHIMA	1,918,746	1,260	1,523
IBARAKI	1,940,833	1,547	1,255
TOCHIGI	1,503,619	1,148	1,310
GUMMA	1,524,635	1,131	1,348
SAITAMA	2,028,553	1,357	1,495
CHIBA	2,008,114	1,686	1,191
TOKYO	4,183,072	18,315	228
KANAGAWA	2,019,943	3,668	551
NIIGATA	2,326,811	1,707	1,363
TOYAMA	932,669	880	1,060
ISHIKAWA	877,197	958	916
FUKUI	695,703	764	911
YAMANASHI	796,973	713	1,118
NAGANO	2,028,235	1,390	1,459
GIFU	1,444,000	946	1,526
SHIZUOKA	2,260,059	1,622	1,393
AICHI	2,919,085	4,329	674
MIE	1,371,858	1,135	1,209
SHIGA	831,306	706	1,177
KYOTO	1,621,998	2,489	652
OSAKA	2,976,140	6,814	437
HYOGO	2,826,192	4,330	653
NARA	744,381	700	1,063
WAKAYAMA	933,231	1,086	859
TOTTORI	557,429	579	963
SHIMANE	848,995	739	1,149
OKAYAMA	1,538,621	1,377	1,117
HIROSHIMA	1,901,430	1,841	1,033
YAMAGUCHI	1,375,472	1,839	748
TOKUSHIMA	828,784	756	1,096
KAGAWA	872,312	708	1,232
EHIME	1,380,700	1,100	1,255

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SECRET

POLICE

MILITARY FORCES GROUND ARMS

R E TO ONE EMAN	M.P.	CIC	MIL. GOVT.	GROUND ARM TROOPS (2)	TOTAL	NO. TO ARM
70	86	56	69	4,784	4,995	
43	—	9	39	2,482	2,530	
67	—	10	33	76	119	
56	218	16	75	3,437	3,746	
92	—	13	33	—	46	
35	—	10	39	2,174	2,223	
23	—	11	33	—	44	
55	—	13	33	—	46	
10	—	12	33	—	45	
48	—	12	39	1,676	1,727	
95	106	13	69	5,069	5,257	
91	—	14	33	—	47	
28	923	97	76	3,587	4,683	
51	1,060	48	94	6,591	7,793	
63	—	14	33	—	47	
60	—	3	33	—	36	
16	—	13	33	—	46	
11	—	4	26	—	30	
18	—	10	33	—	43	
59	—	14	33	—	47	
26	—	3	33	3,475	3,511	
93	—	12	33	—	45	
74	351	19	69	10	449	
09	—	15	33	—	48	
77	—	4	26	2,350	2,380	
52	65	23	80	860	1,028	
37	106	24	44	5,094	5,268	
53	471	21	39	524	1,055	
63	—	5	26	1,676	1,707	
59	—	4	26	—	30	
63	—	4	26	934	964	
49	—	5	26	1,111	1,142	
17	—	11	33	2,684	2,728	
33	—	16	69	5,673	5,758	
48	—	15	33	3,351	3,399	
96	—	5	26	341	372	
32	—	12	56	75	143	
55	—	7	33	—	40	

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

MILITARY FORCES GROUND ARMS

MIL. GOVT.	GROUND ARM TROOPS (2)	TOTAL	NO. PEOPLE TO ONE GRD, ARM SOLDIER	NO. PEOPLE TO ONE COMBINED GRD. ARM SOLDIER & POLICEMAN
69	4,784	4,995	698	406
39	2,482	2,530	430	313
33	76	119	10,227	1,206
75	3,437	3,746	390	285
33	—	46	25,995	1,306
39	2,174	2,223	583	385
33	—	44	43,607	1,471
33	—	46	42,192	1,218
33	—	45	33,413	1,260
39	1,676	1,727	882	533
69	5,069	5,257	385	307
33	—	47	42,725	1,159
76	3,587	4,683	893	182
94	6,591	7,793	259	176
33	—	47	49,506	1,327
33	—	36	25,907	1,018
33	—	46	19,070	874
26	—	30	23,190	876
33	—	43	18,534	1,054
33	—	47	43,153	1,411
33	3,475	3,511	411	324
33	—	45	50,224	1,356
69	10	449	6,501	611
33	—	48	28,580	1,160
26	2,350	2,380	349	269
80	860	1,028	1,578	461
44	5,094	5,268	564	246
39	524	1,055	2,678	525
26	1,676	1,707	436	309
26	—	30	31,108	836
26	934	964	578	361
26	1,111	1,142	743	451
33	2,684	2,728	564	375
69	5,673	5,758	330	250
33	3,351	3,399	408	263
26	341	372	2,226	735
56	75	143	6,100	1,025
33	—	40	34.517	1.211

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TOCHIGI	1,503,619	1,148	1,310	
GUMMA	1,524,635	1,131	1,348	
SAITAMA	2,028,553	1,357	1,495	1
CHIBA	2,008,114	1,686	1,191	
TOKYO	4,183,072	18,315	228	9
KANAGAWA	2,019,943	3,668	551	1,0
NIIGATA	2,326,811	1,707	1,363	
TOYAMA	932,669	880	1,060	
ISHIKAWA	877,197	958	916	
FUKUI	695,703	764	911	
YAMANASHI	796,973	713	1,118	
NAGANO	2,028,235	1,390	1,459	
GIFU	1,444,000	946	1,526	
SHIZUOKA	2,260,059	1,622	1,393	
AICHI	2,919,085	4,329	674	3
MIE	1,371,858	1,135	1,209	
SHIGA	831,306	706	1,177	
KYOTO	1,621,998	2,489	652	
OSAKA	2,976,140	6,814	437	1
HYOGO	2,826,192	4,330	653	4
NARA	744,381	700	1,063	
WAKAYAMA	933,231	1,086	859	
TOTTORI	557,429	579	963	
SHIMANE	848,995	739	1,149	
OKAYAMA	1,538,621	1,377	1,117	
HIROSHIMA	1,901,430	1,841	1,033	
YAMAGUCHI	1,375,472	1,839	748	
TOKUSHIMA	828,784	756	1,096	
KAGAWA	872,312	708	1,232	
EHIME	1,380,700	1,100	1,255	
KOCHI	797,876	812	983	
FUKUOKA	2,906,644	3,969	732	1
SAGA	856,692	860	996	
NAGASAKI	1,417,924	1,945	729	
KUMAMOTO	1,631,976	1,403	1,163	
OITA	1,148,009	1,007	1,140	
MIYAZAKI	957,856	869	1,102	
KAGOSHIMA	1,629,760	1,233	1,322	
TOTAL	73,110,995	90,550	807	3,4

(1) ALL PREFECTURES IN HOKKAIDO CONSOLIDATED UNDER THIS ONE ENTRY.

(2) MILITARY STRENGTH FIGURES SECURED FROM G-2 SOURCE AND ARE T/O STRENGTHS OF VARIOUS UNITS CONSIDERED AVAILABLE FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS STUDY. THE FOLLOWING TYPE UNITS WERE CONSIDERED:

(A) ORGANIC DIVISIONAL TROOPS OF ALL BRANCHES
(B) MILITARY GOVERNMENT UNITS INCLUDING MILITARY PERSONNEL ONLY
(C) AAA, AGF CHEMICAL AND ARMORED
(D) CORPS M.P. PLATOONS
(E) NON-DIVISIONAL M.P. PERSONNEL
(F) BULK OVERHEAD M.P. PERSONNEL
(G) B.C.O.F. FIGHTING FORCES

Tab F

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

—	12	33	—	45	
—	12	39	1,676	1,727	
106	13	69	5,069	5,257	
—	14	33	—	47	
923	97	76	3,587	4,683	
1,060	48	94	6,591	7,793	
—	14	33	—	47	
—	3	33	—	36	
—	13	33	—	46	
—	4	26	—	30	
—	10	33	—	43	
—	14	33	—	47	
—	3	33	3,475	3,511	
—	12	33	—	45	
351	19	69	10	449	
—	15	33	—	48	
—	4	26	2,350	2,380	
65	23	80	860	1,028	
106	24	44	5,094	5,268	
471	21	39	524	1,055	
—	5	26	1,676	1,707	
—	4	26	—	30	
—	4	26	934	964	
—	5	26	1,111	1,142	
—	11	33	2,684	2,728	
—	16	69	5,673	5,758	
—	15	33	3,351	3,399	
—	5	26	341	372	
—	12	56	75	143	
—	7	33	—	40	
—	5	26	43	74	
106	21	69	4,349	4,545	
—	7	26	—	33	
—	6	39	3,210	3,255	
—	31	33	3,210	3,274	
—	9	33	3,210	3,252	
—	7	26	—	33	
—	9	33	—	42	
3,492	692	1,885	72,056	78,125	AVG.

E ENTRY.

ARE T/O
E PURPOSES
ED:

ARY PERSONNEL ONLY

SECRET

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—	42	[illegible]	[illegible]
1,676	1,727	882	533
5,069	5,257	385	307
—	47	42,725	1,159
3,587	4,683	893	182
6,591	7,793	259	176
—	47	49,506	1,327
—	36	25,907	1,018
—	46	19,070	874
—	30	23,190	876
—	43	18,534	1,054
—	47	43,153	1,411
3,475	3,511	411	324
—	45	50,224	1,356
10	449	6,501	611
—	48	28,580	1,160
2,350	2,380	349	269
860	1,028	1,578	461
5,094	5,268	564	246
524	1,055	2,678	525
1,676	1,707	436	309
—	30	31,108	836
934	964	578	361
1,111	1,142	743	451
2,684	2,728	564	375
5,673	5,758	330	250
3,351	3,399	408	263
341	372	2,226	735
75	143	6,100	1,025
—	40	34,517	1,211
43	74	10,782	900
4,349	4,545	639	341
—	33	25,960	959
3,210	3,255	439	273
3,210	3,274	498	349
3,210	3,252	350	270
—	33	2,902	1,062
—	42	38,804	1,278
72,056	78,125	AVG. 936	AVG. 433

ANALYSIS OF POPULATION

MILITARY & POLICE

STRENGTH BY PREFECTURE

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SECRET

DENSITY OF DEMOBILIZED
JAPANESE SOLDIERS
BY PREFECTURE

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009



GHQ · SCAP

NUMBER

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Tab G

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

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

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

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

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009



Tab H

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009



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GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF KOREANS IN JAPAN BY PREFECTURE

FOREIGN NATIONALS IN JAPAN





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

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Tab I

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

SECRET

NUMBER OF JAPANESE TO ONE
JAPANESE POLICEMAN
BY PREFECTURE

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

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

GHQ · SCAP

NUMBER

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Tab J

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NUMBER OF JAPANESE TO ONE
GROUND ARM SOLDIER
BY PREFECTURE

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

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

LEGEND

	1- 500
	501- 1,000
	1,001- 5,000
	5,001-10,000
	10,001-20,000
	20,001-30,000
	30,001-40,000
	40,001-50,000

GHQ · SCAP

NUMBER

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NUMBER OF JAPANESE TO ONE GROUND ARM SOLDIER AND JAPANESE POLICEMAN COMBINED. BY PREFECTURE

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009



GHQ · SCAP

NUMBER

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Tab L

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNIDG NO. 775009

SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

APO 500
29 August 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Police Purge - Dai Nihon Butoku Kai (Great Military Virtues Society)

1. Continued blanket purges of personnel previously screened and passed are resulting in constant personnel changes with complete deterioration of the efficiency of the Japanese police and their ability to perform the mission directed by SCAP.

2. During the period 1945-1947, 39,637 members of the Japanese police have been separated from the service, a loss of 45% from normal establishment (Tab A).

3. 5,073 key officials, experienced and most capable, have been lost by purge. 1,583 more key officials have been lost from other causes. This is an average yearly increase of 375% over the previous five year average (Tab A).

4. The present Butoku Kai purge sponsored by Government Section will remove about 1,004 additional key police officials, all in grade of inspector or higher, a total loss of 25.16% of all top bracket police by purge.

5. The activities of the Butoku Kai are roughly the counterpart of the U. S. National Rifle Association. Most police officials concerned were ex-officio officers of the Butoku Kai, similar to members of our state police forces who are ex-officio game, forest and fire wardens. Their activities were no more militaristic than our own police supervision over war-time civilian air raid wardens.

6. That this particular blanket purge adversely affects police efficiency and occupation tranquility, is the considered opinion of: (1) Civil Intelligence Section, Public Safety Division (Tab B); (2)

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lost by purge. 1,583 more key officials have been lost from other causes. This is an average yearly increase of 375% over the previous five year average (Tab A).

4. The present Butoku Kai purge sponsored by Government Section will remove about 1,004 additional key police officials, all in grade of inspector or higher, a total loss of 25.16% of all top bracket police by purge.

5. The activities of the Butoku Kai are roughly the counterpart of the U. S. National Rifle Association. Most police officials concerned were ex-officio officers of the Butoku Kai, similar to members of our state police forces who are ex-officio game, forest and fire wardens. Their activities were no more militaristic than our own police supervision over war-time civilian air raid wardens.

6. That this particular blanket purge adversely affects police efficiency and occupation tranquility, is the considered opinion of: (1) Civil Intelligence Section, Public Safety Division (Tab B); (2) Tokyo Provost Marshal (Tab C); (3) Commanding General, 8th Army (Tab D).

7. Factors involved in the resolving of these opinions are:

a. Crime incidence has increased over 200% since the occupation (Tab E).

b. Loss of police personnel has exceeded recruitment of authorized strength (Tab B). On 1 May police personnel reached 97% of authorized strength.

c. Six million disillusioned and jobless repatriates may become an easy prey to subversive ideas and represent an element of social unrest (Tabs G, H).

d. Ninety-four per cent of foreign nationals in Japan are Koreans, a unified group of potential dissatisfaction and lawless characteristics (Tab I).

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Memo for the C/S, subj: "Police Purge - Dai Niton Butoku Kai (Great Military Virtues Society)", dtd 29 Aug 47.

e. The present and future weakness of occupation strength in Japan is well known. The ratio of population density is approximately 1 U. S. soldier per 730 Japanese.

f. The average ratio of Japanese police to population is 1 to 807, which compares unfavorably with the United States ratio of 1 to 598 backed by a regular army and national guard.

g. Our total military, plus a semi-trained and largely unarmed Japanese police force, currently 92,495, represents an inadequate force for the control of seventy-three million people (Tabs F, K, L).

h. The low effectiveness of the forces of law and order, on the basis of numerical ratios, training and decreasing efficiency, could not prevail against organized blocks, millions strong, such as dissatisfied discharged military, with a highly trained nucleus to furnish command leadership.

i. Changes in the status of the police affecting its efficiency thereby affects the occupation and throws a potential burden on this shrinking manpower of the Occupation Forces.

8. When the Butoku Kai purge was discovered, unavailing contact was made with Government Section in an effort to postpone or minimize the effect on the Japanese Police (Tab B).

9. Continual purging of experienced police officials has, and will continue to be, reflected in decreasing police efficiency and domestic tranquility.

10. The practical aspects of the need for balance between blanket purges and efficiency must be recognized. Theory versus practicability can give divergent results (Tab B).

11. It is recommended that:

a. The Butoku Kai purge be immediately suspended from

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

furnish command leadership.

i. Changes in the status of the police affecting its efficiency thereby affects the occupation and throws a potential burden on this shrinking manpower of the Occupation Forces.

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10. The practical aspects of the need for balance between blanket purges and efficiency must be recognized. Theory versus practicability can give divergent results (Tab B).

11. It is recommended that:

a. The Butoku Kai purge be immediately suspended from specific mass application to the Japanese police forces.

b. Further blanket purging of Japanese police be delayed to permit training of replacement personnel.

c. The practical effects of any blanket purge be considered and coordinated by the initiating staff section with other staff sections.

C. A. W.

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

SECRET

Memo for the C/S, subj: "Police Purge - Dai Niton Butoku Kai (Great Military Virtues Society)", dtd 29 Aug 47.

INDEX TO TABS

A. Effect of purge on police manpower. (Unclassified)
B. CIS, PSD Memorandum, subject, Police Purge. (Unclassified)
C. Check note, Provost Marshal, Tokyo, to PSD, subject, Police Purge. (Unclassified)
D. PSD Memorandum for Record. Contact 8th Army, subject, Police Purge. (Unclassified)
E. Chart, Crime Incidence. (Restricted)
F. Analysis of population, military and police strength by prefecture. (Secret)
G. Density of demobilized soldiers by prefecture. (Secret)
H. Geographical table of population of demobilized personnel by prefecture. (Secret)
I. Geographical distribution of Koreans in Japan. (Secret)
J. Number of people to one Japanese policeman by prefecture. (Secret)
K. Number of people to one ground armed soldier by prefecture. (Secret)
L. Number of people to one ground armed soldier and Japanese policeman combined by prefecture. (Secret)

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

L. Number of people to one ground armed soldier and Japanese policeman combined by prefecture. (Secret)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

EFFECTS OF PURGE ON POLICE MANPOWER

(Purges of Oct. '45 and Jan. '46.

Actual Strength as of 15 October '46)

Rank or Grade	Actual Strength	Number Purged
Prefectural Chiefs	51*	49
Superintendents	947	114
Inspectors	1,773	196
Ass't Inspectors	6,594	1,000**
Police Sergeants	13,264	1,587**
Policemen	66,393	2,127**
Total	89,022	5,073

* A number of police officials presently hold the rank of prefectural chief but are assigned to duty as heads of sections in the Police Bureau or to other general duties. The chiefs of all prefectural police departments were removed by the purge.

** These represent the principal numerical component of the Special Higher Police (Tokko Ka).

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG No. 775009

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Civil Intelligence Section, G-2
PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION

APO 500
July 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

THRU: CIS

SUBJECT: Police Purge

1. During the years 1945-1946, 39,637 members of the Japanese police force have been separated from the service by reason of purge, voluntary retirement, cause and death; an average yearly increase of 374% over the 1940-1945 average. To date the force has lost 5,073 of its most capable experienced and key police officers by purge. In addition, 1,583 more of its most capable and experienced police officers have been lost from other causes.

2. The present Butokukai purge, now being sponsored and urged upon the purge board of the Japanese Government by the Government Section, SCAP, will remove about 1,004 additional police officers, all in the grade of inspector or higher. This purge will remove 10.3% of the remaining experienced administrators, resulting in the removal from the police force of all men of the rank of prefectural chief, two-thirds of superintendents, and one-third of the inspectors, or a total loss of 25.16% of all top bracket police officers by purge. All together this means that 60% of the present police force are men with less than two years of experience.

3. The civilian police are the only stabilizing force available to the Japanese Government to maintain civil law and order. Crime incidence has been upward since termination of hostilities. Recruitment and partial training of Japanese policemen has not kept abreast of losses. There are, as of 1 January 1947, 90,550 police as against an occupation authorization of 93,935. The average ratio of police to population for Japan is 1 to 807, which does not compare favorably with that of the United States of 1 to 598, supported by a regular army and national guard. There are approximately five million repatriated Japanese ex-soldiers, disillusioned and idle

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

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4. Further purging or a continual erosion of capable and experienced police officials, will remove the remaining remnants of key personnel and destroy the efficiency of this arm of government.

5. The activities of the Butokukai society as an organization were not entirely police functions in nature. Evaluating the pros and cons with respect to the society, it appears to have been about the counterpart of the National Rifle Association in the United States.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

That this society was used by the military as a civilian defense organization is true, as was every other organization which could contribute to or be utilized toward the national effort. Most police officials concerned were ex-officio officers of the Butokukai, similar to members of our state police forces who are ex-officio game, forest, and fire wardens. Their activities were no more militaristic nor ideological than our own police instruction or supervision of civilian air raid wardens who were utilized in the promulgation of our own war effort.

6. The Tokyo Provost Marshal is opposed to further blanket purges that will seriously affect the efficiency of the Metropolitan Police Board. This Board has had five different superintendent generals since initiation of the purges. These changes have not all been desirable, yet the efficiency of the force, as a result thereof, has been maintained only by the closest supervision and retention of other key officers. It is presently operating more efficiently than at any time since the beginning of the occupation. However, it is feared that the present purge will destroy the efficiency thus far obtained and the incentive responsible for the development. The metropolitan police force will be particularly hard hit and will lose about 75% of its top executives. Prior purges have eliminated the most capable and experienced police officers to the point where there are now no qualified replacements on the force. Police efficiency as it now exists is entirely dependent upon a few experienced executives. This purge will eliminate this group.

7. The Commanding General, Eighth Army, charged with the operation of the Japanese police, is opposed to further blanket purges that will seriously affect the efficiency of the police. From an operational point of view, police departments throughout Japan will be similarly affected as the Metropolitan Police Board. Today's effort should be towards strengthening police efficiency, not weakening it. Constant personnel changes brought about by purge, after personnel have presumably been screened and passed, are causing complete deterioration of police efficiency and the ability to perform the mission directed by SCAP.

8. When the Butokukai purge was known to be in the making, contact was established with Government Section to determine whether

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

feared that the present purge will destroy the efficiency thus far obtained and the incentive responsible for the development. The metropolitan police force will be particularly hard hit and will lose about 75% of its top executives. Prior purges have eliminated the most capable and experienced police officers to the point where there are now no qualified replacements on the force. Police efficiency as it now exists is entirely dependent upon a few experienced executives. This purge will eliminate this group.

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8. When the Butokukai purge was known to be in the making, contact was established with Government Section to determine whether or not the effect upon the Japanese police could be postponed and minimized. In general, the answer was that this organization fell in the category of undesirables, that Government Section had decided to eliminate personnel of this society, and that this purge will affect all personnel belonging to this organization, be they government officers, school teachers, newspaper men, etc. However, Government Section indicated they might consider individual cases, depending upon the individual and the time spent in the organization.

9. There are other purges under study by the Government Section which will affect members of the police force but the number involved and for what reason or affiliation is as yet unknown. Continual purging of experienced police officers has and will continue to be reflected in the general efficiency of the force. How long the Japanese police force will be able to sustain similar losses and maintain any degree of efficiency is a serious question. If policy requires continual purging of police officers the force cannot hope to rebuild as rapidly as it is destroyed. There must be a reasonable balance maintained between efficiency and purge with the practical aspects for the latter duly recognized.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

Memo to Ass't C/S, G-2, thru CIS, subj: "Police Purge"

10. It is recommended that:

a. The practical effects of any purge affecting the police be considered and coordinated by the initiating staff section with PSD, CIS, G-2 and 8th Army.

b. The provisions of the Butokukai purge be suspended from application to the Japanese police.

c. Further blanket purging of Japanese police be terminated to permit adequate training of replacement personnel lost from all causes.

H. E. Pulliam,
H. E. PULLIAM
Colonel, (GSC)
Chief, Public Safety Division

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

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HEADQUARTERS
METROPOLITAN PROVOST MARSHAL OF TOKYO, JAPAN
APO 1[illegible]

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No: Subject:

Note No.	From: Provost Marshal, Tokyo	To: Chief, Public Safety Division, GHQ	Date: 21 July 47
1	Herewith brief study on the effect of the proposed purge on the local MPB. I have sent a copy of this to G-2, including Exhibits 3 and 4, of which, I am sure, you have already received copies. They consist in reports from the MPB, #3 headed "OUTLINE OF THE BUTOKU-KAI", and #4 Letter dated 21 July 1947 to Chief of Public Peace Section, GHQ. C. S. Ferrin		

Tab C

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

Brief the guts of this
factual statement into one or two
puchhlines and put on checksheet

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

HEADQUARTERS
METROPOLITAN PROVOST MARSHAL OF TOKYO, JAPAN
APO 181

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No: Subject:

Note No. 1.

From: Liaison Section, PMO, Tokyo. To: Provost Marshal, Tokyo. Date: 21 July 1947

1. The undersigned is in receipt of information which indicates that a large percentage of the police officials occupying executive positions throughout Japan will be "Purged" in the near future.

2. Metropolitan Police Board will be particularly hard hit. It appears that the Superintendent General and Chiefs of all Major Sections will be affected. This will leave MPB with no experienced executives. (See exhibit 1).

3. Police Affairs Bureau of the Home Ministry and Prefectural Police Organizations will be similarly affected. (see exhibit 2).

4. Due to the number of Police Officials affected, (approx. 60% of top executives) the executive nature of their duties, and the number of police executives already removed in prior purges, there will be no experienced police executives available for replacement. Therefore the police efficiency, not only in Tokyo, but throughout Japan will be reduced.

5. Since the Occupation began, Metropolitan Police Board has had five (5) different Chief Executives. While these changes of Chief executives have not always been desireable, the damage resulting therefrom has been held to a minimum by the retention of all other key personnel, and Metropolitan Police Board has continued to improve until, it is at present operating more efficiently than at any time since the occupation began. It is feared that the present purge, if carried out, will destroy the efficiency which has been built up since the end of the war, and will, in some measure, destroy the incentive which has been responsible for the progress made to date.

6. Those presently scheduled for purge were at one time connected with BUTOKU-KAI. An outline of the activities of this society is appended as exhibit 3. There is not doubt that it has been somewhat glossed over, but whether or not it falls within the scope of SCAP directives is questionable.

7. A summation of the possible effects of the pending purge which was prepared by MPB is appended as exhibit 4.

8. Recommend that action be initiated to forstall any such drastic purge as is contemplated.

James W. Miller
JAMES W. MILLER
Capt., F.A.
Liaison Officer

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

JAPANESE EXECUTIVES OF MPB WHO ARE SCHEDULED FOR PURGE.

Present Position		
Supt. Gen. MPB	TOGA, Muneo	Represents MPB on Policy matters at a Cabinet Level
Dir. Police Affairs Dept.	NAKANISHI, Hisao	Top executive and wheelhorse of MPB
Dir, Pub. Peace Dept.	SHIOYA, Takao	Responsible for police Adm. and enforcement in economic field.
Dir. Criminal Affairs	FUJITA, Jiro	Coordinates Criminal Investigations on national level.
Chief of Police Affairs Section	MASUI, Shojiro	Direct administrator of Police in Tokyo
Chief of Police Guard Section	SAEGUSA, Saburo	The exective in charge of all police matters other than Traffic, Economic and criminal
Chief of 2nd CI Section	TAMAMURA, Shiichi	In charge of Criminal investigations in Tokyo
Chief of Liaison Section	WATANABE, Minoru	Coordinates work of MPB with all outside agencies, particularly O.F.

1. The includes all top executives of MPB

2. In addition, approximately 28% of the personnel of the section chief class will be affected.

EXHIBIT 1.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

POLICE EXECUTIVES OTHER THAN MPB THROUGHOUT JAPAN SCHEDULED FOR PURGE

1. Of the 45 directors of prefectural police departments 14 will be affected. (31%)

2. Of the 306 section chiefs of prefectural police departments, 198 will be affected. (65%)

3. Of the 1127 chiefs of police stations 680 will probably be affected.

4. As an overall picture, approximately 60% of the top police executives throughout Japan will be affected.

EXHIBIT 2.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

OUTLINE OF THE BUTOKUKAI (MARTIAL VIRTUES SOCIETY) AND ITS RELATION TO THE PURGE

I. AIM OF THE BUTOKUKAI

The Butokukai was formed by followers of the ancient Japanese art of fencing, judo (jujitsu) and archery and aimed, through improvement in training and technical akill, at fostering a deportment of frugality, chivalry and pride and at elevating character and training of physique. Thus it is neither a political, ideological body nor a militaristic body. As may be seem from its activities neither can it be considered to have taken part in any political or ideological activity nor in carrying out any militaristic or quasi-militaristic training, nor can it be considered that the reform in 1942 produced any basic change in organization or activities. The following attempts to demonstrate this point through a historical survey as well through the reform of 1942 and through their real activities.

II. HISTORY OF THE BUTOKUKAI AND OUTLINE OF THE ACTIVITIES THEREOF.

1. History

a) The old Butokukai.

The Butokukai was established in Kyoto in April 1895 by civilian enthusiasts with the object of building up the physique and mind and the inculcation of curtesy through training in the ancient Japanese Art of fencing,

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

judo (jujitsu) and archery. At that time the Governor of Kyoto Prefecture, Mr. Chiaki WATANABE was made Chairman and leading members were appointed from among the respective spheres and have been instrumental in the advancement and dissemination of these arts. Subsequently, members of the society increased in many localities and the members in the various prefectures formed themselves into branches of the society and thus commenced activities by contributions from members and enthusiasts.

In the prefectures it became customary as in the case of Kyoto, to delegate the head post of the branch to the prefectural governor. With the establishment of the local branches it no longer became appropriate at Kyoto to have its governor as the chairman, and it was decided to ask a senior person to assume it. Accordingly, civilians such as Mr. Shuzo AOKI, the then Foreign Minister and Mr. Kanetake OURA, Minister of Communications were entrusted with the post in the beginning. In 1915, however, the then chairman Viscount OURA in the midst of political turmoil retired from office under a cloud of suspected corruption and thereafter in order to make it a sports organ of true lovers of the martial arts, the choice of a chairman from among politicians was avoided and it was considered appropriate to recommend a retired soldier of high moral character and a non-participant in politics and in 1916 Lieut.-General Nariyuki MIYOSHI was appointed Chairman while subsequently it became customary to appoint retired soldiers of impartial and high integrity and unrelated to politics. Its activities however never at any time exceeded the aims given before and no

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

political or ideological activities were carried out up to and subsequent to the reform of 1942 it remained a purely athletic organization.

b) Reform of 1942.

After the commencement of the pacific war, it was inevitable that the various set ups internally moved to a wartime forting and the Butokukai could claim no exception to this rule, that is on the demand of the military (person responsible at that time was former Lieut.-General Ryukichi TANAKA, Chief of Military Affairs Bureau) and with the object of co-ordinating military arts and of the advancement of bayonet drill and shooting, the Ministry of Welfare, former Surgeon Lieut.-General KOIZUMI) planned to establish a new Martial Arts Organization. Despite strong opposition from the Butokukai which took its stand from its tradition and original mission, it was arbitrarily taken over and the old name of Butokukai was continued, while in addition to fencing, judo and archery (including the arts of scythe, staff and stick wielding) the two arts of bayonet drill and shooting were added, thus culminating in March 1942 in the formation of a new organization as an outer organization of the government. The Prime Minister was appointed Chairman, while the five Ministers of Welfare, Education, War, Navy and Home Affairs, together with one other from academic circles were made Vice-Chairmen. Although the competent minister was the Minister of Welfare, the reasons for the appointment of the arts of students, soldiers and police personnel and the respective ministers concerned were thus made vice-chairmen. As it may be seen later, the activities of the Butokukai differed very little from what they were prior to the

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

surrender.

c) Reform after the surrender.

With the surrender, the Butokukai immediatoly embarked upon wholesale reform in order to efface its abnormal wartime character. Thus it abolished bayonetting and shooting and having reverted to a purely civilian body, it was democratically organized to contribute to the advancement of judo, fencing and archery as a healthy sport. Subsequently stern attention was drawn by the General Headquarters to the existence of certain undesirable persons among the members of the Butokukai. Since however, by the character of this organization it was unable to assume responsibility in the suppression of individual activities of such persons, it took its inevitable step of a voluntary dissolution.

2. The Reform of the Butokukai and its Activities.

a) Central Headquarters.

After this reform the military attempted arbitrarily to disseminate bayonetting and shooting to the youthful group, but the leading members of the old Butokukai who had adhered to fencing, judo and archery of their own free choice, maintained their ground on these old arts and internal harmony could not have been said to have been attained. Thus the military were unsuccessful in their attempt to exercise control over them, with the result that the pivot of Butokukai rested as before on the arts of fencing, judo and archery and its activities differed very little from what they were previous to the reform. In judo and fencing auditoriums were placed at the disposal of a few enthusiasts for entirely voluntary and individual

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

practice and training and forced mass training such as is in the armed forces and schools was never practised while no organized direction and dissemination to the general public was made. As far as Bayonet drill and shooting were concerned they were not practised by the Butokukai, but were given training courses mainly in the Japan War Veterans' Association (Dainippon Zaigo-gunjin kai), Bayonetting Advancement Association, (outer organization of the Zaigo-gunjin-kai), and the Japan Shooting Association (Olympic Member organization) and in schools. The Butokukai merely conducted tests for those who desired them in bayonet drill. Especially in regard to shooting, both training and tests were conducted by the Shooting Association. Bayonet drill and shooting were given no direction or training, while general dissemination to the public was entirely non existent; nor was there any relation between the Butokukai and the training conducted by the schools and War Veterans' Association.

b) Branches.

With the reform of the Butokukai there was a change in the members at headquarters and military personnel on active service were included in part; but the control and management over the branches remained no different from what they were prior to the reform.

As stated before, owing to the gradual increase in the members since the establishment of the Butokukai in 1895, the branches were operated by the members by prefectures through contributions of members and enthusiasts. In the local branches the martial arts were cultivated and maintained, apart from a few enthusiasts, by police officers from the nature of their duties. With regard to the relation between the branches and headquarters

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

the latter merely exercised control in the granting of high gradings. The branches were independent financially of the central headquarters and possessed independent capital and the leading members thereof were appointed by the branch chiefs. Thus the activities of the branches were not bound in any way by headquarters but were operated on a self-regulatory basis. Furthermore, the formations of branches were not confined to this country alone, but branches were established overseas, for example not only in Shanghai and Hankow but also in Southern California and in Seattle.

c) Members.

The members of the Butokukai since its establishment entered the society on a voluntary basis as enthusiasts of the arts and no effects were felt by the reform. The grades of the Butokukai however were granted only to the members thereof. Thus persons holding grades of the Butokukai have first of all to be members, with the result that since a considerable length of time has elapsed since the establishment of the society, the total members thereof reach considerable proportions. These persons however who took a real part in the real activities were but a small minority.

d) Capital.

The capital of headquarters and the branches were respectively independent of each other. The headquarters exercised no control over the assets of the branch. Both headquarters and the branches however, apart from halls built from contributions by members and enthusiasts, generally did not possess capital worth mentioning and the financial status in each of these cases was in considerable difficulties.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE BUTOKUKAI SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS FALLING UNDER PARAGRAPH "C" OF THE PURGE DIRECTIVE.

1. Whether or not to consider the Butokukai as a militaristic or ultra nationalistic body. No qualification is required in that the object of the Purge is in the removal and exclusion from public office of militaristic and ultra nationalistic persons. The organizations under Paragraph "C" must be such that their aims or the results of their activities fall under any one of the items under paragraph 1 of the SCAP Memorandum of January 4, 1946.

The organizations thus far designated as paragraph "C" cases have all possessed aims or activities which fall under the above diqualifying categories. It is a fact however that the Butokukai for circumstances stated before were formed by enthusiasts of the ancient Japanese art of judo, fencing and archery for the purpose of training character in the virtues of curtesy, pride and courage and in the building of moral integrity and physical fitness. Never at any time did the activities of this society exceed the limits of these aims. By the organizational reform of 1942 its organizational formation and activities were seen temporarily to have distorted the original mission and character, but the circumstances leading up to it together with the actual facts of the case were as has been stated before an emanation of wartime abnormality and not the real outcome of the intentions of the Butokukai. Nor were its activities in any close proximity to the pretentions of the military and its basic features were hardly different from these prior to the reform and politico-ideological activities with such interpretation during

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

that period were entirely inconceivable. It is possible that there were persons amongst those who excelled at fencing and judo and who received grades from the Butokukai, who possessed militaristic or agressive thoughts and who were responsible for such activities and it is moreover a fact that persons concerned in the martial arts have been actually warned by the General Headquarters for having exchanged correspondence suspected of such nature since the surrender. It is considered however that these have been the results in many cases of discontent through the loss of livelihood or the part of instructors following on the abolition of the martial arts from school curricula and that a minority of these discontented groups became recklessly directly related to the Butokukai and even if they are members thereof, their unruly conduct is entirely of a personal nature, of which the Butokukai is wholly ignorant. It is not for the Butokukai to assume responsibility for the behavior and actions of a part of its members. Thus it was evident that the Butokukai aimed solely at training in the martial arts for the advancement of the moral character of the individual and in the shaping of the mind and physique. Never did it lend itself to the assertion of aggression or militarism or to acts of violence and thus it cannot be regarded as a militaristic or ultra nationalistic body.

2. Did the Butokukai carry out militaristic or quasi-militaristic training or perpetuate or acts with the object of perpetuating a bellicose spirit.

a) On the occasion of the reform of 1942, as a result of strong pressure from the military, the Butokukai came to handle nominally bayonetting and shooting in addition to judo,

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

fencing and archery. As stated before however, the enthusiasts who adhered to the tradition of the old Butokukai never agreed with the military and in actual fact diverged considerably from the initial intentions of the military. In other words neither bayonetting drill, nor shooting were carried out by the Butokukai, and courses given in these by the Japan War Veteran's Association and in the schools have no relative to the society.

Thus even assuming bayonet exercise and shooting to be militaristic or quasi-militaristic, it would be wrong to assume that the Butokukai engaged in organized and co-ordinated training thereof. It is clearly stretching the point too far to consider shooting as militaristic or quasi-militaristic just as shooting for game-shooting is considered a pleasant sport and is widely acclaimed by peaceloving persons and just as the Japan Shooting Association a member organization of the Olympic Federation can hardly be considered a paragraph "C" case.

b) Ever since its foundation, the Butokukai has it is true been engaged in the advancement of the technique in the ancient Japanese arts of judo, fencing and archery but through the attainment of this technical skill it has never given militaristic or quasi-militaristic training or diffused a bellicose spirit or to have had such aims. As far as the Butokukai was concerned it was essentially athletic organization formed by persons of common leanings resulting in the erection of training halls in the respective branches, where such persons got together for the improvement in technical skill. It was fundamentarily a voluntary organization of enthusiasts with the specific aim of perfection of technique and personal self-improvement.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

Never did it carry out any generally organized directed training, let alone resort to propaganda of technique or training with militaristic motives. Where organized training in judo or fencing was given most were perhaps in the armed forces, schools and police. The courses given in the armed forces and in the schools have no relation with the Butokukai. Among instructors in schools there are some graduates of Martial Arts Technical Schools operated by the Butokukai; but of the 5,000 martial arts instructors at the time of the abolition of martial arts education in schools last autumn they only numbered 800. The relations of these persons to the Butokukai moreover were personal and there is no relation whatsoever between the education given in the martial arts in the schools and the Butokukai itself.

The training given in judo and fencing in the police forces were carried out in consideration of the nature of their duties and the fact that this constituted the chief work in the branches are as stated previously. To regard judo or fencing themselves as something militaristic or quasi-militaristic or bellicose is clearly mistaken just as in the case of shooting. Judo or fencing are no different from boxing or wrestling and on this point there are no reasons for differentiating the society from the Kodokan or other civil training fall.

c) For these reasons even after the organizational reform of 1942, to regard the Butokukai as having carried out militaristic or quasi-militaristic training or aimed at or engaged in the perpetuation of a bellicose spirit, is a conclusion which cannot be said to be based on accurate facts.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

21st July 1947

TO : Chief of Public Peace Section, G.H.Q.

FROM : NAKANISHI Hisao,
Director of Police Affairs Dept.,
Metropolitan Police Board.

SUBJECT: Report on the Purge of police officers once connected with the "Butokukai (Martial Arts) Association and on its possible effects.

We beg to submit for your information a report on the above subject as follows:

1. LIST OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICERS OF M.P.B. ONCE CONNECTED WITH "BUTOKUKAI (Martial Arts) ASSOCIATION.

A. Directors of Departments and others who are above them in rank.

PRESENT POSITION	N A M E	POSITION IN THE BUTOKUKAI ASSN.	PERIOD OF CONNECTION
Police Superintendent General	TOGA Muneo	Vice-chief of Prefectural Branch	For a year and seven months. (From 7th July 1942 to 1st July 1943). As Chief of Yamanashi Prefectural Police. (From 2nd Aug. 1944 to 24th March 1945). As Chief of Ibaraki Prefectural Police.
Director of Police Affairs Dept., M.P.B.	NAKANISHI Hisao	ditto	For two years and a month (from 7th July 1942 to 2nd Aug. 1944) as Chief of Mie Prefectural Police.
Director of Public Peace Dept., M.P.B.	SHIONOYA Takao	ditto	For nine months (from 2nd Aug. 1944 to 21st April 1945) as Chief of Akita Prefectural Police.
Director of Criminal Affairs Dept., M.P.B.	FUJITA Jiro	Director of Prefectural Branch	For a year and six months (from 22nd March 1942 to 9th Sept. 1943) as Chief of School Affairs Section, Fukushima Prefecture.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

B. Officers concerned of section chief class.

PRESENT POSITION	NAME	POSITION IN THE BUTOKUKAI ASSN.	PERIOD OF CONNECTION
Chief of Police Affairs Sect., Police Affairs Dept., M.P.B.	MASUI Shojiro	Director of Prefectural Branch	For a year and five months (from 13th Jan. 1943 to 20th June 1944) as Chief of Police Affairs Sect., Gifu Pref.
Chief of Police Guard Sect., Police Affairs Dept., M.P.B.	SAEGUSA Saburo	ditto	For a year and nine months (from 13th Jan. 1943 to 6th Oct. 1944) as Chief of Police Affairs Sect., Mie Pref.
Chief of 2nd Criminal Investigation Sect., Criminal Affairs Dept., M.P.B.	TAMAMURA Shiichi	ditto	For four months (from 24th July 1942 to 20th Nov. 1942) as Chief of Education Sect., Akita Prefecture).
Chief of Liaison Sect., Secretariate of Police Superintendent General, M.P.B.	WATANABE Minoru	ditto	For seven months (from 1st July 1942 to 20th Jan. 1943) as Chief of Education Sect., Tokushima Prefecture.
Police Supervisor, M.P.B.	MATSUMOTO Kyo	ditto	For a year and five months (from 2nd March 1942 to 31st July 1943) as Chief of Police Affairs Sect., Tokushima Pref.
ditto	FUJISAWA Saburo	ditto	For two years and six months (from 2nd March 1942 to 26th Feb. 1944) as Chief of Police Affairs Sect., Ehime Pref.; (from 26th Feb. 1944 to 19th June 1944) as Chief of Police Affairs Sect., Niigata Pref.

REMARKS:

In the above list the period of connection shows the service term of each person as director or section-chief. The date of the reorganization of the "Butoku-kai" was not the same in all the prefectures, and as a result the actual period of connection in each case is expected to be found much shorter than shown above.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

2. NUMBER OF POLICE OFFICERS CONCERNED, SERVING IN THE POLICE BUREAU OF THE HOME MINISTRY AND THE POLICE DEPARTMENTS OF ALL PREFECTURES, AND THE EXPECTED EFFECT TO BE PRODUCED BY THE DISMISSAL OF THEM.

1) Police Bureau of Home Ministry:

Of 16 persons, including the Director of the Bureau, Chiefs of all sections and school head masters, 8 persons are concerned (50%)

2) Metropolitan Police Board:

Of 7 persons, including the Police Superintendent General and Directors of all departments, 4 persons are concerned (57%).

Of 21 persons of section chief class, 6 persons are concerned (28%).

3) Hokkaido and Prefectural Police Departments:

i) Of 45 directors, 14 are concerned (31%).

ii) Of 306 section chiefs, 198 are presumed to be concerned (65%).

iii) 60% (680 persons) of all police station chiefs numbering 1,127 are presumed to be concerned.

Summing up the above, we can see that as many as 910 (64% of all police executives totaling 1,422 including police station chiefs) are presumed to be concerned.

Dismissal of all these executives would no doubt produce a very bad effect on the whole police. It can be easily presumed, moreover, that it would make the very preservation of public peace difficult.

Further, it is clear that we should be confronted by a difficulty of filling up the vacant positions.

Police experts are already decreased by the simultaneous dismissal executed in accordance with the Memorandum regarding the abolition of all limitation to political, civil, and religious freedom.

If the dismissal of police officers who were once connected with "Butokukai" Association were really brought to effect, it would be extremely difficult to fill up the position not only of the highest executives but also of the police station chiefs. As a result, we should be forced to fill them with those who are not competent.-- for example, with such officers as are wanting in experience or in ability, especially in administrative abilities -- which would wreck the efficiency of police. There may be some prefectural police departments which would lose all the executive officers and more than half of the police station chiefs.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

3. REAL SITUATION OF M.P.B.

M.P.B. being not only the police board controlling the Metropolitan police affairs but also the rallying center of all the criminal investigations throughout the country, the positions of officers of this Board, especially of executive officers, have usually been filled with those selected from among the most competent executives of the prefectural police departments. So, if all the police officers who were connected with "Butokukai" Association were dismissed simultaneously, Police Superintendent and the brains of this Board -- Director of Police Affairs Department who is the mainstay of police administration, Director of Criminal Affairs who is in charge of crime investigation which is indespensable for maintainance of public peace and Director of Public Peace Department engaging in the hardest business of controlling the economic field which has been utterly confused since the cessation of hostility -- would all leave their position. As to the persons of section chief class, Chief of the Police Affairs Section who is the direct administrator of police, Chief of Police Guard Section and Chief of 2nd Criminal Investigation Section -- both are in charge of regulating people directly and maintaining social peace, and the Chief Police Supervisor and an attache who are expected to play the most important role for police reform -- these important positions in this Board would all become vacant. The difficulty of filling these positions would prevent us from reforming and strengthening the police. Sweeping purge of officers of important positions would depress the spirits of all police officers and make the whole system incompetent again which is about to recover from the bad conditions in which it has remained plunged since the termination of war. We are afraid, too, that the sweeping dismissal of executives would hinder us from securing the very public peace on which Japan should be rebuilt as a civilized nation, the accomplishment of which is the earnest desire of us Japanese people.

4. Furthermore, when the matter is studied from the viewpoint of the preservation of public peace in general, as well as from that of the police system itself,

a) The first -- and perhaps the most serious -- question to be considered is: How is public peace to be preserved in immediate future when all the persons involved be dismissed? The condition of public peace, which looks superficially to have attained a temporary calm, is in reality far from such as may be called satisfactory in any sense. With the progress of inflation and consequent stress upon life there are to be perceived some grave signs of various social problems smouldering to burst out into blaze at any moment. It needs no vivid imagination to foresee that the near future of our country will surely witness a series of social upheavals affecting public peace most seriously.

With the February 1 general strike abortion as a turning point Japanese labor disputes changed their character, much less in number and far more peaceful on the surface. Mass move-

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

ments of various kinds, too, appear to have retained hitherto a peaceful and orderly character. But with the progress of inflation and the worsening of food shortage, a possibility of violent outburst of hungry masses is not to be put out of thought. It shall be a matter of grave concern how the masses, despairing of successful party politics through parliamental measures, may go drifting and into what channels of thought and action they may be led, as well as how the former militarists and ultra-nationalists, deeply dissatisfied with the present state of their half-destroyed fatherland, may find means to give vent to their stifled sense of humiliation and anger.

Unfortunately, at this very juncture the Home Ministry is going to be liquidated as a process of political democratization, and the wholesale dismissal of such police high-ranking officials as were connected with the "Butoku-kai" Association is going to be carried out. It means not only a lowering of morale and a deepening sense of instability among police officials who form the kernel power of maintaining peaceful social order, but also a loss of police experts to such an extent that it is almost hapeless to expect a safe execution of responsible police duties in the field of general peace preservation in immediate future.

In 1919 rice riots occurred throughout Japan, and their origin was to be found in the gossip of household wives in Toyama prefecture. The work of police, who make it their duty to prevent and suppress all the criminal tendencies in fluid society, is indeed an onerous one, it being necessary to keep a watchful eye over the whole aspect of ever-changing society and to apply their expert technique with a definite conviction based on a clear grasp of the actual movements of the people's mind. Order and security in society is precariously maintained only through such vigilant efforts of expert police straining themselves for the attainment of general happiness.

If over 60% of such expert police officials as form the executive nuclei of the Metropolitan Police Board, and of the Police Bureau of Home Ministry, as well as of the prefectural police departments, be purged at a blow, the whole system of Japanese police will again be plunged into such a chaos and disorder as may lead to some grave consequences in the all-important preservation of public peace in immediate future which cannot fail to materially affect the successful realization of ~~ultimately~~ the Allied Occupation policies by making a vacancy of those positions which are ultimately responsible for the preservation of public peace and the maintenance of social order.

b) In the second place, perhaps the most difficult question resulting from the wholesale dismissal throughout the country of those who are truly fit to take the highest responsibility of police affairs in Metropolitan as well as in Prefectural Governments, is that of filling vacant positions. The coming purge will cripple the efficiency of Metropolitan as well as Prefectural police so much that it will become all but impossible to fill the vacancy with any competent personnel for some time. The result will be contrary to one that

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

has been sought after, I fear. Repeated purges have already robbed us of those most competent and fitted for the highest positions. It is by no means desirable now to lost such expert officials as were nothing but puppets and figure-heads though nominally forming the highest staff of the "Butoku-kai" Associations. As a result of the coming purge there may well be found such extreme cases in the provinces as will mean a virtual stoppage of all police activities. Not only that, but there is a great danger of leaving a permanent source of evil preventing the reconstruction of Japan as a peaceful democracy in future.

As it is, my firm belief is that the purge will not bring with it any beneficial effect upon the successful carrying-out of the Allied occupation policies.

Of course, it is necessary to push on democratization in political as well as administrative circles for the future benefit of Japan no less than for the fulfillment of occupation policies, but such a formal democratization, as the coming purge of the "Butoku-kai" officials means, will, I have much fear, entail an effect quite contrary to that intended for, strengthening, rather than weakening, in general the totalitarian tendencies of society.

The democratization of police, above all, will be effectively carried out only when the whole system of police is so established as to enable it to perform its duties to perfection as an organ independent of politics and solely devoted to the support and vindication of fundamental human rights, and is given a proper supervision and guidance.

FOR REFERENCE:

1. When the "Butoku-kai" purge is compared with those of the Sangyo Kokoku-kai (Industrial Patriotic Association), the Rodo Hokoku-kai (Labor Patriotic Association), the Nogyo Hokoku-kai (Agricultural Patriotic Association), or the Genron Hokoku-kai (Patriotic Association of Journalists & Authors), one cannot but be struck with the extreme impartiality. While in the latter cases the purge did not extend beyong prefectural chiefs, who were governors, in the former even the chiefs of the smallest area-branches are to be purged.

2. The relation between the Japanese police and the Butokukai was of far older standing than the so-called Greater East War. Ken-jitsu (swordmanship) and Jujitsu (way of single combat without weapons) were necessary arts for policemen, and and so police chiefs were appointed nominal officials of the Martial Arts Association without any real functions but encouraging policemen to exercise their necessary arts and to keep themselves ever fit for the execution of their duties.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

There was no instance of their enforcing the general cultivation of martial arts or of their preaching an aggressive nationalism on a system of national authority and legal compulsion. Even after the reorganization by Tojo, the actual case remained the same, and it was by a special order of the Army that Juken Jitsu (art of thrusting with a bayonet) and gun-shooting were included among the so-called Martial Arts. Moreover, those new types of martial arts were chiefly practised and superintended by the members of the Zaigo Gunjin-kai (Veterans' Association).

Preceding to the Tojo reform, there were frequent instances of friction between the Butoku-kai and its antagonistic association called the Juken-do Shinko-kai (Association for Encouraging Bayonet-Thrusting) which was composed of the Vet Association members. By the Tojo reform it was intended that the source of this friction might be eradicated by including bayonet-thrusting and gun-shooting among martial arts.

But these new types of martial arts, the practice of which was necessitated by the war, were in no way imposed forcibly upon people by those staff officials under prefectural governors composed of directors of police departments and home administration departments.

In reality these new martial arts were popularized by the Vet Association members grouped under regimental district commanders.

There was not a single instance where a police chief, who was the chief of area-branch, took the initiative in the propagation of these new types of martial arts. Police chiefs did nothing but despatch their nominal functions as area-branch chief in supervising the practice of old swordmanship and Jujitsu (sometimes such quaint art of archery) as policemen's necessary arts and as means of keeping their mind and body ever fit for the proper performance of their duties.

Thus the purge of the Butoku-kai officials is a demand of sacrifice to be solely borne by those who did nothing in practice for the advancement of sheer militarism and jingoism. I cannot help expressing my deep regret when I see an extreme impartiality with which the Butoku-kai officials are treated in comparison with those connected with other organizations under purge-directives.

Let me add one more word in conclusion. It is often said that the Butoku-kai was a national organization dedicated to militarism and its proselytization, but the former area-chiefs and other officials have at present no memory whatever of what they did during their office-terms, and have been reduced to a nonplus by the recent purge directive.

We have done nothing that leaves a guilty conscience, nor anything in the way of enforcing the practice of martial arts compulsory with peaceful citizens in general. It is particularly worthy of notice that the majority of such nominal officials of the Butoku-kai as are going to be

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

purged know nothing of what martial arts mean or do not know how to handle bamboo swords or how to throw a person according to the rules of Jujitsu.

In order to play an active role in the technical practice and positive encouragement of martial arts, some knowledge at least of these arts will be required. It is strange and quite incomprehensible that those who were mere nominal officials without any actual knowledge of the arts are to be purged as responsible persons who played active parts in the positive work of their advancement.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Civil Intelligence Section, G-2
PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION

APO 500
25 July 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Police Purge Dai Nihon Butoku Kai (Great Military Virtues Society)

1. Commanding General, 8th Army, is seriously concerned with respect to the far-reaching effect the Butoku Kai purge will have on the Japanese police. The force at present is dangerously low in experienced police officials of the higher grades and that further loss in this bracket would mean the difference between the preservation of law and order among the civilian population and the use of occupation troops to restore law and order.

2. The five million repatriated, demobilized ex-soldiers, disillusioned and jobless, are easy prey to subversive ideas and may well become a social problem. The occupation force, plus the semi-trained Japanese police of 93,935, represents the physical force for seventy-three million people. Further losses of capable and experienced police personnel serves only to aggravate the seriousness of this situation.

3. The Commanding General, 8th Army, is charged with operational control of Japanese police and for the preservation of law and order throughout Japan. He has repeatedly voiced concern over the inexperience and length of service of the higher police officials to cope with the growing lawlessness of gangster elements. He has consistently maintained that the police should be the stabilizing force for the civilian population and that further losses of experienced police by purge be reduced to a minimum.

4. The Commanding General, 8th Army, is opposed to any blanket action of purge affecting the Japanese police. Judicial use of individual case action should be the guiding principle.

5. The Commanding General, 8th Army, recommends:

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

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4. The Commanding General, 8th Army, is opposed to any blanket action of purge affecting the Japanese police. Judicial use of individual case action should be the guiding principle.

5. The Commanding General, 8th Army, recommends:

a. That the Butoku Kai purge, directed by the Government Section, SCAP, be suspended from specific application of the Japanese police force.

b. That individual case action only be applied in aggravated instances.

H. E. Pulliam,
H. E. PULLIAM
Colonel, (GSC)
Chief, Public Safety Division

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

RESTRICTED

JAPANESE CRIME STATISTICS

A. JAPANESE CRIME STATISTICS
OFFENSES AGAINST THE CRIMINAL CODE

1. 1924 — 1946



2. JANUARY 1945 — MAY 1947

B. JAPANESE CRIME RATE
(OFFENSES AGAINST THE CRIMINAL CODE)

BY PREFECTURE

MAY 1947



MAY NATIONAL RATE: 152



C. OFFENSES REPORTED
BY OFFENSE, BY MONTH

1947



NUMBER OF OFFENSES REPORTED DURING
MAY 1947
BY TYPE, BY PREFECTURE

Prefecture	Against Criminal Code: Person	Property	Others	Total	Other Than Criminal Code	Grand Total
Hokaido	77	4,751	274	5,102	2,146	7,248
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	619	400	1,019

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009



C. OFFENSES REPORTED BY OFFENSE, BY MONTH 1947





NUMBER OF OFFENSES REPORTED DURING
MAY 1947
BY TYPE, BY PREFECTURE

Prefecture	Against Criminal Code: Person	Against Criminal Code: Property	Against Criminal Code: Others	Against Criminal Code: Total	Other Than Criminal Code	Grand Total
Hokkaido	77	4,751	274	5,202	2,146	7,348
Aomori	35	531	50	619	400	1,019
Iwate	20	651	72	743	995	1,738
Miyagi	40	1,211	59	1,310	1,277	2,587
Akita	26	534	40	598	853	1,451
Yamagata	16	504	16	536	253	824
Fukushima	48	1,650	99	1,797	778	2,575
Ibaraki	74	1,087	243	1,404	434	1,838
Tochigi	31	1,036	100	1,167	495	1,662
Gunma	65	1,923	41	2,024	761	2,795
Saitama	66	3,156	70	3,292	634	3,926
Chiba	89	1,633	155	1,877	317	2,194
Tokyo	203	10,510	806	11,518	896	12,414
Kanagawa	82	2,900	102	3,084	342	3,426
Niigata	43	1,971	69	2,083	1,806	3,621
Toyama	16	563	26	607	1,682	2,289
Ishikawa	6	973	10	989	167	1,156
Fukui	16	630	15	711	190	901
Yamanashi	22	612	53	687	197	884
Nagano	39	1,566	102	1,707	721	2,428
Gifu	16	1,560	70	1,653	274	1,927
Shizuoka	25	2,474	106	*2,605	863	3,468
Aichi	64	7,409	257	7,730	2,729	10,459
Mie	25	1,106	57	1,188	298	2,186
Shiga	3	488	100	591	285	873
Kyoto	73	4,980	75	5,098	993	6,091
Osaka	136	10,267	205	10,598	958	11,652
Hyogo	121	5,763	162	6,046	2,635	8,681
Nara	17	819	26	863	198	1,060
Wakayama	36	1,838	64	1,938	283	2,221
Tottori	18	581	19	618	234	852
Shimane	11	439	38	488	528	1,016
Okayama	73	2,724	102	2,899	279	3,178
Hiroshima	58	2,750	101	2,909	767	3,676
Yamaguchi	67	3,473	99	3,639	842	4,481
Tokushima	7	316	68	391	618	1,009
Kagawa	16	853	11	880	397	1,277
Ehime	40	1,268	40	1,348	458	1,806
Kochi	20	525	31	576	655	1,231
Fukuoka	108	6,593	129	6,830	1,745	8,607
Saga	22	708	45	823	460	1,283
Nagasaki	30	1,655	344	2,029	266	2,295
Kumamoto	69	2,422	67	2,558	690	3,248
Oita	37	1,056	59	1,152	421	1,573
Miyazaki	11	903	35	949	338	1,287
Kagoshima	40	1,507	88	1,635	978	2,613
TOTAL	2,145	104,069	4,724	110,938	35,097	146,045

SOURCE: MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS

GRAPH NO. I

RESTRICTED

PREPARED BY: PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

JAPANESE POLICE

PREFECTURE	POPULATION	NUMBER OF POLICEMEN	NUMBER PEOPLE TO ONE POLICEMAN	M.
HOKKAIDO (1)	3,488,013	3,595	970	8
AOMORI	1,089,232	953	1,143	—
IWATE	1,217,070	890	1,367	—
MIYAGI	1,462,100	1,384	1,056	21
AKITA	1,195,813	869	1,392	—
YAMAGATA	1,294,934	1,141	1,135	—
FUKUSHIMA	1,918,746	1,260	1,523	—
IBARAKI	1,940,833	1,547	1,255	—
TOCHIGI	1,503,619	1,148	1,310	—
GUMMA	1,524,635	1,131	1,348	—
SAITAMA	2,028,553	1,357	1,495	10
CHIBA	2,008,114	1,686	1,191	—
TOKYO	4,183,072	18,315	228	92
KANAGAWA	2,019,943	3,668	551	1,06
NIIGATA	2,326,811	1,707	1,363	—
TOYAMA	932,669	880	1,060	—
ISHIKAWA	877,197	958	916	—
FUKUI	695,703	764	911	—
YAMANASHI	796,973	713	1,118	—
NAGANO	2,028,235	1,390	1,459	—
GIFU	1,444,000	946	1,526	—
SHIZUOKA	2,260,059	1,622	1,393	—
AICHI	2,919,085	4,329	674	35
MIE	1,371,858	1,135	1,209	—
SHIGA	831,306	706	1,177	—
KYOTO	1,621,998	2,489	652	6
OSAKA	2,976,140	6,814	437	10
HYOGO	2,826,192	4,330	653	47
NARA	744,381	700	1,063	—
WAKAYAMA	933,231	1,086	859	—
TOTTORI	557,429	579	963	—
SHIMANE	848,995	739	1,149	—
OKAYAMA	1,538,621	1,377	1,117	—
HIROSHIMA	1,901,430	1,841	1,033	—
YAMAGUCHI	1,375,472	1,839	748	—
TOKUSHIMA	828,784	756	1,096	—

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SE POLICE				MILITARY FORCES GROUND ARMS	
ER PLE TO ONE ICEMAN	M.P.	CIC	MIL. GOVT.	GROUND ARM TROOPS (2)	TOTAL
970	86	56	69	4,784	4,995
143	—	9	39	2,482	2,530
367	—	10	33	76	119
056	218	16	75	3,437	3,746
392	—	13	33	—	46
135	—	10	39	2,174	2,223
523	—	11	33	—	44
255	—	13	33	—	46
310	—	12	33	—	45
348	—	12	39	1,676	1,727
495	106	13	69	5,069	5,257
191	—	14	33	—	47
228	923	97	76	3,587	4,683
551	1,060	48	94	6,591	7,793
363	—	14	33	—	47
060	—	3	33	—	36
916	—	13	33	—	46
911	—	4	26	—	30
118	—	10	33	—	43
459	—	14	33	—	47
526	—	3	33	3,475	3,511
393	—	12	33	—	45
674	351	19	69	10	449
209	—	15	33	—	48
177	—	4	26	2,350	2,380
652	65	23	80	860	1,028
437	106	24	44	5,094	5,268
653	471	21	39	524	1,055
063	—	5	26	1,676	1,707
859	—	4	26	—	30
963	—	4	26	934	964
149	—	5	26	1,111	1,142
117	—	11	33	2,684	2,728
033	—	16	69	5,673	5,758
748	—	15	33	3,351	3,399
096	—	5	26	341	372
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

MILITARY FORCES GROUND ARMS

GOVT.	GROUND ARM TROOPS (2)	TOTAL	NO. PEOPLE TO ONE GRD, ARM SOLDIER	NO. PEOPLE TO ONE COMBINED GRD. ARM SOLDIER & POLICEMAN
9	4,784	4,995	698	406
9	2,482	2,530	430	313
3	76	119	10,227	1,206
5	3,437	3,746	390	285
3	—	46	25,995	1,306
9	2,174	2,223	583	385
3	—	44	43,607	1,471
3	—	46	42,192	1,218
3	—	45	33,413	1,260
9	1,676	1,727	882	533
9	5,069	5,257	385	307
3	—	47	42,725	1,159
6	3,587	4,683	893	182
4	6,591	7,793	259	176
3	—	47	49,506	1,327
3	—	36	25,907	1,018
3	—	46	19,070	874
6	—	30	23,190	876
3	—	43	18,534	1,054
3	—	47	43,153	1,411
3	3,475	3,511	411	324
3	—	45	50,224	1,356
9	10	449	6,501	611
3	—	48	28,580	1,160
6	2,350	2,380	349	269
0	860	1,028	1,578	461
4	5,094	5,268	564	246
9	524	1,055	2,678	525
6	1,676	1,707	436	309
6	—	30	31,108	836
6	934	964	578	361
6	1,111	1,142	743	451
3	2,684	2,728	564	375
9	5,673	5,758	330	250
3	3,351	3,399	408	263
6	341	372	2,226	735
6	75	143	6,100	1,025

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CHIBA	2,006,114	1,686	1,191	
TOKYO	4,183,072	18,315	228	9
KANAGAWA	2,019,943	3,668	551	1,0
NIIGATA	2,326,811	1,707	1,363	
TOYAMA	932,669	880	1,060	
ISHIKAWA	877,197	958	916	
FUKUI	695,703	764	911	
YAMANASHI	796,973	713	1,118	
NAGANO	2,028,235	1,390	1,459	
GIFU	1,444,000	946	1,526	
SHIZUOKA	2,260,059	1,622	1,393	
AICHI	2,919,085	4,329	674	3
MIE	1,371,858	1,135	1,209	
SHIGA	831,306	706	1,177	
KYOTO	1,621,998	2,489	652	
OSAKA	2,976,140	6,814	437	1
HYOGO	2,826,192	4,330	653	4
NARA	744,381	700	1,063	
WAKAYAMA	933,231	1,086	859	
TOTTORI	557,429	579	963	
SHIMANE	848,995	739	1,149	
OKAYAMA	1,538,621	1,377	1,117	
HIROSHIMA	1,901,430	1,841	1,033	
YAMAGUCHI	1,375,472	1,839	748	
TOKUSHIMA	828,784	756	1,096	
KAGAWA	872,312	708	1,232	
EHIME	1,380,700	1,100	1,255	
KOCHI	797,876	812	983	
FUKUOKA	2,906,644	3,969	732	1
SAGA	856,692	860	996	
NAGASAKI	1,417,924	1,945	729	
KUMAMOTO	1,631,976	1,403	1,163	
OITA	1,148,009	1,007	1,140	
MIYAZAKI	957,856	869	1,102	
KAGOSHIMA	1,629,760	1,233	1,322	
TOTAL	73,110,995	90,550	807	3,4

(1) ALL ~~PREFECTURES~~ districts IN HOKKAIDO CONSOLIDATED UNDER THIS ONE ENTRY.

(2) MILITARY STRENGTH FIGURES SECURED FROM G-2 SOURCE AND ARE T/O STRENGTHS OF VARIOUS UNITS CONSIDERED AVAILABLE FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS STUDY. THE FOLLOWING TYPE UNITS WERE CONSIDERED:

(A) ORGANIC DIVISIONAL TROOPS OF ALL BRANCHES
(B) MILITARY GOVERNMENT UNITS INCLUDING MILITARY PERSONNEL ONL
(C) AAA, AGF CHEMICAL AND ARMORED
(D) CORPS M.P. PLATOONS
(E) NON-DIVISIONAL M.P. PERSONNEL
(F) BULK OVERHEAD M.P. PERSONNEL
(G) B.C.O.F. FIGHTING FORCES

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

,191	—	—	—		
228	923	97	76	3,587	4,683
551	1,060	48	94	6,591	7,793
1,363	—	14	33	—	47
1,060	—	3	33	—	36
916	—	13	33	—	46
911	—	4	26	—	30
1,118	—	10	33	—	43
1,459	—	14	33	—	47
1,526	—	3	33	3,475	3,511
1,393	—	12	33	—	45
674	351	19	69	10	449
1,209	—	15	33	—	48
1,177	—	4	26	2,350	2,380
652	65	23	80	860	1,028
437	106	24	44	5,094	5,268
653	471	21	39	524	1,055
1,063	—	5	26	1,676	1,707
859	—	4	26	—	30
963	—	4	26	934	964
1,149	—	5	26	1,111	1,142
1,117	—	11	33	2,684	2,728
1,033	—	16	69	5,673	5,758
748	—	15	33	3,351	3,399
1,096	—	5	26	341	372
1,232	—	12	56	75	143
1,255	—	7	33	—	40
983	—	5	26	43	74
732	106	21	69	4,349	4,545
996	—	7	26	—	33
729	—	6	39	3,210	3,255
1,163	—	31	33	3,210	3,274
1,140	—	9	33	3,210	3,252
1,102	—	7	26	—	33
1,322	—	9	33	—	42
807	3,492	692	1,885	72,056	78,125

IS ONE ENTRY.

AND ARE T/O
OR THE PURPOSES
SIDERED:

NCHES
MILITARY PERSONNEL ONLY

SECRET

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76	3,587	4,683	893	182
94	6,591	7,793	259	176
33	—	47	49,506	1,327
33	—	36	25,907	1,018
33	—	46	19,070	874
26	—	30	23,190	876
33	—	43	18,534	1,054
33	—	47	43,153	1,411
33	3,475	3,511	411	324
33	—	45	50,224	1,356
69	10	449	6,501	611
33	—	48	28,580	1,160
26	2,350	2,380	349	269
80	860	1,028	1,578	461
44	5,094	5,268	564	246
39	524	1,055	2,678	525
26	1,676	1,707	436	309
26	—	30	31,108	836
26	934	964	578	361
26	1,111	1,142	743	451
33	2,684	2,728	564	375
69	5,673	5,758	330	250
33	3,351	3,399	408	263
26	341	372	2,226	735
56	75	143	6,100	1,025
33	—	40	34,517	1,211
26	43	74	10,782	900
69	4,349	4,545	639	341
26	—	33	25,960	959
39	3,210	3,255	439	273
33	3,210	3,274	498	349
33	3,210	3,252	350	270
26	—	33	2,902	1,062
33	—	42	38,804	1,278
1,885	72,056	78,125	AVG. 936	AVG. 433

ANALYSIS OF POPULATION

MILITARY & POLICE

STRENGTH BY PREFECTURE

SECRET

DENSITY OF DEMOBILIZED
JAPANESE SOLDIERS
BY PREFECTURE

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

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

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

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

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

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GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF KOREANS IN JAPAN BY PREFECTURE

FOREIGN NATIONALS IN JAPAN





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