

Doc. 2001

(191)

C E R T I F I C A T E

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Washington, D. C.


KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

That I, Jesse L. Ward, certify that I am Senior Partner of the firm of WARD & PAUL, court reporters, whose address is 1760 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.; that our said firm was engaged by the Joint Committee of the Congress of the United States as official reporter to take and report the proceedings of the hearings held before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Senate Congressional Resolution 27, and that the published report in Volumes 1 to 71, inclusive, pages 1 to 14765, inclusive, comprise a full, complete, and correct report of the proceedings, including all of the testimony of the witnesses given at the hearings held before said Joint Committee, and I do so certify.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto signed the name of WARD & PAUL at the City of Washington, in the District of Columbia, United States of America, on this 15th day of July, 1946.

WARD & PAUL

By


Senior Partner

444

C E R T I F I C A T E

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)
CITY OF WASHINGTON)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA)

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

That I, Filo Bratten, hereby certify that I am Secretary (Clerk) of the duly constituted Joint Committee of the Congress of the United States on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Senate Congressional Resolution 27, and as such am the keeper of the documents and records of said Committee; that Ward & Paul (Electroreporters, Inc.), 1760 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C., official reporters, were duly engaged by said Joint Committee to report the proceedings held at the hearings before said Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack; that the report of the said reporters, in Volumes 1 to 71, inclusive contained, and comprising pages 1 to 14765, inclusive, is the report duly prepared and returned to my office by said firm of reporters; that it has been duly filed therein as an official and authentic document and report of said hearings, and that the copies of the same transmitted to Joseph B. Keenan, Chief of Counsel of the International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP, Tokyo, Japan, constitute a true and correct and official copy of the same.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my name and official seal in the City of Washington, District of Columbia, United States of America, on this 15th day of July, 1946.

Filo Bratten
(Name and Official Title)
Executive Secretary

200-2071

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2001-2070 Inc.

Date: 20 June 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Copies, Report of Investigation of Pearl Harbor Attack (70 Vols).

Date: 1945-1946 Original Copy Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Archives, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: National War Crimes Office, JAGD, Washington, D. C.

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Attack on Pearl Harbor, Relations with G. D. and U. S.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

An official publication of Congress covering the Joint Committee Investigation of the Attack on Pearl Harbor.

(2001 - Vol. 1) (2002 - Vol. 2) (2003 - Vol. 3) etc.

(2068-2069-2070) Volumes 68, 69 and 70 have not yet been received, but these numbers are reserved for them.

Analyst: C. J. Phelps

Doc. No. 2001-2070 Inc.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. ⁷⁰ 2001-2007 (incl.) Date 30 May 46

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Copies, Report of Investigation of Pearl Harbor Attack (70 vols).

Date: 1945, 1946 Original () Copy (X) Language: Eng

Has it been translated? Yes () No (X)
Has it been photostated? Yes () No (X)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Archives, Library of Congress, Wash., D.C.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Natl. War Crimes Office, JAGD, Wash., D.C.

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Attack on Pearl Harbor; Relations with G.B. + U.S.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

An official publication of Congress covering the Joint Committee Investigation of the Attack on Pearl Harbor.

(2001 - vol 1
2002 - vol 2
2003 - vol 3, etc)

2068-69+70 - Vols 68, 69+70

Analyst: CW Phelps

yet been received, but these are reserved for them. Doc. No.

Doc # 2001

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Vol. 1

Congress of the United States

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Joint Committee
on the
Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
S. Con. Res. 27

November 15, 1945

Washington, D. C.

Pages: 1 to 186

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4267
4268

WARD & PAUL
(ELECTREPORTER, INC.)
OFFICIAL REPORTERS
1760 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N. W.
WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

Joint Pearl
Harbor Invest-
igating Com.
11/15/45

C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF:

PAGE

Corrected
11/17/45

INGLIS, Rear Admiral T.B., and
THIELEN, Colonel Bernard

41

Please insert
in your copy
of Transcript

EXHIBITS

NUMBER

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S. Con. Res. 27

- - -

Thursday, November 15, 1945

Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation of Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m.,
in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator

Alben W. Bumpus, Chairman

Alben W. Bumpus,
Brewster, C.

PEARL HARBOR REPORT
VOL. I

(5)

George, Lucas,

(vice chairman), Clark,

Murphy, George

Also

, General Counsel;

Gerhard A. Bumpus,

and John E. Masten, of

counsel, for

WARD S. PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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S. Con. Res. 27

- - -

Thursday, November 15, 1945

Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation of Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m.,
in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator
Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,
Brewster, and Ferguson.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark,
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel;
Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of
counsel, for the joint committee.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

2 All those in the auditorium will please be seated.

3 Before we start, the Chair desires to admonish the
4 audience that we are glad to have them here, but in view of
5 the difficult acoustics in this room, it will make it neces-
6 sary for the committee to use these microphones. We must
7 ask the audience to refrain from any sort of conversation or
8 any sort of demonstration during these hearings, any applauses
9 or otherwise.

10 Also I think it is advisable to say to our friends,
11 the photographers, we are glad to cooperate with you in
12 getting all the pictures you may wish to take so long as
13 it does not interfere with these hearings.

14 During the testimony, while the witnesses are on the
15 stand, the photographers will not be permitted to occupy
16 this space here in front of the committee.

17 Take whatever pictures you want to take and then leave
18 this congested area here.

19 The last time I sat on a committee in this room, I
20 could not see the witness half the time, because of the
21 photographers standing between me and the witness, trying
22 to take him with his hands up, or something like that.

23 We must insist that during these hearings, while the
24 witness is on the stand and testifying, that the photographers
25 will not occupy this space between the committee and the

1 witness and counsel.

2 I want to make that announcement in advance so that
3 there will not be any misunderstanding. It applies to
4 everybody alike.

5 I believe the members of the committee are all here.

6 Mr. Mitchell, as counsel for the committee, we are
7 ready to proceed.

8 Mr. Mitchell: Mr. Chairman --

9 Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, before you proceed,
10 I would like to make one comment for myself and others. I
11 want to record my regret and protest, at the start of the
12 hearings at this time, and as has previously been said, and
13 I would like to have that entered in the record, and that is
14 this:

15 It has only been within the past week that the members
16 of the Executive Department have had the permission, under
17 notification of the President's Order to submit the exhibits
18 so they will be in the best order, and I have been given a
19 stack of papers, over a thousand pages, which it is essential
20 to go over in order to conduct any intelligent cross examina-
21 tion.

22 I hope my fears will be disappointed, my fears that
23 this will result in confusion and delay, but I do think it
24 ought to be made a matter of record at this time that we
25 regret this somewhat premature beginning of this inquiry.

1 The Chairman: The Chair desires to be reasonable in
2 regard to that. The committee at one time, some two or three
3 weeks ago, I forget the date, unanimously decided to begin
4 hearings today, that is, those who voted.

5 Senator Ferguson: I would like the record to show
6 that --

7 The Chairman: Those who voted in the committee, voted
8 without dissent to begin the hearing today. Two members
9 were absent and two were present and not voting.

10 At a meeting later, a week ago, or a week or ten days
11 ago, a motion was made to postpone the hearings from today
12 until the 23rd day of November, which is the day following
13 Thanksgiving, and that motion was voted down.

14 The situation that confronts us, that confronts all of
15 the members of the committee is that documents have been
16 given to us as quickly and as practicably as counsel obtained
17 them. Inasmuch as these hearings will probably last several
18 weeks, it occurred to the Chair that we will have, as we
19 go along, ample opportunity to familiarize ourselves with
20 the testimony brought before us today, without attempting
21 to read any documents before we begin.

22 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a
23 statement on the record.

24 The Chairman: Yes, go ahead.

25 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I had made a request

1 previously that the committee be furnished these exhibit
2 copies at least ten days prior to the hearing. If I had
3 had some assistance, I would have been able to have carried
4 down the exhibits that had been given to me on Wednesday and
5 on Tuesday. Over a thousand of them have been placed in our
6 hands. Many of them it is impossible to read because of the
7 job of photostating them. Therefore, it is just a physical
8 impossibility to go over the papers prior to this hearing.

9 While I will do my very best, I do want the record to
10 show that we have not had these exhibits in this form properly
11 indexed.

12 Here is the first one. It is over 200 pages, and no
13 index to it. It has been just a physical impossibility to
14 go over them intelligently, although I want to say on the
15 record, I will do my best to go over them as the hearing
16 goes along, and it may be essential that we recall witnesses
17 in order that we may properly examine and obtain all of the
18 facts.

19 The Chairman: Of course, if I may say so, there would
20 be no objection to recalling any witness by the committee.
21 The exhibits were given to all members at a given time. They
22 have been given to members as soon as it was possible, and
23 as fast as it was possible to obtain them. There are large
24 quantities of them. We are all laboring under the same
25 handicap, that we have not been able to read them all since

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we got them.

As I said a moment ago, I think as the hearings go on, we can familiarize ourselves with them sufficiently to permit us to know each day what would be expected in the way of testimony, and prepare for that day.

Senator Ferguson: The record ought to also show that I have made many requests for other things. We do not have all the files here at the present time.

The Chairman: In order that the record may be correct, as the requests have been made, the records have been sought, and have been either delivered, or are in the process of preparation. It is manifestly impossible to provide all the exhibits at one time. As soon as they were ready, they have been delivered to the committee, as soon as they could be obtained.

Senator Ferguson: May I understand that it is a fact as to the exhibits that have been requested, that the staff has them but they are not at the present time ready for delivery? That is my understanding.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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The Chairman: The committee has no way to know what personal requests have been made either in writing or orally by members of the committee to the counsel, by individual members. Counsel explained to the committee that as fast as these exhibits could be obtained and could be copied for each Member and for others, that they would be supplied.

Now, Mr. Mitchell, will you proceed?

Mr. Mitchell: Mr. Chairman, to open the record, there are some informal matters. I have some documents --

Senator Brewster: Before he proceeds, I renew my motion.

The Chairman: Let's have order, please, in the Committee Room.

Mr. Mitchell.

Mr. Mitchell: Mr. Chairman, to open the record formally, there are a few documents that should be entered.

The Chairman: Very well.

Mr. Mitchell: First is the concurrent resolution of the Senate under which the committee was organized.

(S. Con. Res. 27 is as follows:)

79th Congress
1st Session

S. CON. RES. 27

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

September 6, 1945

Mr. Barkley submitted the following concurrent resolution;

which was considered, modified, and agreed to

September 11, 1945

LaCharity
(1)

WARD A. PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

House concurs

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

1
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3 Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives
4 concurring), That there is hereby established a joint com-
5 mittee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, to
6 be composed of five Members of the Senate (not more than
7 three of whom shall be members of the majority party), to
8 be appointed by the President pro tempore, and five Mem-
9 bers of the House of Representatives (not more than three
10 of whom shall be members of the majority party), to be
11 appointed by the Speaker of the House. Vacancies in the
12 membership of the committee shall not affect the power
13 of the remaining members to execute the functions of the
14 committee, and shall be filled in the same manner as in
15 the case of the original selection. The committee shall
16 select a chairman and a vice chairman from among its
17 members.

18 SEC. 2. The committee shall make a full and complete
19 investigation of the facts relating to the events and circum-
20 stances leading up to or following the attack made by Japa-
21 nese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of
22 Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and shall report to the Senate
23 and the House of Representatives not later than January 3,
24 1946, the results of its investigation, together with such
25 recommendations as it may deem advisable.

SEC. 3. The testimony of any person in the armed services, and the fact that such person testified before the joint committee herein provided for, shall not be used against him in any court proceeding, or held against him in examining his military status for credits in the service to which he belongs.

SEC. 4. (a) The committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Seventy-ninth Congress (prior to January 3, 1946), to require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report such hearings shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words.

(b) The committee is empowered to appoint and fix the compensation of such experts, consultants, and clerical and stenographic assistants as it deems necessary, but the compensation so fixed shall not exceed the compensation prescribed under the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, for comparable duties.

(c) The expenses of the committee, which shall not exceed \$25,000, shall be paid one-half from the contingent fund of the Senate and one-half from the contingent fund of

the House of Representatives, upon vouchers signed by the chairman.

Passed the Senate September 6, 1945.

Attest: LESLIE L. BIFFLE, Secretary.

Passed the House of Representatives September 11, 1945.

Attest: SOUTH TRIMBLE, Clerk.

Mr. Mitchell: Then there is the record of the members of the committee.

(The list of the Committee Members is as follows.)

MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

- Alben W. Barkley, Kentucky, Chairman
- Walter F. George, Georgia
- Scott W. Lucas, Illinois
- Owen Brewster, Maine
- Home Ferguson, Michigan
- Jere Cooper, Tennessee, Vice Chairman
- J. Bayard Clark, North Carolina
- John W. Murphy, Pennsylvania
- Bertrand W. Gearhart, California
- Frank B. Keefe, Wisconsin

WARD S. PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. Mitchell: Next is a list of all counsel, including counsel for a number of witnesses who will be called.

(The list of counsel for the committee is as follows:)

COUNSEL FOR THE COMMITTEE:

Chief Counsel - William D. Mitchell
 Chief Assistant Counsel - Gerhard A. Gesell
 Assistant Counsel - Jule M. Hannaford
 Assistant Counsel - John E. Masten

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR THE COMMITTEE:

Mrs. Flo E. Bratten
 Office - 357 Senate Office Building
 Telephone extensions - 1159 and 1189

COUNSEL FOR GENERAL SHORT:

Captain Patrick H. Ford
 2601 Munitions Building
 War Department, Extension 7-8109

COUNSEL FOR ADMIRAL KIMMEL:

Charles Rugg
 Building N, Room 1-N-90
 Navy Department
 Extension 3292
 Lieutenant Hanifey
 Navy Department
 Extension 6-3036

COUNSEL FOR ADMIRAL STARK:

Hugh H. Obear

Southern Building, Washington, D. C.

Telephone - National 2155

Commander Richmond

Navy Department, Extension 2326

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Mr. Mitchell: Then there is the correspondence, with which you are familiar, between the chairman of the committee and the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the White House, asking for the appointment of the liaison officers and the responses from those Departments and the President.

There is also a letter here from the estate of Franklin D. Roosevelt respecting the late President's files in the Archives Building.

(The correspondence referred to is as follows:)

October 5, 1945.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

On behalf of the Joint Congressional Committee to investigate the disaster at Pearl Harbor, I am writing to suggest that you designate someone in the State Department to whom Counsel for the Committee may apply at any time to aid us in obtaining information from the Department's records and to arrange for the attendance before the Committee of

witnesses from the State Department. We believe such an arrangement should expedite the work of the Committee.

Now that the war is ended, we hope that reasons of national security should not require that any information material to the investigation be withheld from the Committee or their Counsel, and that the Committee will be free to use any pertinent evidence. The Committee proposes to hold public hearings and all evidence material to our inquiry will thus be made public.

Respectfully,

/s/ Alben W. Barkley

Chairman,
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.

The Honorable James F. Byrnes,
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Washington

October 13, 1945

Dear Alben:

Replying to your letter, I have asked Under Secretary Acheson to make available any information the State Department may have which is desired by the Committee with reference to the investigation referred to by you.

Sincerely yours,

(signed) James F. Byrnes

The Honorable Alben W. Barkley,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

October 5, 1945

Dear Mr. Secretary:

On behalf of the Joint Congressional Committee to investigate the disaster at Pearl Harbor, I am writing to suggest that you designate someone in the War Department to whom Counsel for the Committee may apply at any time to aid us in obtaining information from the Department's records and to arrange for the attendance before the Committee of witnesses from the armed forces. We believe such an arrangement should expedite the work of the Committee.

Now that the war is ended, we hope that reasons of national security should not require that any information material to the investigation be withheld from the Committee or their Counsel, and that the Committee will be free to use any pertinent evidence. The Committee proposes to hold public hearings and all evidence material to our inquiry will thus be made public.

Respectfully,

/s/ Alben W. Barkley
Chairman,
Joint Committee on the Investi-
gation of the Pearl Harbor
Attack.

The Honorable Robert P. Patterson,
The Secretary of War,
Washington, D. C.

WAR DEPARTMENT

Washington

10 OCT 1945

Hon. Alben W. Barkley
Chairman, Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack
United States Senate

Dear Senator Barkley:

In accordance with the suggestion in your letter of October 5, Lt. Colonel Harmon Duncombe has been designated as the representative of the War Department for the purpose of assisting the Joint Congressional Committee to investigate the disaster at Pearl Harbor. He will have full access to all pertinent files and records of the War Department and will arrange for the attendance before the Committee of witnesses from the Army.

The War Department is prepared to furnish the Committee and their Counsel all information in its possession material to the investigation, and to have the Committee make free use of any pertinent evidence. Also, the War Department will be glad to assist the Committee in its desire to hold public hearings.

Sincerely yours,

(signed) Robert P. Patterson
Secretary of War

October 5, 1945.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

On behalf of the Joint Congressional Committee to investigate the disaster at Pearl Harbor, I am writing to suggest that you designate someone in the Navy Department to whom Counsel for the Committee may apply at any time to aid us in obtaining information from the Department's records and to arrange for the attendance before the Committee of witnesses from the armed forces. We believe such an arrangement should expedite the work of the Committee.

Now that the war is ended, we hope that reasons of national security should not require that any information material to the investigation be withheld from the Committee or their Counsel, and that the Committee will be free to use any pertinent evidence. The Committee proposes to hold public hearings and all evidence material to our inquiry will thus be made public.

Respectfully,

Alben W. Barkley

Chairman,

Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack.

The Honorable James Forrestal,

The Secretary of the Navy,

Washington, D. C.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Washington

11 October 1945

The Honorable Alben W. Barkley
Chairman, Joint Committee on Investigation of the
Pearl Harbor Attack
United States Senate

Dear Senator Barkley:

Reference is made to your letter dated 5 October 1945 suggesting the designation of a Navy Department representative with whom Counsel for the Committee may deal in matters concerning information and witnesses desired by the Committee.

In accordance with your request, Rear Admiral O.S. Colclough, U.S.N., the Assistant Judge Advocate General of the Navy, is designated to receive and act upon Counsel's request for information from the Navy Department's records and for the attendance of naval witnesses.

In addition to the foregoing suggestion, your referenced letter expresses the hope that, by virtue of the war's end, reasons of national security do not require the withholding from the Committee, or its counsel, any information material to the investigation, and that the Committee, whose hearings will be public, will be free to use any pertinent evidence. Please be assured that the Navy Department stands ready to render full assistance to the Committee and its Counsel,

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WARD N. PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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making available from its records all information material
to the investigation.

Sincerely yours,

James Forrestal

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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October 5, 1945

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, I respectfully suggest for your consideration that someone in the Executive Offices be named by you, to whom the Committee and its Counsel may go to obtain information from the files in the Executive Offices bearing on the matter under investigation, and that the Committee may be free to disclose at its public hearings information so obtained.

Respectfully,

Alben W. Barkley

Chairman,

Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.

The Honorable Harry S. Truman,

The White House,

Washington, D. C.

WARD B. PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 THE WHITE HOUSE

2 WASHINGTON

3 October 13, 1945

4 Dear Senator Barkley:

5 Replied to your letter of the fifth, regarding the
6 appointment of someone in the Executive Offices to consult
7 with the Committee and its Counsel, I am appointing Judge
8 Letta, who has been in charge of all the files in The
9 White House for the past twenty-eight years.

10 Any information that you want will be cheerfully
11 supplied by him.

12 For your information all the files of the previous
13 Administration have been moved to the Archives Building
14 and Hyde Park. If there is any difficulty about your
15 having access to them I'll be glad to issue the necessary
16 order so that you may have complete access.

17 Sincerely yours,

18 Harry S. Truman

19 Honorable Alben W. Barkley

20 United States Senate

21 Washington, D. C.
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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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ESTATE OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

120 Broadway

New York 5

James Roosevelt
Basil O'Connor
Henry T. Hackett
Executors and Trustees

October 31, 1945

Dr. Solon J. Buck

Archivist of the United States

National Archives Building

Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

On behalf of the Executors of the Estate of the late Franklin D. Roosevelt, it is hereby requested that you permit Miss Grace G. Tully to withdraw from the files of the late Mr. Roosevelt, now at the National Archives for storage and safekeeping, and make available to the Senate-House Joint Committee Investigating the Pearl Harbor Disaster such papers relating to the subject of the investigation as it may request.

This is to certify that such papers are being withdrawn and made available to said Committee at the instigation of the President of the United States and with the approval of the Executors of the Estate.

Yours very truly,

Earle R. Koons

Mr. Mitchell: Then there is a list of Liaison Officers who have been designated by the various Departments, with their addresses and telephone numbers, which may be of service to the Members of the Committee.

(The list of Liaison Officers is as follows:)

LIST OF LIAISON OFFICERS

APPOINTED BY AGENCIES

WLC

WAR DEPARTMENT

Lieut. Col. Harmon Duncombe

Tel. Ext. 2335

Room 4D761, Pentagon

Capt. R. M. Diggs

Tel. Ext. 2335

Room 4D757, Pentagon

Capt. C. Roger Nelson

Tel. Ext. 73157

Room 2C686, Pentagon

Lieut. Bennett Boskey

Tel. Ext. 71470

Room 4D757, Pentagon

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Rear Admiral Oswald S. Colcough

Assistant Judge Advocate General

Tel. Ext. 3365

Room 2307

Lieut. Commander John Ford Baecher, USNR

Tel. Ext. 2451

Room 1083A

WLC2

STATE DEPARTMENT

Under Secretary of State

Dean Acheson

Tel. Ext. 2101

Room 203-1/2

Edward Miller

Tel. Ext. 2210

Room 280

Joseph Ballantine

Tel. Ext. 600

Room 288

WHITE HOUSE

Judge Maurice C. Latta

Miss Grace Tully (Roosevelt Papers)

F. B. I.

D. M. Ladd

Assistant Director

EXecutive 7100, Ext. 2121

Room 1742, Justice

- - - -

Mr. Mitchell: Then there follows the directive of August 28, 1945 by the President forbidding the disclosure of technique or procedures or any specific results of any cryptanalytic unit, the agencies that break codes.

(The directive of August 28, 1945 is as follows:)

C O P Y

28 August 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of War

The Secretary of the Navy

The Attorney General

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director of the Budget

The Director of the Office of War Information

Appropriate departments of the Government and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are hereby directed to take such steps as are necessary to prevent release to the public, except with the specific approval of the President in each case, of:

Information regarding the past or present status, technique or procedures, degree of success attained, or any specific results of any cryptanalytic unit acting under the authority of the U.S. Government or any Department thereof.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

RESTRICTED

Mr. Mitchell: There is the order of October 23, 1945 by the President lifting the ban of that directive for the benefit of this Committee.

(The memorandum is as follows:)

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of War
The Secretary of Navy
The Joint Chiefs of Staff

In order to assist the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack in its desire to hold public hearings and make public pertinent evidence relating to the circumstances of that attack, a specific exception to my memorandum dated 28 August 1945, relating to the release of information concerning cryptanalytic activities, is hereby made as follows:

The State, War and Navy Departments will make available to the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, for such use as the Committee may determine, any information in their possession material to the investigation, and will respectively authorize any employee or member of the armed services whose testimony is desired by the Committee to testify publicly before the Committee concerning any matter pertinent to the investigation.

(signed) Harry S. Truman

Harry S. Truman

APPROVED

OCT 23 1945

Mr. Mitchell: There is another order, of November 7, 1945, by the President respecting leave for men in the services to talk freely with the Committee and volunteer information.

(The memorandum of November 7, 1945 is as follows:)

WARD S. HALL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington

November 7, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF EXECUTIVES OF ALL EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS AND BUREAUS,
INCLUDING THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Section 3 of the Concurrent Resolution creating the
Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the
Pearl Harbor Attack reads as follows:

"SEC. 3. The testimony of any person in the
armed services, and the fact that such person
testified before the joint committee herein
provided for, shall not be used against him in
any court proceeding or held against him in
examining his military status for credits in
the service to which he belongs."

In order to assist the Joint Committee to make a full
and complete investigation of the facts relating to the events
leading up to or following the attack, you are requested to
authorize every person in your respective departments or
agencies, if they are interrogated by the Committee or its
counsel, to give any information of which they may have
knowledge bearing on the subject of the Committee's investi-
gation.

You are further requested to authorize them whether or

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not they are interrogated by the Committee or its counsel to
send forward voluntarily and disclose to the Committee or to
its counsel any information they may have on the subject of
the inquiry which they may have any reason to think may not
already have been disclosed to the Committee.

This directive is applicable to all persons in your de-
partments or agencies whether they are in the armed services
or not and whether or not they are called to testify before
the Joint Committee.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Mr. Mitchell: Then there is a memorandum by the President under date of November 9, 1945 enlarging on the last mentioned memorandum.

(The memorandum of November 9, 1945 is as follows:)

rlk 3

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF EXECUTIVES OF ALL EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS AND BUREAUS,
INCLUDING THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

With further reference to my letter of November 7,
1945 addressed to the above executives, you are requested
further to authorize every person in your respective
departments or agencies, whether or not they are interro-
gated by the Committee or its counsel, to come forward and
disclose orally to any of the members of the Joint Con-
gressional Committee on the investigation of the Pearl
Harbor attack any information they may have on the subject
of the inquiry which they may have any reason to think
has not already been disclosed to the Committee.

This does not include any files or written material.

(Handwritten) O. K.

H. S. T.

Mr. Mitchell: Those formal documents I hand to the reporter to open the record in that way.

Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, I think it would also be proper and helpful, if the record of the original presentation of the resolution by the Chairman, and the discussions on the floor at that time -- not subsequent -- at that time, be inserted in the record so that there may be a full interpretation of what was the purport of the hearings.

The Chairman: There being no objection in connection with the introduction of the joint resolution, the statement made by the author of the resolution and the discussion that took place at that time, will be inserted in the record.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask that the full discussion that took place at that time be inserted in the record.

Senator Brewster: That is what I intended.

The Chairman: That is what I understood the Senator from Maine requested.

Senator Brewster: Yes.

I would like also to have the request of the committee to the President, the final draft of the order, inserted, in connection with the order which was made. I think you are familiar with that, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Without objection, that will be inserted in connection with these papers.

Off the record for a moment.

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(The matter referred to in the foregoing discussion
is as follows:)

COMMITTEE INSERT

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(Discussion off the record)

The Chairman: Counsel may go ahead.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I think if counsel spoke into the microphone we could better hear, rather than if he stood up.

Mr. Mitchell: I have never tried a case with my nose in a microphone, but I will do my best.

The Chairman: I am sure you will do all right, Mr. Mitchell.

Mr. Mitchell: You would like me to keep my seat?

Senator Brewster: I think so.

Mr. Mitchell: There are two master exhibits which have been distributed to the committee. They will be referred to by innumerable witnesses on the stand, and I think this is the appropriate time to present them.

One is a document, printed in the Government Printing Office, entitled "Intercepted Diplomatic Messages Sent by the Japanese Government Between July 1 and December 8, 1941." These were messages, in code, intercepted by our services, decoded and translated. They were exchanged between the Japanese Government and its Embassy at Washington, and include the responses from Washington to Tokyo. There are a few of them that are diplomatic messages from Japan to their ambassadors in other nations.

They are arranged chronologically in the order in which

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1 they were sent. We will not refer to them this morning, I
2 think, but will shortly. The document, of course, will be
3 supported later authentically by detail witnesses, but for
4 the present we present it to the reporter as Exhibit 1.

5 The Chairman: Are those to be printed at this point
6 in the record?

7 Mr. Mitchell: No, they are already printed by the
8 Government Printing Office, and they are available in this
9 form to the committee. We will mark it Exhibit 1, but
10 the reporter will not have to transcribe it.

11 The Vice Chairman: That is one of the documents that
12 was supplied to the committee?

13 Mr. Mitchell: Yes, not long ago; I think yesterday.

14 Senator Brewster: Are copies of that now available
15 to the press?

16 Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

17 Senator Ferguson: This is being received in evidence
18 as Exhibit 1?

19 The Chairman: Yes. It is filed with the committee
20 as Exhibit 1, and will be referred to specifically, as I
21 understand it, by witnesses later.

22 Mr. Mitchell: And it is wide open once it is offered.

23 Senator Ferguson: That is what I wanted to be sure
24 of. It is a part of the record.

25 Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

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Senator Brewster: That was the one that was received by us yesterday?

Mr. Mitchell: Yes, sir.

The next exhibit, I have marked Exhibit 2. This is another volume of Japanese messages from their Government and their people around the world relating to military installations, ship movements, and so forth. The first exhibit we will call the diplomatic messages, because they related to diplomatic negotiations, but this one is concerned with the military installations, reports from their espionage people in different places, and matters of that kind. That volume also includes documents in code, intercepted, decoded, and translated by our cryptanalytic units, and they are arranged in chronological order.

I present that as exhibit 2 so that it may be available to every witness.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, may I make an inquiry as to whether counsel claims that is all the information, are these two exhibits now complete?

Mr. Mitchell: There may be additional information. I do not claim, Senator, that anything we have is final or complete. We will see after we get going whether you are satisfied with what is produced.

Senator Ferguson: I wanted to have the record show as to whether or not it is purported that these are complete.

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Mr. Mitchell: No, sir. These are selected messages that seem pertinent to the case, and it is always open, if there is any inquiry by anybody on the committee that we are asked to pursue, why, we will pursue it further.

Mr. Gearhart: Mr. Chairman, may I inquire whether or not copies of Exhibit 2 have been supplied the individual members of this committee?

Mr. Mitchell: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Were they included in the packet given us yesterday?

Mr. Mitchell: They are earlier than that.

Senator Brewster: That was delivered to us on November 13, I think.

Mr. Gesell: I think it was early this week.

Senator Brewster: Yes, Tuesday of this week, I think.

The Chairman: All right. You may go ahead, Mr. Mitchell.

Mr. Mitchell: Mr. Chairman, in the previous investigations that have been held, scores of witnesses and thousands of pages of testimony were taken on piecing together the story of the situation at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and to describe the incidents of the attack.

If this committee were to pursue that same course, it might take two or three weeks for that kind of testimony.

We have, in an effort to save time of the committee,

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had prepared by the Army and the Navy jointly, under our direction, a narrative and detailed statement, based upon reports and material available in those departments, of the conditions prevailing at Pearl Harbor on that day, and the events that took place. We have tried to eliminate, and I think we have, every question that is in controversy, every matter of fact that hasn't clearly been established, and any question of responsibility.

I think the officers who are presenting that for us have followed that schedule.

This isn't intended to foreclose the fact on anything. It is a picture of the conditions that existed on the 7th and things that happened, and if there is any question that arises later as to whether it is accurate or not, of course, it will be open to the taking of eye-witness testimony. And there are also many questions, doubtless, that aren't covered by the statement, because they are not yet fully established, or in controversy, that will have to be filled in by eye-witnesses.

The officers who have done this work for us are Rear Admiral T. B. Inglis of the Navy and Colonel Bernard Thielen of the Army, and we would like to have them sworn.

The Chairman: Which one do you want first?

Mr. Mitchell: The narrative statement is a consolidated one. It is not a Navy or an Army statement. It is all

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woven together, and these gentlemen ought to be sworn together, and they will pick up portions of it and pass the ball as they go along.

The Chairman: Will the two witnesses referred to arise, and be sworn.

(Witnesses sworn)

The Chairman: Be seated.

Mr. Gearhart: Mr. Chairman, I will ask that the men taking pictures complete their work before we get started.

The Chairman: The photographers may get their pictures and then clear this space in here.

The committee, in executive session, decided that the order of procedure, so far as the examination of witnesses is concerned, shall be that counsel should be first permitted to examine the witnesses without interruption; that upon the conclusion of his examination, members of the committee will alternate from the Chair right and left between the members from the Senate and the House, and they will ask such questions as they have, and following that, counsel for any witness who has counsel will be permitted to examine the witness himself.

So, gentlemen, we will now proceed.

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1
2 TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL T. B. INGLIS AND
3 COLONEL BERNARD THIELEN
(having been duly sworn by The Chairman)

4 Mr. Mitchell: Admiral Inglis, what is your status in
5 the Navy now?

6 Admiral Inglis: I am attached to the Office of Naval
7 Operations as Chief of Naval Intelligence.

8 Mr. Mitchell: How long have you been in that post?

9 Admiral Inglis: I have had that particular post for
10 about one week, Mr. Mitchell.

11 Mr. Mitchell: What were you doing before that?

12 Admiral Inglis: Before that I was Deputy Director of
13 Naval Intelligence.

14 Mr. Mitchell: Have you had in your Naval work the task
15 at times to prepare material and documents and review the
16 facts and do work of that kind?

17 Admiral Inglis: I have had something over 31 years
18 of Naval experience, and during this time I have served on
19 several admiral staffs. More recently, my duties in the
20 Navy Department do require that I prepare evaluations and
21 studies somewhat comparable to this we are discussing this
22 morning.

23 Mr. Mitchell: What duty were you engaged in on December
24 7, 1941?

25 Admiral Inglis: I was Commanding Officer of the

Witness: Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1
2 U. S. S. ALGERAB, which was a ship in the Atlantic Ocean
3 at that time. On that particular date, my ship and I were
4 in port in New York.

5 Mr. Mitchell: Had you been stationed at the Pearl
6 Harbor base previously to that?

7 Admiral Inglis: I have never had shore duty at Pearl
8 Harbor. I have visited Pearl Harbor on numerous occasions
9 on board ships.

10 Mr. Mitchell: So you are familiar with the locality?

11 Admiral Inglis: I am generally familiar with the
12 locality, yes, sir.

13 Mr. Mitchell: You prepared here, in connection with
14 Colonel Thielen, a narrative statement from the official
15 records and other data available to you?

16 Admiral Inglis: I have, sir, with the assistance of
17 officers under my control.

18 Mr. Mitchell: You were instructed, or asked by counsel
19 to eliminate matters that were in dispute or questions of
20 responsibility, or questions where your reports and records
21 showed a point of fact had not been clearly established?

22 Admiral Inglis: That is correct, and we have done our
23 best to carry out that directive.

24 Mr. Mitchell: Colonel Thielen, what is your status
25 in the Army today?

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

Witness Thielen

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Colonel Thielen: I am a member of the War Department

General Staff, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: Have you been stationed at Pearl Harbor?

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir. I was stationed there from 1934 through 1936.

Mr. Mitchell: Where were you on duty on December 7, 1941?

Colonel Thielen: I was instructor at the U. S. Military Academy.

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Witnesses Inglis and Thielen questions by: Mr. Mitchell

Mr. Mitchell: Have you had occasion in your work to do the sort of thing that I asked Admiral Inglis about, preparing documents and related material?

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir. That is my normal duty.

Mr. Mitchell: Now, you gentlemen proceed as you have prepared your work and give us this narrative statement of the conditions at Pearl Harbor on December 7 and what occurred there.

Admiral Inglis: I propose to start this presentation with a brief description --

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, do we have copies of this statement?

Mr. Gesell: No, Senator, there are no mimeographed copies of the statement. There are before each Member of the Committee two basic folders which I show you now, the Navy folder of exhibits and charts, and the Army folder, which is the red envelope, large red envelope. I suggest that those are the two basic documents that each Member of the Committee will wish to have before him to follow this presentation.

Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, it was my understanding that if there were any prepared statements we would have them twenty-four hours in advance. Was that not the understanding?

The Chairman: Well, it wasn't the Chair's understanding that that rule applied to this preliminary testimony here.

WARD S. PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

The witnesses who were to testify after this groundwork was laid as to what happened on that day would present to the Committee copies of their written statements in advance.

Senator Brewster: It is equally essential here, I think. Do they have prepared statements we can have now?

Mr. Gesell: We hadn't considered these were prepared statements, Senator. The charts and schedules which contain the basic information are all before the Members of the Committee. There is going to be a good deal of ad libbing on the charts. It is not quite in the nature of a prepared statement. For that reason it is not before the Committee.

Senator Ferguson: Has counsel had a copy of this prepared statement, and if so, when did he get it?

Mr. Gesell: We have no copy, Senator, and we have never had a copy of any prepared statements from either of these witnesses.

Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, will it be understood that after today the rule will apply?

The Chairman: It will apply to witnesses. Whether it will apply after today I don't know. I can't tell how soon these witnesses will be through.

Senator Brewster: Yes.

Mr. Mitchell: We didn't understand that this type of prepared statement came within the rule, but we will have it mimeographed and furnish it to the Members of the Committee as

rapidly as possible and if you want the witnesses recalled we will be happy to recall them.

The Chairman: The Chair might also state that arrangements have been made with the reporters taking this testimony to provide each Member a copy of the day's testimony on the following morning, and I think they will be able to furnish it to the Members on the evening the testimony has been brought forward.

Senator Brewster: Fine.

The Chairman: We will have it as soon as possible.

Mr. Mitchell: You may proceed, Admiral.

Admiral Inglis: I propose to start this presentation with a brief description of the geography of the Hawaiian Islands and their relation to the whole Pacific Ocean area.

Commander Barrett has a chart which has the title up in the upper right-hand corner "Disposition of U.S. Pacific Fleet in December, 1941".

I will ask the Committee to refer to that chart and also to item number 1, which is a reproduction of that chart, and which is contained in the white folder which has been given to each member of the committee.

It will be seen that Pearl Harbor is on the southern or lee side of the Island of Oahu, which is one of the eight principal islands of the Hawaiian chain. These eight Hawaiian Islands lie in a strategically and commercially important

position in the North Pacific Ocean approximately 2,000 nautical miles west to southwest of San Francisco.

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Commander Barrett is pointing out these distances and directions as we proceed.

Oahu is the most important of the islands because of the excellent enclosed fleet anchorage at Pearl Harbor and the commercial port of Honolulu. It is 3,430 nautical miles southeast of Tokyo, 4,685 nautical miles northwest of Panama, 1,990 nautical miles south of Dutch Harbor in the Aleutian Islands and 4,767 nautical miles east of Manila.

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Witness Inglis:

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2 A table of distances from Pearl Harbor and other important
3 points in the Pacific is Item 2 of the Navy folder. In this
4 connection, it must be remembered that a nautical mile is
5 approximately 1-1/6 land miles.

6 The islands have a mild sub-tropical climate with moder-
7 ate seasonal changes of temperature. They lie in the path
8 of the steady northeasterly trade winds; therefore, the
9 northern portions of Oahu and the immediate adjacent waters
10 are characterized by fresh winds from a northerly direction.
11 The force of the trades is broken by the configuration of the
12 land so that to the south of Oahu the seas are relatively
13 smooth.

14 Commander Barrett, will you point to the other chart,
15 please, showing the Island of Oahu? That is the lee island,
16 where the winds and seas are more moderate than on the wind-
17 ward side.

18 Much of the moisture of the trade winds is deposited on
19 the high peaks to the north forming mist and clouds. Because
20 of this, the visibility to the south of the islands is better
21 than to the north. Further, the northern fringe of the trade
22 belt lies roughly about 300 miles to the north of Oahu --
23 will you point that out? Three hundred miles to the north of
24 Oahu there is a belt characterized by low ceilings, poor
25 visibility, squalls and rain.

1 Witness Inglis:

2 The Hawaiian chain of islands and adjacent waters are
3 shown in Item 3 of the Navy folder. It may be seen from this
4 chart that the sea area around the Hawaiian Islands was on 7
5 December 1941, divided into certain restricted Fleet training
6 areas where units and aircraft of the Fleet might carry out
7 exercises and target practices. This same chart also shows
8 two defensive sea areas off Pearl Harbor and Kaneohe. These
9 defensive sea areas were designated by the President of the
10 United States and entry of all merchant ships, both U. S.
11 and foreign, and of all foreign men-of-war was prohibited
12 unless specific permission for such entry had been granted by
13 the Secretary of the Navy.

14 The next item is a rather puzzling question of time,
15 difference of time in different parts of the world.

16 Time varies throughout the world. For instance, when going
17 from Washington, D.C. to Chicago it is necessary for a
18 traveler to adjust his watch upon arrival in Chicago, because
19 Chicago time is one hour behind that in Washington. Compar-
20 able changes of time occur whenever the traveler moves about
21 the world.

22 When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor at 7:55 on the
23 morning of 7 December 1941, it was 1:25 in the afternoon of
24 the same day in Washington, D.C., and was 3:25 A. M., 8
25 December, in Tokyo.

1 Witness Inglis:

2 Item 4 of the Navy folder is a table showing comparative
3 times and dates for Greenwich, England, Washington, D.C.,
4 San Francisco, Hawaii, Tokyo and Manila on 6, 7 and 8 De-
5 cember 1941.

6 The time of sunrise on the morning of 7 December 1941, the
7 beginning of morning twilight was 5:06 A.M., Hawaiian time,
8 and sunrise was 6:26 A.M., Hawaiian time. That is an hour
9 and twenty minutes before sunrise.

10 Proceeding next to the composition of the Atlantic and
11 Pacific fleets, on the 7th of December 1941 the Pacific Fleet
12 was numerically two-thirds the size of the Atlantic Fleet but
13 the Pacific Fleet contained more modern and more heavily
14 armed vessels.

15 Next, the commanders of major units of the U. S. Pacific
16 Fleet:

17 The Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, who
18 was also the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet,
19 was Admiral H. E. Kimmel.

20 The force commanders were Commander, Battle Force, Vice
21 Admiral W. S. Pye; Commander, Scouting Force, Vice Admiral
22 Wilson Brown; Commander, Base Force, Rear Admiral W. L. Cal-
23 houn.

24 The type commanders, and by "type" I mean the type or
25 classification of the ships which they commanded:

Witness Inglis:

1
2 Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, Vice Admiral W. F.

3 Halsey.

4 Commander Battleships, Battle Force, Rear Admiral W. S.

5 Anderson.

6 Commander Cruisers, Battle Force, Rear Admiral H. F.

7 Leary.

8 Commander Mine Craft, Battle Force, Rear Admiral W. R.

9 Furlong.

10 Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force, Rear Admiral J. H.

11 Newton.

12 Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, Rear Admiral M. J.

13 Draemel.

14 Commander Submarines, Scouting Force, Rear Admiral Thomas

15 Withers.

16 Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, Rear Admiral J. S.

17 McCain.

18 Commander of the 14th Naval District, Rear Admiral C. C.

19 Bloch.

20 And in explanation of the relationship between the 14th
21 Naval District and the Commander-in-Chief, the 14th Naval
22 District was a subordinate command of the Commander-in-Chief
23 Pacific Fleet and in this respect differed from the then
24 usual practice in the continental United States.

25 The 14th Naval District included the Hawaiian Islands,

1 Witness Inglis:

2 Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra and Canton Islands.

3 Commander Barrett, will you just draw an imaginary line
4 about the 14th Naval District? Just circle it with your
5 wand, will you?

6 The disposition of the United States Pacific Fleet out-
7 side of the continental United States at 8:00 A.M., 7 De-
8 cember was roughly as follows:

9 The main body of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor comprised 8
10 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers, 30 destroy-
11 ers and 49 other vessels such as submarines, mine craft,
12 tenders, transports and miscellaneous small craft.

13 Those are the ships that were in Pearl Harbor. We will
14 go into greater detail on that a little further along in the
15 discussion.

16 You may also refer to the chart in Item No. 1, Navy
17 folder, for the location in detail and the naming of these
18 ships.

19 In addition to that, Item 5 of the Navy folder contains a
20 complete list of every ship in the Pacific Fleet.

21 Task Force 8 under Admiral Halsey consisted of one air-
22 craft carrier (ENTERPRISE), 3 heavy cruisers and 9 destroyers.
23 It was about 200 miles west of Oahu, en route to Pearl Harbor
24 after having ferried Marine Corps fighter planes to Wake
25 Island.

Witness Inglis:

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2 That task force was coming back from Wake Island to
3 Pearl Harbor.

4 Task Force 12 under Admiral Newton consisted of one
5 aircraft carrier (LEXINGTON), 3 heavy cruisers and 5 de-
6 stroyers. It was about 460 miles southeast of Midway, en
7 route to Midway from Pearl Harbor with a squadron of Ma-
8 rine Corps scout bombers.

9 Task Force 3 under Admiral Wilson Brown consisted of
10 one heavy cruiser and 5 destroyer minesweepers. It had
11 just arrived off Johnston Island to conduct tests of a new
12 type landing craft.

13 One heavy cruiser, with 4 destroyer minesweepers, was
14 in the Fleet Operating Area about 25 miles south of Oahu
15 conducting exercises.

16 The heavy cruiser PENSACOLA with an eight-ship convoy
17 westbound was in the Samoan area. More will be said about
18 convoys later.

19 The heavy cruiser LOUISVILLE with a two-ship convoy
20 eastbound was near the Solomons.

21 Two submarines and a cargo ship were in the Midway area
22 and a similar group in the Wake area.

23 Two tankers were about half way between Hawaii and the
24 west coast of the United States.

25 Some smaller units of the Fleet were in positions as

Witness Inglis:

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2 as follows: One destroyer (WARD), concerning which more
3 will be said later, was patrolling off the entrance of Pearl
4 Harbor; one destroyer in company with a submarine was about
5 60 miles southwest; 3 submarines were 200 miles east of
6 Oahu; the seaplane tender WRIGHT was 300 miles west, and 4
7 auxiliaries were in Honolulu and Lahina Roads.

8 The remaining units of the U. S. Pacific Fleet are shown
9 on the chart and Item 1 of the Navy folder.

10 A detailed list giving the names and locations of U.S.
11 naval ships of the Pacific Fleet is Item 5 of the Navy
12 folder.

13 Turning next to the location of cargo ships and troop
14 carriers:

15 About 25 cargo and troop carriers which were U.S. owned
16 or chartered were west of Hawaii at the time of the attack
17 on Pearl Harbor. As shown on the chart (Item 1, Navy
18 folder), eight of these, including one Navy and three Army
19 troop transports and four ships carrying general cargo bound
20 for the Philippines, were in the Samoan area, escorted by
21 the heavy cruiser PENSACOLA. Two Army troop transports
22 were in the Solomons area bound for Pearl Harbor, escorted
23 by the heavy cruiser LOUISVILLE. Four independently routed
24 ships without escorts carrying general cargo were between 700
25 and 1200 miles southwest of Hawaii westward bound, while

Witness Inglis:

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2 another, eastbound, was in the same area. One vessel was at
3 Canton Island, four in Australia, one in New Guinea, one
4 in Java, and three in the Manila area. All troop carriers
5 were being escorted.

6 All of the westbound ships had left Honolulu from two
7 to nine days prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, routed and
8 dispatched from there by the Port Director, 14th Naval
9 District.

10 A detailed list of these ships and their locations is
11 Item 6 of the Navy folder.

12 There was no United States or Allied shipping of conse-
13 quence along the North Pacific trade routes west of the 180th
14 meridian on 7 December 1941.

15 Those thin black lines represent the Great Circle course
16 to the Orient from Los Angeles, San Francisco and Puget
17 Sound.

18 Mr. Mitchell: You mean the regular ship lanes?

19 Admiral Inglis: The regular, normal shipping lanes used
20 in time of peace.

21 Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

22 Admiral Inglis: Those Great Circle courses are the
23 shortest distances between those points. That is because of
24 the mercator projection on the chart. A straight line is
25 not the shortest distance between two points on such a chart.

Witness Inglis:

1
2 The Chief of Naval Operations, on 25 November 1941,
3 directed that all trans-Pacific shipping be routed through
4 the Torres Strait between Australia and New Guinea.

5 Senator Ferguson: May I have that date again, please?

6 Admiral Inglis: The name? Torres.

7 Senator Ferguson: No, the date.

8 Admiral Inglis: Oh, the date? 25 November, 1941.

9 Therefore, the usual shipping lanes, as shown on the
10 maps of the North Pacific, were not being followed, but
11 rather all ships were being routed as indicated --- from
12 Honolulu via Suva in the Fijis and thence to Australia, or
13 via the Torres Strait to the Philippines. Ships destined
14 for Guam were routed via the Philippines, thus avoiding as
15 much as possible the sea area controlled by the Japanese
16 Mandated Islands in the Pacific.

17 Trans-Pacific shipping lanes, both the usual lanes and
18 those being followed just prior to and on 7 December 1941,
19 are shown in Item 1 in thin black lines.

20 Passing next to a description of the navy installations
21 ashore in the Hawaiian Islands; except for Pearl Harbor it-
22 self these are all classified as minor United States naval
23 installations and were naturally integrated in the over-all
24 defense of the islands, of which Pearl Harbor was the focal
25 point.

1 Witness Inglis:

2 I will ask the committee now to refer to Item 3-A of the
3 folder and Commander Barrett is going to point to the Army
4 chart, on which we have a Navy overlay.

5 On the Island of Molokai there was the Homestead Field
6 Naval Air Base, which consisted of a runway, a warming-up
7 platform and supporting installations.

8 On the Island of Maui there was the Puunene Naval Air
9 Base, which consisted of runways, a warming-up platform and
10 a CAA Territorial Landing Field.

11 Also on Maui was the Maalaen Naval Emergency Landing
12 Field, which consisted of two runways and other supporting
13 installations.

14 On the Island of Hawaii, the largest island in the group,
15 there was the Naval Radio Station at Hilo.

16 On the most important island of the group, Oahu, although
17 not the largest, there was a Naval Air Station at Ewa, which
18 consisted of a mooring mast, a landing mat and supporting
19 installations.

20 At the Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, on the opposite side
21 of the island, was a landing mat and warming-up platform and
22 supporting installations and also a seaplane base.

23 At Kaluku Point, up at the north end of the island, there
24 was an emergency landing field.

25 At Lualualei, a naval radio station, transmitting station.

S11

Witness Inglis:

1
2 At Wahiawa, in the interior, a Naval radio receiving
3 station.

4 At Heeia, a Naval radio transmitting station and at
5 Wailupe a Naval radio receiving station.

6 I would like to make it quite clear at this point that
7 these radio stations were radio stations for transmitting and
8 receiving messages and were not radar stations.

9 Pearl Harbor, on 7 December 1941, was a major Fleet base
10 capable of berthing the entire Pacific Fleet. If the com-
11 mittee will now turn to Item 7 in the Navy folder you will
12 find a chart of the approaches to Pearl Harbor.

13 That is a reproduction of the smallish chart that has
14 just been mounted on the easel.

15 You will see that the only entrance is from the south via
16 an entrance channel blasted through the fringing coral reef
17 which had formerly blocked the entrance to the harbor. This
18 channel extending to the harbor entrance proper was 375 yards
19 wide and 3,500 yards long, with a minimum depth of 45 feet.
20 The entrance proper to Pearl Harbor is between Keahi Point
21 and Holokahiki Point. From here the channel leads to the
22 various locks and passages which form the harbor.

23 I think I should explain at this time that the word
24 "l-o-c-h" is used occasionally throughout this presentation
25 and indicates an arm of the harbor, or perhaps the Scotch

Witness In-lis:

1
2 would call it a "wake", although it is not fresh water.

3 It is not a "lock" as used in connection with canals.

4 The ramifications of the harbor are shown on the chart,
5 Item 8 of the Navy folder, and also on the chart which has
6 just been mounted on the left hand easel.

7 You will see on that chart that the water surface is il-
8 lustrated by a blue color and the land surface by a white
9 color. The positions of certain ships are marked in red, but
10 I will ask you to disregard that for the moment. We will
11 come back to those later on.

12 There were varying depths in the harbor, as shown by
13 soundings on the chart. Those tiny specked figures show the
14 soundings.

15 The major channels or the main channels and water in the
16 vicinity of the major ships' berths had a depth of 40 feet.
17 From the sea buoys to the large dry docks a portion of the
18 channel had a minimum depth of 45 feet to provide for the
19 entrance and docking of damaged vessels.

20 The entrance to the harbor was closed by two protective
21 nets. Here the channel through the coral reefs was about 400
22 yards wide and the depth was from 41 to 60 feet. The nets
23 themselves consisted of a combined anti-torpedo net and
24 anti-boat boom to seaward and an inner anti-torpedo net with-
25 out the boat boom.

Witness Inglis:

You see, there are two nets there. The barrier one has both booms, which are usually cross-armed with spikes to prevent surface craft from sliding up over the boom. Of course, the nets down below the booms are to stop torpedoes and also submarines proceeding under water.

The standard net is 30 feet deep and when suspended covers a depth of 35 feet. Because the channel was of a greater depth, the Chief of Naval Operations instructed the Commandant, 14th Naval District, to suspend the inner net 15 feet, making a total coverage of 45 feet.

The Pearl Harbor Fleet Base included every type of naval activity. Many of the installations operable at that time were new, having been built subsequent to August 1939. Major installations in operation were, at the Navy Yard - Pearl Harbor:

- 1 - Battleship dock - built 1918
 - 1 - Battleship dock - under construction
 - 1 - Floating dry dock - 18,000 tons
 - 1 - Large repair basin - supporting industrial establishments for repairs to anything afloat.
 - 1 - Fuel depot with 2-tank farms above ground.
- As you all know, a tank farm is a collection of fuel oil storage tanks.
- 1 - Submarine base - all services for war conditions

Witness Inglis:

1 - Section base - inshore patrol and harbor entrance control post.

And then, of course, there was the administrative office of the 14th Naval District which was inside the Navy yard.

At the Naval Air Station - Ford Island, which is the large island at the center of the harbor, there was a large flying field, warming-up platform, seaplane parking areas, and supporting installations.

Next we come to the ships present at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. You can refer again to Item 8 in the white folder.

Eight battleships of between 29,000 and 33,000 tons each were among the ships of the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.

Units of the Fleet were located as follows:

The battleships NEVADA -- Commander Barrett is pointing those out now; those battleships are shown in red and they are as precisely as we can make them to scale.

The NEVADA, ARIZONA, WEST VIRGINIA, TENNESSEE, OKLAHOMA, MARYLAND and CALIFORNIA were moored on the southeast side of Ford Island; the PENNSYLVANIA in Dry Dock No. 1 at the Navy Yard.

Two heavy cruisers, NEW ORLEANS and SAN FRANCISCO, of the 10,000-ton type, were at docks in the Navy Yard Repair Basin.

Witness Inglis:

Four light cruisers of the 10,000-ton type were berthed as follows: ST. LOUIS, HONOLULU, HELENA at Navy Yard Docks, and PHOENIX moored northeast of Ford Island.

Two light cruisers of the 7,000-ton type, RALEIGH and DETROIT, were moored on the northwest side of Ford Island.

Twenty-nine destroyers (all but three of which had been completed since 1933) were moored to the north and west of Ford Island.

There were five submarines, four of which were tied up at the Submarine Base, and the fifth at Ten-Ten Dock in the Navy Yard.

That dock is called "1010" dock because it is 1010 feet long.

One gunboat was tied up at a Navy Yard dock. Nine mine-layers (eight of which were converted flush-deck destroyers) were located at Navy Yard docks and in Middle Loch.

Eleven minesweepers (five of which were converted flush-deck destroyers) moored in Middle Loch and at Navy Yard docks.

Twenty-three fleet auxiliaries, such as repair ships, oilers, tenders, store ships, and tugs were located at various berths throughout the harbor.

There were no aircraft carriers in port.

All battleships of the Pacific Fleet except the COLORADO,

Witness Inglis:

which was in the Navy Yard, Puget Sound, were present, in Pearl Harbor.

Item 9 of the white folder gives a list of the vessels present at the time of the attack.

In accordance with existing Fleet orders, the vessels of the Pacific Fleet except those undergoing Navy Yard overhaul maintained Condition of Readiness 3 while in the harbor. This condition at that time varied according to the armaments of the various types of ships but, in general, required that about one-fourth of the anti-aircraft batteries and necessary control stations be manned and that ready ammunition be at the guns. Vessels likewise were limited in the degree to which they could disable their propulsive machinery. In general, most vessels were on twelve hours' notice.

By "twelve hours' notice" I mean that the ships were required to be able to get under way twelve hours after receiving the order to get under way.

I will ask Colonel Thielen to pick up from this point.

Colonel Thielen: Very well.

Witness Thielen:

The Army's report, of course, roughly parallels that which Admiral Inglis has just completed for the Navy. That is, it takes up the Army organization in that area and the disposition of Army units, with their strength indicated.

The Hawaiian Islands were organized for joint defense as the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. The Army Command was designated as the Hawaiian Department. On 7 February 1941, Major General Walter C. Short relieved Major General Charles D. Herron as Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.

The principal elements of the Department were two infantry divisions and supporting ground troops composing the beach and land defense forces; the Coast Artillery Command, consisting of the seacoast and anti-aircraft defense forces; and the Hawaiian Air Force.

On December 6, 1941 General Short had approximately 43,000 troops under his command, disposed as shown in detail on pages 1 to 5 of the Army exhibit which the committee has and which lists the unit locations by district, with an indication of the strength of each unit and the station at which located.

Mr. Mitchell: The Army exhibits are in the brown folder.

Mr. Gesell: It is the mimeographed folder in a brown folder, I think.

Mr. Mitchell: Go ahead.

Witness Thielen:

On the small chart there is the indication of the major units as distributed in the various islands of the group. A reproduction of that chart, is in the hands of each member of the committee.

In the Kauai District we had the 3rd Battalion, 299th Infantry (less Companies "K" and "L") and attached troops;

Company "G", 299th Infantry

1st Platoon, Signal Company Aircraft Warning

Air Corps Detachment.

In the Maui District we had the 1st Battalion, 299th Infantry (less Company "C") and attached troops

Company "K", 299th Infantry (Molokai)

4th Platoon Signal Company, Aircraft Warning

Air Corps Detachment.

In the Hawaii District we had the 2d Battalion, 299th Infantry and attached troops

Camp Detachment, Kilauea Military Camp

5th Platoon Signal Company Aircraft Warning

Air Corps Detachment.

On the principal Island of Oahu we had the following lesser units:

The 24th Infantry Division (less 299th Infantry Regiment)

25th Infantry Division

Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command

Witness Thielen:

Hawaiian Air Force

34th Engineers

804th Engineer Battalion (Aviation)

11th Tank Company

Company "A", 1st Separate Chemical Battalion

Hawaiian Pack Train

The 24th Infantry Division was responsible for the ground defense of the northern half of Oahu, and the 25th Division for that of the southern sector. Most of the components of these divisions were located at Schofield Barracks.

The Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, under Major General Henry T. Burgin, consisted of the following harbor defense units:

15th Coast Artillery Regiment (Harbor Defense)

16th Coast Artillery Regiment (Harbor Defense)

41st Coast Artillery Regiment (Railway)

55th Coast Artillery Regiment (155 mm., tractor-drawn)

and of these anti-aircraft units:

64th Coast Artillery Regiment, semi-mobile

97th Coast Artillery Regiment, semi-mobile

98th Coast Artillery Regiment, semi-mobile

251st Coast Artillery Regiment, mobile.

The principal weapons of the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command were as shown on page 6 of Army exhibit.

Witness Thielen:

Other large-caliber guns available for defense but manned by field artillery were two 240 mm. howitzers and 3-155 mm. howitzers. The seacoast guns were installed principally in permanent fortifications. The fixed anti-aircraft guns were emplaced generally to defend the seacoast artillery, and the mobile anti-aircraft units were normally stationed at Fort Shafter, Schofield Barracks, and Camp Malakole.

Liaison between the Coast Artillery Command and the Navy was maintained prior to December 7 by one Army officer and one enlisted man stationed at the Harbor Patrol station at Pearl Harbor. The Harbor Patrol station was controlled and operated by the Navy. The purpose of this liaison was to coordinate identification of waterborne craft and other possible targets.

The principal units of Major General Frederick L. Martin's Hawaiian Air Force were the 5th and 11th Bombardment Groups, the 15th and 18th Pursuit Groups, the 86th Observation Squadron, and the Air Corps services. The Air Force was generally disposed on four fields, Hickam, Wheeler, Haleiwa and Bellows.

Prior to the attack on 7 December, Alert Number 1 of the local defense plan set up by the Hawaiian Department was

Witness Thielen:

in effect. This alert, one of three provided in the plan, was therein defined as a "defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without." Military installations and equipment, planes, hangars, ammunition, communication centers, highway bridges and the like were protected by standing guards and patrols.

I will now explain the dispositions as indicated on the chart, on the large map of Oahu, under Alert Number 1.

The two divisions, as I have already indicated, had all their principal elements located in Schofield Barracks. There were, however, a number of patrols and standing guards primarily on the road at Kakanoe Island from Honolulu, around to the east, up past Kaena Point and comes back down the central valley. These patrols were located at intersections, highway bridges and other critical points.

The yellow squares indicate anti-aircraft weapons, and as I remarked, it will be noted that in general they are situated down on the south coast, protecting the seacoast installations, except for concentrations of these weapons at Schofield Barracks, the regiment at Fort Shafter, as previously mentioned and several mobile batteries out at Camp Molokai.

Most of the white squares are either seacoast weapons of various types, those that have the general appearance of

Witness Hielen:

cannon, and the aircraft installations at the fields which I have mentioned.

That concludes the Army's indication of organization and strength and I believe the Navy will now resume.

Ward's Paul Washington, D.C.

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Witness Inglis:

Admiral Inglis: The next topic is off-shore reconnaissance.

There is no written record available of any searches having been made on 6 December either from the Hawaiian area or from Midway. However, Midway had orders to have one squadron of aircraft search daily a circular area with a radius of 100 miles. Patrol squadrons from Midway were also ordered to perform searches wherever sea forces were operating, that is, surface forces. In general, the operating areas for Fleet units were south of a line drawn from Midway to Oahu.

I would like now to invite the attention of the committee to Item 10 of the Navy folder, which is a reproduction of the large chart that is on display on the right hand easel. That chart shows in green and white diagonal lines the air searches conducted on the 6th of December and in black and white horizontal lines the searches conducted just prior to the Japanese attack on the 7th of December and then in red and white vertical lines the searches after the attack on the 7th of December.

Of course, in reproducing that chart for your folders the colors do not show, but the identity is preserved by the direction of the stripes, horizontal, vertical and diagonal.

Witness Inglis:

Patrol squadrons from Midway were also ordered to perform searches wherever sea forces were operating. In general, the operating areas for Fleet Units were south of a line drawn from Midway to Oahu.

Although there is no record of regular reconnaissance flights being made on this date, the USS ENTERPRISE, 375 miles west of Pearl Harbor and traveling due east, did at 1:00 in the afternoon launch 15 torpedo bombers which searched, ahead of the ship, an arc of 110 degrees to a distance of 150 miles. At the time of the above search, the ENTERPRISE had six other planes in the air as an anti-submarine patrol ahead of the ship.

On the morning of 7 December there were three patrol planes of the PBV-5 type from Kaneohe Air Station engaged in a routine search of the Fleet operating areas approximately 120 miles south of Oahu. That is shown in the black and white horizontal stripes.

According to the operations plan then current, each plane was to be fueled with 1,000 gallons of gasoline which would give it a patrolling range of 800 miles. The planes were to take off at dawn, 5:27 Hawaiian time on the 7th, carrying two depth charges and with all machine guns fully armed. However, these planes did not take off until about 6:40. Later, when the attack took place, these planes were

S25

Witness Inglis:

diverted to the northwest to search for the Japanese forces.

Four patrol planes were also in the air when the attack came, engaged in inter-type tactical exercises with U.S. submarines near Lahaina Roads. They also were diverted after the attack to search for Japanese forces. All their machine guns were fully armed but they carried no depth charges. Thus there were a total of seven Navy patrol planes employed in the search.

In addition to regular scheduled reconnaissance flights, the USS ENTERPRISE, 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor, launched 18 scout bombers armed with machine guns, shortly after 6:00 A.M., which searched to the eastward ahead of the ship an arc of 110 degrees to a distance of 150 miles. The mission of these planes was to search an area around and ahead of the ENTERPRISE and then to land at Ewa where they were to base while the ship was in port. They arrived there during the attack on Pearl Harbor and engaged Japanese aircraft. Three of these planes landed at 9:40 and ten at 10:15. The other five never arrived.

There is no written record available of any inshore reconnaissance and by "inshore" I mean a distance up to only thirty miles, - flown by the Navy off Oahu the afternoon and evening of 6 December or the morning of 7 December 1941.

From neighboring islands on the morning of 7 December

826

Witness Inglis:

there was a reconnaissance of five patrol planes armed with machine guns and a full allowance of ammunition, which took off from the Naval Air Station, Midway, at 7:50 Hawaiian time. Their mission was to patrol the area to the south and southeast of Midway to a distance of 450 miles. Although this reconnaissance was scheduled before, it actually occurred after attack and is shown on the chart in vertical stripes.

Two additional planes of the same type took off at the same time to rendezvous with the USS LEXINGTON at a point 400 miles from Midway in a southeasterly direction. These planes were to escort the 18 Marine scout bombing planes being brought in by the LEXINGTON as reinforcements for Midway. This Marine flight was cancelled after news was received of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Five additional planes, armed with two 500-pound bombs each, were on the alert at Midway ready to take off on 10 minutes' notice.

I will ask Colonel Thielen to take up from here again.

Witness Thielen:

Colonel Thielen: As for Army reconnaissance, there is no evidence that any inshore patrol was maintained by the Army Air Forces on 7 December or on the days preceding the attack. Neither is there evidence that Army bombers were patrolling offshore on 7 December prior to the attack.

Closely related to this subject, however, is the flight of B-17s being ferried from the mainland, which arrived in Oahu about the time of the attack.

Beginning at 9:30 P.M., 6 December 1941, six B-17's of the 88th Reconnaissance Squadron and six B-17's of the 38th Reconnaissance Squadron took off from Hamilton Field, California, at two-minute intervals. These airplanes were to travel to the Philippines via Oahu. They were not armed.

The aircraft did not maintain formation or visual contact with each other, and made landfall at Oahu at various places. The course from the mainland followed the arc of a great circle which would bring the planes into Oahu from the northeast. However, one plane approached Oahu from about 100 miles north-northwest of the island and another from Kauai, about 75 miles west-northwest of Oahu.

All planes landed on Oahu between 8:30 and 9:00 A.M., 7 December. One landed at Wheeler Field, one at Bellows Field, one on a golf course, two at Haleiwa and the remainder at Hickam Field. Three planes were badly damaged and one was

S 28

Witness Thielen:

destroyed during landing.

As to the air warning service which was in effect at this time, this air warning service included the radar detecting stations and related equipment and was under the control of the Hawaiian Department Signal Officer. The warning net did not include any system of ground observers.

By December 7, the Hawaiian Department had received all components for three fixed detector stations (SCR 271). At the time of the attack, construction work had not been completed on the fixed installations at Mt. Kalla (Oahu), Kokee (Kauai) and Halekala (Maui), for the use of this equipment. Six mobile, long-range radar sets (SCR 270) had been received, five of which were in operation early on 7 December at the following points on Oahu -- Fort Shafter, Koko Head, Kaaawa, Opana and Kawaihoa. This mobile set (SCR 270) has a normal range up to 150 miles, depending upon the height of the station and height of aircraft. Detection of planes at a distance of 150 miles and flying at 20,000 feet may be expected from sea-level positions. The set consists essentially of four large, heavy truck units. It takes at least four hours to place the set in operation. Its full operating complement requires four crews of six trained men to each crew. The equipment is accurate to within two miles in range and three degrees in azimuth, that is, in direction.

Witness Thielen:

As a matter of interest, the range and other characteristics of the fixed sets were substantially the same as those of the mobile sets.

In use, radar indicates the presence of an airplane by a luminous pip on a dark screen. A large number of airplanes at a great distance flying in formation would appear as an abnormally wide pip. At the radar station, one of the crew observes the indication of the airplanes on the screen and periodically calls off the distance. Another reads direction from an azimuth scale. From these data are plotted positions on a chart. There was no way on 7 December 1941 of distinguishing between the images formed by enemy planes and by friendly planes.

When replaced Alert No. 1 in effect, General Short also directed that the Aircraft Warning Service operate all mobile aircraft warning stations from two hours before dawn to one hour after dawn, specifically, from four to seven o'clock in the morning. Thus the operating schedule of the mobile radar detector stations was daily from 4:00 A.M. to 7:00 A.M.; routine training from 7:00 A.M. to 11:00 A.M., except Sundays; and daily except Saturday and Sunday from 12:00 to 4:00 P.M. for training and maintenance work.

May I call your attention to the chart which represents a consolidation of the recorded plots at the Orana station

Witness Nielsen:

before and after the attack. Also in the Army exhibit, page 7, is a reproduction of a photostatic copy of the record of early flights on 7 December 1941 obtained by the Opana detector station. This chart on the easel is taken from the photostatic chart.

On page 8 of the exhibit is a reproduction of a photostatic copy of mobile detector station records obtained prior to 7:00 A.M. on 7 December 1941. The dots indicate the location of aircraft. Going back to the chart on the easel, the blue arrow represents the direction of approach of the B-17's previously mentioned as being ferried from the mainland.

I perhaps should mention that those planes were not recorded by the radar station. Their direction is put on the chart merely as a matter of orientation.

At 7:00 A.M., 7 December 1941, all radar detector stations closed down except the Opana station at Kahuku Point which remained in operation in order to continue the training of a new man, Pvt. George E. Elliott, who had volunteered to remain on the job for this purpose.

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Witness Thielen

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1 At 7:02 a.m. this station, manned by Private Elliott and
2 Private Joseph L. Lockard, picked up an indication of aero-
3 planes at 132 miles, bearing 3 degrees east of north, indi-
4 cated by that pip at the top of the chart marked with the
5 time 7:02.
6

7 The soldiers kept tracking the target. At 7:20 a.m.
8 Private Lockard called to inform Lieutenant Tyler, the Watch
9 Officer at the Information Center, Fort Shafter, of his ob-
10 servations, but that officer decided to take no action.

11 Shortly after 8:00 a.m. Lieutenant Tyler received a
12 telephone message that Wheeler Field was under attack.
13 Lieutenant Tyler thereupon directed that all radar crews be
14 recalled to their stations.

15 Sound Detectors.

16 In the Coast Artillery Anti-Aircraft Regiment there
17 were generally two battalions of guns, each of which included
18 three gun batteries and a battery of ten 60-inch searchlights.

19 Mr. Mitchell: Just a minute, Colonel. Will you put
20 the map back there? I would like to ask him a question.

21 Colonel Thielen: Yes.

22 Mr. Mitchell: Do you have anything to say about those
23 purple ink marks on your exhibit, "6:45" and "6:48"?

24 Mr. Keefe: I can't hear your question, Mr. Mitchell.

25 Mr. Mitchell: I am sorry. I have to put my nose in

Witness Thielen

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1
2 the instrument.

3 Have you anything to say about those indications of
4 interception at earlier hours to the left of that, as you
5 pointed out?

6 Colonel Thielen: As I mentioned, that chart was taken
7 from the historical plot, so-called, of which the committee
8 has a photostatic copy. I reduced the information in those
9 pips on the chart for the sake of accuracy, but I am not in
10 a position to interpret them.

11 Mr. Mitchell: That is, the Army hasn't any information,
12 from its records, to interpret what the radar station showed,
13 what the record of the radar station showed, to the left, I
14 mean?

15 Colonel Thielen: Any interpretation would be speculation,
16 I think, on my part, sir.

17 Mr. Mitchell: I just wondered, as it is shown there,
18 whether something ought to be said about it.

19 Colonel Thielen: They are taken, as I said, for the
20 sake of completeness from the historical plot. They do appear
21 on the plot. They were plotted on the Opana station. As I
22 indicated, with the state of radar at that time, it could
23 not be definitely stated whether any image was that of a
24 friendly or hostile aircraft.

25 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman --

Witness Thielen

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Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, I am going to raise the point of order. If we are going to have a rule it ought to be followed.

Senator Ferguson: Since the point of order is raised --

The Chairman: I think we have a point of order that we agreed to follow, otherwise we will be breaking down the rules before we start.

Go ahead.

Mr. Mitchell: Go ahead, Colonel.

Colonel Thielen: As for the sound detectors --

Senator Ferguson: I assumed, Mr. Chairman, when the counsel asked questions and no one else asked questions, that it would naturally come around to ask him a question.

The Chairman: The Chair's interpretation of the rule is that the committee members are not to ask questions until the counsel has finished with the witness.

Senator Ferguson: That means completely finished with the witness and he turns him over to the committee?

The Chairman: Yes.

Senator Brewster: It might be quite in order for the committee members to suggest questions, so if they have any suggestions to make they make written suggestions. I think it might clarify the record as to procedure.

The Chairman: Certainly.

Witnesses Inglis and Thielen

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

(3)

Mr. Mitchell: Colonel, may I ask you also if there is anything you have to say about the purple arrow going from 10:39 to 10:27 on that map? What does that mean? Why is that on there?

Colonel Thielen: Because those two points were plotted by the Opana station at that time.

Mr. Mitchell: After the attack?

Colonel Thielen: That is correct. We could see definitely that they were going away at 1027, having been plotted earlier than that at 1039.

Mr. Mitchell: That is all. You may go ahead.

Colonel Thielen: As for the sound detectors, in the Coast Artillery Anti-Aircraft Regiment there were generally two battalions of guns, each of which included three gun batteries and a battery of ten 60-inch searchlights. One sound detector generally worked with each searchlight. The primary purpose of the sound detector was to pick up an aeroplane by its sound and then to point the searchlight; consequently detectors were employed only at night.

The sound detector in use at the time had an optimum range of about 10,000 yards.

I believe the Navy will now discuss the radar.

Admiral Inglis: Before discussing Navy radar I would like to reconcile one point that might seem inconsistent to

Witness. Inglis

the members of the committee.

You will recall in describing the search of the patrol planes I said that the planes were to take off at sunrise, 5:27 Hawaiian time. That word "sunrise" was taken out of the report, but I think it was a typographical error because sunrise was actually an hour later, at 6:26.

It is my understanding that the plan did call for the planes to take off at 5:27, an hour before sunrise, which is usually considered as dawn in those latitudes.

With that explanation, I would like to pass on now to the Navy's radar equipment. The only ships in Pearl Harbor equipped with ship search radar at that time, on 7 December, 1941, were the battleships Pennsylvania, California, West Virginia, and the seaplane tender Curtiss. The radar equipment on these ships was not manned since the height of the land around the Harbor would have made it ineffective. The equipment on the Curtiss was put into operation at the beginning of the first attack and that on the Pennsylvania began to operate fifteen minutes later, both with negative results.

Facilities for Aircraft Spotting.

On board the naval vessels at Pearl Harbor, aircraft spotting was a function of the crews manning their stations at Condition of Readiness then existing. Every Ship's organization Bill provided for certain members of the watch

al-6

Witness Inglis

at the gun and control stations to act as aircraft lookouts. There were no naval air lookout stations ashore. However, crews of the signal tower at Pearl Harbor had certain air lookout duties as part of their general signal duties.

Character of Anti-Submarine Patrol Operations 7 December 1941.

On the morning of 7 December 1941, the U.S. destroyer Ward was assigned and was carrying out an inner anti-submarine patrol off the Pearl Harbor entrance. Commander Barrett is pointing to that locality. This patrol searched the navigable waters between bearings 100° to 250° (True) from Entrance Buoy No. 1 to a distance of two miles.

The mission of this patrol was to detect and prevent unidentified submarines and unauthorized vessels from entering the approaches to the Pearl Harbor Entrance Channel.

Although not part of the anti-submarine patrol, the U.S. minesweepers Condor and Crossbill were conducting minesweeping operations in the channel and approaches thereto.

The Fleet units at sea were screened by both a surface and air anti-submarine patrol.

Account of Japanese Attack on Ships and Installations at Pearl Harbor - 7 December 1941.

Possibly the first Japanese contact off Oahu was made at 3:50 a.m. Pearl Harbor time (9:20 a.m. Washington time)

al-7

Witness, Inglis

when the U.S. coastal minesweeper Condor sighted the periscope of a submerged submarine. At that time the Condor was conducting minesweeping operations approximately 1-3/4 miles southwest of the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys. At 3:57 a.m. the Condor, by visual signal, informed the destroyer Ward, then patrolling off the Pearl Harbor entrance, of this contact.

The Ward thereupon immediately instituted a search and at about 6:40 a.m. sighted the periscope of an unidentified submarine apparently trailing the U.S. target repair ship Antares, then en route to Honolulu Harbor.

Commander Barrett, will you show the relationship between Honolulu Harbor and Pearl Harbor entrance?

That is Pearl Harbor (indicating) and that is Honolulu Harbor, about ten miles apart.

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1 Upon sighting the submarine, the WARD ordered all hands
2 to battle stations, increased her speed from five to 25
3 knots, and started the attack. The WARD opened fire with
4 her guns at 6:45 a.m. and a depth charge attack was com-
5 menced. The second gun salvo scored a direct hit upon
6 the conning tower of the Japanese submarine. As a result
7 of these attacks, the submarine is believed to have gone
8 down in 1200 feet of water. A large amount of oil came
9 to the surface.

11 At 6:54 a.m., the WARD sent the following dispatch by
12 voice transmission to the Commandant, 14th Naval District:

13 "We have attacked, fired upon, and dropped charges upon
14 submarine operating in Defensive Sea Area."

15 At 7:15 a.m. (12:45 p.m. Washington time) this message
16 was reported delivered to the District Duty Officer, Lieuten-
17 ant Commander Harold Haminski. In turn, at 7:16 a.m.,
18 Lieutenant Commander Kaminski notified the duty officer of
19 the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet. This was the first
20 information received at the Pearl Harbor Headquarters of the
21 Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, that unidentified forces
22 might be in the Hawaiian area. Twenty-five minutes after
23 this telephone report, a second was received at the Headquart-
24 ers, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, from the Operations
25 Officer of Patrol Wing Two relaying a report received at

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h2

7:32 a.m. to the effect that a patrol plane had sunk an unidentified submarine south of Pearl Harbor channel entrance buoy. This was the same submarine reported by the WARD. This report was followed by another telephone report from the 14th Naval District Duty Officer in which it was stated that the WARD was towing a sampan into Honolulu. This last report was undoubtedly erroneous since there is no mention in the WARD'S Administrative Log of her towing a sampan.

Upon receipt of the WARD'S report by the Commandant, 14th Naval District, the Commandant ordered the ready-duty destroyer USS MONAGHAN to proceed to sea, to close the net gate, to attempt to verify the contact report giving full details, and to notify the Commander-in-Chief 's Staff Duty Officer. A dispatch was sent to the WARD at 7:37 a. m., asking verification of the report and details of the attack on the enemy submarine.

After the WARD'S message and prior to the Japanese raid, no other reports indicating or verifying the enemy'S presence were received at the Headquarters, Commandant, 14th Naval District.

At about 7:55 a. m. Pearl Harbor time (1:25 p. m. Washington time), the Navy Yard Signal Tower telephoned the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as follows:

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"Enemy Air Raid -- Not Drill."

Almost simultaneously, Japanese torpedo planes attacked the battle ships. From then on until 9:45 a.m., Pearl Harbor time (3:15 p.m. Washington time) there was almost continuous enemy air activity of some kind over the Harbor. However, there seemed to be separate periods of greatly intensified activity. On this basis, the narrative of the attack may be divided into five phases.

The five phases of the attack are:

- Phase I - Combined torpedo plane and dive bomber attacks lasting from 7:55 a.m. to 8:25 a.m.
- Phase II - Lull in attacks lasting from 8:25 a.m. to 8:40 a.m.
- Phase III - Horizontal bomber attacks extending from 8:40 a. m. to 9:15 a. m.
- Phase IV - Dive bomber attacks between 9:15 a. m. and 9:45 a. m.
- Phase V - Waning of attacks and completion of raid after 9:45 a. m.

The primary objectives of the Japanese during the raid were the heavy combatant ships and aircraft. Damage to the light forces and the industrial plant was incidental to the destruction or disablement of the heavy ships and aircraft based ashore.

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h4

PHASE I - 7:55 - 8:25 A.M. - Combined Torpedo and

Dive Bomber Attacks:

The beginning of the attack coincided with the hoisting of the preparatory signal for eight o'clock colors. At this time (namely 7:55 a.m.) Japanese dive bombers appeared over Ford Island, and within the next few seconds enemy torpedo planes and dive bombers swung in from various sectors to concentrate their attack on the heavy ships moored in Pearl Harbor. It is estimated that nine planes engaged in the attack on the Naval Air Station on Ford Island, concentrated on the planes parked in the vicinity of Hangar No. 6.

At the time of the attack, our planes (patrol flying boats, float planes, and scout bombers, carrier type) were lined up on the field. These planes caught fire and exploded. Machine gun emplacements were set up hastily and manned, although the return fire from shore on Ford Island was pitifully weak. Then as suddenly as they had appeared, the Japanese planes vanished. No further attack on this air station was made during the day. Except for a direct hit on Hangar No. 6 resulting from a bomb which was apparently aimed at the battleship CALIFORNIA and which fell short, the damage to the station itself was comparatively slight. However, 33 of our best planes out of a total of 70 planes of all types were destroyed or damaged.

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h5

As soon as the attack began, Commander Patrol Wing Two broadcasted from Ford Island the warning: "Air Raid, Pearl Harbor - This is not drill." This warning was followed a few minutes later by a similar message from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

At approximately the same time that the Japanese dive bombers appeared over Ford Island, other low flying planes struck at the Kaneohe Naval Air Station on the other side of the island. The attack was well executed, with the planes coming down in shallow dives and inflicting severe casualties on the seaplanes moored in the water. Machine guns and rifles were brought out, and men dispersed to fire at will at the low flying planes. After a period of ten to fifteen minutes, the attacking planes drew off to the north at a low altitude and disappeared from sight. Several other contingents of bombers passed over, but none dropped bombs on Kaneohe Bay.

About twenty-five minutes after the first attack, another squadron of planes similar to one of our light bomber types, appeared over Kaneohe and commenced bombing and strafing. No. 3 Hangar received a direct hit during this attack and four planes in the hangar were destroyed. The majority of the casualties suffered at Kaneohe resulted from this attack. Most of the injured personnel were in the squadrons attempting either to launch their planes or to save those

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h6

planes not as yet damaged. When the enemy withdrew, some ten to fifteen minutes later, salvage operations were commenced, but it was too late to save No. 1 Hangar, which burned until only its steel structural work was left. Only nine out of the 35 planes at Kaneohe escaped destruction in this attack. Six of these were damaged and three were in the air on patrol south of Oahu as previous described.

Meanwhile, the Marine Air Base at Ewa was undergoing similar attack. Apparently the attack on Ewa preceded that at Pearl Harbor by about two minutes. It was delivered by two squadrons of 18 to 24 single-seater fighter planes using machine gun strafing tactics, which came in from the northwest at an altitude of approximately one thousand feet. These enemy planes would descend to within 20 to 25 feet of the ground, attacking single planes with short bursts of gunfire. Then they would pull over the tree tops, reverse their course, and attack from the opposite direction. Within less than fifteen minutes, all the Marine tactical aircraft had been shot up or set on fire. Then the guns of the enemy fighters were turned upon our utility aircraft, upon planes that had been disassembled for repair, and upon the Marines themselves.

Effective defense measures were impossible until after the first raid had subsided. Pilots aching to strike at the enemy in the air viewed the wreckage which until a

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h7
1 few minutes before had been a strong air group of Marine
2 fighters and bombers. Altogether 33 out of the 49 planes
3 at Ewa had gone up in smoke. Some Marines, unable to find
4 anything more effective, had tried to oppose fighter
5 planes with pistols, since the remaining 16 planes were
6 too badly damaged to fly.

7 Although in Phase I of the attack on the ships at
8 Pearl Harbor Japanese dive bombers were effective, the tor-
9 pedo planes did the most damage. They adhered strictly
10 to a carefully laid plan and directed their attacks from
11 those sectors which afforded the best avenues of approach
12 for torpedo attack against selected heavy ship objectives.
13 Thus they indicated accurate knowledge of harbor and channel
14 depths and the berths ordinarily occupied by the major com-
15 batant units of our fleet. At least in the great majority
16 of cases, the depth of water in Pearl Harbor did not prevent
17 the successful execution of this form of attack. Shallow
18 dives of the torpedos upon launching were assured by the
19 use of specially constructed wooden fins, remnants of which
20 were discovered on enemy torpedos salvaged after the attack.

21 Four separate torpedo plane attacks were made during
22 Phase I. The major attack was made by 12 planes which
23 swung in generally from the southeast over the tank farm
24 and the vicinity of Merry Point. After splitting, they
25 launched their torpedos at very low altitudes (within 50