

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 than mine, I think.

3 Mr. Murphy: No.

4 Admiral Kimmel: You should be able to understand
5 what the message means. It is plain English. It says
6 "burn codes". I can't make out what kind of codes he is
7 talking about. There must be something missing. I can't
8 see that it makes sense.

9 Mr. Murphy: My trouble is that when I read the one
10 in December about burning codes, from everything I have
11 read, I thought that meant war, but apparently it didn't
12 mean war at Hawaii, because burning codes you said didn't
13 have much significance to you.

14 Admiral Kimmel: Well, this "burn codes" here in July
15 didn't bring on war, at least. I don't know what it
16 meant. There is something about burning codes.

17 Mr. Murphy: You say it didn't bring on war. They
18 did go into Indo-China. They took over there, didn't they?

19 Admiral Kimmel: Well, as far as I am concerned, I
20 don't understand what they are talking about.

21 Mr. Murphy: It is a fact that after this message,
22 shortly thereafter, they did go into Indo-China and take
23 over?

24 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, but who burned the codes?

25 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, I am only dealing with

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 what messages are before us, and my only reason in talking
3 about burning codes, if you didn't understand it, did you
4 ask Washington then, in July, to explain it?

5 Admiral Kimmel: I thought I understood it.

6 Mr. Murphy: Will counsel check that and get us the
7 original?

8 Mr. Masten: That is the one on page 9.

9 Senator Lucas: You are going to find out who burned
10 the codes?

11 Mr. Murphy: I am interested in whether or not we are
12 getting accurate information. It is hard enough to keep
13 up with accurate information.

14 Admiral Kimmel: From memory, I don't remember the
15 message. I probably saw it; if it was addressed to me I
16 certainly saw it.

17 Mr. Murphy: Now, do we have the copy of the Short
18 testimony?

19 Before the Roberts Commission, Admiral, General Short
20 was being questioned about what he would have done if he
21 had had all of the material which was asked for. He was
22 also asked what the Navy would have done if the Navy had
23 all the material they had asked for. The General was
24 reluctant to answer the question, but he did say to the
25 Roberts Board that even if the Navy had had all that it

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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wanted and had asked for in his opinion there still
 would have been no reconnaissance on that morning. Would
 you agree with that?

Admiral Kimmel: I take the statement that you have
 made, and I presume it is correct, I haven't read it,
 but I do not agree with his conclusion as you have stated
 it.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Mr. Murphy: I refer to page 1637.

3 Admiral Kimmel: Yes. Where is it?

4 Mr. Murphy: Excuse me just one minute. I beg your par-
5 don, page 1641, Admiral.

6 Admiral Kimmel: 1641?

7 Mr. Murphy: Yes, 1641, at the bottom of the page.

8 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

9 Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

10 "General McCoy: If you had been furnished with all
11 of the things that you felt necessary, would that have
12 made any difference in this particular action?

13 "General Short: I do not believe it would.

14 "Admiral Standley: Right there: In case the pat-
15 rol planes that were necessary to make the effective off-
16 shore patrol were here in sufficient numbers, do you
17 still think that no change would have been made in the
18 plans?

19 "General Short: None whatever, because you couldn't
20 tell when some of them might have been ordered away.
21 If they had been left they just simply would not have
22 called upon us. As a matter of fact, as I said, in
23 most of our exercises the assumption was that they had
24 enough to make the patrol, so they made the patrols and
25 called up on us to execute the bombing mission, because

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Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 they considered that our B-17s were more effective as
3 bombers than their own planes.

4 "Admiral Standley: Yes, but in this estimate they
5 stated definitely that there were not sufficient forces
6 to make a continuous air patrol as required in war.

7 "General Short: Yes, sir. Well, there wouldn't
8 be --

9 "Admiral Standley: Now, if you had had that force
10 here do you think under the circumstances you would have
11 been making that patrol every morning? Not you, I mean,
12 but the Navy.

13 "General Short: But the Navy.

14 "Admiral Standley: The combined effort, yes.

15 "General Short: Well, I think that would be a fair
16 question to ask the Navy. I don't hardly think under the
17 conditions that they would; I think that they would have
18 been doing it as an exercise now and then in connection
19 with us. I do not believe that they would have been do-
20 ing it habitually if they had had them, but I don't know.
21 It would be a fair question to ask them."

22 And then down below:

23 "Admiral Reeves: Before you go to that, General,
24 let me ask General Short this:

25 "On the other hand, if you had had material and

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Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 fully equipped radar stations, would you have been oper-
3 ating them throughout the day or would you have operated
4 them as you did on the morning of the 7th?

5 "General Short: I probably would have operated
6 them just as I did."

7 Now, do you agree, first, with General Short that if you
8 had had the planes that you wanted that you would have con-
9 tinued the same schedule of operations on the morning of the
10 7th as you did?

11 Admiral Kimmel: I do not agree with any of his conclu-
12 sions here about that. I most certainly do not.

13 Mr. Murphy: The fact is, Admiral, that General Short
14 testified before the Roberts Board that he implicitly believed
15 that you were having reconnaissance on that morning, although
16 he did not know the details of it and, as I understand it, you
17 testified that you implicitly believed that you were getting
18 radar protection for two hundred miles?

19 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

20 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, if there had been a conference
21 between you and General Short on what to do and into detail
22 after November the 27th would you have then been led to be-
23 lieve that you were getting a two hundred mile coverage at
24 all times on radar and would he have been led to believe im-
25 plicitly that there was a reconnaissance?

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Admiral Kimmel: Let us get the beginning of that. That
3 is a little bit too long for me.

4 Mr. Murphy: It is a long question.

5 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, a little too much there.

6 The Vice Chairman: Read the question, please.

7 (Question read.)

8 Admiral Kimmel: There was a conference, not only one
9 but several of them, at which we discussed all phases of the
10 P acific campaign and the defenses of Hawaii and I have covered
11 that very thoroughly in previous testimony and in the state-
12 ment which I submitted to the committee.

13 Mr. Murphy: You have read, have you, General Short's
14 testimony before the Roberts Board?

15 Admiral Kimmel: Have I what?

16 Mr. Murphy: Have you read General Short's testimony be-
17 fore the Roberts Board?

18 Admiral Kimmel: I have read some of it.

19 Mr. Murphy: Well, didn't he tell them that you did not
20 discuss details, that you spent your time on discussing the out-
21 lying islands; that he had never seen the war warning mes-
22 sage of the 27th and that he thought there was reconnaissance
23 but he did not know the details?

24 Admiral Kimmel: He changed that testimony considerably
25 later, as you will recall.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Mr. Murphy: Before the Board?

3 Admiral Kimmel: I think so.

4 Mr. Murphy: He changed it in subsequent hearings but I
5 was wondering if he testified to it before the Board. He
6 did say that it was his recollection that he had seen the
7 message but he did not know whether he had or not, as I
8 remember it.

9 Let me go into it exactly; I think it is important. I
10 direct your attention to page 38 of the record.

11 The Vice Chairman: What record?

12 Mr. Murphy: Of the Roberts hearing, General Short's
13 testimony. General Short there said that since the beginning
14 of the emergency there was only one alert and that was at
15 the time of the freezing of assets in July. At that time
16 General Short placed the Army on an alert against --

17 Admiral Kimmel: Where are you reading from?

18 Mr. Murphy: I am not reading yet. I am giving this
19 as preliminary to try to save time.

20 In July, after the message about the freezing of the as-
21 sets General Short immediately put out his sabotage alert.
22 As I understand it, at that time the Navy did nothing special,
23 is that right? You took no special precautions?

24 Admiral Kimmel: What date was that, sir?

25 Mr. Murphy: In July, after the message about freezing

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Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 the assets.

3 Admiral Kimmel: I do not recall now just what action
4 we took at that time, if any.

5 Mr. Murphy: Well, as I understand it you were on a
6 sabotage alert for many years; the Fleet had done everything
7 they could to stop sabotage and there was no need of getting
8 into any additional precautions about it, isn't that so?

9 Admiral Kimmel: That is true, that part of it.

10 Mr. Murphy: Whereas the Army did go into a sabotage
11 alert and they put men out to protect the utilities and as I
12 understand it they never stopped protecting them right down to
13 November the 27th, whereas you did not have any special pre-
14 cautions at that time.

15 Admiral Kimmel: I had many precautions but our problem
16 in regard to sabotage in the Navy and the Army's problem were
17 entirely separate and distinct, very different.

18 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, in October when you got the mes-
19 sage you did go in and take special precautions and make
20 special assignments, did you not?

21 Admiral Kimmel: As I recall, yes.

22 Mr. Murphy: Yes.

23 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

24 Mr. Murphy: The Army, so far as you know, did not take
25 any steps at that time, did they?

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Admiral Kimmel: I do not now recall.

3 Mr. Murphy: Now I direct your attention to page 46. At
4 the bottom of the page, about ten lines from the bottom of
5 the page General Short says:

6 "The question of just how the total reconnaiss_ance
7 was carried out was never known by me."

8 Do you see that?

9 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I saw that.

10 Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

11 "If they called on us for a squadron of planes they
12 would assign it to a certain sector, say maybe from zero
13 to 70 degrees, to search out 600 miles, or whatever it
14 was. I assumed that the Navy planes were searching all
15 the other critical areas, and they probably were. I say,
16 that was a matter that was not under my control."

17 General Short did so testify, didn't he?

18 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, it is so recorded here.

19 Mr. Murphy: Yes. I now direct your attention to page
20 47, about one-third of the way down:

21 "General Short: From March 21" --

22 Admiral Kimmel: I have it.

23 Mr. Murphy: (Reading):

24 "From March 21 on we had repeatedly carried out
25 exercises along that line. We had a minimum of one exer-

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 cise a week, and sometimes exercises more frequently than
3 that, but we were working constantly to perfect that co-
4 ordination. This has no direct bearing, but to show what
5 we were trying to do, that same agreement provided that
6 when we were using fighters over the Island of Oahu then
7 they turned their fighters over to my command. We were
8 trying to get a coordinated whole in that."

9 Now, I am reading, Admiral, but I do hope that the coun-
10 sel will check on the date of November the 20th as being the
11 last exercise.

12 Mr. Richardson: The 12th.

13 Mr. Murphy: November the 12th?

14 Mr. Richardson: Yes.

15 Mr. Murphy: As the last exercise and I am wondering why
16 if you and General Short had plans to have an exercise every
17 week and sometimes oftener than that throughout the year,
18 there was not at least an exercise held to get ready after the
19 war warning of the 27th.

20 Admiral Kimmel: I am unable to answer that. I told you
21 that that was a matter handled by the Commandant of the Di-
22 strict and the Commanding General.

23 Mr. Murphy: I now direct your attention, Admiral, to
24 page 54 at the bottom of the page, the last paragraph:

25 "So, while I do not remember exactly asking a speci-

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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the question as to the location of the Japanese carriers, I had a very decided impression that at that time there was nothing in the situation that the location of the Japanese carriers was worrying us at that time. In fact, the question came up very definitely by a question of Admiral Kimmel's. During this conference on the 27th with General Martin, his chief of staff, Colonel Morrison, the question was asked, and I would like to read it since his statement is more definite than my recollection:

"I certify that on November 27, 1941, I accompanied General Short and General Martin to Admiral Kimmel's office for conference relative to sending Army pursuit planes to Midway and Wake. As this would unquestionably weaken the defense of Oahu, Admiral Kimmel asked a question of Captain McMorris, his War Plans Officer, which was substantially as follows:

"Admiral Kimmel: 'McMorris, what is your idea of the chances of a surprise raid on Oahu?'

"Captain McMorris: 'I should say none, Admiral.'"

"At that time there was no exception taken to that statement by either Admiral Kimmel or Admiral Bloch, and apparently the Navy felt that they had definite information of the location of carriers and major ships of the Japanese and that there was no question in their minds of the

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 possibility or probability of a surprise attack upon
3 Oahu."

4 Now, the fact is, Admiral, that at least one person
5 there in the affidavit says that the purpose of that meeting
6 on that morning was about Wake and Midway, isn't that so?

7 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct and that was before the
8 receipt of the war warning dispatches you will recall.

9 Mr. Murphy: That is right.

10 Admiral Kimmel: But we did discuss, - in the discussion
11 about the sending of planes to Midway and Wake it was inevit-
12 able that we should discuss the Pacific situation and we did
13 discuss it and this one little passage here is an indication
14 of the fact that we did so discuss it.

15 Mr. Murphy: Did you ever discuss the question of a
16 raid with McMorris in the light of the war warning to see if
17 that would change his judgment? He said there was no danger
18 of a raid before he knew about the war warning.

19 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

20 Mr. Murphy: But then came a war warning. Did you ask
21 McMorris for his judgment in view of the fact that war is
22 coming?

23 Admiral Kimmel: I discussed all phases of the situation
24 with McMorris almost daily; not almost daily but daily, and
25 we went over the whole situation and at no time did McMorris

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 recommend to me that we put out these planes for reconnais-
3 sance purposes and he would have done so had he considered
4 it necessary. He is a very able, outspoken officer and a man
5 in whom I had the highest confidence.

6 Mr. Murphy: Did you discuss that subject with General
7 Short and was McMorris asked as to whether or not his view
8 would be qualified in view of the war warning, before General
9 Short?

10 Admiral Kimmel: Did I discuss it before General Short?

11 Mr. Murphy: Yes, sir.

12 Admiral Kimmel: I cannot now recall.

13 Mr. Murphy: All right.

14 Admiral Kimmel: I cannot recall any specific discussion
15 but I am sure it took place.

16 Mr. Murphy: Now direct your attention to the same
17 page:

18 "General Short: At that time there was no exception
19 taken to that statement by either Admiral Kimmel or Ad-
20 miral Bloch, and apparently the Navy felt that they had
21 definite information of the location of carriers and
22 major ships of the Japanese and that there was no ques-
23 tion in their minds of the possibility or probability of
24 a surprise attack upon Oahu."

25 In other words, you were not even discussing Oahu at that

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 time, were you, I mean as such? Your problem -- well, I
3 think General Short is wrong myself on that one, because one
4 contradicts the other.

5 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, of course it does.

6 Mr. Murphy: I am not going to question you on that.

7 Now, I direct your attention to page 58. You gave some
8 testimony relative to the flight of the B --

9 Admiral Kimmel: One moment.

10 Mr. Murphy: I am not referring to any particular part
11 yet, Admiral. This is preliminary.

12 Admiral Kimmel: All right, go ahead. What is this?

13 Mr. Murphy: You gave some testimony relative to the fact
14 that the Army had sent B-17s from the West Coast to Hawaii
15 and you said that they did not even have guns ready to shoot
16 and you apparently criticized that, or at least said that that
17 would mean that they were not worrying about attack. There
18 was a question of ammunition and there was also a question of
19 a crew.

20 Now, on this page I would like to refer to the testimony
21 of General Short relative to where he says the crews would
22 not be enough to man the guns --

23 Admiral Kimmel: Where is this?

24 Mr. Murphy: I will get it for you. At the bottom of
25 the page, in the last paragraph, about ten lines up!

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

"The crews" --

Admiral Kimmel: Wait. I think I had better clear up something right now.

Mr. Murphy: Yes.

Admiral Kimmel: I saw never saw these B-17s that came to Hawaii.

Mr. Murphy: That is right.

Admiral Kimmel: I do not know of my own knowledge anything about the condition of their guns.

Mr. Murphy: I am not going to ask you that question. You have already testified that they were cosmoline.

Admiral Kimmel: I testified that that was reported to me.

Mr. Murphy: Right.

Admiral Kimmel: And no statements were made and, so far as I know, they have never been contradicted.

Mr. Murphy: That is right, I am not challenging that. My question here is that General Short says that the crews would not be enough to man the guns even if the guns had been in shape to fire and even if they had ammunition and I want to ask you that for this reason: There is much ado made in this record, as I recollect, by yourself and by others about the fact that the B-17s had come from the coast to Hawaii without being able to protect themselves.

General Marshall said that the reason why that occurred

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 was that there was a question of the amount of gasoline, we
3 did not have planes as good then as now, and that there was a
4 question of how much gasoline they could possibly carry and
5 they wanted to have as much as possible because they thought
6 they could not cover that distance; they were having winds at
7 the time and the distance basis.

8 Now, as I understand it you testified that that would lead
9 to the inference that they did not fear an attack and you said
10 that they had the guns themselves there on the ships but they
11 were cosmolined and could not fire.

12 Now my question is to you as an expert. General Short
13 said they did not have enough crew to fire the guns and they
14 did not have enough ammunition, - did not have any ammunition.
15 What would the relative weight be of a sufficient number of
16 men to fire the guns, a complete crew and ammunition and would
17 that interfere substantially with the amount of gas they could
18 carry? Now, do you understand my question?

19 Admiral Kimmel: I understand your question and I do not
20 know enough to answer it. I think you can get complete and
21 full answers from people who knew the characteristics of the
22 B-17s at that time. However, I certainly was under the im-
23 pression and the belief that they could have taken on a full
24 crew and ammunition and still have had ample gasoline to make
25 the trip from San Francisco to Hawaii. Now, I am not familiar

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 with the details but from all the evidence which was presented
3 to me and from all that I believed before Pearl Harbor and af-
4 terwards, that is what I thought. I do not know whether that
5 is true or not.

6 Mr. Murphy: Well, my only reason in asking you the ques-
7 tion, Admiral, was that you had discussed the cosmoline ques-
8 tion and the fact that they were not able to fire and I agree
9 with you that --

10 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I did not discuss cosmolined guns
11 because I believed then and I still believe, although I cannot
12 prove it and I am not qualified as an expert, but I believed
13 that the B-17s could have made the trip with guns and ammuni-
14 tion and a crew.

15 Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

16 Mr. Murphy: Yes, sir, I will.

17 Senator Brewster: I presume that is a thing about which
18 there need not be any question or controversy. There must be
19 some competent authority to determine it and I am wondering,
20 does the gentleman contemplate having counsel prepare a state-
21 ment?

22 Mr. Murphy: I presume General Arnold can answer it.
23 I think General Short will be able to answer it. We are having
24 an airman here, General Arnold, but there is a conflict in the
25 record now, I think, between the Admiral and General Marshall.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Admiral Kimmel: I beg your pardon?

3 Mr. Murphy: I think the record and the testimony con-
4 flict because General Marshall said the reason they did not
5 do these other things was because of the difficulty with
6 gas and there you think they could have had the full crew
7 and the ammunition and the gas at that time.

8 Admiral Kimmel: I want you to understand that I am not
9 able to testify accurately on it. I am merely testifying as
10 to my understanding from conversations I have had.

11 Mr. Murphy: Now I direct your attention to page 69 in
12 which General Short says --

13 Admiral Kimmel: It might be interesting to find out
14 what condition the B-17s that came out subsequent to December
15 7th, what condition they were in when they came out.

16 Mr. Murphy: Well, the last ones we have were those that
17 came that morning and they were in the same condition.

18 Admiral Kimmel: Well, you will recall, of course, that
19 they quickly reinforced places out there with a number of
20 B-17s and B-24s, and so forth.

21 Mr. Murphy: That is right.

22 Admiral Kimmel: And I would be surprised, although I know
23 nothing about it, I would be surprised if they went out there
24 unarmed.

25 Mr. Murphy: Well, will counsel check that, the condition

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 of the B-17s that went out to Hawaii immediately after the at-
3 tack, as to whether they had a full crew and ammunition and
4 guns not cosmolined but ready to fire and a proper bore sight?

5 Now I direct your attention to page 69, Admiral, a ques-
6 tion to General Short, speaking about the air warning center:

7 "General McCoy: Could you state whether there was
8 a naval officer there that morning?

9 "General Short: There was not, for some reason, a
10 naval officer there during the period four to seven.
11 There had been on previous days, and as a matter of fact
12 the Navy had felt that it would be a good idea to have a
13 little more of that, and they had arranged -- the inter-
14 ceptor command and the Navy and the whole group had
15 worked out, on just a volunteer basis, of continuing that
16 training every day until four o'clock in the afternoon,
17 but decided that on Sunday they would only work until
18 seven, but the Navy had been instrumental in even extend-
19 ing that period, and it had been agreed that they would
20 work right through until four o'clock. I had not ordered
21 that, but that was just something they were doing on their
22 own. "

23 Now, you have previously testified, as I understand it,
24 that you do not know whether there was a Navy man there on
25 that morning.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Admiral Kimmel: Not of my own knowledge, no.

3 Mr. Murphy: Well, then we will go into that with an-
4 other witness, but at any rate General Short said that you
5 had a Navy man there, as I read his testimony, on other days
6 but not on the morning in question.

7 Now, immediately after the attack the interceptor command
8 station did work 24 hours a day, didn't it, with Navy men
9 present, or would you know that, Admiral?

10 Admiral Kimmel: I presume they did if it is in your re-
11 ports.

12 Mr. Murphy: On page 73:

13 "General McCoy: Yes. Is it in actual operation to-
14 day?

15 "General Short: Oh, yes, 24 hours of the day."

16 Now, there is one statement at page that may be a typo-
17 graphical error but it is an important one if it is. I di-
18 rect your attention to page 78 in which General Short is testi-
19 fying and about the middle of the second paragraph he says:

20 "Admiral Halsey had an airplane carrier up to the
21 north."

22 This is before December 7th. Do you see that, Admiral?

23 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I see it.

24 Mr. Murphy: Was there any reason why General Short
25 would think that an airplane carrier was up in the north waters?

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Admiral Kimmel: I am unable to state. He had access
3 to all the information on the movements of our own ships
4 that we had ourselves.

5 Mr. Murphy: I direct your attention to page 109, on
6 which General Short says in the middle of the first para-
7 graph:

8 "Anybody who has lived here in the last year would
9 know he could hardly ever step out of his house without
10 hearing planes."

11 Do you see that?

12 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

13 Mr. Murphy: Was there anything in any of these messages
14 about publicity that in any way influenced your judgment as to
15 what the Navy should have done after November 27th?

16 Admiral Kimmel: I had to take that into consideration in
17 what I did.

18 Mr. Murphy: I direct your attention to November 30th, in
19 which the Honolulu Advertiser in a big headline across the top
20 of the page says, "The Japanese may strike over the week end."

21 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

22 Mr. Murphy: Would there be much concern about publicity
23 after that headline in the papers in Honolulu?

24 Admiral Kimmel: The Honolulu Advertiser carried a good
25 many headlines like that.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: Well, at any rate on the 30th of November you said that after November 27th you got your information from the papers and that they in effect made you think that there was less danger of an attack and I am wondering about this particular one, "The Japanese may strike over the week end; Kurusu bluntly warned the nation is ready for battle," if that would make you think less of the likelihood of war or more?

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Admiral Kimmel: Of course, the Honolulu Advertiser said they might strike over the week end. The week end came and passed and they did not strike and you will read -- my recollection of those headlines in the Honolulu papers is that that eased off considerably after that.

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Mr. Murphy: Well, you said yesterday you did not know about Mr. Hull's attitude and this testimony of the foreign expert about Tokyo's mad dog madness.

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Admiral Kimmel: What is that?

Mr. Murphy: You said yesterday you did not know about the Hull attitude to the effect that they were mad dogs, about the madness of the war lords in Tokyo. Wouldn't that be along the same line?

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Admiral Kimmel: Not in the same language, and this was a newspaper article.

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Mr. Murphy: That is right. By the way, would you give

1 Witness Kimmel Questions by: Mr. Murphy
2 a newspaper article more importance or greater weight than you
3 would to a command of the Chief of Naval Operations?

4 Admiral Kimmel: No, of course not.

5 Mr. Murphy: Well, you did let newspaper articles influ-
6 ence your judgment, didn't you?

7 Admiral Kimmel: Everything that I saw and heard influ-
8 enced my judgment to some degree and I tried to differentiate
9 betwixt the source and the reliability of everything I heard.
10 In the newspapers in Honolulu and on the radio I heard that
11 Mr. Hull was talking to, I forget exactly, but that he was
12 having conversations still with the Japanese Ambassador, he
13 called him down to talk to him, Mr. Welles talked to him,
14 all in that week and I think that is contained in the -- that
15 was in the papers and it is also contained in the volume
16 called Peace and War, I believe it is.

17 The Vice Chairman: Does that complete your answer on
18 that question, Admiral?

19 Admiral Kimmel: I think so, sir.

20 The Vice Chairman: It is now 12:30. The committee will
21 stand in recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

22 (Whereupon, at 12:30 o'clock P.M., a recess was
23 taken until 2:00 o'clock P.M. of the same day.)

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25

AFTERNOON SESSION

2 P.M.

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The Vice Chairman: The committee will be in order.

Does counsel have something at this point?

Mr. Masten: We have two letters that we would like to add to Exhibit 113, which we distributed to the committee.

The first is dated February 21, 1941, from the Commander in Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet to various commanders of the Fleet.

We would like to offer that as Exhibit 113-A.

The Vice Chairman: 113-A?

Mr. Masten: Yes.

The Vice Chairman: It will be received as Exhibit 113-A.

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit 113-A).

Mr. Masten: The second letter is one dated October 31, 1941, headed "Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41," having to do with the organization and missions of the several task forces. We would like to offer that as Exhibit 113-B.

The Vice Chairman: It will be so received.

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit 113-B).

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h2

2 TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL

3 (Resumed)

4 The Vice Chairman: Do you have anything, Admiral,
5 before examination is resumed?

6 Admiral Kimmel: I have nothing.

7 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania is
8 recognized to continue his inquiry.

9 Mr. Murphy: Admiral Kimmel, after receipt of the war
10 warning message to the Army, which was not so worded, how-
11 ever, but the message of the 27th of November, General
12 Short made a reply to Washington, and, as I recall it,
13 you referred to that reply in your statement to the com-
14 mittee. Are you familiar with the wording of that reply?

15 Admiral Kimmel: Generally, yes. I would like to
16 refresh my memory on it, if I may.

17 Mr. Murphy: Will you refer to Exhibit 32, page 16.
18 I beg your pardon. Page 12. Do you have that, Admiral?

19 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I have it now.

20 Mr. Murphy: Well, after General Short received the
21 message of November 27, he sent a message to Washington
22 reading as follows:

23 "Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage.
24 Liaison with Navy."

25 Now, did you see that dispatch, that you can recollect,

1 Witness Kimmel questions by: Mr. Murphy
2 subsequent to November 27, the answer of General Short?

3 Admiral Kimmel: I never saw that dispatch until
4 after the attack.

5 Mr. Murphy: Now, I direct your attention to page
6 380 of the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearings.

7 Will you get that for the Admiral, please?

8 In my opinion, it is one of the most important entries
9 in any of these volumes.

10 General Grunert to General Short:

11 "In your message of November 27 --"

12 Admiral Kimmel: Where is that?

13 Mr. Murphy: The middle of the page, question 134. Do
14 you have that?

15 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

16 Mr. Murphy: General Grunert to General Short:

17 "In your message of November 27, you say, 'liaison
18 with the Navy.' Just what did you mean by that? How did
19 that cover anything required by that particular message?

20 "General Short. To my mind it meant very definitely
21 keeping in touch with the Navy, knowing what information
22 they had, and what they were doing.

23 "General Grunert. Did it indicate in any way that
24 you expected the Navy to carry out its part of that agree-
25 ment for long distance reconnaissance?

h3

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h4

2 "General Short. Yes. Without any question, whether
3 I had sent that or not, it would have affected it, because
4 they had signed a definite agreement which was approved
5 by the Navy as well as our Chief of Staff."

6 Did you know then that General Short had notified
7 Washington and meant to infer by that telegram that he
8 expected you were conducting the proper reconnaissance after
9 November 27?

10 Admiral Kimmel: General Short knew that I was going
11 to conduct a reconnaissance and that I had the means to
12 conduct a reconnaissance only for a very short period, and
13 when an attack on Hawaii was known to be probable within
14 narrow limits, and I never knew at any time that an attack
15 on Hawaii was probable within narrow limits. That was also
16 a part of the estimate of the situation and was well known
17 to everybody that had anything to do with it.

18 Mr. Murphy: Do you think if you and General Short
19 had held the proper kind of conference --

20 Admiral Kimmel: We did.

21 Mr. Murphy: Let me finish. Do you think he could
22 have made a statement such as he makes at page 359?

23 Admiral Kimmel: I can't explain why General Short
24 made his statement.

25 Mr. Murphy: I now direct your attention to page 1633

1 Witness Kimmel questions by: Mr. Murphy
2 of General Short's testimony.

3 That would be in the photostatic section.

4 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I have it.

5 Mr. Murphy: Doesn't General Short say -- do you
6 have your copy, counsel?

7 Mr. Masten: Admiral Kimmel is using our copy.

8 Mr. Murphy: I understand that at page 1633, General
9 Short makes the statement that he did not know what the
10 Navy was doing.

11 Admiral Kimmel: General Short?

12 Mr. Murphy: Yes.

13 Admiral Kimmel: I think you had better put in what
14 he said.

15 Mr. Murphy: I will get exactly what he said.

16 I have myself confused the papers. I thought I
17 wouldn't have to refer to that again, Admiral.

18 Well, I can't find it. I will pass on that one.

19 The Vice Chairman: Perhaps you could use counsel's
20 copy.

21 Mr. Masten: Do you want to see this copy?

22 Mr. Murphy: Yes, I would like to see page 1633, if
23 I may.

24 Very well.

25 "Admiral Stanley. Well, as a matter of fact, this

h5

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h6
2 shows that your search was not being made, and these orders
3 indicate that they were not to be made in peacetime, and
4 they were only to be made in case of initiation of a
5 hostile attack.

6 "General Short: Frankly, I do not know how much
7 search the Navy made, as the whole business of search
8 was tied in between the ships and the planes, and it was
9 their responsibility, and I do not know when their task
10 forces -- as I say, they have two task forces out at the
11 time. I don't know what instructions their task forces
12 had as to search. I assumed that when their task force
13 went out, if it located Japanese ships, it would report
14 to them.

15 "Admiral Stanley. But his search from Oahu itself,
16 which in wartime was to be an all around search, did you
17 know that that was not being carried out?

18 "General Short. I didn't know just what the Navy
19 was doing, frankly. I knew they had task forces out and
20 I assumed any searching they did was tied in with the
21 task forces."

22 Would that indicate to you that General Short knew
23 whether you were conducting reconnaissance or not?

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Admiral Kimmel: Well, that indicates to me the testimony that General Short made at the time.

3

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Mr. Murphy: Now I direct your attention to page 1638, General Short again testifying:

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6

"General McCoy" -- at the bottom of the page.

7

Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

8

Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

9

10

"General McCoy: I would like to ask a few questions: In view of what happened and looking back on it are you satisfied with the adequateness of the system in operation?

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"General Short: I think the system is all right.

14

15

I think we made a very serious mistake when we did not go on an alert against an all-out attack. I think our system was perfectly alright. Our estimate of the situation was not."

16

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18

Do you think you made a mistake in not going on an all-

19

out alert?

20

Admiral Kimmel: In view of what happened, yes, of

21

course.

22

Mr. Murphy: I now direct your attention to page 108,

23

General Short's testimony before the Roberts Board.

24

Admiral Kimmel: What is the number?

25

Mr. Murphy: 108, Admiral. I am sorry to take you

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 around the lot but this is a big proposition and it is a big
3 record, Admiral. This is at the top of the page, the first
4 question:

5 "General McNarney: As I remember, you stated in
6 your statement that you assumed that the Navy was send-
7 ing out the proper reconnaissance covering the proper
8 areas. Did you know that they were?

9 "General Short: I knew it was their full responsi-
10 bility, that if they could not do it they would call on
11 me for bombers to assist them. That was in the definite
12 agreement. I didn't think that I had a right to call on
13 them for a daily report of what they were doing. They
14 had task forces out all the time. I don't know just
15 where they went, and I don't know just what they did when
16 they went out. That was a naval problem.

17 "General McNarney: Didn't you feel it was part of
18 your responsibility for the security of your command that
19 you should have that information available?

20 "General Short: I didn't feel that they had certain
21 information in regards to the location of Japanese boats.
22 I felt sure that if they had anything to indicate any
23 Japanese carriers or anything within a thousand miles
24 or probably closer than the Mandate Islands, which are
25 2100 miles, they would have told me, and I did not feel

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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that it was my business to try to tell Admiral Kimmel how he would conduct his reconnaissance. I think he would have resented it very much."

Would you have resented it if General Short asked what reconnaissance was being conducted in view of the war warning of the 27th of November?

Admiral Kimmel: I would have supplied General Short with all the information I had and all the information of all I was doing very cheerfully and I must point out again that if I had had any information on the location of a Japanese ship within a thousand miles of Pearl Harbor I certainly would have passed that information on to General Short.

Mr. Murphy: Now, I direct your attention, Admiral, to page 114 of the same record, at the top of the page, in the third line.

Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: Admiral, there General Short said:

"I do not believe that I should be found guilty even of an error in judgment because I did not have the vision to foresee that the War Department would not notify me of a crisis in the least possible time and that the Navy with its large fleet in Hawaiian waters would not be able to carry out its mission of intercepting Japanese carriers, or at least detecting their presence in Hawaiian

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 waters and informing me of the fact."

3 That, incidentally, is one of General Short's statements
4 by way of summary. Do you think he is justified in making
5 that statement about the Navy?

6 Admiral Kimmel: No, I think he is scarcely justified be-
7 cause he knew that we did not have the means to conduct a
8 reconnaissance over long periods of time and that we had to
9 know within narrow limits when an attack was going to be made
10 in order to have any search that was worthy of the name.

11 Mr. Murphy: I now direct your attention to page 130.

12 Admiral Kimmel: As far as the task forces that were out,
13 we did conduct reconnaissance in connection with those task
14 forces and we did everything within our power to discover any
15 Japanese ships that might have been within the area. We did
16 not have the means to conduct a reconnaissance which would
17 have been effective and I did not want and I thought it wise
18 not to expend the facilities I had in a partial and an ineffec-
19 tive search.

20 Mr. Murphy: On page 130, Admiral, General Short says in
21 the last two lines of the last paragraph:

22 "We figured" -- do you have that, Admiral?

23 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

24 Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

25 "General Short: Not if it stopped at 500 miles, no.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Our plan and the plans we had sent in to the War Depart-
3 ment called for reconnaissance out to a thousand and
4 fifty miles."

5 Now, you sent a letter to Admiral Stark, as I remember,
6 in which you stated that you were having regular tests with
7 the Army and that you were having liaison with them. Do you
8 remember that? Let me get it exactly.

9 Admiral Kimmel: I do not know which one you refer to,
10 but I sent many letters to Admiral Stark.

11 Mr. Murphy: I am referring now to the one of June 4,
12 1941 as follows:

13 "The liaison betwixt the Army and Navy Air Corps in
14 Hawaii is very satisfactory and weekly drills in air
15 raid alarms with the two services acting in unison are
16 held."

17 The second page of that group shows under date of June
18 13th:

19 "MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL:

20 "Enclosed is the arrangement of Kimmel and General
21 Short with regard to joint air operations. You will re-
22 call our talking about it and it looks to me extremely
23 good."

24 My question is, in view of that letter of yours to Ad-
25 miral Stark and that being sent to General Marshall and in

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 view of what General Short said about what he meant by liai-
3 son with the Navy don't you think Washington would be justi-
4 fied in thinking liaison with the Navy meant that reconnais-
5 sance was being had?

6 Admiral Kimmel: No, I do not. That liaison with the
7 Navy statement is a very indefinite statement and the message
8 from General Marshall to General Short said, "Report action
9 taken" and if he wanted to know what action was taken I would
10 consider that an entirely inadequate report. Unless General
11 Marshall when he received that message thought that the alert-
12 ing against sabotage was all that was required at that time
13 I would say that then that was an inadequate report.

14 Mr. Murphy: Well, you did hear me read what General Short
15 intended to convey by it, didn't you, a little while ago?

16 Admiral Kimmel: What is it?

17 Mr. Murphy: You heard my question before? You heard me
18 read what General Short meant to convey by the words "liaison
19 with the Navy"?

20 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

21 Mr. Murphy: Now I direct your attention, Admiral, if
22 you will, please, to page 143 of the same record.

23 Admiral Kimmel: All right.

24 Mr. Murphy: In the middle of the page, Admiral Standley
25 to General Short:

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy:

2 "You don't remember having seen or heard of a mes-
3 sage that started out, 'This is a war warning'?

4 "General Short: No, sir, I didn't see it.

5 "Admiral Standley: That message never got to you?

6 "General Short: No.

7 "General McCoy: Didn't it instruct the admiral to
8 inform him?

9 "General Short: May I ask the date of that message?

10 "The Chairman: November 27.

11 "General Short: It may have been the same. It may
12 have been the same as my message of the 27th.

13 "The Chairman: No. It started out, 'This is a war
14 warning.'

15 "General Short: I don't remember seeing it. I
16 think I would remember seeing that.

17 "The Chairman: I think I asked you whether you
18 thought you had been apprised of that message but you
19 said you did not recall, that you had been in conference
20 with the Navy officers and supposed you had seen it.

21 "General Short: Oh, I was in conference for two or
22 three hours. If they got that later in the day --

23 "The Chairman: You were in conference with them
24 again later than this?

25 "General Short: Yes.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 "The Chairman: They may or may not have shown it
3 to you, but that is the best you can say on that?

4 "General Short: I do not know whether I saw it or
5 not. I am not sure."

6 Admiral Kimmel: As a matter of fact, that message or a
7 very accurate paraphrase of it was delivered to General Short's
8 headquarters on the evening of November 27, 1941, there is no
9 question of that. I think General Short covered that very
10 completely in his subsequent testimony.

11 Mr. Murphy: Before the same Board?

12 Admiral Kimmel: No, I do not know about the same Board.

13 Mr. Murphy: Admiral, I direct your attention to page
14 355 and 366 of the Army Board in the same volume but over in
15 the next section, 355 and 366.

16 Admiral Kimmel: All right.

17 Mr. Murphy: At the bottom of the page:

18 "General Short: Because of the information I had
19 from the Navy and the Navy strength that was there, I was
20 not exercised at any one time as to the possibility of
21 an immediate attack. I realized that there was a pos-
22 sibility of a considerable part of that navy being moved
23 out at some time and that the danger would become very
24 acute. With that in mind, I made a special effort to
25 bring the anti-air equipment up to date and to get enough

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 coast artillery personnel that we would not have to have
3 dual assignments, and to get the aircraft warning ser-
4 vice functioning."

5 Now, my question is isn't it more likely that there would
6 have been an air attack with the Fleet in the harbor than with
7 the Fleet out of the Harbor?

8 Admiral Kimmel: That is very difficult to say but I
9 would like to observe at this time that had the attack been
10 made on Hawaii and if there had not been a ship in the port,
11 they could have done serious damage and if they had destroyed
12 the oil which was all above ground at that time and which could
13 have been destroyed it would have forced the withdrawal of the
14 Fleet to the coast because there wasn't any oil anywhere else
15 out there to keep the Fleet operating.

16 Mr. Murphy: There were four million gallons, weren't
17 there, not bomb proof?

18 Admiral Kimmel: What is that?

19 Mr. Murphy: There were four million gallons not bomb
20 proof or protected by bomb proof covers?

21 Admiral Kimmel: There was nothing there that was pro-
22 tected by bomb proof covers at this time.

23 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, if they were going to come all
24 the way from Japan they could, of course, destroy the base,
25 which would have prevented you from operating, or they could

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 have come with the Fleet in the base and destroyed the Fleet?

3 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

4 Mr. Murphy: It is hard to say which they might have done
5 or whether they would have come if the Fleet was out.

6 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I am saying that if they had de-
7 stroyed the base and the facilities in the base and destroyed
8 the oil there it might well have been even worse than it was.

9 Mr. Murphy: Incidentally, there is a letter from a very
10 distinguished Admiral in the Washington Post today on that
11 question. I am just calling that to the attention of the com-
12 mittee. A very distinguished Senator had something to say
13 about it; Admiral Hart talks about it.

14 Admiral Kimmel: I did not say that.

15 Mr. Murphy: Well, I saw that but I am not going into it.
16 If somebody else wants to they can.

17 At page 361, Admiral, of the Army Board, - I might say
18 I am almost through -- page 361.

19 Admiral Kimmel: I have it.

20 Mr. Murphy: At the bottom of the page. General Frank
21 to General Short.

22 Admiral Kimmel. Yes.

23 Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

24 "General Frank: Were you advised that there was a
25 Japanese task force in the Marshalls, between the 25th

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 and 30th of November?

3 "General Short: No, sir. In fact, as I remember the
4 thing, I was led to believe that there was a task force
5 of Japanese out somewhere to the south of Japan, but not
6 in those Islands. My feeling was that it was more di-
7 rected toward the Philippines.

8 "General Frank: You had no knowledge?

9 "General Short: At least, I don't remember that I
10 had any. That is my recollection, that my information
11 was that the Japanese ships were either in their home
12 ports or had been sent to the south.

13 "General Frank: Would you not have been concerned
14 if you had gotten the information that there was a
15 Japanese force --

16 "General Short: In the mandated islands? Yes, yes.

17 "General Frank: There was a piece of information
18 that Navy had that they did not give you?

19 "General Short: Yes, that may have happened. Did
20 they have definite information to that effect, or was it
21 rumor?

22 "General Frank: It was information that is reported
23 in the Roberts report, of which they were sufficiently
24 confident to notify the Navy Department in Washington.

25 "General Short: In a report from Kimmel, you mean,

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 or from the Asiatic Fleet?

3 "General Frank: From Kimmel to Washington.

4 "General Short: To Washington? Well, I don't re-
5 member it, if he gave it, and I think I would have re-
6 membered it, because I do remember that we talked about
7 the location of the fleet during that period, and as I
8 remember it, it was rumored that the Japanese ships were
9 partly in their home ports, and that what were not there
10 they thought were proceeding to the south.

11 "General Frank: The basis of your feeling of secur-
12 ity then was the belief that the Navy was effectively at
13 its job?

14 "General Short: I would rather say, a confidence,
15 than a belief -- a confidence that they were working at
16 their job and doing it effectively."

17 Now, do you remember telling General Short about this
18 expedition and the possibilities of aircraft carriers in the
19 Marshalls?

20 Admiral Kimmel: The facts of the matter in regard to that
21 are that the commander of the 14th Naval District on November
22 26th made a report to OPNAV:

23 "There is believed to be strong concentration of
24 submarines and air groups in the Marshalls which comprise
25 AIRRON Twenty Four at least one carrier division unit

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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plus probably one-third of the submarine fleet"

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and that went from the Commandant of the 14th Naval District

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to OPNAV and I had a copy of it.

5

At the same time the Commandant of the 16th Naval Di-

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strict in Manila reported on November 26, 1941:

7

"Cannot confirm supposition that carriers and sub-

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marines in force are in Mandates. Our best indications

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are that all known first and second fleet carriers still

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in Sasebo-Kure area."

11

Now, in that connection, the Commandant of the 16th Naval

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District was in a more advantageous position to intercept

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Japanese communications than were the people in Honolulu and

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not only the Chief of Naval Operations but I myself gave more

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weight to the opinions given by Commandant 16th on matters

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of that kind and for the reasons I have tried to state here

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than I gave to that of the Commandant 14th. They made their

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estimates independently, but the Commandant 16th had more ac-

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curate and more detailed information than was ever available

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to the Commandant 14th.

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Shack (1) pm
follows
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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 On November 24 the Chief of Naval Operations sent a
3 message to the Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet and "informa-
4 tion" various other people:

5 "Orange naval movements as reported from individual
6 information addressees is often conflicting because of nec-
7 essary fragmentary nature. Since COMSIXTEEN intercepts are
8 considered most reliable I suggest other reports carefully
9 evaluated be sent to COMSIXTEEN for action, OPNAV for in-
10 formation. After combining all incoming reports COMSIXTEEN
11 direct dispatches to OPNAV info CINCPAC, based on all
12 information received indicating own evaluation and providing
13 best possible continuity. Request CINCAF issue directive
14 necessary to fulfill general directive."

15 Now after I had received those two dispatches I thought
16 it was highly improbable that there were any carriers at
17 all in the Mandates, and I now believe, after all the
18 returns are in, that there were no carriers in the Mandates.

19 Mr. Murphy: Admiral, is it fair to say that at that
20 time there was some dispute between the Intelligence forces
21 at Manila and Intelligence forces at Hawaii as to whether
22 or not there were carriers in the Marshalls and that you
23 did not inform General Short about that situation?

24 Admiral Kimmel: I would have informed General Short
25 if I had believed there were any carriers in the Marshalls.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

I did not believe it, and I did not inform him.

Mr. Masten: Mr. Chairman, in order that the record on the first telegram the Admiral referred to may be complete, would it not be well to have the recorder spread it on the record in full at this point?

The Vice Chairman: Yes.

Admiral Kimmel: I read only a part. It is a long message, but I have read all the parts that I believe to be pertinent.

The Vice Chairman: The reporter will spread the whole message on the record at this point.

(The first two messages referred to are as follows:)

FROM: COM 14	FOR ACTION: OPNAV
DATE: 26 NOVEMBER 1941	INFORMATION: CINCPAC CINCAF
DECODED BY A.V. PERING	COM 16

260110

COPEK

FOR PAST MONTH COMMANDER SECOND FLEET HAS BEEN ORGANIZING A TASK FORCE WHICH COMPRISES FOLLOWING UNITS: SECOND FLEET, THIRD FLEET INCLUDING FIRST AND SECOND BASE FORCES AND FIRST DEFENSE DIVISION, COMBINED AIRFORCE, DESRON THREE, AIRRON SEVEN, SUBRON FIVE AND POSSIBLY UNITS OF BATDIV THREE FROM FIRST FLEET

IN MESSAGES CONCERNING THESE UNITS SOUTH CHINA FLEET AND

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

I did not believe it, and I did not inform him.

Mr. Masten: Mr. Chairman, in order that the record on the first telegram the Admiral referred to may be complete, would it not be well to have the recorder spread it on the record in full at this point?

The Vice Chairman: Yes.

Admiral Kimmel: I read only a part. It is a long message, but I have read all the parts that I believe to be pertinent.

The Vice Chairman: The reporter will spread the whole message on the record at this point.

(The message referred to is as follows:)

NOVEMBER 26, 1941

TOP SECRET

FROM: COMSIXTEEN

TO: CINCPAC, OPNAV, COMFOURTEEN, CINCAF

261331

MORNING COMMENT COMFOURTEEN TWO ONE TEN OF TWENTYSIXTH X
TRAFFIC ANALYSIS PAST FEW DAYS INDICATE CINC SECOND DIRECTING
UNITS OF FIRST SECOND THIRD FLEETS AND SUBFORCE IN A LOOSE
KNIT TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION THAT APPARENTLY WILL BE
DIVIDED INTO TWO SECTIONS X FOR PURPOSES OF CLARIFY UNITS
EXPECTED TO OPERATE IN SOUTH CHINA AREA WILL BE REFERRED TO
AS FIRST SECTION AND UNITS EXPECTED TO OPERATE IN MANDATES
WILL BE REFERRED TO AS SECOND SECTION X ESTIMATED UNITS IN

FRENCH INDOCHINA FORCE HAVE APPEARED AS WELL AS THE NAVAL STATION AT SAMA, BAKO AND TAKAO

THIRD BASE FORCE AT PALAO AND RNO PALAO HAVE ALSO BEEN ENGAGED IN EXTENSIVE COMMUNICATIONS WITH SECOND FLEET COMMANDER COMBINED AIR FORCE HAS ASSEMBLED IN TAKAO WITH INDICATIONS THAT SOME COMPONENTS HAVE MOVED ON TO HAINAN

THIRD FLEET UNITS BELIEVED TO BE MOVING IN DIRECTION OF TAKAO AND BAKO

SECOND BASE FORCE APPEARS TRANSPORTING EQUIPMENT OF AIR FORCES TO TAIWAN

TAKAO RADIO TODAY ACCEPTED TRAFFIC FOR UNIDENTIFIED SECOND FLEET UNIT AND SUBMARINE DIVISION OR SQUADRON

CRUDIV SEVEN AND DESRON THREE APPEAR AS AN ADVANCE UNIT AND MAY BE ENROUTE SOUTH CHINA

THERE IS BELIEVED TO BE STRONG CONCENTRATION OF SUBMARINES AND AIR GROUPS IN THE MARSHALLS WHICH COMPRISE AIRRON TWENTY FOUR AT LEAST ONE CARRIER DIVISION UNIT PLUS PROBABLY ONE THIRD OF THE SUBMARINE FLEET

EVALUATE ABOVE TO INDICATE STRONG FORCE MAY BE PREPARING TO OPERATE IN SOUTH EASTERN ASIA WHILE COMPONENT PARTS MAY OPERATE FROM PALAO AND MARSHALLS

NOVEMBER 26, 1941

TOP SECRET

FROM: COMSIXTEEN

TO: CINCPAC, OPNAV, COMFOURTEEN, CINCAF

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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FROM CENTRAL OR NORTH CHINA PROBABLY TORPEDO BOATS XX

(continued on page 7612.)

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 SOUTHERN EXPEDITIONARY FLEET APPARENTLY BEING REINFORCED
3 BY ONE BASE FORCE UNIT XX DIRECTIVES TO THE ABOVE TASK
4 FORCES IF SUCH ARE DIRECTED TO INDIVIDUAL UNITS AND NOT TO
5 COMPLETE GROUPS X SPECIAL CALLS USUALLY PRECEDE FORMATION
6 OF TASK FORCE USED IN AREA OPERATIONS X CINC SECOND X THIRD
7 AND CINC SOUTHERN EXPEDITIONARY FLEET APPEAR TO HAVE MAJOR
8 ROLES X TRAFFIC FROM NAVMINISTER AND CNGS TO CINCS OF FLEET
9 APPEAR NORMAL X EVALUATION IS CONSIDERED RELIABLE.

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11 Mr. Murphy: Just a few words about your previous testi-
12 mony. I direct your attention to page 630, that is the
13 typewritten 630, of the Roberts Board. As I understand it,
14 the Chairman asked you this question:

15 "In the picture of it as drawn by Admiral Standley's
16 question and your answer, if that is correct as I understand
17 it, the Army knew that it was not going to get any warning
18 from your distant reconnaissance?"

19 Admiral Kimmel: I think I lost you again.

20 Mr. Murphy: At the top of the page, the first question.

21 Admiral Kimmel: "The Chairman", you mean?

22 Mr. Murphy: Yes.

23 "The Chairman. In the picture of it as drawn by Admiral
24 Standley's question and your answer, if that is correct as
25 I understand it, the Army knew that it was not going to get

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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any warning from your distant reconnaissance?

"Admiral Kimmel. No, sir."

You meant by "no, sir" that they should have known they were not going to get any warning, is that right?

Admiral Kimmel: Well, as I now reconstruct that testimony--

Mr. Murphy: After four years or five years --

Admiral Kimmel: Wait a minute.

Hook follows

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Mr. Murphy: I might, to clarify your thinking,
3 Admiral, say the way this has been set up, they have one
4 sheet, then they have a correction sheet, and then after
5 showing all of this for 200 pages, they have another
6 statement.

7 Admiral Kimmel: I would like to say something in con-
8 nection with this at the present time, and it may serve to
9 clarify the situation a little bit. After I had given
10 my testimony before the Roberts Commission, I waited for
11 an opportunity to revise and correct my testimony, and after
12 three or four days, I asked that I be given an opportunity
13 to correct my testimony.

14 I was finally given permission to come to the Royal
15 Hawaiian Hotel alone, to correct my testimony. When I
16 got there, and the testimony was submitted to me, I found
17 it inaccurate in many respects. The recording of it, I
18 mean. I spent all that afternoon and the next day I came
19 back, and I brought a yeoman with me, and Admiral Thiebold,
20 and we worked for sometime attempting to reconstruct this
21 testimony.

22 It was very badly recorded, and I do not know whether
23 this testimony is the result of some of the poor recording
24 or whether it is after I had attempted to correct it and
25 bring it into some kind of order.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h2

2 Mr. Murphy: I might say for the benefit of the
3 committee that both statements are in this exhibit here,
4 your corrected statement and the other statement. Just
5 how much they differ, I am not going to take the time to
6 check, several hundred pages.

7 Admiral Kimmel: They did differ to a considerable
8 degree. I had submitted, amongst other things, a 16-page
9 statement which I read, and when my testimony was first
10 submitted to me, that had been entirely omitted from what
11 purported to be my recorded testimony.

12 Mr. Murphy: What I meant by what I said, Admiral,
13 is I do not think I should be expected to go through that.
14 I assume that there are a number of corrections, because
15 you said so, and I certainly take your word on the matter.

16 The record shows that you did submit this several
17 hundred pages after the hearing was concluded, and requested
18 that it be submitted, but that the Board took both instead
19 of taking what you claimed was the correct one.

20 Admiral Kimmel: They refused to change the testimony
21 as recorded, although I knew and told them it was in error,
22 and they attached my statement to their report. At least
23 I was so informed.

24 Mr. Murphy: They took the position, did they not,
25 that they should have it both ways, the way it was reported

1 Witness Kimmel Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h3

2 by the recorder, and the way you claimed it should be?

3 Admiral Kimmel: Although they knew full well as
4 recorded by the recorder, it was inaccurate and incomplete.

5 Mr. Murphy: Now, I direct your attention, Admiral,
6 to page 636. That is the typewritten page.

7 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I have 636. Is this corrected
8 or uncorrected?

9 Mr. Murphy: I am not sure whether this has been cor-
10 rected or not, but let me ask you this:

11 "The Chairman: If you had known that no radar was
12 working on December 5, 6, or 7," --

13 Admiral Kimmel: Wait a minute. Let me find where
14 it is.

15 Mr. Murphy: The third or fourth question down.

16 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

17 Mr. Murphy: "The Chairman: If you had known that no
18 radar was working on December 5, 6, or 7, would you have
19 altered your distant patrols in any way?

20 "Admiral Kimmel: No, sir. I doubt it."

21 Would that be a correct answer to that kind of
22 question?

23 Admiral Kimmel: Well, the way I would answer that
24 question now is that I was doing all I could with the
25 patrols at that time, in the light of the information I

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h4

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2 had. The reason I probably said "I doubt it," was
3 because I could not.

4 Mr. Murphy: The next question is:

5 "The Chairman: Then if no radar was working on that
6 morning, there was no method of warning of a raid on these
7 islands; is that correct?

8 "Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir, that is correct. If I
9 had known that no radar was working, it would have been a
10 factor to consider, but what I would have done under those
11 conditions, I do not like to state.

12 "The Chairman: You thought it was working?

13 "Admiral Kimmel: That is the short of it. I thought
14 it was in working condition."

15 Now, Admiral, I direct your attention to your letter
16 of December 12, 1941. Do you have that before you, Admiral?

17 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

18 Mr. Murphy: In your letter you say in the first para-
19 graph:

20 "Briefly, we had considered an air raid on Hawaii as
21 a very remote possibility" --

22 Admiral Kimmel: Where is that please?

23 Mr. Murphy: In the first paragraph.

24 Admiral Kimmel: I have it now.

25 Mr. Murphy: "Briefly we had considered an air raid on

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Hawaii as a very remote possibility, particularly at the
3 time that it occurred. There were ten BP in the air
4 that morning. They, of course, could not adequately
5 cover 360 degrees of arc, and their primary effort was
6 directed against the submarine menace that everyone fully
7 recognized.

8 "In our endeavor to avoid wearing out both personnel
9 and planes, we had made periodic sweeps to the northward
10 and westward, but none were made on the morning in ques-
11 tion."

12 That was exactly the position you had on December 12,
13 five days after Pearl Harbor?

14 Admiral Kimmel: I do not understand.

15 Mr. Murphy: I say that is exactly the same position
16 you had on the 12 of December, 1941, and the same position
17 you take before this committee?

18 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct.

19 Mr. Murphy: Now, in the next paragraph you say:

20 "Full precautions were taken by all ships at sea."

21 Did you mean to include there the ships in the harbor?
22 I do not believe you did, but did you?

23 Admiral Kimmel: Well, the words "full precautions
24 were taken by all ships at sea," explain themselves, and
25 I am happy to state no casualties were incurred by any of

Witness Kimmel

questions by: Mr. Murphy

h6

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2 them.3 Mr. Murphy: The fact is all ships in the harbor were
4 on alert 3, which did not provide for the anti-aircraft
5 guns being fully manned; isn't that right?6 Admiral Kimmel: That has been exhaustively gone into
7 here, and I would like to repeat once more that from one-
8 quarter to one-half of the guns opened fire immediately,
9 and the remainder of the guns were firing on all ships
10 depending upon the different ships. Some of them got all
11 guns in action in four minutes, and others took as much
12 as seven minutes.13 Mr. Murphy: But you did say, Admiral, did you not,
14 in the second to the last paragraph, at the bottom of the
15 page, "The ships in the harbor opened fire very promptly,
16 but the first attack waive was practically unopposed"?17 Admiral Kimmel: I did state that. I was in error.
18 That was a very few days after the attack, and I had
19 gotten very few reports by that time.20 Even if I did not indicate it, anybody would know that
21 in such a short time as that, I was unable to get all the
22 facts straight.23 Mr. Murphy: Is it not a fact, Admiral, that if the
24 men were at the anti-aircraft guns before the waive of
25 planes came over, if they were alerted, that the damage

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 would have been less by the damage that these additional
3 guns could have done in about three or four minutes.

4 You state also in the paragraph before that,

5 "The Army anti-aircraft guns were not manned."

6 Was that a correct statement?

7 Admiral Kimmel: I had found that out by that time.

8 Mr. Murphy: Now, Mr. Chairman, I ask that this --

9 Admiral Kimmel (interposing): Where is that?

10 Mr. Murphy: That is the third to the last paragraph,

11 Admiral, on the bottom of the first page.

12 Admiral Kimmel: Of the first page?

13 Mr. Murphy: Yes. You said, "The Army anti-aircraft
14 guns were not manned."

15 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, that was the information that I
16 had at the time. You must realize my information on all
17 this situation, when I wrote this letter, was very sketchy.

18 Mr. Murphy: I think you will find, Admiral, that
19 General Short agreed with you, that there were skeleton
20 crews there for sabotage purposes, but not to man the
21 guns strictly as such.

22 Admiral Kimmel: This, you must understand, excluded
23 all of the information I had gained after the time I wrote
24 the letter.

25 Mr. Murphy: I am agreeing with you, Admiral.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Admiral Kimmel: All right.

Mr. Murphy: Now, Mr. Chairman, there is a paper that has been presented to the committee which shows the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor; Singapore; Khota Baru; Davao Gulf, Philippine Islands; Guam; Hongkong; Wake; Clark Field, Philippine Islands; Midway, and Nichols Field, Manila, all occurring between the time of the attack on Hawaii, and the 8th of December, Washington time.

I think that should be spread on the record, and I ask that it be done at this point.

The Vice Chairman: It will be done, without objection.

(The table referred to is as follows:)

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25TIME OF JAP ATTACKS IN THE PACIFIC 7 AND 8 DECEMBER 1941

<u>Place</u>	<u>Local Time</u>	<u>Greenwich Time</u>	<u>Washington Time</u>
Pearl Harbor	7:55 am - 7th	6:25 pm - 7th	1:25 pm - 7th
Singapore	3:00 am - 8th	8:00 pm - 7th	3:00 pm - 7th
Khota Baru	3:40 pm - 8th	8:40 pm - 7th	3:40 pm - 7th
Davao Gulf, P.I.	7:10 am - 8th	11:10 pm - 7th	6:10 pm - 7th
Guam	9:10 am - 8th	11:10 pm - 7th	6:10 pm - 7th
Hong Kong	8:00 am - 8th	Midnight-7-8th	7:00 pm - 7th
Wake	12:00 noon-8th	1:00 am - 8th	8:00 pm - 7th
Clark Field, P.I.	9:27 am - 8th	1:27 am - 8th	8:27 pm - 7th
Midway	9:30 pm - 7th	9:30 am - 8th	4:30 am - 8th
Nichols Field (Manila)	3:00 am - 9th	7:00 pm - 8th	2:00 pm - 8th

- Notes: (1) The above times are compiled from existing records. Minor inaccuracies are possible.
- (2) There were other attacks on Army and foreign installations of which the Navy has no records.

Shack (5) pm
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7623

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Mr. Keefe: As I recall this exhibit, it lists a
3 statement from the Navy in an attempt to fix in columns the
4 various times when these attacks took place Washington time
5 and Greenwich time, and it lists the attack on Pearl Harbor
6 as taking place 7:55 a.m. Am I correct in that?

7 Admiral Kimmel: That is Hawaiian time, not Greenwich
8 time.

9 Mr. Keefe: That is Hawaiian time. Now I want to call
10 attention to the fact that in the official Navy Report
11 published sometime after Pearl Harbor, about a year or so,
12 they fix the time at 7:55, but further state that an attack
13 had taken place at Kaneohe some minutes prior to 7:55.

14 I want to call attention to it now because there is
15 a dispute in this record as to the exact time when the first
16 flight of planes attacked, and you will find it in the
17 official Navy Report.

18 So that this record will not be considered to be
19 entirely conclusive upon that subject, and I, as one member
20 of the committee, cannot accept it as conclusive, as to
21 showing the exact time, because of the fact that the official
22 Naval Report contains the language which I have indicated.

23 Mr. Masten: Mr. Keefe, so the record will be clear,
24 what is the date of the report that you are speaking of?

25 Mr. Keefe: Well, I have it in my file. I cannot give

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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the exact date, but I will bring it in here next week.

Mr. Murphy: I really think we ought to have that, in order to make it clear.

Mr. Keefe: It was published in full in the New York Times, and that is what I have a copy of, the New York Times.

Mr. Murphy: May I inquire which is the official Navy Report?

Mr. Keefe: This is a report that was published by the Navy about a year, I would say, after Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Murphy: I think we ought to get a copy of that, if that is the official one. I have been looking for it for some time. I would like to see it.

Mr. Richardson: Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Richardson.

Mr. Richardson: May I ask Congressman Keefe to hand us his copy and then we will contact the Navy and get the official copies for distribution.

Mr. Keefe: I will bring that here Monday, Mr. Counsel. I have it. I had it here before and I raised questions about it at the time when the Navy man was on the stand, Admiral Inglis.

The Vice Chairman: If Mr. Murphy will allow the Chair to inquire as to the document which has been spread upon the record that was furnished by the counsel, that is a document

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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from the Navy Department, is that correct?

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Mr. Masten: I understand, Mr. Cooper, that that was furnished us by Commander Baecher from the Navy. I myself had not seen it.

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The Vice Chairman: It was distributed to the members of the committee here. I recall seeing it, and I have a copy of it.

9

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Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt at this point --

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The Vice Chairman: Does the gentleman yield?

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Mr. Murphy: Yes, I will be glad to.

Senator Brewster: In connection with this matter of time, I think it may be a matter of considerable importance and significance as to the timing of the attack on the Philippines. There have been suggestions from highly responsible sources that the times here given maybe somewhat inaccurate. So I would appreciate having whatever official report they are based on made available in this examination.

23

24

Possibly it may be a desire subsequently to have testimony of some of those who were participants in the situation at the Philippines.

25

Mr. Richardson: Mr. Chairman, we will report later on the more accurate information as to those times.

(6)

The Vice Chairman: Counsel has heard the observations

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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made by the various members of the committee, and I am sure he will do all he can to meet those suggestions.

Mr. Murphy: I do not have available a copy of the original Honolulu Advertiser of Sunday, November 30, 1941. I do have what appears to be a correct duplicate of it from The Christian Science Monitor of Thursday, September 28, 1944, and I ask that this photostat appear in the record, to show what was before the people of Honolulu and I assume before the Commanding General of the Army and Commander in Chief of the Fleet on that morning one week before Pearl Harbor.

The Vice Chairman: It will be so received in the record.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Proud Rhinelanders Humiliated by Nazi Order to

Pearl Harbor: Politics Still Screens Facts

Republicans demand trial of Kimmel and Short; Administration seems to want delay.

By Richard L. Strout

WASHINGTON, Sept. 28 — At 7:55 on the morning of Sunday, Dec. 7, 1941, 200 Japanese planes attacked Pearl Harbor. Three hours later 4,000 officers and men of the American armed forces were killed, the Hawaiian Air Force was destroyed on the ground, and the Pacific battle fleet—chief instrument to restrain Japan and hold the Pacific—was bent, burnt, or sunk.

Who was the responsibility? As the 1944 presidential election swings into the home stretch, this question is taking on an increasingly political aspect. Republicans charge President Roosevelt with political responsibility for the disaster, in whole or part. Senator Styles Bridges (R) of New Hampshire was recently quoted as saying Governor Dewey was gathering data on the affair.

The Republican vice-presidential candidate, Governor Bricker, has shown interest in it. In the House, Representative Ralph E. Church (R) of Illinois has charged that the Australian Government had advanced warning of the attack. He repeated his charge yesterday asking that Army and Navy boards investigating the matter go into this phase.

The Australian delegation in Washington flatly denied the allegation but rumors continue, and are now re-enforced by full-page advertisements being placed in newspapers by Basil Brewer, New Bedford, Mass., publisher, charging political responsibility to the White House.

Commanders' Hands Tied?

"The President, and others in Washington," this argument runs, "first had lulled the commanders at Pearl Harbor into expecting only sabotage." Mr. Brewer seeks to show that warnings sent to the commanders at Pearl Harbor were accompanied by "confusing and contradictory precautions" which tied their hands.

From the first, Republicans have demanded that Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, in charge of naval forces, and Lieut. Gen. Walter C. Short, in charge of Army forces, be given a public trial.

The Administration has appeared to prefer to delay the court-martial. President Roosevelt at his latest press conference put the matter aside by asking if Army and Navy investigations were not now going on, implying that this covered the matter. Republicans, including Mr. Church and others, charge the Administration is trying to "cover things up," and some have implied that the President, as Commander in Chief, is responsible for the disaster.

What then, are the facts?

Commission Reported

So far as they have been officially presented, the story is covered by the so-called "Roberts report." A five-man commission, headed by Owen J. Roberts, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (appointed by President Hoover), went to Pearl Harbor, heard witnesses, including Admiral Kimmel and General Short, and made its extensive 10,000-word report, dated Jan. 23, 1942.

The full text was carried in newspapers. Individual testimony was kept secret at the time, because America was not then disclosing the full disaster. But the Roberts report did go over the situation, did present concrete findings, and did fix responsibility.

In retrospect, like all great dramas, it seems almost incredible that the Pearl Harbor surprise ever could have happened. Warnings of a surprise Japanese air attack were issued almost a year in advance. On the day of the attack itself a Japanese submarine was sunk off Pearl Harbor by the U. S. S. Ward at 6:45 a. m., a report reaching the naval base and Chief of Staff at 7:12, but no alert warning was issued.

A noncommissioned officer actually picked up the signal of the approaching Japanese airplanes as an aircraft warning detection system and reported his discovery at 7:20—half an hour before the attack, but an inexperienced lieutenant took no action.

Warnings Issued

In chronological order, here are some of the warnings issued:

On Jan. 24, 1941, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox advised Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson that increased gravity of the Pacific situation had caused a re-study of the security of the fleet. He mentioned the possibility of "a surprise attack upon the fleet at the naval base at Pearl Harbor."

Admiral Kimmel and General Short received this letter and the correspondence that ensued. Warnings of war threats became casual in the fall of 1941. On Oct. 16 both Admiral Kimmel and General Short were warned to take precautions. On Nov. 24 the Chief of Naval Operations warned Admiral Kimmel that the Navy feared a "surprise aggressive movement in any direction by the

Japanese May Strike Over Weekend!

The Honolulu Advertiser logo and masthead information including 'FINAL EDITION' and 'PRICE TEN CENTS'.

KURUSU BLUNTLY WARNED NATION READY FOR BATTLE

Honolulu Paper Was Alert Early

Headlines in the Honolulu Sunday Advertiser of Nov. 30, 1941, published a week before the Japanese struck Pearl Harbor, show anticipation of surprise action by the Japanese. The two-column story leading the front page at the right told of President Roosevelt conferring by telephone with his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, on the situation, with the announcement that the President might cut shorter his Warm Springs, Ga., visit to return to Washington.

Another top story, at left, recorded a widely held belief that the Japanese might attack at any moment, as conditions daily worsened in the Far East.

Japanese. The Army commander was similarly advised.

Discussions Not Held

On Nov. 27 they were advised that hostilities by Japan were "momentarily possible." On the same day Admiral Kimmel received a message "which stated in substance that the dispatch was to be considered a war warning" and that "Japan was expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days."

On Nov. 30 Admiral Kimmel was informed that a Japanese task force was forming. General Short was similarly advised. While full precautions were ordered, the two commanders were advised to pre-empt no action that would place the onus of attack on the United States.

The Roberts report shows that after Nov. 27 the two commanders did not meet to discuss the situation. Admiral Kimmel assumed that the aircraft warning system was being fully operated by the Army, which was not true, according to the report. General Short assumed that the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance, which was not true, the report showed. Despite the October and November warnings, it was found they made no inquiries of each other.

"The first duty of such commanders in the case of an emergency," the Roberts commission found, "is conference and consultation."

Mr. Brewer, in his full-page newspaper advertisements on "the truth of Pearl Harbor," charges that the warnings to Admiral Kimmel and General Short were coupled with such "precautionary orders" from Washington "as to tie their hands." This is not sustained by the Roberts Report. The Report found Admiral Kimmel and General Short guilty of dereliction of duty and condemns them for failing to exercise authority which they had, or of heeding warnings which they received.

The Roberts report takes up the Secretary of State, of War and Navy, one by one, and examines their relation to the Pearl Harbor affair. The measured conclusion is that they fulfilled their obligations. The Army Chief of Staff and the Navy Chief of Operations likewise fulfilled their responsibilities, the Report concludes.

There are extenuating circumstances. The Roberts commission notes, for example, that "there were deficiencies in personnel, weapons, equipment, and facilities to maintain all the defenses on a war footing for extended periods of time," but, it adds, these should not have affected the decision of the commanders as to the state of readiness to be prescribed.

Warning Came Too Late

In the same way, the final Washington war warning—more drastic than any of the others—arrived at Hawaii too late. But this was but an added precaution, said the Roberts commission, and, even if received, it would have been of little good.

As "contributory causes" for the disaster, the Roberts commission added the following—Japanese disregard of international law; restrictions preventing effective counterespionage; emphasis in Washington warnings on the probability of Japanese attack in the Far East and antisabotage measures; failure of the War Department to reply to a message from General Short explaining the antisabotage measures instituted; nonreceipt of the final Washington warning of Dec. 7.

Besides Associate Justice Roberts, the board was composed of a Brigadier General of the Army Air Corps, a former Chief of Naval Operations, a former Commander in Chief of the Fleet, and a retired Major General.

Leaders Call Troops Back In Singapore

Hope Wasn't As Nations Fall as Farley's Nightly Blackouts Held in Ft. Hawaii Troops 'Aborted'

Will Santa Fit The Plane?



Hey Kids, Santa Claus Will Land Here Today!

Nazis Clamp Curfew Over Montmartre

Terroristic Bombings Bring Rigid Curfew Over Montmartre

Foreign Affairs Expert Attacks Tokio Madness

WARM SPRINGS, Ga., Nov. 26. (UP)—President Roosevelt called to Secretary of State Cordell Hull for his opinion on the Pacific situation after his departure from Washington yesterday.

NEW YORK, Nov. 26. (UP)—Tyler Donnell, former adviser to the state department, and thought that the United States and Japan always have been and always will be normal enemies.

British Reveal Naval Help To Reds In Arctic

Editor Enters Pearl Harbor Controversy

By a Staff Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

BOSTON, Sept. 28 — Basil Brewer, publisher of the New Bedford, Mass., Standard-Times, in a full-page advertisement in the Boston Herald and other newspapers today, said the "success of the attack" on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese "can, in part, in all fairness, and in such measure as each citizen shall judge, be placed at the door of the Commander in Chief (President Roosevelt) as commander and personally."

Mr. Brewer's "editorial" on "The Truth of Pearl Harbor" gives a documented case placing the blame largely on the President. The article, republished from his paper, as "a patriotic public service," had obvious political effects at this time, inasmuch as Gov. Thomas E. Dewey, Republican presidential nominee, and other Republicans have sharply criticized the President's record on this issue.

"The President, and others, in Washington," continued the "editorial," "first had lulled the commanders at Pearl Harbor into expecting only sabotage. The President then had given them such restraining precautions and orders they did not know what they could or dare do—in measures of protection and defense."

"Keep the Record Clear"

The attack of Dec. 7, 1941, however, "was one which the 'isolationists' could not tie onto the President," Mr. Brewer said, referring to the President's efforts to "keep the record clear."

But with these efforts, "The President unknowingly and unintentionally had contributed to the destruction of the Pacific battle fleet, and helped to bring about Bataan and Corregidor, had lengthened immeasurably the Japanese war."

Saying this course "explains many things," Mr. Brewer listed: "It explains the long delay of the court-martial of General Short (Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, Army commander relieved after the attack) and Admiral Kimmel (Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Navy commander relieved after the attack)."

Restraint on Trials

"It explains why the President, through members of Senate and House, stopped Congress from passing resolutions calling for trials."

"It explains why the President still prevents the records of the Roberts Commission and the testimony of its 127 witnesses being made public."

"It explains the presidential order which forbade Admiral Hooper [Rear Admiral Stanford C. Hooper, a Pearl Harbor communications officer] a year ago to testify about Pearl Harbor to a committee of Congress."

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Mr. Murphy: I would like to read into the record from
3 a letter of December 2, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral
4 Stark the following:

5 "I fear we may become so much concerned with defensive
6 roles that we may become unable to take the offensive. Too
7 much diversion of effort for defense will leave us an inadequate
8 force with which to take the offensive."

9 I also wish to read from page 7 of the letter of December
10 2, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark.

11 Mr. Masten: Is that part of Exhibit 106?

12 Mr. Murphy: Part of the general group of letters con-
13 tained in that exhibit.

14 Now I would like to refer to a part of your statement,
15 Admiral, in which you refer to a letter to Admiral Stark
16 asking for more detailed information as to the international
17 situation. Did not you say in your letter that you did not
18 expect any categorical instructions from Washington?

19 Admiral Kimmel: I made certain observations along that
20 line. I think the best thing to do is to read it.

21 Mr. Murphy: It is in your statement at page 79.

22 Admiral Kimmel: This letter was, incidentally, on the
23 26th of May, 1941.

24 "The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, is in a very
25 difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Government, in a complex and rapidly changing situation.
3 He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change
4 of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements
5 and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect
6 upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force
7 will be available to him and has little voice in matters
8 radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned
9 tasks. This lack of information is disturbing and tends to
10 create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes
11 that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course
12 of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations.

13 "It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments
14 in the international picture, both diplomatic and military,
15 and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military
16 authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing
17 of timely information, but certainly the present situation
18 is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative
19 knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though
20 necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander in
21 Chief, Pacific Fleet, to modify, adapt, or even reorient
22 his possible courses of action to conform to current concepts.
23 This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific
24 situation, where the necessities for intensive training of
25 a partially trained fleet must be carefully balanced against

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it even more necessary that the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.

"It is suggested that it may be a cardinal principle that the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available."

Mr. Murphy: You did say you did not want any categorical instructions? You did say that, did you not?

Admiral Kimmel: I did not say I did not want any categorical instructions. I gave the reasons why I thought that problems could best be solved by giving me the information rather than giving me categorical instructions. One or the other was certainly necessary.

Now in that connection, I was at times given categorical instructions, and you will find one, for instance, in the dispatch of 26 November 1941.

Mr. Murphy: What was that, Admiral?

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Admiral Kimmel: It is dated 270038.

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Mr. Murphy: Will you read the categorical instruction?

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Admiral Kimmel: Page 55 of Exhibit 112, and in that dispatch, suggesting that we send reinforcement to the islands, this passage occurs -- I will read the whole thing.

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"In order to keep the planes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use OPNAV has requested and Army has agreed to station 25 Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake provided you consider this feasible and desirable. It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier. Planes will be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats essential spare parts, tools and ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips of regular Navy supply vessels. Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents. Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies."

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Mr. Murphy: Admiral, had not you already said that to the Chief of Naval Operations, that because of the difficulties there you could not possibly get up in there? Did not you say that in your correspondence, that it would be difficult to get boats up in there, that there was danger of submarines, and difficulty in getting close enough to do

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

(8)

2 anything but they would have to fly out to the ship.

3 Had not you told Admiral Stark that previously? Is not
4 that repeating what you had told him?

5 Admiral Kimmel: I do not recall whether I specifically
6 told Admiral Stark, but it was certainly information which
7 he could have had and which I probably did give him. But
8 then these are categorical instructions about things that
9 certainly could have been worked out in Honolulu and Pearl
10 Harbor.

11 Mr. Murphy: Well, you did not think that was a wise
12 procedure, did you? Why did not they let you work that out?

13 Admiral Kimmel: I had no objection to it. I had no
14 criticism of it. I do not mean to make a criticism of it,
15 I merely am trying to show you that I did receive categorical
16 instructions.

17 Mr. Murphy: Now I refer to your letter of September
18 12, 1941.

19 Admiral Kimmel: All right.

20 Mr. Murphy: I find in your second paragraph, Admiral,
21 about the middle of it --

22 Admiral Kimmel: Where is this?

23 Mr. Murphy: In your second paragraph on page 1, about
24 the middle of it.

25 " -- the question arises as to just how much we can

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 discount the threat of Japanese action."

3 Admiral Kimmel: I will have to find it. I have lost you.

4 Mr. Murphy: About the eighth line down the second
5 paragraph.

6 Admiral Kimmel: That is right in the middle of a sentence.

7 Mr. Murphy: " -- the question arises as to just how
8 much we can discount the threat of Japanese action."

9 Now at the end of paragraph (a), the last sentence --

10 Admiral Kimmel: Wait just a moment, please.

11 Mr. Murphy: Do you want me to read the whole letter?

12 Admiral Kimmel: I think in order to make sense you
13 better.

14 Mr. Murphy: I tried to tie it up with what you have
15 down below. I will read the whole letter.

16 "Dear Betty" --

17 Admiral Kimmel: I mean at least start reading with
18 the beginning of that paragraph.

19 Mr. Murphy: I will read the whole letter, Admiral,
20 and then there will not be any question about it.

21 "Dear Betty",

22 "We all listened to the President's speech with great
23 interest. With that and King's operation orders, of which
24 we have copies, the situation in the Atlantic is fairly
25 clear. But what about the Pacific?"

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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"I noted that Bidwell's Southeast Pacific Force has shooting orders for surface raiders east of 100 degrees west, which seems to clear that up as far as raiders are concerned, but just how significant was the restriction, limiting offensive action to 'surface raiders'? Or course I know that the possibility of German or Italian submarines in that area is slight and Japanese improbable, but the question arises as to just how much we can discount the threat of Japanese action. This uncertainty, coupled with current rumors of U.S.-Japanese rapprochement and the absence of any specific reference to the Pacific in the President's speech, leaves me in some doubt as to just what my situation out here is. Specific questions that arise are:

"(a) What orders to shoot should be issued for areas other than Atlantic and Southeast Pacific sub-areas? This is particularly pertinent to our present escorts for ships proceeding to the Far East. So far, my orders to them have been to protect their convoy from interference; to avoid use of force if possible, but to use it if necessary. These orders, at least by implication, preclude taking the offensive. Shouldn't I now change them to direct offensive measures against German and Italian raiders?"

Now it is this next sentence that I want to ask you about.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Admiral Kimmel: What is that?

3 Mr. Murphy: It is this next sentence that I want to
4 stress:

5 "In view of the delicate nature of our present Pacific
6 relations, with particular reference to their fluidity, I
7 feel that you are the only one who can answer this question."

8 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

9 Mr. Murphy: Now my question is: If you felt he was
10 the only one who could answer the question why did not you
11 feel that way when he said "This is a war warning"?

12 Admiral Kimmel: I have told you several times that I
13 thought I knew what the war warning meant. I would not have
14 hesitated to ask for clarification if there had been any
15 doubt in my mind at the time.

16 Mr. Murphy: You also say, Admiral, on page 2, in the
17 third sentence:

18 "I cannot escape the conclusion that the maintenance of
19 the 'status quo' out here is almost entirely a matter of
20 the strength of this Fleet."

21 Did you thereby mean to say that the Fleet, where it
22 was, was a deterrent to Japanese action?

23 Admiral Kimmel: I think you ought to read this whole
24 letter. You cannot take out one little passage from a letter
25 and ask questions on it, it has got to be taken as a whole

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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and not separated from its context.

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Mr. Murphy: Apart from the letter, Admiral, did you think the presence of the Fleet at Hawaii was a deterrent to Japanese action?

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Admiral Kimmel: I felt that the strength of the Fleet in the Pacific was what primarily affected the Japanese. Its location in Hawaii, in the opinion of the best minds in Washington, was that the Fleet at Hawaii was a deterrent to Japanese actions. I felt that they were perhaps better able to judge that than I was.

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Mr. Murphy: I am directing that inquiry to you, sir.

Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: Did you feel that the presence of the Fleet at Hawaii was a deterrent to Japanese action?

Admiral Kimmel: Well, I will put it this way; The strength of the Fleet in the Pacific was what governed Japan. After the Fleet had been in Hawaii for over a year it might well have been interpreted as a sign of weakness if they had brought it back to the coast. That, however, I very much doubt.

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Mr. Murphy: You did say, Admiral, on the third page of that letter, did you not, at the end of the paragraph:

"Until we can keep a force here strong enough to meet the Japanese Fleet we are not secure in the Pacific"?

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Admiral Kimmel: Where is that?

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Mr. Murphy: The last sentence in the first paragraph on the third page. "Until we can keep a force here strong enough to meet the Japanese Fleet we are not secure in the Pacific - and the Pacific is still very much a part of the world situation."

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Admiral Kimmel: Well, it is difficult for me at this time to interpret every word I wrote more than four years ago, but I will give you my interpretation now for what it is worth, and my interpretation is that when I said "here" I meant the Pacific.

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Mr. Murphy: Let me ask you this question, Admiral: In view of the success of the strategy that was adopted by those in Washington and those in command of our Army and Navy by sending ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic and using them as we did use them, in view of the success we had do you think now that it was a wise policy?

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Admiral Kimmel: I feel that after December 7 a very considerable number of ships suitable for the early stages of the Pacific campaign, which were carriers, fast cruisers, destroyers, and fast battleships, were sent to the Pacific, and that added to the forces that they had out there -- I haven't the figures, but I am quite certain that a considerable number was sent from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: At any rate, the strategy that was used by those in command did result in victory, did it not, Admiral?

Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes, there is no question about that.

Mr. Murphy: In that connection, and as my parting final question, I would like to refer to your letter of January 28, 1942.

Admiral Kimmel: (Interposing) The disposition of ships prior to December 7, particularly those in the Pacific, was changed considerably after December 7.

Mr. Murphy: I would like to refer now, Admiral, to the last paragraph of your letter of January 28, 1942.

Admiral Kimmel: January 28, 1942?

Mr. Murphy: Yes, Admiral, the third paragraph. I think if I read it to you it will be all right, Admiral. In that paragraph you say this:

"I desire my request for retirement to stand subject only to determination by the Department as to what course of action will best serve the interests of the country and the good of the service."

So that after forty years and eight months of honorable service you held yourself out during the war to contribute to the war effort in any way you possibly could, isn't that right? You proffered your services to those in authority?

Admiral Kimmel: I think the letter speaks for itself.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy
Senator Brewster

2 I do not want to comment on that.

3 Mr. Murphy: You do not want to go further on that?

4 Admiral Kimmel: I have nothing to add on to that except
5 what is already in the record.

6 Mr. Murphy: All right, I have no further questions.

7 The Vice Chairman: Senator Brewster of Maine will inquire,
8 Admiral.

9 Senator Brewster: I want to comment first that the
10 exacting character of your examination --

11 Admiral Kimmel: I cannot hear you, sir. I am sorry.

12 Senator Brewster: I will get a little closer to this
13 thing. I do not know that I can get accustomed to it.

14 I appreciate, as you do, that perhaps necessarily over
15 the past few days, this entire week now, there has been much
16 that is repetitious in the very extended examination. I do
17 not want to single out any of my colleagues by undue mention,
18 but I do want to say Mr. Cooper, who is perhaps of the most
19 belligerent variety, has questioned you in his customary
20 style. But you do not want to interpret it as personal to
21 you, as he went after other witnesses in the same way.

22 When I went before him as a witness one time in the
23 House he offered to throw me out of the room. I say that
24 so you will understand in questioning we are seeking the
25 truth.

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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Admiral Kimmel: I can appreciate the belligerency. I may have indulged in that sometimes myself. I do not object to it.

Senator Brewster: Now if I repeat some of the questions that have been gone over before, or that may seem to have been covered, I apologize. I will try to be as brief as I can.

Admiral Kimmel: I would like to give you as full information as possible.

Senator Brewster: Have you testified so far, Admiral, as to your whereabouts on Saturday evening, December 6?

Admiral Kimmel: As to where I was when?

Senator Brewster: On Saturday evening, December 6. That is the question we asked of Admiral Stark and General Marshall, and they have been able to tell us, so I want to ask you.

Senator Ferguson: What year?

Senator Brewster: That is in 1941.

Admiral Kimmel: I will tell you. In the forenoon of December 6 I was in my office and I discussed the situation during most of the forenoon with Admiral Pye and, as I recall it, I had my Fleet Intelligence Officer come in and give us a survey.

In the afternoon, I spent most of the afternoon talking to Captain Morris, Captain Delaney and Captain Smith, all in my staff, and then I went home to my quarters.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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2 I went to a dinner at the Halekulani Hotel in Honolulu.
3 I was the guest of Admiral and Mrs. Leary. There was a party
4 of about a dozen people there.

5 I left about 9:30 and went to my quarters. The
6 Halekulani Hotel is about 20 to 25 minutes by motor from my
7 headquarters. I spent the rest of the night in my bunk,
8 until I was called in the morning to get this report about
9 the submarine, and then the airplane attack a few minutes
10 later.

11 Senator Brewster: And you were accessible all that time?

12 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, my staff knew where I was. My
13 staff duty officer knew where I was, and so far as I know,
14 I missed nothing that came in.

15 Senator Brewster: The Halekulani Hotel is immediately
16 adjacent to the coast defense batteries, isn't it, in that
17 vicinity?

18 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes. I believe there is an Army
19 coast defense battery there, yes.

20 Senator Brewster: Now we will go a little into the
21 matter of the submarines that appeared off Pearl Harbor, and
22 also to those that entered the harbor, the one that entered
23 the harbor and was sunk.

24 There has been previous testimony about a map recovered
25 from the submarine sunk at Bellows Point.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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Admiral Kimmel: Adjacent to Bellows Field.

Senator Brewster: Yes, Bellows Field. It purported to show the route of a Japanese submarine around Pearl Harbor during the early morning hours, between 4:00 and half past five in the morning. Has that come to your attention at any time?

Larry follows

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Kimmel

2 Admiral Kimmel: I remember something about it. I
3 don't know whether I ever saw the papers on it or not.
4 But the best opinion that I have been able to get on the
5 subject is that this Jap commander had laid down his
6 courses, and speeds, and times he expected to pass various
7 places in the harbor, and that he had this list of ships
8 and where they were berthed all plotted in there when he
9 went down to go into the harbor; that he made a misque
10 somewhere and instead of getting into the harbor he ran
11 aground on the north coast. That is what I believed then;
12 that is what I still believe.

13 I do not believe that any Japanese submarine would
14 have entered Pearl Harbor except to shoot.

15 There was no reason. It didn't make sense. They
16 could see from the hills, so why risk a submarine going
17 in there.

18 And besides, if a submarine had stuck up a periscope
19 in Pearl Harbor, in the narrow waters there, where boats
20 were running constantly, where the lookouts were scanning
21 every inch of the place, that submarine would have been
22 discovered at once, just as the one was that did enter,
23 and the minute it stuck a periscope, the people began to
24 shoot at it.

25 It doesn't make sense to me that they would go in and

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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2 without examining any evidence, I would strongly discount
3 anything except the most positive evidence that the Japanese
4 were stupid enough to send a submarine in there merely
5 for purposes of observing.

6 Senator Brewster: One of the entries alleged to be
7 on this map, the original of which I understand we will
8 have available, was interpreted as saying in Japanese, "I
9 saw it with my own eyes."

10 Admiral Kimmel: I beg your pardon?

11 Senator Brewster: "I saw it with my own eyes." That
12 was one of the entries on the map. As though the officer
13 had, apparently, made it in the enthusiasm of his success.

14 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir. I have talked to some of
15 these Japanese scholars, and I think there is considerable
16 difference of opinion as to the exact translation of those
17 Japanese notations. I don't know whether he entered or
18 not, but it doesn't make sense to me. I don't believe
19 he did.

20 Senator Brewster: What about the condition of light
21 at ten minutes of five in the morning? What was the time
22 of dawn then?

23 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, I have forgotten just exactly
24 what time dawn was. Sunrise was at 6:27, and dawn must
25 have been, oh, a half an hour before that, maybe.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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2 Senator Brewster: Would a submarine periscope
3 before five o'clock in the morning have been readily
4 visible?

5 Admiral Kimmel: I doubt it very much; I doubt it.

6 Senator Brewster: That might lend some credence to
7 the possibility that he might have been in there and not
8 have been discovered.

9 Admiral Kimmel: I don't think he could have seen much
10 himself.

11 Senator Brewster: Well, I take it a battleship against
12 the skyline would be somewhat more visible than a periscope.

13 Admiral Kimmel: You are quite right about that. My
14 conclusion is based on the fact that he would gain nothing
15 by it.

16 You must remember that these Japs could go up in the
17 hills and look down in the daytime and see everything.

18 Senator Brewster: In what was termed an official
19 account of the incident prior to Pearl Harbor, compiled
20 under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, the
21 book which I have here, it was intimated that one of the
22 grounds for saying there might have been a report by this
23 submarine commander was that, as I recall, a ship, which
24 he identified mistakenly as a carrier, and which was, I
25 believe, the Utah, received a great deal of attention from

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Brewster

h4

2 the Japanese. These two naval officers who wrote this
3 book indicated that that might indicate that the Japanese
4 thought they were attacking a carrier. Did that theory
5 ever come to your attention?

6 Admiral Kimmel: I heard something of that kind.

7 Senator Brewster: Are you familiar with this book
8 (indicating)?

9 Admiral Kimmel: I am not familiar with it. I have
10 read it hastily, and the comments I have heard do not give
11 it a very high mark for accuracy.

12 Senator Brewster: What was the situation as to the
13 submarine net at the entrance to Pearl Harbor that morning?

14 Admiral Kimmel: In the first place there was no
15 submarine net in the entrance to Pearl Harbor. There was
16 a torpedo net at the entrance to Pearl Harbor. That is
17 different. And the torpedo was to prevent any submarines
18 or other craft from coming up off the entrance and flying
19 a torpedo which would have run up into the area where the
20 ships were berthed. The net was being operated, and the
21 orders for the net were issued, and under the control of
22 the Commandant of the district.

23 My understanding was it was being operated.

24 Now, the details of what happened there on that morning
25 are not known to me personally, and I never investigated

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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2 it thoroughly, because I never had time.

3 Senator Brewster: It is my understanding that the
4 evidence shows that the net was open from approximately
5 four o'clock to seven o'clock that morning.

6 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I believe that is true, but I
7 am talking about what I know now.

8 Senator Brewster: Yes.

9 Admiral Kimmel: From my own investigations.

10 Senator Brewster: Yes.

11 Admiral Kimmel: I hesitate to give evidence based on
12 something I read, and that is somebody else's evidence.

13 Senator Brewster: If that were correct, would that
14 be, so far as you know, unusual?

15 Admiral Kimmel: I wouldn't know why it had been kept
16 open for that length of time, and in view of my order to
17 exercise vigilance against submarines which I issued on
18 the 28th, I think it was -- I was surprised when I saw
19 that testimony.

20 Senator Brewster: Were the torpedo nets such as
21 would have detected the entrance of a submarine of the
22 character the Japanese used, the one that entered the
23 harbor?

24 Admiral Kimmel: I think so.

25 Senator Brewster: It wouldn't have been able to go

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Brewster

h6

2 under the net?

3 Admiral Kimmel: That I am not positive of. I would
4 judge it probably couldn't. At one time somebody had
5 reported to me that it was deep enough in one spot for
6 the submarine to have gotten under the net. On further
7 investigation I think that is very doubtful.

8 Senator Brewster: Was it unusual that you did not
9 have a submarine net there?

10 Admiral Kimmel: We didn't have a submarine net
11 because all the submarines of which we knew were so large
12 that if they entered that channel, the periscope would
13 show, they couldn't go down far enough without having
14 their periscope showing. And these were a surprise type,
15 and I described them in very sketchy terms here the other
16 day.

17 They were very small and were able to submerge in
18 the channel, and in the waters of Pearl Harbor.

19 The Vice Chairman: Will you permit an interruption?

20 Senator Brewster: Yes.

21 The Vice Chairman: Is that what has been described
22 to this hearing as the midget submarine?

23 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct, the midget submarine.

24 Senator Brewster: That was a new development in
25 Naval warfare?

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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2 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, and a very ineffective one,
3 in my opinion.

4 Senator Brewster: Had other countries been using it
5 prior to that time?

6 Admiral Kimmel: I don't know of any in re cent years.
7 I believe way back before the Civil War, they had a one-
8 man or a two-man submarine, something of that kind, but it
9 was a thing that we did not expect, and as far as I was
10 concerned, and I believe that is true of everybody else,
11 we didn't know that any such thing as that existed.

12 Senator Brewster: There was the message of December
13 6, 1941 authorizing the destruction of confidential papers.

14 Have you testified as to when that was received?
15 Regarding the outlying islands?

16 Admiral Kimmel: I will look at it. I couldn't
17 tell you when that was received, but to the best of my
18 recollection I never saw it until after the attack. It
19 is an even bet as to whether I saw it before or after the
20 attack.

21 I think I didn't get it until after the attack.

22 Senator Brewster: That was my understanding, but I
23 thought it should appear in the record as to whether it
24 was delivered in Hawaii before December 7.

25 Do you know what the record shows on that?

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Brewster

h8

2 Admiral Kimmel: I have no record upon which I can
3 definitely state that. I can only state my recollection.

4 Senator Brewster: I inquire on that because the
5 Roberts report, on page 8 of the Senate document, that
6 is referred to as one of the items that might be considered
7 in creating concern in your mind; I thought it ought to
8 be established definitely as to whether it was a matter
9 that had come to your attention prior to that time.

10 Admiral Kimmel: Incidentally, I might point out, in
11 the Roberts report, they added, you notice, the wording
12 here, it says "In view of the international situation."

13 Senator Brewster: Yes.

14 Admiral Kimmel: The Roberts report reads, "In view
15 of the tense situation."

16 Senator Brewster: Yes.

17 Admiral Kimmel: There is a little added impetus
18 given in the Roberts report over what the dispatch itself
19 shows.

20 Senator Brewster: Yes.

21 Admiral Kimmel: At any rate, if I did receive this
22 before the attack, it was no more than I would have expected
23 under the circumstances.

24 "You may authorize the destruction by them of secret
25 and confidential documents now or under later conditions of

1 Witness Kimmel Questions by: Senator Brewster
2 emergency."

3 And that was not particularly alarming.

4 Senator Brewster: Do you know whether or not that
5 message was sent deferred so that it didn't have priority?

6 Admiral Kimmel: My recollection is that it was.

7 Senator Brewster: That is my understanding.

8 Admiral Kimmel: Those things are eliminated from
9 here, and you should have it.

10 Senator Brewster: Yes.

11 Admiral Kimmel: I think that message was sent defer-
12 red. You are right. I had forgotten that.

13 Senator Brewster: Yes.

14 Now, what is the significance of a message being sent
15 deferred, both as to its expedition, and as to its signifi-
16 cance.

17 Admiral Kimmel: Well, a deferred message comes after
18 they have cleaned up all the messages of priority. It
19 is routine. My understanding of "deferred" is that it goes
20 out after every other message has been cleared.

21 Senator Brewster: Would that have any significance
22 as to its importance?

23 Admiral Kimmel: I think so.

24 Senator Brewster: That it was of lesser importance?

25 Admiral Kimmel: It was of lesser importance, the

h9

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Brewster

h10

2 deferred message.

3 Senator Brewster: In your letter of October 14, 1941,
4 concerning the Pacific Fleet Confidential letter, on
5 page 4, you stated:

6 "The battleships, carriers, and cruisers shall nor-
7 mally be moored singly insofar as available berths
8 permit."

9 Admiral Kimmel: Where is that now? What page, sir.

10 Senator Brewster: Page 4 of your letter.

11 Lieutenant Hanify: Which paragraph?

12 Senator Brewster: I haven't that before me. It is
13 referring to the mooring of the battleships singly.

14 The testimony before the Roberts committee. Have you
15 that?

16 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes, sir, I have it now.

17 Senator Brewster: Now, do I understand that it was
18 not possible to have them moored singly at this time?

19 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I presume that is correct.
20 Otherwise, they would have carried out this order. I can't
21 tell you now what the considerations were, but I presume
22 it was because available berths did not permit the single
23 berthing, they had to double them up.

24 Senator Brewster: There had been no alteration in
25 your orders, so far as that was concerned?

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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2 Admiral Kimmel: This order was in effect on the day
3 of the attack.

4 Senator Brewster: Now, in the Hewitt narrative, you
5 are quoted as stating that you told Admiral Stark and the
6 President of the dangers to the fleet blocking the harbor
7 and so forth.

8 You are quoted on page 367 of the Navy testimony to
9 the following effect:

10 "The only real answer to an air attack was not to
11 have the fleet in port when an attack came, that it took
12 two to four hours to sortie, and once an attack was started,
13 it would be completed before they could change the disposi-
14 tion of the fleet. In general he said he felt that the
15 fleet should not stay in Pearl Harbor, but he made no
16 protest and made no recommendations for withdrawal for
17 any of the battleships or carriers."

18 Is that a fair summary, in the Hewitt report of your
19 statement to the President?

20 Admiral Kimmel: I did make that statement to the
21 President, that the only real answer to an air attack, so
22 far as the Fleet was concerned, was not to be in Pearl Harbor
23 when the air attack came, but there were other considerations,
24 and I still think that the best answer is not to have the
25 fleet in Pearl Harbor when an air attack comes there.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Brewster

h12

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2 Senator Brewster: Now, the further statement:

3 "In general, he said he felt the fleet should not
4 stay in Pearl Harbor" --

5 I take it that would, apparently, apply as a general policy.

6 "--the fleet should not stay in Pearl Harbor, but
7 made no protest and made no recommendations for withdrawal
8 of any of the battleships or cruisers."

9 Did you go that far with the President?

10 Admiral Kimmel: I am just trying to think. Where
11 does this come from?

12 Senator Brewster: Take your time.

13 Admiral Kimmel: I would like to know where it comes
14 from.

15 Senator Brewster: That is the Hewitt narrative and
16 it is on page 367 of what is called the Navy testimony. It
17 is cited here in this compilation. Apparently, this is
18 the Hewitt summary of what you were supposed to have said.

19 Did you testify before the Hewitt and Hart inquiries?

20 Admiral Kimmel: I testified before the Hewitt inquiry?
21 I testified neither before the Hewitt nor the Hart inquiry.
22 When the Hewitt inquiry was started, as I have said before,
23 I tried to be made an interested party, and have the right
24 to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

25 Now, he didn't get that from anything before the Hewitt

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Brewster

2 inquiry. He must have taken that -- that is his conclusion
3 from other testimony that I gave, and it must have been
4 either before the Roberts Commission, or the Navy Court of
5 Inquiry.

6 Senator Brewster: Well, he apparently attributes it
7 to page 367 of the Navy testimony.

8 Admiral Kimmel: That is where it is then, I presume.
9 If you want to find out what I said, I think it is much
10 better to go to page 367 of the Navy testimony than to take
11 conclusions that Admiral Hewitt drew.

12 Senator Brewster: Well, the point which I am making
13 is that the Admiral Hewitt report is one of the factors
14 in these proceedings, and whether or not it is a fair
15 presentation of your viewpoint or your testimony, I thought
16 might be a matter that would invite your comment.

17 Admiral Kimmel: That is right. I am glad to comment.

18 Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

19 Admiral Kimmel: In general, my recollection is that
20 I told the President that the only answer to an attack
21 on the fleet in Pearl Harbor was not to have the fleet in
22 there. I was pointing out to him the vulnerability of
23 Pearl Harbor as a base, not only in regard to the fleet
24 but with regard to the whole situation out there. I went
25 into it fairly thoroughly. I did not recommend that he

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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2 withdraw any ships from Pearl Harbor, and I accepted the
3 hazard and I tried at that time, when I accepted that
4 hazard, to impress upon everybody the extreme necessity
5 under those conditions to keep me fully and completely
6 informed.

7 Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

8 Senator Brewster: Yes.

9 Mr. Murphy: I want to keep the record straight.

10 There is no 367 in the Hewitt narrative given to us.

11 Senator Ferguson: It is page 367 of Admiral Kimmel's
12 previous testimony. It is this testimony that has been
13 handed to us.

14 Mr. Murphy: I just wanted to show that.

15 Senator Ferguson: It is a boiled-down version of
16 what he said.

17 Mr. Murphy: At any rate it is not at page 367 of
18 the Navy narrative.

19 Senator Ferguson: That is true. It was given in the
20 Navy testimony.

21 Senator Brewster: I thank the gentleman from Pennsyl-
22 vania for the correction. We certainly want to keep the
23 record as straight as we can.

24 Admiral Kimmel: Did I answer your question?

25 Senator Brewster: Yes, except this, what comment did

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Brewster

h15

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2 the President make on it at the time of your presenta-
3 tion? I don't think you have testified about that.

4 Admiral Kimmel: I think he generally agreed with me
5 about it. I had no disagreement on that subject.

6 Senator Brewster: Did he give you the reasons why
7 he felt it nevertheless should stay there, in spite of
8 a certain lack of security?

9 Admiral Kimmel: I didn't ask him his reasons, and he
10 volunteered none.

11 Senator Brewster: You have stated that keeping the
12 fleet in Pearl Harbor was in no way a condition of your
13 taking command?

14 Admiral Kimmel: That is true. I never had any condi-
15 tions imposed upon me before I took command, and the only
16 conditions I had afterward were the orders I received,
17 all of which have been placed in evidence here. Most of
18 which, I should say.

19 Senator Brewster: What did you understand as to why
20 Admiral Richardson was relieved of his command?

21 Admiral Kimmel: I never knew and Admiral Richardson --

22 Senator Brewster: I didn't ask you that. I asked
23 you what you understood?

24 Admiral Kimmel: I know. I wanted to preface my
25 remarks with that.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Brewster

hl6

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2 Senator Brewster: Yes.

3 Admiral Kimmel: I never knew, but I did know that
4 Admiral Richardson had come to Washington, and he had
5 had an interview with the President and that he had dis-
6 agreed with the President, and he came back to Pearl Harbor.

7 I believed at the time that, or just before I received
8 my notification that I was to be made Commander in Chief,
9 that Admiral Richardson was going to stay there. I hadn't
10 any idea he was going to be relieved. I have known Richardson
11 very well for many, many years. He is a man I have always
12 admitted very much.

13 I knew his views about taking the Fleet to the Coast
14 rather than Pearl Harbor; I knew that his primary reason
15 for wanting the fleet to go to the Coast was that he
16 thought it could be more expeditiously and quickly prepared
17 for war there than it could at Pearl Harbor. That was
18 his prime objective.

19 I knew also that he knew the conditions that obtained
20 at Pearl Harbor as did every other experienced Naval
21 officer who ever went out there, and it was something that
22 was not new. It had been there for many, many years, and
23 had been the subject of conversation in the Navy and in
24 naval circles for a long time.

25 Senator Brewster: Were you a subordinate of Admiral

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Brewster

hl7

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2 Richardson at that time? Had you been serving under him?

3 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir, I was a subordinate of

4 Admiral Richardson: I had command of the cruisers of the
5 battle force.

6 Senator Brewster: You were in that way familiar with
7 his views on the situation?

8 Admiral Kimmel: That wouldn't necessarily make me
9 familiar with his views, but Admiral Richardson told me
10 various things because he wanted to.

11 Senator Brewster: Did you have any substantial dis-
12 agreement with him on his views in that situation?

13 Admiral Kimmel: No, I didn't. I felt, as I said in
14 my statement that after the Fleet had been out there for
15 so long, I was particularly concerned about getting the
16 Fleet so that it could get ready to fight, no matter
17 where it was gotten ready, and I didn't want any further
18 delay in getting busy on it.

19 Senator Brewster: That is, you were confronted with
20 a condition and not a theory?

21 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct, sir; very much so.

22 Senator Brewster: Now, what about the significance
23 of the change in routing of the merchant shipping around
24 November, 1941?

25 Admiral Kimmel: We had been routing merchant ships,

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Brewster

hl8

2 escorting them for some time. I forget the exact date,
3 but it was over a period of months.

4 Senator Brewster: Was that escort initiated by you
5 or from Washington?

6 Admiral Kimmel: From Washington.

7 Senator Brewster: Yes.

8 Admiral Kimmel: And about November 25, we got orders
9 to route the shipping down through Torres Strait as a
10 matter of precaution, and to take them further from the
11 Japanese homeland, and that was continued up to well long
12 after December 7.

13 Senator Brewster: That did involve several thousand
14 miles further travel by the merchant shipping, did it not?

15 Admiral Kimmel: It was a step that wouldn't have been
16 taken, except from necessity, because it added, yes, several
17 thousand miles, to the trip.

18 Senator Brewster: Yes.

19 Now, further quoting the Hewitt narrative, as it is
20 called, quoting from Hart's testimony, it states:

21 "Kimmel's orders to Halsey when he left for Wake,
22 and asked how far he wanted him to go, was 'use your
23 common sense.' Admiral Smith stated that before Halsey
24 left he asked Kimmel what he should do in case he met
25 Jap forces.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Brewster

hl9

2 "Admiral Kimmel, said in that case he was to use
3 his own discretion. Admiral Halsey replied that those
4 were the best orders he had received, to keep his move-
5 ments secret, and if he found even the Japanese sandman
6 he would sink it."

7 That was within the discretion of Admiral Halsey under
8 the order which you had given to him, was it?

9 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I had given Admiral Halsey, as
10 I testified here the other day --

11 Senator Brewster: Yes.

12 Admiral Kimmel: In his conversation with me after he
13 came back from Wake, he said that when he asked me how far
14 he could go, I said "You will have to use your common
15 sense." By that I meant whatever situation arose he would
16 have to take care of.

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