

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

RESTRICTED
(Reclassify when filled out)

CONFIDENTIAL

I. GENERAL

(a) Unit Reporting VBF-12 (b) Based on or at CV-18, USS RANDOLPH (c) Report No. 8
 (d) Take off: Date 17 Feb. '45 Time (LZT) 0900(K) (Zone); Lat. 33-55N Long. 141-50E
 (e) Mission Strike-Tachikawa Engine Plant (f) Time of Return 1330(K) (Zone)

II. OWN AIRCRAFT OFFICIALLY COVERED BY THIS REPORT.

TYPE (a)	SQUADRON (b)	NUMBER			BOMBS AND TORPEDOES CARRIED (PER PLANE) (f)	FUZE, SETTING (g)
		TAKING OFF (c)	ENGAGING ENEMY A/C (d)	ATTACKING TARGET (e)		
F6F-5	VBF-12	11	7	11	6 Rockets - HVAR	AN/M-149-Noze-Inst. AN/M-159-Base-02 delay .015

III. OTHER U. S. OR ALLIED AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED IN THIS OPERATION.

TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER	BASE	TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER	BASE
TBM-3	VT-12	15	USS RANDOLPH				
SB2C-4E	VB-12	11	" "				
Other units from T.O. 58.4							

IV. ENEMY AIRCRAFT OBSERVED OR ENGAGED (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) TYPE	(b) NO. OBSERVED	(c) NO. ENGAGING OWN A/C	(d) TIME ENCOUNTERED	(e) LOCATION OF ENCOUNTER	(f) BOMBS, TORPEDOES CARRIED; GUNS OBSERVED	(g) CAMOUFLAGE AND MARKING
Oscar	4	1	1130(ZONE)	At Target		
Tony	3	3	1140(ZONE)	South of Target		
Zeke	4	0	1130(ZONE)	pm Retirement		

(h) Apparent Enemy Mission(s) Interception
 Did Any Part of
 (i) Encounter(s) Occur in Clouds? No If so, Describe Clouds _____
(YES OR NO) (BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)
 Time of Day and Brilliance
 (j) of Sun or Moon Day Bright (k) Visibility Unlimited
(NIGHT, BRIGHT MOON; DAY, OVERCAST; ETC.) (MILES)

V. ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED OR DAMAGED IN AIR (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) TYPE ENEMY A/C	(b) DESTROYED OR DAMAGED BY:			(c) WHERE HIT, ANGLE	(d) DAMAGE CLAIMED
	TYPE A/C	SQUADRON	PILOT OR GUNNER		
Oscar	F6F-5	VBF-12	Lt(jg) D.A. CARMICHAEL Jr. USNR		

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(OMIT THIS SHEET IF NO ATTACK WAS MADE)

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XI. ATTACK ON ENEMY SHIPS OR GROUND OBJECTIVES (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) Target(s) and Location(s) Tachikawa Eng. Plant 35-43N 139-25E (b) Time Over Target(s) 1135(K) (Zone)

(FOR SHIPS INCLUDE ALL IN AREA UNDER ATTACK)

(c) Clouds Over Target Clear in Target area
(BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)

(d) Visibility of Target Clear - little haze (e) Visibility 45
(CLEAR, HAZY, PARTIALLY OBSCURED BY CLOUDS, ETC.) (MILES)

(f) Bombing Tactics: Type Rockets Bomb Sight Used MK 23
(LEVEL, GLIDE OR DIVE) (TYPE)

Bombs Dropped per Run _____ Spacing _____ Altitude of Bomb Release _____
(NUMBER) (FEET) (FEET)

(g) Number of Enemy Aircraft Hit on Ground: Destroyed XXX Probably Destroyed XXX Damaged XXX

(h) AIMING POINT	(i) DIMENSIONS OR TONNAGE	(j) NO. A/C ATTACKING (k) SQUADRON	(l) BOMBS AND AMMUNITION EXPENDED, EACH AIMING POINT	(m) NO. HITS On Aiming Point	(n) DAMAGE (None, slight, serious, destroyed or sunk)
1					
2					
3					
4					
5					
6					
7					
8					

(o) RESULTS: (For all hits claimed on ship targets and for land targets of special interest, draw diagram, top or side view or both, as appropriate, showing type and location of hits. For all targets give location and effect of hits, and identify by numbers above. Use additional sheets if necessary).

Serious damage was inflicted inflicted on the target. Some rockets & some bombs from other planes were dropped by mistake upon the Tachikawa Assembly Plant immediately south and across the Tachikawa A/F. As a result considerable damage was done to that plant also.

(p) Were Photographs Taken? No Good Photographs of Damage, When Taken, Should Be Attached By Staple.

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XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY

OWN AIRCRAFT

- Disposition
- Altitudes
- Speeds
- Approach Tactics
- Use of Cover, Deception
- Angles of Attack and Their Effectiveness
- Distance of Opening Fire
- Defense Tactics and Their Effectiveness

ENEMY AIRCRAFT

- Method of Locating, Distance
- Disposition
- Altitudes
- Speeds
- Approach Tactics
- Use of Cover, Deception
- Angles of Attack
- Distance of Opening Fire
- Defensive Tactics

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Own Weaknesses
- Enemy Weaknesses
- Offensive Tactics, Own
- " " Enemy
- Defensive Tactics, Own
- " " Enemy
- Flexible Gunnery, Own
- Escort Tactics
- Fighter Direction
- Use of Radar
- Night Fighting
- Recognition, Aircraft

ATTACK

OWN TACTICS

- Method of Locating Target
- Approach to Target
- Altitudes, Speeds
- Approach
- Dive
- Pull-Out
- Dive Angle
- Strafing
- Retirement
- Defensive Tactics
- Use of Jamming

DEFENSE, ENEMY

- Evasive Tactics, Ships
- Concealment
- Searchlights
- Night Fighter Tactics
- Use of Jamming

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Bombing Tactics
- Torpedo Tactics
- Effectiveness of Bombs, Torpedoes
- Selection of Targets
- Fuzing
- Strafing Tactics
- Defensive Tactics
- Use of Radar
- Reconnaissance
- Photography
- Briefing

OPERATIONAL

- Navigation
- Homing
- Rendezvous
- Recognition, Ships
- Communications
- Flight Operations
- Search and Tracking
- Base Operations
- Maintenance

Comdr. C. L. CROMMELIN was strike leader of this mission and was in command of all available VB & VT from T.C. 58.4 plus suitable escort. All a/e launched and rendezvoused without incident. Tachikawa a/e Engine Plant was the primary target and Kasumigawa Supply Base the secondary target. Weather from Base to the coast of Japan was particularly bad with heavy rain and ceiling from 300 to 700 feet. While in route to the coast, weather reports from planes contacted over the primary target area, influenced the strike leader to announce Kasumigawa Supply Base as the target to be attacked. Upon approaching the coast the weather opened up considerably, and the Strike Group climbed to 10,000'. A short distance inland it could be seen that the weather was clear as far South as the primary target, & the Strike Group was ordered to strike the Tachikawa a/e Engine Plant. 301 Cobra (from USS YORKTOWN) announced that some of his planes were having trouble & that he would pull out all his VT with 4 VF and strike Kasumigawa Supply Base. Permission was granted.

Upon approaching Tokyo area proper, moderate to intense heavy A/A was encountered, both director & barrage fire. Just North of Tokyo several bogeys were sighted on the starboard hand. No aggressive attack was seen to be made. One bogey seemed to be pacing the strike group perhaps to transmit speed & altitude to A/A batteries. The strike leader ordered rendezvous and retirement according to plan set forth at Ulithi in a conference of Squadron & Group Commanders involved.

Approach to target was made on a Westerly heading with dive & retirement towards the South. It is believed no bombs hit outside the target itself. The strike leader & his division remained over target to observe and to take photographs for damage assessment. (Photos sent to Interpron 2 at Guam) and then dove at the target, releasing rockets & retiring.

Three planes in the Strike Leaders division, including the Strike Leader's plane, had trouble, as did planes in other divisions, in that prop controls froze at 2000 to 2200 rpm. One plane had no blower at 16,000'. On retirement 5 Tonys hopped the Strike Leader's division. Lt. A.C. Boldue, the only pilot in the division whose plane was functioning properly, was able to make a high speed turn & shoot one Tony off the Strike Leader's tail. The second Tony was shot off Lt. Boldue's tail by Ens. Mangieri who was last of the 4 plane division. The 4 planes were strung out more or less in a line, one behind the other, join up after diving on the target not having been affected at that time. The third Tony (or possibly Flack) got the first of the 4 planes. His propeller was seen to freeze and he headed for a water landing.

At lower altitudes prop controls unfroze & retirement to base was made without further incident.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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XIII. MATERIAL DATA. (Comment freely on performance or suitability, following check list at left.
Use additional sheets if necessary).

ARMAMENT

- Guns, Gunsights
- Turrets
- Ammunition
- Bombs, Torpedoes
- Bomb Sights
- Bomb Releases

COMMUNICATIONS

- Radio, Radar
- Homing Devices
- Visual Signals
- Codes, Ciphers

RECOGNITION

- IFF
- Signals
- Battle Lights
- Procedures

PROTECTION

- Armor; Points and Angles
of Fire Needing Further
Protection
- Leak Proofing

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

- Parachutes
- Life Belts, Life Rafts
- Safety Belts
- Emergency Kits
- Rations, First Aid

NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT

- Compasses
- Driftsights
- Octants
- Automatic Pilots
- Charts
- Field Lighting

INSTRUMENTS

- Flight
- Power Plant

OXYGEN SYSTEM

**CAMOUFLAGE AND
DECEPTION DEVICES**

STRUCTURE

- Airframe
- Control Surfaces
- Control System
- Dive Flaps
- Landing Gear
- Heating System
- Flight Characteristics
At Various Loadings

POWER PLANT

- Engines
- Engine Accessories
- Propellers
- Lubricating System
- Starters
- Exhaust Dampers

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

- Auxiliary Plant
- Lights

FUEL SYSTEM

FLIGHT CLOTHING

MAINTENANCE

BASE FACILITIES

- Plane Servicing Equipment
- Personnel Facilities

1. On retirement from Target, the Strike Leaders division, strung out in line before join up after dive, was attacked by 3 Tonys. The Strike Leader, whose prop had frozen at high altitude at 2120 r.p.m., called for Help. Lt. A. G. Boldue, in front of the Strike Leaders plane, made a high speed turn at 260 Kn. indicate, pulling 6 G's throughout, and shot the Tony off the Strike Leader's tail. The "Z" suit prevented black out, and the manoeuvre could not have been made without the new "Z" suit. The pilot "greyed" out as it was.

2. Lt. L.A. Menard, Jr. experienced trouble on bail out that nearly proved fatal. He was using a Bureau issue cushion on top of his life raft & parachute. The cushion was tacked on to the risers approximately at the D ring. When the shoot inflated, the cushion remained above his head, preventing use of lines in guiding the chute and collapsing it when it ballooned over the water, dragging the pilot at a speed of 10 Kn.. The pilot was unable to unfasten chest or leg straps before hitting the water(or afterwards) as he could not sit back in the harness & pressure was too great.

The pilot was dragged on his back though the water. He did not dare to inflate his Mae West as pressure on his chest would thereby have been increased. Pilot picked up unconscious by DD Taussig, revived and returned to CV-15.

REPORT PREPARED BY:

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APPROVED BY:

E.J. Panka
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SIGNATURE

RANK AND DUTY

SIGNATURE

RANK AND DUTY

2-28-45

DATE