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PROBLEMS OF THE SECONDARY TEACHER. *By William Jerusalem. Translated by Charles F. Sanders.*

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PROBLEMS OF THE SECONDARY TEACHER

By

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PREFACE

The problems of education take their character from the nature of man. The ideals of civilization, the social results of the achievements in any age, the impulse towards adventure and the undertaking of advance or reform, all issue somehow out of the nature of man. And in its fundamental aspects this nature is very much the same the world over. When we note the differences of peoples and nations we find that we are dwelling on things they "have put on for the occasion." We are not yet at the bottom. Much of our philosophy, religion and education has been satisfied to build without going to this real foundation, the bedrock of human nature.

The market is flooded with pedagogic literature. It seems well-nigh a fad. There seems to be good sense in the demand that one should have some good reason for offering a new book in this field. My reason for offering this book in English dress is its splendid success in the effort to furnish insight into the rich problems of the Secondary School from the profound viewpoint of the fundamentals of human nature and of human society.

Jerusalem has cultivated the fields of philosophy, psychology and sociology and it is these that are peculiarly essential to an undertaking of the problems of pedagogy. He has learned much from Spencer in sociology, from Royce in philosophy and from James in psychology. In the treatment of his problems he has dealt with an earnest frankness with everything, with the result that we have a book that must appeal to everyone who really cares for the advancement of the race and has anything like confidence that the school can be made an effective agent in effecting such advance.

In making the translation we have eliminated such portions of the book as would have little or no interest outside Austria. The translation is made from the second edition of the original. The following from the author's Preface will tell the story of the book:

In respect to subject matter my book bears an intimate relation to the *Practical Pedagogics* of Adolf Matthias and the *Spirit of the Teacher* of William Muench. Both men are in position to speak to teachers as from a higher platform and hence have a right to admonish, to suggest, and to impose a duty. They understand well how to take the viewpoint of the teacher, but they themselves are nevertheless no longer on that level. In this respect my position is entirely different. I have never been a Director nor an Inspector. Furthermore, during the twenty years of my professional life I have never risen beyond the position of Privatdozent. I, therefore, have neither the right nor the obligation, and least of all the inclination, to speak from above. I come as a teacher to address myself to my present and future colleagues with a view to impressing upon them the tremendous social significance of our school and of our profession. My most serious concern is to energize the teacher subjectively, to give new impulses to his ambition and in this way, which I regard the only possible and effective one, to contribute to the reform of our advanced school system for which there is such a crying need. But the first requirement to this end is the demand for uncompromising frankness. We must neither cover up nor apologize for the failures and weaknesses of which we teachers are so frequently guilty. I have touched upon a number of very tender spots and am prepared to expect that the painful touch will meet with some bitter resentment and some complaisant denial. I have spoken without equivocation on both the actual short-comings of our High School organization as well as the failures of our Boards of Instruction. And I have likewise spoken many plain truths to the parents of our pupils. But I have done all this solely from my interest in the great social service to which my book is devoted. My criticism is never merely negative. I have no desire to destroy, but rather to build anew from within. I have constantly directed my efforts towards the positive and the concrete. It is just in the very act of trying to give the vital energies of the teaching profession the direction which leads towards higher achievements that the errors which lead elsewhere are exposed automatically. As Spinoza has put it, the truth must illuminate both itself and error.

The sociological method of interpretation which I have

applied to our schools and their teachers may indeed appear new and unfamiliar to many of my colleagues. Sociology is still a new science and it is not yet in position to direct attention to an abundance of positive results. But as a method of interpretation it has justified itself in splendid fashion. In the investigation of the concept of *general education* it has been very fruitful. The ethical problems of the teacher are likewise brought into a new light by consideration from this point of view. We must constantly strive for a clearer conception of the social function of our high schools. It is only from this point of view that we can at present come to a correct understanding and evaluation of the insistent demands for far-reaching individualization and for the intensive development of personality. It is on this account that my book applies not only to specialists in the narrower sense. It is precisely among these that many of my suggestions will still meet with opposition, especially, for example, my effort at the reorganization of the curriculum and my requirements in reference to the pedagogical training of teachers. But if educated society will concern itself more than it has hitherto about the social problem of the secondary school with a view to attaining a clear understanding both of its importance and its unique position, many will certainly learn to see that the existing evils can never be overcome by means of superficial reforms, such for example as by a more strict supervision, or by a gradual reduction of the material of instruction, or by eliminating written exercises, or by the free elective system in the advanced classes. The state and society will then perhaps think through to the conviction that the clearly recognised aim or purpose of the secondary school can be attained only by means of a thoroughgoing internal reconstruction. Internal reconstruction, however, is possible only if the vital energies of the teachers and schools are aroused, disciplined, and directed upon the course which brings us closer to these aims. I may perhaps, therefore, be permitted to hope that I will find sympathizers among the large class of the educated in every calling, who will agree to an early introduction of my requirements and a much more thorough pedagogic preparation of teachers. The future generation of teachers, however, will soon likewise gratefully recognise the advantages of such a training themselves.

Finally, permit me to emphasize once more that this essay is a personal work, an expression that issues from the depth of my own heart. It is as such that I send it forth into the world with the epigrammatic blessing of Grillparzer's lines:

Wer viel verschenken will, ob Fuerst auch oder Koenig,
Mehr als sich selbst gab keiner noch, der war.
Hier nimm mich selbst, und selber bring ichs dar.
Dein Herz entscheide nun, obs viel ist oder wenig.

(Of all who have rich blessings shed, whether prince or king,
None that ever lived more than himself has given.
Here, take my very self, 'tis I who offer thee.
Then let your own heart decide, whether it be much or little.)

C. F. SANDERS.

Gettysburg, Pa.,
July 27, 1918.

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PROBLEMS OF THE
SECONDARY TEACHER

PROBLEMS OF THE SECONDARY TEACHER

CHAPTER I

THE SECONDARY TEACHER

I. OUR VOCATION

THE teacher's vocation is unique. It is full of difficulty and it is charged with the highest responsibilities. The demands made upon him by official boards, parents, and more particularly by the pupils are boundless. But the obligations which the conscientious teacher imposes upon himself—he should at least—are of vastly greater consequence. Of the multitudes of young people expecting to teach in our secondary schools after graduation from college, but a very few have anything like a clear conception of the responsibilities involved. And even those of us who are in the active service, after having entered upon our difficult task, rarely find time, leisure and concentration, to reflect upon ourselves. It seems to me that the vague, uncertain and consequent unsatisfactory position of the secondary teacher at present is chiefly due to this lack of clearness concerning our duties, the utter failure to appreciate the social function of the secondary school and the teacher of the secondary school.

We are scientifically trained and we are, generally speaking, interested in science and accordingly we strive to keep in touch with the representatives of science, the University professors. We are teachers, we feel the need of discussion on method and the art of teaching and we occasionally visit the educational association conventions held by the teachers of the public schools.

We come under criticism from various angles. The educational authorities on the one hand are critical from the viewpoint of the organized state, and society at large on the other is apt to approach us from a more individualistic point of view. Short-comings are as variously ascribed to tradition, to social conditions, or even to malignity, both on the part of the parents or the official boards. And we look for improvement of the conditions. But it seems to me that external remedies will not relieve the situation. It must proceed from within ourselves. It becomes imperative, therefore, that we apply ourselves diligently to self-study. We must first of all raise the very serious question whether we have reflected with sufficient seriousness on what we are and what we ought to be. Do we really have a clear conception of the nature and purpose of the secondary school in which we are engaged? Have we ever been fully conscious of all the problems which confront the secondary teacher? Do we understand the tremendously important social function which the secondary school, together with its teachers, is called upon and obliged to exercise in the social organization? I fear the most of us would not pass this self-examination, which seems to me indispensable to a proper appreciation of the purpose and dignity of the profession. The point at issue here is to show that we are really and truly teachers. We must announce the results of each examination clearly, with inexorable truthfulness and without regard for personal feelings, which in this case means ourselves. Whoever approaches the examination poorly prepared must fail. We require the courage therefore to permit ourselves at least for once in our lives to fail at our own hands and be required to repeat. This will mean severe application in order that we may make up quickly and thoroughly what has been neglected.

I am rash enough to offer myself as a preceptor for the preparation for renewed self-examination. I offer the results of my experiences gathered from the practical life of a pedagogue, covering a period of thirty years, and latterly as instructor of pedagogy, together with my conclusions drawn from the study of psychology and sociology. I shall endeavor in the following pages to explain the nature and purpose of the secondary school more clearly, as it seems to me, than has hitherto been done. I shall discuss the scientific, the pedagogic-didactic

and the social-ethical duties of the secondary teacher and thus be in a position not only to offer general principles to prospective teachers and to teachers with limited experience, who may care to make use of it, but likewise to give many practical suggestions directly applicable to the real work of the school. But my deepest concern in this whole matter is to show my present and future vocational colleagues that the secondary teacher possesses a field of influence at once profound and extensive, his exclusive possession, without any other occupants and beyond the possibility of any counter claimants, which furnishes the opportunity for personal development wholly unique and at the same time satisfying the highest ambitions. The secondary school has its own specific problems which are clearly definable and hence requires specially prepared teachers who understand its problems and devote themselves to their high social task. We have at least no need to obtrude ourselves upon anyone either above, below, or in any way beyond our circle. The association with our pupils and with our colleagues and the constant, quiet application to a fuller development of our own personality, furnishes us abundant satisfaction. We must first of all get a correct estimate of ourselves, we need to know exactly what we are and regulate our conduct, our life, accordingly. The more thoroughly we master this problem of self-knowledge and autonomous self-estimation, the more rapidly will we attain the respect among all classes of people, which corresponds to our high calling.

The mental task for which I am anxious to enlist my present, and more especially my future vocational colleagues is by no means easy nor insignificant. The first requirement is a definite, strong determination, a vigorous spiritual backbone, which will force us out of the customary ways of thinking and, more particularly, the customary thoughtlessness. As soon as we are thoroughly initiated to the new mental vision it will be necessary to review carefully and thoroughly the whole field of our preparation and of our vocational activity from this new viewpoint. The university courses already completed or still in prospect of completion, the further scientific education for the purpose of fixing and of extending knowledge, the preparation for teaching, the management of pupils, methods, the relation to school boards and to colleagues, to parents and to the gen-

eral public, will all appear in a new light. We will then recognize clearly wherein the university fails by virtue of its regulations and wherein we have permitted it to fail by our own mistakes. The things we have learned there that seemed superfluous will then no longer appear superfluous, but as "superflu, chose très nécessaire." We will then be able to fill in the gaps which remain with genuine interest and undoubted gain. Once we are fully imbued with the great problem of our vocation, the conviction follows, that our purpose can be realized only by the slow, steady, consciously directed, daily occupation with small tasks and that on this account the things in our work which seem insignificant become important. The reproach of pedantry so often brought against school teachers will then appear in a new light and we will no longer regard it as a serious reproach.

2. THE SYNTHESIS OF SCIENCE AND PEDAGOGY

The first synthesis to be effected is that between the *scholar* and the *teacher*, or as I prefer to express it, between *science* and *pedagogy*. During the first half of the nineteenth century, when, especially in Prussia, but in other parts of Germany as well, the new-humanistic gymnasium founded under the auspices of *Goethe* and *Herder* and especially *Fr. Aug. Wolf*, the opinion generally prevailed that a strictly scientific education is quite sufficient for the gymnasial teacher. The school teachers of those days were all classical philologists and they were particularly disdainful of pedagogy. And the educational consistency of Prussia likewise placed the greatest, almost exclusive, emphasis on the scientific, i. e., philological, education of teachers. Paulsen's *History of Higher Education* furnishes abundant proof of the prevalence of these views, and he constantly refers to the sources with great care. I quote several characteristic passages. Paulsen describes (vol. II, 269 ff) the development of the philosophical faculties in the nineteenth century and the Seminaries founded during the same period: "The philological Seminaries are the oldest institutions of this kind. Founded originally for the purpose of furnishing a thorough preparation for the teaching profession, during the nineteenth century they became places of scientific research pure and simple."

"The Institute completely devoted to the education of scholars; the actual future vocation of the majority of the members, that of teaching, as such, receives no consideration whatever." (270) "Later statutes (e. g. Halle, 1857, Münster, 1854) make express mention of the fact that they likewise give special attention to the preparation of teachers for the higher schools, but not indeed in the way of guidance in acquiring the art of teaching, but simply through furnishing a scientific training. These statutes do not provide, according to Wiese (Hist. Statist. Darst. I. 525) for the teaching of pedagogy, but that instruction shall be given to independent application and advancement of science. It is presumed that a thorough pursuit of scientific studies is at the same time a training in method, that systematically acquired science likewise enables a methodical application, whilst methods without any deeper comprehension of the subject-matter soon become an empty, mechanical routine." (271) "It is indeed a noteworthy fact that the pedagogical enthusiasm of the eighteenth century was almost wholly extinguished by the scientific enthusiasm of the nineteenth century. Especially were the philologists outspoken in their contempt for pedagogy. Be enthusiastic and understand how to inspire enthusiasm, was the principle which gave rise to the whole pedagogy of Wolf. Ritschl thinks that teaching will come naturally to anyone who has the knowledge. And the youthful Lehrs, even while under appointment at a Königsberg Gymnasium, in the customary biographic sketches introduced into the program of the institution, could not refrain from deliverances like the following: 'This conviction preserved me (notwithstanding the fact that the life of an educator was constantly hovering before my mind) from the digression, temptations to which were at that time not wanting, of dissipating and wasting my time with the study of pedagogy, as they call it. Furthermore; for anyone to set limits to his science, to wish to master it for the sake of an immediate and pressing need, savors of the calculation of the trader, and the attempt to learn how to deal with men from a text book in psychology is childish.'" (253.) Principal Spilleke describes the slight esteem into which pedagogy had fallen among the philological governors of the schools as follows: "It is a most remarkable phenomenon that inasmuch as the elementary school

organization has during the past thirty years shown extraordinary progress in matters of didactics and method and has trained a generation of teachers who deserve admiration for their ability to inspire the masses by their pedagogic skill and by their general adaptability, the Gymnasias have nevertheless taken no notice whatever, or at least very little, of the great changes taking place in the pedagogical world. A gymnasial teacher who had so far departed from the way as to read a book on pedagogy or to manifest an interest in the subject had almost to be ashamed in the presence of his colleagues and fear being regarded a poor schoolmaster deserving pity. Not a few of the gymnasial teachers hold it as a fundamental principle that a man can teach any subject in which he has been instructed. Baumeister, who quotes this passage in the introduction to his *Handbook of Pedagogy*, adds: 'One might almost think they had only recently been written.'" (276)

This onesided and almost exclusive concern for the scientific training of the gymnasial teacher has, at least in Germany during the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century, had a very wholesome result for our profession. It has enhanced the respect for the profession in an extraordinary manner. Paulsen describes this with his customary clearness and vividness (II, 387 ff. Esp 389). And it follows from this that we are obliged to insist with all emphasis and zeal that the scientific training of the secondary teacher must not be neglected or supplanted by any means. Our authority and our social position, as history shows, rests on our scientific training. The results of our instruction depend above all else upon our scientific efficiency, and the introductory ordinance of the second edition of the "Instructions"¹ is perfectly right in saying: "The art of teaching, in so far as an art can be acquired, can, at least in the sphere of education to which these instructions apply, be acquired only under the presupposition that the teacher is complete master of his subject matter, in constant touch with the advances made by science and continually draws thence renewed strength and love for his arduous calling."

It is impossible therefore to emphasize too strongly or too frequently that scientific efficiency is the vital source and sole justification of our profession. But we must nevertheless in-

¹ Courses and Directions for Teaching in the Gymnasias of Austria.

sist just as clearly and just as decidedly that the ability for scientific research, the thorough mastery of the methods and principles of science, the restriction to a limited field, indispensable to the scholar, are utterly inadequate to a correct comprehension and the solution of the problems of the secondary school and of the secondary teacher. We must not only learn to understand and love science, but likewise our pupils. It is our business to quicken the mental powers of our pupils which ripen the desire and the ability to give a scientific account of their environment. But in order to do this it is necessary that we prepare ourselves thoroughly and at the proper time. Moreover the science and the art of education and instruction are not the mere inventions of yesterday. Great minds have reflected upon these problems for several thousand years, and it is therefore a false procedure to direct the young teacher to begin at the beginning with these matters and draw everything from his own resources. At the beginning of the first Olympic oration Demosthenes speaks of two kinds of orators. The one come well prepared (*χρήσιμον έσκεμμένον*) and present their plan systematically. The others depend on inspiration and speak from the stirrup (*έκ τοῦ παραχρήμα*). They have hitherto for too long a time imposed the frequently very painful position of the stirrup-teacher upon us and left us to ourselves to adjust to the schools. I still remember quite vividly with what feeling of trepidation I entered the class-room as teacher for the first time more than thirty years ago. But in the course of recent decades there has been an increasing demand from the widest variety of view-points that the secondary school teacher should likewise be pedagogically prepared for his calling.

The things which have been attempted and accomplished in this line, the probationary year, the university and school-seminars, the so-called further probationary years and everything pertaining to these matters are carefully compiled and discussed in the important volume by William Fries, *The Preparation of the Teacher for His Office*. (*Baumeister's Handbook*, vol. 2, first division B.) No arrangement meeting all the requirements has as yet been found, and we will doubtless still have to expend much labor and reflection in order to meet the needs of the time in this respect. We shall have

occasion to return to this point later. But we must observe this one thing in passing, namely, that in recent years the pedagogical preparation of the secondary teacher has been emphasized almost as onesidedly as was previously the case with the scientific preparation. Unfortunately it cannot be denied that there has been a marked decline in the scientific efficiency of the secondary school teachers during recent decades. Whether this fact can be adequately explained by the somewhat deeper interest in problems of method and didactics, I do not care to decide at present. One thing is nevertheless certain, namely, that at least with us in Austria the scientific regression has not enhanced the respect for our profession.

We must therefore never state the question alternatively, whether science or pedagogy is our chief concern. We must realize the synthesis emphasized above, *the vital blending of the scholar and the teacher in us*. We need scientific education most unqualifiedly. We must learn to understand the work of the investigator, since we are to participate in it. We must proceed far enough to be able always to be above the text books. We must — and this is the essence of the desired synthesis — we must press forward to the conception *that for us science is not an end in itself, but that it is only a means*. Our end, our life's problem is the school. Inasmuch as we devote our whole energy to it, we have the best and surest opportunity to develop ourselves to complete, consciously purposeful, independent personalities. Here every slumbering energy is developed, here we must find our joys and satisfactions. All that we are and all that we are able to do belongs to the school. And for this reason too science is not an end for us, but a means.

This is in no sense a depreciation of science. It is not a matter of alternatives between the "heavenly goddess" and the "milking cow." In the light of modern psychology and sociology this conception can no longer be maintained. All the sciences owe their origin to practical needs, and the highest aim of human endeavor must forever consist of the effort to make the life of the individual and of the human race richer, more complete and happier. Whenever therefore we use science for the purpose of inspiring and educating the minds of our pupils, whenever we impart to them the necessary equip-

ment for life by means of furnishing them with facts and by habituating them to individual effort, it is then that we have applied science to that which by its real nature it is intended, the advancement of life.

If the secondary school teacher is at the same time able to engage in independent research work, it will be of advantage to him in his vocation, as we shall show farther on, and he will thus likewise contribute to the elevation of the dignity of the profession. However, if he has fully realized the desired synthesis, he will understand that his whole effort must nevertheless be devoted to the school and science be only a pastime. He will not forget the teacher for the scholar, not neglect or indeed despise, but know that he must likewise cultivate and foster those phases of his science which do not appeal to him as an investigator, wherever the school requires it. Whoever, like myself for example, who as a teacher of the classical languages and philosophical propaedeutic, applies himself scientifically to psychology and philosophy, must at the same time be concerned about Latin style, German orthography, Greek meter and likewise be at home in Roman politics as well as in the Homeric problems and in the Attic system of legal procedure. As teachers we cannot by any means limit ourselves to a brief time period as the scholar is bound to do.

This synthesis of science and pedagogy is an unqualified requirement for the secondary teacher. The sooner and the more completely we give ourselves this,—perhaps somewhat painful for many,—mental jolt, the better it will be for us. Whoever is so fortunate as to gain this insight while still at the university, will get great advantage from it in pursuing his studies. He will guard against undertaking scientific investigations which will confine him for a number of years to a small part of his subject. He will rather seek themes which will furnish an opportunity to become acquainted with broader fields and furnish him with a comprehensive view. The classical philologist, who has rightly conceived his future vocation, will thus, for example, prefer investigations which will require him to study extensively Homer, the Tragedians or Plato, Thucydides, Demosthenes and the other orators, or those which furnish an intimate acquaintance with Virgil, Horace, Cicero, Tacitus or Livy. The historian will then scarcely devote six

or eight semesters exclusively to the late Roman emperors. He will rather institute a limited investigation to the Pentekontatie, and afterwards another to the period of the Gracchii, and then again devote himself to the Hohenstaufen emperor Frederick II and undertake an essay on the period of Wallenstein and Napoleon.

But it will do no harm if this synthesis is realized first by the young teacher. The work of the school will show him best, what is still lacking in his training. If the university has given him the ability to work systematically; it will not be difficult for him to fill in the gaps gradually and to combine breadth with thoroughness. We will have occasion to illustrate this synthesis by examples at greater length when we come to discuss the duties of the secondary teacher. Here it is of primary importance to show that the only way we can properly conceive and discharge our vocation is under the clear conviction that we must put science into the service of the school. Whoever is filled with this conception will soon begin of his own accord to be interested in general principles of education and instruction as well as in the special methods of his subject. He will desire to be a teacher and educator, not a scholar and an investigator, and it is this desire that appears to me to be the important matter. Our calling verifies the old English proverb, where there is a will, there is a way, very uniquely. Whoever seeks earnestly will certainly find a way, and moreover, the way that is adapted to his own individuality. There are now an abundance of guides, so that everyone can select such as suits his purpose.

We find at present that the personality of the teacher receives more emphasis than formerly and rightly so. We have come to see that the best course and the best teaching art become effective only as they become vital forces through the personality of the teacher. But we are not always clear as to the nature and growth of personality. We frequently speak of individuality and personality and mean nothing more than an unorganized bundle of impulses, phantasms, passions, whims, peculiarities and bad habits. But whoever understands the development of mankind, whoever clearly conceives the significance of the process of differentiation in the civilization of man, must conclude that the individual can become a really complete and forceful personality

only as he discovers some great fact of social importance to which he devotes himself and in which he is completely absorbed by his own resolve and volition. Josiah Royce, the American philosopher, brought this out very forcefully in his excellent book, *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, and it seems to me significant that this idea is reaching wider circles. Our calling is certainly an important one, of high social significance. Anyone who fully devotes himself to these matters will find abundant opportunity to unfold his individuality and to develop a forceful, complete personality. Devotion to these great matters quickens every hidden force, we recognize our strength and our weakness. Goethe observes, "*Peculiarities* will indeed remain, cultivate your *capacities*." The teacher who would struggle upwards to personality will follow this striking suggestion. He will have his peculiarities like everyone else, but that does no harm. He will however not find the essence of personality in these peculiarities, but in the deeper attributes of the soul which attain their complete development in vocational activity. Personality thus matured and refined is the only one that possesses the force which will really affect the pupils. But it has thereby likewise acquired the right to be obeyed and respected. Anyone who has made of himself such a personality as this will arrange his own methods and discover the path to a pedagogy adapted to his needs. The beginning of this path however will always lead through science, through strict science which demands the whole man. We must adhere to this unflinchingly. It is the source of our power and of our distinction.

3. SYNTHESIS OF OFFICER AND TEACHER

The synthesis of science and pedagogy is therefore the first fundamental requirement which every secondary teacher must impose upon himself. The fact that the secondary teacher is in a position to develop himself into an independent and energetic, professionally conscious, personality is likewise one of the most important conditions to this end. The second synthesis which we propose, the harmonious blending of the officer and the teacher which each of us is expected to realize in his own person, tends to produce the same effect.

The secondary teacher is at present an officer of the state.

He is in the direct or indirect service of the state from which follows, as the inevitable consequence of this relation, the duty of subjection and the duty of integration. Münch has elaborated this point very thoroughly in his splendid book on *The Spirit of the Teacher's Office*, and Matthias likewise takes occasion to discuss it in his excellent *Practical Pedagogy*. As public officers it is unquestionably our duty to adapt ourselves to the instructions of the authorities especially in so far as they affect the external conduct of the business of the school. We must teach the branches which are referred to us, we must observe the time periods strictly, conduct the oversight in church and in the corridors of the school buildings, we must see to it that the written exercises are done in the prescribed number and in the prescribed time, we must correct and return them at the proper time, we are obliged to recognize and follow the orders of the authorities, we must also do the writing connected with the granting of certificates and with the conferences, in short, there are many things and many times in which we must *obey*.

No honest teacher would care to deny that the discharge of his official duties, especially as far as they pertain to external matters have frequently become burdensome, exceedingly burdensome and oppressive. The psychological ground of this feeling however is not generally due to laziness or over-sensitiveness. It lies much deeper. We are in fact not merely public officers, we are above all else teachers and that is what we are intended to be. But then our actual vocational activity is so arranged as to contradict the duty of subjection imposed on the public officer.

In his classes the teacher is the superior, the leader. The function of the teacher consists in guiding, in leading. It is his duty to direct and to command. The interests of education and discipline, that is to say the interests of the matter of our service, requires us to insist upon the pupils complying with our rules and regulations. We must decide how and with what the pupils are to be occupied at a given time, we must assign what is to be prepared and studied for the next period, we must criticise the work of the pupils, in short, in the performance of our actual vocational duties we feel entirely independent and responsible. This independence is not merely our

privilege, but in a far higher degree our duty. We must bring our whole personality to bear on our pupils in order to influence them, which is possible only when the feeling of the unrestrained exercise of our powers is not constantly curbed by the embarrassing fear of interference on the part of higher authorities.

If the teacher is therefore accustomed to proceed freely and independently in his class room in proportion as he has fully identified himself with the responsibilities of the position of leader, it cannot but be difficult for him, outside the school, especially in the presence of the Board instantly to become the submissive servant with the restricted prerogatives of an underling. This profound contradiction which attaches to our calling is frequently the source of the strong dissatisfaction unfortunately found so often among secondary teachers. The cause lies in the fact that a vigorous, courageous, genuinely established professional consciousness cannot properly develop under such conditions. If the officer in us gains the mastery over the teacher, then the class room is no longer our chief concern. It seems to be more important for progress and advancement, that we *τοῖς ἐν τέλει βεβῶσιν* be in favor with those at the top, that we timorously avoid everything which might bring us even a shadow of criticism. A positive vital enthusiasm for work no longer dominates the class room, but rather a mechanical precision. The vigorous and cheerful endeavor to advance the young is frequently supplanted by a characterless seeking for position. The officer in us has slain the teacher.

But if the spirit of the teacher has been kept alive, if we have preserved our inner freedom and independence, if the class room is the place of our distinctive activity, into which we throw our whole personality, then on the other hand we readily get into difficulties of a different order. Every decree of the director, every conference, every regulation of the general inspector of schools or of the minister of education will then frequently appear as an infringement on our personal liberty. Opposition to the director consumes valuable spiritual energy which could be used to better advantage and far more fruitfully in the service of the young people. One is disposed to speak disparagingly of the ordinances of the authorities, which affect only externals or are regarded as so general as to make

but little difference in the actual process of instruction. But it then occasionally happens that we are told very plainly that we are merely a teaching force, a teaching individual or a teaching person, whose business it is to submit to the directions of superiors. It frequently happens that a general inspector of schools regards it as his peculiar duty to clearly impress upon the consciousness of such enthusiastic teachers, who do their own thinking, that their position is a subordinate one and it is their business to obey. Personally I have always belonged to the latter category of teachers, and never permitted myself to be robbed of the joy of teaching. But I must confess, that, especially during the early years of my teaching experiences, I not infrequently suffered deep anguish of this sort. I clearly recall even now the criticism which a school inspector—he has died since and I therefore withhold his name—passed on my work after several weeks' inspection of the institution. I was fully convinced that the classes he visited were doing real thinking and the pupils likewise gave evidence of a very respectable ability. I certainly expected some words of appreciation. Instead of this however there was nothing but petty grumbling and fault-finding. In the one subject—it was psychology in the eighth grade (corresponding to the *Prima* in Germany)—in which he was forced to admit the lively participation of the pupils, he did it with a patronizing accent. I was so deeply agitated by this criticism, which I regarded so palpably unjust, and my soul so deeply mortified that for several days I was fully determined to resign. Fortunately consideration for my family prevented my taking this rash step and I afterwards learned to treat such matters differently.

I have related this experience in order to show that the inherent contradiction of our vocation, between the teacher and the officer, will as a matter of fact frequently lead to profound soul-struggles and hence that victory over them becomes a matter of life or death. And this victory can never be a mere one-sided affair. Neither the officer nor the teacher within us can have complete control. We must rather seek to realize the synthesis of the two as described above. This synthesis is difficult, exceedingly difficult, at least more difficult than that between science and pedagogy. But the difficulty is still not on this account impossible. Dr. Samuel Howe, the American

philanthropist and pedagogue, heard of a deaf-blind girl in the vicinity of Boston where he had founded the first American institute for the blind in 1831. He hastened thither, took the child (Laura Bridgman) to his institute and undertook to enable the poor, solitary thing to speak, read and write by means of the sense of touch alone. His seemingly impossible task succeeded and since then there have been many others, similarly situated, delivered from their solitude and restored to social fellowship with mankind by the method which he elaborated. Dr. Howe's pedagogical principle was: "*Obstacles are things to be overcome.*" I know of no better motto for everyone who wishes to devote himself to our difficult vocation. Difficult and impossible must forever be regarded as two entirely different things. It is for this reason that I regard the synthesis of the officer and the teacher as difficult, but by no means impossible. I base this conclusion, not alone on general psychological principles, but on the fact that I myself together with many others have succeeded in overcoming this inherent contradiction by such a synthesis.

The synthesis of science and pedagogy is realized, as indicated above, by the determination made once for all and then rigorously applied, to place the scientific education hitherto acquired and constantly increased and deepened in the service of the school. The far more difficult synthesis of the officer and teacher in us involves an analogous process. Whoever feels inclined and capable, as a scientifically educated teacher, of inspiring the maturer pupils to intellectual independence and moral responsibility, must clearly understand that his efforts cannot realize the results for which he longs and hopes except *in the service of the state*. Every government of the civilized world has discovered that education is one of its functions, the desire for scientific discipline and a more refined sense of moral responsibility cannot be left to private initiative. The state has therefore established such institutions everywhere and at the same time conferred the mark of official rank upon the secondary teacher. We are thus without doubt placed in a position of relative dependence by which what is superficially called personal liberty is materially limited. We are most certainly not permitted to teach only at such times and such matters as suits our inclination, at the moment. We are articu-

lated in a social organization and things do not proceed haphazard and without constraint. But the public office, participation in a social organization of vast importance may likewise be considered from an entirely different viewpoint. All social phenomena have a particular two-fold bearing. From the standpoint of the individual they seem to be wholly objective, super-individual and super-personal, power and authority. They impel, they restrain, they command and compel. Such, indeed is the effect of the prescribed laws, the prevailing customs, the religious creeds and forms of worship. But besides this they operate in a quite different fashion. They are not merely *outside* and *above* us. They are likewise *in us*. They enrich our soul, they furnish a contact and a spiritual anchorage which, if left to ourselves, we could never attain. They furnish our intellect, our feelings and will with material, direction and purpose. The kernel of this truth is nevertheless contained in the saying of Christ, as profound as it is plain: "When two or three are together in My name, I am in the midst of them." Wherever a number of persons unite for the purpose of solving a common moral problem there arises among them and above them something of a higher order, something super-personal, which makes the impression upon the individual of being objective, but which nevertheless at the same time penetrates to the depths of his soul, enlarges his own nature and dedicates him to higher realities.

As soon as we contemplate the official character of our vocation from this point of view it immediately assumes an entirely different aspect. By yielding together with our colleagues to the spiritual desire to train the young, by devoting our scientific training, our authority and our personality to the purpose of inspiring and disciplining the intellectual powers of our pupils, of training them in systematic work and the faithful discharge of duty, we are not merely exercising our own personal impulses. Far from it. We are thus discharging a most important and a most significant social service under the inspiration of a higher power. Our efforts are thus lifted up from the sphere of the individual to that of the super-individual. We are devoting ourselves to a matter of great social consequence, and this devotion is, therefore, well calculated to enlarge and to elevate our personality. The whole array and bureaucratic machinery

called into being in the modern state for the purpose of maintaining the secondary school and enabling it to discharge its functions, the school buildings and their equipments, the Director, the Inspector, the Minister's Counsellors, whose business has to do with the management of the secondary school, all of this exists for and serves but the single purpose, namely, that our efforts in the classroom may proceed systematically, under favorable conditions, and thus produce the greatest and best results possible. The central member of the entire organization, the end which all of this is intended to serve is the class exercise, which is to say, we and our pupils. The whole machinery is set in array to the end that the pupils may be instructed and disciplined as well as possible as intensively and as efficiently as possible in the class exercises. If we clearly understand the facts in this way we must agree that the official character of our vocation is far more calculated to elevate the consciousness of the importance and dignity of our profession than to degrade and humiliate us.

There is still another fact to be added. The teacher who is both well educated and an enthusiast in his calling is rarely also an organizer, a man of system. He lives with the young and for the young, knows how to arouse and perhaps to inspire them. He is, however, inclined to place slight value on certain externalities, and easily permits some old customs to become fixed. Put upon his own responsibility and left entirely to his individual resources he might indeed impart instruction very interestingly, but he would also neglect many incidentals and it might easily happen that the reins would thus slip entirely from his hands. But if provision for the systematic arrangement of the course of instruction comes from the authorities outside, if the Director, for example, insists on punctuality in the class periods, that the pupils are on time, that the written exercises be submitted when due and likewise returned, the teacher who is in full sympathy with his calling soon adapts himself to requirements which at first seemed arbitrary and hard to meet, and soon discovers that his school work has not only not been increased and hampered, but relieved and advanced.

With no burdens of conscience on account of arrearages in corrected exercises, disturbed by no gross infringements of

discipline, he is in a position to fully unfold his personal gifts in the class exercise. He can then urge and bestir his pupils to his heart's content and the better he succeeds in this the greater the satisfaction he will find in his calling.

I frankly confess having had just such experiences and I owe it in no small degree to these very experiences, that I have changed and as I believe, come to this higher conception of the official character attaching to our vocation.

That is to say, the secondary teacher who has grasped the full meaning of the social function of the secondary school, will find that there is not only no obstacle and no indignity in the circumstance that we are not only teachers, but officers also, likewise servants of the state, but rather an enlargement and enhancement of his personal dignity. The duty of coordination and subordination arising from our official character, properly understood, proves to be really advantageous to the actual vocational activity. The synthesis of the officer and teacher in us is therefore not only possible, but it implies an enhancement of our importance and of our dignity.

But the realization of this synthesis does not rest alone on the foregoing conception of our official character. The coordination with the whole, indispensable to the official relation, is, in our special case, adapted to elevate and advance us spiritually only as we constantly retain the consciousness that it is our privilege and duty as teachers to preserve our independence. Anyone who has worked out a course of instruction and a method by which he has been able to enlist the interest of his pupils and to impart to them the knowledge and ability required from his subject, must permit no one to interrupt him and is obliged to defend himself against arbitrary interference, against petty and malicious grumbling, if there should be any such. The Austrian Instructions repeatedly emphasize the fact that the experienced teacher whose work has stood the test shall not be hampered in his independence. And it would be moral suicide if we should permit our guaranteed liberty, which it is both our privilege and our duty to preserve, to be reduced and limited in any way whatsoever. When, for example, on Education days, votes are frequently taken which require definite directions and ordinances for each and every detail, all self-respecting men of our profession should oppose it as one man

and enter emphatic protest. Such submissive slave-natures may be of some use as beasts of burden in certain departments of the body politic, as leaders and officers, *as educators and teachers they are ruined once for all*. We should see to it that such persons quit the profession or at least observe a commendable silence in our conventions.

In the actual operation of the schools — let this be said for the consolation of peaceful natures — it happens but rarely that the scientifically efficient and the pedagogically tactful teacher is required to defend his independence and liberty, his right to follow his own method in the classroom, against arbitrary interference. My experience on this point as given above is an incident, thank heaven, that is very exceptional. Personally I have not experienced anything approaching it in the latter two-thirds of my service as teacher. I have been permitted to instruct in my own way without molestation and kindly appreciation has not been entirely wanting. Directors and Inspectors as a rule have far too much to do with the multitudes of unsuitable elements which — especially in times of dearth of teachers — press into our vocation without bringing along with them the necessary intellectual and moral qualification, and they are therefore glad to have a number of efficient teachers who can complaisantly be permitted to pursue their own course. But it still sometimes happens that the government meddles in the filling of important positions. The bureaucratic organization of matters pertaining to education rests upon the principle that correct conduct and the conscientious discharge of controllable duties furnish its guaranty, that actual personal efficiency and inner adaptation to a position of leadership are present. Many a man may of course furnish a high degree of protection or comradeship in a certain position, to whom God must give understanding only after his patrons have secured his office for him. The entrance upon an important position at the same time has a tendency to produce a great stir, especially at the beginning. The functional delight which accompanies the exercises of the office of authority, readily misleads into a vigorous exercise of the one function and making the other very prominent. That is to say, when fresh baked Directors and Inspectors are more than ordinarily severe during the first few months of their incumbency, the experienced teacher consoles

himself with this line from Eschylus (Prom. 35) ἅπας δὲ τραχὺς ὅστις ἀν νέον κρατῆ. "And hard is every one, who to rule has just begun." This soon wears off however and things soon go better. But when tyrannical pedantry and malicious fault-finding is persistently spread abroad, when teachers have reason to feel that they have suffered personal injury and that the freedom of their teaching has been infringed upon, it then becomes their right and duty, on the basis of undoubted and well established facts, to enter their vigorous protest both individually and enmasse. In such cases they will likewise succeed as abundant experience proves.

The discussions which follow will explain these two syntheses in detail and deduce from them the resulting consequences. According to the plan announced above we must first of all discuss the nature and purpose of the secondary school as well as its social function. This will reveal the various problems of the secondary teacher, which we shall then consider more closely in detail. This will furnish the opportunity, as we have already observed, not only to deduct general principles but likewise to offer practical suggestions directly applicable to the actual work of the school.

CHAPTER II

THE CHARACTER AND THE PROBLEM OF THE SECONDARY SCHOOL

I. THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE SECONDARY SCHOOL

IN the passionate controversy, which has been raging during recent decades against the existing organization of the secondary school, particularly the gymnasium, a controversy in which the indignation of the elders found justifiable expression equally with the opinions of reputable men of science,—in this controversy, I say, the real problem was either entirely overlooked or discussed with utter inadequacy. This is the problem: Under the social, economic, political or, very generally stated, under the existing cultural conditions, *what is the problem of the secondary school? What can and shall a school do, that is intended to impart more than an elementary education to our boys and girls, a school which is to enable our youths to understand and solve the profound problems of the age?* I may perhaps be permitted after thirty years of experience as a teacher to attempt a more exact and more thorough answer to this question, on the basis of psychological and sociological principles, than has hitherto been given.

The first and the most important prerequisite for us secondary teachers is a proper insight into the nature, the problem and the aim of the school in which we are engaged. If we shall meet with any success in realizing the two syntheses discussed in the previous chapter, and thus become aware of our individuality, we must first of all understand the goal towards which we wish to lead our pupils in methodical, clearly conscious effort. This insight however cannot be derived from the mere practice of teaching. There are historical and psychological, general pedagogical and sociological considerations which cannot be set aside. In this case theory can and must precede practice in order to indicate the course to be taken. This general, purely theoretical orientation is therefore of spe-

cial importance to the prospective teacher as well as to the beginner in the profession.

The need of more than an elementary education for the more mature young people of the higher classes has made itself felt wherever cultural development has reached a certain degree of complexity. During recent centuries this need has led to the establishment of permanent educational institutions which are founded and maintained by the state or other corporations. To-day every civilized nation has institutions between the public school, which teaches the rudiments of knowledge and skill, and the university which is devoted to the advancement of scientific investigation. Baumeister's Handbook, *The Organization and Administration of Higher Education in the Civilized States of Europe and North America* (Vol. I, Div. 2) contains a summary of this class of organizations existing at present. Notwithstanding the wide variation in the schedule of studies the position of the schools is everywhere the same. They all occupy a position between the public school and the professional school. And in exact terminology therefore they are "Intermediate Schools."

Having a place above the rudiments of the elementary school, and below the special research work of the university, the sphere of the "Intermediate School" (which we shall call The Secondary School) is in the field of general education. We are therefore occupied with the concept of general education which is conceived to be the first and most important educational aim of the secondary school. We must rid it of its indefiniteness, reduce it to its elements and seek to clarify the pedagogic-didactic nature of these elements.

2. THE CONCEPTION OF GENERAL EDUCATION

Historico — Critical Analysis

The term "general education" is not only used as a watchword by the laity and made the basis for progressive reforms, but it is likewise indulged by scientific educators and described as a goal to be realized. This concept has however not yet attained anything like the definiteness and universality of meaning which we must require of a scientific instrument of thought. The reason for this lies first of all in the fact that the concept

of education itself is not precisely defined. By education, as a rule we mean about the same thing as "knowledge" but the original *organic* significance of the term is nevertheless likewise present as a sort of overtone. When we speak of education, we mean not only the possession of certain knowledge, but likewise a complete discipline and formation of man's spiritual powers. We are no doubt thinking more particularly of intellectual discipline, but it likewise involves a certain development of the emotions and a kind of acquired self-discipline of the will. We expect of the educated man, not only a certain degree of information, but likewise characteristic interests and modes of conduct. We shall see farther on that this organic significance of the term education is of profound importance for our investigation.

But the indefiniteness of our concept becomes still greater and more intolerable because the adjective "general" in our combination, is taken in very different senses, mostly without being consciously aware of it. If we wish to have a usable concept of general education we must try to clear up this diversity. It appears to me therefore that as a matter of fact there are three entirely distinct modes of using the term, the constant blending of which is responsible for the confusion.

The term general refers first of all to the subject matter of education or of knowledge and signifies the same as "something of everything." This is general education in the *encyclopedic sense*. But general education can likewise mean something entirely different, if the adjective general refers not to the *object*, but to the *subject* of education, that is, not to the facts, but the men to be educated. In that case general education means the same as the harmonious development of all man's spiritual powers. It was in this sense that the *neo-humanism*, elaborated by Herder and William von Humboldt, understood the term. I shall call this the *biologico-psychological* conception, because it refers the term general to the vital powers of the human organism.

In addition to these two meanings of the term "general" there is still another interpretation which has hitherto been almost entirely ignored, which has been brought to our attention through the new science of *Sociology*. Here the term

“general” means what society demands of all who wish to participate in its life. From this point of view general education implies the sum total of social requirements. We shall call this mode of interpretation the *sociological*.

We shall now have to examine into the process of the formation of our concept under these three modes of the interpretation of the adjective “general.” We shall begin with the last mentioned, with the sociological mode of interpretation, because, in my judgment, it is the most original and primary even though we have been unaware of it. The encyclopedic conception of general education has evolved from sociological requirements, as I shall hope to show, and the biologicico-psychologic conception has in turn evolved from the encyclopedic. It will then be possible on the basis of this historico-critical analysis, undertaken in the sense indicated from the elements of these various concepts which are still active, to reach an interpretation of general education corresponding to the needs of the present time.

A. GENERAL EDUCATION IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL SENSE

Wherever, under civilized conditions, an active mental and social life is evolved there results an educated social class. This class imposes certain requirements upon every individual who wishes to become a member of the group, participate in the life of the community and receive recognition in it. These requirements are, as a matter of course, nowhere precisely formulated, but still sufficiently well understood by all that they govern their own conduct, and especially the matters pertaining to the education and instruction of their children, according to it. We desire certain facts and accomplishments, we presuppose an interest in certain definite things, we insist upon a specific kind of individual and social forms. The sum-total of these social requirements constitute general education in the sociological sense. The content of these requirements naturally varies in the different periods of civilization. It is one thing in the Athens of fifth and fourth centuries B. C. and quite different in Rome during the period of the empire. Here, e.g., the knowledge of a foreign language, that of the Greeks, enters into the content of general education. During the period of

humanism and the renaissance both the ancient languages and an appreciation of plastic art are the most essential requirements. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries mathematical, scientific and especially philosophical problems constitute the subject matter of conversation in the French Salons. In the latter half of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century general education again assumes a more aesthetic cast. In the first half of the nineteenth century the historical came strongly to the front in Germany, whilst in the second half science and technique gradually began to be elements of general education.

The one element which is relatively the most constant is the requirement of a correct and acceptable use of the mother tongue and an acquaintance with the chief works of polite literature.

Such a sociological conception of general education has existed for more than two thousand years. In proof of this assertion permit me to submit a passage from the "Protagoras" of Plato, which likewise seems to me in other ways to illustrate this sociological phase of our concept very clearly. The passage is found in the third chapter of the dialogue (p. 312 b). A brief recapitulation of what precedes it is necessary to an understanding of the passage. The studious, enthusiastic young aristocrat, Hippocrates, comes to Socrates very early in the morning and invites him to visit the renowned Sophist Protagoras who is now staying in Athens, that he might gain some information from him. Socrates asks him what it is that he would like to learn from Protagoras, and explains the meaning of his question by two examples. "Let us assume," he remarks, "that you wished to apply to your cousin of the name, the renowned physician of Coos for instruction, what would be your purpose?" Hippocrates answers, "I would do this in case I wished to become a physician." "And if you should go to Phidias or to Polycleitus?" "Then I should wish to become a sculptor." "What then is the vocation of Protagoras?" Socrates further inquires. "They call him one of the sophists." "But would you not hesitate to acknowledge to all Greece that you wish to become a sophist?" "I frankly confess, yes, if I am to speak truly, what I think." To this Socrates remarks — and now comes the important passage (see vol. I, p. 112) to which we refer — as follows: "Perhaps you do not regard

Protagoras' instruction in this light (as in the two examples given), but perhaps after the manner of the instruction of the grammarian, the musician and of the trainer. The learning acquired from these was not intended as professional *learning* with a view to preparing you for some definite profession, but only as a part of general education, and because a gentleman and a freeman ought to know them?"

The passage is interesting first of all as a bit of the history of civilization, because we here discover for the first time the conception of general education. But it is likewise materially significant because the simplicity and impartiality peculiar to the Greek mind bring it to pass that the most important elements of our concept are here presented with extraordinary clearness and force. The language "*because a gentleman and a freeman ought to know them*" clearly implies that general education is a social requirement. Furthermore general education is here very definitely distinguished from specialized and vocational education. But the content of the social requirements, if we subject the passage to a little analysis, offers important and valuable suggestions, and thus indicates again that the German neo-humanism was still not so far in the wrong when it insisted that the intensive study of Greek thought is of the highest value for modern education.

Let us examine the content of these requirements more closely. The pupils did not simply learn to read and write from the grammarian; they likewise became acquainted with the poetry of the fatherland and memorized many passages from Homer and Hesiod, and later also from Pindar and the tragedians. We thus observe that the correct use of the mother tongue and acquaintance with the chief works in its literature belong to the oldest and most fundamental elements of general education. If we in Germany still insist with perfect right on the intensive study of the German language and literature in the intermediate school, we are simply returning to the principle which to the Greeks was self-evident. The progress of civilization has revealed the fact that for many centuries foreign languages and literatures constituted a more important part of general education, but these same Greeks can teach us that the most elementary requirement involves the cultivation of the native tongue. The musician arouses the soul and imparts aesthetic education,

which is at present very properly coming into the foreground again. And finally the fact that in Greece the trainer dared not be wanting is a most emphatic witness to the importance of physical development. The modern period is even in this respect reverting to what the Greeks could and should have taught us long since.

Hence if we follow the evolution of the sociological moment, so clearly evinced in the passage quoted, we will discover important phases of our concept which would otherwise have escaped us. From this point of view general education appears as a social requirement. The acquirement of knowledge and of education which we are disposed to regard as a matter to be left to the choice and caprice of the individual thus assumes the imperative aspect characteristic of all social requirements and hence a *social duty*. This duty demands that the individual meet the requirements imposed by society to the limit of his ability. But it at the same time holds society responsible for giving the individual a chance to discharge this duty. Inasmuch therefore as the social evolution constantly tends to make the *state* the commander of society, the state finds itself under the necessity not only to make possible the establishment of the schools involved in the requirements of general education, but likewise to use its full authority in enforcing their establishment. The principle of compulsory school attendance which has in recent times become a law in almost every civilized nation is a result of this development, to the gradual realization of which the most varied social, economic, political and military factors have contributed.

Hitherto the principle of general compulsory school attendance has been limited to the elementary subjects and accomplishments taught in the public schools, but almost everywhere the state has likewise taken the higher general education of certain classes of the social body in hand, and thus recognized its imperative character. Historical evolution furthermore reveals the fact that the social class on which society imposes the intellectual requirements, described by the term general education, has constantly been increasing. We see particularly at the present time that the economically weaker portion of the population, the laboring class, is constantly striving for higher education. To meet these needs, the various nations have begun to

extend the privileges of the advanced school, and the organizations for popular education arising therefrom constitute the palpable justification for this extension. It follows from this, that the higher general education is increasingly felt as a social duty, and that the need of discharging this duty is constantly spreading.

To us intermediate teachers this first result of the sociological interpretation of our concept is very significant. If we are imparting general education to our pupils, we are not simply training them intellectually and esthetically, but likewise ethically. And this at once gives our efforts an essentially spiritual aspect and a profounder meaning. We are helping our pupils to realize one of their most important social obligations, and our own position in the social organism thus becomes vastly more significant.

The content of the requirements which society imposes on the individual in this respect not only varies with the different epochs of culture, but it likewise varies in the same period in different classes of society. But notwithstanding this the sociological mode of interpretation is not wholly useless for the content of general education. We observe first of all that certain requirements show a constant tendency to recur, and thus become constant elements of general education. This is especially true of the linguistic and aesthetic elements of education. A knowledge of language and its elements, the correct and generally chaste use of the same in conversation together with acquaintance with masterpieces of literature have been the criteria of education for more than two thousand years. Among the Greeks, as a matter of course, it was the mastery of the native tongue that was regarded essential; among the Romans, the Greek in addition to their own language; during the middle ages, and the humanistic period, a knowledge of the Latin was regarded as the indispensable requirement. In the modern period even to the present time there has been almost a universal return to the native tongue, that the clearest distinction between the educated and the uneducated is still correct and choice mode of speech. We may say therefore that linguistic education, and at present especially the mother tongue undoubtedly belongs to the social requirements which we regard as the elements of general education and which must be treated accordingly in our

educational institutions. The extent to which foreign languages come under this classification cannot be shown directly by the sociological mode of interpretation. The social requirements in this respect have been too varied, as Zielinski observes, to evolve a principle favorable to the ancient languages.

In addition to the linguistic and aesthetic education there soon arises a desire for a knowledge of things. There is an evident tendency to foster all forms of knowledge worth knowing, i.e., to offer them. The speech of the linguistically educated man will be rich in proportion to his knowledge of facts and things. The orator, the lawyer, the historian, the philosopher, above all the generally educated man is expected to know a little of everything. Society is naturally less concerned about the thoroughness than about breadth of information, and the possession and command of useful knowledge. Just as soon therefore, as the sociological requirement extends beyond linguistic and aesthetic education to knowledge about things, it produces a new conception of general education. The imperative moment naturally persists, but the object of the requirement assumes a more concrete, and definite form. Every educated man is expected to know a little of everything, and thus the encyclopedic character of general education is evolved, to the discussion of which we now proceed.

B. THE ENCYCLOPEDIC THEORY

The name, and the idea of encyclopedic education arose in antiquity. A course of study for the education of the young which came into general use seems to have been evolved in Athens, and in other parts of Greece as well about the fourth century B. C. Thus Plutarch, e.g., in his life of Alexander the Great, relates the fact that King Philipp refused to limit his son's training to music and the customary education τὰ ἐγκύκλια παιδεύματα of the time, but that he wished to furnish him with a discipline suited to his individuality, and hence called Aristotle to the position of tutor to his son. (Pub. Alex. C. 7.) Aristotle also uses the word ἐγκύκλια repeatedly in the sense of customary, general practice, and in reference to spiritual things as well. It is in this sense that he speaks of ἐγκύκλια φιλοσοφήματα meaning philosophical doctrines which have been widely dis-

seminated and found general acceptance. During the hellenistic period the subjects which had been generally introduced in the education of the young were organized into a system and called *ἐγκύκλια παιδέυματα*, *ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία* which later gave rise to the compound word *ἐγκυκλοπαιδεία* (Encyclopedia). Here it is clearly evident that the word stands for a definite list of the sciences which comprehend everything worth knowing.¹

But this encyclopedic education was still for a long time regarded as the prerogative of the freeman. It is an adornment of the mind and not intended to serve any practical end. The "Arts" of which it consists are called the "liberal arts." They are also regarded as a kind of preparatory training which is intended to precede the strictly scientific, i.e., the philosophic, education as well as actual vocational education.

But it loses this character in later antiquity and the middle ages. The content of encyclopedic education becomes fixed. It consists of the seven liberal arts, classified as elementary and scientific. The elementary division is called Trivium and embraces Grammar, Dialectics, and Rhetoric; the more advanced division is called the Quadrivium and consists of Arithmetic, Geometry, Music and Astronomy.

We discover attempts at organizing the sum total of encyclopedic knowledge into a series of text books for the use of the schools even among the Romans. Varro, the contemporary of Cicero, wrote his *disciplinarum libri novem*, containing the encyclopedic education of his age, with this end in view. He adds medicine and architecture to the seven liberal arts. Celsus and Appuleius wrote similar compendiums, and St. Augustine made plans for the production of a great encyclopedia, only a few parts of which however came to completion. Marcian Capella's (about 425 A. D.) text book, bearing the title *Satiricon libri IX*, was in use throughout the entire middle age period. (Cf. Willman, *Didaktik*, 4 Ed. p. 128.) During the middle

¹ Vitruvius describes this encyclopedic conception of education very clearly as follows: "It may well be that the inexperienced are astonished at the fact that the human mind is capable of mastering such a large number of sciences and retain them in memory. But if they have observed that all these branches are vitally related and connected, this possibility will be more readily understood. For encyclopedic education is analogous to a body which comprises these members."

ages the system based on the seven liberal arts attained a sort of canonical authority. The number seven is frequently described as the symbol of perfection, the arts and their system graphically illustrated and arranged in mnemonic verses. Willman, to whom we are indebted for these data, observes: "The ancient title, 'artes liberales' is retained but its relation to the education of free citizens is lost." Following the method of Cassiodorus, liberalis is derived from liber, book, and the artes are therefore construed as book sciences. (*Didaktik* 4 173 f.) Of the seven liberal arts the first three comprised under the name Trivium are by far the most important. Everyone who is to correctly understand and expound the Holy Scriptures and the Church Fathers, as well as those whose duty require them to produce the evidences for the truth of the doctrine of the church in the numerous Disputations, had to be disciplined in Grammar, Dialectic and Rhetoric. But many of the compendiums of the middle ages likewise include the real sciences, not even only those of the Quadrivium. The lack of books made such encyclopedias exceedingly valuable, and, in the state of the sciences at that period, they were possible and practical.

During the period of humanism and the renaissance the encyclopedic character of education at first fell into the background. The Roman orators and poets were read and studied with a view to acquiring the ability of Latin oratory and versification. An opposition to the Aristotelian scholastic logic likewise arose and it was thought the art of persuasion and proof could be acquired and taught better from Cicero. But this did not last long. The improvement in economic conditions and the increasing significance of citizenship together with many other circumstances gave rise to a constantly growing desire for a fuller practical education of the young. The attempt was therefore made to impart a large amount of practical information, for the most part poorly arranged, by means of the instruction in Latin which was still regarded as an indispensable requisite for the educated man. The "Orbis Pictus" and the "Janua linguarum reserata" of Amos Comenius are in fact nothing more than little encyclopedias designed to furnish youth with the matters of greatest consequence about the world and life. The famous polyhistorian, Daniel George Morhoff, even undertook to give a kind of encyclopedia or polymathy, as it was called, a

philosophical and psychological basis by directing attention to the organic relation and unity of science, as well as to a vital impulse in human nature (*α ὁρμή προς πάντα μαθήματα*), which inspires everyone with a desire for all human knowledge. (Cf. Heubaum, *History of German Education*, I, p. 28.)

After the middle of the seventeenth century the increasing differentiation of vocation and the rise of an aristocratic state in Germany emphasized the need of different preparation for the different classes and vocations. Heubaum has shown this very clearly in the work just cited. Academies for the nobility and, in addition to the Latin schools still maintained in the cities, schools for the poor and the peasant class of the rural districts were founded. The element of utility in education received greater stress than previously, without however losing its encyclopedic character.

And as a matter of fact the neohumanisms for which Shaftsbury, Rollin Gesner, Ernesti and Heyne prepared the way and which was reduced to a working system by Herder, Fr. Aug. Wolf and William von Humboldt, the educational ideal of which we shall presently discuss, did not completely break with the encyclopedic education. Ernesti, the philologist, published his *Initia doctrinae solidioris* in the year 1755, a distinctively encyclopedic textbook which was used in the Gymnasia for a long time. Even though the ancient languages constituted the predominant part of the German gymnasial curriculum until in the seventies of the nineteenth century, so many other subjects were nevertheless gradually introduced that their educational system again assumed an encyclopedic character. At present this is far more the case in the various kinds of higher schools. The discussions of school reform, which have been vigorously indulged in recent years, contain frequent mention of new subjects which should find a place in the intermediate school, on the ground that they belong to a general education.

But on the other hand we must not forget that, owing to the unprecedented increase of knowledge, especially as produced during the nineteenth century, an actually encyclopedic education is becoming more and more impossible. At present even the scholar, speaking generally, can thoroughly master but a single division of his subject and every attempt at comprehending the whole field of knowledge must now be pronounced a

failure from the start. We must therefore say frankly and unequivocally once for all: *General education in the encyclopedic sense is an utter impossibility and the proposition of making such a conception the aim of the intermediate school is an absurdity which must be set aside.* The much quoted saying of Heraclitus is especially pertinent at this point: "Polymathy does not discipline the mind." (*πολυμαθίη νόον οὐ διδάσκει.*) Every effort to formulate our course of study according to the encyclopedic idea must of necessity lead to an intolerable overburdening of the course and at the same time to a reckless superficiality.

But since the encyclopedic conception of general education has persisted with great tenacity for more than two thousand years notwithstanding these facts, and the fact that the desire to know everything which man has ever known is still indulged by many men would seem to indicate that this conception must rest upon some deeper basis still. There seems to be something in the nature of man that impels him with a desire to experience everything which the human race has ever experienced. Goethe has given an intimation of what this is in Faust, a sort of revelation of concentrated man:

"And all that has been vouchsafed to all mankind,
I would in mine inmost self enjoy,
In my own mind conceive the heights and depths,
Collect its weal and woe within my bosom
And thus expand my own self to comprehend the All."

A human being is not merely a microcosm, a world in miniature, he is likewise a miniature copy of the human race. Each one of us bears the impress of the milleniums of spiritual struggle in the form of spiritual precipitates. Everyone feels a vital relationship with everything which man has ever thought, felt or desired and has an impulse to know and to repeat in his own experience all these things. The force of this experience is most fully and clearly felt by the more richly endowed, but each one of us wishes, at least unconsciously, that nothing human shall remain unknown to him.

Our ego is a unity, perhaps indeed the primary image of all unities, the correlate of which we presume to discover or seek to produce in things and in the universe. But our ego is not an element, it is not an atom. It is rather the psychical expres-

sion of our centralized organization capable of producing an infinite variety of functions. These functions tend to become active and it may well be that the functional impulses thus evolved are the ultimate and primary source of the yearning for general education. This yearning however is not merely concerned with the multiplicity of facts, but, consistently with the nature of our ego, the unity in the multiplicity. It is in this sense that Morhof seems to have construed encyclopedic education as a unity of all the sciences. We find the same idea more profoundly elaborated by Fichte in his "Proposed Plan for the Founding of a Higher Institution of Learning at Berlin." He here insists that every professor should first of all publish an encyclopedia of the matter within his department and that the several encyclopedias be arranged as one uniform philosophical encyclopedia. "For the several encyclopedias of the different departments, elaborated to the greatest attainable clearness, are first of all constituent members of the general encyclopedia of philosophy. This is especially true if both the teachers and the pupils are acquainted with all of them. They will likewise serve as a great stimulus to the former and render the latter comprehensible, once it is established, because they will also receive renewed authentication and clearness from it. Hence it follows that unity and the interpretation of reality from a single viewpoint constitutes the very nature of the philosophy and of the technique for which we are striving. Unrelated multiplicity and singularity without any coordination whatsoever on the other hand is unphilosophical, confused and awkward. This we should like to banish entirely from the earth." (Fichte, Werke VIII, 127 f.; Spranger, 31 f.)

Hegel's *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* is also a kind of compendium of knowledge which is intended to form a unity by means of a uniform dialectical method of developing the concepts. But all these efforts to reduce encyclopedia to objective unity go to pieces in the constantly increasing, practically immeasurable wealth of knowledge and the increasing differentiation in the methods of investigation.

Man's undoubted native desire for universal knowledge can never be satisfied with a mere accumulation of facts. It is possible, as a matter of course, to introduce him objectively to a vast amount and well arranged material, but this will not

inspire his spiritual powers to fruitful exercise and bring them into unitary consistency. Our educational concept must therefore not be sought in things but in the man who is to be educated. The path leads from within outward and not from without inward. Our classical poets and thinkers, particularly *Herder*, *Goethe*, *Schiller* and *William von Humboldt*, have elaborated an ideal of education for us in harmony with this principle of orientation. We have thus arrived at the third conception of general education suggested above which will probably also be the most important for our constructive synthesis.

C. THE BIOLOGICO-PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF GENERAL EDUCATION

Here the term "general" receives an entirely different meaning. It no longer means what society requires, and still less does it correspond to "something of everything." "General" is here wholly restricted to the spiritual nature of man. The whole of man's nature is to be taken into account, not merely a single phase, the understanding for example. All the latent powers of man shall rather be quickened and developed. The whole man is to be so trained and "educated" as to produce an enriched and well-balanced personality, with an appreciative capacity for everything which transpires in the realm of heart and mind. But the new aspect of the concept "education" is even more important than this change in the meaning of the term "general." Drill and training with a view to external ends no longer constitute the essence of education. It is not a matter of forcefully filling the soul by the process of a dead cramming of the memory. Education means organic development and a growth from within. This new concept of education may indeed be said to have sprung from *the spirit of the German language*, to have been formulated by the most cultured minds of the German nation for the German people for the salvation of all mankind. If we read in the much-quoted work of Paulsen or still better in his article on "Education" in *Rein's Encyclopedia* (I, 414 ff.) what changes of the educational ideal, what profound culture movement was produced by this spiritualized organic conception of education in the latter half of the eighteenth and at the beginning of the nineteenth century,

we will see that a permanent step of progress in the evolution of the human race is here prepared.

The stimulus to this reconstruction however came from France. In his "Emile" Rousseau had issued the call to return to nature and pleaded with a fiery enthusiasm for an education according to nature. But the thing for which Rousseau appealed with passionate persuasiveness was first cast into permanent form and developed to a living fact in Germany. Pestalozzi, the Philanthropists and Herbart made education from within the fundamental principle of elementary education and thus created the modern public school. By theory and practice these men laid the foundation of a public school pedagogy which has developed wonderfully and beneficently during the course of the nineteenth century. The principle indeed in the course of time became a sort of a dead letter of routine method, but the majority of the public school teachers of Germany and Austria are nevertheless more secure in their method and more definite in their aim because of their possession of a method of instruction than the teachers of the intermediate schools. And they are likewise more open to progressive didactic stimuli, as is evident from the interest in the experimental didactics in the public schools inaugurated by Lay and Meumann.

The educational theory elaborated by the German neohumanists dominates the higher schools and thus the entire culture movement among the intellectual leaders of the German people. The new ideal of education and the whole movement have often been described. Thus especially by Paulsen in the passages referred to above and likewise in Ziegler's *History of Pedagogy*, 3d edition, p. 266 ff. After calling attention to these treatises I will simply indicate the essential features and call special attention to several factors which seem to me to have been somewhat neglected hitherto.

Neohumanism is not based alone on the new evolution of ancient art and poetry, anticipated by Shaftesbury and Rollin, philologically established by Gesner, Ernesti and Heyne and inaugurated especially by Winckelmann and Lessing, but likewise on a profounder psychological insight into the nature and function of the human mind. This is clearly apparent in John G. Herder, the man who was the first to grasp the new ideal

of education in its full breadth and depth, and made the largest contributions to its formulation and dissemination. Herder is preeminently a psychologist, and a psychologist moreover whose importance for this science has not even yet been appreciated fully. According to Herder the human organism is a unity in which the physical and the psychical vitally interpenetrate in mutual interaction. For him life is spirit and spirit is life. In this respect he is closely related to our modern biologists, the so-called psycho-vitalists. He regards Leibnitz's theory of preestablished harmony, which has no room for the idea of interpenetration but simply a parallelism of the physical and the psychical, as utterly incomprehensible. ("Concerning Knowledge and Experience," *Works*, Ed. 1853, Vol. 31, 12 ff.)¹ "According to my limited observation it is impossible to speak of psychology which is not at every step definite physiology. Haller's physiology elevated to the rank of psychology and endowed with mind like Pygmalion's statue,—then we will be in position to speak of thought and knowledge." (Op. cit., p. 17.) Besides this Herder's psychology is not in the least intellectualistic—in which he is also quite modern. According to him the nature of man consists far more in the quality and intensity of his feeling and will. "The inwardness, depth and extent with which we receive, elaborate and propagate emotional impressions is what makes us either the profound or shallow natures which we are. Causes are frequently located below the diaphragm which we erroneously and laboriously seek to find in the head. Hence the idea can never arise without the previous experience in its natural place. The extent of our participation in the things of our environment, the depth with which love and hate, disgust and aversion, indignation and delight, find root in us, it is this that attunes the melody of our thoughts, that makes us the men we are." (Op. cit., p. 16.)

It is this organic theory of spiritual life, and especially the correct understanding of the significance of feeling and will which made Herder the author of the Storm and Stress period, which are likewise fundamental, determining principles in Herder's theory and ideal of education. He knew both as a psycholo-

¹ My references are to the Cotta Edition of 1853. The School Addresses are referred to in the Suphan Edition, vol. 30.

gist and an educator of wide experience that the child mind is predisposed to the exercise of its powers. "Why has the creator endowed youth, the male youth on the one hand with such vivacity, such a restless spirit, such a disposition to rivalry, and their sisters with an irrepressible curiosity? It can be for no other purpose than that humanity should be exercised, trained in all its powers.¹ This involves the movement of the eyes, feet, hands, tongue, lips, expression of the countenance in our richly endowed, exquisite organism."—"Our bodies are adapted to exercise by their very construction, our spiritual powers are characterized by these childhood predispositions and no others. There is nothing so detestable to a healthy child or boy, one that is trained, trained to happiness, to joyous youth as indolent inactivity: an inactive life is death to him; lively, and even severe exercise brings joy and health." (W. Suphan 30, 253 f.) The predisposition to the exercise of every power is present therefore and it is the business of education to bring these powers to complete development by exercise. Teaching must therefore never be a process of hammering, of mere drill, it must rather inspire the pupil's self-activity. "No teacher can give, or pour into me *his* thoughts; he can, should and must awaken *my* thoughts by means of ideas, so that they are *my* thoughts and not *his*." (Op. cit., p. 268.)

But it is not merely the intellect and the understanding that require this kind of discipline. Feeling and will likewise require development and exercise. "Any one whose constant industry at school has made dull, who studies to the point of mental weakness, hypochondria, depletion and ill health, who trains the spiritual to the neglect of the body, as if he were a pure and foolish mind, who cultivates one mental power, the imagination or the memory for example, without regard for the others, as understanding and reflection, who studies for the head without regard for the heart, or on the contrary, who is everlastingly absorbed in sensation without elaborating correct concepts with cold-blooded courage, who toys with everything and avoids serious, persistent effort as he does the bottomless pit, all these learn nothing for life; for life requires the whole undivided man, the healthy man with all his powers and members, he

¹ Which is beyond me.

must apply himself with head and heart, with thought, volition and deed, not only in play but likewise in the most serious affairs of life, not only agreeably but vigorously. Any one who is unable to do this, who has failed to train himself for this early in life, has acquired nothing for life." (Op. cit., 272.) I shall quote one more passage from the same address which discusses the subject "Non scholae sed vitae discendum." "Finally since life not only uses facts and ideas, but likewise volitions, and deeds, and it is in these above all that life consists, and the proverb "learn life rather than the school" directs itself especially to the training of the heart and of character. What avails it to possess a thousand facts and no will, no taste, no desire or impulse to live, honestly and really to live. We live in the will, the heart must condemn or comfort, encourage or defeat, reward or punish us; the efficiency and value, the good or ill fortune of life is not based on facts alone, but on character and impulse, on what dwells in the human breast." (273) Herder's pedagogical maxim may be briefly formulated somewhat as follows: The whole man is to be fully trained in each individual so that each may become complete. Herder invented the phrase, *Education to humanity*, to express this pedagogical aim. He elaborates and praises this ideal psychologically and pedagogically, historically and philosophically with untiring effort. In one of the "Letters for the Advancement of Humanity" (No. 24, vol. 35, p. 114) he makes a defence of the word against a weak germinization and continues: "Let us therefore hold fast to the word *humanity* with which the best authors both ancient and modern have associated such noble ideas. Humanity constitutes the *character of our race*; but it is innate only in rudimentary form and it must really be acquired through education. We do not bring it with us into the world as a finished product; in the world, however, it is intended to be the goal of all our effort, the sum total of our activities, our *worth*, for we know nothing of the angelic in man, and if the Daemon which governs our conduct is not a human Daemon we are a plague to mankind. The divine in our race is therefore the *education to humanity*. All great and good men, statesmen, inventors, philosophers, poets, artists every noble soul in his particular sphere, has contributed to this end in the bringing up of his children, in the discharge

of his duties, by example, deed, institution and doctrine. Humanity consists of the treasure store and profit of every human relationship, in short *the art of our race*. Education to this end is a task which must be incessantly fostered, lest we revert, both high and low, to a state of crude animality, to brutality."

It is Herder's profound conviction to which he gives frequent expression that this humanity is likewise the goal and meaning of human history. He undertook to elaborate this thought in his *Ideas* and thus lay the foundation for a philosophy of history. In book four of the *Ideas* we read: "I have indulged the wish that I might comprehend everything which I have hitherto said concerning the education of man to rationality and freedom, to his speculations and impulses, to the most delicate and the most rugged health, to the replenishing and subduing of the earth, in the word humanity. For man has no better word with which to describe his own nature than what he himself is, in whom the image of the creator of the world is imprinted, in a way in which it may here become visible." The idea that humanity is the conscious or unconscious ideal of social evolution appears more clearly in book fifteen. The title of the first chapter of this book is: "Humanity is the Destiny of the Human Race, and with this Destiny God has placed the Fate of our Race in its own Hands." At the very beginning we read: "It is with a view to this manifest destiny, as we have seen, that our nature is organized, our finer sensibilities and instincts, our reason and freedom, our delicate and abiding health, our language, art and religion are directed towards it. In every situation and in every community it has been utterly impossible for man to have any other thought, to strive for any other goal than humanity, and in the way in which he conceived it. The arrangements of nature in the race and our respective ages are adapted to this end, the period of childhood lasts longer and acquires a kind of humanity only through the help of education. All the various modes of human life throughout the earth have been instituted, all varieties of social organization have been founded to this end." Throughout all history whatsoever of good has ever been done has been done for the sake of humanity; whatsoever of folly, viciousness and atrocities have come into vogue were perpetrated against humanity, so that it is impossible for man to conceive

of any other purpose in all his earthly contrivances than those which he finds within himself, i.e., imbedded in the weakness and strength, the lowliness and nobility of the nature in which God created him. If therefore we know everything throughout the whole universe only by what it is and by the effects it produces, the purpose of the human race on earth likewise receives its clearest demonstration in its nature and history." (29, 216 f.)

Humanity is therefore the ideal of history and education to humanity the duty of man. As yet this goal has nowhere been attained, but the nearest approach to the ideal — is not in the period in which Herder lived, but in the culture of the Greeks in their best days. Herder as a matter of course also construes Greek civilization entirely from the historical point of view and likewise on this account deserves more consideration at the present time. Even among the Greeks everything is conditioned by place, time and circumstance which accounts for the fact that the spirit of the Greeks cannot be repeated. "The thought of any one inventing, of singing an Iliad now, of any one writing like Eschylus, Sophocles, Plato; is impossible. The childlike simplicity, the unconstrained mode of thinking about the world, in short the period of Greek childhood is past." (29, 245) But we can nevertheless learn from the Greeks how to exercise and develop our powers so as to adapt them to the problems of our own age. In his youth Herder was an enthusiastic admirer of the Greeks and he remained such until the time of his death. In the *Fragments* he praises the Greek poets in glowing terms: "Yea verily, the Greeks with their fine poetic sense are worthy of emulation; they, whose splendid ideal furnishes us a reflection of nature, like the sun is mirrored in the sparkling brook; whose poetic design was described by the goddess Eunomia and embellished her daughters, the heavenly graces, whose images are veiled in the glory of the rising sun, whose mouth speaks melodies — they are worthy of emulation." (18, 218) There are even passages in the thirteenth book of the *Ideas*, which is devoted exclusively to the Greeks, treating of their historical development and significance, in which the Greeks are described as typical, as our everlasting teachers. "The young people must learn to read the Greeks because the aged rarely see them and are rarely inclined to appropriate their

flowers.”—“ We have still much to learn in their forms of expression, the beautiful proportion and sweep of their ideas, the nature-inspired intensity of their sensations, and finally in the sonorous rhythm of their language, which has never found its equal anywhere.” “ In point of popular enlightenment we are indebted to solitary Athens for all that is the greatest and most beautiful of all the ages.” Herder begins his *General Observations on the History of Greece* with the following words: “ We have contemplated the history of this remarkable zone from several points of view, because in the philosophy of history it in a sense is a unique datum among all the nations of the earth. The Greeks are not only free from the admixture of foreign nations and maintained their identity in their whole education; but they have likewise lived through their periods so fully and traversed the whole course, from the smallest beginnings of education, so completely as no other nation of history has done.” “ They speak to us with a philosophical spirit, the humanity of which I seek in vain to put into my essay concerning them.”

But Herder has given the best characterization of the Greek spirit in its pure manliness and in its pedagogic value in his *Nemesis, a Suggestive Allegory*, a work that has been somewhat neglected by the expounders of the Herder literature. Herder here discusses the distinctively Greek conception of Nemesis on the basis of artistic representations and poetic references with which the Greeks have incorporated their refined sense of Justice which curbs and avenges superciliousness in good fortune. In the conclusion of this brief but richly suggestive essay he observes: “ Moreover I doubt whether any nation has ever described the poco piu and poco meno of human sociation, i.e., the fine outline of the form and art of life, so clearly and so beautifully as the Greeks were able to do. To them the Muses gave that intuitive appreciation of every form in sculpture and poetic art, that unexaggerated and unexaggerating sense of the true and the beautiful of every kind, which could not even be disguised in philosophy and gave their shortest pedagogic maxims, their slightest symbols such a well defined outline, such an impressive grace, as we seek in vain among any other people. Their horizon is of course limited; it extends but a little beyond the present life which to them constituted the main object of existence. But from this point of view, how

wonderfully clear was their vision, how humanely they appreciated every form! How beautifully they clothed the language of their statuary and literature! No nation has equalled them in this respect, to say nothing of surpassing them, so that it must be regarded a distinct loss to humanity when their philosophy and symbolism, their poetry and language was driven from the earth and banished from the sight of youth. I can see no substitute for them." And finally permit me to refer to one more passage bearing on this point in the school addresses. In his funeral oration on director Heinze, Herder eulogizes the departed "as the broad-minded, sweet-tempered philosophic spirit, such as could be nurtured and inspired only by a study of the ancients," and in his address on "The Correct Conception of the Fine Arts" he says: "These ancient progenitors of the discipline of the human mind therefore stand before us as the eternal types of correct, good and cultured taste and the most beautiful finish in the use of language. We must form our mode of thought and writing after theirs, and if we would be useful to mankind, we must construct our reason and language after their pattern."

Herder's idea and purpose is therefore clear. Humanity is the ideal of mankind and all education must be based upon it. The education of all the spiritual powers from within in order that they may evolve a complete, harmonious personality. And the study of the ancients, especially the Greeks, is an approved and certain means to this end. It is not intended however that we imitate the Greeks, but rather be filled with their spirit in order thereby to quicken our own. Herder is really insisting on the same thing as the most enthusiastic among modern advocates of antiquity, Th. Zielinski, in his excellent book: *The Ancients and We* cast into the phrase, "Not norm, but seed." We are to contemplate the artistic products of the Greeks so as to comprehend from them the nature and beauty of the human form. We are to study their poets and philosophers to quicken the powers within us which bring to perfection the desire and the capacity to be men and nothing but men.

It is in the same spirit that Goethe, Schiller and William von Humboldt would bring a new Greece to birth in which everything noble and aspiring in man should be fostered, developed and recognized. Complete personality is the goal, ab-

sorption in the Greek spirit is the way. Schiller emphasizes above all else the æsthetic education of man. According to him it is play and the art which results therefrom that develops manhood in man; that distinguishes him from animals and the Deity. He regards the Greek ideas of the gods the prototypes of the æsthetically happy man, whom the pure joy of art is capable of refining to true spiritual freedom. Goethe's ingenious versatility, his exceptionally rich and creative personality, his profound interest in natural science, his method of thoroughly mastering everything he undertook and making it a part of himself, permits him to see in the Greeks not only the æsthetic, but rather the organic, the things in their nature which bear on life. "Man may accomplish much," observes Goethe, "by an intelligent use of individual powers, he may accomplish the extraordinary by a combination of several talents, but he produces the unique and wholly unexpected only by uniformly uniting within himself all the human attributes. The last was the lot of the ancients, especially *the Greeks in their palmiest days.*" In Greek sculpture and poetry he especially prizes the "immediate intuition of the objective and the subjective world." "It's clearness of conception, serenity of appropriation, ease of communication that enchants us, and when we say therefore that we find all of these in the genuine Greek works, and indeed accomplished in connection with the sublimest subject matter, the most noteworthy content, together with accurate and complete elaboration, it will be understood why we make this our starting-point and in the end always return thither again. *Everyone is a Greek in his own way, but let him be one in fact.*"

Neohumanism, which means, as we now are aware, aiming at complete and pure personality through absorption in the Greek spirit, is most fully developed and most thoroughly systematized by William von Humboldt. William von Humboldt construed the idea of humanity so as to comprehend a theory of the universe and of life, so as to involve a philosophy of humanity. Edward Spranger has brought out this fact both impressively and instructively in his book on *William v. Humboldt and the Idea of Humanity.*" (Berlin, 1909.) His *William v. Humboldt and Educational Reform* furnishes a splendid supplement. Inasmuch as I refer the reader, who cares to

make a deeper study of William v. Humboldt, to these works, I shall at present describe the characteristic principles of the first mentioned work to which the citations likewise refer.

William v. Humboldt's aim from the start is directed towards intensive and extensive self-education. This is shown by his early dismissal from public office upon which he had entered at the age of twenty-five. This dismissal, Spranger quite correctly observes (p. 46), is his first decisive, personal avowal of the idea of humanity. We see how seriously he regarded the matter from the reference he makes to it in writing to his betrothed: "It then dawned on me for the first time, that after all the only thing of actual value consists of what man is in himself."—"My vocation appeared to be that of finding the way which would lead me, me alone, to the highest goal."—"I afterwards found that there is another criterion of the good, even of that which man does, and I became firmly and unshakably convinced of the truth, often vaguely felt but rarely clearly elaborated, that man inevitably does just as much good as he becomes good in himself." (Spranger, 46 f.) According to Humboldt, however, self-education means first of all an extensive acquaintance with men, a comprehensive knowledge of everything that transpires within man. "I once had the fixed idea," he writes even at the age of fifty-six, "that before we depart the present life we must understand and appropriate as many subjective human phenomena as possible — and it is for these alone that I have a correct sense of appreciation, since everything else only produces a passing effect." Thus the individualistic principle involved in the effort at self-education expands to universalism, which would appropriate everything human, develop every phase of the individual ego and enlarge this individual self to the humanity-ego.

Like Herder, Humboldt is at first chiefly interested in psychology and æsthetics. His intimate association with Goethe, Schiller and Körner furnishes him an opportunity to elaborate his æsthetic ideas more thoroughly, as is evident from his essay on Hermann and Dorothea. But the serious study of Kant and Fichte gradually impresses him with the ethical element of the idea of humanity. Man as an end in himself, personal worth and autonomy resting wholly on our subjective nature show a tendency to deepen his concept of humanity.

Under the influence of Schelling he came to a more profound understanding of the relation of mind and nature which gives rise to the organic-cosmic interpretation of his idea of humanity, in which however the subjective, i. e., the spiritual man still remains dominant. "Everything spiritual in man consists in the self-appropriation of the world, the transmutation to idea and the realization of the idea in the same world to which its materials belong, and the energy and mode by which this takes place is simply changed by objective conditions, not created or determined."

It is a well known fact that it is largely owing to the founding of the University of Berlin and the principles of school organization put into operation by Humboldt during the brief period of his official incumbency as minister of education that his idea of humanity controlled the neohumanistic gymnasium for several decades. Unity and consistency constitute the nature of mind and education, instruction, in short, the whole of education must be conducted accordingly. He has expressed this idea very forcefully in a recently discovered letter to Schiller of Feb. 13, 1796, lately published in the *Deutschen Rundschau*: "The sum total of knowledge (in its most comprehensive sense) must serve the single purpose of furnishing the mind with objects for its exercise and the refinement of its powers. I for one can conceive of no other ultimate end of knowledge and education. Knowledge is so constituted that it reacts on the mind which has produced it, and the two must constantly remain in interaction. This will be active and salutary in the proportion in which knowledge is homogeneous with mind, and since this can only pertain to its form, it must follow that the direct importance and value of knowledge lies in its form alone. The subject matter deserves attention only in so far as the form would be inconceivable without it and the latter necessarily increases both in definiteness and effectiveness with the quantity of well elaborated material. The most essential attribute of mind is unity in the organic efficiency of all its powers. If therefore the sum-total of knowledge is to be homogeneous with mind it must possess the qualities of completeness, consistency and unity. This is the general principle in which all educated minds must be exactly alike and upon which the possibility of their agreement rests. This however

implies more than that the mere knowledge and abilities of men must constitute a whole, they must not merely constitute a whole in a general way, but at the same time such a whole as corresponds *with respect to form* to that whole of which all knowledge consists. That is to say that every object of knowledge bears a twofold relation, one to the whole body of knowledge and another to the mind itself. The scholar should at least understand all these relations, although he is at the same time far from requiring the possession of the objects to which these relations appertain. The matter of primary importance therefore is to set up the business, the whole, the sphere, which is completely general, and secondly to determine the several viewpoints from which the whole is possible. For we must always aim to interpret the whole field of knowledge from some definite point of view. This is the only way to avoid narrowness and insipidity."

This analysis clearly reveals the way in which the conception of general education subjectively considered (biological) is construed, and to what extent the neohumanists placed the stress not on the imparting of information, but on inspiring the mental powers. But it likewise reveals the beginning of the transition to the *formal* conception of education which later developed so narrowly, after the idea of humanity had lost its force. It is for this reason that I have given Humboldt's view as developed in his correspondence in such detail.

Humboldt's idea of humanity and his ideal of education are permeated through and through and supported by his enthusiasm for Greek civilization. In his case this enthusiasm rests on comprehensive, thorough and profound philological and historical studies. Heyne introduced him to the study of antiquities and his intimate friendship with the philologist, F. A. Wolf, continued for so many years, kept alive his interest in the strictly philological treatment of the Greeks. Although it was chiefly the philological, historical as well as the æsthetic interest that at first attracted him to the Greeks, the idea that the Greeks are a unique phenomenon in the history of the world and that they reveal the beauty and completeness of humanity is nevertheless combined with it even at this stage of his development. As early as 1796 therefore he regarded the study of the Greeks as the most valuable as well as the most effective

instrument of human education. In that year he writes: "I therefore proceed to make clear to myself in an essay of my own the reason why the study of the ancients as such and without any special interest in this special department, deserves a man's time and attention for its intrinsic merit. It seems to me that these reasons have been correctly appreciated hitherto (for natural impulses rarely deceive, and without them we would scarcely have sacrificed life-times to this otherwise worthless plunder), but not so clearly analysed." (Spranger, 457.) Humboldt's wide acquaintance with Greek literature repeatedly convinced him that the productions of the Greek mind do not all manifest the same power and that not everything among the Greeks corresponded with this ideal. But he deliberately construes a unity and an ideal out of the Greek spirit, just because he intentionally did not regard them purely from the historical point of view. "One spirit pervades all Greek poetry without distinction of the character or age. The divergences are insignificant and we may disregard them when speaking of Greek character from the viewpoint of criticism and æsthetics rather than historically." (Spranger, 468.) "We evidently regard antiquity more idealistically than it was, and we should do so,¹ since by its form and its relation to us we are forced to expect ideas and effects which transcend the ideas which constitute our environment." (Spranger, 487.) Humboldt therefore also regards such poetic productions as Euripides as un-Greek, for the same reasons that the Hellenism of the Alexandrian period represented a decline of the Greek spirit.

This idealized conception constantly assumes a more definite form in Humboldt's mind. The influence of the Romanticists, especially Schelling, impels Humboldt to undertake to deduce the character of the Greek spirit from metaphysical principles. Through the elaboration of the categories of the organic and the symbolic, the Greek spirit seems to him more and more the expression of the pure idea of humanity. "Everything is so completely transformed in the hands of the Greeks, all things sensible are among them so charged with a breath of the divine, the same breath which we feel in their language; for it symbolizes the genuine Greek type as nothing else can. It not only gives the Greek type sensible form however, but the

¹ Impossible to me.

productions of the Greek mind gave rise at the same time to the most delicate, the most pure and the most complete symbol of humanity, and thus became the creator and prototype of humanity in general. The vital impulse actuating the Greeks is nothing less than to be pure and complete personalities and to enjoy the full serenity of personal existence. Owing to the fact that they outlived their original impulse, followed their merely natural instincts, they were therefore destined by fate to advance the evolution of humanity."

Humboldt cherished the idea that the Germans above all others were fitted to give the Greek ideal of humanity a further development and adapt it to the thought and sentiment of the modern world. This therefore establishes the conviction that engrafting the Greek spirit in the German would result beneficially, if humanity should again enter the course of progress without let or hindrance.¹

It is therefore evidently an idealized Greek spirit that is here advocated as the source of general human education. This ideal, as Wilamowitz has correctly contended, was ruined by the philology of the nineteenth century. But that idealized Greek spirit has inspired sublime and noble powers among the German people, and we may well question whether the historically better known and more consistent account which scholarship furnishes us to-day is capable of accomplishing as much for German youth as the Greece of Schiller, Goethe and William v. Humboldt really has accomplished.

Through the introduction of W. v. Humboldt the philologist, F. A. Wolf, eventually came into touch with the Weimar group, among whom the new ideal of education was not only cultivated æsthetically, but likewise theoretically systematized by the Jena philosophers, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. Wolf was an out and out philologist. When he went to Göttingen as a student in 1777, he insisted independently, notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of Heyne, on matriculating as a student of philology rather than of theology, as was customary at that time. During the twenty-three years of his professorship at Halle (1787-1810) Wolf accomplished truly wonderful results. He developed "Antiquities" to an independent science

¹ These latter ideas are taken from a letter written in French to Schweighäuser.

and likewise became the organizer of the neohumanistic Gymnasium. Full of enthusiasm for the new ideal of education, Wolf was thoroughly saturated with the idea that a thorough and self-elaborated intelligent understanding of classical antiquity furnishes the surest, in fact the only method to profound knowledge and to real education. But this method involves a thorough study of both classical languages. Wolf is therefore, both by the wealth of his philological knowledge and philosophical orientation, specially well prepared to give a correct estimate of the elements of education involved in the study of the languages. He repeatedly refers to the fact with emphasis, that the ancient languages contain far more such formal elements of education than the modern. Paulsen quotes a number of such expressions from Wolf of which we here add a few. "Languages, the first artistic products of the human mind, contain a complete stock of the general ideas and forms of our thought attained and developed in and through the progress of knowledge. It is by the knowledge and thorough examination of the differing forms of expression in several languages that we first begin to get our bearings in the realm of intellect and learn to better understand and use its accumulated stores, because of the fact that the variety of modifications of similar fundamental ideas force us to recognize the points of dissimilarity which appear in them. This comparison of words and forms of expression therefore does not merely furnish us with a store of many similar symbols, but provides us with an actual enrichment of means for the explanation and construction of our ideas which is attainable in no other way." "The language of a people must necessarily furnish us unaccustomed views of things, new ideas and modifications of thought in proportion as their mode of thought, conduct and life differs from and conflicts with ours. This is proven by the ease with which we to-day learn three languages of our neighbors as readily as one of the ancient languages, because, as we might almost say, a kind of neo-Europeanism has combined them under a single idiom. But this greater difficulty of an ancient language, which carries us into a strange realm of ideas and points of view, likewise rewards our labor correspondingly." (Paulsen II, 213.)

Even though Wolf did not lay the chief stress on this linguistic discipline, but referred to the whole of antiquity, the

"organic education" of the Greeks, nevertheless the reversal of the splendid and profound program of education of our classicists was brought about by him. This tendency gradually becomes clearer, more deliberate and more narrow among Wolf's disciples of the first and second generation. The maxim of "formal education" becomes ever more frequent. It is intended to imply a purely intellectual discipline of the mind by means of the analysis of linguistic forms. The idealistic philosophy which esteems abstract thought far above sense perception, was favorable to this tendency and Fichte, Schelling and Hegel are the most vigorous and ardent advocates of the classical education which had become philological. The fact that Latin, which had receded somewhat into the background at the first enthusiasm for the Greek, again came into prominence during the twenties of the nineteenth century is likewise characteristic of the turn from the universal human to the merely formal. (Paulsen II, 324.) Latin style and an intensive study of grammar therefore constituted the most important part of "humanistic" studies. Paulsen relates the fact, in his *Youthful Reminiscences* that he was admitted to Untersecunda in the Altona Gymnasium at Easter, 1863, on the basis of a successful translation into Latin. He further observes: "The writing of Latin dominated the whole educational system so completely that there were no examinations in other branches. It would be incorrect to assert that lectures on the ancient classics were neglected on account of the instruction in grammar and style. Rather the contrary. In many institutions there was indeed considerable attention given to the Greek authors. But the aim was no longer a balanced personality, but formal discipline. Herder's comprehensive and profound ideal of humanity had become narrowed down to classical philology."

Far be it from us to ascribe slight value to such formal discipline of the mind as that resulting from an intensive drill in the classic languages. This kind of discipline of the intellect will retain its value as an important element of general education for a long time to come. But even the most pronounced and most vigorous advocate of the humanistic gymnasium will no longer care to affirm that the philological pursuit of the classical languages is really adapted to quicken all the spiritual and mental powers and furnish an actually general education in

the biologico-psychological sense of the term. The demand for new elements of education therefore became and still becomes more insistent. We want the modern languages, we want history and geography, and we especially insist, and justifiably so, on a thorough acquaintance with mathematics and the natural sciences. New institutions arise which devote more attention to practical needs, and, since the Prussian code of 1900 places the three kinds of secondary schools of north Germany having nine-year courses, on the same level so far as entrance to university is concerned, the general education offered by the German secondary schools has again assumed the encyclopedic character. Otto Willmann has very pointedly described the difficulty with our educational policy on this point. In the latest edition of his *Didactics* he speaks of it as follows (276): "The weakness of our courses of study lies in the unsystematic amalgamation of ancient with modern subject matter. They have come into being through a cumulative process rather than by organic development, and have even ruthlessly separated matters vitally related for no better reason than a pedantic desire for division and a false effort at consistency. By attending to each particular element of education, its unity has been neglected. Instead of giving the internal structure a firm foundation in a well-organized whole of systematically related facts and intelligent capacities, in order to collect and arrange the confused mass of suggestions and advices, as they occur in the course of a public life affected by intelligence, our education has fallen a victim of multiplicity and permitted *polymathy*, which has its unquestioned value as a peripheral element of education, to occupy the central position."

The brief historical sketch, outlined above reveals the following: Our classicists, especially Herder, formulated an ideal of education which was both comprehensive and consistent and described a method of deducing a pedagogically and didactically effective concept of general education on a biologico-psychological basis. Due to a variety of causes, which we cannot even mention in detail, it has hitherto been impossible to realize the suggestions of Herder in his own sense. We have rather returned to the ancient encyclopedic conception by way of formal discipline. Here it is therefore necessary to effect a change. Encyclopedic education cannot and must not remain the edu-

cational aim of the secondary school. This must of necessity lead to dissipation of energy, superficiality. And even more than this it must lead to an overburdening of courses. We must introduce unity into this variety. This will succeed most readily and most certainly by a return to the educational ideal of our classicists and aim to develop and formulate them on the basis of the later knowledge of the principles of biology, psychology and sociology, so as to harmonize with the demands of the present time.

3. THE THEORY OF GENERAL EDUCATION

Constructive Synthesis

According to the biologico-psychological conception of our theory which forms the basis of the educational ideal of our classicists, especially Herder, the term "general," as previously observed, means an all-round development of the functions found in the human organism. The term "education" furthermore implies that this development must proceed organically, a growth from within. The first concern of the educator and teacher to whom is committed the difficult and responsible task of developing the potential powers of the pupil, must therefore be to discover what powers are hidden in the human organism. He must strive to acquaint himself with the most important functional combinations in order that he may first of all eliminate those upon the exercise and development of which he can have but little influence from the sphere of his effort and concentrate his whole energy upon those functions which require the most help.

Without taking any position on the metaphysical question of the relation of body and soul we can nevertheless, wholly within the sphere of experience, divide the native functions of the human organism into two large classes, the physical and the psychical. It is self-evident that mental capacity constitutes the most important object of disciplinary effort in general education, but there are likewise some bodily functions with a significance that must not be underestimated. We shall first direct attention to these.

First of all, the so-called vegetative processes, such as the circulation of the blood, digestion, assimilation and secretion do

not come within the range of educational effort. It is of course important for the success of the pupil that these processes perform their respective functions normally, but their care belongs to the department of rearing children which Herbart calls *Care of the Health*. The school must not neglect these functions, and the present day insistence that the conduct of the school be hygienic is fully justified, but no one would seriously care to say that we send our children to school in order to improve their digestion. These matters are important conditions, but not the subject matter of the problem of education.

On the other hand the motor arrangements of our body, and especially deliberate movements, belong to the functions which require intelligent training and development. Writing, drawing, playing the piano constitute a series of deliberate movements which become effective only through intelligent discipline. And there is another factor of still greater importance. The long periods of sitting in school tend to arrest the development of a number of the motor organs, especially the muscles. We have long understood that this condition could not continue without harm to the growing organism and tried to counteract it by gymnasium drill and games. From our point of view we must not only approve this practice, but we must do even more than that. We should add extended courses in manual training to the gymnasium drill, because it is only by this means that we can accomplish a complete general development of the body. Gymnastics and manual training must therefore be recognized as indispensable elements of general education and receive consideration in comparison to their importance.

There is still a further reason for this which has hitherto been largely neglected. Gymnastics and manual training not only serve to produce physical development; they strengthen and discipline the will in a way that can scarcely be accomplished by any other means. We hear much at present about the training of the will and we shall likewise return to this point later on. But what is generally implied is practice in self-control, self-possession; self-command — briefly put — speaking in physiological terms — the establishment of an effective inhibitive system. But our pressing need is positive invigoration, an increase of vital impulse, a strengthened determination. Gymnastics

and manual training are peculiarly effective in this direction. They furnish the pupil with a kind of mastery over his own body, give him a sense of power, of ability to do things, of security, such as adds vigor and courage to the whole personality. Gymnastics and manual training are therefore important and very essential elements of general education.

This brings us to the consideration of the mental functions. First of all, permit us to make two general observations. Everything psychical is essentially teleological, i. e., directed towards an end, and all psychical processes bear a profound and vital relation to the preservation of life. I have made this teleological and biological conception the basis of my textbook in psychology (4 Ed., 1907) and I must refer to it for the detailed exposition of this point. But it seems to me very important that every teacher should thoroughly acquaint himself with this mode of the interpretation of psychical processes. It will enable him better to understand the origin and tendency of the psychical dispositions of his pupils and thus be in position to institute disciplinary measures accordingly.

We must observe further that modern psychology has taught us to make a sharp distinction between psychical processes and psychical dispositions. Psychical processes are the actual spiritual experiences which constitute the fleeting, constantly changing content of consciousness at any given moment. But by a psychical disposition we mean a relatively persistent and permanent capacity of the soul to experience certain kinds of psychical processes, and eventually to produce them at will. Corresponding with the primary functions of consciousness to be discussed presently and its various stages of development, a large number and great variety of dispositions are gradually formed and our language has formulated an abundance of descriptive names. Thus, e. g., memory represents a group of dispositions which enable us to experience memory-images and to reproduce a series of ideas and judgments. Knowledge represents a group of acquired judgment-dispositions.

We may therefore say that the whole problem of education consists of the higher development of the innate dispositions of the pupil and to aid in the acquisition of new dispositions. The aim of instruction is not the production of momentary processes, but permanent dispositions. The processes excited in the minds

of the pupils by means of instruction are not ends per se, but simply the means for the production of permanent dispositions. Descriptively speaking, a general education represents a number of acquired dispositions and our problem consists in coming to a clear understanding of the nature of the dispositions to be produced both as a class and individually.

This requires, as previously observed, a comprehensive understanding of the psychical processes. We can accomplish this most readily for our purposes by making Jodl's division according to the primary functions and stages of development our starting point. I have likewise followed his division in my textbook. We accordingly distinguish three primary functions of consciousness, which I am disposed to call, knowledge, feeling and will. These three primary functions are very easily distinguished conceptually, but they cannot actually be separated. All three cooperate in every actually experienced mental process and we describe a psychical act as an act of knowledge, feeling or will only in the sense that one of the fundamental functions has dominated it. The nature of the soul has therefore prescribed both the method and the aim of the educational problem. If general education constitutes this result, it must follow that none of these fundamental functions dare be given preference at the expense of the others. All must rather have the chance of exercise and they should all be trained to harmonious cooperation. We shall therefore show very briefly what kind of educational effort is adapted to each of these primary functions.

In the primary function of knowledge the stages of development as described by Jodl are most readily distinguished. The primary stage involves sensation and perception, the secondary ideation and the third linguistically formulated, conceptual thought. Educational effort will always be most effective and most intensive in these primary functions because the direction and activity is most easily and most definitely influenced and determined by the presentation of new material. The educational problem here applies almost exclusively to the two higher stages, i. e., therefore to the ideational and the conceptual. What is generally described as training in sense perception is never exclusively or even chiefly a further development of the sensory or perceptual apparatus, but always a guidance to a many-sided and correct interpretation of sense-impressions and

this interpretation consists in effecting an association of ideas and in the development of the function of judgment. The value of instruction in sense perception lies in the fact that strong sensory impressions are better adapted to stimulate and develop the ideational and intellectual processes than it is possible to do with words.

The question arises therefore in what manner and to what degree the school, and especially the secondary school, is called upon to develop the function of knowledge. Or, to put it differently, what degree of intellectual discipline is involved in general education. The public school lays the foundation for a further development of the intellect first of all by the fact that furnishes the children with the conditions and possibility of further education by teaching them to read and write. The child learns to read in order to gain access to the thoughts of others, and it learns to write for the purpose of imparting its own ideas to others. Instruction in reading and writing however is not a discipline of the intellectual functions, it merely provides the possibility of doing this. The educational task has no bearing on the intellectual function of the child until the subject matter read is treated from the viewpoint of linguistic construction and matters of fact. Arithmetic brings into play another very important factor. It is the business of the elementary school therefore to furnish the elements of intellectual education so as to meet the most general and important demands of practical life and the needs of the state. It is a matter of history however that general compulsory education was established chiefly from military and economic motives. Every citizen is to be fitted for the ordinary business of life and every male citizen is to be intellectually fitted for military service. If the elementary school by its thorough instruction in facts accomplishes more for its pupils than the minimum needs of practical life require, it must be a matter of rejoicing to every friend of childhood. But we must nevertheless observe that it can undertake this higher aim only on condition that the absolute certainty in the application of the elements of education does not suffer. For the first and most important aim of the elementary school is nevertheless concerned with the practical utility of the intellectual discipline which it furnishes. It must confine itself to what is unconditionally necessary, the

elements.

How then may we the most clearly and most intelligibly describe the more intensive discipline of the intellect which is justly expected and demanded of the secondary school? How may we best characterize what is called the advanced general education, in so far as it pertains to the intellect? In the heyday of neohumanism men presumed to find the real value of education — especially the classical education — in the very fact of its separation from everything practical, in the complete ignoring and disregarding of everything useful. (Paulsen II, 215.) The discipline of the mind was to be regarded absolutely as an ideal end in itself. But we can no longer maintain this negative position. It follows with inevitable certitude from the teleological bearing of all things psychical, that all intellectual discipline must of necessity react on our actions, on our conduct, on our character. Furthermore if we reflect on the fact that general education consists of a group of social requirements, we will no longer be able to say that the aim of elementary education is practical, but that that of the so-called higher education has nothing to do with such matters. We must rather maintain with rigid consistency that all education as well as all science proceeds from practical needs and that its ultimate and highest aim must be to enhance life, i. e., be practical in the broadest sense of the term. We must therefore look somewhere else for the distinction between the elementary and higher discipline of the intellect.

Elementary education aims at the immediate utility of the knowledge and skill required, whilst the more intensive intellectual discipline deliberately takes an apparently indirect course and fixes its attention, not on the immediate, but merely on the indirect application of the acquired discipline. This indirect course consists in the fact that we lead the pupil from the prescientific to the scientific stage of thought. We are thus leading the pupils along the same course which the human race has taken. Man has made a large number of discoveries and inventions on the level of pre-scientific thought, instinctively so to speak. But the evolution of higher civilization begins only where definite, persistent effort is applied to the investigation of nature and the human soul, i. e., where science begins. The chief distinction between scientific and pre-scientific thought

consists in the fact that the former subjects experience to a more thorough analysis. In this way it is often possible to discover new relations and principles in experience-complexes which are objectively very different but alike in their elementary processes. The various sciences have in the course of time elaborated their own method of procedure and invented a large number of new instruments of thought. These instruments of thought on the one hand enable us to grasp a larger number of experiences in a single act of thought, and on the other to discover and express finer and more subtle distinctions. It is this familiarity with these instruments of thought discovered by science especially that characterizes the scientifically trained mind and distinguishes it from those on a lower plane.

Anyone occupying a responsible position in the social organism to-day must equip himself with scientific method. We may therefore say that the higher class of society, intellectually considered, demands a scientific education of all who would join its ranks,—i. e., familiarity with the most important scientific instruments of thought. It follows therefore that general education, so far as it concerns the intellectual phase, is nothing more than scientific education.

Looking at the prescribed course and methods of instruction pursued at our secondary schools from this point of view, we must conclude that the most general and most characteristic aspect of every subject consists in the fact that the pupils are led from the pre-scientific plane of thought to the scientific method of doing things. Everywhere they are taught to analyse experience and in every subject they are familiarized with a splendid array of scientific instruments. In many subjects this latter feature indeed constitutes a very essential, if not the essential part of the instruction. What are signs of equality, brackets, powers, roots, logarithms, systems of coordinates, equation of curves, function, but instruments of thought created by mathematics. And hasn't instruction accomplished something worth while when it has enabled the pupil to comprehend the significance and use of those instruments of thought in all their breadth and depth? Force and energy, atom and molecule, chemical element and chemical affinity, velocity, acceleration, moment of inertia, electron, potential, again are thought instruments of physics and here also much has certainly been

gained if the pupils have learned to use these instruments correctly.

And the same thing holds true of instruction in philological and historical subjects. In this case linguistic forms are analysed — frequently to satiety — not only with a view to a deeper and more thorough understanding of the instruments prevailing in the elementary school such as subject, predicate, attribute, object, adverbial relation, but new and more complicated philological instruments are introduced and practiced, such as, e.g., hypothetical period, relative dependence, potential mode, &c. After we have once put all philological instruction on a psychological basis, as I have contended for more than twenty years, we will here discover analyses still more profound and thought instruments of still greater effectiveness.

The intellectual discipline which the pupil receives in the secondary school therefore is nothing more than an introduction into the scientific method of interpretation, or more briefly expressed, *scientific training*. The subjects and methods which are best adapted to this end will engage us farther on. At present it must suffice to describe precisely and clearly what constitutes the phase of general education which is concerned in the development of the intellectual functions. And here we can therefore say briefly and definitely; so far as it concerns the intellectual functions, general education is *scientific training*.

This brings us to the primary function of feeling. We must here note with all emphasis, as suggested above, that the three primary functions never function independently of one another. And the feelings are in fact the least independent of them all. Especially is it true of those feelings which lend themselves most readily to development and differentiation, that it is only by means of ideas and judgments that they can be selected, i. e., through the cooperation of the intellectual functions. Hence, in discussing the education of the feelings, with a view to getting clear as to the kind and method, reference must always be made to the intellectual element involved in it.

In my textbook of psychology I have shown the vital bearing of the feelings on the preservation of life, and on this basis classified the feelings from the biological viewpoint. This method required me to distinguish a peculiar class of feelings which have barely been recognized hitherto. It consists of

those feelings which have their ground in functional needs of our physical and psychical organism and which I would briefly describe as *functional feelings*. There is a sense in which every arrangement or function with which the human organism is provided has a propensity towards activity and the satisfaction of this need gives rise to a peculiar feeling of pleasure, for which I have suggested the term "functional pleasure." I think I may therefore say that all education of the feelings, in so far as intelligent guidance is possible and necessary consists in developing and differentiating definite kinds of functional pleasure.

A correct methodical division of instruction will itself inspire a very important kind of functional pleasure. I refer to what is popularly called interest. From the psychological point of view theoretical interest is nothing more than joy in the successful exercise of our understanding. We shall show farther on, that the matter of inspiring interest must necessarily be the first and most important principle of instruction in the secondary school. The joy in one's own individual mental activity is so far as education is concerned merely a means of securing the object of instruction, i. e., of producing the requisite intellectual dispositions. Knowledge can affect the human mind, produce the state of mind above described as scientific education, only as it proceeds from within by means of the spontaneous activity of the pupil. Even Plato observed: "The freeman shall never be required to acquire knowledge under conditions of servile coercing for the body does not lose efficiency through coercion, but no knowledge abides in the soul which was forced upon it" (*ψυχῆ δὲ βίαιον ὀυδὲν ἔμμονον μάθημα*, Rep. 536 E.). Inspiring interest however is not merely a means, but likewise an end. The joy of individual intellectual activity excited and guided in various directions by instruction, i. e., differentiated and enriched, likewise creates new dispositions of feeling. Even Herbart described the many-sidedness of interest as the aim of all instruction.

The most important form of functional pleasure admitting and requiring discipline is that which we find in *æsthetic satisfaction*. In my *Introduction to Philosophy* (Eng. Trans. p. 196) I have endeavored to show that æsthetic satisfaction is nothing more than the functional pleasure arising from con-

templation (Introduction, p. 213 f.). From this definition of the concept it inevitably follows that æsthetic satisfaction, the rudiments of which must certainly be present in everyone, may be greatly increased, enriched and refined by intelligent guidance. Philological instruction is peculiarly adapted to this purpose and in fact both in native and foreign languages. The interpretation of the poets, in case the teacher possesses broad information, intensive psychological training and æsthetic appreciation, can arouse the sense of poetic beauty and develop the indefinite impression which the first presentation of a great production makes on the pupil, to an appreciative satisfaction and a purer and richer joy. Historical instruction furthermore furnishes occasion to interpret the works of constructive art, whilst arithmetic may develop the capacity of conceiving artistic forms. Schiller has also shown in his letters on æsthetic education and even more forcefully in his poem *Ideal and Life*, that the æsthetic situation develops the purely personal powers in man and that man only attains to complete personality after he is capable of æsthetic satisfaction. The pure joy in the beautiful elevates man to spiritual freedom and the realization of the highest attainments. Æsthetic training is therefore one of the most important parts of general education and it is likewise historically one of the oldest and most constant elements of the same. Society justly insists that all who belong to the more highly educated class be trained æsthetically, in fact it must aim to develop the appreciation of the beautiful and of art as widely as possible. The art-inspiring efforts of our age such as the concerts and readings at our public social gatherings are of high cultural value. The advanced school dare not neglect this element at any cost. We may even say that the dissemination of æsthetic education constitutes one of its most important problems. The primary function of consciousness which we have designated the feelings is therefore most effectively and beneficently developed and enriched by æsthetic training.

So far as concerns the will, no one doubts any longer that the will is capable of and needs training. Herbart treats this phase of education in the chapter on discipline and in ordinary life, as observed above, the training of the will generally means chiefly discipline, control, in short the restraint of the will.

But at present we require a more positive training of the will, consisting of the accumulation of new impulses and motives. The aim we must strive to realize is the invigoration, regulation and enlargement of the will in adaptation to the tasks of the age.

The invigoration of the will, as indicated above, is realized first of all by means of systematic physical exercise. Hardening the bodies of the pupils, giving them control of the motor arrangements, invigorates their will, increases social efficiency and at the same time opens to them an unfailing source of rich functional pleasure.

The regulation of the will is best attained by habituation to work. We shall see farther on that together with the development of interest habituation to work constitutes the most important pedagogic principle of the secondary school. At present however we are concerned with its value in volitional discipline. We may therefore say that habituation to regularity in work produces volitional dispositions which increase the social efficiency of the pupil to an extraordinary degree. But such habituation is likewise profitable to the individual from the simple fact that anyone who is accustomed to work, as experience shows and necessarily, will overcome the most difficult obstacles more easily. And in addition to this it opens a rich source of functional pleasure.

The enlargement of the will consists first of all in the fact that the pupil gradually learns to set up more remote ideals. The progress of civilization is based on the fact that man not only provides for the passing day but undertakes projects which frequently involve great sacrifices for the time being but promise increased wealth and happiness for the future in compensation. It is fitting in this age that even the youth should be trained to this on account of the highly developed civilization under which we are living. The school through its method of instruction furnishes splendid opportunity for such enlargement of the will. I simply refer to the exercises in public speaking which require a more extensive elaboration of subject matter and a longer time in preparation. I refer to the final examinations the pedagogic value of which has hitherto been wholly neglected. And private reading, especially in the native tongue, can likewise be made effective in this respect. And the intro-

duction of a kind of general review examination for the brighter and more industrious pupils on their own election can likewise be recommended.

However, we must not only strive to enlarge the will in its formal aspect thus far described but likewise more positively as respects its content. I have in mind the direction of the will towards social affairs. All of us who dwell in civilized countries have been born into a great social organism whose institutions not only rest on us but are likewise infinitely enriched by our presence. We utilize these institutions, such as the mails, the telegraph, railroad, schools, museums and such like without much thought about it. These things belong to the blessings for which, as Schiller has so pointedly observed, "habit and unchallenged possession so easily despoil our gratitude." According to my judgment it is the business of the school to impress the value and significance of these institutions upon the mind and thus introduce the will to a new and large field. The effort to which we train the pupils, the remoter ideals upon which we teach them to train their wills must ultimately contribute to the advancement of the social body to which each of us belongs. If we were far enough advanced to permit the pupils to discover in the school that the individual develops his powers most effectively and at the same time most pleasantly and that he becomes a forceful, well-balanced personality only as he devotes his energies to some important social problem, we would then approach the ideal of will-training very closely. This kind of training may best be fostered through school organizations such as exist in America in large variety and very extensively, whilst we have simply made a beginning. (Cf. Scott, *Social Education*, 1909.)

The training of the function of will is intended to create the dispositions which may be described as the ethico-social sense. We may therefore describe that part of general education which pertains to the primary function of will, i.e., the invigoration, regulation and enlargement of the will, as ethico-social education.

This would complete the psychological foundation of general education. Scientific, æsthetic and ethico-social education constitute its essential elements. The creation of these psychological dispositions is the didactic and pedagogic problem at pres-

ent clearly evident on every hand. Nevertheless since all these dispositions are to be systematically organized and all education is at the same time to be consistent, well-balanced and socially useful, we must add a word concerning the subjective relation of the three primary functions of consciousness and the unity of personality.

The older psychology, particularly the Herbartian, which still forms the psychological basis of pedagogic and didactic theory in our teachers' seminaries, is still wholly intellectualistic. The ideational process is regarded as the primary, original property of the soul, whilst feeling and effort are regarded as derived states and interactions of ideas. Modern psychology is now in process of completely inverting this order of relation. The conviction is constantly gaining ground that the feelings and impulses are the most original and primary activities of the psychical and that ideation and reflection are simply built upon them. The sublime conception of Schopenhauer, that the will has created the intellect for its own ends, has been remarkably supported by the theory of evolution, sociology and the study of primitive races and children. Primitive races and children are moved to reflection only through intense feeling and always in connection with very definite and immediate ends. The intellect is primarily an instrument created by the human impulse to self-preservation. As a matter of fact man has not only conquered the world with this instrument, but he has even created an entirely new world to the enrichment of his being and the enhancement of his worth. "Science," says Mach, "has apparently grown out of biological and cultural evolution as the most superfluous side-issue. But we can now no longer doubt, that it has become the most essential factor both biologically and culturally." (*Knowledge and Error*, 2d Ed., 462.)

But notwithstanding all this the intellect still remains a superstructure. Stone upon stone is added to this structure under the illumination of the light of consciousness and the whole problem of education in fact apparently consists simply of the intelligent construction of such a temple of knowledge. However, if this superstructure of knowledge neglects the — I should say — vital foundation consisting of dispositions of feeling and will, the whole arduously constructed establishment

consisting of facts is swept to utter ruin like an air-castle at the first spiritual upheaval, the first breath of doubt. This constitutes the profounder meaning of the platonic passage cited above, that no knowledge which is forced upon the mind abides. This explains why our pupils accomplish such wonders by forgetting what they have learned. The ballast is thrown overboard, just because it was nothing more than ballast. The superstructure falls because it was erected without being sufficiently anchored in the bedrock of the soul.

If therefore we aim to make the scientific education which we impart to our pupils their permanent possession, and to form and enrich their spiritual life, we must see to it that our instruction furnishes both inspiration to their feelings and opportunity for invigoration and desirable exercise to their wills. Every class period which fails to enlist the interest of the pupils and in which they are not inspired to individual effort must be regarded as lost.

I am aware that this makes a large, perhaps too large a demand on the present generation of teachers. But we must nevertheless insist with all emphasis that emotional and volitional training are not accessory elements of general education, which forsooth are important as desirable by-products of intellectual discipline, but which still fall far below the real problem. Every teacher must far rather come to the conviction that all his instruction is in vain except as he constantly touches the emotional and volitional foundation of general education. We have described the emotional and volitional dispositions as the sub-soil of the soul. But the teacher cannot proceed after the manner of an architect who first lays his foundation and then proceeds deliberately to the erection of the superstructure. This is impossible on account of the subjective interaction of all three primary functions. He must rather work at the foundation unceasingly and as the knowledge of the pupil advances the more securely must he be anchored in correct emotional and volitional dispositions and constantly strengthen the foundation. We shall have occasion farther on to discuss this problem in detail with special reference to the actual practice of instruction.

Scientific, æsthetic and ethico-social education are therefore not isolated parts, but vitally related attributes of the concept

of general education, as we have undertaken to construe it. We must maintain their organic union and at the same time contribute to the enrichment and unification of the personality of the pupil. But this unity would still be incomplete without the addition of two more educational elements besides the ones discussed. In my judgment the completion of personality likewise requires religious and philosophical training. I shall therefore conclude this already somewhat lengthy exposition of the concept of general education with a discussion of these two elements.

Religious training in general is not so much a problem of the school as of the family and the Church. Anyone who is reared in a community that is religiously inclined will naturally acquire those spiritual dispositions we may briefly define as religiosity. The social character essential to religion already indicates that the influence of environment, the suggestive effect of the milieu counts for more than any direct instruction. And the great culture religions all possess the prestige of a long, historical course of development, a powerful tradition; they have developed complex systems of doctrine and many ceremonies of worship. The need of familiarizing the rising generation with all these things by direct instruction long ago made itself felt among most religious communities. Many civilized countries regard it the duty of the state to furnish the youth with religious instruction, and therefore include religious training in the group of social requirements, the sum-total of which constitute the concept of general education. Some countries, such as France and North America leave the matter of religious training to the discretion of parents. But even in those countries the attitude which the individual takes to this question depends more upon the social group to which he belongs than upon the choice of the individual himself. At any rate religion is at present not a private affair as many pretend to assume. It is of course true that religion has been profoundly spiritualized and individualized during the course of the ages and we can even at the present time note the progress of this process. The social character of religion however can never be lost, because it belongs to its essential nature. Religion is undoubtedly a matter of personal faith and life, but it is nevertheless above all else, a sense of fellowship. All religious ideas

consist of social crystallizations and it is as such that they have acquired their influence upon men.

Religion is however likewise one of the elementary principles of humanity. Just as the most primitive race has its religion, humanity, no matter how far advanced, is unable and unwilling to renounce it. The problem as to whether the ultimate nature of the universe is spiritual or material, or, as I believe, both, belongs to metaphysics. It is however not a problem, but a fact of the evolution of civilization that the world is constantly being more and more spiritualized through the efforts of man. Hence, faith in spiritual powers constantly receives new incentive through the progress of mankind and as long as this faith persists religion will likewise endure.

We may therefore say that religious training will constitute an element of general education for a long time to come, and it is our business to determine which of the primary functions of consciousness it is calculated to develop. The various confessions will no doubt always retain the privilege and duty of determining the matter of religious instruction, but general didactics, as Willmann construes the theory of education, will nevertheless be permitted to interpose suggestions. I feel justified therefore in saying that religious training must, first of all, be a part of emotional and volitional training. If religious instruction is not to result in a reduction instead of an advancement of religiosity, it must not be too intellectualistic, i.e., it must not appeal exclusively or even chiefly to the memory and intelligence of the pupils. History of religion and apologetics dare not constitute the chief element of religious education as is the case at present. Not the facts, but the religious significance of the facts must receive the chief stress. Every class exercise in religion should contribute something towards strengthening the religious sense of fellowship with the super-individual, the transcendent, the infinite, the primary cause of things and thus inspire the will with new impulses and influence its ideals. Religion should furnish its adherents with spiritual enrichment and energy by permeating them with tender consolation, imparting to them a consistent theory of the universe and of life. Here however religion comes into intimate relation with philosophy.

It is the business of philosophy to do the same for the primary

functions of intellect as religion does for emotional and volitional training. Both are intended to be unifying and completing in their effect.

Philosophical training is at present gaining increased recognition as compared with the closing decades of the nineteenth century. Philosophical training could be imparted most effectively if all the teachers of the advanced grades were capable and disposed to bring out forcefully and thoroughly the philosophical elements contained in every subject of instruction. However since this can neither be expected nor desired for a long time to come, it will be advisable to allow a course in philosophical propaedeutic to remain or introduce it anew as a separate branch at the conclusion of secondary education as has been the case in Austria for the past sixty years and as Germany is at present again insisting. The plan of organization therefore prescribes logic, psychology and introduction to philosophy. The last was soon omitted and the Austrian gymnasias (not the Real. schools) actually devote two week-hours each to logic and psychology in each of the highest classes. In Germany several different suggestions have recently been made, which do not come within the range of our discussion. On the other hand I should like to call attention to a new and suggestive idea recently set forth by Frederick Jodl, because in my judgment it offers the best method for what may be called philosophical training in the true sense of the term.¹ Jodl says clearly and definitely that it seems to him that a certain kind of instruction in logic can be omitted. Grammar, mathematics and the mathematical sciences contain so much logical discipline in their very nature that the intensive and prolonged study of these subjects apparently makes it superfluous to burden the pupils with the additional formal cramming of traditional logic. From my own experiences I find it quite possible to make logic both stimulating and interesting. But the pupils nevertheless generally get the impression that its principles are partly self-evident and partly incomprehensible. On the other hand Jodl correctly contends that psychology is necessary and valuable, a conclusion borne out by my own wide experiences with this subject. Stimulus to introspection and exercise in the analysis

¹ *On Departmental Training of Candidates for Professorships in Secondary Schools.* 1909. 114 ff. Esp. 121 f.

of psychical processes enrich the psychical inventory and constitute a valuable asset for life. Many of my pupils who have specialized in law and psychiatry have repeatedly assured me that the suggestions and facts acquired in the psychology classes were of value to them even after many years. Jodl accordingly suggests that psychology be given in the next to the last year, which likewise fits our conditions here in Austria, for the reason that the natural science instruction of the preceding year consists of anatomy and physiology.

Jodl finally suggests a course in the world theories of the Greek philosophers which should be presented to the pupils on the basis of a reader containing the most important passages in the original text and in translation. I heartily accepted this idea at the time Prof. Jodl presented it at the meeting of our Vienna teachers' association, and the more I reflect on it the more do I find that it must be possible in this way to arouse the philosophical Eros in the pupils. The Greeks were the first to discover the problems with which we are still occupied and they have likewise created the most important philosophical instruments of thought with which we still operate. A teacher well educated in philosophy with a well-prepared reader would certainly be in position to introduce the pupils to the most important problems in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and sociology, by means of free discussions of the original passages. The pupils would thus become familiar with the most important philosophical instruments of thought. Being and becoming (change), reality and phenomenon, cause and effect, idea, concept, sense-perception, matter and form, mind and matter, all these have been elaborated by the ancients. A great variety of points of contact between ancient and modern thought arise naturally. The Eleatics suggest Spinoza, Heraclitus modern natural science and evolution, Plato's *ἀνάμνησις* Kantian apriorism, Aristotle's *ζῆλον πολιτικόν* the modern theories of the state, the epistemology of the Stoics Descartes, &c. And another circumstance not sufficiently appreciated hitherto seems to me to be of the greatest importance, namely, the fact that the ancient philosophers approached the profound problems of cosmology and of theology with a freedom from prejudice which since then is no longer found. It is this impartiality and neutrality of the ancient thinkers, by which they raised their views above the

sphere of the common place, that adapts them so peculiarly to furnish the foundation of the philosophic training of the young. Our pupils can here be taught to see, without being implicated in party controversies, that there are problems upon which man will never cease to reflect. Here we can likewise show them the difficulties involved in discovering the ways which lead to the solution of these problems.

This brings us to the end of our constructive task and there remains only the matter of giving a brief summary of the results. General education consists of a number of social requirements the content of which varies with the times. For a long time it was regarded as an encyclopedic summation of facts, a conception which still constitutes the basis of the courses of study at our higher schools. We have shown above that this conception is utterly untenable and pedagogically impracticable. On the other hand a return to the educational ideal of our classicists and reconstructing it on the basis of modern psychology and sociology furnishes a theory that is both concrete and practical.

Viewed from this standpoint, general education consists in the harmonious development of all the rudimentary functions in man's psycho-physical organism. On the physical side we insist especially on the control of the spontaneous motor processes, resulting in the strengthening of the will and the advancement of purposefulness. On the mental side, as we have shown, the three primary functions of consciousness are brought to a higher stage of development by scientific, æsthetic and ethico-social training. Religion and philosophy are to unify and complete this development.

4. THE AIM OF THE SECONDARY SCHOOL

The aim of the secondary is 1, the dissemination of general education and 2, the preparation for the university and professional school. We have just given a detailed discussion of what general education is, or rather what it should be. From the viewpoint of the aim the secondary school is, first of all, an end in itself, because general education is valuable also to such as will not continue their studies after completing the secondary school. But, on the other hand, general education is here

described as a preparation for the professional school. It becomes us therefore to investigate further what really constitutes preparation for the professional school.

In all civilised countries the secondary school finds its place between the elementary school and the university. If we study more closely the way in which education is conducted at the opposite extremes between which the secondary school exists, i.e., the elementary school on the one hand, and the university on the other, we will better understand whence our pupils come and whither we should lead them.

In the elementary school the work must all be done within the school itself. The teacher cannot and should not expect the children to do any independent study at their homes. The object here is, if possible, that all shall acquire the ability to read, write and cipher. Constant repetition and untiring practice therefore constitutes the chief work of the elementary teacher. The competitive position of the state, both from the military and economic point of view depends to no small degree upon the success of this work. When the modern elementary school teaches the children the most important facts of life in their own environment by the method of observation, it in fact indicates a tremendous advance, but makes little or no difference in method. The vast progress made in elementary pedagogics has made learning much easier and more pleasant for the children and thus at the same time greatly increased the actual results of instruction. But the direction which the individual effort of the pupil is to take must constantly be carefully prescribed. The teacher leads the pupils on, step by step, until they have reached their goal without knowing how. The mental powers of the children are, as a matter of course, likewise increased in the elementary school, but the real object nevertheless remains the acquisition of certain facts and abilities and the means are constant repetition and practice at school.

But at the university and in practical life the young man is thrown on his own responsibility. He is confronted with the task of mastering a department of knowledge. If his intellect and will have been sufficiently disciplined to the required effort, he will make progress, if not, he must fail. The lectures and exercises furnish him with the necessary guidance in his studies. What use he makes of it is his own affair. He may attend the

lectures or shirk them, it is wholly his own affair whether he participates in the exercises or not. The freedom-to-learn which is accorded him in fact frequently becomes a most dangerous freedom-not-to-learn. In elementary education the responsibility rests almost exclusively with the teacher. At the university and in practical life each individual is responsible for his own progress. In the elementary school unavoidable guardianship, at the university and in practical life complete independence and complete responsibility.

The secondary school is intermediate between these two and its most essential and most important problem may be clearly and concisely defined from its position. It is the business of the secondary school to train the pupils it receives from the elementary school and whom it is to pass on to the university, to intellectual independence and moral responsibility. Every teacher should be clearly conscious in each class period of this general object of all secondary education. The course of study and the method of instruction must be determined and evaluated from the viewpoint of this primary task. Every reform movement, those pertaining to the introduction of new subjects or new methods, as well as those bearing on the reduction or expansion of the curriculum, must be viewed and criticised from the viewpoint of this most important and fundamental problem.

We have therefore shown that preparation for the university involves being trained to intellectual independence and moral responsibility. Notwithstanding the importance of this aim and the degree to which it is adapted to furnish a common bond between all secondary schools and all secondary teachers, we must nevertheless confess that it is nothing more than a mere formal definition. Such a definition becomes effective only when it is reduced to some positive, concrete statement. And we deduce this from the theory of general education as we have just construed it. The secondary school undertakes to train its pupils to intellectual independence and moral responsibility by imparting to them scientific, æsthetic, ethico-social discipline and unifies and completes the development of the primary functions of consciousness through religious and philosophical education.

Of the elements of general education that produce intellectual independence scientific discipline must receive first consideration.

This implies, as observed above, practice in the analysis of experience and familiarity with a number of scientific instruments of thought. Here we are at once confronted with the danger of falling once more into the encyclopedic conception which we have just repudiated so emphatically. We might, for example, say that only he who has analyzed every sphere of experience and is familiar with the methods of all the sciences possesses scientific education. We must therefore make selection on the basis of general considerations and the evidence of history and define more explicitly what we really mean by a scientific education which shall constitute a practical, attainable aim for the secondary school.

First of all, there are two grand divisions of experience into which we must introduce our pupils if we wish to impart scientific training to them. The one is nature, the other is the human soul. We are obliged at all events to adhere to this methodological dualism. The mathematical sciences, i.e., mathematics and physics, introduce the pupil to the most exact and most profound consideration of nature. The intensive pursuit of these disciplines teaches the pupil the inexorable uniformity of natural processes and at the same time to understand the methods which have enabled the human mind to investigate this uniformity. Even Plato recognized and appreciated the general disciplinary value of mathematics, and it would be quite superfluous to discuss the matter here. But we have only recently begun to see that this disciplinary value only attains vital efficiency in mathematical physics and that it is greatly intensified by it. The significance of the trigonometrical formulæ and the comparisons of analytical geometry make an entirely different impression if e.g., we discover, in deducing the conditions upon which the sensitivity of a balance depends, or in the theory of the horizontal and diagonal projection, that these formulæ correspond to objective, real, physical processes, and that nature actually operates according to the laws described in the respective formulæ. Mathematics, physics and chemistry are subjects of instruction therefore which impart a very important, and for general education a quite indispensable part of scientific training by reason of the fact that they introduce the pupil to the scientific method of interpreting nature. The second grand division of experience, and from our point of

view quite as important, consists of the human mind and its productions. In this sphere the methods of the mathematical sciences lose their efficiency. There are a number of natural scientists who in fact have the courage to believe that the realm of mind can likewise be vanquished with the weapons of natural science, but the gravest and most fatal misunderstandings are inevitable consequences of such a program. As soon as we apply the purely physical concepts of work, energy, &c., to mental processes these concepts are at once transformed into something quite different. We assume that we are speaking of mental processes whilst as a matter of fact we are simply discussing the physiological accompaniments. On the other hand if we ascribe the subjective processes individually familiar to every one to brain cells the intended physiology becomes psychology of the brain. There isn't any natural science that leads into the depths of the human soul. Its methods and instruments here fail absolutely.

And yet there is scarcely anyone who would deny that the events transpiring on earth are to no small degree determined by the intellect and will of man. The progress and position of nations still depend on the intellectual and moral forces conserved within them. Even the fate of the individual is not the result of natural forces acting blindly, but it is materially influenced by the spiritual forces within and about him. If we would therefore understand our environment and adjust ourselves to it we must not only seek to attain an insight into the workshop of nature, but likewise in the workshop of mind. We must also furnish our young people a timely familiarity with this workshop, in order that they may learn to elaborate and place proper value on the mental products within their own experience. There is one well-attested and sure means of access to this workshop of mind, namely, the study of language and the products of mind stored away in language. But it is philology that is occupied with this branch of study in its widest sense.

The things which appear in language, no matter whether they are statements which are merely intended for the moment or definite productions handed on to succeeding generations, are not mere symbols, they are essential elements of spiritual processes. Language is not simply the manifestation of thought.

It is far more an expression of the type and mode of the thought, feeling and will of the individual and of nations. The language and linguistic forms which have been preserved from various epochs, are nothing less than objectified human mind which is thus rendered accessible to scientific investigation. The analytic effort of philologists assumes the task of reconstructing the mental life which finds expression in these forms. This task is not solved at the first attempt. It requires repeated application. And the effort thus applied produces a kind of structural modification of the organ of thought, the change which we describe as philological discipline. Those who possess it immediately analyze the linguistic forms with which they come in contact into their parts, they know how to distinguish the form from the content, they are able to grasp comprehensive productions more quickly and easily recognize similar thoughts under various forms of expression. Philological discipline simplifies every form of scientific effort. It is of as much advantage to the natural scientist as the historian, the jurist, the economist and the philosopher.

The analysis of the native tongue leaves philological discipline incomplete. We acquire the native tongue through imitation unconsciously and instinctively. We use it spontaneously, readily understanding our fellows and making ourselves understood by them. We cannot quite see therefore that what we have otherwise practiced "like eating and drinking, free, in addition requires one, two, three." However, when we undertake to acquire a foreign language the separate words and forms of expression assume an entirely new significance. The fact that we are obliged constantly to make comparisons between the foreign language and our own likewise brings the power of expression in the native tongue, both as to its elements and its articulated wholes, clearly before our consciousness. As Goethe remarked: "He who learns no foreign language knows nothing about his own." The pursuit of both the classical languages generally furnishes opportunity for peculiarly intensive philological training which retains its value even after the vocabularies and forms are largely forgotten. The pupils thus become acquainted with the important products of a civilization and literature which not only constitutes the foundation but is likewise still an element of modern life. The modern lan-

guages of the advanced nations however are also excellent means for the realization of philological training which is valuable for all the sciences. We have above discussed the importance of philological instruction for æsthetic training, which furthermore involves the intensive study of one's native language and literature.

We may therefore say: The secondary school trains the pupil to intellectual independence by means of scientific discipline. This is accomplished most effectively by introducing the pupils to the work-shop of nature through instruction in the mathematical sciences and to the work-shop of the human soul through philosophical discipline.

Training to moral responsibility, in the manner described above, is to be accomplished through ethico-social education which consists in the control, invigoration and expansion of the will.

We would thus have a concrete definition of the aim of the secondary school. This definition of aim fits all the categories of the existing secondary schools of Germany and Austria and may likewise be applied to the majority of other civilized nations. We may therefore summarize our discussion on the nature of the secondary school in the following propositions:

1. The secondary school is intermediate between the elementary school and the university.

2. Its problem consists in training its pupils to intellectual independence and moral responsibility and thus prepare them both for the university and for practical life.

3. It must solve this problem by imparting general education, the elements of which include scientific, æsthetic, ethico-social, religious and philosophical training.

4. The scientific training is to be accomplished by the combination of discipline in mathematical science and philosophy.

We must now consider the matter of the construction of the course of study of a secondary school based on the principles set forth above.

5. THE COURSE OF STUDY IN THE SECONDARY SCHOOL

Systematically constructed courses of study, deduced from the principles of pedagogy actually exist only in handbooks in

pedagogy. All the courses of study in actual existence in the advanced schools of our age as a matter of fact are a product of historical tradition and the confused mass of the public opinion of the present age. But this is readily understood if we recall that general education is first of all nothing more than the sum-total of social requirements. Historical tradition represents the social requirements of the past and the public opinion of the present time presumes to tell us what elements of education the present generation needs. It is therefore no easy task to select from the wishes, complaints, well meant or notoriety-seeking suggestions which are constantly appearing in the thousands of newspapers, magazines and pamphlets, what the intelligent portion of society actually wants. We need not wonder therefore if the board of public instruction seeks to preserve the courses approved by age longer than many an enthusiast among our school reformers would desire and only slowly and gradually recognize what is urged upon them as "the demands of the age."

It would certainly be a safer mode of procedure if the department of public instruction would determine upon their measures from broad general viewpoints and well established, scientific principles. There would at least be less ambiguity and indecision in the various edicts and regulations.

I shall therefore endeavor to outline a scheme for a general course of study in the secondary schools, deduced from scientific principles and at the same time leaving room for the differentiation and growth demanded by the wealth of modern life.

A school's course of instruction is certainly one of the most important means for the realization of its general educational aim. It is likewise evident that the matter of first importance in devising the course must be the intellectual development of the pupil. Furthermore we have above described that part of general education which bears on the development of the intellectual functions, so far as concerns the purposes of the secondary school as scientific discipline. The surest way of accomplishing this, as shown above, is by the combination of mathematico-scientific and philological instruction. If we recall further that philological discipline cannot be attained by instruction in the native tongue alone, we will then have laid a firm foundation for our course of instruction. Every secondary school must

therefore at least teach the following subjects: A. Mathematics and physics (including chemistry); B. the native tongue and two foreign languages. This likewise furnishes an opportunity for varied differentiation, according to whether the instruction in languages makes both the classical languages, or the modern languages, or even a combination of the two, the basis. But the principle of combining humanistic and realistic training, or, as this principle has been called, *utraquism*, applies to all secondary schools. In these fundamental branches intensive work is indispensable, for it is only by this means that the pupil receives real scientific discipline from them. This *utraquism* may be described as objective *utraquism*, since it consists of the two great reality-complexes, nature and mind, as we have shown in detail above.

The question might then be raised whether it would not be well to be satisfied with this foundation of the course of study. There are many reasons in favor of such a simplification. It would require fewer school periods, and we could instruct the pupils very gradually and very thoroughly without interruption. It would also leave more time for the private inclinations of the pupil, for play, sport, music, and the general cultivation of individuality. Public opinion would nevertheless condemn such a reduction, and justifiably so, because such program would leave whole series of important life-problems outside the pupil's horizon. This foundation therefore requires expansion and supplementation.

With a view to realizing a practical principle for this expansion I propose the following suggestion: a subjective or psychological *utraquism* should be combined with the objective or scientific *utraquism* which consists of a combination of philology and mathematical natural science. That is to say, the scientific training of our pupils requires, in addition to the branches which are intended to produce severe mental discipline, such subjects also as furnish inspiration and opportunity for the unrestricted development of the intellectual functions. This would involve the grouping of the subjects taught in the secondary schools under two general heads. On the one hand they would divide into the philological and mathematico-natural science branches, on the other into the "disciplinary" and "inspirational."

This would furnish an articulation of the course of study which I regard as a pressing need. That is to say whenever all branches are placed on an equal footing the inevitable tendency to expand in every subject involved in the progress of science must necessarily lead to an over-burdening of courses, and as a matter of fact it has done so. In Germany the complaints against over-burden begin about the end of the third decade of last century. In Austria we hear them repeatedly since the seventies, after the more vigorous development of parliamentary life. The department of education tries to correct this evil by a reduction and simplification of the subject matter of instruction, as well as by other methods of relief. But this method cannot be continued indefinitely and it likewise involves very serious dangers. By avoiding the Scylla of an over-burdened course we encounter the Charybdis of superficiality. If we proceed still farther by this method of increasing simplification the secondary school can no longer fulfill its mission of furnishing a higher general education, preparation for the university and selecting the capable and industrious.

On the other hand both dangers may be avoided — that of the over-burdened course and that of superficiality — if the subjects are divided into “disciplinary” and “inspirational” and this division be made the criterion for the administration of the curriculum of the secondary school. In the disciplinary branches thorough recitation work at school, previous preparation of lessons by the pupil, thorough mastery of the subject matter of instruction and the thought-instruments involved are indispensable requirements. Those who fail to keep up with their classes through incapacity or lack of industry must be dismissed from the school. We demand the best conceivable methods of instruction in the disciplinary branches, and in estimating the work of the pupils we must insist on conscientious and rigorous effort. As a matter of course not all pupils are equally gifted for both groups, i.e., for natural science and for philology. Notwithstanding this however I could not by any means approve the freedom of election which is at present insisted on so largely. The on-sidedness of endowment for the one or the other group is by no means as absolute in actual experience as is often supposed. The pupils who are specially interested in mathematics and physics are as a rule capable, with a proper

arrangement of instruction, of acquiring without difficulty the philological discipline necessary for every scientific education. Those who show an aptness for philological studies are likewise capable of acquainting themselves with the thought instruments of the mathematical sciences. So far as pertains to "disciplinary" branches therefore I still insist without qualification, on objective *utraquism* because, as I am convinced, it is this alone that will guarantee the actual realization of the minimum of scientific training. A thorough mastery of the disciplinary branches is possible however without any danger of over-burden. The student of mediocre capacity can satisfy even strict requirements with two periods a day, provided the work of the school is done as intensively as the importance of the matter requires.

On the other hand I conceive the administration of the "inspirational" subjects in an entirely different manner. In these subjects the work should really all be done in the school. The teacher would have to direct all his energy and all his pedagogic skill towards quickening the interest of his pupils and enlisting their active cooperation. The memory work would have to be reduced to a minimum and this minimum would have to be noted and impressed by constant repetition within the school itself. Failures on the part of the pupils in these "inspirational" subjects should really never occur. We will likewise find as a rule that wherever the results in the "inspirational" subjects are wholly negative, there will be correspondingly less accomplished in the "disciplinary" subjects. But in the matter of promotions the "inspirational" subjects must not be regarded as nearly so important as the "disciplinary."

What branches therefore are to be regarded as such "inspirational" subjects? According to my notion each of the two "disciplinary" groups need to be supplemented by "inspirational" subjects within their own field. Mathematics and physics, which reveal the uniformity of inorganic nature, must first of all be supplemented in the direction of acquainting the pupil with the world of organisms. Botany and zoology including anthropology must therefore be regarded as such indispensable supplements of the mathematico-scientific groups. The results and the thought-instruments of modern biology are

not yet sufficiently clear and concise to adapt these subjects to the purpose of scientific discipline. They should therefore simply enlist an interest in observing the animal and vegetable kingdoms, and, as far as possible by examining the objects themselves, show how to regard, describe and classify the organisms. In botany it is possible to place an example of the subject under consideration in the hands of each pupil and permit him to form a conception of its structure and various parts by an analysis which he has himself performed. Under no conditions should the memoriter learning of the names of many animals and plants be required. What the pupils learn and acquire in the school work and excursions must be sufficient.

I regard geography as a further supplementation of mathe-matico-scientific instruction, with which geology and mineralogy are readily combined. The greatly improved methods of instruction in geography make it easy to develop the fundamental concepts of physical geography through sense perception. Exercise in the use of maps, which I regard as the most important result of the study of geography, can certainly be accomplished within the class periods, and if the teacher succeeds in awakening the interest of the pupils they will be glad to refer to their atlas at home. The clear images which are thus impressed on their memories must suffice. The memorizing of names and figures must be limited to a minimum. Mathematical and astronomical geography are readily and organically correlated with physics and the strictly scientific character of this discipline likewise thus attains clearer force. Political geography and ethnography as well as everything political and statistical on the other hand is well adapted to instruction in history.

The second group of "disciplinary" subjects, which I have briefly described as "philology," requires a very important supplementation, furnished by the study of history. Philology is constantly becoming more historical, and this applies to both classical and modern philology. The historical foundation therefore becomes increasingly important. On the other hand however the intimate correlation of history with philology gives the former an æsthetic and ethical point of contact which is of vast importance. According to the famous saying of Goethe the best thing about history consists of the enthusiasm which

it inspires. And as a matter of fact we must insist that the teaching of history is not a process of hammering a list of names and dates into the heads of the pupils, but a filling of their souls with new energy.

The history of one's native country and of the ancients is peculiarly adapted to this purpose. Both are also readily correlated with philological study. In my opinion the best results would be obtained if the work in history were in charge of the language teachers. The teacher of German, who has been under no necessity of making any intensive study of history, could quite readily acquire the ability to teach German history and even ancient history is not beyond his reach. It must even be easier for the classical philologist to present ancient history, and the teachers of modern languages have frequent occasion to make a thorough study of the history of the nations whose languages they are studying. I am decidedly of the opinion that the teaching of history, the method of which is unfortunately still but slightly developed, could be improved by such a correlation with philology and at the same time be made a living reality.

The teachers who are at present dealing exclusively with the subjects which I have described as "inspirational" will likely find objection to the arrangement of the course of study here suggested. They may think that they will thus drop in the estimation of their pupils and colleagues because they would likewise be reduced to the position of teachers of the second rank. But this difficulty could easily be overcome by reconstructing the system of examinations and the distribution of subjects according to the suggestions here made. Each teacher who is qualified for a "disciplinary" subject, could also easily acquire the ability to teach an "inspirational" subject. The distribution of subjects would then have to be made so as to give each teacher both disciplinary and inspirational branches. This would offer the not inconsiderable additional advantage of introducing helpful alternation into the work of the teacher, which would enable the teacher to make different sides of his personality felt. The teacher who has been working diligently for two successive periods in mathematics and held the attention of the pupils will find it refreshing to devote a third hour to geography where he can tell of his travels and thus

inspire and hold the attention of his pupils. The teacher also learns to understand the individuality of the pupil better if he has the opportunity of observing their conduct in both the "disciplinary" and "inspirational" subjects. In brief: The more I reflect the greater seem the advantages of the arrangement of the subject matter of instruction here suggested.

The course of study arranged in this way will still require completion by religion and philosophy as indicated above. The æsthetic training of the pupils, as has been frequently observed, is really an important part of the instruction in language. But in addition to this we should recommend for this specific purpose the taking up of drawing because it simplifies and refines the conception of æsthetic form.

The care of the body and the discipline of the will, as we have likewise shown, requires the introduction of gymnastics and manual training.

This would furnish a systematically constructed course of study, which so far as content is concerned, differs but little from what is in actual operation. The principle of division into "disciplinary" and "inspirational" branches is the only thing that is new. And I should like to commend this principle once more to the careful consideration of my colleagues and to the officers of public instruction.

We must now turn to the consideration of the things which a teacher in a secondary school thus organized may be expected to accomplish in a scientific, didactic and ethical way, in order that our pedagogic and educational aim thus clearly circumscribed and characterized may also be actually achieved.

CHAPTER III

THE SCIENTIFIC PROBLEM OF THE SECONDARY TEACHERS

I. THE GENERAL PROBLEM

IF then, the aim of the secondary school, discussed in detail in chapter two, is to be realized, each teacher, no matter what branch he has chosen for his special field, must study the fundamental principles of pedagogy and give some attention to the aim and the method for the guidance of the pupils. Among the general scientific problems, which are obligatory on all teachers, it seems to me therefore that the scientific pursuit of pedagogics is the first and most important.

The opposition to everything pertaining to didactics and methods which has been prevalent among us for a considerable period seems now to be happily on the wane. The charge that we are scholars but not teachers, that we lecture instead of instruct and educate has been made too emphatically and too loudly. Educational administrators have been very active in organizing and developing schools of education during recent years. But notwithstanding this fact there are still many who regard the study of pedagogy at the university as unnecessary, useless and even harmful. At the university, so they say, the student should devote himself wholly to the science of his chosen department. He should study and investigate without being hampered by any thought of his future vocation, so as above all else to become skilled in his department. The majority of hearers, it is added, likewise have no interest in pedagogy during their university years. They want to learn and are not concerned about the fact that they are sometime later on expected to teach.

I am utterly opposed to this view so frequently heard and advocated even by so famous a pedagogue as Fries, both from the viewpoint of theory and likewise on the basis of the facts. I feel on the contrary that whoever goes to the university with

a view to preparation for teaching cannot discover too soon what it really means to be a teacher. He should understand as early as possible what really constitutes his future vocation, the problem of each and every education and the qualities of personality it requires. Pedagogy is no longer an addendum of philosophy and its principles must no longer be deduced from a completed philosophical system. We have already for a long time been working on a system of education which, resting on a biological, psychological, historical and especially sociological basis, is using the inductive and even the experimental methods with increasing effect. Education as a matter of course is now as always the conscious influence of the mature on the immature pupils, but the conditions and aims of this influence now appear in an entirely different light. The zealous pedagogues of the eighteenth century regarded the pupil after the analogy of a mass of tones from which the teacher was supposed to be able to produce whatever form he chose. We now know on the basis of the theory of evolution that every new-born child enters the world with very definite, inherited psychical dispositions. It is the business of education to recognize these existing germs, to cultivate and bring them to their full development, which essentially can and should be nothing more than an aid in development.

Modern pedagogy differs from the older on still another point. The new humanistic educational ideal, as conceived for example by a William v. Humboldt, regards the all-round and harmonious development of personality as the only, as well as the highest aim of education. They seek to realize the conception of personality as an end in itself so vigorously emphasized by Kant in the second formulation of the categorical imperative, and reject every reference to social utility with the greatest finality. Hence William v. Humboldt was dismissed from his office in 1791 because he had vaguely conceived the idea that the only thing really worth while consists of personality. This individualistic conception, which likewise characterized Goethe's ideas, was unable to resist the historical and social-intellectual trend of the nineteenth century. Society imperiously commands the individual who has become independent through social differentiation to return to its service. Perhaps too imperiously, for already in the twentieth century we again

hear the cry for the free development of personality. But our insight into the human soul and into human society now teaches us that man who is born into society is capable of developing a complete and vigorous personality only as he places his energies in the service of a social fact which freely inspires his complete devotion. (See above, pp. 8, 22.) That is to say that in our day even individualism has a social basis and we must say that one of the chief duties of every educator is to enable his pupils to understand the relations of the individual to the whole and impress upon them the obligations which this involves. Modern pedagogy is therefore characterized by the fact that it must be empirical, evolutionary and social.

We shall have occasion farther on, in connection with the discussion of the didactic problems of the secondary teacher, to emphasize the important didactic principles which apply specially to instruction in the advanced schools. We are at present concerned with the scientific pursuit of pedagogy and a brief mention of such parties as specially require consideration for our vocation must suffice.

In my opinion it is of primary importance that every prospective teacher should be concerned about the fundamental principles of his profession. And he will find these of the greatest advantage to him if he approaches them from the evolutionary and sociological viewpoint. And more than this, it seems to me important that every teacher should thoroughly understand the school in which he is working, both as to its organization and its relation to the body politic and the social organism in general. The method of the particular subject is rather a problem of didactics. But I should nevertheless regard it desirable that the universities should give courses on methods in the most important departments, so that the students in the closing semesters of their work might at least have the opportunity of getting some special preparation for their future work.

Anyone who takes up the study of pedagogy quickly sees that some familiarity with psychology is indispensable. The necessity of psychological training for every teacher is so generally acknowledged at present that I need not elaborate this point in detail. I shall therefore confine myself to a few suggestions as to what in psychology is of most importance to the teacher and how he may acquire a knowledge of it most readily and

most quickly. The matter of first importance is the attainment and grasp of the psychological point of view. By this I mean that the teacher's whole being must be thoroughly permeated with the insight that in every moment of his didactic and pedagogic activity he must constantly transplant himself into the souls of his pupils. The teacher must never forget that it is the pupils who must acquire certain materials of instruction, and that the only way in which they can do this is by means of the rudiments, capacities, or, to express it generally, the psychical dispositions which they already possess. Everyone who wishes to teach must certainly understand this. And this is such a self-evident fact that it is actually embarrassing even to make any specific reference to such banalities. But the experienced school-man, who is acquainted with his colleagues, knows that this self-evident requirement is nevertheless but relatively seldom realized. Many teachers cannot understand that their pupils are not interested in their subjects, in fact they refuse to concede that it is their business to awaken interest. They fail to see how it is that this or that is so hard for their pupils to comprehend, that notwithstanding the fact that the subject has been covered repeatedly they still continue to make mistakes. And teachers are too prone to ascribe the cause of the failure to laziness, indolence, poor preparation, or even to the perversity of the pupils. This however is wholly due to the fact that the teachers of the higher schools are as yet but poorly trained in psychology. Psychological training implies first of all practice in the analysis of psychical processes and knowledge of the psychical laws discovered hitherto. Anyone who understands the associative and apperceptive course of ideas, anyone who is familiar with the conditions and limits of the retentiveness of memory, anyone who has a clear conception of the fundamental importance of the sphere of feeling and will, will at least be preserved from the error of requiring or expecting the impossible. He will arrange his work of teaching in accordance with the laws of attention and the phenomena of fatigue, and likewise reach the conclusion that the cause of certain failures is not always the fault of the pupils, but frequently that of the teachers.

The constant use of the latest achievements in psychology and the unremitting endeavor to extend and deepen it are among

the most important of the didactic obligations of the teacher. We shall return to the discussion of these matters farther on.

An acquaintance with experimental methods in psychology can best be acquired from Wundt's *Human and Animal Psychology*. William James' *Principles of Psychology* still remains the most important work in introspective psychology and should be studied by every one. James' *Talks to Teachers* is likewise very rich and suggestive for the teacher. The carefully compiled results of experimental investigation in Max Olfner's books on *Memory and Fatigue* (Trans. by Whipple) are exceedingly valuable.

The matter of greatest importance is this, namely, that the teacher acquire the psychological point of view as early in his vocational career as possible and that he retains it throughout the period of his service. I might also suggest that the teacher with psychological training and interest will here likewise find a fruitful field for productive authorship. The school furnishes abundant opportunity for observations which are entirely spontaneous. At present the theory of various characteristic types and especially the differential psychology of the pupil in the process of development is highly important. Stanley Hall's comprehensive work, *Adolescence*, furnishes an abundance of suggestive material.

The bearing of what is called philosophical training in the narrower sense is somewhat different from psychology. I should myself certainly be the last to depreciate the value of a thorough acquaintance with philosophy. From wide observation I am more and more convinced that philosophy is more a personal matter than a matter of scientific need. Philosophy is more a matter of life than of learning. A philosophy which has been laboriously gathered from comprehensive reading, which has not been vitally and personally assimilated and constructed, certainly cannot so permeate the soul as to be transformed into its essence. But it is only such that in truth deserves the name of philosophy. Anyone who feels the need of penetrating beyond the common-place experiences of life and the positive results of his science to a consistent world-view in terms of his own thinking, will himself discover the ways and means to realize his purpose. But it is certainly highly desirable that many of the secondary teachers possess the philo-

sophical Eros, and everything should be done to cultivate and develop this impulse. But those who are not brought to a genuine philosophical wonder will never profit much from a study of philosophical treatises enforced by the certificate requirements. A skillful specialist with good psychological training will do good work without philosophy and bring the disciplinary power contained in his subject to effective results.

The philosophical training of the teacher acts most vitally and hence most advantageously when he starts with his own special field and seeks to advance to conclusions or principles of greater generality. Personally I have been led to the study of the psychology of language by classical philology and then, through the appointment to teach philosophical propædeutic, extended my studies to a broader field. The Germanist and the modern philologist will have similar experiences in his field. He may perhaps also be led to the problems of poetics and thence to æsthetics and the philosophy of art. The historian is most likely to be attracted to the study of the youngest philosophical discipline, sociology, and thence to the philosophy of history which has recently come more into vogue again. The mathematician and physicist on the other hand will naturally be concerned with the epistemological bases of natural science which will also furnish him with information on the origin, significance and meaning of the fundamental concepts of his science; such as space, time, force and energy, which he will find useful in instruction.

But there is one branch of philosophical study with which every teacher should be acquainted. I refer to the history of philosophy. Even those who do not feel the impulse to independent philosophizing can acquire the most important facts. A knowledge of these facts is however of vast importance in every department of instruction. The Austrian Instructions require the teacher of classical philology to give a résumé of the presocratic philosophy as an introduction to Plato, and he must self-evidently understand the philosophy of Socrates and Plato in order to interpret the dialogues correctly. So likewise the thorough understanding of the philosophical writings of Cicero requires a knowledge of Stoicism, Epicureanism and the philosophy of the Academy. The same is true in many respects in the case of Horace, especially in reference to the

Epistles. But if the classical philologist is acquainted not only with ancient philosophy but likewise with the modern he will be in position to inspire an entirely new life into the lessons of Plato. And according to my view a more profound understanding of Plato's *Apology* requires that the ethical principles it contains be thoroughly explained in the light of modern life, and I have found great satisfaction every time we read the *Apology* in the eager participation and lively interest manifested by the pupils in such expositions. The combination of the ancient with the most modern philosophy impressed itself upon me still more clearly as I once attempted this method in the reading of the *Gorgias* with the pupils of the eighth class. (Prima.) I directed the attention of the pupils to how great an extent Frederick Nietzsche appropriated the ideas expressed by the youthful Callicles in this dialogue, and I could likewise show them the triumphant superiority with which Socrates refuted these views which are being so enthusiastically adopted by our modern youth. The classes were mutually inspiring to both teacher and pupils and they also contributed much towards removing the confusion, frequently quite serious, produced by Nietzsche.

The Germanist, in order to interpret Lessing's *Laokoon*, Schiller's philosophical *Lyrics*, Goethe's *Faust*, and finally for an understanding of the romanticists, must understand almost the whole of modern philosophy, but especially the fundamental principles of Spinoza, Baumgarten (the author of modern æsthetics), Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schleiermacher. And even the instructor in natural science cannot have full success without an acquaintance with the influence of the discoveries and investigations of Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler and Newton on the world-view of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

There remain a large number of special cases in which a knowledge of the history of philosophy is necessary for the teacher, or at least very useful. I think therefore that it is very desirable that more direct reference should be made in the regulations governing the certification of teachers. In Prussia every candidate for the office of teacher must pass an examination in philosophy, which generally also includes an essay. Vaihinger has made valuable suggestions on the selec-

tion of themes for these philosophical essays in his very readable article on *Philosophy in the State Examinations*. He advocates the same principles which I have just set forth, namely, that the examination in philosophy should be made from the viewpoint of the candidate's special branch of study. In the oral examination he would also require the history of philosophy. Here in Austria we do not require quite as much as this. The regulations simply require that the candidate attend a course of lectures in philosophy for a semester and that he give evidence of his work by conducting a conference on some philosophical topic. It has been my privilege to conduct more than three thousand such conferences during the past ten years. The experiences which have thus come to me seem in a general way to confirm the wisdom of this rule. But I should like to see several modifications.

First of all psychology should be separated from philosophy and each candidate should be required to present a Colloquium in psychology, or, what might perhaps be better still, to examine directly in psychology at the teacher's final examination. It would then be necessary to require each student to conduct a Colloquium on two philosophical lectures. And it should be added, that *Introduction to Philosophy* and *History of Philosophy* are best adapted to this purpose. The educational administrators would then have to make provision for such courses at regular intervals. It would also be very desirable if the history of philosophy were not only given in exhaustive courses extending through several semesters, but also that a comprehensive outline be given in a single semester. The history of philosophy is a pretty difficult subject, and the living voice, the stimulus of oral exposition here contributes greatly to the study of the dead letter.

We might therefore say that thorough philosophical training is indeed desirable for every teacher, but it should nevertheless not be made an absolute requirement. On the other hand we should regard the acquaintance with the problems of philosophy and their historical development as the common scientific problem of all teachers, and see to it that the necessary means are discovered to accomplish the solution of this problem.

Prussia still requires an examination in religion of all its candidates for the teaching office. This has not been required

here in Austria since the reorganization of the Gymnasium in 1849. My experiences convince me that a familiarity with the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments is a real necessity in a large number of subjects of instruction and very valuable in most all of them. It has, e.g., always made a profound impression on the class when, in the study of the familiar chorus of *Antigone*, "Much that is mighty lives," I read the eighth Psalm, where the power of man over nature is likewise set forth. But the knowledge of the Bible is even of far greater importance to the Germanist and the historian than to the classical philologist. But alas, this knowledge seems to have greatly decreased during recent decades. I have made a variety of interesting observations on this point, both with teachers and pupils. I was once sitting in a hotel with some twenty colleagues after a meeting of our secondary teachers' union. It happened, I know not how, that our conversation drifted to the familiar phrase, "Now we know in part." I was curious to know whether my colleagues knew the origin of the phrase, so I inquired whence this expression was derived. One thought Lessing was the author, another Goethe but the majority admitted that they did not know. In the circle, consisting largely of Catholics, there was also a Protestant teacher. The latter remarked that the passage seemed to him to come from the Bible somewhere. And they were all greatly surprised to find the passage in the same thirteenth chapter of first Corinthians which begins with the familiar words: "And though I speak with the tongue of men and angels, &c." I have also found that among my pupils the Protestants, who are scarce among us, are as a rule better acquainted with the Bible.

But notwithstanding this I could not agree to make it a required subject in the state examination. As a matter of fact both the political and inter-confessional character of our schools presents no obstacles to such provision, but the candidates would find it an added burden which would seem to have but little practical value, since religious instruction at the higher schools is scarcely ever in the hands of the secular teachers in this predominantly Roman Catholic state. On the other hand I should regard it very desirable that the students be given an opportunity to attend lectures on comparative religion and on the general philosophy of religion. The scientific world of to-

day takes an essentially different attitude to the significance of religion as a factor in civilization from that of the enlightenment of the eighteenth century. The profound awakening and sharpening of the historical sense brought about in the nineteenth century is producing results. The science of anthropology has established the fact that religious ideas belong to the primary thought of the human race. We are in position to show the social origin and the individual construction of human knowledge in the evolution of religions in a manner scarcely equalled in any other subject. This evolutionary process moreover reveals, to all who have learned to interpret them intelligently, how the religious concepts, originally coarsely anthropomorphic are gradually purified and refined by being vitally related with ethical requirements. The classical philologist who is acquainted with these facts can show this to the pupils right in the process of the change undergone in the idea of the gods, especially that of Zeus, during the period from Homer to Sophocles. The historian will have a better understanding of the religious movements of the various epochs and the Germanist will more correctly evaluate the religious element in the creations of Shakespeare, Goethe and the Romantics. Even the physicist and naturalist will learn much from such study on the relation of religion and science which will be valuable in his own department.

An acquaintance with the nature of religion and a knowledge of the doctrines and practices of the confession to which the teacher belongs as well as that to which the majority of the pupils belong, forms a part of our general scientific problem, no matter whether it is included in the examination regulations or not.

The examination regulations, both in Germany and here in Austria, require the correct use of the language of instruction and an acquaintance with the masterpieces of its literature. This requirement is so patent as to need no further comment. I might simply add that this minimum requirement for certification is not sufficient for the needs of instruction. If Nägelsbach could say, the Gymnasial teacher must be a learned man, we must now say, the secondary teacher must be a cultured man. But this does not mean the mere ability to speak German and some knowledge of Goethe and Schiller. We must acquaint

ourselves as thoroughly as possible with the literary, political, economic, social and the general cultural movements of our age. We must understand our age so as to be the better enabled to guard our pupils against the errors of the age. The profound complexity of modern life, which particularly in our great cities pours down upon the pupils of the advanced classes, frequently gives rise to ideas, feelings and desires from which we ordinarily shrink. We cannot, as a matter of course, by any means paralyse all the influences or direct them into the proper channels. But if we are to be in a position to be helpful in any real sense to the youth who are entrusted to our care, we are obliged to understand as thoroughly as possible the temptations to which they are exposed. We shall have occasion to refer to this phase of our work again when we come to the discussion of our social duties.

Finally therefore I might summarize our general professional duties as follows: The thorough mastery of pedagogy and psychology is the irremissible duty of every teacher. General philosophical training, and particularly an acquaintance with the historical development of philosophical problems is very desirable. An intelligent grasp of the nature of religion and an acquaintance with the sources and practices of his own confession will greatly increase the teacher's efficiency in his work. And every teacher must not only be able to use his mother tongue correctly and with facility; he must also be well acquainted with the masterpieces of its literature and be in touch with the thought-currents of his people and his age.

2. THE SPECIAL GROUPS

I wish to add to the above considerations, of our general duties, a few remarks on the preparation of the teacher in the various departments.

A. PHILOLOGY

1. *The ancient languages.* The teacher of classical philology at present encounters a situation which is highly complicated and difficult. First of all the storm of protest against the Gymnasial monopoly has had the objective result of admitting

to university privileges the pupils from the schools where neither of the ancient classics are taught. But of far more serious consequence for classical training is the subjective effect which the protest against the ancient languages, especially against Greek, is beginning to produce. We find unfortunately, even in the camp of the philologists themselves, clear evidences of discouragement. Faith in the disciplinary value of the ancient languages is declining and without this faith it is impossible to inspire the subjective spirit necessary to the proper appreciation of the treasures stored up in the ancient languages and their utilization for the development of youth. And this unfortunately undeniable lethargy even comes at a time when the science of philology is not only in the full bloom of its usefulness, but in fact just in position to gather the harvest provided by millenniums of preliminary toil. The monuments of antiquity, enhanced by many precious discoveries, are now within the reach of scientific investigation. The papyrus-records and the inscriptions have been added to the texts of the ancient authors, with the result that our knowledge of the history of the social and private life of the peoples of antiquity has been wonderfully deepened. Philology has drawn the early Christian and Byzantine literature into the sphere of its investigation and by an intensive study has discovered new points of contact with Hellenism. Psychology and anthropology permeate and vitalize the whole field. The detailed work of analysis, hitherto the chief business of the philologist, will still find much material and many problems for a long time to come. But we may nevertheless undertake to move forward to more comprehensive syntheses, many have in fact already done so. We approach the problem of writing the history of the science, the religion, the ethics and the æsthetics and interpreting the evolution of political and social ideas as well as the economic life of antiquity with definite principles. Anyone who now devotes himself to the study of classical philology discovers great and inspiring problems, which are well adapted to enrich and strengthen the mind and soul. If it should actually be the sad lot of classical philology, that now, just as she is realizing the climax of her scientific endeavor, she must be robbed of her fostering soil, the school, the situation is still not so deplorable. The classical studies still have abundant friends

and the existing regulations still leave abundant room to give proof of the inexhaustible cultural value of antiquity. It therefore becomes a matter of honor to every teacher of the ancient languages so to inspire and interest their pupils that they will in time insist on the preservation of this department of education. Many have sinned in this respect. The over-emphasis of the grammatical phase of the instruction in the ancient languages has diverted the attention from the thought of the authors to the linguistic form. On the other hand the attempt to introduce a large amount of sense-perception, archæology and objective facts into philological instruction has frequently been detrimental to thoroughness. It is necessary therefore to introduce new energy at this point and the primary condition is that the prospective teachers get a correct conception of their educational problem and apply themselves unremittingly to their philological education.

The primary duty of the philologist is to read widely and thoroughly of the ancient authors. These readings must form the foundation upon which the knowledge of classical antiquity as a unique phenomenon of civilization is gradually builded. The professional pursuit of philology is not always favorable to such reading. The necessary specialization imposed by the progress of investigation has the effect of leading the amateur philologist to a one-sided detailed study of a single author or to investigations requiring a perusal of various authors with reference to some specific linguistic or factual phenomenon. Anyone reading Cæsar, e.g., for the purpose of studying the consecutive temporum in the historical present tense, or works through Plato with a view to investigations of terminology, or undertakes to find out the frequency and position of dactyls in trimeter in the *Tragedies* of Sophocles, will assimilate but little of the content of what he has read and will retain still less. We teachers require a different kind of reading and especially with a different end in view. We must acquire a stock of the æsthetically and historically important masterpieces of ancient literature by our own effort which will always be at our command. But we must read these works for their own sake. We must retain their content, structure and as many details as possible, and if possible the language. And at the same time we must attempt to conceive these works in their

relation to the whole of antiquity and hence in their historical significance. We are quite as well aware as the research philologists that antiquity, to quote the famous phrase of Wilamowitz, as an ideal and unity is past. We know that the fifteen centuries between Homer and Justinian have produced profound changes in the relation of the individual to his people, to morals, and to religion and that the intellectual horizon of man has been greatly enlarged. But, if I am permitted the expression, there are permanent levels in this process of evolution. In this rise and fall of history there are several pinnacles which remain forever visible from every side. And we can say very literally that there are products in the history and civilization of antiquity whose beneficent influence is by no means spent and is not likely to be spent within any conceivable period of time. The acquisition of these vital elements of antiquity and their application to the problems of modern life is the goal which every teacher of ancient languages should set up for himself.

The certificate regulations in the majority of the German states and likewise in Austria confine the requirements to the authors read in the schools. But teachers cannot be satisfied with this. No one can understand Sophocles without some acquaintance with Aeschylus and Euripides, and the intellectual life of Athens in the fifth century B. C. can never be appreciated in all its vital splendor without having read Aristophanes and Thucydides. On the other hand I should gladly waive Lysias aside, and induce the candidates to devote some attention to Aristotle and read the *Poetics*, the *Nichomachean Ethics* and especially the *Politics*.

In the essay cited above, Arnim very correctly indicated that every philologist should likewise practice translating. On this point I beg to offer a suggestion to everyone wishing to prepare for teaching the ancient languages. Let him provide himself at the very beginning of his university studies with a notebook for classic gems. Then whenever in his reading he comes upon a passage which impresses him as important and interesting for any reason whatsoever, let him transcribe it in the original in his notebook and underneath a translation made as exact and careful as possible with special reference to content and form. He will thus gradually acquire a splendid collec-

tion of gems of antiquity, a collection made by personal choice and individual effort, which corresponds to the individuality of the teacher and is therefore readily fixed in memory. He at the same time practices translation and acquires invaluable materials for vitalizing his instruction.

Reading must likewise furnish the basis for the constant increase and enrichment of linguistic ability. Arnim correctly observes, that the philologist should study the theory of phonetics and verbal structure under the linguist, and syntax under the philologist. A familiarity with the elements of comparative philology is indispensable in elementary instruction in Greek as also in the interpretation of Homer. And a clear understanding of the sentence structure of the ancient languages can only be acquired by absorption in these languages themselves through intensive interpretation, through thorough analysis. But this presupposes — and here I repeat one of my oft expressed pet phrases — above everything else psychological training. The peculiar flexibility of the Greek language which makes it possible to express the most delicate nuances of thought appropriately, which frequently in the midst of an address as if by the slight pressure of a secret button yields a new coloring, can only be appreciated by one whose mind has become pliable by practice in analyzing psychical processes. I have illustrated this with examples in my essays on *Psychology in the Service of Grammar and Interpretation* and *The Disciplinary Value of Instruction in the Ancient Languages*. Both for the thorough understanding of grammatical structure as well as for the interpretation of an author it is absolutely necessary to transport oneself into the soul of the speaker and subjectively reexperience what is said and written. It then becomes an easy matter both in grammar and in reading to suffuse the subject with life and arouse interest in it. And the psychological interpretation of language likewise confirms the view that verbal and real understanding always proceed together and mutually interpenetrate and support each other. In my opinion therefore it is the duty of every philologist not only to study psychology to the extent required of all teachers; in addition to this he must even make language itself and the products of language the subject of a penetrating psychological analysis.

We remarked above that reading forms the most important basis for the professional training of the philologist. This cannot be over-emphasized, but we must always add that reading alone is not wholly sufficient. We also need summarized statements of ancient history, of the literary development as well as of the public and private life of the Greeks and Romans. Scientific research, by appropriating the inscriptions, the papyri and the remaining relics of antiquity which the spade has brought to light, has in a very wide sense enriched and corrected our idea of the ancients. A recognition of the results of this research is likewise an indispensable requirement for the understanding of the authors. But this recognition is required in the rules governing certification and the university instruction makes ample provision for it, so that I can pass it by without any further elaboration. Touching the matter of philosophy I would simply refer to what has been said above and only observe in conclusion that the teacher of philology needs both classical and modern training. The value of the ancients is greatly enhanced when viewed in the light of the modern man.

2. *Modern Languages. (French and English.)*—The duties of the modern philologist are essentially different from those of the teacher of ancient languages. As a matter of course the instruction in modern languages is likewise supposed to contribute to a deeper understanding of language in general, but the most important aim still remains the practical command of the language of a modern people and to enable the pupils to understand the language quickly and correctly and to speak and write it with facility. It is therefore the first and most important duty of the teacher to acquire this knowledge himself. To this end, after preliminary intensive theoretical study at home—but not without this foundation—a prolonged stay among the people whose native language it is is the best method. It is far less important that the student should complete a course of study or research in Paris or London and to this end spend days in the libraries. He will accomplish his purpose far better by hearing lectures on language and literature, visiting parliament and courts of law and seek every opportunity to practice the living use of the language himself. If he has acquired a correct expression—if possible with phonetic appreciation—as well as facility in speech and a

rich vocabulary, especially in reference to the common things of life, he has accomplished a great, perhaps the greatest part of his educational duty. As matters stand at present the chief concern of the teacher of modern languages is the ability to use the language.

Historical grammar and the literature of the language under consideration occupies so large a place in the conduct of the university and in the certificate requirements, that students are not greatly tempted to neglect these things. That the teacher must have a general knowledge of the literature is self-evident. And it is quite as evident that he would carefully study the suggestive relations of foreign literatures to the German. And the modern philologist should be acquainted with ancient literature and mythology.

Psychological training is quite as important in instruction in modern linguistics as in ancient. French offers exceptionally rich material in the matter of the position of the words and variation of meaning. It is of course not always easy in the highly developed and consequent highly complicated nature of modern language, to discover the psychological thread, but the search for it is even more interesting for this very reason. At any rate French teachers should never forget, that it was the masters of romance philology preeminently who insisted on, practiced and cultivated the psychological method of language interpretation.

3. *German* (as subject of instruction). The teacher of German requires philosophical training and an acquaintance with general literature. He should have a complete command of the language, facility in speech and a taste for poetry. Many teachers of German are not sufficiently familiar with their own literature, which must be regarded the very first and most important duty of the Germanist. The masterpieces of Lessing, Schiller, Goethe, Grillparzer, Kleist and even Heibel and Otto Ludwig should be so thoroughly familiar in all their details to the teacher of German that everything they contain should be at his command at any moment. And he should also have a first hand knowledge of the works of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The study of the old German language and literature is likewise necessary. Anyone wishing to fully assimilate the German

nature and the German spirit must be thoroughly familiar with the development of the German language, with its legendary poetry, with chivalry and the Minnesingers. But here there may be too much of the good thing. The study of the Gothic and other old germanic languages requires much time and energy, and the student who applies himself diligently may readily find that he has but little time left for modern literature. But the latter is undoubtedly of far greater value. In actual practice he will never have occasion to read the Nibelungenlied and Walther with his pupils for more than a semester, whilst he will constantly use accurate knowledge of modern literature in both the higher and lower classes and can never know enough of it. And there is still another fact requiring mention. Modern literary science has developed a method of its own during the last decades which is essentially different from that of the old philology.

If the Germanist is to be a modern man — and the teacher of German must be, even more so than the other secondary teachers — it is a matter of first importance that he devote his undivided effort to penetrating as deeply as possible into the matter and spirit of German literature from the sixteenth century onward. No one can ever fully appreciate the literature of a people without considering it in connection with their religious, political, social, technical, scientific and economic development. The Germanist therefore needs a vast amount of knowledge of the history of civilization. The frequent combination of German and history among secondary teachers is consequently quite fortunate, and its still greater frequency highly desirable. Thus, e.g., the historically trained Germanist perceives at once that the rise of the political drama in the middle of the eighteenth century (*The London Merchant* and *Miss Sara Sampson*) finds its real explanation in the social and economic advance of the citizen class. The closing lines of Chamisso's poem "Die Weiber von Weinsberg":

"Im Jahr 1140, wo ich's verzeichnet fand,
Galt Königswort noch heilig im deutschen Vaterland."

are incomprehensible without the historical knowledge that at the time when Chamisso wrote the poem several German princes

had promised their people constitutions, but failed to fulfill the promises.

The Germanist will also find a knowledge of general literature indispensable. Lessing, Schiller, Goethe and Grillparzer contain linguistic and factual reminiscences of Ovid, Vergil and Horace in no inconsiderable number and lack of familiarity with these poets has even resulted in erroneous conceptions among learned investigators of our own age.

The value of philosophical training for the teacher of German likewise requires emphasis. In order to appreciate Schiller's philosophical Lyrics an acquaintance with Kant's aesthetics and ethics is of special importance. Any one, e.g., who wishes to understand and interpret the pearl of Schiller's Thought-poems, "The Ideal and the Life," must know Kant's "Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics" and "The Critique of Practical Reason." Thus the two lines of the first strophe:

"Zwischen Sinnenglück und Seelenfrieden bleibt dem Menschen nur die bange Wahl," are incomprehensible except from the viewpoint of Kant's rigoristic theory of morality. So likewise the line: "Kein Erschaffner hat das Ziel erflogen." Lessing's "Laokoon" contains passages whose sense can only be appreciated by those who are acquainted with Baumgarten's theory of the beautiful. But whilst the knowledge of certain philosophical systems contributes chiefly to the better understanding of certain poems and particular passages, psychological training is indispensable for the whole treatment of grammar and interpretation and we accordingly emphasize once more the fact that every Germanist even as every other philologist must be a trained psychologist.

We might summarize these requirements as follows: The teacher of German above all else needs a comprehensive historico-philosophic and a literary-aesthetic training. He must have a complete mastery of the language, culture and literature of the German people both in its progressive development and in the climax of its achievement. And further he must have an acquaintance with general literature and acquired the ability to penetrate his subject both psychologically and philosophically.

4. *History.* The secondary teacher of history needs two things in particular. He must seek to attain a general con-

spectus of general historical evolution of the human race from pre-historic times to the present. In order to accomplish the real object of historical instruction, the development of the historic sense, the teacher must have the whole course of development in mind at every class period, so as to be able to direct attention to the relation of events and the various parallels in historical phenomena. In addition to this he must have at his command a wealth of information on the epochal periods of history so as to be able to describe them vividly and impressively. It is not an easy matter to meet both these requirements but they are both indispensable to the successful impartation of historical instruction. A more intimate coordination of philology and history would materially reduce the difficulties of prospective teachers. The classical philologist must at the same time master Greek and Roman history and he would not find any great difficulty in familiarizing himself with the other periods in addition. The same principle applies to the teacher of modern languages and especially so to the teacher of German. Such a coordination with philology together with a corresponding separation from Geography, which always tends to develop in the direction of the natural sciences, would bring great gain to instruction in both philology and history.

The student can most readily acquire a survey of the evolution of civilization by taking a course of lectures on the subject under a spirited lecturer on universal history. But under present conditions the universal historians are constantly becoming more rare. Karl Lamprecht has announced his purpose upon the completion of his history of the Germans to devote himself to general history, and it is to be hoped that his famous institute in Leipzig may soon produce men with broad outlook and an appreciation of the universal who will greatly reduce the difficulties of future generations of teachers of history in the matter of the correlation of events. But even if the university makes no provision, the future teacher of history cannot repudiate this exceedingly important professional duty. He must acquire a general conspectus of the evolution of human culture by his own individual study. Working through a *History of the World* extending through many volumes is ill adapted to this purpose. In the first place this would require a number of years and then the wealth of details would increase the

difficulty of grasping it as a unitary whole. Permit me to suggest to the young historian what may perhaps sound somewhat like fatherly advice. Read Schiller's inaugural address at frequent intervals, master it thoroughly and illustrate its principles by examples of your own. It seems to me this address is nothing short of wonderful in the abundance of suggestions and ideas it contains which can only now be correctly and fully utilized. Thus, e.g., Schiller's suggestion concerning the use to be made of the reports of the wanderings of primitive tribes in the reconstruction of the history of primitive man can only be fully appreciated in our own age on account of the extraordinary increase in the amount of material at our command and its elaboration by modern anthropology. The observation illustrated by an example, that the explanation of every particular fact of the present time involves the whole history of the world is likely to inspire the historic sense more powerfully and instructively than an extended dissertation. If the prospective historian takes the trouble to illustrate these principles with new examples of his own and to get a clear grasp of them he will find that he is making substantial progress.

The old question whether history reveals any laws has recently been very widely and thoroughly discussed. Windelband and Rickert have taken a decidedly negative attitude and maintain that history in its very nature differs from natural science by the very fact that history has nothing to do with the investigation of general laws, but confines itself to separate facts. It is the business of the science of history — according to Rickert — to select from among these facts such as have cultural value. That is to say, Rickert conceives history as a science of facts on the one hand and of culture on the other and as distinguished from natural science by these two characteristics. History specialists will in a general way readily adopt this conception. They no longer regard it their business to search for the principles of historical development; they can become wholly absorbed in their particular problem without being annoyed by any philosophical scruples.

This conception would also be very acceptable to the history teacher, if Rickert had not materially reduced its value by his attitude toward scientific psychology. Rickert does not wish to deny the possibility of "the historian being able to learn some-

thing from scientific psychology." He is of the opinion however that in the majority of cases "the general conceptual knowledge which he has already acquired in the pre-scientific stage is sufficient for his purposes." And he adds, "In fact he may perhaps find that his prescientific general knowledge will be a safer guide than any psychological theories, because his descriptions will thus be more readily understood by all who share these ideas with him than would be possible with the use of technical terms."

This will not inspire the historian who reads it to give much attention to the study of psychology. He will rather feel that he is superior to it. From my point of view therefore I must protest against it most vigorously. I am thoroughly of the opinion that an intensive study of the human soul is the only way for the historian to acquire an insight into the nature of history and a knowledge of the real significance of instruction in history. If, as Rickert claims, history is really to be a cultural science, we must be able to show clearly what benefit man may derive from a knowledge of his spiritual history. It should be the aim of the history teacher to transform historical truths into living realities with a view to enlarging the minds of his pupils with new powers. And this is certainly impossible without a knowledge of the general laws of spiritual development, i.e., if he is nothing more than acquainted with human nature, but at the same time a scientific psychologist.

Rickert refers to the fact that many great historians paid little or no attention to the scientific psychology of their age, and concludes, even with direct reference to Lamprecht, that the application of scientifically generalized concepts "has produced more confusion than contributed to progress." In reply I should like to direct the teacher of history to Lamprecht himself and urge them to learn from his *History of the Germans* and perhaps better still from his little book on *Modern History*, how much help the historian can gain for the intellectual analysis of historical material from the study of modern scientific psychology.

In his essay on "The Good and Bad Influence of History on Life," Nietzsche has described the psychological effects of the study of history with telling effect. Every teacher of history would do well to reflect on what he has to say concerning the

“monumental” and more especially concerning the “antiquarian” type of history. It is peculiarly befitting the teacher and the learner of history to assume the attitude of the “perpetuator and worshipper, who, with fidelity and love, is peering back into the things from whence he has come, in which he has come to be.” To discover facts in the common-places of life which point to ages long past, enlarges and enriches the soul. Our division of time into weeks takes us back to the ancient Babylonians, the year to the Egyptians, the word “Kaiser” and the names of the months of July and August show how two men (Julius and Augustus Cæsar) together with the empire they builded, extend the impress of their work even to the present time. To call attention to such facts as these is one of the important duties of the historian, who should always begin with the living realities of the present. He may indeed learn from Nietzsche’s essay just cited that there is also such a thing as historic excess, which is harmful, that he may be the more concerned to seek diligently for what is useful in history.

A general conspectus, psychological penetration, and vital appreciation of the present, might therefore be called the primary requirements of the teacher of history. In addition to this he needs a wealth of detailed information, as previously observed. This requires the historian to make investigations of the sources in various periods. These enable him to get hold of threads on various phases, familiarize him with the records and permit him to penetrate more deeply into the period under consideration at definite points.

I would also recommend to the history teacher the careful reading of collections of letters and memoirs, because they convey a more vivid picture of epochs or persons than anything else.

Political history, notwithstanding the criticisms brought against it during recent decades, will remain for a long time to come the chief business of the historian. It constitutes the foundation upon which civilization builds. Edward Meyer has just recently emphasized this view in the introductory volume of his *History of Antiquity* (3 ed. 1910), a book which every teacher of history should certainly have read. “But even the separation of the history of civilization from political history is only relatively justified. For just as man and the

human social group is a spiritual unit, so likewise is his historical life; the real and highest duty of the science of history can therefore be nothing less than the description of this life in its totality. Hence it follows without further comment, that of the two political history holds the dominant place.¹ For the political compact governs the external organization, upon which the existence and manner of life of all its subjects depends, its fortunes therefore not only have a direct effect upon each individual, but likewise reacts upon every institution for which it is responsible and hence are likewise of vital significance to the cultural and economic life."

This is not intended to mean that the historian is simply required to study the history of states and their territorial changes. His aim to comprehend mankind in its totality however precludes his indifference to the evolution of religion, science and art. An understanding of the various economic institutions and consequently, some familiarity with the basal principles of political economy is peculiarly valuable to the teacher of history. The economic conception of history proposed by Marx and Engels fails to do full justice to certain phases of historical development, but it nevertheless furnishes an important heuristic principle. In every case of a great world-movement we must seek for the economic motives and we may rest assured that this setting of the problem will yield a profounder understanding of the period under consideration.

It naturally follows from the economic interpretation of history that the historian must make a study of the legal conditions of social organization and he must therefore acquire a knowledge of the fundamental principles of jurisprudence. These are likewise of vast importance in political history and even on this account indispensable to the historian.

It is of course not necessary that the teacher of history make a systematic study of all these branches. He cannot be a specialist in theology, art, economics and law combined. He must simply keep clearly in mind the fact that all history begins with present conditions and in the final analysis its aim is to enrich and invigorate the present generation. If, actuated by this idea, he is careful to understand the spirit of his own age, to comprehend its economic conditions and its social char-

¹ I do not think so.

acteristics, he will readily discover the ways and means adapted to his individuality for acquiring the necessary information.

5. *Philosophical Propaedeutic.* This department may be correlated with the mathematics-natural science disciplines quite as well as with those of philology. I introduce my discussion of this topic at this point chiefly for the reason that I have approached philosophy through philology and in giving instruction in philosophical propaedeutic for a number of years made it a practice in the treatment of logic and psychology to draw materials from grammar and literature as well as from mathematics and physics.

Any one who has already decided while a student at the university to prepare for teaching philosophical branches will naturally make a thorough study of philosophical problems and particularly history of philosophy. The teacher's success in inspiring his pupils to reflective thought will largely depend on how much of a philosopher he is himself. It is evident that the teacher will naturally incline towards teaching those parts of philosophy which are most intimately related with his specialty. And this is by no means a disadvantage as is witnessed by the express mention made of it in the Austrian Regulations of the year 1900 (p. 274). We read: "The difference of specialized training of the teacher not only pertains to his relation to the text book, but to the whole matter of instruction. In case he has specialized in history and language he will naturally take a different attitude to certain parts of logic and psychology than if he had specialized in mathematics and the natural sciences. But this difference of coloring of all instruction, so far as results are concerned, is on the whole not objectionable." The teacher should rather strive to impress the full force of his scientific and personal individuality. Otherwise his teaching will lack inspiration, and in philosophical propaedeutic inspiration is the chief thing.

Notwithstanding this however we must note the fact that in logic instruction the examples of physics and mathematics are indispensable. The philologist who teaches propaedeutic must cultivate these departments sufficiently to acquire a mastery of the fundamental concepts. To secure results in the teaching of logic requires a wide variety of illustration. It is of great importance to have at command a large store of examples

and to possess sufficient knowledge to criticise the examples submitted by the pupils both formally and from the viewpoint of fact.

I should like to offer a suggestion to teachers and especially to the future authors of text books in logic. There is a field which offers a rich store of most interesting examples that would almost always be readily understood, that has not yet been utilized in instruction nearly as much as it should be. I refer to jurisprudence and its practical application. Here the processes of logic appear in their purity and at the same time in such variety as scarcely occurs anywhere else. Here we find the process of the subsumption of the particular case under the general principle, a detailed analysis of the facts in the case and the selection of the pertinent elements, and finally, a vast variety of processes of inference. The teacher of logic who has the opportunity and the taste to make a study of legal procedure will be in position to vitalize his instruction to a remarkable degree. He will gradually make the discovery that logic is far from being the supreme lawgiver of thought as it has usually been regarded for more than two thousand years. The rôle of logic in science and the affairs of life is far more modest than that. It must confine itself to a single problem, namely, to give us a clear conception by showing the precise relation of ideas the amount of universal and attested experience, contained in every particular experience or in every complex of experiences. The real problem of logic is the analysis and organization of ideas. It is not the business of logic to decide questions of truth or error. This can only be done by a profound penetration into the actual conditions involved by the facts. The examples drawn from legal practice reveal this very clearly. Logic, consisting of the analysis and organization of thought, reveals the psychological, social, economic and moral relationships. It makes it possible for us to survey the whole field and finally form our conclusions on the basis of a thorough comprehension of the dominant truth.

That is to say, as I am thoroughly convinced, we are in need of a logic which is based on an empirical foundation.

If the teacher has convinced himself of the necessity of such a treatment of the subject he will lay stress on the theory of method and direct his efforts towards a more comprehensive

and a more profound understanding of the nature of scientific procedure. And thus he will constantly increase his ability to advance the scientific training of his pupils by his instruction in logic.

Psychology seems to me to be the more important part of pro-paedeutic instruction. The matter of primary importance here is that the teacher should be as thoroughly trained a psychologist as possible. He should be familiar with the results and the methods of experimental psychology, and at the same time never neglect the introspective element. This phase of psychology is by far the most important. The zealous teacher will find that every time he repeats the same subject new phases will be revealed and that it is a matter of genuine satisfaction to have the opportunity to study it again. Spiritual life is so inexhaustively rich that the investigator is constantly discovering something new. Has not even Heraclitus observed: "You cannot search out the confines of the soul, even though you should step off every avenue, so profound is its depth."

It seems to me important that the teacher of psychology be at home in literature and art. Nothing so inspires the pupils of the higher classes than the psychological analysis of several scenes of a familiar poem. They participate eagerly and thus acquire practice in psychological analysis and at the same time get a better understanding of the poets. It is no longer a matter of question that the psychologist must understand the fundamental facts of physiology. It is perhaps more necessary here to warn against an excess of physiology, than to insist upon its study. Physiology furnishes no information whatever concerning the nature of the psychical process, no matter how it may be stated, it only describes the phenomena which accompany it.

Personally I regard it far more important that the teacher should be familiar with the theory of evolution and acquire the assurance that everything psychical bears the most intimate relation to the preservation and enrichment of life. In my *Text Book of Psychology* I have attempted to apply the biological point of view to the whole field of mental activity, and I think I have demonstrated the fruitfulness of this method. The whole process of thought and cognition appears in a new light, the nature of attention, the origin of the concepts, all

of these become clear and vital. The theory of the emotions likewise profits quite as much by this method of interpretation. And we may add that in recent years many biologists are giving increased attention to the influence of psychical processes and express the conviction that it is utterly impossible to reduce the phenomena of life to mechanical and chemical processes. This gives increased significance to the biological viewpoint in psychology.

The teacher of psychology readily finds occasion to treat of ethical and aesthetic problems in the course of his instruction. It is exceedingly desirable therefore that he should feel at home in these fields. Here the evolutionary viewpoint is likewise richly suggestive. I should like to direct attention in this connection to the very valuable and instructive work by Westermarck, *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*.

Summarizing, I might say that the teacher of philosophical propaedeutic should make the synthesis of versatility and thoroughness so indispensable to every secondary teacher his own motto in even greater degree.

B. MATHEMATICS AND THE NATURAL SCIENCES

1. *Mathematics*. At the universities the mathematicians occupy themselves almost exclusively with the so-called higher mathematics, i.e., with differential and integral calculus, the theory of functions, etc. This knowledge contains scarcely anything that can be adapted to any practical use in instruction. The importance attaching to rigorous scientific discipline has frequently given rise to the expression of the wish that elementary mathematics also be explained and deduced in strict scientific fashion at the university. Director Joseph Jacob, in an important pamphlet on the *Austrian Secondary School*, among other things, calls attention to the fact that the history of mathematics abounds in suggestions for the teacher, and recommends the reading of the classics of mathematics. He also insists that the mathematician should seek a clear understanding of the logical functions which he employs.

And I might add that in addition to the history of mathematics and the logic of mathematics the psychology of the mathematical process is of vast importance to the teacher.

He should seek, by means of independent reflection, and also by suitable experiments with himself and his colleagues, to acquire a clear conception of the significance of the constructive imagination, the memory and finally of abstract thought in mathematics. He may perhaps in this way discover criteria by which to distinguish mathematical talent. He will at least discover by such investigations that industry and intensive repetition accomplish more in mathematical training than is generally supposed. According to my experience it would appear that the most essential mathematical principles may be acquired even without exceptional talent, and this seems to me after all to be the chief object of mathematical instruction.

It is also important that the teacher of mathematics acquire some knowledge of practical affairs in order that he may understand the application of the mathematical formulae to surveying, military operations, the insurance business, etc. I have shown above that these formulae only acquire real significance in physics.

2. *Physics and Chemistry.* It is matter of first importance to the teacher of these two subjects that he begin to practice experimentation early and familiarize himself with the apparatus. But on this point it is necessary to observe that experiments entered upon for the ultimate purpose of research do not impart a sufficient degree of acquaintance and familiarity for the purposes of the teacher. They must be exercises which deal predominantly with the school experiments, which clearly reveals the law which is being illustrated in its universal significance.

The necessity of mathematical training for the physicist and the chemist is so universally acknowledged and so constantly impressed on the students as to make any reference to it here superfluous. On the other hand it seems worth while to emphasize even here that the teacher should master the methods of investigation and the instruments of thought which are constantly becoming more exact. Here also the history of their subjects will be of great service to them.

In optics and acoustics and partly also in the theory of heat the physicist comes into touch with the physiology of the senses as well as the psychology of sense perception. He must know enough psychology to distinguish precisely the physical, the physiological and the psychical phases of the process. Pitch is doubt-

less a function of the wave length, but the power of distinguishing higher and lower tones, as well as arranging in orderly series nevertheless rests upon psychical dispositions. Physicists without psychological training frequently fall into gross misunderstandings at this point.

It is also well for the physicist to know practical affairs and especially to study the technical use of the knowledge of nature. It is not an easy task for the teacher to keep abreast of the progress of the age, especially in the case of those located in small country towns. For this purpose the vacation courses are to be strongly recommended. These furnish the teacher with the latest discoveries and improvements made in his science.

3. *Natural history.* The scientific development of zoology and botany has resulted in placing morphology and biology in the foreground at the present time. It follows as a natural consequence that students chiefly confine themselves to investigations to which the primitive organisms are better adapted than those more highly developed. Important as these investigations are for an understanding of the elementary organic processes and valuable as they can be made for the purposes of instruction, we must not forget that the teacher of these subjects dare not neglect more extensive, systematic information. He must have complete knowledge of the fauna and flora of his own territory, otherwise he will be required to refer to his guide-book too frequently when making excursions with his pupils. He should also be informed on the forms and conditions of life in the plant and animal kingdom in other lands.

It scarcely requires mention that the teacher of natural history must understand the use of the microscope and scalpel and be able to show others how to use them. The more he makes use of them the greater the likelihood of inspiring interest on the part of the pupils. It is also generally conceded now that the botanist and zoologist likewise make considerable use of chemistry and physics. The treatment of the nervous system in human anatomy and physiology brings the teacher into vital touch with psychology and here also, just as in the case of physics, it is important to make clear distinctions between the physiological and psychical phases of the various processes.

The vast importance recently attained by animal and vegetable geography requires the historian of nature to make a study of geography and the history of origins. It would even be well if he were also prepared for the teaching of geography.

4. *Geography.* The extraordinary progress in the department of geography has been accompanied by a most gratifying activity in the sphere of methods. Here in Austria Penck especially has trained a whole generation of exceptionally fine teachers who, equipped with methods that are scientifically attested, know how to inspire the interest of their pupils. These circumstances relieve me of the necessity of enlarging on the duty of the teacher of geography.

We have now discussed the professional problems of the secondary teacher both in general and in detail. The guiding thought throughout this discussion has been the difficult combination of versatility and thoroughness with the positive (in antithesis to the critical) tendency. The professional equipment of the secondary teacher constitutes the indispensable foundation for the exercise of his calling, which consists of teaching and training. As we now turn our attention to the didactic problems of our vocation we shall likewise discover new and difficult syntheses. We shall also make the positive tendency the guiding principle in our didactic problems.

CHAPTER IV

DIDACTICS

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF METHOD

THE purpose we should seek to realize on behalf of our pupils, we trust, has been made sufficiently clear in the discussions contained in chapter two the results of which are summarized in the form of brief propositions on page 83. It is our duty to train the pupils which we receive from the elementary schools to intellectual independence and a sense of moral responsibility and thus prepare them for both the university and practical life. And we have proposed the impartation of a general education, consisting of the discipline of intellect, feeling and will as the means best adapted to this end. We have described the kind of intellectual discipline belonging to the secondary school as scientific training.

This accordingly defines the aim and at the same time furnishes the cue to the course of study. But on the other hand these definitions say nothing about the methods we shall have to employ in order to realize the desired goal. The matter of method therefore is one of the most difficult of the didactic problems of the secondary school. True, we have an abundant literature on methods in the various branches. And there is no lack of general advice on such matters as fidelity to duty, and professional dignity, conduct in and out of school, relation to pupils, parents, colleagues and to the educational authorities. But of the general psychological and didactic principles which must form the basis of the whole business of teaching, of the well-established and evident principles which should govern every secondary teacher we scarcely find any clearly elaborated statement anywhere. It seems to me, if mutual cooperation, unfortunately sadly lacking among us, is to become an actual fact and produce the desired results that some such statement is absolutely necessary. The nature of our method of teaching

is entirely unique and, if we are to fulfill our vocation in any degree, requires the realization of most difficult combinations. We shall have to learn from our colleagues in the public school not only how to impart the materials of instruction and render them comprehensible, but even to so infuse it into the whole school so as to become the complete possession of the pupils. We must endeavor to perfect ourselves in this method which is the only one possible in the lower grades, and at the same time seek to get the secret of success in getting the pupils to do independent work, from our university instructors, especially those who conduct practical courses. We are supposed to develop intellectual independence and the sense of moral responsibility and at the same time maintain our authority. We are supposed to impart positive information and at the same time we must never forget that the permanent possession of this information and skill is not the most important thing so far as our pupil is concerned, but much rather that the effort required in the acquisition of the facts and the discipline of mind and character thus brought about must be regarded as the permanent result.

It is not a simple task to meet such varied requirements. But we have frequently observed before; difficult and impossible are two entirely different things, and obstacles are capable of being overcome. Our pupils are under our care for a period of from seven to nine years, certainly not too short a time. During these years our pupils pass the pubertal period which works a profound change in personality. Particularly an intense impulse towards independence reveals itself during this period. This impulse is by no means to be forcefully suppressed. It is rather our duty to furnish this natural impulse its proper nurture and guidance. We receive the pupils from the public school where they were accustomed to do their study in the school. In the lower classes we must therefore pursue the same method. But even then we shall have to require a small amount of work at home in order to awaken the sense of responsibility. Training and developing the sense of responsibility is in fact our most important problem. And here unfortunately there is much wanting from two points of view. On the one hand we frequently require and expect a greater degree of intellectual and moral independence from the pupils of the lower classes

than their psychological capacity permits. And on the other hand we hold the pupils of the more advanced classes so firmly to leading strings, that they find the gymnasium an intolerable restraint from which there is no hope of escape. It is in fact not an easy matter, in seeking to develop independence, always to strike the psychological moment, the correct tack and stay within the proper bounds of conduct.

I have experienced a growing consciousness of these difficulties, throughout the course of my professional career, but I have at the same time seen that they are by no means insuperable. I have found it comparatively easy in the lower classes to drill in the lessons effectively during school hours and at the same time require a small amount of outside work of the pupils daily. I have always kept a strict oversight of these lessons with the result that the required work soon became so habitual with the pupils that only in the rarest cases would a pupil fail to show results. In the more advanced classes moreover I made it a point to establish the same habit of preparation, always appealing to the pupil's independence as strongly as possible. I have even gone so far as to challenge them to criticise my lectures and have more than once had occasion in both the higher classes in logic and psychology to say to the pupils: "And so you do not accept everything I say." And only in the rarest instances was it necessary to apply or suggest disciplinary penalties. Neither was there any evidence that the incitement to independent judgment and my direct challenge of criticism affected my authority in the least. The contrary was rather the case.

My psychological and philosophical studies suggested the effort to reduce my didactic experience to system and base it on general principles. To this end I first of all sought fellowship with colleagues of the public school, among whom methodical confidence is usually greater than among us. I gained much inspiration and information from two summer courses for public and high school teachers at which I was one of the lecturers. At first it appeared to me that instruction is more difficult in the public school than in ours, and this chiefly on account of the fact that the public school has no such means of eliminating the incapable and indolent pupils as we have. Upon deeper reflection however I discovered, by means of careful observation

of the teachers' conferences, that this duty of sifting devolving upon us, whilst reducing the difficulties, in no way results in any improvement in the instruction. We are too much inclined to shift the poor results of teaching to the indolence, limited capacity or inadequate preparation of the pupils and frequently neglect to ask ourselves conscientiously whether we have really done everything in our power to overcome these difficulties.

The difference in the matter of methods between the public and the secondary school lies in an entirely different quarter. The knowledge of the subject matter to be imparted in the public school is comparatively easy for the teacher, almost a matter of self-evidence. With us on the contrary the subject-matter is frequently quite complex and difficult. It is no small task for the teacher to master the material, and make it completely his own. Not infrequently we must first learn what we are to teach. And we must add the further fact: namely, the university has accustomed us to systematic thought, such as science requires. Even our courses of instruction are frequently more systematic than methodical. Hence it follows that the preparation for the instruction period is frequently rather a scientific and systematic task. This requires a large measure of our energy so that but little remains for methodical and didactical elaboration. The synthesis of science and pedagogy, discussed in the first chapter, is in fact very difficult and not possible for every one.

But these obstacles involved in our scientific training and in the difficulty of the subject-matter must be overcome no matter what the cost. We fail to meet our exalted social obligation if we do not direct every energy towards making ourselves teachers and trainers in the fullest sense of the term. We are expected to instil scientific training in our pupils and to inspire in them the sense of moral responsibility. We must therefore search out the way, i.e., the method, that leads most directly and most certainly to this high goal. Many will of course find this way themselves, if, thoroughly equipped with knowledge and naturally filled with a love for youth, they bring to their task a fixed purpose and keep themselves under constant self-discipline. But the discovery of established methods of instruction which could be applied to any kind of subject matter and at any stage of development would certainly sim-

plify this task for many teachers. I think I have discovered two such principles which must give direction to the whole course of our instruction. One of these is the awakening of interest and the other the habit of regular work.

Didactically, these principles are neither new nor original. I might rather apply to them the profound scriptural saying concerning the divine law: "For this commandment which I command thee this day, it is not hidden from thee, neither is it far off. It is not in heaven, that thou shouldest say, Who shall go up for us to heaven, and bring it unto us, that we may hear it, and do it? Neither is it beyond the sea, that thou shouldest say, Who shall go over the sea for us, and bring it unto us, that we may hear it, and do it? But the word is very nigh unto thee in thy mouth, and in thy heart, that thou mayest do it." (Deut. 30, 11-14.) Every teacher is in position to acquire these principles and to make them the guiding thought of every period of instruction. The only point is that we comprehend the significance of these principles in their application to the instruction of the secondary school in all its breadth and depth. With a view to simplifying this we shall therefore subject each of them to a thorough analysis.

2. AWAKENING INTEREST AS A PRINCIPLE OF INSTRUCTION

The pedagogical importance of interest has long been recognized. Even Herbart regarded the many-sidedness of interest as the chief end of all instruction and elaborates this idea in detail in the second book of his *General Pedagogy*. Modern text books in pedagogy and monographic literature make abundant reference to this topic. My reasons for adding another analytic discussion of the pedagogy of interest and for showing its application to the secondary school are twofold.

The first reason is that, according to my own observations, we have not as yet attached sufficient importance to the awakening of interest. Classical philologists place more stress on accuracy in grammatical construction and carefulness in preparation than in inspiring pleasure in the reading of the classical authors and a genuine appreciation of antiquity on the part of the pupils. The mathematician places more stress on faultless accuracy in demonstration, the skillful manipulation of the

formulae, the accurate arrangement of the external form and rigorous definitions, than on the gradual development of self-activity on the part of the pupils and the satisfaction accompanying the sense of individual accomplishment. The historian wants his pupils to know dates accurately, to understand and recognize the growth of constitutions in their various phases, and fails to lay constant stress on developing the historic sense and inspiring the pupils with an interest in the past history of their own nation. Even the teachers of German who seem so peculiarly in position to inspire love for the mother tongue and an appreciation of the works of their poets and thinkers are not infrequently more concerned — and that especially in case they are exceptionally industrious professionally — that the pupils learn the history of literature, that they strictly follow the rules in their essay writings, and that they accurately learn the content and date of each of the great productions. On the whole the principle of coercion still dominates us and rigorous discipline seems to be more important than spontaneous participation. However I should be the very last to deny the value of rigorous discipline. I will show in detail what importance I would attach to it in the discussion of the second didactic principle. But I am firmly of the opinion that the prerequisite to rigorous discipline is the quickening of the sense of satisfaction in one's own mental achievements. If we neglect to carefully cultivate this subjective satisfaction in teaching and to inspire pleasure in the self-activity of the intellect, in short, if we do not know how to enlist the interest of the pupils, then indeed discipline fails to reach the sanctuary of the soul and remains an evanescent objective constraint, a bond, to be cast aside as quickly as possible. On this account it seems to me of utmost importance to impress upon teachers that their first and most important duty is to inspire interest, which is in fact nothing more than to inspire the sense of satisfaction in the exercise of the native mental powers. The splendid saying of St. Augustine applies here: Spontaneous interest accomplishes more in learning than force inspired by fear.

The second reason which leads me to place the principle of interest in the foreground of secondary didactics is the profounder insight into the psychical nature of interest furnished us by modern psychology. I have previously (p. 67) indicated

what constitutes the nature of interest and will now attempt to develop it more fully.

First of all interest is experienced as a feeling of pleasure. Even that in itself is of vast significance. The value of joy in moral development and in education is still far from receiving adequate appreciation. Joy has an out-spreading, expansive as well as a concentrating energy. It furnishes us with new positive impulses and has something of the creative nature about it. Instruction that furnishes pupils with joy is valuable for this reason alone. The teacher who succeeds in keeping pupils agreeably occupied by this fact alone secures their complete absorption in their task, the concentration of their whole mental energy upon it, which simply means that they are attentive. Innumerable complaints of the inattentiveness of pupils would be silenced if all teachers would make it their duty to inspire interest, i.e., joy in the subject on the part of the pupils. Cheerfulness is therefore valuable in itself in teaching, but it is not the only thing. This might in fact also be accomplished by spending the class period in exchanging jokes and having fun with the pupils. St. Augustine's observation, "Interest, unde quis gaudeat," is not an empty phrase. The source of our joy is not a matter of indifference. And here also the psychology of interest furnishes guidance. Not every kind of pleasurable feeling is to be ascribed to interest. Interest is rather, as previously shown (p. 67), functional pleasure and in fact a distinct kind of functional pleasure. (The joyous excitation and disposition, which we call interest, arises from the fact that we have been furnished an opportunity of exercising our intellectual functions in a satisfactory manner.) There is a native demand for such mental activity and interest is nothing more than the pleasure arising from the satisfaction of the functional demands of our intellect. This conception of interest is the logical result of the genetic and biological method of interpreting the psychical process rigorously carried to its conclusion. But many descriptive psychologists of former and recent times have likewise arrived at similar conclusions. Thus, for example, Garve says that all satisfaction proceeds from the things which engage our thoughts or stimulate our sensations, and one of our most prominent psychologists, Karl Stumpf, defines interest as the pleasure accompanying the act of awareness.

The joy which we provide for our pupils by enlisting their interest is therefore at the same time an incitement to self-activity and it is even this that constitutes the real significance of this didactic principle. The more frequently and intensely we succeed in leading the pupils to find satisfaction in their own thoughts and judgments, so much the better are they prepared to acquire scientific training and thus attain to intellectual independence.) The frequent and intensive stimulation of their interest not only satisfies their intellectual requirements, but likewise strengthens them. We thus bring it to pass that, to use a profound scriptural expression, "the draught increases the thirst." We must endeavor, by arousing interest, to develop a desire for knowledge, a kind of hungering after knowledge, in order that the pupils respond to our instructions spontaneously and readily assimilate what is presented to them. Our task thus becomes easier, more pleasant and even more effective.

Still another fact needs to be added. Man's pleasure-feelings are capable of an intense, far-reaching differentiation. This differentiation of the pleasure-feelings has played an important human civilization, an element alas, which has hitherto been almost wholly neglected by the historian and sociologist. The differentiation of the pleasure-feelings has played an important part, e.g., in the origin of language, and it is likewise the basis of the constant refinement of aesthetic enjoyment. In view of this possibility for differentiation our pedagogic principle acquires a new significance.

The functional need of the intellect is present in every normal pupil at every period of development, within the range of our consideration. This need is satisfied in a variety of ways by the different subjects of instruction. Presupposing that all teachers understand how to enlist the interest of their pupils, there are therefore many kinds of functional pleasure, and, if I am permitted to say so, the pupils' capacity for intellectual pleasure is thus differentiated and the sphere of his mental life greatly enlarged. In this way the disadvantages which attend the excessive variety of subjects of instruction are at least in part overcome.

The differentiation of the pleasure-feelings is important likewise from the fact that we are thus led, by our effort to awaken interest, to observe the individuality of our pupils. In

one case we find that the functional needs of the intellect are peculiarly satisfied by the analysis of the forms of speech, another by a difficult mathematical problem, a third is incited to independent activity by the study of a plant. However I do not wish myself to be classed with the pedagogues who find the hope of education in the intensive cultivation of onesided talent. But an understanding of the individuality of the pupils is nevertheless of vast importance and this is enhanced by the effective application of our pedagogic principle.

That our pupils are natively endowed with intellectual functional needs and that the satisfaction of these needs affords them pleasure are psychological facts which simply cannot be ruled out. And the inevitable logic of these facts is that the quickening of interest is one of our most fundamental and insistent duties. It is not simply a matter of the teacher presenting certain established facts and that of his understanding how to enlist the interest of his pupils and keep them awake during the presentation merely signifies a creditable additional service. It must not be said; the chief thing is that the pupils learn something, either with or without interest, as to this it matters little. We must rather be filled with the conviction that the enlistment of interest is the very first thing which we must seek to attain and that every lesson is valueless in which the pupils were not incited to pleasurable self-activity.

Before proceeding to discuss the practical significance and application of this pedagogic principle I must explain another misconception that frequently attaches to the words "interest" and "interesting." When we insist on instruction being interesting to the pupils, some seem to think that it means the addition of inspiring suggestions, original settings, and perhaps even all kinds of sarcasm. And since not every teacher is skilled in this kind of thing, it produces a profound opposition, in fact even a kind of contempt for teachers with a reputation of being "interesting." "It is of course very nice," it is frequently observed, "if one can do it, to attract and stimulate the pupils with all kinds of novelties, but the actual learning nevertheless thereby suffers harm." In answer to such views, which I have frequently heard expressed, I must protest most emphatically that in advocating interest as the most important pedagogic principle I have never meant, even in the remotest way, inspiring

suggestions and sarcasm. It does not require "spirit" to inspire interest. It simply requires the serious purpose to so arrange the matter of instruction that it will not consist merely of recitation and drill, but so as to furnish the pupils the opportunity of exercising their own intellectual powers in a pleasurable way. I shall attempt to illustrate this by several examples in what follows.

3. INTEREST AS A PEDAGOGIC PRINCIPLE. ITS PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE AND APPLICATION

In speaking of interest I refer exclusively to the pleasure incident to the exercise of our intellectual functions, i.e., what is ordinarily described as theoretical or intellectual interest. The word is also frequently used in the sense of benefit or advantage, which is the older meaning of the term. The two meanings have been sharply differentiated in the course of their evolution so that the word now represents entirely different ideas. But an effort has been made to combine the two meanings. This is specially true of Ostermann in the monograph cited above. But such a forced combination makes the uses of the term so vague and general as to be of very little practical use to the teacher. If interest means every subjective participation and, e.g., the whole subject matter of ethics is treated under this head, it loses all distinctiveness and definiteness as a pedagogic principle.

Let it be understood therefore that for us interest as a pedagogic principle always mean simply the functional pleasure of the intellect. It is in this sense that I shall seek to indicate its practical significance and application.

The fact that mental self-activity can be pleasurable and furnish subjective joy only as it effects results is quite commonplace, but it is of profound importance in the practical application of this pedagogic principle. Our effort must accomplish something if we are to get any pleasure out of it. We have a good illustration of this fact, which is at once perfectly clear, in the case of an exercise undertaken solely for its own sake and not with a view to the realization of some definite end. I refer to the solving of conundrums. Any one who has no taste for conundrums and gets nothing out of them will soon lay

aside the conundrum book which happens to fall into his hands, whilst some one else, who readily solves them, can occupy himself with it for hours. I have tried this out on myself and on others with the exceptionally suggestive conundrum book published by Franz Brentano under the title *Aennigatias*. Here it is at once evident that only successful exercise is pleasurable.

It follows from this that the teacher, especially at the beginning of a new subject or a new division, must set the pupils to work in such a way as to enable them to accomplish what he wants quite easily, even playfully. This will produce the pleasurable attitude which in turn effects its creative result and likewise prepares the pupils for more difficult tasks.

We must likewise remember that in the lower grades the pupils' need of activity is comparatively easily satisfied. Even the reciting of a brief passage from a foreign language gives them pleasure, and if a concert exercise is added, a class so trained can soon be given something more difficult. Instead of any further detailed elaboration I should like to illustrate by a concrete example how I conceive the application of our pedagogic method in a lower grade and for this purpose I select beginners' Latin.

The reader begins for example with the sentences: *Alanda volat* and *Luscinia cantat*. The teacher reads the first sentence and has six or eight of the pupils repeat it after him, at first separately and then the whole class together. He then translates it and has them repeat the Latin sentence again together with its translation. He then proceeds to the second sentence and proceeds in the same way. The pupils are perceptibly happy over the fact that they can already translate two Latin sentences and they are in an enthusiastic mood, if only the teacher knows how to maintain it and sets an inspiring pace. He can now turn to the different sound of the *c* in the words *luscinia* and *cantat* and then proceed to the more important and more difficult problem of Latin pronunciation. He asks, for example; How many syllables in *volat*? Answer; Two. Which is accented? The first. Observe, therefore, pupils; Dissyllables in Latin always have the accent on the first syllable. Does the same principle apply to the pronunciation of German? The answers are indefinite and varied. Mention several German dissyllables which accent the first syllable. The pupils respond

with: Vater, Mutter, Bruder, Schwester, etc. But now mention some dissyllables that are accented on the second syllable. The pupils respond: gerecht, bequem, geführt, gescheit, etc. Observe therefore, this never happens in Latin. All dissyllables in Latin are accented on the first syllable. Thus far it has been easy and all the pupils could easily follow. And it is just this fact that has developed the enthusiastic attitude which permits us to proceed a step further. How many syllables in alanda? Three. Pronounce the accented syllable? *Lan*. What syllable is it counting from the end of the word? The pupil may not understand this at once. We therefore ask: How do you pronounce the last syllable? Answer: Da. What then would you call *lan*? The next to the last. Very well. We have a trisyllable here in which the next to the last syllable is accented. Where have we had another word of more than two syllables?—Several pupils respond: *Luscinia*. Very well. How many syllables does it have? Answer: four. How is the accented syllable pronounced? Answer: *ci*. What number is it from the end? And if the answer is not forthcoming, we ask again for the last, and then for the next to the last, and then show that in this case the third syllable from the last is accented.—Now, observe, children: In words of more than two syllables the accent frequently falls on the next to the last syllable and frequently on the third from the last.—I would not attempt to go further than this in the first exercise. If time should permit I should rather read and translate one or two more sentences and study the application of the rules of pronunciation just learned to the words of these sentences.

In this way all the pupils are busy, none of them is over-questioned, and all follow and are able to grasp and retain what has been presented. The pleasure of achievement must be aroused and a vital enthusiasm developed which concentrates and strengthens the mental powers. This is what I understand by the principle of the quickening of interest. It is readily observed, this does not require any exceptional capacity or genius. It only requires a thorough, detailed, preparation, a definite aim, an enthusiastic movement and two more factors which every teacher must have; patience and love.

It has been my repeated experience that by pursuing this method during the first six or eight weeks practically all the

pupils follow and I can never believe therefore that Latin is too difficult for ten year old children. The subject matter becomes more complex farther on and the number of delinquents will be greater. But this is not due to the difficulty of the subject, but on account of the fact that our text books contain too much vocabulary and too much details of syntax and that the content of the sentences are not always capable of holding attention.

I have had frequent opportunity in instruction in beginners' Greek to observe the creative power developed by the pleasurable attitude. The impression is likewise intensified by a remarkable contrast effect as I shall presently show. With us in Austria the study of Greek begins in the third grade (corresponding to quarta in Germany). It is customary with us that in the lower grades the teacher of Greek likewise has the Latin. In this way it has happened that during the period of my teaching I have frequently been in the position of teaching Latin and Greek in the third grade. But the study of Latin in this grade is not very rich in interesting material. Cornelius Nepos is frequently dry bean-pods and even the lessons in grammar, the case-endings, are not specially attractive. On the other hand I, an enthusiastic admirer of the Greek language and everything Greek, have found the elementary teaching in this subject exceptionally interesting. Here I laid myself out, so to speak, and I always succeeded in enlisting the interest of the pupils with me. It frequently happened that I had Latin from 8 to 9 and Greek from 9 to 10. During the Latin period I tried, as a matter of course, to do my best to enliven the study, but it often happened that the dry material prevented me realizing the attitude I have been describing. And as a consequence the pupils not infrequently sat ill-humored throughout the Latin period. But this condition was changed completely as soon as we began the Greek period. It seemed to transform the class. Each member of the class was anxious to write a sentence on the board, every one paid attention and was ready to answer questions. It was not long until the pupils were so interested as to construct short Greek sentences in class from the vocabularies and forms previously learned, and this produced genuine enthusiasm. I could thus see what even mediocre pupils are capable of doing when their powers are concentrated and in-

tensified by interest. I was frequently astonished at the length of the sentences they put together, at their making use of everything they had previously acquired, and their care that the sentence should make sense. I remember, e.g., that a very ordinary pupil, after about three months' instruction, formulated the following sentence: *τὴν μὲν ἀηδόνα οὐ βλέπομεν, τὴν δὲ φωνὴν αὐτῆς ἀκούομεν.* (We do not hear the nightingale, but we hear its voice.) Every experienced teacher will grant, after a little reflection, that it is not a matter of small consequence for a pupil to formulate a sentence such as this, in which he uses the *μὲν* and *δὲ* correctly, hits upon the difficult setting of the pronoun and constructs it into an intelligent sentence. To put the matter briefly, this incitement to original composition in a language until but recently entirely strange had an electrical effect and I can not recommend this method too strongly. These consecutive periods have at least revealed to me the contrasting appearance between a class period with little or no interest and one with vital interest. It is upon such experiences as these that my conviction rests, that the awakening of interest is our most important pedagogic principle.

The need of exercise, as observed above, is easily satisfied in the lower grades. Even jolly conjugation and declension approaches fun. But,—and this must be said in addition— the pleasure which proceeds from such elementary exercise likewise soon grows dull. There results, therefore, for the teacher the by no means easy task of so arranging his instruction as to maintain the interest of the class. He must likewise take account of the pupils' previous attainments and neither deter them by excessive requirements nor dull and weary them by elementary exercises. This is however by no means an easy task. But we must nevertheless make it a rule, in every subject and at every stage of advancement to discover the kind of instruction which will bring out the spontaneous thought of the pupil in a pleasurable manner. According to my experiences the error of aiming too high in the lower grades is less serious than in aiming too low in the higher grades.

If, e. g., an exceptionally skillful history teacher with a class in constitutional history in the lower grades, where the interest of the pupils rests more on strong personalities and clear, illustrative capacities, dwells too much on constitutional

development, he will certainly be but little understood by the pupils. But the majority of them will nevertheless have the feeling that they are being given something of importance, and, even though they cannot follow completely, they will not remain entirely inactive, but make an effort to understand. So also a well trained linguist, who permits himself to wander into comparative philology in teaching elementary Greek, will be making an error of method, but nevertheless inspire the interest of the majority of the pupils.

On the other hand it is the death-blow of all teaching if a philologist or germanist in the advanced classes introduces too much grammar and meter into the expositions of the great poems, if he requires the recital of tedious passages and asks common-place questions. Grammatical construction and meter are exceedingly important, but simply as means to the understanding of the meaning and beauty of the poetry. Here it means the combining of all knowledge and power, in order to lift, even inspire the pupils to the plane of poetry. It seems to me therefore that it is advisable to select such texts for the higher classes as will not be beyond the grasp of the average pupil. At this age the interest of the pupils will not be sufficiently aroused unless the questions of the teacher direct their attention to facts which they would otherwise have missed. But, if it is anywise possible, we must allow the pupils to discover these facts for themselves. The teacher cannot always avoid detailed explanations and they likewise produce good results. But I would warn against profuse eulogizing of the poet or his productions. It is an all too common experience that it is but a step from the sublime to the ridiculous, and our modern youth is strongly inclined to regard enthusiastic tirades on the beauties of classic poetry as a great joke. The deepest interest is aroused by showing the pupils the rich content of our great classics and the range of positive information and penetrating analysis required to thoroughly understand the text. When the pupils, under the guidance of the teacher, have attained a clear understanding of a difficult passage the joy of achievement is reflected back upon the production and the sense of aesthetic appreciation arises spontaneously.

The practical significance of our pedagogic principle makes the profound and vital relation of interest and attention of vast

importance. As a matter of fact, as everybody knows, the effect of teaching depends almost entirely on the success of securing the pupils' concentrated attention. The majority of teachers regard attention as the pupils' duty and hold that they have a right to and must require it of the pupils. Psychologically this view is not altogether false. It is beyond question that we can gradually train the pupils by a prolonged volitional effort to concentrate attention upon the subject matter which they are studying. This capacity grows with the increasing intellectual maturity of the pupil and its discipline is one of the most important problems in the training of the will. We shall discuss this topic in the next chapter. But notwithstanding this it is quite erroneous to think that attention is exclusively or even chiefly a function of active volition and that the capacity for prolonged concentration is a native possession of all pupils from the start.

From the standpoint of its origin attention is biologically the most important function of psychical life. We concentrate our organism quite unconsciously upon such processes of our environment as have significance for the preservation of life. And there is likewise a kind preparation of the means of its realization combined with this concentration. A cat watching for a mouse is the objective symbol of attention. The ability to thus concentrate upon the anticipated impression is deeply imbedded in our centralized organization and is one of the most important conditions for the preservation and enrichment of life.

The human intellect, that mighty instrument in the struggle for existence, in the course of time develops an increasing variation and refinement. Its activity is serviceable to life and for this reason, just as everything which enhances life, it is correlated with a sense of pleasure. And we have seen above that interest is nothing more than the functional pleasure of the intellect. The concentration of the intellect upon the object, which furnishes the occasion of its activity proceeds hand in hand with this joy-begetting exercise. But this simply means that interest is the sole cause of the origin of attention. We might perhaps put it even better thus; interest and attention are simply the opposite sides of one and the same process. That is to say, whoever arouses my interest has at the same time also concentrated my attention. Hence the concentration of

attention does not even require any conscious volitional effort on the part of the pupils. With the enlistment of interest attention follows quite spontaneously. This spontaneous attention persists just as long as the interest is maintained. Whoever therefore wishes to hold the constant attention of his pupils must aim to enlist their interest. It is only after this has been effectively practiced for a number of years, and the pupil's intellect is sufficiently strengthened, that we may urge them to concentrate their attention as a conscious volitional effort.

But even then it is inadvisable to base instruction wholly on this so-called "active" attention. A series of experiments has shown that attention which results from intensive volitional effort is an intermittent activity, which even adults are unable to continue for any considerable time. This intermittence characterizes the active attention of the pupils to a much greater degree. Hence, notwithstanding the desirability and necessity of training the pupils to persistent concentration, quite as much so as to regularity in work, attention is nevertheless, as a matter of fact, more certainly secured through the enlistment of interest. We would recommend the following procedure as the best in the practical work of the school. Seek constantly to arouse interest and you will at the same time secure attention. In case mind wandering or weariness should arise during the course of the class period it is possible for the teacher, by an emphatic admonition, to force the pupils to renewed physical and mental energy and a vigorous effort of attention. But the effect of such effort usually lasts only a few minutes. The teacher must then utilize this interval to arouse interest again and thus reproduce the correlated attention.

We must conclude therefore, that as a rule attention and interest combine in a single psychical act. A complete grasp of this fact will still further illuminate and impress our obligation to arouse interest. If our pupils therefore become indifferent and inattentive, we must first of all hold ourselves responsible, not them. We must at least endeavor by the constant enlistment of interest so to increase the intellectual powers of our pupils as to enable them to sustain such prolonged concentration as results from active volitional effort. And at no stage, in no subject and in no class period dare we neglect the enlistment of interest and securing the pleasure of spontaneous intellectual

effort on the part of our pupils and to increase it as much as possible.

The enlistment of interest therefore remains our first and most important pedagogic principle. This is the primary condition of pedagogic success. However, and we must immediately add, it is the primary but not the only one. Interest tends to arouse the intellectual powers but it does not discipline them. It is possible to proceed upon this principle so exclusively as even to endanger the final result. Permit me to illustrate this by relating a personal experience.

In the winter of 1884-85 — I was then a gymnasial teacher in one of the provincial cities of Mähren — I was required to give the elective course in the Bohemian language. There were two classes, one for beginners and another for advanced pupils. In the elementary course I took the matter very seriously and tried to do what I could. In the advanced work, in which, if I recall correctly, I had three pupils, I was somewhat indifferent. I frequently took occasion to discuss general questions with the pupils. At the end of the year the father of one of my pupils in the advanced class remarked to me, that his son had frequently spoken of my course in Bohemian and expressed himself thus: "The class periods were exceedingly interesting, but we did not learn anything." I have constantly kept this incident in mind whenever my individuality as a teacher tempted me to emphasize onesidedly or exclusively the principle of interest.

The class periods must be interesting, this is the first and most important commandment, but something must also be learned. To this end the principle of interest must be correlated with a second principle which will cooperate with the first. Earlier in life I was inclined to call this second principle the principle of constraint. Every practical pedagogue will admit that permanent results cannot be attained without a certain degree of constraint. But I have discovered by careful reflection that the constraint moment is still not the most essential. It is not a matter of very great importance that we constrain, but far more to what end we constrain. If we inquire into what we are instilling into our pupils, at any rate what we must instill by means of constraint, the answer will run as follows: Systematic work and its correlated sense of responsi-

bility. I therefore call the second pedagogic principle that must be correlated with that of arousing interest, the principle of training to work. We shall now proceed to the discussion of the significance and practical application of this second principle.

4. THE PRINCIPLE OF TRAINING TO WORK

The principle of interest rests upon the fact that the pupils are endowed with an intellectual functional demand. Satisfying this demand in accordance with the stage of development and thus inspire pleasure in mental spontaneity constitutes the task of the teacher as described in the two preceding sections. But our pupils, as they come from the public school in the vast majority of cases do not bring with them the training to work. The conduct of the school must be so arranged that all of the study must be done in school. As a matter of course some specially zealous and gifted teachers will succeed in securing independent home study on the part of individual pupils. But these are exceptions with which we cannot reckon. Training in systematic work and the development of the sense of responsibility to do so, is something new. Here we are obliged to begin at the foundation and train our pupils from the start so that they will not only experience functional pleasure in mental activity, but likewise learn to regard it as an indispensable duty.

Training to work is an exceedingly important pedagogic principle in the secondary school for reasons of sequence: First of all on this account, namely, that training in systematic work is valuable in itself, even neglecting what is to be accomplished by the work. We have instilled in our pupils one of the most valuable things in life when we have trained them to consider the relation of their work to the future, to regard this work as the natural course of events and to shun idle indifference. Work is the most important principle of morals and even for this reason training to work belongs to the most important ethical task of the secondary school. Experience shows that the pupils from the institutions which strictly enforce systematic work are far more rarely idle and they generally complete their studies in the prescribed time.

But even in the department of general education which we have described as scientific discipline training to work in addition to the awakening of interest is likewise indispensable. The mental activity discharged through the awakening of interest must be intensified by exercise and gradually developed to definite, positive achievements.

In the lowest classes, as previously observed, we must keep close to the methods of the public school and do the greater part of the work in the school. But even at this stage we should make a beginning in training to work. We should assign the pupils a certain amount of work, not too difficult, to be done at home, and keep strict account of the work done, in order that the pupils come to see that they are now assuming the responsibility for their achievements. A little later on we can and should increase our requirements so that they do not merely mechanically repeat, but likewise independently apply what they have acquired. They should also gradually learn to deal with larger problems and be held responsible for their solution. It is a good plan in the higher classes to allow a larger amount of material to accumulate before requiring a report. The pupils should likewise be given a chance to write essays on themes of their own choosing. In this way they will learn how to study with a definite end in view and the method of gathering materials.

The principle of training to work must be applied with special vigor in the branches which we have previously contrasted with the merely "inspirational" as "disciplinary." In this class belong on the one hand the philological subjects, i.e., foreign and native languages, and on the other hand mathematics and physics. Here training to work should even be fostered during the class period. As a matter of course we should also in these subjects seek to inspire interest as much as possible and stimulate the pupils to pleasurable exercise. And we show them even in school that this exercise has definite ends and that we expect them to actually appropriate what they have heard and learned by practice. In mathematics, e.g., the teacher must rigorously require all his pupils to follow the process of solution, and he will accomplish this by requiring various pupils to direct the several stages of the operation. So likewise frequently in the midst of an experiment in physics he will put the question to the pupils, what will happen next. In such thought-experiments

both pedagogic principles are effectively applied simultaneously. The philologist will show the pupils even in the lower classes that the forms are practiced in school in order to impress them firmly, and that they must eventually become permanent. He will endeavor to train them in methodical thought and in thoroughness even in the interpretation of authors and thus during the class period not only inspire but likewise discipline the intellect.

Our principle demands however that the pupils work intensively not only in school, but that they prepare for the class period at home and thus train themselves to the performance of a duty, assuming the responsibility for results which rests with them.

There is a strong tendency at present to reduce the home work of the pupils as much as possible. This is due to the desire to get more time for excursions and games for the highly important physical development. This is quite as clearly understood as it is justified, but it directly contradicts the nature of the higher school if the ideal of didactics is conceived as confining all the mental discipline to the class period. The purpose of the secondary school can never be realized without training in independent work which carries with it the sense of responsibility. Our pupils must become conscious of the fact, that the knowledge and power (*Wissen und Können*) imparted to them in school must be made their permanent possession through their own effort. Even more than this should be accomplished. The teacher should stimulate the pupils to organize for independent coöperative work on their own initiative. Colin A. Scott, in his excellent book on *Social Education* (Boston, 1909), has given a number of valuable suggestions on this point for the American public schools which could and should be introduced into our higher schools with the necessary modifications.

But this principle should not be overworked. We dare not press our requirements to the limit of the ability of our pupils. We must see to it that they have sufficient time for recreation, time in which they may at least pursue occupations of their own choosing. These favorite occupations frequently reveal the individuality of the pupil, here peculiar gifts occasionally come to the surface, which may be of decisive importance in the choice of vocation. We must regard the powers of our

pupils as a precious possession which has been entrusted to our nurture. The state has committed to us the administration of its most valuable working capital. The value of this capital will increase if we give the powers of our pupils opportunity to exercise moderately in productive effort. Excessive demands on these youthfully tender capacities however produce the sad result of prematurely consuming and shrivelling up this wealth that belongs to the future.

The danger of overburdening, which doubtless exists, could most readily be avoided by arranging the program of studies as suggested above. The principle of interest would be used chiefly in the "inspirational" subjects, whilst both pedagogic principles would cooperate in the "disciplinary" subjects. This cooperation is by no means difficult to realize. As the pleasure in intellectual exercise develops through the awakening of interest the requirements involved in the solution of a definite problem meet with far less resistance. On the contrary. The intensified functional demand immediately reaches out after concrete, clearly definite opportunity to do something. If the teacher understands how to give direction and purpose to the awakened desire for exercise, to assign a task which is neither too easy nor yet too difficult, he will succeed in developing the creative energy of interest into the demand for work and by training raise it to a second nature.

The principle of work has hitherto been dominant in the conduct of secondary instruction. In fact there have been times when it has been thought that the learning process should be made as difficult as possible and that the pupils should be prepared for the difficult problems of life by strict discipline even by unrelenting severity. In reply to this I would once more call attention to the frequently quoted passage of St. Augustine: *Plus valet in discendo libera curiositas quam meticulosa necessitas*. In the acquisition of knowledge spontaneous interest accomplishes more than fear-inspired coercion. The principle of work which must be intimately associated with interest however cannot quite be carried through without coercion, but this *necessitas* does not on that account have to be *meticulosa*. It is far better to exercise the coercion by a consistent non-indulgence than by the intimidations of examination and discipline. In every class period we must furthermore keep in mind the

total aim of the secondary school and be conscious of the fact that we have not merely nor even chiefly to impart facts, but to develop intellectual independence and moral responsibility.

5. THE AUTHORITY OF THE TEACHER

The concept of authority has hitherto been elaborated chiefly by theologians and moralists, and more recently also by sociologists. I have been investigating this problem for some time and several years ago promised my students a monograph on authority. The following suggestions may be regarded as a kind of abstract of that promise. My investigations, as a matter of fact, have not as yet enabled me to attain a satisfactory theory in all its phases. However the most important aspects have become sufficiently clear to permit the hope of having penetrated into the matter somewhat more profoundly and to have attained results of no slight importance to practical pedagogics.

First of all this one fact must be laid down as fundamental, namely, that *authority is a spiritual force*. Just as in the case of every other psychical factor, authority can of course be exercised only through physical means, as e.g., through looks, verbal admonitions, and written rules. But the physical and physiological is only the instrument, never the essence. The same words and gestures which, when used with authority produce swift and profound results, are utterly ineffective when lacking the psychical element which constitutes the very essence of authority. This fact in itself is of profound importance to us teachers. It shows that we can acquire authority by knowledge and especially by consistent, effective action even if we are not naturally endowed with the physical attributes of authority. As a matter of fact I have known colleagues who were small and insignificant in appearance who nevertheless governed their classes splendidly, had excellent discipline and got their pupils to work. On the other hand I recall others of imposing stature, a strong voice, in brief possessing every external characteristic which ordinarily inspires the pupils' respect, but were nevertheless a veritable joke to the young men. Authority, therefore, is based on spirit and it can effect results from that source alone.

The sphere in which authority produces its profoundest as

well as its widest results is that of the religious life. God, Christ, the Church, the Holy Scriptures, all exercise a profound spiritual influence upon believers and determine their thoughts, feelings and desires. By the term "believers" we mean all who feel themselves subject to religious authority. And since we have no term which is capable of describing this relation to authority with equal brevity and clearness, I shall take the liberty to speak of believers even where religion is not under consideration, and apply the term to all who are under the influence of authority in any form whatsoever. And I now raise the question; How shall we describe the operation of authority upon believers in general?

We can draw the answer to this question with considerable certitude from the extensive investigations made during the last decades of last century into the phenomena of hypnotism and suggestion discovered by the Englishman Braid. It is a well known fact that individuals are not infrequently put into a state of artificial sleep (hypnosis) while unusually open to the suggestions of the hypnotist. They regard every proposition of the hypnotist,—even the most absurd—as true and blindly follow his instructions. The hypnotised moreover remain under the influence of the hypnotist even after they awaken. For weeks, and even months afterwards they follow the commands given during hypnosis for the future. Any one interested in the details of these processes will find abundant material in Moll's book on *Hypnotism*. The psychological and physiological interpretation of these facts may be found in James' *Principles of Psychology* (II. 593-614).

When the facts of hypnosis became known during the seventies and eighties of last century and the results of Charcot and Bernheim convinced the public that it is not a matter of spiritistic frauds, but scientific discoveries, the interest of psychologists was at once directed to the hypnotic state. They entertained the hope that experiments would reveal hitherto unknown psychical powers and also expected new information in physiology. Hypnosis has indeed illumined many a profound psychical problem, especially concerning the nature of volitional processes, and furnished physiology valuable information concerning the nature and direction of centrally aroused stimuli. But the most important result of this whole investigation is not

hypnosis, but the exact knowledge of the intimately related fact of suggestion. This involves a peculiar sort of influence exercised by one man upon another, the essence of which consists in the fact that everything which proceeds from the suggestor exerts a peculiarly strong influence on the sense perception, the ideation, judgment, feeling and desire of the subject of the suggestion, and that all influences from other sources, all counter reasons and counter motives are either wholly obliterated or at least essentially weakened.

In hypnosis both the suggestibility of the hypnotic and the power of the suggestor come so clearly and forcefully into the foreground that this form of influence of one individual upon another must impress every observer. Hypnosis differs from ordinary sleep, as Lipps has strikingly observed, "by the firm and limited wakeful island within the surrounding more or less sleeping soul. The wakeful island is described by the personality of the hypnotist. It is the 'abode' or province in the soul of the hypnotic, where this personality manifests itself, the seat of the clangcolor and pitch of his voice." The power of the hypnotist is frequently frightfully great. He may call forth at will, in the consciousness of the hypnotic, hallucinations and illusions of such strength as even to produce physiological modifications. It has happened, for instance, that the hypnotist has remarked to the hypnotic that the iron with which he is now touching his hand is red hot. The hypnotic drew himself together with a painful shudder at the contact and small fire-blisters formed in the skin at the point of contact. The hypnotic believes the hypnotist in everything and even frequently performs his commands after the spell has passed off. But notwithstanding this the individuality of the hypnotic is not entirely destroyed. If the counter reasons against the suggested judgment or the counter motives against the suggested commands are very strong, the hypnotic struggles against them after awaking and his own reason and will frequently gain the mastery. But the trend of his thought, feeling and will is nevertheless tremendously affected.

The experiments in hypnotism directed attention to suggestibility on the one hand, to man's power of suggestion on the other. Observation thus intensified soon took note that these facts are by no means confined to hypnosis. We are likewise

under the influence of suggestion during our waking hours. Not only do strong personalities, but traditional opinions, established customs and usages, favorite books, etc., affect us in a way similar to the observed facts of hypnosis, differing only in degree. Suggestion is a universal form of interaction between man and man. The effect of suggestion everywhere reveals the twofold characteristic of contraction and of intensification. Certain stimuli are intensified and others are weakened. But whilst in hypnosis the effect on the sphere of physical sensitivity is the most striking, in the case of wakeful suggestion the effect on the secondary and tertiary images is by far the most important. It is our judgment, our feelings and our volitional choices that are influenced by suggestion more frequently and more profoundly than we are aware. The profound influence of favorite popular orators upon excited crowds, the alluring and impelling force of certain ideas and catch words, the tremendous impression of the founders of religions upon their first adherents, all of these things rest on suggestion and suggestibility.

I haven't any doubt but that the psychical influence of authority on believers is to be conceived as a kind of suggestion and that this theory will give the teacher a decided advantage. The teacher who speaks with authority penetrates into the depths of the minds of his pupils with his whole personality, of which his subject constitutes a vital part, and arouses the "wakeful island" mentioned above. The pupils are in an attitude of receptiveness for everything which the teacher has to say that bears on the subject, and the predisposition to other ideas and judgments is greatly diminished. This accounts for the fact that students in the Greek class seem so remarkably unready with their knowledge of geography, mathematics and history. These are beyond the range of the "wakeful island." Authority exercised in this way renders it an easy matter for the teacher to arouse the interest of the pupils, enlist their own efforts and hold their attention. It follows therefore that the possession of authority reduces the difficulty of teaching very materially. But this is a matter so palpably manifest as to be meaningless. What we are anxious to know is quite another matter. We need to investigate more closely the suggestive effects of authority, we must be able to distinguish its various forms, so as

to establish definite criteria by which the teacher will be able to judge whether he still possesses authority or whether he has lost it. And we must likewise never forget that our authority is a means and not an end in itself. In addition to the effects and criteria of authority we must likewise discover its limits and have care to observe them.

The psychical effects of authority are most easily and most simply classified after the analogy of the three fundamental functions of consciousness, described by the words; thought, feeling, and volition. And we know moreover, that these fundamental functions are never isolated in actual psychical life, but, due to our unitary and centralized organization, constantly work together. But, owing to a division of labor, a profound psychical differentiation has nevertheless taken place during the course of the development of civilization, which has not only resulted in a diversification, but likewise in a narrowing of functions. This fact becomes clear as soon as we note the effect of authority. Under ordinary conditions we are practically never merely subject to the influence of but a single authority. We are generally affected by a number of different authorities. No single one of them controls us completely. One appeals more especially to our intellect and then even frequently to a specific field rather than the intellect as a whole, whilst other authorities affect our emotions or volitions. Thus, e.g., a scholar, whom we regard as an authority in his department, readily gains our acquiescence without opposition, whilst he is not even considered as furnishing a standard for our will. On the other hand parents who have not had the advantages of a scientific training, frequently retain their authority over their children for a long time, and even when the latter have far surpassed the parents in knowledge and training. In such cases authority has no effect whatever on the intellect, but merely inspires the feelings and will of the believers. We see therefore that the influence of authority is not only to be classified theoretically according to the various fundamental functions of the mind, but that it is also actually differentiated in practical life, that it affects only the one or the other fundamental functions and fails to affect the remaining psychical activities. Experience therefore justifies us in regarding this classification as established and to investigate the mode of its development in

connection with the various mental powers separately.

Authority reveals its influence on the intellect by the fact that we accept as true without further proof the judgments which proceed from the accepted authority. As a matter of fact we are even inclined to defend such judgments against opposition and even the more vigorously in proportion to the eminence of the authority. We measure the greatness and power of authority by the intensity and stability of our faith. We shall call this kind of persuasion *intellectual* authority. Religion furnishes the largest number and the most suggestive examples of the effect of intellectual authority. The believer accepts the dogmas and promises, the traditions and interpretations of his church and regards them true without specific evidence. In case of even the slightest doubt, the church inevitably suffers a shock. The church, particularly the Roman Catholic, is well aware of this and accordingly lays great stress on purity of faith. Teachers regard this matter somewhat differently. We shall therefore have occasion farther on to investigate the significance for instruction involved in the intellectual authority of the teacher, and more particularly to indicate its natural limits.

The effect of authority on feeling is shown in the fact that every approval or even commendation of my position by an authority produces a sense of exaltation and arouses intense, beneficent feelings of pleasure within me. On the other hand every criticism, every blame coming from the side of authority is likely to produce a sense of self-depreciation and give rise to a depressed state of emotion together with an intense displeasure within me. This fact is a very important matter for us teachers as a criterion. The moment we find that our pupils are indifferent to our praise or our blame, we may be sure it is a serious indication of waning authority on our part.

Authority affects the will in a way that secures obedience to its commands without resistance. In case the command involves something which is downright unpleasant, it may of course give rise to a struggle in the mind of the subject, but, in case the authority is of sufficient force, it will last but for a short time. As a matter of fact obedience may also be secured by brute force and awe inspiring strictness. The obedience of the pupils is therefore even still no sure criterion of authority. Dis-

obedience however is a sure sign that the teacher's authority is gone.

The effects of authority on feeling and will are vitally correlated. Any praise and blame that discharges intense feelings of pleasure, or displeasure as the case may be, will generally produce a ready and unobstructed obedience. But on the other hand there is a vast difference between this effect on sentiment and will and the influence of intellectual authority on our judgments, a relative — even if in fact not absolute — independence so to speak. We should therefore endeavor to formulate a distinctive term with which to describe the influence of authority on feeling and will. I suggest the term "moral authority," because of the fact that this kind of influence seems to be peculiarly active in moral development.

We shall now have to investigate how these two kinds of authority operate in the work of the school and how they should operate.

So far as pertains to intellectual authority, experience shows, that, among the lower grades we have this authority as a foregone conclusion. The pupils have become accustomed, in the public schools, to regard the teacher as omniscient and consequently expect even more of the teachers of the more advanced school, who are called "Professors." That is to say, when we enter the class room to give our first lessons we are the absolute intellectual authority for all, or at least by far the greatest majority, of the pupils in the lower grades. It never occurs to any of the pupils to doubt the truth of any of our judgments. That is to say, we are not obliged to acquire our intellectual authority at this stage. We simply need to avoid the things which would be likely to undermine our authority. And this demands nothing more than careful preparation and rigid self-discipline.

In the lower grades however the intellectual authority of the teacher is an indispensable prerequisite to effective teaching. At this stage the teacher, rather than the text book, should be the first and direct source of instruction. We write the paradigms on the blackboard, we develop and formulate the rules, we demonstrate with the globe and the objects of nature study and tell the facts of history. We pronounce the first words of a foreign language for our pupils, from our lips they

learn pronunciation and accent. The pupil must regard what we say as almost sacred. There must be no occasion for criticism or doubt. We must be absolutely certain of our knowledge in our own minds and give evidence of it in our work. *We must be and appear as persons who know.*

We must therefore never waver, never make mistakes. Under no circumstances dare it come to pass that we must correct a statement previously made or even take it back.

This absolutely indispensable certitude is not difficult to attain on account of the elementary nature of the subject-matter of instruction at this stage. But just for this very reason we are frequently inclined to think that intensive preparation is unnecessary. Hence we often neglect familiarizing ourselves with the content and language of the text books from which the pupils must review what they have learned from us. We permit ourselves slight digressions which may as matter of fact be unimportant or irrelevant, but are nevertheless likely to confuse the pupils, who adhere closely to the letter of the text. This results in perplexity as to whether they should follow us or the book. This is the reason why I regard it so highly important that we clearly grasp the significance of intellectual authority at this stage. Intellectual authority must here be nothing short of absolute, so that the fundamental elements in all subjects, but especially in language work and mathematics, become the fixed and abiding acquisition of the pupils.

The matter assumes a different aspect when the pupils pass from the first year into the middle and thence advance to the highest class. Here the intellectual authority of the teacher, which was an indispensable prerequisite in the first year, becomes a *problem*. The task of the secondary school moreover consists pre-eminently, as we have repeatedly observed, in training the pupils to intellectual independence. How is it possible to do this therefore, if the intellectual authority of the teacher is always to remain absolute and unquestioned? Here we are again confronted with another difficult synthesis, of which the secondary teacher must fulfill so many. He must create the possibility. The intellectual authority of the teacher must be so adjusted and developed as not to suppress the individuality of the pupils, but rather encourage it. This problem has never been clearly elaborated in pedagogical circles, at least

not to my knowledge. The intellectual authority of the teacher is consequently often expanded to cover too much, requiring of the pupils of the higher classes a "jurare in verba magistri" (to swear by their teacher literally), which suppresses individual development, is frequently regarded by the pupils as a burdensome requirement resulting in hostility towards education. Not a few teachers fear that their dignity will suffer if they do not decide absolutely and finally concerning the interpretation of a philological text, or the only correct method of solving a mathematical problem, or the reason for the failure of an experiment in physics. Such teachers not infrequently regard a criticism on the part of the pupils as deserving discipline, conduct that must be vigorously suppressed.

Such procedure, which unfortunately is not infrequent, must be regarded as a serious pedagogical blunder. Such teachers, due to a lack of psychological training, fail to see that it is utterly impossible to attain the end they are striving for by such methods. Authoritatively decreed conclusions and the suppression of all criticism by brute force may bring it to pass that the pupils will keep quiet, conform outwardly and at least not interpose any objections. But the indignation at the supposed injustice may easily result in such an accumulation of resentment in the minds of the pupils as frequently leads to surprising and most serious eruptions. It is even worse if pupils, through our treatment of all their individual judgments as out of place, lose all interest in school or in several of the subjects of the course of study, if they remain stolid and indifferent in school and direct the impulse towards the exercise of the functions of individuality to matters entirely outside the school. The school has then lost all influence in the shaping, forming and directing of the youthful mind. The teacher has therefore, by his dogmatic conclusions, not enhanced his own dignity, but most seriously injured it.

If, therefore, we are not to lose sight of our central purpose, training to intellectual independence by means of scientific discipline, we must become clearly aware that our intellectual authority which must be absolute and unqualified in the first year will have to be transformed with the increasing maturity of the pupil. The sense in which this transformation must be made will at once be clear if we reflect on the way in which we

acquire our scientific education and from what sources we draw our information. It is at once evident that, by the method of instruction pursued during the middle and last years, our pupils themselves have access to many of these sources. The pupils gradually learn to draw from the same sources that we do. And hence an authority slowly arises to which both teacher and pupils readily yield adherence in similar fashion. This authority is nothing less than the authority of science itself. And as we gradually permit our personal authority to pass over into the impersonal authority of science we are in position to train our pupils with all the energy and tact at our command to independent investigation without prejudice to our dignity. We shall endeavor to illustrate this by several examples.

If we do not know the meaning of a Greek word we look it up in the lexicon. But this is exactly what the pupils likewise do and we at once observe that the lexicon constitutes a common authority for both teacher and pupil. The teacher may have a larger lexicon, and by the fact of his wider reading he is certainly in position to use the lexicon to greater advantage, but in the final analysis he depends on the lexicon in precisely the same way as the pupil does. So likewise the tables of logarithms are final standards for teacher and pupil alike. The historian draws his information concerning events either directly from the sources or from approved treatises. But these treatises are likewise at the disposal of the pupils of the higher classes, especially in the larger cities. If we wish to train our pupils to independence, therefore, we must direct them in the middle and especially in the highest class to make liberal use of these scientific helps and to form their own conclusions. It will sometimes happen that a pupil will arrive at a conclusion which disagrees with that of the teacher. He must then invariably be permitted to state his position in the usual form and give his reasons for it. The teacher must carefully examine this view and either show that in this case this interpretation is likewise possible, or indicate the reasons why the pupil's conclusion is invalid. He will thus have opportunity to show that notwithstanding the fact that he is no longer an absolute authority, he still possesses a certain advantage in the form of knowledge of facts and the use of scientific instruments. This advantage must be clearly evident. Otherwise the teacher will

lose respect. After the pupils are convinced that their teacher is actually well-informed and is master of the methods and instruments of his science, it will make nothing but the very best impression if he should some time have occasion to show that the view of a pupil which differs from his own is likewise possible, or even to give it the preference. In this way he furnishes an example of open-mindedness which constitutes the very best and purest evidence of genuine scientific method.

I once had a pupil, in the two higher classes in which I taught Greek, who was intensely interested in philology and studiously devoted himself to it. He procured critical editions of the authors we were reading in class and read scientific treatises, e.g., Lehr's *Aristarchus*. He used to bring a critical edition of Sophocles along to class and consequently knew the various readings very well. It happened several times that the text used in the school edition could not be interpreted satisfactorily. I asked this pupil quite casually what the traditions had to say on the point at issue and permitted him to give his opinion of the passage. It frequently happened that the tradition was simpler and more consistent than the conjecture adopted by the editor of the school edition. The interpretation thus simply became more interesting. There wasn't the slightest occasion for any indecorum. I kept constant control of the discussion and my dignity did not suffer in the least. Several colleagues however frequently complained of the presumption and impudence of this same pupil, because they seemed to think that such a high degree of independence on the part of a pupil cast reflection on the intellectual authority of the teacher.

A few years after I began teaching — I had a position in a provincial-gymnasium at that time — the Inspector gave me charge of the instruction in philosophical propaedeutic, which here in Austria includes logic and psychology. At that time I had of course attended several courses of lectures in philosophy at the university, but my scientific studies up to that time had been exclusively classical philology. I was under necessity therefore to work up this new department, and I made no secret of my lack of preparation to my pupils. We worked together in the most enthusiastic fashion and my pupils told me many years afterward that my candour had produced the very best impression on them. Years later, after I had studied psychology

and philosophy intensively for a considerable period, I required my pupils to make criticisms, as observed above (p. 124). The class periods developed enthusiastic interest, the discussions were lively, but never any drag or hesitation. I was always in position to break off the discussion when it threatened confusion, and had frequent occasion to pronounce the suggestions of the pupils as valuable.

These experiences confirm my conviction therefore that in the advanced classes the intellectual authority of the teacher can and should be transferred to science itself, without detriment to the dignity of the teacher. Training to intellectual independence raises this transformation to an indispensable requirement.

If all teachers fully appreciated this necessity there would be no need of prescribed regulations concerning the more liberal treatment of pupils in the higher classes. This more liberal treatment develops quite naturally. The teacher thus becomes the advantageous guiding friend of the pupil, who leads the way by which they attain scientific discipline and intellectual independence.

We have still to answer briefly the question how intellectual authority is acquired, and how it is retained. The apt remark of Demosthenes, that it is often more difficult to keep than to gain wealth, likewise applies to authority.

Every prospective teacher should strive to get the foundation for intellectual authority at the university. If he brings thorough, comprehensive knowledge of his subject with him from the university as well as joy in scientific research and a candid conscientiousness on scientific problems, he will at once inspire the respect of his pupils at the first classes that he conducts. On the other hand superficiality and indifference together with the indolence which is generally coupled with it will soon be discovered by the pupils and the loss of authority follows only too soon. The knowledge acquired at the university must nevertheless be deepened and thoroughly established by the most careful preparation and constant expansion. Especially during our first years of teaching we must spare no effort, we must lay hold of everything which will contribute to the understanding of a passage, to the vivifying of the historical lecture, to the sure success of the laboratory experiment. If the classical

philologist will not take the time to work through detailed commentaries, to make free use of the reference books, if, as is not infrequently the case, he absolutely refuses to acquire complete mastery of the scientific and technical facts which appear in the lesson, he need not be surprised if it occasionally happens that a diligent student will know more than his teacher. I still have a vivid recollection of the trouble I had to find out something more authentic about the "wild asses" which Xenophon speaks about in the *Anabasis*, and how difficult I found it to picture to my mind the kind of Celtic masonry which Cæsar describes in the seventh book of the Gallic Wars. I have, however, constantly acted on the principle that the philologist must be thoroughly saturated with his authors even as to matters of fact. Hence, in proportion as the teacher makes light of these things, he may require the necessary care and thoroughness in preparation on the part of the student, but he will not secure it.

The scientific ability and conscientiousness of the teacher are therefore the foundation of his intellectual authority. It is possible therefore for every teacher to acquire and retain them, because they do not require any special gifts of personality, but above all else accurate knowledge and careful preparation. But if the teacher is to lead the way and effect the transition from the intellectual authority based on his personality to the impersonal scientific authority which we have set forth, he must unquestionably have an adequate amount of the other kind of authority which we above described as moral. Otherwise he will lose his influence and the school will suffer harm. We must therefore now examine the conditions and effects of moral authority more closely.

By moral authority we mean, as observed above, the influence of the teacher on the feelings and will of the pupil. We have described sensitivity to the praise or blame of the teacher and unquestioned obedience as the criteria by which the teacher may discover whether he still possesses this authority. It remains for us to inquire, in what the significance of this form of authority in pedagogic discipline consists?

We must observe, first of all, that the moral authority of the teacher is an important condition for the smooth and successful conduct of instruction. If the pupil is not indifferent

to the praise or blame of the teacher he will try to please him, that is to say, he will feel a sense of urgency to develop his own activity. The moral authority of the teacher therefore is of considerable advantage in arousing interest. Unquestioning obedience likewise makes it easier to apply our second pedagogic principle, the habit of regularity in work. It follows from this that the moral authority of the teacher is not required to undergo the same transformation as the intellectual. We are in need of the moral authority in the first year as well as in the last. Even though the external forms of conduct towards pupils change with the age period the subjective basis upon which the teacher's moral authority rests must nevertheless remain the same.

The effect of moral authority is still more important for the *discipline* of our pupils. Moral authority furnishes us with an influence over what Aristotle called, τὰ ἄλογα τῆς ψυχῆς, i.e., over the irrational part of the soul, the feeling and will of the pupil. These, moreover, as indicated more fully above (p. 66), constitute the substructure of consciousness. If the teacher possesses moral authority, habitually praises only the praiseworthy and reproves only the blameworthy, if he furthermore requires only the things that are necessary to intellectual development, he will be able indeed to contribute incalculably to the positive growth of personality and effect entire generations beneficently. Moral authority therefore lies deeper and operates more slowly than intellectual. Its roots are hidden away in the inmost subjectivity of the personality of the teacher. A suggestive influence issues from those depths, the nature of which is hard to describe and its conditions cannot be so clearly explained as in the case of intellectual authority. We shall nevertheless endeavor, out of a rich experience, to set forth at least several important factors which may serve as suggestions to the young teacher,— the things to be observed and the things to be avoided in order to acquire and retain moral authority.

We must first of all note the fact that there exists a relative independence between intellectual and moral authority, but it is by no means absolute. If the teacher gives evidence of learning and at the same time manifests a high degree of assurance in handling his subject-matter, he has already laid the foundation for moral authority. His knowledge and careful preparation

secure him a respectful hearing in the class-room which in itself means a great deal. This applies not only to the first year where, as observed above, intellectual authority must be absolute, but likewise to the advanced classes where intellectual authority has been transferred to impersonal science. It is in fact the pupils of the higher classes who are impressed by a large amount, extensive learning, especially if not exclusively limited to his own field. If the pupils get the impression that their teacher is a man of learning they will not regard his praise and reproof with indifference, at least not when the case involves an intellectual solution. Hence if we apply ourselves diligently to the increase and precision of our knowledge, if we make careful preparation and consequently appear to have complete mastery of our subject-matter, we at the same time lay the foundation for the development of moral authority. This much at least is certain, that without accurate knowledge, without scientific thoroughness it is difficult to acquire moral authority. If a man lacks assurance in his knowledge or even shows weakness his praise and reproof will be a matter of indifference to the pupils

But scientific thoroughness alone is not sufficient to guarantee moral quality. There are still certain attributes of character that must be added.

Many thinkers hold that these attributes, just because they issue from the depths of personality, must be innate and cannot be acquired. In my judgment however and experience confirms me in this, that the young teacher as a matter of fact is but rarely a fully developed personality. I have discovered in my own experience that it is really the school that develops the personality of the teacher. I know from my own experience that firm resolution, rigorous self-discipline, careful preparation and constant reflection on the principles employed, even if the peculiar gifts of leadership are lacking, will gradually give the young teacher the necessary assurance with which to begin. I hope, for this reason, that the following suggestions and advice may be helpful to many young colleagues in acquiring moral authority.

If we intend that praise and reproof are to make an impression on the pupils, we must use them sparingly and in carefully discriminating degrees. The honors which we con-

fer on the pupils should be, to employ the phrase of Cornelius Nepos, "rara ac tennes," i.e. they must not be given too frequently and not with too extravagant expression. The simple performance of duty is taken for granted, on the other hand an act which is distinctly extraordinary, a peculiarly pertinent answer, should be kindly and openly commended. It is similarly advisable to practise economy with reproof. An inattentive pupil may frequently be brought back to active participation merely by fixing attention on him. In the matter of habitual neglect of duty I have frequently, instead of a reproof, simply expressed my surprise and generally found it more effective. However, in the case of a grave misdemeanor, which even involves dishonesty, strong expression of indignation is in place, but it should never include abuse.

On the matter of influencing the will we will proceed most effectively if we plan carefully and exactly in advance just what we intend to require. However, once the requirement has been made we must refuse absolutely to relax. We must insist with energy and tenacity that our requirements be actually fulfilled. As soon as the pupils discover that objection, side-stepping, or forgetfulness are useless, they will learn, and that right quickly, to adjust themselves to our requirements without resistance.

In order to maintain moral authority it is exceedingly important that the teacher does not permit his personal sympathies and antipathies towards certain pupils, feelings which are thoroughly human and incapable of complete elimination, to affect the treatment and esteem of the pupil. Absolute justice is the surest means for the acquisition and maintenance of authority. Pupils endure with comparative readiness a considerable degree of rigor in the requirements, provided the teacher never violates their sense of justice. And every teacher can avoid this if he determines to do so. There is a proverb that love cannot be taken by force, but a man can attain to justice by diligent reflection and self-discipline. And justice, let me repeat it, is the most important source of moral authority.

We might perhaps suggest additional conditions and methods which indicate the way by which the teacher can acquire authority. I shall however let the matter rest with what has been said. What seems to me the most important is the con-

viction of every teacher that intellectual and moral authority are indispensable prerequisites to successful teaching, and that it is possible to acquire these by knowledge and will.

However, notwithstanding its great importance, the authority of the teacher is never an end in itself, but always only a means. It is certainly granted that we are here for the sake of the pupils, not the pupils for our sakes. We require authority in order that we may lead our pupils safely and accurately.

CHAPTER V

ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

I. THE ETHICAL FACTOR IN THE SECONDARY SCHOOL

WE have repeatedly had occasion during the course of our investigations to refer to the ethical problems of the secondary school. We have described social-ethical training as an integral element of general education. It consists, as we endeavored to show, in a corresponding development of the function of volition, and moreover, in such a way as to effect an invigoration, control, and expansion of the will (pp. 70, 83). According to our way of looking at it this expansion consists in giving the choices of our pupils the social point of view and to arouse in them the ability and necessity of advancing in every way the social whole of which they are a part. Our second pedagogic principle, which we have described as "the habit of industry," gave us occasion to call attention to the fact that one of the most important ethical problems of the secondary school is the matter of developing industry. We have also referred to the fact that intellectual discipline can be effective only as it is supported by fixed volitional dispositions which likewise constitute its vital basis. And finally, we have repeatedly emphasized that it is the duty and responsibility of the secondary school to train its pupils not alone to intellectual independence, but likewise to a sense of moral responsibility.

These occasional references indicate that, in addition to the scientific and didactic, the secondary teacher likewise has very important ethical and social problems to solve. But the matter is by no means at an end when we have become clearly and vitally aware of the problems. We must clearly isolate the ethical factor of the secondary school so as to understand that our whole pedagogic activity, but especially the administration of discipline, must be surcharged with the ethical and social spirit. While we are teaching our pupils and endeavoring to

discipline their intellect we must constantly try to establish their character, to furnish them a firm spiritual foundation. Moreover, we are thus simply fulfilling the intention of the Austrian Organization-plan, where the ultimate and highest aim of education is said to be, "a well-trained noble character."

This phase of our pedagogic activity is just at present of quite peculiar significance. In this point I fully agree with Fr. W. Foerster, who, near the beginning of his *School and Character*, emphasizes the necessity of a more intensive discipline of character in our modern schools, and insists on a thorough reform of school discipline.

The technical civilization of our age can show achievements which no one could have dreamed a century ago. All the obstacles to travel have been overcome, the Oecumene of the ancients is becoming more and more one mighty unity, whose parts are constantly revealing a more intimate relationship. And now that we are in the act of subduing the air and making it an instrument in human commerce, we are raising the words of Horace "Nil mortalibus arduum est," to an overwhelming truth.

Notwithstanding the great admiration with which we are filled by these achievements of the human mind we must nevertheless not ignore the dangers involved in this technical and economical advance. Human interests are constantly growing more materialistic, our spiritual vision is being torn towards externals with ever increasing force. We scarcely have time or interest any longer to think about ourselves, to cultivate our deeper spiritual powers, to interpret the purpose and meaning of existence from within. The consequence is that inner unrest and spiritual abandon with its correlated nervousness which constitutes so deplorable a characteristic of the modern man, especially the modern youth. If parents, physicians and teachers do not interpose most vigorously the danger is not excluded that civilized humanity will be destroyed by the mighty forces of its own creation.

If the technical and economic progress of humanity is to be a blessing and not a curse, man's subjective mastery of his spiritual powers must keep even pace with the splendid achievements in the external mastery over nature. We must learn to propose higher ideals and to suppress passing inclinations and

moods, momentary wishes, impulses and temptations in the interest of these ideals. The complaint has frequently been made that moral progress is far outstripped by technical progress. Sophocles expressed this idea more than two thousand years ago:

Σοφόν τι τὸ μηχανόεν τέχνας
ὑπὲρ ἐλπίδ' ἔχων ποτὲ μὲν κακὸν
ἄλλοτ' ἐπ' ἐσθλὸν ἔρπει.

"Endowed beyond all expectation with the wisdom of art, man still reverts now to the bad and then again to the good." (Antigone, 365 ff.) Pestalozzi observes even more clearly: "Just as in the case of an individual man, so likewise a whole epoch may achieve great progress in the knowledge of the truth while at the same time be woefully lacking in doing good." Foerster, who quotes this passage of Pestalozzi's, adds: "These words were spoken over a century ago and yet they seem to be intended directly for our own age."

Notwithstanding the fact that these complaints against the respective ages find justification and that at present they are perhaps even more true than ever before, we must nevertheless not neglect the additions to moral progress which our age has to show. Penal law has grown less cruel, corporal punishment has receded, the solvent debtor receives more humane consideration at the hands of the law. Labor is being more highly esteemed, men are speaking in no uncertain tone of the duties of wealth, and the fact that public opinion is far more sensitive and strict on moral affairs is readily perceivable. We are as a matter of course still far short of what we ought to be in moral progress, but it were nevertheless unfair to deny that we are moving forward ethically. And it is just for this reason that it is so highly important that the secondary school appreciate its moral and social problem. If we succeed in developing our pupils into moral characters by means of our instruction and discipline we will produce a public opinion of the next generation that will be still more strict and sensitive to moral facts. We may say, therefore, the worthiness of humanity is placed in our charge. It depends upon us what attitude the rising generation will take to the problems of social ethics. We share the responsibility in case there is evidence of a breaking down of principles, an in-

crease of egoism, a loss of the sense of solidarity. We are responsible if our young people regard every caprice and every desire as an essential part of their personality the development of which is at present described as the highest goal. We have failed in proportion as our academic youth exults about "the will to power" and so conceives the "revaluation of values" that everything is right to the strong.

Once we teachers have risen to this high conception of our vocation, each one of us will feel obliged to get a clear understanding of moral evolution and the moral destiny of mankind, but more particularly of the moral requirements which our immediate age imposes and must impose on the individual. Anyone who has attained this clear insight, by means of careful study and independent reflection and especially by analytic observation of child mind, will readily be in position to evaluate all pedagogic material from the viewpoint of social ethics and to administer school discipline in such a way as to prevent the rise of bitterness and crudity, the tendency to treachery and deceit among the pupils, but rather subjective invigoration, cheerful coöperation and spontaneous subjection.

Every teacher has at his disposal an extensive literature on ethics and sociology adapted to such study as this. The richest collection of materials for the actual evolution of the moral sense is found in Westermarck's *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*. (2 vols.) No library should be without this book. But as respects the various theories, everyone must be free to choose the guide with whose help he is best able to acquire clear insight. It is of course beyond my present task to discuss the leading moral theories and critically state my attitude towards each one. And this would be of little value to the teacher who is seeking help. On the other hand I may perhaps rather hope to facilitate the orientation of one or another by briefly outlining my own views and try to show how they apply to the problems of the school.

The moral evolution of the human race, in my judgment, reveals two tendencies which frequently operate against each other. On the one hand human society in the form of the herd, the tribe, the class, the nationality, the state coerces the individual into subjection and servitude to the whole. It imposes requirements upon us which in conscience we find obliga-

tory. Public condemnation or even punishment are the consequences which follow the ignoring or the violation of these requirements. The sum total of obligations which society imposes on the individual may be expressed in the comprehensive term, duty towards humanity. Social conscience bids us fulfill our duty towards humanity. (Cf. Jerusalem, *Introduction to Philosophy*, Eng. Tr., p. 271.) On the other hand every man constantly learns to appreciate his individual dignity more highly. The mere fulfillment of social requirements ceases to satisfy us in direct proportion to the degree to which our individual personality has been developed. We impose obligations upon ourselves and we are dissatisfied until we are conscious of having done our best. We likewise resist social requirements whenever these impair the dignity of our individual personality. As Kant puts it, we discover that we are no longer mere means but that we are ends in ourselves. The sum total of the requirements thus evolved may be described as personal worth or dignity.

We shall proceed to investigate this twofold development of morality in the human race a little more thoroughly.

2. PERSONAL DUTY AND PERSONAL DIGNITY

Human society is the birthplace of moral ideas. Westermarck, in the work previously cited, has not only made this affirmation, but he has demonstrated it incontrovertibly by an overwhelming abundance of inductive matters of fact. All morality is both in its origin and, as I shall hope to show, likewise in its essence, of a social nature. This depends on the fact that, as Aristotle observed, man is by nature a social being (*φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον*, *Politics* I, 2). And as a matter of fact we find that man, wherever we first come in contact with him in history and wherever explorers meet with him — frequently under very primitive conditions — always lives in groups. The attachment of the individual to the general will of his group, i.e., his attachment to custom, moral conceptions and the ideas of religious faith, is greater on the lower levels of civilization than on the higher, but some kind of attachment is always present. A completely isolated individual, entirely separate from human society never occurs and never will occur. For:

Der Mensch bedarf des Menschen sehr
 Zu seinem grossen Ziele
 Und nur im Ganzen wirket er.

Under primitive conditions this attachment of the individual remains largely unconscious and likewise acts instinctively. The individual regulates his conduct according to the customs and morals of his ancestry without giving the matter much thought. But as the groups increase in size and the state assumes more complicated forms, the requirements which the group imposes on the individual becomes more clearly and more sharply defined. In this way every citizen becomes clearly aware of his obligation to the group as a whole. It is only the clear consciousness of this demand of the whole that comes under the term *duty*.

The term duty is wholly a social concept and possesses all the attributes which we have previously suggested as the characteristics of society. As a social concept duty possesses imperative character and impresses the individual as an authoritative command. But duty likewise reveals that peculiar dual nature of which we have spoken above. It is in us as a consciousness of duty, as a sense of duty and acts as an impelling and an inhibiting influence on our wills. But it is also outside us, it stands over us as something super-individual, super-personal, as power and authority. This super-individual something has power to coerce us, to impose punishment and confer reward. This idea of possible condemnation and punishment is a constant element of duty, as long as it retains its strictly social character. The power which meets us here as something super-personal is the general will of society as expressed in the existing laws and institutions. In this way the concept of duty, arising from purely human factors, soon takes on a strongly religious aspect. Even in Homer we find that kings and judges protect the laws *Πρὸς Διός*, i.e., as ambassadors of Zeus, the supreme god. We likewise read that Zeus sends a wind-storm because men distort the law, banish justice and pay no heed to the will of the gods. Zeus is likewise the protector of strangers and beggars. Institutions and laws acquire a somewhat sacred and eternal aspect by this connection with super-sensible powers. Anyone who breaks the laws is not only an enemy and a traitor, but even a blasphemer against the divine will.

But in this way the general will, once it assumes the form of the regulations of society, acquires a decidedly conservative character. These institutions have revealed their adaptability to the maintenance of the social structure, and they must therefore not be disturbed. A counter force eventually arises within society in opposition to this conservative tendency, which is produced and brought to maturity by social evolution itself, notwithstanding its apparently anti-social and revolutionary activity, as a matter of fact, contributes tremendously to the progress of social evolution. This power consists of the human individual with an intensified consciousness of his personal dignity. Let us examine how this new power arises and its method of operation.

Every cultural advance produces a more complicated organization of economic life or is rather conditioned and supported by this progress in economic intercourse. But the increased demands can only be satisfied by a constantly increasing *division of labor*. The intensive and extensive division of labor has therefore already been long recognized as the characteristic mark of every higher cultural evolution. Where the agriculturist and his family formerly provided their own food, their shelter, their clothing and their utensils themselves, this business is now divided among the miller, the baker, the tailor, the locksmith, the carpenter and mechanic. In addition to these, the founding of cities gives rise to numerous other vocations which owe their origin to the newly evolved demands. The inevitable consequence of every division of labor moreover is an increasing differentiation of interests and a concomitant differentiation of characters. The agriculturist who lives with his family from the products of the fields will naturally be most deeply interested in the preservation of the existing institutions. An increase of the necessities of life multiplies his difficulties. Every political upheaval, every war threatens his property. At the same time his uniform occupation, which only rarely requires haste makes him slow and perhaps dull in intellect. Once in a while the functional necessities of his emotional nature seeks excitement and on this account gives eager ear to the recital of the histories of "war and rumors of war."

"Sie mögen sich die Köpfe spalten,
Doch nur zu Hause bleib's beim Alten."

The tradesman, on the other hand, must be more versatile. Competition forces him constantly to be on the lookout for new methods of operation and new markets for his goods. He is therefore interested in everything new and he is consequently more ready for changes. So likewise the professional soldiers will evolve different characteristics from the peaceful citizen. It is by some such process of differentiation as this that certain individuals are developed, which formerly submitted to the general will rather instinctively and unconsciously, into personalities who do their own thinking, who try to put their own judgment, their own interest, their own principles into effect.

The independent individual, the self-sufficient personality does not exist from the beginning, but first appears as a product of social evolution. He is admittedly one of its most valuable and most significant products. While independently thinking personalities are evolved from the human herd a downright inexhaustible supply of new spiritual energies are set free, which, with their infinite capacities, are capable of creating civilization in the real sense of that term.

Man, once he has matured, no longer accepts laws and institutions without question as matters of course and unchangeable. He has come to feel himself a being with powers and values distinctly his own and at times regards himself hampered, debased and robbed of his rights by the statutes which are sanctified by tradition. Subjectively revolting and becoming indignant, he raises his protest against the oppressions imposed by the power of the eternally bygone and finds a hearing and an understanding appreciation among kindred spirits. This gives rise to the battle of the individual struggling for the freer exercise of his powers against every kind of social bondage, a battle which began over two thousand years ago, manifested itself in the most varied forms and is not yet at an end. There are periods of history in which this battle attains exceptional prominence. Permit me to present several of these in order that the nature of this conflict which profoundly uproots humanity and thus becomes a mighty dynamic of progress may be conceived more clearly and realistically.

During the fifth and fourth centuries B. C., we behold this prolific strife of intellects vividly portrayed in Athens, the training school of Hellas (*παιδευσίς Ἑλλάδος*). The speeches of

Kallicles in Plato's *Gorgias*, no less by their utter lack of consideration for tradition than in their finished style, furnish a peculiarly clear illustration of this intellectual current. The irresponsibility of the strong personality, its privilege of injustice and force is vigorously defended against Socrates — Plato, who emphasizes adherence to the moral law, which, notwithstanding its super-individual and transcendental origin, can be developed within the soul of each individual human being.

Christianity, in deepest essence, is nothing more than the deliverance of the individual from the overwhelming pressure of the law. In post-exilic Judaism this law had become an absolute authority in the presence of which the individual was forbidden to know or do anything, save to yield absolute subservience. When Christianity turns its attention to man's subjective self, digs up his feelings in their profoundest depths with tremendous energy, demands superhuman reactions from his will in lieu of which, moreover, satisfaction is promised for the individual's need of redemption, it released spiritual energies which were entirely new, which until then had been practically dormant. Each individual human being now acquires an importance of his own, for like all others he is a child of God. This spontaneous development of spiritual powers has indeed suffered serious restriction through the organization of Christianity into an ecclesiastical institution. The church, as a matter of course, is founded on authority rather than on liberty. In sole possession of the means of grace it in large measure assumes responsibility for the life of the individual and thus lulls to sleep again the conscience which Christ had aroused. Personality, grown stronger, arrays itself against this tutelage once more in two movements which are essentially distinct from each other. The one movement is protestantism, which, at the beginning aims to reinstate the deliverance of the mind from the tyranny of dogma and law characteristic of primitive Christianity and accordingly finds enthusiastic adherents. True, it is not long until protestantism likewise is seized with the torpor of an authoritative church, but it nevertheless seems that here there is somewhat more room for the spontaneous development of personal conviction.

The other form of the disenthralment of the individual is the still active movement of humanism and the renaissance.

Here it is the Greeks who put man into possession of himself once more and, by their world-view characteristically devoted to life, again establish the distinctive worth of each individual human being and joy in the developing of personal energies. This so-called civil emancipation of mankind is still in process of development. The eighteenth century enlightenment issuing from England, temperamentally intensified in France, the storm and stress and neohumanism in Germany, the sanguinary struggle for human rights in America and France, all this is but the same constant striving after the realization of the distinctive dignity of each individual human personality.

The most important product of this cultural evolution consists of a new moral ideal which correlates with the requirements of human duty previously elaborated and suffuses it with a new spirit. We shall describe this new moral ideal as the impulse towards the dignity of man. Every human individual is therefore no longer merely a laboring animal among the herd, not merely an enslaved member of society, but possesses unique dignity as a man, as a representative of the human species. Laws and institutions which violate personal dignity must be vigorously assailed. Humanity must be respected in the insolvent debtor, yea even in the criminal. And the rack has been abolished by the sway of this new ideal of the dignity of man, the whipping post has likewise receded into the background and regard for humanity also appears in various other ways in our penal laws. This new requirement in the first place expands the circle of duties. Both in legislation and economic life new duties of benevolence have arisen. And these new ideals have produced even more profound results upon man subjectively than objectively. My conscience is no longer satisfied when I have met the objective requirements imposed upon me by the state and society. The dignity of man demands of me that I develop all my powers, that I do my best to advance and realize my better self.

The moral law of human dignity has been set forth and elaborated most analytically and most penetratingly by Immanuel Kant. "Act so as to use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always as an end, never as merely a means." This famous second formulation of the "categorical imperative" constitutes a whole moral program.

Kant, as is indeed characteristic of his ethics, has likewise overstrained this requirement. His unconditional rejection of lying, deduced from the principle of human dignity, is impractical in social life, it sometimes even conflicts with higher social duties. But notwithstanding this his requirements elaborated with relentless logical consistency continue to be of vast significance. He constructs an ideal, the realization of which steels one's energies even if he knows it is beyond the reach of mortals.

We also discover an overstrain of this individualistic principle among the protagonists of neohumanism in romanticism. Goethe's remark that personality is the highest fortune of mundane children is frequently quoted. William v. Humboldt is a typical representative of this view of the moral task of mankind. We have quoted several passages above, from which it follows that Humboldt felt man's highest duty to consist in developing all his capacities and to be constantly occupied with this finishing of his subjective self. Humboldt even resigned a state appointment early in life in order to devote himself entirely to this problem of self-discipline. Even though he later again served the state in important positions, the refinement of personality still remains his express moral ideal. "My vocation seemed to me to be to discover the path which would lead me, me alone, to the highest destiny." We discover similar endeavors among the earlier romanticists, where among other factors the æsthetic motives predominate.

During the nineteenth century a powerful reaction against this on-sided cultivation of the individualistic principle set in, which went to the opposite extreme and emphasized the social problem of humanity so vigorously, that the new moral ideal of human dignity, achieved through the struggle of centuries, fell into abeyance. This reaction is the product of economic evolution. The invention of the steam engine, railways, steamship propellers and telegraphy has resulted in a colossal advance in the industries. Great manufacturing establishments arose in which the hosts of laborers were completely subordinated to the will of the manager. Unrestrained egoism was elevated to the distinction of a principle in economic life by the so-called Manchester plan. The wages of labor is then simply an administrative account for the manager, which he naturally seeks to keep

as low as possible. Laborers were therefore rapidly worn out and frequently received such small wages that they were scarcely able to appease their hunger. On the other hand the army of the proletariat arose inspired by their leading spirits with a consciousness of their rights and power. This gave rise to the powerful social-democracy movement which is still on the increase. The organization of the laboring classes is becoming increasingly more general and at the same time more robust. "Expropriation of the expropriator" was the watchword of the earlier more revolutionary period. Later on the movement developed into a systematic program, in which a complete change in the organization of society based upon private property is demanded. "The nationalization of all the instruments of production" expresses the chief point of this program. This means that the production of all goods required for the satisfaction of the primary necessities of mankind shall no longer be left to private enterprise and free competition, but shall be administered by the state organized on a social-democratic basis. In this state the obligation to work shall be universal and the accumulation of a large amount of capital in the hands of a few individuals shall be made an impossibility.

The problem whether this program is at all feasible, whether such a state of affairs is reconcilable with the actual variations in human capacity and tenable for any length of time does not concern us here. We have only to consider the extent to which this movement has modified the moral ideas of the civilized nations. We must observe then that since the beginning of Christianity there has been no spiritual factor that has been so active in this respect as modern socialism. The appreciation of the value of labor has increased so remarkably in public opinion that the idea of the universal obligation to work no longer appears entirely utopian. The wages of labor have been palpably increased, the length of the work day has been shortened. Practically all nations have found it necessary to pass laws which are intended to guarantee the protection of the laborer, their superannuates, invalid and accident insurance. People speak more than ever before of the obligations of wealth and the idea that the state dare not permit the principle of unrestricted egoism in economic life is constantly winning new adherents.

The ethical principle which is active in this movement is without doubt *social* through and through. The sphere of duties for each individual is enlarged and his dependence on the social whole is more sharply and decisively defined. Everyone must know that he owes certain obligations to the social organism to which he belongs, and he must constantly be kept in mind of the fact that he can be required to discharge these obligations. Society imperiously remands the individual, at whose emancipation it had been unconsciously working, back into its service. It refuses to concede that the highly developed powers be employed according to the pleasure of the individual. It rather claims the whole man with all his dispositions and capacities for itself and forces him into its service.

But on the other hand powerful voices begin to protest against this socialization of the enfranchised and richly endowed individual, and demanded,— and in fact partly accomplished,— by all parties of social reform. Herbert Spencer, whom Ludwig Stein once pertinently called the philosopher of liberalism, in his *Man Versus State*, describes the conditions involved in the program of social democracy as “the coming slavery.” Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy, in its deepest meaning, is nothing more than a vigorous and finally a forceful emancipation of subjective man from the tyranny of tradition and from the tyranny of the masses. In his irresistible and incredibly forceful insistence on absolute honesty, on heroic loyalty to self, he becomes so extraordinarily clear-visioned for the downright frightful amount of hypocrisy to be found in national custom and unfortunately even in national ethics. Nietzsche perished in this desperate battle for the freedom of personality against the enforced subordination of the individual to the social whole but his works constitute a rich armory whence many coming generations will draw weapons against unjustified suppression of free personality among men. Nietzsche’s influence upon our modern youth has frequently been quite unfortunate and dangerous because he was not yet fully understood. But now since men begin to estimate him more objectively, the depths of his psychological penetration and the pure uprightness of his sentiment will doubtless become an exceedingly valuable cultural factor.

In connection with Nietzsche and due to the pressure of in-

creasing socialization a kind of neoromanticism and personality-cult, supported partly by æsthetic, partly by religious motives, has evolved since the beginning of the twentieth century. This is likewise a reaction of individualism against the demands of society which are becoming overwhelming, a battle of human dignity against the frequently oppressive human duty. This personality-cult might doubtless develop into a new source of energy, but thus far it lacks a firm psychological basis. As we have previously observed, man quite frequently regards transitory moods, superficial wishes, fancied sympathies and antipathies as effluences of personality and thinks self-development consists in following every inspiration and neglecting distasteful tasks. At present we frequently find young people utterly lacking in subjective stability. We see how young boys and girls frivolously throw their young life away, which nevertheless belongs to the family and to the state, just because a single wish remains unfulfilled, because not every budding dream matures. These sad facts, which unfortunately are increasing daily, should furnish cause for reflection to all fanatics of individual liberty, and especially all who never weary of emphasizing that every child brings its finished individuality into the world and that this individuality must be fostered, indulged and coddled and dare not be suppressed by any kind of coercion. The thought expressed by Ellen Key, that this is the century of the child, is indeed a profound idea. The modern theory of evolution finds its most fruitful application in the demand that we direct our education towards the future rather than the past. By this I mean that the aim of education dare no longer consist in so influencing the pupils that they walk in the paths laid out for them by their teachers and become like their forebears. The theory of evolution teaches us that each generation produces something new and that we should therefore instil in our children the capacity of contributing to the creation and development of the new. But just for the very reason that we regard education as an aid to evolution and wish to help our children to develop complete, well-rounded personalities, we must not forget the fact that this involves consideration for the social requirements quite as well as the development of the individual dispositions. We must be clearly aware of the fact that we are at present right in the midst of the struggle

of these two evolutionary tendencies. The problem of political civilization and of philosophical civilization of the twentieth century, in my opinion consists in making possible the synthesis of individualism and socialism, the reconciliation of the ideas of personal duty and personal dignity. The state as the authorized agent of society should be so constituted as to be able to require and compel its subjects to fulfill their social obligations without injury to their personal dignity. We dare not permit or even establish any institutions which betray or even force the individual to resort to falsehood, treachery and deceit because the burdens imposed by the state are unbearable. On the contrary each individual should clearly understand — and education must provide for this — that it is to the best advantage of every citizen to be vitally associated with the state. He should never forget that railroads, the postal service, telegraph and telephone are impossible without the coöperation of the state. He should be taught to see that the state furnishes him the opportunity of educating his children, protects him against the ravages of epidemic and safeguards his rights. Everyone must become familiar with the idea that such advantages require personal sacrifices and active coöperation in the further development of the state.

At present we are still far short of the actualization of this synthesis. In fact we must even confess that the consciousness of its necessity is as yet not very general. The state and the individual still largely assume a hostile attitude towards each other. Government officials still regard the individual citizen largely as a man bent on resisting authority, evading taxation, despoiling the public treasury and securing private advantages at the expense of the state. The motto of our Crown Prince Rudolph, who unfortunately died too soon, that man is the most valuable asset of the state, is still far from receiving adequate recognition by the governments. The individual likewise frequently merely regards the state as a superior enemy who extorts taxes, requires military service and interposes bureaucratic obstacles in the way of his private enterprizes.

Here the schools, and especially the high school, and their teachers are confronted with a vast problem, fraught with much blessing. We must coöperate in effecting this absolutely necessary synthesis. We must inspire our pupils with the social

spirit and at the same time train them to preserve their personal independence, their personal dignity. It is for us to hold them to a strict accounting with duty, to indelibly implant in their minds the sense of moral responsibility and at the same time to develop their individuality and not be satisfied with anything less than having done their very best. We must show them examples and if possible let them discover for themselves that there can be no more intensive, delightful and effective development of personality than that which comes from a complete dedication of one's self, together with all his powers, to some self-chosen social task.

Examples of men who have made a brilliant success of this synthesis of personal duty and personal dignity are not so very numerous. It is therefore the more important to present these few as clearly as possible and make frequent reference to them. Among these there is one especially with whom our pupils become acquainted rather early in their course and concerning whom they later on have opportunity to acquire authoritative information. I have in mind the personality of Socrates. He loyally performed his duty as a citizen, going thrice to the front and there furnishing his man. And at the same time he chose a vocation, in harmony with his individuality, which consisted in arousing the moral consciousness of his fellow citizens. He remained loyal to this calling and went down to death for his vocation. Twice the state charged him with violations of the law and both times he disproved the charge. "Neither the threatening mien of tyrants, nor the passions of the rabble, boding him ill" disturbed the stability of his purpose. In his defense he gave expression to words that deserve reflection: "Whenever anyone assumes a position because he thinks it best or whenever his superior assigns a position, there he must persevere in danger." Here we have the synthesis of personal duty and personal dignity clearly and vividly illustrated and expressed by a man who, by his life and even more by his death, suffused this principle with vital power. In the lessons on Plato's *Apology* I have repeatedly taken occasion, in connection with this passage, to discuss man's moral problems with the senior pupils, and invariably found them participating in these explanations with lively interest. And in this connection we can again see that the highest demands of the present were

anticipated by the Greeks.

We have thus discovered an important and effective principle for our ethico-social problem. Every teacher who has thoroughly assimilated this line of thought will find abundant opportunity in teaching to instil this sentiment in the pupils. And better still, in the administration of discipline he will be in position to apply the method of the "pastor" rather than that of the "policeman," as Foerster has so well observed. Although every teacher will apply this principle in conformity with his own individuality many will perhaps nevertheless welcome a few suggestions on its practical application in the school.

3. THE SOCIAL SPIRIT IN SCHOOL

By the term "social spirit" I have no reference whatever to any political partizan tendency nor even any specific effort towards the reconstruction of the existing social order. It is important to emphasize this at present so as not to be misunderstood. The social spirit, a sum-total judgment, emotion- and volition-impulses which arouse our consciousness and keep it alert to the fact that every man is born into a highly developed social order, that his development has tremendous advantages and his life's meaning is immeasurably enhanced as a result of this fact, and that he is therefore called upon and in duty bound to contribute to the continuance and further development of this social organism. If we keep constantly in mind the fact that the large majority of our pupils are destined, even by their position to serve the community, the state, no one will doubt the importance of our being concerned to effect a vigorous development of the social spirit in them.

Modern sociology has taught us that the individual's dependence on his social milieu is far greater than was previously supposed. Not only are volitional tendencies and tastes affected by custom and fashion, but intellect and knowledge are largely products of social cooperation. There are many at the present time who regard this fact as a fetter, a drag on individual development, as we have just now indicated. But these complaints do not banish the unalterable fact of social influence from the world. It is useless and a highly injudicious waste of energy to be constantly kicking against the social pricks. We must

live in a social group and we must therefore acquire the characters which facilitate this community life and advance our interests. It will soon appear that the social organism which we serve by no means merely restrains our individual development. We shall soon discover that the most powerful impulses, the most effective enlargements of our ego proceed from this social organism.

Sociology is still a youthful science. It has thus far failed to describe adequately the relations of the individual to the social whole of which he is a part and reduce them to systematic order. We are consequently not in position to submit our proposals for the cultivation of the social spirit in the school on the basis of a scientifically elaborated plan. We must rather be satisfied to lay hold of those factors of the social spirit which manifest themselves clearly in the practical life of the school.

Even the ordinary conduct of instruction furnishes considerable opportunity to prepare the pupils for future social life: here the habit of industry, which we have previously described as an important pedagogic principle, must be emphasized first of all. We must call attention to the fact that the habit of industry is an exceedingly important part of social education. The appreciation of work, as we have repeatedly observed, is increasing because we are constantly becoming better acquainted with its social significance. Social evolution is unquestionably moving in the direction of a constantly decreasing toleration of an indolent existence which even Plato declared to be detestable. (Rep. VIII, 552.) Hence if we accustom our pupils each day to regard a definite amount of work as their irremissible duty for the passing day, we have in fact breathed into them a breath of the social spirit. Goethe once answered the question, "What constitutes your duty?" as follows: "The demand of the day." But this simply means daily, uniform occupation. At present the term work does not apply to every definite occupation which likewise intensely engages one's powers. Work in the narrower sense implies only such occupation as produces results of value not only for the workman, but likewise for others. The thought of those who need or expect the product of labor is intimately associated with the nature of work and this clothes labor in the real sense of the term with an altruistic, and especially a social character. But the habit

of industry is likewise of great value to man as an individual. The infant organism is so constituted that it desires the exercise of its powers. By furnishing this impulse an opportunity for exercise in the proper manner we produce a happy, subjective self-gratification. I am reminded of once having read the following in one of Schiller's letters: "But the best of all is industry; it not only produces the means of livelihood, it even gives life its real value." Hence while habituating our pupils to work we are furnishing their native functional need the opportunity for delightful exercise and at the same time fit them for social efficiency.

The cultivation of a sense of order and punctuality is intimately associated with the habit of industry. It has frequently been observed that order facilitates every effort. But there are far deeper reasons which impel us to inculcate orderliness, and the duty of the most exact precision even in little things as well as the punctual meeting of appointments. Modern life is constantly developing more vocations in which important interests are conditioned on minute, even the most detailed precision and not infrequently it involves the life of many human beings. We need only refer to the postal and railway service, technical engineering in the building of tunnels and aqueducts, the critical operations of surgery, the prescription of medicine, etc. The slightest error here is frequently fraught with the most dire consequences. It is therefore the duty of social education to hold the pupils of the higher schools, many of whom will eventually occupy such responsible positions, to order, punctuality and precision from the beginning. The reproach of pedantry frequently charged against teachers in such cases will, in view of the vast social consequences involved, not be regarded as a reproach. Knowledge still constitutes the vast significance attributable to man in the small and even smallest things of life, one of the triumphs of modern science and technics. Devastating epidemics have only been effectively counteracted since man has come to recognize their causes in the little bacilli and microbes. Our planet has acquired its present form, not by mighty revolutions, as was once supposed, but by a gradual condensation and cooling process, and it is only since man has learned the summation of these minimal changes that geology has been placed on a scientific basis. The larger organism

is made up of minute cells and only he who understands the nature of the cell can comprehend the structure and function of the higher organs. In similar fashion also the commonplace in civil life, the ordinary, the minimal attains its significance and it is precisely the investigation of the commonplace that has shed the clearest light on the past epochs.

We are right in line with the spirit of modern life and modern science therefore, if we cultivate "respect for small things." The teaching of mathematics and especially philology as well as the administration of discipline furnishes opportunity to this end. The pupils must be brought to see what greatness is frequently involved in loyalty in little things. The will for the good is actually good and really strong only as it extends to the smallest veins and receptacles of the soul and completely pervades the whole. Any one who is tardy, even though it is but for a single time, disturbs the teaching and he has thus injured both the teacher and his fellow pupils. We should understand how to influence the public sentiment of the class in this direction. An excellent method of accomplishing this is to enlist the coöperation of the pupils in the maintenance of order and cleanliness in the classroom. The moment they become guardians their native impulse towards activity, which only too easily finds vent in disturbances and vicious pranks, will be guided into correct channels and thus contribute to subjective invigoration. The teacher himself must at least exert an influence in this direction by his example. If he always begins the recitation promptly on time, returns written exercises at the proper time and exercises care in his corrections, the pupils will be able to see in him their example. On the contrary it is absolutely impossible to maintain order and punctuality among others if a man is indifferent to such things himself, and thereby shows that he has not yet learned the real greatness of being faithful in little things.

Work and order succeed only under intelligent guidance. This naturally falls to the duty of the teacher. It goes without saying that it can succeed only as the pupils conform with the regulations laid down by the teacher, i.e., as they spontaneously obey. Obedience has from the earliest times been regarded as the first duty of the citizen and as the most important duty of the pupil. It would be superfluous to speak in

detail of training to obedience. But we have generally been thinking, in connection with this term, of a purely passive obedience, the involuntary subjection to the will of the stronger. This form of obedience is likewise indispensable, but only as preliminary to the higher form. If obedience is not to operate as a mere inhibiting instrument, which suppresses powerful emotions and thus excites opposition, if obedience is rather to arouse new powers and inspire the social spirit it must rest on an entirely different foundation. The pupils must be brought to understand the profound meaning of the passage from the Iphigenia: "And obedient I always felt my soul most beautifully free!" This will happen only as the teacher understands so to enlist the interest of the pupils for the task of instruction that it becomes a common interest for both teacher and pupil, which both serve. If the teacher and the pupils together are interested in solving this somewhat complicated mathematical problem by the simplest and neatest possible method, that the passage of a foreign language immediately under discussion shall be really well translated and thoroughly understood, instruction has then become a common undertaking, in which it is assumed that one leads and the others follow. The pupils know full well from their games that things run smoothly only as the self-appointed leader, who well understands how to regulate and guide, has command and all the others strictly and vigorously obey. We must seek to enlist these latent powers of our youth for our cause. The teacher has been transformed from an officially appointed master into an eagerly and spontaneously recognized leader obedience to whom has become a matter of course. Obedience regulated in this fashion is no longer inhibitive or repressive. Rather the opposite. The pupils experience a sense of coöperation in their obedience. This kind of obedience quickens new powers within their souls and the genuine social spirit is thus evolved.

It is not so very easy to offer practical suggestions as to how this transformation may be brought about. It bears a close analogy to the transference of intellectual authority to impersonal science previously elaborated. The teacher will perhaps more easily discover the method of attaining this active and spontaneous obedience if he recalls the lines of Antonio in Goethe's "*Tasso*":

Es ist kein schönerer Anblick in der Welt,
Als ein Fürsten sehn, der klug regiert,
Das Reich zu sehn, wo jeder stolz gehorcht;
Wo jeder nur sich selbst zu dienen glaubt,
Weil ihm das Rechte nur befohlen wird.

It becomes us to consider precisely, and very precisely, what adjustments we have to make. We must become perfectly clear in our own minds, on all that pertains to this matter, by careful preparation even to the smallest detail. We can only require such things of the pupils as they are able to do, and we to control. But once an order is given the only thing to do is to insist with absolute consistency on its execution. There must be no evasion, no pretext, no forgetting and no wearying. Foerster speaks of a " Militarism of a superior order " which he contrasts with the frequently customary " gruff tone of the corporal." We can appropriate this idea because we are trying to develop a kind of " tactical consciousness " in the class, which proceeds from a strong sense of solidarity and is capable of increasing the achievements of the whole class. The most important point here moreover is this, namely, that the solidarity include the teacher and does not degenerate into a conspiracy against the teacher. Then obedience is combined with subjective liberty, with intensified satisfaction and likewise with self-discipline.

Industry, the sense of order, punctuality and obedience are without doubt social virtues. They inspire the social spirit and prepare men for community life. But they maintain their connection with the center of social spirit only as they contribute to the quickening and strengthening of the sense of individual moral responsibility among the pupils. And we have repeatedly observed that the secondary school should train its pupils not only to intellectual independence, but likewise to moral responsibility (pp. 79, 83, 122). It is of the nature of the social spirit that whoever is inspired by it is conscious of the whole of which he is a part in all his actions. He never forgets to keep in mind the consequences of his actions and especially of his omissions, and to permit these ideas to constantly determine his conduct. The sense of responsibility, in the truest sense, is social in its nature and evolves only in society and by society.

By developing the habit of industry and punctuality, by the vigorous cultivation of obedience in spontaneous subjection we prepare our pupils for the later development of the sense of responsibility. But at this point the school ought to do more. We should furnish the pupils opportunity, even during the period of their education, to experience what responsibility means, we should permit them to experience this emotion often and deeply.

Under the present method of discipline, which is based on the authority of the teacher and the passive obedience of the pupils there is but little opportunity for this. We can at best assign certain pupils definite tasks by giving them charge say of keeping the blackboard clean, the record of absences, the collection of contributions. But this reaches only a few and beyond this the required services are so easily discharged that they contribute very little to the quickening of the sense of moral responsibility. In America this difficulty has been recognized for some time already, giving rise to the idea of enlisting the coöperation of the pupils in the maintenance of order and also to secure organized coöperation in other ways. Efforts in this direction have also been made in Switzerland, in Germany and in Austria,—but on a far more modest scale. The reader will find a very complete summary of the experiments and achievements in this line in Foerster *School and Character*. In supplementation I should like to call attention to Colin A. Scott's *Social Education*. I unfortunately have no practical experience on this point. I can therefore only express my theoretical conviction, on the basis of psychological and sociological considerations together with the published reports of individual teachers, that the only way to train our pupils effectively to moral responsibility is by this method of "student self-government."

Since, as I have observed, I have no practical experience in "self-government," I present the most important facts from the repeatedly published reports of individual teachers in order that the method of applying this principle in the practical life of the school may be apparent to teachers. This system has been most extensively applied in the American public and city schools where girls and boys are generally taught together. Whole school cities and even school states have been organized

whose "constitutions" rest on a strictly democratic and constitutional basis. The reports are unanimous in emphasizing the brilliant success of the system everywhere. The pupils in their own "assemblies" choose a number of "officers" for certain functions and work out "school laws" and "school regulations." The officers chosen on their own initiative provide for order and cleanliness, sit in judgment on such as have violated the law and work for the maintenance of the discipline, which formerly was wholly a matter of the teacher's autocratic requirement or prohibition. It develops a "public sentiment" among the pupils which, now that the pupils feel themselves responsible for the conduct of the class, reveals an entirely different spirit than formerly under the despotic régime. The pupils thus find opportunity in the various transactions and discussions to practice speaking before an assembly and to become acquainted with parliamentary procedure in general. Reports show repeatedly that in schools where the worst carelessness and rudeness formerly prevailed, you now find sober morality and enthusiastic study.

In Switzerland during recent years — chiefly through Foerster's agitations — a number of experiments in "self-government" have been made in the public schools. The teachers are all actually astonished at the result. John Hepp, in a small volume on *Pupil's Self-Government* gives the following account of the motives which led him to introduce the new system and its first fruits: "The impudence, carelessness, disorderliness on the one hand, and the fickleness, instability and disinclination to perform required work neatly and conscientiously on the other frequently brought me to desperation. In my efforts to preserve order in the classroom I sometimes felt more like a police bailiff than a teacher. I usually kept several pupils after school, discussing their difficulties with them, went over their work in their presence and tried to train the good people to systematic industry, to the discharge of duty. But the greater my efforts, the less seemed to be the result — at least generally speaking. In my desperation I unfortunately resorted to corporal punishment with increasing frequency. In this way it was utterly impossible for the pupils to love school. I felt a hidden opposition to my rigorous discipline beginning to germinate, after the fashion of an uncanny resistance. I saw clearly

that if matters continued as they were the best thinking boys would likewise join in with the dissatisfied ones. The fault lay not alone with the pupils, but even more largely with me and this naturally made me ill-humored in the highest degree. I said to myself, if you do not gain their confidence, you cannot teach them."

The writer then tells how, by frequent visitation of the pupils' parents he acquired an insight into their home environment and thus learned to judge with more moderation. He then continues: "I had long been acquainted with the American ideas through Foerster's *Jugendlehre*. Inasmuch as I had made more or less of a fiasco of my disciplinary efforts hitherto, I resolved to make a trial of governing according to the example set by the new world. Until then the 'School city' system had impressed me most favorably on account of the fact that I was convinced that it was better adapted than our school system to the training of citizens to whose capacity of judgment democracy could commit far-reaching decisions. I resolved therefore to make my pupils co-partners, to rule with them rather than over them. I considered how it might be possible, with the help of the better element of the class, to implant a public sentiment, to transform the energies, which had been making themselves so uncomfortably perceptible in the form of resistance to all coercion, into useful, positive achievements of helpfulness. Nowhere could I find any special guidance. Insuperable difficulties seemed to thwart my efforts. I accordingly determined to first undertake an experiment cautiously on a small scale, in order that I might eventually enlarge upon it on the basis of my experiences. I began with the insignificant little offices in vogue in every school; the cleaning of the blackboard, the handing out and collecting of papers, portfolios, etc. According to the prevailing custom there was one paper-collector and one board-cleaner appointed for each three rows of seats. The class under my direction first of all proposed a schedule of duties for these offices. Later on the pupils made nominations and they were given the privilege of electing respectively three board-cleaners and three paper collectors by the method of a majority vote. On this occasion I made the interesting observation that no one was chosen whom I had hitherto entrusted with the performance of all sorts of

commissions and errands. They were of course nominated, but brilliantly defeated. The term of office was likewise, after brief debate, fixed at four weeks by the general assembly. That those who were elected by their comrades regarded it as an honor to discharge the duties entrusted to them conscientiously, is self-evident. At the end of the month we held a brief review of the services of the six officers whose term had expired. The pupils were required to make criticisms. In general the views of the class corresponded with my own. Any one who has made similar experiments will doubtless have observed that, generally speaking, the pupils criticise more severely than the teacher. But there are always a number of good-hearted pupils who reject unjust charges brought against their comrades without the necessary interposition of the teacher. I then called their attention to other matters pertaining to the external order of the school of which they might actually relieve me; and further that they should coöperate with me in making our class a typical example of good order. But I guarded against offering suggestions. They must work out their own ideas and the ways and means of putting them into execution."

The writer goes on to tell of the inventiveness frequently manifested by the boys in working out new methods for the enforcement of their own regulations. They created the office of "window-opener" and the time-consuming and responsible office of "chest-keeper" whose business required him to care for and clean the drawing materials. Committees of cleanliness and order were appointed who had to see to it that every pupil came to school cleanly washed and that they all clean their shoes before entering the room. Hepp gives a very instructive illustration of the disciplinary effect of "self-government" introduced on a modest scale. "Either through thoughtlessness or as a joke, I do not know which, a terribly dirty fellow was once nominated for me for an appointment on the cleanliness and good order committee and even elected to the delight of everybody. And behold, on the following day he not only arrived at school on time, which had previously been a rare occurrence, but his mother had cut his hair which in its obstinacy had always given him an unkempt appearance. On the following day he brought a roll of towel paper and put it at its proper place. And even before the end of the week I

observed that he carried a quite small piece of soap with him. He evidently felt that as a member of the committee he must turn everything to account if he wished any further advance in public esteem. At the end of the four weeks the class expressly acknowledged that N. had manifested remarkable improvement, had shown himself worthy of his office and discharged his duties faithfully. I was particularly pleased with the result because it taught me how to influence the fellow. Without this assistance from his comrades I could in all probability never have approached him. Is not a single result like this already of infinite value? We must preach morality less, and instead open more paths for spontaneous self-activity in the sphere of morals. This creates life, this develops moral power."

A matter of peculiar significance in "self-government" is the "public sentiment" among the pupils to which it everywhere gives rise. Our author likewise furnishes a typical illustration of this point. "The seriousness with which the pupils regard the 'laws' of their own making is revealed in an event which happened recently. As I was about to begin school I observed a circle of pupils gathered about a certain F. who didn't know the first thing of obedience, and of duty scarcely even the name. Upon inquiry I discovered that he had declined to comply with the order of the committee, to wash his hands. He could resume his place as soon as he would obey. 'Public opinion,' as the Americans term it, was against him and he had to yield. It is evident that this 'public sentiment' greatly simplifies the administration of discipline for the teacher. The important thing is that by the method here described the truth of the principle 'every privilege involves duties and begets duties, responsibility' becomes clear to the pupils and is transformed into flesh and blood by an object lesson. It is an object lesson in democracy on a small scale. Of greater value than the knowledge of laws is the community spirit, the sense of co-responsibility for one's neighbor."

This report, which must impress every one familiar with school life with its absolute sincerity, by its clear statement illustrated by so many details and characteristic experiences, shows how much more effectively pupils can be trained to responsibility by self-government. This system has thus far been chiefly applied to the public schools. But there can be no doubt

that the high school, whose peculiar task consists in developing intellectual independence and moral responsibility, is the place where self-government should be cultivated most intensively. As a matter of fact experiments with this system have here and there already been made, which furnish decided encouragement to its continuance and further development. Foerster reports that institutions of this sort have recently been introduced in the gymnasiums of the Rhine Province. The essential feature there consists in the fact that the pupils elect a class committee which looks after the maintenance of order and good conduct. These committees are associated with the class president and the principal and may bring the wishes of the pupils to their attention. Teachers and principals are quite generally well pleased with the results. Foerster quotes the following passages from a report of gymnasium-director Prof. Siebourg in München-Gladbach: "We think our organization appeals far more strongly to noble class and school spirit and the sense of honor, which as a rule is far more highly developed and useful among our German youth than the purely penal-pedagogy is willing to admit. And we hope by this method to acquire a powerful support in the battle against dishonesty, which among pupils and unfortunately even in the homes of many parents, is regarded as an entirely proper weapon of defense. If the young man knows that he can express his grievance without hesitation and that a well-founded complaint will receive a ready hearing, he will be more likely to see how much better and more respectable this method of procedure is than the method of deceit. The institution is educative at least for all the pupils who hold an office of honor. And since this can change quite a number may hold office in the course of the school period. They learn to understand what it means to bear responsibility for something for which in our day so few men show any inclination and disposition. They must see to it that their orders are obeyed and any one who has once experienced the fact that it is by no means an easy task to issue orders will far more readily submit thereafter. And finally discipline which, for the great masses of mankind, was hitherto mere command and coercion from above, becomes a matter of spontaneous obedience, and the anticipation that rich blessings may flow from this source upon the whole after life is certainly

justified.

In Austrian institutions likewise two of these experiments have become known. Professor Prodingler organized a "School community" in Pola under peculiarly difficult circumstances. Since the pupils represented different nationalities (Italians, Germans, Slavs) he had first to solve the "nationality problem." Prodingler succeeded in effecting a unified organization by a system of national representation on the pupil-committees, and in this way the "school community" got along all right like every place else. Prodingler likewise emphasizes in his report that the sense of honor and responsibility is elevated by self-government and moral training is thus advanced. We shall quote several passages from his reports which are characterized by peculiar impressiveness and thorough enthusiasm for the new method. "But if order is really the foundation principle of all life, then the external material life dare not alone furnish the basis of its laws, it must rather be subordinated to the spiritual life of man, his spiritual nature, its ultimate issue again be under the guidance and determination of spirit, of ideas. And if man is really to maintain order and be able to force the enemies within his own bosom into subjection, he must be master of himself. But self-mastery requires strength of will, capable of vanquishing the enticements to evil. This will must be acquired, otherwise even the best doctrines remain but empty words. But here we are confronted by a remarkable phenomenon. In our present school system there is absolutely no possibility of working towards this end. Every opportunity, where youth might strengthen their will and actually develop self-mastery, is taken away from them. Youth has no responsibility. Are matters going crooked or straight, is there order or not, this does not concern them; this belongs to the head of the institution and the corps of teachers; it is their business to see to it; youth, under existing conditions, simply see to it that there is as much confusion as possible. Should our pupils act differently? Why? Whether order prevails or not, they haven't the least share in it; on the contrary it furnishes them rare fun to aggravate the gentlemen who conduct the investigation by cunningly contrived mischief. But matters would be quite different if the pupils were participants in the maintenance of order, if they were co-responsible. Then they have

no reason any longer to stir up mischief, they must rather aspire towards the realization of the greatest possible degree of peace."

The pupils who are actually beguiled into inciting mischief by the absolutistic system are then required to reflect a little on the subject of order and to take a little more account of their sins of commission and omission than formerly. By the fact that they must themselves provide for order, either as director, or as ordinary school citizen, they get abundant opportunity to practice self-mastery and likewise to direct others to do so. If the directors or superintendents perform their proper service they naturally dare not participate in mischievous tricks, but govern and conduct themselves properly — even for the sake of their dignity — and the others who might still be disposed to various follies, do not wish to encumber the service of their comrades and therefore avoid many an act they would otherwise have done. Let no one object that pupils even at present have sufficient opportunity for self-mastery in school; they must sit quietly during school hours, they must get their lessons even if they are perhaps eager for play or to take a walk, they dare not smoke, nor visit saloons, etc. Very well, but all this simply forces young people into passivity and completely suppresses their native impulse towards exercise, and it is just this that a rational system of education should take into account and wisely utilize youth's desire for exercise. Here, in the maintenance of order, youth is at once offered a vast field for its lust for activity; here plans must be worked out for the realization of prescribed requirements, to respect rights on every hand, conducting prescribed inspections, leading the erring to better conduct, to counsel with the officer in charge concerning this and that feature of the administration and many more things of like character. Here the young man, who finds himself appointed to a responsible position, learns to govern himself, he perceives that, in order to be somebody and hold his respect, he dare not permit himself to be plunged into ill-considered acts, that he must rather have himself under complete control. Just imagine a child under such training for a period of eight or twelve years — is it conceivable that this school of character will leave no impression on young people?"

"We have hitherto not been accustomed to contemplate the problem of discipline from this angle; we have regarded the

maintenance of discipline as a matter that concerns the teachers and about which the pupils need not bother themselves. But a genuine moral character can only unfold spontaneously, i.e., under conditions which simply exercises sufficient restraint to permit the completest possible development under every circumstance. Inasmuch as the antiquated despotic school system however proceeds on the principle of suppressing all spontaneity, and therefore prevents any genuine moral training, it must be set aside and supplanted by the best system thus far devised, the constitutional school community. I need not as a matter of course speak in detail of the more palpable matters, the additional advantages resulting from the pupils governing themselves. They become more independent, more conscious of their dignity, acquire a finer sense of honor and justice, learn to associate with people, are obliged to acquire a courteous but definite conduct, accustom themselves to surveying the whole situation, are thus preserved from narrow-minded pedantry, and inasmuch as they wish to train or guide themselves and others they must soon begin to reflect on the principles of pedagogic method, to say nothing of other advantages of a more technical administrative nature. And the teaching profession saves time by this system, can save its energies more than formerly, gets into closer touch with the pupils, gains their confidence and love, and the school, previously a nerve-racking institution, becomes a place of happy and delightful occupation. If the teaching profession understands its advantages, they must inevitably want to introduce the school community."

We have quoted the reports of educators in considerable detail in order that the reader might see that we are not discussing speculative, theoretical principles, but concrete institutions which are practical and feasible. The system moreover seems to me to be capable of still further development. Self-government is by no means necessarily limited to matters of external discipline. Colin A. Scott, in his book previously cited, gives very instructive illustrations of the effectiveness of the spontaneous coöperation of the pupils for scientific, technical and even aesthetic training. At any rate a method has here been discovered by which the social spirit can be cultivated in school in an entirely different way and far more intensively than was possible hitherto. The meaning of work, of order and punctu-

ality, genuine, spontaneous obedience, and more especially the sense and clear conception of moral responsibility will develop quite differently if the strong native impulse towards exercise characteristic of youth is directed into the proper channels, and if it is possible to quicken the vital psychical energies of the pupils and enlist them in the service of society at large, which is finally furnished for youth at school in which it is being trained.

Self-government is well adapted moreover, even if one only takes account of the experiments and results thus far published, to contribute to the solution of a higher pedagogic problem. The first and most evident effect of the new system consists in the fact that it inspires the pupils with the social spirit, breathes into their soul the sense of participation in the social whole and thus disciplines them to service, to spontaneous subordination and responsibility. But at the same time with these things a sense of superior obligation, a consciousness of individual dignity must develop in the pupils who are elected to the various offices which must inevitably contribute towards making these young people self-assured, ambitious, personalities who are practiced in self-command. By devoting themselves to a social function which has been entrusted to them and enthusiastically assumed on their part, they become stronger mentally, spiritually more independent and gradually acquire possession of what the Stoic sages and what Schiller justly described as the highest good of man, the possession of inner freedom. But inner freedom is nothing else than the consciousness that man is not merely a means, but that he is likewise an end in himself, and that for him there is no higher ambition than the preservation and enhancement of his personal dignity. Self-government is therefore the method by which to quicken not only the appreciation of personal obligation, but likewise the sense of personal dignity. These two moral requirements, which we have previously elaborated, are in fact not antitheses, but intimately related and mutually reciprocal. The sense of participation in a social body and the requirements consequent thereupon create a point of concentration in every individual which becomes a new spiritual source of energy and combines the individual ambitions and moods into a uniform whole. Personality thus invigorated constantly makes higher demands of

itself, expands the circle of duties and elevates the moral level of mankind. Personal obligation and personal dignity are two distinct paths to one and the same goal, and this goal is nothing less than the constant broader and higher evolution of the human race.

The high school must not only show its pupils both these ways, but must likewise lead and accompany them for a considerable distance on both. In the foregoing we have tried to show that the school is capable of developing social sentiment, quickening the consciousness of duty and possibly, by enlisting the active coöperation of the pupils, habituate them to spontaneous subordination and train them to responsibility. We shall now address ourselves to the higher and more difficult problem which consists in bringing to maturity in each individual pupil the thought that every human being is designed to preserve the dignity of the human race in his own person by developing his natural endowments to their highest powers, by constant self discipline, doing his best, elevating his ambitions and thus developing himself into a being which is a joy unto itself and a joy to others.

4. THE CULTIVATION OF PERSONAL DIGNITY

Training to industry, orderliness and punctuality, to obedience and responsibility, in short everything which we have treated under the watchword "social spirit," these are matters with which we older teachers have long been familiar. I presume therefore that even those of my colleagues who for the present have not yet been able to favor the introduction of the "school community" and the system of pupils' self-government, will agree with what I have said on these points. On the other hand however the cultivation of individuality, the heightening of self-consciousness, discipline in criticism is something new. It is our educational reformers that have included these requirements in their program and I may therefore hope that I shall here perhaps meet with fuller appreciation among the younger members of the teaching profession. It is part of the present characteristic trend towards the culture of personality that individualization in education is increasingly demanded. Our present day youth is aware of this

fact and is strongly influenced thereby. Children to-day no longer show the gratitude, are no longer so submissive as they were in the days of our childhood. They see full well that the parents turn everything to account in order to make their life more healthful, more pleasant and richer in content. Present day youth has come to regard itself as an end in itself and parents as a more or less useful means, whose purpose of existence is to help the children to the realization of their individuality.

These dominating tendencies of youth in combination with other factors frequently produce a rare fruitage. According to my judgment they have led to an unhealthy over-stimulation of various kinds of sport and are especially prominent in modern aestheticism. Here the artistic portrayal of all action and the aesthetic appreciation of the same is looked upon as the central feature of life, that all other problems are insignificant by comparison and the highest social requirements are felt to be an infringement on personal liberty, an unbearable vexation. I certainly set a high value on aesthetic training and have strongly advocated above that this source of happiness should be opened to our youth in liberal measure. But notwithstanding this modern aestheticism does not suit my taste. It seems to me to be characterized by a desire for striking effects which are produced by hyper-stimulation of the nerves, it seems to me more like cheap originality than really profound artistic need. And it is for this reason that I regard it a pressing need that our present day youth be inspired with the social spirit so as to counteract the misconceived culture of personality which not infrequently degenerates into ego-culture. But notwithstanding this the individualistic tendencies just described may be employed with splendid pedagogic effect. If the modern youth brings an excess of self-consciousness and self-sufficiency along to school, it by no means follows that we must suppress these impulses. We should rather urge these inner spiritual energies to provide themselves an appropriate sphere of activity and see to it that they do not shoot out into antisocial egoism or moody aestheticism, but give them the tendency which leads to the consciousness of personal dignity and its correlative obligations. It is just as impossible here as in the previous section to elaborate the pedagogic effects in this sense with systematic

adequacy. I must therefore here again confine myself to several important factors which are likewise feasible in practical pedagogics.

First of all every teacher can contribute to the cultivation of personal dignity in a number of apparently insignificant externalities in his conduct towards his pupils. If a man makes a practice of being friendly with his pupils individually and courteous with the class as a whole, if he never lets slip the calling of such zoological titles as ox, donkey, hog, rhinoceros, even in anger, if he furthermore gives the pupils opportunity, even quite early in their course, to express their own unrestrained opinion, and occasionally even asks them for a criticism of the teacher's expressed views, he has already done much towards the uplift of their personal dignity. I can cite several personal experiences in support of this. I have made it a practice in all my higher classes, when the pupils arose upon my entering the room, to invite them to take a seat with a courteous "please be seated." Always therefore, when I met the class for the first time I could read pleased astonishment on the countenances of the pupils. They had evidently not been accustomed to courteous treatment and felt flattered and elevated by the strange accent. My frequent requests for criticism were even far more effective. I still recall quite vividly how a member of a senior class which I had in psychology, called attention to the fact in his farewell address, that he owed me a special debt of gratitude for the privilege of expressing their opinions freely. We see therefore that young people have a keen sense of appreciation when the teacher reveals a certain degree of respect for the personality of each pupil in his whole attitude and demeanor towards them. Especially in the higher classes it is of great advantage to treat the pupils like gentlemen. Every teacher will find that these apparently insignificant externals pave the way for continuing to a more intensive and deeper cultivation of personal dignity.

To this end, as a beginning, one of the most difficult and at the same time most important problems of the teacher furnishes opportunity. I refer to training in truthfulness. Foerster furnishes suggestions at once profound and concrete in his *Jugendlehre, School and Character* and especially in the book on *Lebensführung*. He first emphatically verifies the fact, which

is unfortunately incontestable, that the method of instruction and the administration of discipline in the public school betrays, and sometimes even compels, the pupils to utilize the whole of their inventive genius in contriving the most plausible lies. He then offers suggestions how a man can, by the serious discussion of several concrete cases of student life, gradually bring the pupils to the point of utilizing their whole curiosity and genius, which they otherwise devote to contriving appropriate lies, in eliciting a mode of procedure in exceptionally difficult cases so as to tell the truth and at the same time avoid unpleasant situations.¹ Foerster further refers to the necessity of investigating the various psychological causes of school lies and then urges strongly that one should try to train to absolute truthfulness by an appeal to the sense of honor and the heroic in child nature, and to inculcate the principle in the Kantian sense that a lie is not permissible and guiltless under any conditions, under any circumstances. He calls the attention of his pupils

¹ The following conversation reported by Foerster (*School and Character*) is of vital interest to all teachers: "The teacher sees a caricature on the board and asks one of the pupils: 'Who has drawn it?' The pupil knows who did it. Should he now say, 'I do not know,' or should he expose the guilty party? Should he be loyal to his friends or obedient to his teacher? First of all an answer to the last question is considered. The result was interesting. The boys almost unanimously agreed that one should deny having knowledge of the identity of the one who did it; the girls practically all agreed that obedience was the proper course. I then referred to the fact that both solutions in the first place were one-sided. One solution regards only the teacher, the other only the fellow pupils. Such a problem can only be regarded as really solved however when justice is done to both parties. If they were teachers they would at once understand that without obedience instruction is impossible. Is there no way of reconciling loyalty and obedience? A boy answered: 'If he should say to the teacher: he would tell on condition that the guilty party shall not be punished.' To this of course the reply had to be made that the teacher could not agree to such a conditional compromise. Finally the following method was proposed: 'I request the privilege of withholding his name at present, but I will see to it that he will report and acknowledge it.' To my question; are you all agreed to this suggestion, came the unanimous and enthusiastic 'yes.' Is not such a deliberate understanding between a teacher and his class of the greatest importance both for its training to truthfulness and its creating an attitude of confidence in humanity? To assist to morality, to indicate the proper methods, or to permit the children to discover them is more important than preaching and teaching morals."

to the lack of independence implied in the fact that one is guided in his actions by what others do or leave undone, and would thus set up the independence of the individual conscience as the ideal. The depth and rigor of these principles and the vivid, pedagogic, downright masterful carrying out of the same deserve the highest praise. I cannot however altogether agree with Foerster at this point. According to my view this implies an anti-social over-strain of the individualistic principle. And even in developing a love for the truth it may be shown how vitally the social and the individual factors are related in moral evolution, and that regard for the social whole is the stronger factor. I have both instituted theoretical investigations and collected abundant material of fact on the matter of truthfulness in ordinary life and in school, the results of which I will present in brief.

In my Essay on Truth and Falsehood (*Gedanken und Denker*, 27-57) I have shown that the evaluation of truthfulness originates from two distinct sources. One of its motives is social in its nature and makes honesty a duty which society strictly insists upon. "In the case of warfare with enemies and when life is in danger the lie (particularly among primitive races) is looked upon as a permissible weapon and its skillful and effective use is even likely to inspire admiration. In the relationship existing between the members of the tribe as also within the family on the other hand the necessity of reciprocal integrity and loyalty is fundamentally essential. Experience teaches assuredly quite early that the weal and woe of the tribe or of the family vitally depend on the reliability of its members. The leader must be in position to believe the statements and pledges of his people. Hence the more highly developed the sense of solidarity so much the more highly is loyalty and truthfulness towards members of the tribe esteemed and demanded, whilst disloyalty and treason is the more severely disapproved and punished." As social life and social intercourse therefore become ever more complex in the course of the progress of civilization and constantly assume new forms, the social obligation of truthfulness likewise undergoes various modifications. It can easily happen that the individual must withhold a fact in the interest of the community. In fact the situation may even arise in which from regard for the welfare of the commu-

nity or from sympathy and kindness we feel obliged to deliberately falsify. There are many and widely different social duties which sometimes come into conflict. Truthfulness is one of these duties, but by no means the first nor the only one. In war and diplomacy, at the sick bed and in penal investigations the sacrifice of the lie is frequently imperatively required. Plato, who severely criticises the dishonesty of the Homeric Zeus, nevertheless concedes without argument that in his ideal state official falsehoods are indispensable for the welfare of the whole. But the fact that the lie is always felt to be a sacrifice, the fact that a moral taint likewise attaches to the perversion of the truth sometimes required by social ethics, the fact that we experience every deliberate falsehood as a degradation of our personality, is due to the other of the two motives from which, as previously observed, the appreciation of truthfulness springs. In addition to the social requirement of loyalty and of keeping faith there is a second mighty factor at work in us, which makes truthfulness a necessity of our nature, the lie an object of disgust. This second motive is individualistic in its nature and issues from the depths of the spontaneously evolved and invigorated personality.

Free personality deeply feels the need of unfolding itself, exercising itself, expressing itself. One should be permitted to say what he thinks and feels, and he should have the courage to say it even against tradition and ancestry. Strong individualities have always felt this need and regarded the lie a degradation of personality, a violation against human dignity. Abhorred like the gates of Hades is even the strong and upright Achilles, the man who thinks one thing in his heart and speaks another with his lips (*Hom. Iliad*, IX, 312). And this attribute is so strongly blended with the character of Achilles that in the portrayal of later poets it is transmitted to his son Neoptolemus, who proclaims the same characteristic so manfully in the *Philoctetus of Sophocles*. Herbert Spencer has quite correctly called attention to the fact that even among nature peoples, who live in freedom, truthfulness is relatively very general, and history reveals the fact that the struggle for liberty which the individual is waging against tutelage and servility is forever associated with abhorrence of falsehood. George Ellinger has shown in his excellent study of the relation of public

opinion to truth and falsehood during the tenth, eleventh and twelfth centuries, that at the beginning of the thirteenth century a much freer spirit manifests itself and that contemporaneously truthfulness is on the increase and falsehood an object of intense disapprobation. Luther, a man moreover of uncommonly strong personality, concludes that there is no more shameful vice on earth than to be guilty of falsehood and disloyalty, and rejoices that the Germans, in contrast with the Greeks and "Welsh," still show a slight sense of resentment and shame when someone calls them a liar. At the same period Hans Sachs complains that "no one has any confidence in the veracity of woman." And this intimate relation between the individual's struggle for liberty and the esteem of truthfulness appears still more clearly in Germany during the eighteenth century. Self-liberating personality waved its winnowing fan with mighty power and in the storm and stress produced the ripest fruit of German poetry. "Wealthy in the treasures his own bosom had long concealed," man, breaking away from convention and tradition, wished to multiply these treasures in rich abundance and to enjoy them. To strive for a clearer, a more vivid expression of the profound surgings of the soul, not to suppress a single natural impulse, this is what was increasingly insisted on and practiced. This is the spirit that gave birth to the Iphigenia which produced everything through her noble self and hence could not condone falsehood, could not place it above self. From this point of view we likewise understand the unqualified condemnation of falsehood by Kant and Fichte. The fact that Kant only reckons individualistic motives is evident in that in his theory of morals he conceives falsehood exclusively as a violation of man's duty towards himself. And besides, he expressly says the damage resulting from falsehood to the subject himself or to others has no bearing whatever on moral judgment. "Falsehood consists in the rejection and likewise the destruction of one's personal worth." Kant moreover undertook superfluously to prove in another brief essay that no one has any right to falsify for love of humanity.

Truthfulness is therefore social obligation on the one hand, but on the other it becomes a necessity to stronger natures and gradually develops into a requirement of personal worth. There is no doubt about the fact that this twofold nature of

honesty frequently gives rise to serious conflicts in practical life. But it is likewise certain that there is no profound or irreconcilable antithesis between these two motives. In this case the synthesis of personal duty and personal dignity may frequently be effected even in the practical experience of the school. It must therefore be our duty, to implant both motives in the minds of the pupils, if possible, permit them to experience both requirements in the school, and suggest a method for their reconciliation.

Let us try to show by a concrete case how this psychological and historical analysis may be applied in practical pedagogy. In a class over which I am presiding some mischief has been done, let us say a window has been broken during recess. It is my duty to discover the guilty party. I may — as is unfortunately frequently done — as an apt detective proceed after the manner of a policeman, get into touch with several “trustworthy” pupils and induce them to tell me who the culprit is. I have thus established the objective fact and perhaps even won the title of an expert detective. But I have not only contributed nothing to the development of character, but in this respect rather the opposite. I have helped to mature the spirit of rivalry and sowed enmity among the pupils. I need not be surprised to find within a few days that my informants have been thoroughly thrashed by their fellow-pupils. Then I have another opportunity to prove my police talent still more brilliantly.

But I may likewise proceed quite differently. I may simply ask the class who has broken the window and add that I definitely expect the man who did it to report. If I have carefully cultivated the spirit of honesty previously, the pupils involved will immediately come forward. That it is possible to do this I am in position to testify on the basis of many experiences as class supervisor in the many years of my teaching activity. But cases will also naturally occur that no one will respond to my inquiry. I would then call attention to the fact that the guilty party is not only under obligation to me, but likewise to his fellow-pupils, to report. If he refuses, then the whole class must make good the damage; he thus permits his fellow pupils to share his penalty, which is certainly not specially honorable. But if the class is dominated by a strong

esprit de corps no one will report. I then penalize the class and require them to make good the damages in common. Inasmuch as the apportioned cost to each individual pupil is but slight they readily accept it and the matter is settled. And we openly grant that in this procedure there has nothing been accomplished towards character development and towards training in honesty. The pupils stand as a compact mass in opposition to their teachers, rejoice in the fact that he failed to accomplish anything, take pride in their solidarity and resolve upon a similar course next time.

But in case a man succeeds in getting the pupil to report he has a most favorable opportunity of impressing the value of honesty on their minds concretely. The pupil has thus discharged his social obligation to his comrades and must at the same time feel that he has elevated his personal worth. He has courageously accepted the consequences of his own action, has not depended on the sympathy of his colleagues like a coward, and submitted himself to the disposal of the teacher not indeed as one subdued by force, but of his own spontaneous initiative. It likewise furnishes an opportunity to call attention to the relation existing between honesty and the sense of honor as well as the courage involved in voluntary confession.

But practical pedagogics likewise furnishes other frequent opportunity — besides cases of discipline — for the exercise of such influence. Let us assume, e. g., that I have explained a somewhat difficult portion of grammar — conditional sentences in Greek, for example — a difficult proposition in geometry, a complicated psychological analysis, a rather difficult sentence in a foreign language, before the class as a whole and I am not quite satisfied that they have all been able to follow, and I ask for example, "Is there anyone who does not fully understand it?" Frequently no one will say anything, perhaps because they hesitate to acknowledge their dullness of comprehension, or because they are not sufficiently clear about the matter to be aware of their lack of understanding it. I call on one of the weaker pupils and convince him and myself that he does not yet fully understand the matter. I ask him very kindly to explain why he failed to say so in response to my request. In this connection I cite my beloved Socrates who regarded it an indication of superior wisdom for anyone to know that he knows nothing,

and show him that it is by no means a sign of lack of intelligence to be aware that certain matters are still obscure. And in addition I call attention to the fact that by his spontaneous rising he would no doubt have helped a number of his fellow-pupils who likewise failed to understand the matter, but were too embarrassed to acknowledge it. Even here honesty manifests its twofold function. It liberates the individual from a certain sense of pressure which he feels, with the effect that should not appear to be intellectually more than he really is, and at the same time helps others who are in the same position. If we adopt this mode of procedure and utilize every opportunity to let the pupils feel the twofold effect of honesty we will eventually succeed, if not in entirely banishing, at least in very materially reducing the spirit of falsehood which our present school system is unfortunately so likely to foster. One may even accomplish a great deal with habitual falsifiers, as my own experience testifies, by private conversation and in the presence of the class, if he moreover exercises the indispensable quality of patience and love.

The example of the teacher can likewise accomplish much at this point. If he always practices absolute honesty, sticks close to the facts in his treatment of a disciplinary offence and makes no effort at coloring for effect, if he invariably frankly admits that he does not know and makes no effort to extricate himself with subterfuge and platitudinous declarations, if he frankly acknowledges an error or an injustice and rectifies the matter publicly. The pupils will then see that he is actually serious in his insistence on honesty and they are ashamed to lie to such a man.

Although my experience teaches that not a little can be accomplished towards discipline in honesty even under the despotic school régime as it is still generally constituted, I must nevertheless say that the "school community" and "self-government" can accomplish vastly more in this respect. Here the dishonest pupil who wishes to deceive his teacher cannot count on the support of his comrades in the contest against a common enemy. Here he is confronted by the increasingly refined public sentiment of his class, which affects him powerfully. He then feels the social value and the liberating power of truth far more intensively. The deepest energies of his soul are uncovered and

everything impels him in the direction of honesty. The pupil now feels himself impelled and urged from within to do that for which the teacher could only gradually prepare the way even in the face of tremendous opposition. Self-government, which trains for liberty and responsibility is likewise even on this account well adapted to quicken the sense of veracity and to permit the pupils to feel its twofold value quite frequently and intensively.

Another no less important activity of personal worth is involved in self-control. This virtue has received the highest praise of educators of all ages. The Spartan education trained the boys to endure the severest pains with terrible rigor, and Christian pedagogy not only regarded self-vanquishment the proof of spiritual power, but even the condition of future salvation and accordingly not only recommended the cultivation of this virtue most enthusiastically, but even practiced it most effectively. There is no doubt about the fact that discipline in self-control is an exceedingly important task of the teacher. As proof of subjective energy self-control is indeed an uplift of personal dignity. And furthermore the man who has his primary functions in his own power, who commands his body, endures hunger and thirst, is capable of governing his violent passion, is a far more useful member of human society than one who is accustomed to follow every momentary impulse.

Self-control is therefore likewise a synthesis of both factors governing moral evolution and must therefore be cultivated and exercised in this double aspect. Foerster likewise offers valuable principles and practical suggestions on this point (*School and Character*) from which every teacher can gain much of value in practical pedagogy. His suggestions are specially valuable where he shows how daily events in the life of the school, such as tardiness, laughing and talking on the part of the pupils may be made the subject of interesting discussions based on the direct experiences of the children. He shows exquisitely how to proceed in order to let self-control appear as the effect of subjective energy, how one may appeal to the sense of honor, to the heroic in child nature, and I am convinced that much can be accomplished with the pupils by following his suggestions.

Notwithstanding this, however, I disagree with Foerster in

an important point touching the theory of the pedagogic significance of self-control and self-vanquishment. He inclines strongly towards regarding self-vanquishment not merely as an exercise of subjective energy, but as something meritorious in itself. But from my viewpoint of social ethics I cannot concede this. I find that the hearty devotion of the individual to the purposes of the welfare of the community, which concentrate his total effort, without any subjective reserve, on a self-chosen high ideal is socially more effective and stands therefore on a higher ethical plane (Cf. *My Introduction to Philosophy*, Eng. Trans., p. 267). Whenever there is a serious struggle against strong temptation, the ultimate victory is invariably doubtful. It were no doubt better for social welfare and for personal happiness if people were spared such profound battles. This is my reason for saying previously (p. 68f) that we are not so much in need of restraining equipment as of invigoration, enlargement and control of volition. The more intensely and the more unambiguously the social motives operate, so much the more certainly do they determine the direction of volition and so much the more pleasurable is the exercise of the will. But we must not forget that we are still far removed from such an ideal state of society as will make this kind of volitional training possible. Man is at present confronted with difficult problems and the educator is under obligation to prepare the youth for these life problems and arouse the powers which he will need in meeting them. We must therefore strengthen the spiritual side of their nature and this will require intensive practice in self-control for a long time to come. In order to make clear just what this involves I shall have to present a brief psychological analysis.

The ego is conceived as the vehicle of our centralized organization. This central dynamic which pervades all psychical processes and makes them what they really are undergoes an exceedingly complicated process of enrichment and differentiation of functions. The ego which we bring with us into the world and which functions almost exclusively during infancy, Theodore Meynert has quite pertinently called the primary ego. The primary ego is regarded as the center of energy whence all movements proceed which tend to satisfy the original impulses and desires. The primary ego makes provision for the

satisfaction of hunger, the warding off of dangerous attacks and thus preserves and protects our body. Our ego-consciousness then experiences a most extraordinary enlargement by means of our ideas of memory and imagination, by means of intellect, emotion and desire. All that we have seen and felt, all the plans we have elaborated, the ideals which we follow, our family, our native land and its history, every one of these in a certain sense gradually becomes an element of our ego. Meynert has coined the term "secondary ego" for this enlarged ego-consciousness. The secondary ego likewise becomes a kind of center of energy and defends its possessions against harmful attacks. In this defence it may easily happen that the secondary ego gets into conflict with the primary ego, and it has not infrequently happened that the primary ego is lost in this battle. We are ready to lay down our lives for the sake of our honor, for the sake of our country. Even the scientific impulse has sometimes been stronger than the primary impulse of self-preservation. And the cases in which religious faith has been stronger than the love of life have been quite numerous.

Among children the primary ego has all but complete control, which explains the natural egoism of childhood which so often charms us by its naïveté. But life does not permit this frank and apparently so estimable a care for the primary ego to constitute the abiding habit of the mind. The child must become an adult and enlarge its primary to a secondary ego on this account. If we should characterize the actual process of the educator's work in terms of pure psychology, we should have to say: The educator is occupied creatively with the secondary ego of his pupils.

If we therefore raise the question, on the basis of this psychological analysis, what constitutes self-control, we are now in position to reply that it is simply a matter of strengthening the secondary ego and preparing for its control of the primary. As we become accustomed to propose higher, farther-reaching spiritual ambitions to ourselves and suppress hunger, thirst, the clamor of the passing mood, in its attainment, we are likewise exercising self-control in that we are enriching our secondary ego. But if this suppression is forcefully imposed on the pupils by requiring them to sit quietly at school and to work

for hours on assigned tasks at home, the care of the secondary ego may easily lead to a stunting of the primary with serious physical consequences, as is only too frequently the case in the practical life of the school. The primary ego moreover is and must remain the basis of the ego-consciousness throughout life, for the simple reason that the bodily functions are the sources of energy for the spiritual functions.

Self-control must therefore not be practiced as if the suppression of physical demands were a desirable achievement in itself. The secondary ego must rather make careful provision for the primary, but constantly keep in mind that the physical powers are to be made to serve higher ends. The mind must not destroy the body, but help to build it up in order that it may have a vigorous and reliable servant. Herbert Spencer has forcefully emphasized this duty towards one's own health in his volume on Education. Self-control is therefore not so much the suppression as the government of the primary energies and impulses. And then it is identical with what the Stoic Sage, Epicurus, Kant and Schiller called subjective freedom.

As a matter of fact the practice of self-control is nothing else than discipline in subjective freedom. It is not altogether a simple task to grasp the essential nature of this psychical state. It is the sense of assurance, reference to the chosen ambition and the methods of its realization. Subjective freedom consists of vital and intense concentration of the deepest psychical energies, which then pervade and vitalize all psychical experience. The philosopher, who has with his own powers worked out an adequate theory of the universe and of life and with calm assurance forms his judgments and adopts his measures in all the vicissitudes of existence from this vantage ground, possesses the highest degree of freedom. So likewise the believing soul who feels himself a child of God and knows that he is under the care of the almighty and all-merciful Father, possesses subjective freedom. And the most ordinary man likewise achieves subjective freedom if he devotes himself to a self-chosen social problem and dedicates his services to this cause. It is likewise possible therefore to implant the germs in the youthful souls, entrusted to our training, which will gradually develop, the tree of subjective freedom.

In the case of youth, the pathway to subjective freedom leads

through industry, the discharge of duty and spontaneous obedience. If we succeed in giving the native impulse towards exercise in young people a definite tendency and to form an ideal conformable with and adequate to their powers, the youthful soul will soon acquire the necessary strength to conquer transitory moods and passions. Yes, even better still! The temptations and desires aroused in the environment of the pupils by all manner of exciting stimuli gradually lose much of their enticing power and eventually even scarcely attract attention. Just as in the case of the experienced mountain-climber to whom the difficulties originally so apparently insuperable no longer appear as such, but rather as furnishing welcome opportunities for the exercise of his power and skill, so likewise the influence of work and duty of this kind so strengthens the youthful soul that he scarcely notes the temptations with which he meets and easily conquers them.

Exercises assigned for the express purpose of developing self-control, are of course bound to advance this invigoration of the soul, but in my judgment they do not constitute the matter of chief importance. The skillful teacher will of course not permit any opportunity in this direction which casually presents itself to pass unimproved and he will find valuable suggestions on this point in Foerster. But the most important matter is this, namely, that the whole conduct of the school be so arranged as to excite and discipline the individual centers of the spiritual energy of the pupils. And the school community and self-government is likewise better adapted to this end than our despotic system. But there is still another method which leads to subjective freedom the effects of which in this direction are far less recognized and scarcely pursued at all. Above all others, our great poet, Friedrich Schiller, has called attention to this method.

The profound meaning of his letters on æsthetic education and the poem, *Ideal und Leben*, is simply this, that we are capable of refining ourselves to real subjective freedom not only by work and duty, but likewise by pure, unselfish, pleasure, the joy inspired by the contemplation of art and the beauty of nature. Even in antiquity Aristippus, and more particularly Epicurus, recognized this effect of joy. But it was left for Schiller to make the idea practically effective by his thorough

philosophical analysis and at the same time incorporate it in his poetry. From this viewpoint æsthetic training, to the importance of which we have made repeated reference, acquires an entirely different significance. If we help our pupils to comprehend the great poets of all the ages, if we assist them to find joy in these productions, we do not thereby merely furnish them a transitory satisfaction; no, we at the same time contribute to their higher moral discipline. If they should more frequently have the opportunity of soaring to those realms where pure forms abide, if they should gradually get an impression of the fact that art elevates to a higher sphere of being, that we are purer and better men while under its spell, they would then later in life more frequently seek the opportunity of drinking at this everlasting fountain of youth and thus strengthen and purify the soul. They should gradually learn to understand and feel the meaning of Schiller's description of perfect art:

Alle Zweifel, alle Kämpfe schweigen
In des Sieges hoher Sicherheit:
Ausgestossen hat es jeden Zeugen
Menschlicher Bedürftigkeit.

The classical philologist who is completely saturated with this sublime and profound effect of æsthetic education will be slow to regard Homer as nothing more than a collection of hexameters, ionic forms and allegories and the tragedies of Sophocles simply as trimeters, dactyls, dochmiac or doric verse. He will far rather devote his best thought to enabling the pupils to perceive the profound spiritual apprehension and the perfect art of the ancients and in showing them that these creations of Greek genius still live in the undiminished vigor of youth.

If we thus educate our pupils æsthetically in Schiller's spirit we will likewise protect them against the individualistic excess of the "artistic" sense so prevalent in modern æstheticism. The modern virtuoso as a matter of fact hasn't any real joy in art. He simply pokes his æsthetic proboscis into every nook and corner, sniffs the air and smells about to see whether he can discover anything anywhere which might furnish him occasion to take offence in his hyper-sensitiveness. In the ar-

rangements of the home which he has occasion to examine he discovers for example that the table-cover doesn't harmonize with the furniture, observes that this painting is poorly hung and that the door is painted too dark. At an art exhibition he feels bored and lonely because there is too much of the "ordinary," too little of the bizarre and cheap originality. At the theater the somewhat too deep voice of a playwright may destroy his enjoyment of the most stirring tragedy, and a single false note robs him of his joy in the "Master-singers." If he knew how to estimate himself correctly, he would be forced to say:

Von Freud' ist nicht die Rede,
Dem Taumel weih' ich mich, dem schmerzlichsten Genuss.

The true lover of art on the other hand — and it is to such we should train our pupils — listens eagerly to the tune of a Beethoven symphony, even if the orchestra fails to meet the highest requirements, is profoundly stirred by *Othello* even if Desdemona's voice is keyed a little high and Iago doesn't play the devil effectively. At an exhibition he seeks out the paintings that please him and has no need of showing off his superiority by criticising the less successful. The genuine joy in the beautiful is never over-pretentious. Anyone who has cultivated and developed this joy in his own soul, as I am accustomed to put it in my *Æsthetics (Introduction to Philosophy, Eng. Trans., p. 231 f.)*, is receptive of the "tender wooing" contained in every great work of art. Inasmuch as he hears this wooing his enraptured emotion is reflected back on the artistic forms and clothes them with a new, spiritual and vital beauty which at once thrills with joy and elevates.

Leading our pupils to subjective freedom not alone by the ordinary method of industry and duty, but likewise by the method of pure and refined joy is an exceedingly profitable occupation. The pedagogic value of joy, as I have previously indicated is thus essentially enhanced. The subjective freedom laboriously acquired by means of industry and duty is thus surcharged with an inner warmth and at the same time becomes a never failing fountain of happiness.

There is another function of personal dignity closely related with the cultivation of honesty and education to self-control

and subjective freedom which is exceedingly important for practical pedagogics. I refer to the gradual development of the sense of honor among the pupils. "It is right among young people," says Foerster, "that the sense of honor is likewise the foundation of all moral cleanliness and a teacher who treats the pupil's sense of honor indifferently becomes directly co-responsible for their moral degeneration." Here I can again fully agree with this profound pedagogue and support his assertion with numerous personal experiences. The thing that Foerster means by sense of honor is indeed the claim on social respect. The demand for this is rather strongly developed, particularly in the higher classes and by taking account of this demand and directing it into the proper channels we can considerably simplify the administration of school discipline and at the same time contribute to the cultivation of personal dignity. Let me supplement this with a personal experience. On a certain occasion at the beginning of the school year the Director requested me to assume the office of principal in the highest class as substitute for a colleague who was ill. This colleague had the reputation of maintaining excellent discipline, and also as governing by fear and rigor. Since my method of handling the pupils of the higher classes was entirely different, I feared that the pupils might soon degenerate under my much milder system. I accordingly stated, at my first meeting with the class, that I meant to treat the pupils, who in fact would leave school within a year, even now as free personalities, as gentlemen, and would expect their coöperation. The experiment was a complete success. We finished the year — with quite negligible exceptions — without any penal discipline and the colleagues were very well satisfied with the conduct of the class.

This, however, comes far short of adequate cultivation of the sense of honor. It is by no means sufficient that one should not violate — I might call it — the social sense of honor of the pupils. We should rather try to cultivate intensively and effect the development of personal sense of honor, what the English call self-respect, the French *amour propre*. And I am not thinking at all of the ambition or effort for external distinctions. This pedagogic principle, which was so prevalent in antiquity and still prevails in France, has been almost entirely

banished from the schools of Germany and Austria. I rather mean that inner sense of honor that might also be described as a superior sense of duty. It is this cultivation of personal conscience that impels us to do our best, to set higher ideals and to work with all our might for the realization of our self-appointed tasks. The unrivalled example of this ideal, as previously observed, is Socrates.

The school cultivates this deep-lying energy of the soul by requiring more from the more talented pupil, by showing him that his achievement is insufficient because he is capable of greater things. But we are likewise contributing to the same result when we encourage the weaker pupils who give evidence of serious effort and express our satisfaction to them. And this whole matter of personal sense of honor may likewise assume a social aspect by requiring the more talented pupils to explain what they have learned, what they have thoroughly grasped, as clearly as possible, in order that the others may hear it again and thus understand it more readily.

And here again self-government offers more advantages than the despotic system. According to the unanimous consensus of the reports of educators it is precisely the officers and guardians chosen by the class who set their honor, not merely on the conscientious administration of their office, but devote their whole mental and moral power to devise new methods which will lead more easily and more certainly to the goal. Such impulses, issuing from the very inmost nature of the pupils themselves is naturally more effective and abiding than the commands and suggestions of the teacher.

According to the preceding discussions therefore our ethical problem consists in seeking to develop the social spirit in our pupils and at the same time quickening and cultivating the sense of personal dignity. These two aims frequently combine into one. Their common object is to educate the pupils to socially useful and individually independent characters. The whole pedagogic program should be inspired with this spirit. Every teacher who has clearly grasped this fact and is thoroughly saturated with the significance of the viewpoint of social ethics in education will find abundant opportunities in his own subject to exercise this influence upon the souls entrusted to his care. But above all else we must never forget in the adminis-

tration of school discipline, that we are not self-sufficient tyrants, not chiefly severe taskmasters and lords, but preeminently educators and the affectionate friends of our pupils. Since the preceding discussions have chiefly referred to discipline it remains to return once more to this important topic and briefly explain the practical application of the principles set forth.

5. DISCIPLINE, INSTRUCTION IN MORALS

We have previously discussed school discipline, but only from the viewpoint of the methods which aim to secure the quiet and orderly conduct of instruction and preserving order in general. In this more objective sense we proposed the principle that *prevention is better than punishment* and illustrated it by practical examples, as an important maxim for the administration of school discipline. It will now appear that this principle has a deeper significance and that it likewise applies to the present problem of the educative task of school discipline. Foerster, whose entire volume, *Schule und Charakter*, is devoted to the problem of discipline, says that the fundamental error of our whole discipline lies "in the lack of the preventive care of souls." He therefore makes use of the same idea as we, but gives it a far deeper meaning. Here the preventive care of souls does not mean, as it does with us in our previous reference, the removal of temptations, a prudent avoidance of occasions. Here "prevention" consists in inspiring in the pupil's will a positive content, to give it its direction and thus assist our pupils subjectively to acquire the power of resisting temptations.

School discipline therefore does not merely require the abatement of disturbing factors. It should rather be administered in such a manner as will contribute to character development in a positive sense. If it is to accomplish this it must be, to adopt Foerster's splendid expression, not doing police duty, but exercising pastoral care. Each separate case of discipline must be made an occasion for clarifying the ideas and judgments of the pupils. They must be given the opportunity of expressing their opinion, in order that the teacher may be in position, not merely to admonish and penalize, but *to create new motives*.

The preceding discussions contain a sufficient number of examples of such personal influences. In this connection I would

particularly emphasize that the young fellow who has done something, should not be regarded as nothing but a mischief-maker, an enfant terrible, an enemy of peace and order. We should above all else keep in mind that it is an immature soul still in process of development, which, like all growing things, appreciates affectionate assistance. We must endeavor to analyze this child-soul as deeply as possible. We may perhaps find that the same impulse which led to mischief, devilry, on this occasion can be transformed into a power for good. Discipline should, as Foerster again very effectively observes, aim to "help the child to morality, and not to render his correct conduct as difficult as possible." We teachers must get this fact clear in our minds, namely, that school life and comradeship does not by any means develop character automatically. We dare not close our eyes to the fact that this group life and group work is likewise fraught with serious dangers to moral development. Let us not be deceived as to the effect of admonitions and punishments. It is necessary to fix our attention on the concrete reality, the vital interests of the child and approach it from the viewpoint of its germinal principle. We have repeatedly spoken of the tremendous influence which the general sentiment of the class has upon the individual pupil. This influence is therefore frequently quite harmful unless we are constantly concerned to direct this general sentiment into the proper channels. The discussion of cases of discipline can be effectively utilized to this end.

Every teacher can certainly hold such discussions with the class occasionally. But the chief portion of this work will naturally fall to the division principal. The principal will soon find that such matters consume much time and that he falls behind in his subject. But this misfortune can easily be disposed of by setting apart several periods for such discussions. The penal periods during afternoons in which there is no school, which has considerable vogue in Germany, our own practice of keeping pupils in after divine services on Sunday, would have an entirely different disciplinary value if used for discussions rather than punishment. And in my judgment this would be the most effective teaching of ethics, because it naturally deals with concrete, personal facts of experience.

I take this opportunity of making several observations con-

cerning the teaching of ethics, introduced by a number of states and desired by many others.

In various nations, especially in North America and in France a separate course of instruction in morals has been given for more than twenty years in public and private schools, which is mostly offered as a substitute for courses in religion. A number of text books have already been produced for this purpose and this method of moral training has many enthusiastic advocates. Personally I have had no opportunity hitherto to give such instruction and unfortunately never even visited any such class. Prof. Felix Adler of New York, the spiritual father of the "ethical movement" which arose during the eighties of last century in America, and even extended to Germany and Austria, has for a number of years been the head of a school organized according to the principles of "ethical culture." From the reports concerning the course of study and the methods pursued, which Prof. Adler was kind enough to furnish me upon the occasion of his visit to Vienna several years since, I gained the impression that his school does actually develop moral character. But we must not forget that in this case the circumstances are peculiarly favorable. Prof. Adler decides absolutely on the course of study, on the admission of pupils and likewise chooses his own corps of teachers. His whole school is organized from this single viewpoint. There is no prescribed amount of work to be completed, no awe-inspiring final examination, there is no need of fitting a separate course in ethics into an otherwise fixed curriculum, but the course itself as well as the discipline as a whole, all together serve this single purpose. It is impossible to base a judgment on the value of a course in ethics on such exceptional cases, the existence of which is indeed a matter for gratification. In France the result of moral instruction, which is there given universally, depends entirely on the personality of the teacher. From the reports which I have received I can simply gather that in some cases there is a lively participation of the pupils manifest, and in others a tedious monotony.

If I were therefore to express my judgment from the standpoint of science and general pedagogic experience, I should first of all emphasize the fact that reflection on moral problems is without doubt an important condition for the development of

moral character. Insight into the nature of personal duty and personal dignity is — a fact that Socrates attested and proved once for all — an indispensable means to moral self-discipline. But in the first place this insight cannot be acquired until in maturer years and, in the second place it is ethically effective only as it has been preceded by an intensive training of the will and years of practical moral conduct. It seems to me therefore entirely consistent and necessary that the pupils of the advanced classes be given an opportunity to acquire a clear understanding of the principles of moral conduct. But in my judgment this does not necessitate a separate course of moral instruction. There are a number of subjects in our courses of study where this can be done without straining a point. The practical educator likewise raises the following objections against the introduction of separate courses in morals. Let us suppose this new subject incorporated in our course of study for the advanced classes under the name of ethics, and two periods a week assigned to it. The pupil who makes a habit of studying the hour schedule for the following day, observes to one of his comrades: "What do we have to-morrow?" "Latin, Greek, Mathematics and Ethics." By the very fact that it is placed on a level with other subjects of instruction, ethics already loses its indispensably unique character. They are either required to learn something for these periods, in which case it signifies an additional unpleasant burden, or they are not required to learn anything for it and then it is slightly treated as of little value. This fact of educational psychology is doubtless correct. It therefore seems more practical to treat the theoretical considerations of ethical principles rather casually in connection with the subjects with which it is intimately related.

Here it is first of all the business of the teacher of religion to inspire the pupils to thorough and profound reflection on their moral problems. Religion and the history of religion furnish him abundant material. If he is personally a man of deep religious experience he will command that comforting intensity which is the only thing capable of implanting the cold intellectual principle into the depths of the heart. The Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments furnish abundant opportunity to illustrate and vitalize the principles of ethics

from the most varied viewpoints. Of course the teacher of religion who would regard moral education as his most important task would not dare be required by narrowing course-prescriptions to devote a large amount of time to liturgics, apologetics and church history. The teacher should rather be permitted to devote his whole time and energy to letting his pupils feel the vital force of the fundamental concepts of religion, such as sin, grace, redemption, faith, active righteousness, and to interpret them ethically. With what effect, e.g., could he show in connection with Isaiah, Chap. 58, that active charity, positive benevolence is more pleasing in the sight of God, and consequently morally better, than the most scrupulous observance of prescribed feasts. How beautifully it can be shown from the words of Job (35, 7), "If thou be righteous, what givest thou him?" that moral conduct above all else gives peace and assurance as its invariable reaction on the moral man himself. The wilderness temptations of Christ should indeed furnish every teacher splendid opportunity to let the pupils find proofs in their own experience that man really does not live by bread alone, but that self-sacrificing devotion to some higher ideal is the only thing that gives him new energy and subjective happiness. There are numerous helps and books on method for teaching religion in this way, and Foerster likewise insists repeatedly that religious doctrines be connected with concrete experience and thus utilized for actual pedagogic development.

The classic literature, both poetry and prose of the German and the ancient languages, furnish a further opportunity for the thorough discussion of ethical problems. I have shown above how I have been accustomed to utilize Plato's *Apology* in this sense. The *Antigone* of Sophocles is likewise well adapted for ethical discussion. Here a strong personality, actuated by profound ethico-religious motives, arrays himself against the authority of the state as embodied in *Creon*. Exceedingly interesting discussions concerning the right and the duty of the individual to criticise existing institutions may be connected with it. Sophocles' *Philoctetus*, Goethe's *Iphigenia* and Grillparzer's *Weh dem, der lügt*, furnish splendid opportunity to explain the nature of honesty and to discuss its related problems. Lessing's *Nathan* challenges a free and unprejudiced discussion of the relation of religion and morality.

The new subject of civics has in recent years been introduced in Germany and Austria. In this study the pupils will become familiar with the rights and duties of a citizen and get an understanding of the meaning of civil life under constitutional government. Here there must be occasion at each step to touch upon fundamental ethical problems. I am even disposed to think that this whole subject will be useless and ineffective if this is not the case.

And finally, introduction to philosophy, which has been taught in Austria for more than sixty years, and for which there is so much demand in Germany, readily admits of such treatment as will include the psychological and sociological foundations of ethics. Even if the suggestion of Jodl, recommended above, were realized there would be abundant opportunity in the presentation of the philosophy of Socrates, Democritus, Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics for the discussion of ethical problems.

In my judgment moral instruction of this kind, incorporated in a scientific scheme and connected with the concrete experiences of the pupils would be more effective than if we were to make ethics an additional, separate subject of instruction. However, the efficiency of school discipline still presupposes that it be administered after the manner of pastoral care rather than like that of a police system, and that the entire program of instruction be permeated with the ethico-social spirit.

So much for the ethical problems of the secondary school. It has been my chief purpose to offer fundamental principles and suggestions. Judging from personal experience this is more important for the educated and assiduous teacher than the presentation of concrete methods in application to particular cases. Any one who wishes to do so will know how to apply such general directions in conformity with his own individuality and in accordance with the needs of his class.

Let us now turn to the requirements which the social organism impose upon the secondary schools and accordingly upon their teachers. This discussion is intended to be an interpretation and development of the repeated observations concerning the social function of the secondary school (pp. 7, 22, 70). That is to say, we shall attempt to apply the sociological point of view, which we found of service in the elaboration of the concept of liberal education, to the school itself and to us

teachers. Nor can we proceed systematically even here, but shall have to be satisfied with selecting several points which are in part fundamentally important, and in part furnish occasion for concrete, practical suggestions.

6. THE TEACHER AND SOCIETY

We here use the term "society" in a twofold sense. We have in mind on the one hand the social organism of which the school and its teacher are articulate members, but on the other hand we are likewise thinking of the immediate environment of the teacher, i.e., the parents of his pupils, of the circle in which he moves, in short, "society" in the narrower, ordinary sense. The relations of the teacher to society in this twofold sense involve a variety of demands and problems the most important of which we shall make the topic of a brief discussion.

The social function of the secondary school in all civilized nations consists in fitting a number of young people for the filling of positions of responsibility in public life to the general satisfaction of all concerned. The state, which in this respect is almost universally the authorized agent of society, demands that the future clergymen and physicians, the judges, attorneys and administrative officials, the teachers of the advanced schools, engineers and architects take a systematic course of intellectual and moral training before they are admitted to the specialized professional studies. We now demand the same training, where agricultural colleges and technical schools are established, likewise for other vocations. It follows from this as the inexorable logical consequence that the secondary school, whose task it is to prepare for these leading professions, must be an organ of social selection. The whole organization would have no sociological meaning if it were not so conceived that only the capable and industrious should enjoy the privileges implied in their diploma of graduation.

Zielinski, in his excellent volume on *Die Antike und wir*, strongly emphasized this social function of the secondary school and illustrated it very effectively. He concludes from this that the school must be difficult. He in a sense would invari-

ably stick close to this at present quite premature requirement. The course of study of a school intended to develop intellectual independence and moral responsibility, must always be so organized as to require a certain amount of talent and industry to graduate. Let there be never so many concessions to the desired individualization, to the free election of courses in the advanced classes, let the methods of study be never so much improved, we shall forever have to demand of the pupils of the secondary school that they put forth a little effort and that they learn to do independent work. Any one who cannot or will not do this must be told by the faculty in good time that he had better turn to some other calling, one which is better adapted to his individuality. That is to say, we must insist in spite of all objections to the contrary that the exercise of selection among its pupils is a social function implied in the nature of the secondary school.

This selection is effected, theoretically at least, to no small degree by the course of study. But as teachers we have no direct influence on the organization of the course of study. If the Bureau of Education with its supervisory functions expected nothing more from us than the strict carrying out of the prescribed courses, i.e., to repress us to the level of teaching-automata, then the entire function of selection would rest upon the Bureau alone. There have indeed actually been times and conceptions such as this. But at present it is universally conceded that every schedule of courses is merely a dead letter which only becomes an actual educational program through the vital effort of the teacher. It is by means of our effort therefore that the educational program becomes a fact and for this very reason we should regard ourselves likewise as organs of social selection. Inasmuch as the problem of the secondary school can be solved only through our effort it is highly important that we constantly strive after a clearer and more definite understanding of its high purposes in all its bearings. If we are convinced that the secondary school has an important social function to perform and feel that we ourselves are responsible for the effective discharge of that function we shall be under obligation to make a constant study of the program of studies to see whether it is fitted to achieve what society demands of the secondary school. We teachers should therefore try to exert

an influence on the organization and arrangement of the program of studies and it is in this sense that my previously (p. 83) established suggestions are to be interpreted.

And even in the practical application of the existing program the whole conduct of the school, in the administration of discipline, and particularly in our judgments as to the fitness or unfitness of our pupils for graduation. The intellectual and moral development of coming generations depends on the conscientiousness and skill with which we cooperate in this social selection. If wholly incompetent elements pass the secondary school or even such as haven't learned how to do independent work, we cannot escape the criticism that our social task has been but very poorly discharged. The ideal public school teacher is the man who imparts the subject matter of the course to all the pupils. The ideal secondary teacher, while making an honest effort to advance as many as possible, will constantly keep in mind his duty to reject the incompetent and the indolent at the proper time. In the exercise of this function we must equally reckon with both talent and industry, two psychical dispositions that are but rarely combined. Industry is certainly a social attribute of very great value and where this is highly developed we can afford to judge less rigorously. But we will as a matter of course never lose sight of our fundamental aim, the training to independent intellectual effort, the attainment of which is impossible without a certain amount of ability. If we are charged from various quarters with attaching undue importance to industry, we can calmly ignore it and base our judgment on a correct estimate of the social significance of industry. We will recall an expression of Franz Grillparzer, a poet, who said of himself: "Inspiration was my god, and it has remained such," and nevertheless expresses the conviction

"Von Himmel träuft herab des Landmanns Segen,
Doch tränkt den Boden auch des Landmann's Schweiß,
Ist das Talent der gottgesandte Regen,
Ist, was die Frucht gibt, immer nur der Fleiss."

We have previously shown that in passing judgment on pupils, particularly when it involves dismissal, everything must

be weighed with exceeding care. The teacher will endeavor to get the clearest possible idea of the ability, the application and the whole peculiarity of every pupil by means of numerous personal observations, compare his own conclusion with that of his colleagues and constantly try to verify his judgment more firmly. If he constantly keeps in mind the fact that his judgment not only affects the individual pupil, but that it is likewise of vast significance to the whole social organism, he cannot be too careful in balancing his judgments and in the conscientiousness of his conclusions. He will employ every possible means of becoming thoroughly acquainted with his pupils, and then make his decisions clearly and firmly in the full light of his responsibility.

Association with the parents is likewise an important method of getting better acquainted with the pupils. This is without doubt a part of our social duty, which sometimes at least involves not only slight inconveniences, but even profound mortifications. One unfortunately not infrequently discovers with us here in Austria that the parents entertain an almost irreconcilable hatred and a mortifying distrust against the teacher. I must frankly confess that personally I have not suffered much from this source, but I have witnessed expressions which must fill every teacher who is proud of his calling with downright alarm and profound anguish. We may indeed not be wholly without blame for this situation which is so thoroughly disastrous for the school and its success, owing to the fact that it is not always possible to avoid the appearance of hostility described in all its dangerousness above (p. 180 f). But the fundamental reason, at least according to my experience, for this situation lies in the fact that there is much confusion of understanding of the real problem of the secondary school, an understanding which is not infrequently found even among well educated parents. In the majority of cases they think no farther than that their children shall get through and participate in the privileges connected with graduation from the secondary school. On the other hand it is but rarely that they inquire into the extent to which the intellectual and moral development of the children is advanced, and very few understand that a man may be a quite efficient and very respectable gentleman even if he possesses but little aptitude for abstract thought, such as is presupposed in

the study of languages and mathematics.

It is nevertheless our duty to carefully cultivate the acquaintance of the parents of our pupils. The Austrian scheme of organization offers very excellent advice on this social intercourse, a suggestion quite in keeping with the authority of the school. "The school is neither to enforce it, nor to go begging for it, but simply to provide for its possibility." But we must at present go somewhat beyond this viewpoint. We must not only give the parents a chance to get information concerning the progress and the conduct of their children, we must in fact seek this chance and give the parents the impression that mutual confidence based on the coöperation of the school and the home is our most earnest wish. If we know how to avoid the professional reserve so easily acquired, we can learn a great deal from these interviews. We frequently discover many an item that will simplify the treatment of certain pupils. We perceive that we have made an error in our judgment of the peculiarity of the pupil concerned and we now try some other method of approach. I have abundant personal experiences in verification of this fact. Especially as supervisor (*Ordinarius*) of the freshman class, if the parents visited me, say after about two months from the beginning of the year, I frequently said that I was not yet sufficiently acquainted with their son; that I was unable to tell whether the unfavorable results hitherto were due to confusion, indolence or lack of ability. I asked of them to tell me about the young man's deportment at home, whether he found the subject difficult, whether he liked going to school, with whom he associated, whether he was a leader or rather preferred to submit to others. By such inquiries I sometimes was enabled to approach the young man from a different angle and thus help him get on. If the parents have once placed confidence in the teacher they will accept his advice and eventually conclude that their son is unfit for the school.

The inexperienced teacher will have many embarrassing experiences in these conferences. For example, fathers or mothers will come and overwhelm him with courtesies and frequently assume an attitude of submissiveness, even to downright servility. Yet these will often be the very ones who will no longer even recognize the teacher after the pupil in question

is no longer in his class. In order to be consistent with the facts I must say that this has occurred to me but seldom. But the few names which I here have in mind I can recall even to-day. This is due to the fact that at the beginning of my professional career I had the weakness of worrying over such nonsense. But if a man has in the course of time attained to a higher conception of his profession he will neither feel flattered by submissiveness nor wounded by discourtesies. These are trifles which a man soon learns to ignore. The not infrequent cases in which the parents appeal to some prominent patron are more embarrassing. A father is apt to say, "I am very anxious that my son shall graduate at the gymnasium because I know that he will then have smooth sailing." Such a case requires great caution. A man dare not allow himself to be affected by such arguments, and yet he dare not give vent to any disparaging observations, as he may well feel inclined to do. I have generally replied to such insinuations: "It is indeed very nice for your son that his promotion is simplified, but if he can't do anything himself, his patrons will likewise be unable to assist him."

In the last analysis the important matter is this, namely, that the parents be convinced that the teacher is a friend and not an enemy of the pupils. I have frequently quoted the prophecy of Ezekiel where Jehovah makes him say: "I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked; but that the wicked turn from his way and live" (Ch. 33, 11). The pupils would tell this at home, as I frequently gathered from later reports, and in this way the parents learned that my intentions were good. I have consequently got along pleasantly with the parents throughout my whole professional career and the cases previously cited were merely incidental exceptions.

There is still another rather delicate point which I do not wish to ignore entirely. Many parents, particularly those in more fortunate economic circumstances, sometimes try to get into close touch with their son's teacher in a social way. A man receives invitations to supper, to a theater box, or a visit during vacation. And sometimes even theater and opera tickets are freely sent to the house. It seems like a very innocent affair, but I must urge my colleagues to the greatest caution. Such slight attentions as these do not greatly differ in their

effect from presents offered with the definite purpose of winning favor. Attempts at bribery have become more rare, thank God, but they have not yet entirely ceased. Every kind of bribery, no matter whether it appears in a coarse or mild form, "blindeth the wise and perverteth the words of the righteous" (Exodus 23, 8). In his third Philippic oration Demosthenes has beautifully set forth this effect of the irregular acceptance of gifts in the following passage: "If you place money on one side of the balance it sinks immediately and the judgment is quickly drawn down with it." One thing is certain, namely, that our subjective independence suffers from every kind of excessive intimacy. We have the very best intentions to show no prejudice notwithstanding these relations, but only to discover the sophistry of the human intellect. Arguments favorable to the pupil concerned arise capriciously and it is next to impossible to exercise strict, absolutely impartial justice under such circumstances. Any one therefore who attaches any importance not only to having a clean external record, but would likewise wish to remain unchallenged before the judgment bar of his own soul, his own conscience, any one who has adopted Iphigenia's maxim: "The unsullied heart alone finds joy," will do well to exercise great caution in social intercourse with his pupil's parents and constantly practice a certain degree of reserve.

The same principle applies to the conduct of the teacher outside the school. We must never forget that we are trainers of youth and that upon entering our profession, no matter how young we may be, we must constantly bear a certain degree of dignity. Here we should take Goethe's statement as our motto:

"Der kann sich manchen Wunsch gewähren,
Der kalt sich selbst und seinem Wollen lebt.
Wer andere wohl zu leiten strebt,
Muss fähig sein, viel zu entbehren."

We do not mean to say that we should timidly refrain from social fellowship entirely, confine ourselves to association with our colleagues and lead an isolated life. This would not be to the advantage of our profession and still less to the advantage of the school. We should indeed acquaint ourselves with

real life in order that we may likewise be in position to act as guides and advisers to our pupils in this respect. We can even accomplish much towards the interpretation of life in the café and the restaurant and thus materially enlarge the sphere of our pedagogic activity. But even aside from this we are by no means condemned to abstain from pleasure and enjoyment. We should rather participate in the undertakings of the educated classes of the community in which we serve. We may dance, skate, play tennis, go skiing, play billiards and, with thoroughly reliable people, even cards. But it is exceedingly important that we never entirely forget our position. There must constantly be a certain measure of subjective control manifest. This applies particularly to the use of alcohol. A teacher who is seen drunk and staggering towards his home has without doubt dropped considerably in the estimation of the parents and pupils. On this point it were highly desirable if all teachers would familiarize themselves with the scientific arguments of the total abstinence movement, and, after having convinced themselves of the absolute harmfulness of this means of indulgence, seek to exert an influence in this direction on pupils and parents.

The faculty of an institution situated in one of the smaller provincial cities should regard it a matter of duty to contribute to the uplift of the intelligence of the community and to inspire interest in literary, artistic and scientific affairs. The people appreciate it, as I can testify from experience. The faculty thus acquires a social position in the community which makes it an easy matter for each teacher to maintain his dignity. He is everywhere received with great respect, people expect interesting information from him. If he visits a café or restaurant people ask questions concerning the questions of the day, and thus an atmosphere develops that makes it well nigh impossible for the teacher to compromise himself.

If we advance from single suggestions to larger projects, such as instituting a course of popular lectures, organizing reading circles, founding societies for the uplift of the general culture of the city, the respect of the citizens for the faculty and the individual professors increases and one is no longer under necessity of exercising the same amount of reserve in social intercourse. It thus appears even here, as has been the

case so often before in this book, that positive impulses, filling the mind with concrete materials, and with definite purposes operates far more certainly and beneficially for the solution of our problems and the maintenance of our position than the constant introduction of a cumbersome restraining apparatus.

If we survey the problems of the teacher elaborated in the whole book we must acknowledge that we have grown into these problems only as we have been indefatigably disciplining ourselves in this direction. But many fail to attain a clear appreciation of their exalted pedagogic task until late, after having spent a number of years in the profession. They have attended the university for the purpose of devoting themselves to science, and they regard science afterwards as well as before as the only worthy object of their efforts. Or perhaps they have chosen the teaching profession because here a man may quickly earn a living, and they are satisfied with having fulfilled the requirements of their superiors and are not otherwise disturbed. Then if they eventually discover that the office of secondary teacher involves more than this, it is often too late to thoroughly readjust the accustomed mode of thought. If we would therefore attain a secondary teacher's profession which will appreciate its exalted task and be prepared to devote its whole energy to this task, greater care will have to be shown in the training of teachers than has hitherto been the case. We shall therefore briefly state, as the conclusion of our exposition, how the pedagogic preparation urgently required of teachers for our profession should be conducted and provided for.

7. THE PEDAGOGIC PREPARATION OF THE TEACHER

I have expressed myself in detail on the scientific training of the teacher in the third chapter. I made reference to pedagogic preparation in that connection only in so far as the theoretical study of pedagogy was described as the general concern of all teachers. In the fourth chapter, where our didactical problems formed the theme of our discussion I was particularly concerned to direct the attention of our present generation of active teachers to the most important principles of instruction and to furnish, in a brief survey of the special methods in the various branches, useful suggestions and plans. On

the point of the teacher's pedagogic training I have however thus far only spoken incidentally and nowhere have I said anything as to the method and to what extent I regard it necessary. I have postponed this explanation for the simple reason that it seemed to me important that it should be preceded by an exposition of the ethical and social problems of the teacher. Now that we have the whole list of functions required of us in full view, we can readily see that a young man cannot so easily adapt himself by his own genius to such a responsible office, one that demands such peculiar syntheses and such a variety of capacities. We must rather assist him in every conceivable way and try with all our might to devise methods and arrangements which will make it possible for him and eventually impel him to prepare himself in every respect for his future profession of teaching.

The superintendents of education of Germany and Austria have for some time already recognized the necessity of an intensive pedagogical training for the teachers of the advanced schools as indicated above (p. 13), and founded various institutions to meet this need. All of these institutions are based on the principle that the university years are to be devoted to scientific training and that the practical introduction into the teaching profession shall not begin until after the examination in pedagogics. The prospective teacher shall be required, in addition to the professional branches, to attend courses in philosophy and pedagogy at the university. The candidate shall give evidence of his attainments in theoretical principles either by a written dissertation or an actual examination.

Here in Austria, by the enactment of 1897, the candidates were required to prepare for two colloquies, one in philosophy and one in pedagogy, which however has been modified by an examination ordinance so that now an examination in pedagogy is all that is required. This examination shall cover the general theory of education together with its psychological and logical (not the ethical) fundamental principles, and the history of education since the sixteenth century.

As to the institution of the colloquies I have been in position during the past fourteen years to gather extraordinarily rich experiences, since I have had to conduct upwards of five thousand such examinations during this period. Coming at the

close of each semester it was a very exhausting task. I must acknowledge however that this institution was by no means useless and it could easily have been developed to still greater effectiveness. The majority of the students who, e.g., reported on a course in introduction to philosophy were well able to discuss the main tendencies of philosophy intelligently, could distinguish between the problems of epistemology and metaphysics and showed considerable familiarity with the terminology. Those who took the examinations in psychology got even greater advantage for their future vocation from it. Finally for the past eight years several hundred students who attended my course in practical secondary school pedagogy each summer semester reported for colloquy on it. The majority of them knew the pedagogic principles which I had elaborated quite well and carried a number of practical suggestions with them into their life's work. We shall have to await results to see whether the present examination system will produce better results.

It is necessary at any rate that the prospective teachers should likewise receive pedagogical training for their future profession even at the university, and I am disposed to think that considerable more should be done in this respect than there is at present. Even in the first edition of this work and afterwards in a brochure on "Unsere Mittelschule" I strongly advocated the plan that the prospective teachers be required to visit an institution and observe practical teaching during the last two years of their university course, to draft hour schedules and teach test lessons in the presence of a committee. Immediately following these lessons they are to be made the subject of discussion and criticism. These suggestions, which I have also advocated at teachers' conferences, have called forth vigorous opposition from very respectable quarters. Before I again state and justify my conclusions let me call attention to the fact that Prof. Willman conducted such exercises with splendid success for many years at Prague in connection with his seminar, and that these exercises were then continued in the same manner by Willman's successor, Prof. Alois Höfler.

In the first place it is objected that in directing the university students to practical exercises we withdraw them from science and thus cut short the time required for their special branch

which is so imperatively necessary. Some think moreover that the students in the midst of their scientific studies would take no interest in practical instruction such as pedagogy. Then too many practical educators think that the orderly progress of regular instruction would suffer undue confusion and interruption by the continuous casual visitors and test lessons. Finally the majority of school teachers regard acquaintance with the technique of instruction and of school administration as a practical introduction to the teaching profession. They accordingly likewise quietly assume that every one will get enough of this from his own experience. On this last point they are undoubtedly correct. If the practical preparation for teaching were nothing more than the acquisition of technical accomplishments and methodical stratagems, then there would certainly be no need for formal organizations and institutions. In that case the formal arrangement of the "extended year of probation" were indeed the most superfluous thing in the world. And so precisely it would appear to the majority of the candidates, who actually never get a clear idea of what is intended, and do not care to understand why there should be so much ado about such simple matters.

My conception of the nature and significance of such practical exercises is entirely different. Permit me to briefly outline this conception and verify it. The objections brought against such exercises will thus, I trust, refute themselves.

The object of the preparation which I am recommending is by no means intended, or at least not chiefly, to be a student drill in the art of teaching. I regard these exercises rather, above all else, as moral and as scientific discipline of the future teacher. In the first place the student is to learn to get the viewpoint of the teacher. Even by the casual attendance he will come to regard the class period in an entirely new light from that to which he had previously been accustomed. Then if he is given the subject of a test lesson about two weeks in advance and is required to prepare thoroughly himself on it, he will doubtless discover gaps in his scientific training. A thorough examination say of a passage from Cæsar which is to be interpreted, will reveal the fact that he hasn't a sufficiently clear conception of relative clauses, that his knowledge of conditions in Rome in the year 52 (the beginning of the seventh

book of the Gallic Wars) is not sufficiently exact, that the precise significance of this or that mode of speech does not occur to him. The approaching test lesson, the fear of exposing himself in the presence of his colleagues, will certainly induce him to fill out all these gaps conscientiously, and he will thus gain greatly in subjective assurance.

But the moral effect of every test lesson seems to me of still greater importance. We assume it as granted that it is not the pupils who are responsible for the imperfect results of the instruction, but the teachers. He is plainly and frankly told in the conference which immediately follows the lesson, that he had given occasion for incorrect answers by an error in the formulation of his question. His attention is called to the fact that too few of the pupils actively participated in the recitation and that consequently a part of the class sat there unoccupied. He discovers that he moved either too rapidly or too slowly, that he failed to inspire the interest of the pupils sufficiently and that consequently there was not sufficient attention manifest in the class. Sometimes he is also shown actual mistakes and thus acquainted with his lack of preparation. If the student knows that his permission to take the final examination admitting him to the profession depends on the results in the test lesson he will take himself in hand quite differently the next time. And perhaps — and this will largely depend on the skill of the man in charge of these exercises — he will acquire a genuine interest in the business which is new to him. He will discover that a man really can never know enough for these little ones, and further that one must study their peculiarities and hence needs to know psychology. He may perhaps even soon learn to know the joy which a teacher experiences when he succeeds in arousing the mind of youths and inspires them to genuine responsiveness. This much is certain however, he will learn what thorough preparation means and what a man must require of himself in this respect. All of this will be impressed upon him by concrete incidents, by definite experiences with all the color of individuality and personal touch. And the effect will be quite different from the study of general principles, no matter how beautifully they are presented.

Such psychical influences and moral transformations can be accomplished with students more readily and likewise more

thoroughly than with probationers. The probationer has passed his final examination and may even have his doctor's degree. He feels that he is a young man who has completed his studies and it is now his business to apply his knowledge. He is now placed in charge of men who are older in years and experience than he, but with whom he feels a sense of equality so far as pertains to academic degrees and scientific training. If such men require him, e.g., to read a book on the general theory of pedagogy or on special methods, it impresses him as a bit of distasteful tutelage. He sees no necessity for this because the art of teaching what he has learned does not appear to him beset with any great difficulties. And since it may easily come to pass that he does not concede the scientific superiority of the men who are inducting him into his profession, he will perhaps outwardly conform with their requirements, but subjectively feel, that this whole matter which is now imposed on him and which he must discharge is of little or no advantage to him. And it involves a number of externals besides. The position of the committee of eleven in relation to the pupils on the extended year of probation is by no means a pleasant one. If the committee of teachers have sufficient tact to treat the candidates assigned to them as younger colleagues, the situation may at least become tolerable. But there is always room for the fear that it may sometimes fail, and then the inevitable result follows, namely, that the pupils regard the candidates as subordinates with whom they are permitted all sorts of privileges. The young man does not always know how to help himself and may thus be embittered and come to the point of regarding the pupils not as subjects committed to him for instruction, but as on the same plane with himself or sometimes even as superior enemies against whom he must defend himself by every means at his command. But we have previously shown in detail how fatal such a conception of his position is for the teacher and the pupils alike. The probationer, who, as we have observed, regards himself as a mature man, moreover is far less receptive of instruction and criticism than the student. He may perhaps try to please the committee by learning pedagogic tricks, but his whole conception of the profession, his relation to the pupils, his sense of responsibility, his views concerning the relation of science and pedagogy, in short his whole mind is no

longer so plastic, no longer so capable of training as that of the student. Open resistance towards instruction and admonition is not very common, although it does sometimes occur. But the subjective resistance, which only the trained psychologist recognizes; the countenance, which betrays the feeling that he knows all this better himself; the passivity, which renders all influence more difficult; everyone who has had anything to do with probationers will recognize all these things from his personal experiences.

These things are entirely different in the case of students. They maintain that they are still in the making and they are consequently, according to the famous poetic phrase, "forever grateful." They are open to new ideas and permit them to have their full effect. They are accustomed from the practice of the seminar to have their work subjected to severe and detailed criticism both by professors and their colleagues. And the majority of the students will be glad for a chance to become intimately acquainted with the various functions of their future vocation. It will be entirely new to them and consequently very interesting. They have not as yet formed any clear idea of their calling. They approach the matter with a certain degree of curiosity and readily follow the course of the development. They regard the test lessons somewhat like the interpretations or reviews of the seminar. They make careful preparation because they know they will be closely criticised. In the conferences which immediately follow the lessons they are open to objections and suggestions. They will frequently defend their position vigorously against the criticism of their colleagues and even in this way penetrate more deeply into didactic principles. It will gradually become self-evident that it is their fault if the pupils show no interest and fail to participate actively in the lesson. They will concentrate all their pride, their whole mental energy, to inspire the pupils, to get correct answers to their questions and to see to it that the class actually retains something from the work covered. This entirely new attitude of mind, this concentration on the pedagogic purpose, this subjective transition from the school-room desk to the teacher's chair seems to me by far the most important preparation for our profession. All these psychical processes may be more easily and more effectively secured with students

than with probationers.

Parallel with this radical transition which must take place if the former pupil is to be transformed into a teacher a number of other not inconsiderable advantages accrue from such exercises. The student acquires a sense of freedom in the presence of the class. The confused mass eventually arranges itself automatically into a number of individuals of varying individuality and talent. He learns to speak with clearness and precision. He discovers that a man must have complete self-possession during the class period, and in this way likewise acquires an exceedingly effective discipline of his subjective self in his new position.

I am therefore convinced that the practical introduction into our profession should begin in the university, because there it will be more effective and it can actually accomplish, what we so much need, the production of the moral dispositions which are absolutely indispensable for our profession. I have already observed that scientific training does not suffer by this mode of procedure but that it is rather fostered from within. And now in order to answer the objections of practical teachers I will briefly describe the arrangement of such exercises as I have in mind.

The course of study for the secondary teacher covers four years with us. In Germany the old three year course is still in vogue, but in actual practice the majority of candidates certainly spend four years at the university. I therefore construe my plan on the basis of a four year course. Of these four years the first two are to be exclusively devoted to the scientific study of the special subject chosen. Here every one may study as if he meant sometime to enter upon a university professorship. The young man is to throw himself into his science with all the enthusiasm at his command. He shall not permit himself to be affected by any considerations concerning his future profession. He shall study, as far as possible, whatever and with whom he pleases guided only by his own scientific interests. These two years must reveal whether he feels disposed to become a scholar, an investigator, whether he has the ability and is called to devote himself entirely to science and only to science, or whether his inclinations and talents impel him towards the profession of teaching. He should come to a decision

by the beginning of the fifth semester. Students should be delivered from the false impression that there is still plenty of time to become a teacher after admission to a university professorship has failed. They should know that the teacher's vocation is no less dignified, but only differently constituted and requires different training.

In case a student decides upon the teaching profession, he must report to the professor of pedagogics, participate in the theoretical exercises in the pedagogical seminar and enroll in the list of candidates for the teaching profession. The professor shall then make provision for each of his students to visit periods of actual teaching, that he be required to draft hour schedules and make reports on what he has seen and heard. This rather receptive exercise will not claim much of his time and the student will be able to continue his specialized scientific studies as before. In the second semester of the third or at the beginning of the fourth year at the university he should begin the test-lessons after the manner described above. On these lessons he must take careful notes. Every student shall have given some eight or ten lessons before being admitted to examination. The clause, "practical pedagogic ability," is to be added to his certificate, and only such as can show an adequate amount of work under this head shall be admitted to the final professional examination. If the efforts at teaching repeatedly fail entirely, we should strongly advise the young man to seek some other profession, and eventually refuse him admission to the professional examination. This will not often be necessary, but it would still be possible in this way to prevent the wholly unfit from entering the profession.

A number of colleagues, who hold metropolitan positions, interpose the objection to this suggestion of which we have made previous mention and for which I must confess there is some justification. These gentlemen think that in case of a large number of candidates such test lessons would of necessity occur quite frequently and that thus the uniform conduct be considerably disturbed. I can readily understand why the regularly appointed teachers should defend themselves against such disturbances. Our time is closely calculated and we have pressing need for all of it. We must utilize it energetically and economically if we

are to cover the ground required. And just for this very reason I do not intend by any means that these test lessons shall be crowded into the regular school course. If the purpose which I would realize by these exercises is to be actually attained model secondary schools will have to be established in every university city similar to those already long in existence for the elementary and public schools. The very best teachers must be secured for these institutions and in addition the number of pupils must not be too great and if possible they should be select. But so long as we do not have such institutions we should pursue the method so successfully operated by Willman and Höfler. Invite a number of pupils of their own free choice to come to an institution, whose principal will take an interest in the matter, during half-holidays and let the candidate give them his test lesson in the presence of the principal, the professor of pedagogy and the department specialist, which shall be discussed immediately afterwards as indicated above. Since the classes change, not all of the pupils being required to attend — twenty is quite a sufficient number,— the pupils lose but very little time. And the increased burden on the various department specialists is not great. There is more demand on the principal who is expected to be present every week. But he will gladly assume this additional task because of his interest in the training of teachers and because it furnishes him an opportunity to become acquainted with the coming generation of teachers from whom he can later on select one or another, of those whose test lessons pleased him, for his institution.

The professor of pedagogy as a matter of course has by far the heaviest task which is actually not a small one. If this arrangement, as I confidently hope, is once recognized as the only method for training a full-fledged teaching profession in its problems and its responsibilities, the professorships of pedagogy will have to be correspondingly increased, successful teachers secured and appointed as assistants to the professors. In short, the formal arrangements, the financial provision, which would be comparatively small, the securing of suitable men, all of this involves no great difficulty. The most important thing of all is to convince the board of education, the examining committees, the philosophical faculties and finally even the parents and the pupils, i.e., the educated general public of the advantage

and necessity of this measure.

With us here in Austria this arrangement should certainly appeal to the board of education even for the reason that there is so frequently a dearth of teachers. In such periods of dearth, I have experienced two since the time of my entrance upon my profession (1876), not only the "additional" year of probation, but even the "simple" year of probation had to be dispensed with. The young men came directly from the university to the school without the slightest pedagogic training. They must at once undertake the teaching of a number of classes independently, have the same duties and privileges as the other, regularly appointed teachers and must adjust themselves accordingly. They are usually assigned to the supervision of a more experienced teacher, but the assistance of this supervising teacher, who is busily engaged and has but little time to visit the classes of his younger colleague, can be of but very little account. He can simply offer a few practical suggestions, but of pedagogic training there can be none. The board should not allow themselves to be deceived on this point and still less deceive themselves by official documents which may be bureaucratically valuable but in point of fact useless. It is not at all amazing if the young people make great mistakes and, what is far worse, if they form distorted and ruinous ideas of their vocation and of the relation of the teacher to the pupils, and allow them to become fixed. With how much greater confidence could such a young man be given charge of a class, if we knew that he had been in practical contact with school for a period of two years, that he had given test lessons, prepared himself and even experienced what it means to be a teacher and to impart instruction. The suggestions and advice of the supervising teacher will likewise have an entirely different effect with an amateur who has been trained in this fashion.

But the effect of such exercises on the whole mind of the future teacher previously discussed seems to me vastly more important than these resulting advantages for the continuation of the school system during periods of a dearth of teachers. The sense of personal responsibility for the pedagogic results and for the entire conduct of the class, the habit of thorough preparation even to details, the conviction that this is the sole pos-

sible method of attaining self-assurance, insight into the relation of the teacher to the pupils, the subjective impulse to be continually striving at self-improvement, all these things can only be effectively achieved for the advanced teacher's profession by implanting these ideas and sentiments in the plastic minds of the students. The teachers of the public schools furnish clear proof of this fact. Every one of them has drafted hour schedules and given test lessons and the majority of them are therefore accustomed to methodical, exact preparation and are interested in such problems. Our pedagogic problems are more difficult to solve, hence the need of even more intensive pedagogic training.

I have already stated the fact that even the scientific education of the candidates must necessarily gain something by this method. Let me add in substantiation the results of my experience. I have twice given courses on methods of teaching the ancient classics at the University of Vienna. During the latter half of the semester I arranged exercises in the ordinary method of interpreting the ancient authors. The first time I took the *Iliad*, the next time the *Antigone* of Sophocles. I urged the students to voluntary participation and to prepare themselves according to outlines which I furnished them. It repeatedly happened that it was only through the requirement of the ordinary interpretation that they clearly saw that certain forms and phenomena of syntax which they of course knew in a general way, were however not as fully understood in their depth and breadth as was necessary for the work of the school.

I think therefore, that we must by all means begin the training of teachers at the university. And I am convinced that the plans here suggested, which in practice will certainly require a number of modifications, are adapted to help us forward towards the desired goal.

If a candidate who has been trained in this manner passes his examination and enrolls for his year of probation, this year can be employed in an entirely different and far more effective way. We can then introduce him to the administration of discipline and show him in this connection how much can be done here towards the formation of character. He will then discern the fact that we must not only be teachers, but likewise trainers. And he will thus acquire an appreciation for the ethical and

social problems of our vocation. And this will again furnish him opportunity to extend and deepen his scientific education, which was thus far as a matter of course confined to his own department, by means of psychological, sociological and ethical studies.

After the young man has as a student thus achieved the veering about from the pupil's desk to the teacher's chair referred to above; after his pedagogic conscience is quickened and sharpened, after he has overcome his natural timidity in the presence of the class and has had a little exercise in practical teaching, after he has then acquired the requisite appreciation of the pedagogic problems as a probationer, then, but not until then, the state may entrust him with the independent guidance of the pupils. We must make sure of one thing, namely, that not only the germs, but even the impulse to constant further development have been deeply implanted in his mind.

If the board of education and the educated classes of society clearly appreciate the wonderfully significant and important social function of the secondary school, if all the governing factors clearly see that the culture and morality of the next generation is essentially molded by the pedagogic results of the advanced teaching profession, then will the conviction, that we must concentrate all our energy on training up a teaching profession which is conscious of and permeated with its sublime task, begin to make some headway. Society will then naturally accord to such a teaching profession the economic and social position which its high significance and service deserves.

CONCLUSION

The problems of the secondary teacher which have here been set forth in broad detail, despite their great variety, bear certain characteristics and peculiarities which give them a common brand.

Thus we observe everywhere that the positive, the concrete and real, which fills our consciousness with real content is far more important than the negative-critical, which rejects and restrains. This manifests itself very clearly in our scientific training. We find it of far greater importance to know perfectly and exactly the positive results of investigation, to have at

our disposal a wealth of fact-data and constantly have it at our command, than to possess the ability to refute false views with critical acumen. My university studies came at a time when the critical spirit prevailed, especially in philology and history. This criticism was not only directed against the authority of the manuscripts and against the convenient legend. People looked at a scientific work, a dissertation first of all to see whether the author had not made a mistake somewhere, which they tried, with much energy and even more pleasure, to prove.

The after effects of this hypercritical period, which, thank God, is past, are still noticeable among many of us, especially among classical philologists. There are at the present time still many who ask first of all concerning another man's work, what is to be rejected and where are its vulnerable points. Such natures are easily inclined to apply their critical methods in the estimation of the work of the pupils. But here this mode of procedure is entirely out of place. Here one must rather discover, both in the answers as well as in the written exercises of the pupils, the things that are positively present, the things that have actually been learned, because it is only on this that we can build further. We must not ascertain our pupil's errors with a sense of superiority or with subjective resentment. We must rather be concerned to understand them, to search out their psychological antecedents, if we would successfully attack them.

Every one of us has discovered this advantage of the positive method over the critical, even if not clearly conscious of the fact. In the preparation for teaching, let us say, the interpretation of an ancient or a modern author, a section of geography or of history, in short in every preparation we get the best results from the handbooks and commentaries that contain the most positive information. Critical editions which merely contain various readings and explanations concerning the probability of the one or the other, do not possess by far the same value as the detailed commentary of fact and linguistic structure. So the historian is likewise surest to find in the rich collections of source documents the things which he needs for teaching.

But the tendency towards the positive likewise affects our didactic problems. We gain the attention of the pupils far

more easily and certainly if we arouse their interest by means of positive, concrete occupation than by loud and frequent admonitions to attention and by reproving and punishing inattention. And the habit of industry is not achieved by scolding and punishing indolence, but by daily furnishing the pupils positive, concrete material on which they can satisfy their intellectual functional impulse in a pleasing manner. The principle which we have proposed for external discipline, that prevention is better than punishment, likewise applies here.

And we note the same characteristic in our ethical and social problems. We can develop characters and inspire them with the social spirit, not by means of instituting a powerful system of restraint, but by arousing the dormant vital energies of the pupils. No phillippic against egoism will even begin to make the impression, which the reference to the contrivances employed daily, which can only come into being and discharge their function by continuous and by organized coöperation, arouses.

Hence just as it is far more important in language teaching that the correct expression be heard frequently, than that the false expression be warned against, so our whole energy must be characterized far more by the positive than by the critical spirit. This, as a matter of course, requires a certain amount of healthy optimism, which to say the least is rather rare these days. The acquisition of vast stores of knowledge and the constant contact with the rising generation is well adapted however to safeguard a man against the cold and listless pessimism so prevalent at present, which accredits nothing. Whilst we transmit the achievements of the human mind to youth we have constant occasion to rejoice at what has been accomplished, and the vast problems which still await scientific investigation, furnish youth the assurance that the past has still left it enough to conquer.

This optimism which so readily combines with the tendency towards the positive will likewise furnish us power to realize the second requirement which is so characteristic of our vocation. I refer to the *consummation of difficult syntheses*. Throughout the foregoing discussions I have frequently referred to the necessity of such syntheses and I should here like to show that the tendencies which thus require reconciliation not only do not restrain, but must rather even mutually advance each other,

if we stick to the positive and concrete method.

Right at the beginning we insisted on the synthesis of science and pedagogy. If the new teacher has really acquired an abundance of positive knowledge at the university, he consequently feels the need of putting it to use. He finds appreciative auditors in the pupils, who eagerly appropriate what is offered them. On the other hand the preparation for his lessons require him to fill out all manner of gaps, and the more thoroughly he does this so much the more rapidly will he increase in knowledge and his teaching be correspondingly more effective. The synthesis constantly grows easier and more complete, since the increased knowledge improves the teaching and the thorough teaching enriches knowledge.

I have clearly shown that the official character of the teacher's activity is calculated not only to restrain, but likewise to enrich him subjectively. And I at the same time proved, that even the most difficult of all syntheses, that of the public official and of the teacher is facilitated by the tendency towards the positive and that here likewise both functions are calculated to foster each other.

We have insisted on the many-sidedness and thoroughness of the teacher's scientific training. And this combination comes to pass well nigh automatically by adhering to the positive tendency. If we practice thorough preparation from the start, if we have made it a matter of course that not even the slightest detail of the subject-matter of the lesson we are preparing dare remain obscure, that we refuse absolutely to allow any uncertainty, this thoroughness will then necessarily fuse with no small degree of many-sidedness. And we have to cover the most varied phases of our department in succession and frequently even contemporaneously in school, which requires us in fact to be at home in many fields. And in addition to this it quite frequently happens that we must likewise reach out into neighboring departments in the course of our instruction which impels us to master the fundamentals even in these fields. In this way therefore the conscientious effort for thoroughness has naturally protected us against a narrow confinement to a small department of knowledge, enriched our knowledge, enlarged our horizon and advanced our many-sidedness. That is to say that here also there is no restraint, but a reciprocal fostering of ap-

parent antitheses.

In connection with our ethical and social problems we have taken special care to show that personal duty and personal dignity, that the social spirit and the development of personality mutually foster one another and that each of them produces its proper effect only through the synthesis of both these principles.

Our exposition should reveal the fact that the problems of the secondary teacher are vast and difficult, but not therefore unsolvable. It should likewise become clear that our pedagogic task is entirely unique, differing essentially from that of the public school teacher on the one hand and the university professor on the other. I have also tried to prove that the discharge of our duties must not be a matter of blind subservience, but our own spontaneous, deliberate act. Only as we grasp our problems in all their breadth and depth, only as we devote our whole ability to our work, will we be in position to at least approach this high ideal. And the reward for all this labor and care is nothing less than the personal sense of satisfaction together with, as we grow older, perhaps the appreciative attachment of former pupils.

I know that my conception of our vocation will receive a criticism with which there is generally combined a dose of depreciation. I will be disparagingly pronounced an *idealist*. And I reply: accipio omen, I am proud of it, if I deserve this title. Only I conceive idealism and ideals in a slightly different way from what is customary at present. The essential nature of an ideal does not consist, as a former Austrian statesman has said, in the fact that it is never attained. The characteristic and effective feature of an ideal lies in the fact that it inspires the desire to approach it, that it excites the imagination and spurs the will. "A noble example inspires emulation and furnishes judgment with higher principles." This is not an empty phrase, but a truth surcharged with seriousness and profound meaning.

Kein Augustisch Alter blühte,
Keines Medicäers Güte
Lächelte des Lehrers Kunst;
Sie wird nicht gepflegt von Ruhme,
Sie entfaltet ihre Blume
Nicht im Strahl der Fürstengunst,
Rühmend darfs der Lehrer sagen,

Höher darf das Herz ihm schlagen,
Selbst erschafft er sich den Wert.

Only as we ourselves create our value subjectively shall we likewise attain the objective appreciation which our profession deserves. And with this appreciation moreover our social position must inevitably rise and our economic condition improve. Hence idealism is still not such an impractical thing as people generally think.

The practical Englishman says: "Time is money." We impractical idealists must invert this adage. For us, money would be time. An adequate subsistence would relieve many of us of the pitiable necessity of seeking outside employment which not only robs us of time that might well be utilized in self-improvement and independent scientific investigation, but unfortunately likewise frequently diminishes our respect and dignity. Oscar Jaeger accordingly offers the new teacher the following advice which is at once as charming as it is wise and penetrating: "First of all have ten thousand dollars." The man of experience and character knows only too well that economic independence constitutes a wonderfully important condition for the respect of our profession.

We see therefore that the idealistic conception of our vocation is consistent with the tendency towards the positive, the concrete and leads to very real, tangible results. Let us take fresh courage and bright hope from this fact. Let us constantly be more thoroughly convinced of the fact, that insight into the wonderfully important social function of the secondary school and in the resulting real and concrete problems of the secondary school, will likewise furnish us the energy to fulfill the exalted requirements which we must impose upon ourselves. Complete devotion to the vast social problem will automatically furnish us opportunity for personal invigoration, to develop self-sufficient personalities, which then likewise possess the capacity of influencing youth. And in this way moreover we effect in ourselves the exceedingly difficult synthesis of individualism and socialism. While working on ourselves and for ourselves we are likewise doing splendid service for the social body of which we are members. We may then perhaps succeed in quickening in our pupils, whom we are anxious to develop to personal duty and personal dignity, the germs which

will eventually enable them likewise to work at this great synthesis on their own part. In this way moreover we contribute in a twofold sense to the solution of the most important problem of the civilization of the twentieth century.

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
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