

Errata Sheet

Affidavit of TOMITA, Kenji.

P. 2, line 11- 12, Delete "The Army had already decided that it was hopeless to continue the negotiations and OKA, at that time" and insert as followings;  
"The general feeling in the army was already inclined to oppose continuation of the negotiations and OKA, at that time".

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARA-I, Sadeo, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent. TOMITA, Kenji

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

I occupied the position of Chief Secretary of the Cabinet from 22 July 1940 to October 15, 1941, during which time I had frequent interviews with Navy Minister OIKAWA, Koshiro and OKA, Takezumi, Director of the Naval Affairs Bureau. They frequently expressed themselves as being anxious to continue with the American-Japanese diplomatic negotiations and also expressed a sincere desire to help bring about a successful consummation of such negotiations.

On July 16, 1941 the Second Konoye Cabinet resigned and the Third Konoye Cabinet was formed. The resignation took place because it was felt that Matsuoka's presence would be a hindrance to the progress of the Japanese-American negotiations. The Third Konoye Cabinet was formed about July 20. The primary reason for the formation of this Cabinet was to expedite the proposed negotiations with the United States. While discussing the proposal I had occasion to have frequent interviews with Oka since August 1941. He expressed himself as being most anxious to continue Japanese-American negotiations and emphasized the fact that Konoye should be delegated with full

discretionary powers to negotiate with Roosevelt in order to settle the matter as quickly as possible. OKA further stated that he would assist in making preparations for a ship to transport the delegation and hoped to become a member of such a suite in attempting to consummate the negotiations. On August 17, 1941 the suggestion was first made to President Roosevelt by Ambassador Nomura personally concerning our request for a meeting between Konoye and Roosevelt.

On October 11, 1941 I paid a visit to OKA at his residence and told him that a meeting was to be held on the following day, October 12 at Prince Konoye's house in Ogikubo and I hoped that a strong stand would be taken by the Navy to support Prince Konoye. The Army had already decided that it was hopeless to continue the negotiations and OKA, at that time, stated that Prince Konoye should be encouraged to continue the negotiations. Later, the same evening, I called on Navy Minister CIKAWA at his official residence at which time the Navy Minister also stated that he wished to avoid an American-Japanese war and that it was his desire that the negotiations be continued by all means. He stated however that the Navy in view of its position as a fighting unit couldn't officially make a statement that it was opposed to war. That it was the duty of the Navy to observe orders if it became necessary to fight and the decision whether to wage war or not was a diplomatic question which was appropriately within the province of the Premier for determination. To these observations I expressed the wish that it would be well for the Navy Minister at the OGIKUBO Conference on the 12th of October to support Premier Konoye in his efforts to continue America-Japanese negotiations.

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The next morning, October 12, I received a telephone call from OKI who stated that the Navy Minister at the Conference being held the same date, intended to state that the decision for war or peace would be left in the hands of the Prime Minister. He further stated that the Navy could not decide whether a war should be waged or not, that it was a matter to be determined by the Prime Minister although it was desired that the Prime Minister should definitely pursue his course in order that war might be avoided. At that time OKI observed that the Konoye Cabinet should not resign so that it might continue with its efforts to bring about a compromise and that if it did resign there was a grave danger of war breaking out. He urged me to do everything possible to prevent Prince Konoye from resigning. He, therefore, stated that for all practical purposes he hoped that the American-Japanese negotiations would be successfully concluded.

Thereafter when the Third Konoye Cabinet resigned OKI expressed himself as being gloomy over the prospects of the American-Japanese negotiations. Even after the resignation of the Third Konoye Cabinet OKI kept Prince Konoye informed of the subsequent developments pertaining to the American-Japanese negotiations through me. He stated that this was because Prince Konoye was one of the important senior statesmen and it was his intention to activate Prince Konoye to continue his efforts to bring about peace between the United States and Japan.

OKI also stated that he did not think Japan should under any circumstances engage in a full scale conflict with a powerful country like the United States. However, he frequently expressed himself as being a subordinate who would be compelled to follow orders whether or not they were in accord with his own personal views.

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During the many times that I came in contact with OKA I observed that he was a man who worked under orders and did not disregard the wishes of his superiors.

At Tokyo,

this 15th day of July 1947.

WITNESS: TOMITA, Shinji (seal)

I hereby certify that the foregoing was duly sworn to, signed and sealed in the presence of this witness.

At the same place,

on the same day.

Witness:

WITNESS: SOMIYA, Shinji (seal)

O A T H

I swear, according to my conscience, that I shall state the truth, whole truth, without holding nor adding anything.

TOMITA, Shinji (seal)