

LCD/lr

4 September 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. D. N. Sutton
FROM: Mr. L. C. Dunigan
RE: MURATA, Shozo

Here is an original and two copies of a memorandum prepared on March 20, 1947 in connection with the above named individual. He has previously testified briefly at pages 18,009 to 18,017.

The memorandum attached hereto is all of the information available in the IPS files. I can see no particular application to the contents of his present Affidavit (Def. Doc 1741) but I am sending it to you for whatever it may be worth in the opinion of the cross-examiner.

I have talked to Mr. Lopez concerning MURATA's Affidavit as well as that of WACHI, Takaji (Def. Doc. 1453). Mr Lopez has informed me that he has consulted with Mr. Keenan and Mr. Tavenner and has given them what information and suggestions he has. Mr. Lopez, of course, is familiar with the subject matter of the two Affidavits.

LESTER C. DUNIGAN

Incl.

MURATA, Shozo

Request by TOJO, Hideki

Address: Sugamo Prison.

He will be able to testify regarding circumstances and the Conditions under which the various representatives attended the Conferences.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent : -- MURATA, Shōzō

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. The outline of my political career is generally as follows:

The Minister of Communications in the Second KONOYE Cabinet (1940) (For a while I was concurrently the Railway Minister but later exclusively Minister of Communications)

Concurrently Minister of Communications and Minister of Railways in the Third KONOYE Cabinet. (1941) I resigned along with the resignation of the KONOYE Cabinet on October 14, 1941.

I arrived at my post as Advisor to the Japanese Army in the Philippine Islands on February 11, 1942.

After the independence of the Philippines on October 14, 1943, I was the Japanese Ambassador Plenipotentiary

to the Philippines until August, 1944.

2. I will now make a statement on the political affairs of the Philippine Islands before and after her independence.

The Philippine Islands were under the military administration of the Japanese army when I arrived at my post there. At that time, the Army Commander was out in the field at the Corregidor and Bataan fronts and, as to political affairs, there was a military governor in Manila who was in charge of the military administration mainly bearing the responsibility of government. However, in so far as the domestic administration was concerned we entrusted it to the important persons of the Philippines who organized the Administrative Committee and were allowed to take charge of administration in accordance with the intention of the Japanese Army. The chairman of the Committee was Mr. Vargas. I recollect that the Administrative Committee was organized on January 23, 1942. The members of this Committee at first took an attitude of assisting the Japanese Army merely for the sake of maintaining peace in the Philippine Islands. But, Premier TŌJŌ's speech in the Japanese Diet on January 21, 1942, to the effect that Japan was willing to honor them with independence if the Philippines would henceforth understand the Japanese intention and act in concert with Japan, made a very favourable impression on the Filipinos and as they gradually grew to recognize the Japanese Army better, they

came to appreciate the true motives of Japan. And they (TN: the members of the Committee) gradually came to take a co-operative attitude towards the Japanese Army. Of course, since it was a period of military administration, things did not go as Filipinos desired completely. Moreover, not only were the Japanese troops fighting in Corregidor and Bataan but also former Filipino troops and troops of the U. S. army remained in various quarters. It was, accordingly, only natural that good government could not be expected, since the military administration was conducted on the field of battle. A little later, Bataan and Corregidor fell and the majority of the U. S. and Filipino troops there, both officers and men, were made prisoners of war. But some of them escaped and filtered into various quarters who, together with the various people who had heretofore been there, all changed to wage guerilla warfare. Things, therefore, came to such a pass as to compel us to make an effort in mopping up the guerillas in their various quarters. The administration in Manila on the part of the Filipinos, however, greatly improved, as Manila was the centre and was the pivot of everything. In January of the following year, the 18th year of SHŌWA(1943), Premier TŌJŌ issued a concrete statement in the Diet to the effect that Japan would grant independence to Philippines in the near future and as a result of which the Philippines

became independent on October 14 of the same year. The Philippines thus became independent, and they first began with the revision of the Constitution essential to independence. In revising the Constitution, the Army appointed as Chairman of the Constitution Revision Committee Mr. Laurel, who had the established reputation of trustworthiness as well as being conversant with the Constitution and an authority on the legal affairs of the Philippine Islands. The Revision Committee was created according to Mr. Laurel's opinion. The Constitution Revision Committee was hereupon formed with all of the members of the aforementioned Administrative Committee (Chairman Mr. Vargas) together with other civilians of excellent character. The Constitution was revised by these members and, on October 14 of the 18th year of SHŌWA (1943), the Philippines became independent and an independent government, was established. At this time, the National Assembly was called in accordance with the new Constitution. Owing to the pressing of time, however, the new Constitution provided for provisional regulations for electing the Assembly members, according to which the members assembled and, in that session, conducted the Presidential election and elected Mr. Laurel President. Then President Laurel personally selected the Cabinet members and put the administrative machinery into operation according to the constitution. Towards the revision of the

Constitution, Japan assumed a non-interference policy. That is, the republican form of government was adopted as before as the form of government for the Philippine Islands and both the national flag and territory were left just as before. Some of the Japanese people were said to be of the opinion regarding territory, "We hope ~~Mindanao Island will be reserved for Japan in view of future military and other purposes.~~" Premier TOJO strongly maintained, this his must absolutely not be done. We should not lay our hands on it in the slightest. As a result, the entire territory became that of the Republic of the Philippines.

As for the national language of the Philippines, the TAGALOG language became the official language after the independence, whereas it was English and Spanish prior to independence. For instance, President Laurel made speeches in the TAGALOG language. And the Foreign Office which did not exist prior to independence was created thereafter, and a most influential man was appointed Foreign Minister. Moreover, American procedure was followed in the Philippine Assembly as to either the form of bills introduced by members or their method of introduction. And in these bills, it seemed to me that Japan did not interfere hardly at all. Afterwards, even when some of the bills were not particularly desirable, they did not seem to have

been interfered with so much.

Not only that, the Japanese advisors to the Philippine Government numbered three, each of whom was respectively in charge of finance, police, and scientific matters, respecting the wishes of President Laurel. In short, I think this course of action was not contrary to the central policy of Japan of having Filipino have their own way in government and having them independently administer the affairs of state from their own will. With such ideas as mentioned above, we did various things for the benefit of the Philippines towards their independence. Let me mention a few within my knowledge:

- A. The birth-place of RIZAL, who had advocated the independence of Philippines since the time of Spain's reign and whose statue was situated at the place of his execution, had been forgotten by the Filipino people. A house was built at his birth-place just as it was when he was born, to encourage the spirit of independence in the Filipino people;
- B. Aiming at cultivating men of ability necessary for an independent state, outstanding youths were selected twice a year and were sent to Japan to study, entering the schools of their own choice;
- C. At the first anniversary of Philippine Independence, the Japanese Government donated 500,000 pesos as the Ambassador's gift in honor of the occasion, suggesting that

it be spent for the purpose of educating the young people of the Philippines and that everything would be left to the Philippines as to its use. Both the President and the Minister of education were over joyed.

D. Agricultural improvement in the Philippine Islands was of the first consideration for an agricultural nation like the Philippines and great effort was put forth in this field ever since the time of the military administration. We had the Director of the Agricultural Affairs Bureau of the Philippine Government inspect Formosa accompanied by 5 or 6 accomplished scientists of agriculture. The Government-General of Formosa gave them free rain and allowed them to inspect wherever they wished. And we had them compare the condition of the Philippines developed under U. S. control for 40 years, with the results of Japan's efforts in the administration of Formosa for 40 years since she got possession of it. On inspecting Formosa, they were greatly surprised at and lost in admiration with the results, uttering in the end even such words as, "I don't care even if someone thinks we received a bribe from Formosa;"

F. As Advisor to the Army, I also set up an inquiry committee on industry, economy, culture, education and the various matters for the sake of contributing to the independence of the Philippines. There were extensive findings made by the U. S. A. of course but they

were naturally made from an American point of view, and I maintained that we must draw up ones based upon an Oriental viewpoint. But Army Headquarters would not agree with me stating that it was not the proper time. So I went to Tokyo to consult with Premier TŌJŌ and he approved it. On the one hand a search was made for outstanding scholars from the general public and on the other, aid was solicited from the presidents of various universities. In the end, the scholars, RŌYAMA, TŌHATA, SUGIMURA, ŌSHIMA, SUEKAWA and ITŌ, all came over to the Philippines with their able assistants and took up the survey:

As originally Philippine Islands was entirely dependent on U. S. A. as her possession; it was indeed impossible speaking only from the industrial point of view for her to be independent without relations with America. For instance, the Filipinos are very fond of smoking cigarettes; but they produce only a lot of cigar leaves and no tobacco-leaf and import cigarettes from America. Rice was also insufficient and about 10 percent had to be imported annually. The Philippines was in such a condition and she hardly had qualifications for an independent state, until she was able to produce ^{herself} for [^]before anything, daily necessities as food first of all, clothing, and others necessities. Therefore, the

technical experts in various fields were sent there from Japan by the military administration to encourage the growing of cotton, yellow tobacco, Formosan rice, etc., looking beyond into the future since as early as the time of the military administration. As for cotton, though it had been grown to some extent since former times, there was some dispute about whether it would grow or not. So we engaged university professors who were experts in cotton - to have them study the matter. As they reported that cotton-growing would be possible in some areas, we had them carry it out. Of course it ^{be carried out} had to ^{be carried out} with the understanding of being prepared to take losses for 3 or 5 years at least. We, accordingly, tried to have influential cotton spinning companies or colonization companies, having the capacity to bear the burden, grow excellent cotton after designating these areas for it. As a consequence, these various companies paid heavily but for which they were prepared from the outset. As for tobacco, some districts got very good yields of the yellow leaf variety used in cigarettes. It can be thought ^{that} up to now, although it was possible to have been grown, they didn't allow them to and had them depend rather upon import. The Formosan rice crop turned out well in the first year but not so well in the second year.

G. Premier Tōjō's statement on the independence of the Philippines created such a sensation in the Philippine Islands that the Filipino people were greatly concerned at the time of the resignation of the Tōjō Cabinet. I therefore, invited the reporters of the Filipino and Japanese newspapers and told them." Even with resignation of the Tōjō Cabinet Japan's policy will not change. Philippine independence shall be recognized as in the past. The declaration at the Greater East Asia Conference is a permanent and immutable one," They were greatly relieved. They thought that well of Tōjō in connection with her independence.

Let me give an example which indicates how Premier Tōjō was adored by the Filipino people. It happened when he visited the Philippine Islands. Premier Tōjō, on alighting from the airplane, directly went to the Ministers, assembled to meet him, and shook hands with them all. As this was completely different from the attitude of the Army Commanders etc, they were very pleased. On the next day, after he spoke to a large audience numbering hundreds of thousand, he returned on foot without taking a waiting automobile to the hotel near by through a crowd of people greeting them as he went along. This was an expression of his attitude to show he was for the Filipino people, without a thought

of personal danger, and they were delighted. Premier TŌJŌ's speech on this occasion gained great popularity. His speech was made at LUNETTA Park in the city of Manila. When the Mayor of Manila expressed his desire, on one occasion, to name it TŌJŌ Park in token of the Philippine people's gratitude, Mr. TŌJŌ refused, saying, "Please don't.

H. As the Commander of the Japanese Army, HOMMA, TANAKA, KURODA and finally YAMASHITA were appointed successively due to various reasons, but Chief of Staff WACHI arrived at his post one or two weeks after my arrival and was in office until YAMASHITA's arrival. He won great popularity as Chief of Staff and as military administrator of the time. He was so zealous in making the Philippines worthy of an independent state by all means that such songs as 'WACHI March' appeared among the people.

3. Now I will make a statement on the "Death March."

I don't think it is clear whether "Death March" is a term to apply to the Filipino war prisoners or to the American war prisoners. I witnessed the American war prisoners on the "March", landing from Corregidor and marching toward the internment camp from the street but there didn't seem to be any deaths in the procession. It was, however, true that there were some deaths among the Filipino war prisoners who marched separately.

I will now relate the state of affairs when I visited the headquarters of the Japanese Army on Bataan soon after the surrender of the U.S. army there. I witnessed then war prisoners lying on the wayside who, after surrendering at Bataan, had fallen out of the march on their way to camp. When I had a talk with the Commander of the Army, I asked him about this. He answered, saying, "Little did I expect that there were so many. Contrary to my expectations that those who offered to surrender would number 30 or 40 thousand, there were as many as 70 or 80 thousand and I had great difficulty in transporting them. First of all, we had no trucks which, accordingly, compelled us to have them walk. Neither had we so much in the way of rations. Moreover, they were suffering from malaria or other diseases, so we had a very hard time escorting them to the camp." This was the actual state of things. Although it may appear to have been done deliberately to be called the "Death March," I think its results were unavoidable.

This is something I heard from a Filipino of some war prisoners who were deeply moved by the fact that Japanese soldiers on duty in prisoner of war camp, for instance, lived under the same roof and ate the same meals with the war prisoners.

Various kinds of leaflets were said to have been distributed from airplanes during the Philippine offensive

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of Commander HOMMA. Among these leaflets, was printed, "The Filipino people who will swear allegiance to us shall not be looked upon as our enemy." I think General HOMMA entertained this idea to the last, because he released war prisoners one after another in spite of the continuation of the war. This greatly pleased the Filipino people. There are other cases as having helped in getting employment for them, assisting them in their education, etc, but as they would come under hearsay I shall refrain.

On this 6th day of June, 1947

At I.M.T.F.F.

DEPONENT Murata, Shozo (seal)

I, KIYOSE, Ichirō, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

At same place

Witness: (signed) Ichiro Kiyose (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

- 14 - Murata Shozo (seal)

CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff
Civil Intelligence Section

General Activities
APO 500
5 April 1947

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION:

SUBJECT: MURATA, Shozo

30 Jul 1936	Appointed member of the Organizing Committee of the Formosa Colonization Company until 28 Nov 1936.
19 Feb 1938	Appointed member of the Organizing Committee of the North China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company until 8 Nov 1938.
27 Aug 1938	Appointed member of the Committee of the Korean Government General to investigate counter-measures for the current situation. Relieved on 6 Sep 1940.
5 Jul 1939	Appointed member of the Asia Promotion Committee until 31 Jul 1940.
22 Jul 1940	Appointed Communications Minister and Railways Minister in the second KONOYE Cabinet.
18 Jul 1941	Appointed Railways Minister in the Third KONOYE Cabinet.
27 Dec 1941	Appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary to the Philippines.
1942	Military adviser in the Philippines.
1942	In address to the Black Dragon Society, stated that it was his intention that "all American influence should be eradicated from the Philippines, even though it took 25 years, and at the end of that time he would have the Filipinos talking, thinking and behaving like Japanese."
19 Aug 1942	Returned to Japan. Stated that "military security rather than economic developments should be given first consideration" in planning for the Philippine Islands.
1 Jul 1943	Appointed adviser to Army Headquarters in the South Seas Areas.

CONFIDENTIAL

Incl 6

CONFIDENTIAL

5 Oct 1943 Relieved of non-official work with the War Ministry.

19 Oct 1943 Dispatched to the Philippines.

23 Sep 1944 After Philippine declaration of war, issued following statement: "The peoples of Japan and the Philippines will trust each other, help each other, share the joys and sorrows together, with the determination to share even life and death together for the defense of the Philippines."

CONFIDENTIAL

NAME: MURATA, Shozo

BORN: 6 Oct. 1878

Permanent Domicile: East No. 3, AZAHAMA, MIKAGE-MACHI, MUKO-GUN, HYOGO-KEN

DATE	APPOINTMENT, DISMISSAL, REWARD, PUNISHMENT & INCIDENTS
July 1900	Graduated from Tokyo Higher Commercial School. Entered the employment of the OSAKA SHOSEN KABUSHIKI KAISHA
January 1920	Appointed managing director of the same company
January 1929	Appointed Vice-President of the same company and has remained in that post up to this date.
17 Apr 1920	Appointed adviser to the employers' representatives to the General Labor Meeting pertaining to seamen to be held at Genoa, Italy (Cabinet)
June 1930	Appointed as a non-official member of the National Parks Investigation Committee.
October 1930	Appointed as a non-official member of special marine transportation investigation committee of the Communications Ministry. Furthermore concerned with the following: Honorary Consul of the Republic of Argentina in OSAKA; Director and President of SETTSU Marine and Fire Insurance Co.; Director of the OSAKA Building Company; Counsellor of the YAMASHITA Steamship Company; Director of North-Japan Steamship Company; Director of NIKKA/Japan and China/ Life Insurance Company; Director of NISSHIN Steamship Company; Adviser to the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in OSAKA.
1 Oct 1931	Appointed member of the National Parks Committee (Cabinet)
11 Sept 1934	Appointed member of the International Sightseeing Committee (Cabinet)
1 August 1936	Appointed member of the Navigation Control Committee (Cabinet)
3 October 1936	Appointed temporary member of the Petroleum Industry Committee (Cabinet); the committee was abolished by Imperial Ordinance No. 42 of 1938
30 July 1936	Appointed member of the Organizing Committee of the Formosa Colonization Company (Cabinet)

20 October 1936	Appointed member of the International Sightseeing Committee.
28 November 1936	Relieved of the position as member of the Organizing Committee of the Formosa Colonization Company
1 July 1937	Appointed councillor of the Central Economic Conference. The Conference was abolished by Imperial Ordinance No. 85 of 1938.
14 July 1937	Appointed member of the Customs Duty Investigation Committee.
16 July 1937	Appointed non-official special member of the Special Committee to Investigate Prices Counter Measure. The Committee was abolished on 3 December 1937.
1 October 1937	Appointed member of the Ships Administration Committee
19 February 1938	Appointed member of the Organizing Committee of the North China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company
27 August 1938	Appointed member of the committee of the Government-General of Korea to investigate the counter measures to cope with the times.
6 Sept 1938	Appointed member of the Organizing Committee of the Japan Electric Power Generation Company.
8 November 1938	Relieved of position as member of the organizing committee of the North China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company.
9 November 1938	Appointed temporary member of the Insurance System Investigation Committee of the Insurance Board.
14 Dec 1938	Appointed member of the International Sight-Seeing Committee
4 Jan 1939	Became member of the House of Peers by No. 4, Article 1 of the Ordinance of the House of Peers
8 Mar 1939	Appointed member of the Central Prices Committee
4 April 1939	Relieved of the position as member of the Organizing Committee of the Japan Electric Power Generation Company
5 April 1939	Appointed temporary member of the Railway Fares Investigation Committee
5 June 1939	Appointed member of the Organizing Committee of the Japan Aviation Company

5 July 1939 Appointed member of the Asia Promotion Committee

12 July 1939 Appointed member of the Railway Main Line Investigation Committee.

2 Sept 1939 Relieved of the position as member of the Organizing Committee of the Japan Aviation Company

26 December 1939 Appointed member of the Shipbuilding Enterprises Committee

20 June 1940 Appointed member of the Central Seamen Wages Investigation Committee

22 July 1940 Appointed the Communications Minister and the Railways Minister.

31 July 1940 Relieved of the position as member of the Projects Investigation Committee at own request;
 Relieved of the position as member of the Asia Promotion Committee at own request;
 Relieved of position as member of the Navigation Control Committee;
 Relieved of the position as member of the Ships Administration Committee at own request;
 Relieved of the position as member of the Shipbuilding Enterprises Committee at own request;
 Relieved of the position as member of the Central Seamen Wages Committee at own request.

1 Aug 1940 Promoted to the 3rd Court Rank, Junior Grade

5 Aug 1940 Relieved of the position as member of the Railways Main Line Investigation Committee at own request;
 Relieved of position as temporary member of the Railway Fares Investigation Committee at own request.

15 Aug 1940 Relieved of position as member of the International Sight-seeing Committee at own request

24 Aug 1940 Relieved of the position as temporary member of the Insurance System Investigation Committee of the Insurance Board at own request (Cabinet)

26 Aug 1940 Relieved of position as member of the National Parks Committee at own request (Cabinet)

6 Sept 1940 Relieved at own request of the position as member of the Committee of the Government-General of Korea to investigate the counter-measures to cope with the times (Cabinet)

21 Sept 1940 Relieved of the position as member of the Customs Duty Investigation Committee at own request (Cabinet)

28 Sept 1940 Relieved of concurrent duties (Cabinet)

18 July 1941 Concurrently appointed the Railways Minister (Cabinet)

30 Sept 1941 Appointed Chairman of the Organizing Committee of the East Asia Marine Transportation Company

18 Oct 1940 Relieved of main and concurrent duties at own request (Cabinet)

24 Oct 1941 Appointed member of the organizing Committee of the East Asia Marine Transportation Company (Cabinet)

4 Nov 1941 Relieved of the position as member of the Organizing Committee of the East Asia Marine Transportation Co. (Cabinet)

27 Dec 1941 Appointed the Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary (Cabinet). Sent to Philippine Islands on official business (Cabinet).

5 Oct 1943 Relieved of the non-official work with the War Department; not reported in the Official Gazette (War Department)

14 Oct 1943 Ordered to reside in the Philippine Islands (Cabinet)

29 Apr 1940 Decorated with the Order of the Sacred Treasure, 4th class, in recognition of meritorious services in the China Incident.

15 Oct 1940 Decorated with the Order of the Sacred Treasure, 3rd Class

9 Feb 1941 Decorated with the Order of the Sacred Treasure, 2nd Class

1 Aug 1945 Relieved of duties at own request (Cabinet)

30 Aug 1945 Appointed adviser to the Transportation Ministry (Cabinet)

24 Oct 1945 Relieved of the position as adviser to the Transportation Ministry (Cabinet)

1..Aug 1946 Designated to come under the Memorandum in accordance with Article 1 of Imperial Ordinance No. 9 of 1946.

Shozo MURATA: Japanese Ambassador to puppet Philippine government;
former Cabinet Minister.

1878 Oct. Born Tokyo. Son of Shozo Murata Senior.
Married Tatsu, daughter of Ai Iida.

1900 Graduated Tokyo Higher Commercial School; entered
Osaka Shoshen Kaisha (Osaka Mail Steamship
Company).

1920 Managing Director, Osaka Shoshen Kaisha.

1920 Attended Labor Conference at Genoa, Italy as
advisor to delegates representing employees.

1934-40 President, Osaka Shoshen Kaisha.
Honorary Consul of Argentina at Osaka.
Chairman, Board of Directors, Settsu Marine &
Fire Insurance Company, Nisshin Kisen
(Steamship) Company and South Seas Transport
Company.
Vice President, Japan-American Society and Japan-
British Society in Kansai.
Auditor of Sumitomo Chemical Industry Company.
Advisor, Osaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
Member House of Peers by Imperial nomination.

1939 Railways Minister in second Konoye Cabinet.

1940 July-Sept. Railways Minister in second Konoye Cabinet.

1940 July-
1941 Oct. Communications Minister second Konoye Cabinet.

1941 July-Oct. Railways Minister in third Konoye Cabinet.

1941 Feb. Advisor to Japanese Military Administration in
Manila.

1943 Sept. Appointed Ambassador to puppet Philippine government.

According to Japanese sources, Murata did a great deal to develop
Philippine natural resources during his year and a half of military
Administrative Advisor. (102) Described as a top flight business
executive, particularly in handling steamship line. An official report
of July 1941 stated that he was formerly considered "rather pro-American".
(88)

MURATA, Shozo

Request by TOJO, Hideki

Address: Sugamo Prison.

He will be able to testify regarding circumstances and the Conditions under which the various representatives attended the Conferences.

MURATA, Shozo

Request by Tojo, Hideki

Address: Sugamo Prison

He will be able to testify regarding circumstances preparatory to the "Greater East Asia Conference of 1943" and the conditions under which the various representatives attended the conference.

Translated by K. SOMA
J. van /

Name: MURATA, Shōzō.

Born: 6 Oct 1878

Permanent

Domicile: East No. 3, ^{AZA} HAMA, MIKAGE -

MACHI, MUKO-GUN, HYŌGO-KEN.

Date

Appointment, Dismissal,
Reward, Punishment
and ~~Fault~~. Incident.

Jul 1900 Graduated from Tokyo

Higher Commercial School

the employment of the

" " Entered ^{the employment of the} ŌSAKA SHŌSEN KABUSHIKI
KAISHA

Jan 1920 Appointed managing director
of the same company

Jan 1929 Appointed Vice-President

of the same company and has
remained in that post ^{up to} ~~until~~
this date.
~~now~~

17 Apr 19~~29~~²⁰ Appointed adviser to the
employers' representatives
at the Labour General
Meeting ^{pertaining} ~~in respect~~ to
seamen to be held at

GENOA, Italy (Cabinet)
Appointed as ~~an~~ ^{an} ~~official~~ ^{official}
Jun 1930 ~~Trustee~~ ^{member} of
the National Parks Investiga-
tion Committee

Oct. 1930 Appointed as a ~~non~~-official member of
special marine transportation investigation ⁽³⁾
committee of the Communications Ministry

Further more concerned

with the following:

Honorary Consul of the

Republic of Argentina in

OSAKA;

Director and President of

SETTSU Marine and Fire

Insurance Company;

Director of the OSAKA

Building Company;

Counsellor of ^{the} YAMASHITA

Steamship Company;

Director of North-Japan

Steamship Company;

NIKKO

Director of ~~N~~ Japan and

China/Life Insurance

Company;

Director of NISSHIN Steam-

ship Company;

Adviser to the Chamber

of Commerce and Industry

in OSAKA.

1 Oct 1931 Appointed member of the

~~Imperial~~

National Parks Committee
(~~Cabinet~~) (Cabinet)

11 Sep 1934 Appointed member of
the International Sight-
seeing Committee (Cabinet)

1 Aug 1936 Appointed member of the
Navigation Control Com-
mittee (Cabinet)

3 Oct 1936 Appointed temporary
member of the Petroleum
Industry Committee.
The committee was
(Cabinet); Abolished
by Imperial Ordinance
No. 42 of 1938

30 Jul 1936 Appointed member of the
the
Organizing Committee of Formosa
Colonization Company (Cabinet)

20 Oct 1936 Appointed member of
the International Sight-
seeing Committee
the position as

28 Nov 1936 Relieved of ~~the~~ member of
the Organizing Committee of ^{the} Formosa
Colonization Company

1 Jul 1937 Appointed councillor
of the Central Economic
Conference

The Conference was abolished
by Imperial Ordinance No. 85
of 1938.

14 Jul 1937 Appointed member of the
Customs Duty Investigation
Committee

16 Jul 1937 Appointed ~~non-official~~
~~Entrusted~~ special member
of the ^{Special Committee} ~~Temporary Investigation~~
~~to investigate~~
~~Committee~~ for Prices Counter

measure; The Committee was
←
abolished on 3 Dec 1937.

1 Oct 1937 Appointed member of the

Ships Administration Committee

19 Feb 1938 Appointed member of the
Projects Investigation Com-
mittee

30 Apr 1938 Appointed member of the
Organizing Committee of the
North-China Development
Company and the Central
China Promotion Company

27 Aug 1938 Appointed member of
the committee ^{measure} + ^{Committee}
of the Government-General

of Korea to investigate the counter measures to cope with the times.

6 Sep 1938 Appointed member of the Organizing Committee of the Japan Electric

Power Generation Company

8 Nov 1938 Relieved of ^{position as} member of

the Organizing Committee of the North-China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company

9 Nov 1938 Appointed temporary member of the Insurance

System Investigation Committee
of the Insurance Board

14 Dec 1938 Appointed member of the
International Sight-Seeing
Committee

4 Jan 1939 Became member of the
House of Peers ~~in accordance~~
~~with~~ ^{by} No. 4, Article
1 of the Ordinance of
the House of Peers

8 Mar 1939 Appointed member of
the Central Prices

Committed

4 Apr 1939 Relieved of the ^{position as} member of the
 Organizing Committee of the
 Japan Electric Power
 Generation Company

5 Apr 1939 Appointed temporary
 member of the Railway
 Fares Investigation Committee

5 Jun 1939 Appointed member of the
 Organizing Committee of the Japan
 Aviation
~~Co~~ Company

5 Jul 1939 Appointed member of the
~~Organizing Committee~~

Asia Promotion Committee

12 Jul 1939 Appointed member of the
Railway Main Line Invest-
igation Committee

2 Sep 1939 Relieved of the ^{position as} member of the

Organizing Committee of the Japan
Aviation
~~Aviation~~ Company

26 Dec 1939 Appointed member of the
Enterprises
Shik building Committee

20 Jun 1940 Appointed member of the
Central Seamen Wages
Investigation Committee

22 Jul 1940 Appointed the Communications
Minister and the Railways

Minister

position as

31 Jul 1940 Relieved of the member of the

Projects Investigation Committee

at own request;

position as

Relieved of the member of the

Asia Promotion Committee at

own request;

position as

Relieved of the member of the

Navigation Control Committee;

position as
Relieved of the member of the
Ships Administration Committee
at own request;

position as
Relieved of the member of the
Enterprises
Shipbuilding Committee at own
request;

position as
Relieved of the member of the
Central
Seamen Wages Committee at own
request

Promoted to
1 Aug 1940 ~~Conferred~~ The 3rd Court Rank,
Junior Grade

5 Aug 1940 Relieved of the ^{position as} member of the
Railway Main Line Invest-
igation Committee at own
request;

Relieved of the ^{position as} temporary
member of the Railway Fares
Investigation Committee at
own request

15 Aug 1940 Relieved of the ^{position as} member of
the International Sight-
Seeing Committee at own request

24 Aug 1940 Relieved of the ^{position as} temporary
 member of the Insurance System
 Investigation Committee of
 the Insurance Board at own
 request (Cabinet)

26 Aug 1940 Relieved of the ^{position as} member of the
 National Parks Committee at
 own request (Cabinet)

6 Sep 1940 Relieved of the ^{at own request, position as} member of the
 the Situation Counter Measure
 Investigation Committee of

the Government-General of Korea
to investigate the counter-measures to
~~Korea at own request~~ (Cabinet)
cope with the times.

21 Sep 1940 Relieved of the member of the
position as

Customs Duty Investigation

Committee at own request (Cabinet)

28 Sep 1940 Relieved of concurrent duties

(Cabinet)

18 Jul 1941 Concurrently appointed the

Railways Minister (Cabinet)

30 Sep 1941 Appointed Chairman of the

Organizing Committee of the

East Asia,
 VMarine Transportation Company

18 Oct 1941 Relieved of main and concurrent duties at own request (Cabinet)

24 Oct 1941 Appointed member of the Organizing Committee of the East Asia Marine Transportation Company (Cabinet)

4 Nov 1941 Relieved of ^{position as} the member of the Organizing Committee of the East Asia Marine Transportation Company (Cabinet)

27 Dec 1941 Appointed member of the
 Affairs
 Marine Investigation Committee
 (Cabinet).

2 Feb 1942 Specially granted the Privileges
 extended to an official of the "Shinnin"
 lieges of an Imperial appointee
 rank/official personally appointed by
 the Emperor.
 (Entrusted with the business
 (Engaged upon official work
 of the War Department);
 reported
 not registered in the Official
 Gazette.

5 Oct 1943 Appointed the Envoy Extra-
 ordinary and Ambassador

Plenipotentiary (Cabinet)

Sent to Philippine Islands on
official
business (Cabinet)

5 Oct 1943 Relieved of ~~being entrusted~~ ^{the non-official} ~~post-work~~

with ~~the business~~ of the War

Department;

not ^{reported} ~~registered~~ in the Official

Gazette (War Department)

14 Oct 1943 Ordered to reside in ^{the} Philippine

Islands (Cabinet)

29 Apr 1940 Decorated with the ~~4th~~ ~~Order~~ of

~~Merit with~~ the Order of the
4 class

Sacred Treasure in recognition
meritorious
of services in the China ~~Disturbances~~ Incident

15 Oct 1940 Decorated with the ~~3rd Order~~

~~of Merit with~~ the Order of

the Sacred Treasure, 3rd class.

9 Feb 1941 Decorated with the ~~2nd Order~~

~~of Merit with~~ the Order of

the Sacred Treasure, 2nd class.

1 Aug 1945 Relieved of ~~main~~ duties

at own request (Cabinet)

30 Aug 1945 Appointed adviser to the
 Transportation
~~Communication~~ Ministry (Cabinet)
 position as

24 Oct 1945 Relieved of the adviser to
 the Transportation
~~Communication~~ Ministry
 (Cabinet)

... Aug 1946 Designated to come under
 the Memorandum in accor-
 Article 1 of
 dance with ~~the~~ Imperial
 Ordinance No. 9 of 1946.

REPORT BY: Lt. J. Curtis

28 Feb. 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE:

Subject: MURATA, Shozo

Case file #114 on subject contained in the files of IPS.

No further information contained in the IPS files on the above.

MURATA, Shozo - Sugamo Prison

Request by TOJO, Hideki

- (a) The nationality of the witness is Japanese.
- (b) He will be able to testify regarding circumstances preparatory to the "Greater East Asia Conferences of 1943" and the conditions under which the various representatives attended the conferences.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
 September 5, 1947
 DEFENSE - Division V - Pacific
 POW - MURATA - Direct

Page

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF MURATA, SHOZO,
 by Mr. Freeman.

27761
 27764

* The witness identified exhibit No. 3102 as his affidavit, and verified it. * The affidavit stated that concerning the Bataan Death March, he did not think it clear whether "Death March" applied to Filipino or to American POWs. The witness saw U. S. POWs on the march from Corregidor toward the internment camp from the street, but there didn't seem to be any deaths in the procession. There were some deaths among the Filipinos, who marched separately.

27765

When he visited Army Headquarters on Bataan soon after the surrender, he saw POWs lying at the wayside who had fallen out of the march on the way to camp. * He asked the commander about this, and was told that there were not expected to be so many. They had thought that there would be 30 or 40 thousand surrendered, but there were 70 or 80 thousand, and there was great difficulty in transporting them. They had no truck, and it was necessary for them to walk, nor had they much in the way of rations. The POWs were suffering from malaria and other diseases, and they had a hard time escorting them.

27766

A Filipino told the witness that some POWs were deeply moved by the fact that Japanese on duty in a camp lived under the same roof and ate the same meals. During the campaign, Commander HOMMA distributed leaflets which stated that the Filipinos who swore allegiance to the Japanese would not be regarded as enemies. HOMMA entertained this idea to the last, because he released POWs in spite of * the war's continuation. This pleased the Filipinos. There were other cases of his getting employment for them and assisting them in their education, but this was hearsay.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TAVENNER.

27767

* The witness stated it was true that he was in the Philippines, first as an adviser to the Army beginning February 11, 1942. The order for his appointment came from TOJO, but since he belonged to the War Ministry, perhaps he was appointed by TOJO as Minister for War. He was also in the capacity as Ambassador Plenipotentiary to the Philippine Government, beginning October, 1943.

Page

27768 In this latter capacity he made reports to the Minister for Greater East Asia Affairs. * According to the organization at that time, diplomatic relations with the Philippines was under the Ministry for Greater East Asia Affairs. He had forgotten the technical term used. So far as diplomacy was concerned, they followed the instructions of the Foreign Office.

At the time of the surrender the witness had already resigned as Ambassador. At that time there were no means of obtaining any instructions, because there was no communication or transportation. As long as he occupied his post he was under the Ministry of East Asia Affairs.

27769 When asked if he had received appeals from the Filipinos to intervene with the Army in behalf of those who were mistreated, the witness stated * that concerning mistreatment, he had had discussions on good things as well as bad, and mediated not only between the Army and the Philippine Government, but also between the Army and the civilians. When asked the nature of the complaints he received about mistreatment of Filipinos, * the witness

27770 stated his reply would depend on the time referred to, whether at the time of HOMMA, or later when YAMASHITA was in charge of the war when conditions were completely unchanged.

At first there was considerable uneasiness among the Filipinos, but as they came to understand the real intentions of Japan suspicion melted. In the later stages of the war the Filipinos depended for ten percent of their rice on imports, but due to ship sinkings this amount was not forthcoming.

27771 * In regard to complaints made to the witness, the primary one was the decrease in food supplies, because the Army had to take them away. The Army did not take all but only that necessary for operations. Since ships were being sunk and no food came in from the outside, they had to rely on native production. Since food could not come in there was no possibility of sending it outside, and the

27772 Army absolutely did not export rice. * The witness stated that some time before that, the U. S. had already landed at various points and established submarine bases. There were no complaints with regard to mistreatment made to the witness.

Page

27773 Even before the U. S. landings, guerrilla activities had become intense, * creating confusion and unrest. The Army suppressed guerrilla activities, and in doing so may have suppressed the good native population in the same way due to language difficulties, etc. Such actions would never have been taken if it had been known they were peaceful natives.

27774 When asked the nature of the complaints, the witness stated it was customary for him to dine twice a week with the Philippine Foreign Minister, and on those occasions he heard complaints, which he transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief. There were many causes of friction because of the language difficulty, * but later they were based on so many different causes that he could not recall all of them from memory. * The most conspicuous example was after he left Manila and went to Baguio, by a case concerning Manila, was when the Japanese forces increased and it was necessary to find dwellings for them and requisition houses, such matters caused dissatisfaction. Black marketing became rampant, and dealers hoarded food products and hid them in warehouses. Japanese gendarmes requisitioned such supplies or confiscated them, and that caused dissatisfaction and complaints.

27776 The witness had hardly heard of complaints of murdering Filipinos, but had heard that guerrillas were imprisoned. * When asked whether complaints were made of innocent Filipinos being slaughtered by the Army, the witness stated that when such complaints were made it was never said that they arose out of an unlawful act. When investigation was made, it was learned that some who were innocent were so mistreated, but in other cases it was found they were punished or mistreated because of illegal acts. These things came to light after the events occurred and investigations made.

27777 When asked regarding the flogging of Filipino citizens for supposed crimes, * the witness stated when such cases were brought to him, it would be difficult to consider flogging or mistreatment as one and the same thing. Such complaints were made to the witness. When these complaints were made to him, he had his subordinates let military authorities or the Commander-in-Chief himself know orally or in writing about them, to have an investigation made and for necessary proper steps taken. After the Army received the complaints they conducted an investigation, and if the matter were found to be a fact, punishment was dealt out.

Page

Often the authorities gave the witness a report to such effect, which was transmitted to the Philippine Foreign Minister. When asked if it were not a fact that he had complained because the Army would not follow his advice, the witness stated that Headquarters always listened and took up his complaints, but there were various armies under separate commands and instructions necessarily did not filter down to the lowest level.

Regarding his conversation with the Commander-in-Chief at the time of the Bataan March, the witness stated that previously he had answered questions pertaining to matters he handled as an ambassador, but this was a matter which took place when he was an adviser. He did not want the two positions confused. This happened soon after he assumed his position as adviser.

Two or three months after he arrived Bataan fell, and he immediately went to the scene. He saw men dead or lying along the roadside. He merely saw it and asked questions, but did not complain about it. Asking questions was not complaining.

27779

* When asked why he asked questions if it were not in the nature of a complaint, the witness stated that he was a civilian not an Army man. He went to the battlefield for the first time in his life, and saw men lying or dead on the field. It was strange, and he thought it only natural to ask questions.

27780

* When asked why, after seeing the weakened condition of Allied POWs he made no remonstrance to the commander, the witness stated that Allied POWs were spoken of, but there were also many Bataan natives who mingled with them in the march. He merely asked why this was, for before he could make complaints or come to a conclusion he would have to first find out what it was all about.

27781

When asked if he had talked to the commander about transportation, the witness stated that in viewing the scene he asked him how the situation came about, and the Commander-in-Chief stated there was a lack of transportation. * Even the U. S. forces had no food, and neither did the Japanese, to sufficiently feed the unexpectedly large number who surrendered.

Page

27782 When asked if his question was prompted by the horror of the scene, the witness stated that this was not the only question he asked the commander. After a lapse of time there were many questions. He merely took this up in answer to a particular request. When the witness was asked again if his question to the commander was not prompted by the horror of the scene, he stated that the question seemed to imply that there was some killing * of people being carried out. That was not the case. He saw dead bodies along the roadside as he passed by in a car.

27783 The witness stated that, having no connection with the Army, he did not know Major General King. When asked if in his conversation with the commanding general at Bataan whether he had told him that General King had advised that he had enough U. S. motor vehicles with gasoline and drivers to transport the prisoners, * the witness stated that he was not a military man. He had nothing to do with the Army, and the conversation did not develop along those lines.

When asked whether the commander, when he told the witness that he had expected only 30 or 40 thousand instead of 70 or 80 thousand prisoners, mentioned the arrangements he had made to transport the number he had expected, the witness stated that he heard nothing else.

27784 * When asked if he had reported to the Foreign Office what he saw at Bataan, the witness stated that he had no connection with the Foreign Office and had no need to send any report. The time he was sent to the Philippines he was under the direction of TOJO. When asked if he advised TOJO, the witness stated he had no obligation or responsibility to report to the War Minister. He was an adviser to the Commander-in-Chief, and if there were any points on economic or political questions which he could suggest to him he would do so, and if the Commander-in-Chief had any consultations to make in regard to such questions he responded.

At no time did he, in writing or orally, report to the War Minister or Vice Minister, anything he saw in connection with the Bataan March, nor did he make a report to any other member of the War Ministry.

LCD/lis

4 September 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. D. N. Sutton
FROM: Mr. L. C. Dunigan
RE: MURATA, Shozo

Here is an original and two copies of a memorandum prepared on March 20, 1947 in connection with the above named individual. He has previously testified briefly at pages 18,009 to 18,017.

The memorandum attached hereto is all of the information available in the IPS files. I can see no particular application to the contents of his present Affidavit (Def. Doc 1741) but I am sending it to you for whatever it may be worth in the opinion of the cross-examiner.

I have talked to Mr. Lopez concerning MURATA's Affidavit as well as that of WACHI, Takaji (Def. Doc. 1453). Mr Lopez has informed me that he has consulted with Mr. Keenan and Mr. Tavenner and has given them what information and suggestions he has. Mr. Lopez, of course, is familiar with the subject matter of the two Affidavits.

LESTER C. DUNIGAN

Incl.

Resume by: L. C. Danigan

Date : 20 March 1947

MURATA, Shiro

July - September 1940 Minister of Railways, 2d KONOYE Cabinet.
July - October 1940 Minister of Communications, 2d KONOYE Cabinet.
July - October 1941 Minister of Railways, 3rd KONOYE Cabinet.
February 1942 Advisor to Japanese Administration in Manila.
October 1943 - August 1945 Ambassador to puppet Philippine Government.
Prominent in Rotary International.
Believed in free trade -- shipping his business.

Summary of interrogation. File #114. Serial 14 (6 March 1946)

Principle weakness of Japanese Government was that it allowed the Army and Navy to control it as a cabinet could not be formed or continued without the Army and Navy's active support. (page 2)

No responsible head of Government in Japan--Prime Minister, Secretary of War or Secretary of the Navy could upset or stymie the work of the other. (page 2)

His idea of Greater East Asia
He wanted in East Asia sort of Pan-American idea -- Japan to take leading role but by peaceful means -- idea in his opinion to bring Asiatics up to point where they would not be considered inferior by other countries. (page 2)

The IHRA was organized to weld the people together in a single unit behind the Government in time of emergency. (page 2)

Reason the 3rd KONOYE Cabinet fell -- the military represented by TOJO were not willing to allow Prince KONOYE to continue negotiations with the U. S. and TOJO told KONOYE "Put pressure on--- make a threat."

He talked with Prince KONOYE in October 1941 and KONOYE told him of the situation which had arisen between him and TOJO. MURATA suggested that KONOYE ask TOJO to resign. KONOYE said he had considered that but if he asked TOJO to resign he would not secure from the Army recommendations for another War Minister and that he (KONOYE) had therefore determined to resign -- he realized no new cabinet could be formed which did not represent the views of the military. (page 3)

MURATA, Shozo

The Ministry of Greater East Asia grew out of a conflict in the cabinet between the Army and the Navy on one hand and Foreign Minister on the other. The Foreign Minister wanted the puppet Governments under him -- the Army and Navy, under them. Ministry GEA was a compromise. Only countries where puppet Governments were established were under the Ministry -- Manchukuo, China, Thailand, Burma, and Philippines.

It was "unnatural" Murata said to set up any such ministry -- Governments in new countries resented status which placed them lower than an independent country.

Prior to organization of GEA, Japan exercised control over business and economic life of China through the KO-A-IN (Asia Development Company) (with China Affairs Board) (page 1, interrogation 13 May 1946, File #114, Serial #22)

KO-A-IN dominated and controlled by the military for the purpose of getting materials from China, primarily for use of the military. (page 2)

Objection to KO-A-IN -- (that it was run by the military for the benefit of the military) led to formation of GEA and KO-A-IN was amalgamated into it. (page 2)

President of KO-A-IN (he was not asked who president was) issued directions. Planning Board made estimates of amount of raw materials it needed from China and gave them to the cabinet. The KO-A-IN would get its directions from the Army and Navy as to amount of raw materials needed from China and would be responsible for supplying them. (page 2)

Economic exploitation of Philippines was "all done by the military." Copper ore, coconut oil, and hemp were brought to Japan from there. Directions as to materials to be brought were given by Central Government in Japan to the military authorities in the Philippines and the military was responsible for carrying out the instructions. (page 3)

T. SUZUKI, President of Planning Board, knew more about the situation in Japan than anyone else and was more responsible for aggressive action than anyone else. (page 3)

(NOTE: MURATA's whole record and his interrogation might well lead to conclusion that his assumption of wartime positions was due to his economic interest in shipping, and perhaps patriotism, and not due to any interest in military expansion per se.

MURATA, Shozo

There is nothing to indicate any connection with ultra nationalistic sources. He does appear to have been connected with any military enterprises ~~during the war.~~

✓ Not to Pacific War.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.



Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent : --- MURATA, Shōzō

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. The outline of my political career is generally as follows:

The Minister of Communications in the Second KONOYE Cabinet (1940) (For a while I was concurrently the Railway Minister but later exclusively Minister of Communications)

Concurrently Minister of Communications and Minister of Railways in the Third KONOYE Cabinet. (1941) I resigned along with the resignation of the KONOYE Cabinet on October 14, 1941.

I arrived at my post as Advisor to the Japanese Army in the Philippine Islands on February 11, 1942.

After the independence of the Philippines on October 14, 1943, I was the Japanese Ambassador Plenipotentiary

Death March # 3.

to the Philippines until August, 1944.

2. I will now make a statement on the political affairs of the Philippine Islands before and after her independence.

The Philippine Islands were under the military administration of the Japanese army when I arrived at my post there. At that time, the Army Commander was out in the field at the Corregidor and Bataan fronts and, as to political affairs, there was a military governor in Manila who was in charge of the military administration mainly bearing the responsibility of government. However, in so far as the domestic administration was concerned we entrusted it to the important persons of the Philippines who organized the Administrative Committee and were allowed to take charge of administration in accordance with the intention of the Japanese Army. The chairman of the Committee was Mr. Vargas. I recollect that the Administrative Committee was organized on January 23, 1942. The members of this Committee at first took an attitude of assisting the Japanese Army merely for the sake of maintaining peace in the Philippine Islands. But, Premier TŌJŌ's speech in the Japanese Diet on January 21, 1942, to the effect that Japan was willing to honor them with independence if the Philippines would henceforth understand the Japanese intention and act in concert with Japan, made a very favourable impression on the Filipinos and as they gradually grew to recognize the Japanese Army better, they

came to appreciate the true motives of Japan. And they (TN: the members of the Committee) gradually came to take a co-operative attitude towards the Japanese Army. Of course, since it was a period of military administration, things did not go as Filipinos desired completely. Moreover, not only were the Japanese troops fighting in Corregidor and Bataan but also former Filipino troops and troops of the U. S. army remained in various quarters. It was, accordingly, only natural that good government could not be expected, since the military administration was conducted on the field of battle. A little later, Bataan and Corregidor fell and the majority of the U. S. and Filipino troops there, both officers and men, were made prisoners of war. But some of them escaped and filtered into various quarters who, together with the various people who had heretofore been there, all changed to wage guerilla warfare. Things, therefore, came to such a pass as to compel us to make an effort in mopping up the guerillas in their various quarters. The administration in Manila on the part of the Filipinos, however, greatly improved, as Manila was the centre and was the pivot of everything. In January of the following year, the 18th year of SHŌWA (1943), Premier TOJO issued a concrete statement in the Diet to the effect that Japan would grant independence to Philippines in the near future and as a result of which the Philippines

became independent on October 14 of the same year. The Philippines also became independent, and they first began with the revision of the Constitution essential to independence. In revising the Constitution, the Army appointed as Chairman of the Constitution Revision Committee Mr. Laurel, who had the established reputation of trustworthiness as well as being conversant with the Constitution and an authority on the legal affairs of the Philippine Islands. The Revision Committee was created according to Mr. Laurel's opinion. The Constitution Revision Committee was hereupon formed with all of the members of the aforementioned Administrative Committee (Chairman Mr. Vargas) together with other civilians of excellent character. The Constitution was revised by these members and, on October 14 of the 18th year of SHŌWA (1943), the Philippines became independent and an independent government, was established. At this time, the National Assembly was called in accordance with the new Constitution. Owing to the pressing of time, however, the new Constitution provided for provisional regulations for electing the Assembly members, according to which the members assembled and, in that session, conducted the Presidential election and elected Mr. Laurel President. Then President Laurel personally selected the Cabinet members and put the administrative machinery into operation according to the constitution. Towards the revision of the

R 18013

Constitution, Japan assumed a non-interference policy. That is, the republican form of government was adopted as before as the form of government for the Philippine Islands and both the national flag and territory were left just as before. Some of the Japanese people were said to be of the opinion regarding territory, "We hope Mindanao Island will be reserved for Japan in view of future military and other purposes." Premier TŌJŌ strongly maintained, this his must absolutely not be done. We should not lay our hands on it in the slightest." As a result, the entire territory became that of the Republic of the Philippines.

*Official
Languages
of the occupier*

As for the national language of the Philippines, the TAGALOG language became the official language after the independence, whereas it was English and Spanish prior to independence. For instance, President Laurel made speeches in the TAGALOG language. And the Foreign Office which did not exist prior to independence was created thereafter, and a most influential man was appointed Foreign Minister. Moreover, American procedure was followed in the Philippine Assembly as to either the form of bills introduced by members or their method of introduction. And in these bills, it seemed to me that Japan did not interfere hardly at all. Afterwards, even when some of the bills were not particularly desirable, they did not seem to have

been interfered with so much.

Not only that, the Japanese advisors to the Philippine Government numbered three, each of whom was respectively in charge of finance, police, and scientific matters, respecting the wishes of President Laurel. In short, I think this course of action was not contrary to the central policy of Japan of having Filipino have their own way in government and having them independently administer the affairs of state from their own will. With such ideas as mentioned above, we did various things for the benefit of the Philippines towards their independence. Let me mention a few within my knowledge:

A. The birth-place of RIZAL, who had advocated the independence of Philippines since the time of Spain's reign and whose statue was situated at the place of his execution, had been forgotten by the Filipino people. A house was built at his birth-place just as it was when he was born, to encourage the spirit of independence in the Filipino people;

restored

B. Aiming at cultivating men of ability necessary for an independent state, outstanding youths were selected twice a year and were sent to Japan to study, entering the schools of their own choice;

Students to Japan

C. At the first anniversary of Philippine Independence, the Japanese Government donated 500,000 pesos as the Ambassador's gift in honor of the occasion, suggesting that

it be spent for the purpose of educating the young people of the Philippines and that everything would be left to the Philippines as to its use. (Both the President and the Minister of Education were over joyed.)

D. Agricultural improvement in the Philippine Islands was of the first consideration for an agricultural nation like the Philippines and great effort was put forth in this field ever since the time of the military administration. We had the Director of the Agricultural Affairs Bureau of the Philippine Government inspect Formosa accompanied by 5 or 6 accomplished scientists of agriculture. The Government-General of Formosa gave them free rain and allowed them to inspect wherever they wished. And we had them compare the condition of the Philippines developed under U. S. control for 40 years, with the results of Japan's efforts in the administration of Formosa for 40 years since she got possession of it. On inspecting Formosa, they were greatly surprised at and lost in admiration with the results, uttering in the end even such words, as, "I don't care even if someone thinks we received a bribe from Formosa;"

object

object

F. As Advisor to the Army, I also set up an inquiry committee on industry, economy, culture, education and the various matters for the sake of contributing to the independence of the Philippines. There were extensive findings made by the U. S. A. of course but they

Survey

were naturally made from an American point of view, and I maintained that we must draw up ones based upon an Oriental viewpoint. But Army Headquarters would not agree with me stating that it was not the proper time. So I went to Tokyo to consult with Premier TŌJŌ and he approved it. On the one hand a search was made for outstanding scholars from the general public and on the other, aid was solicited from the presidents of various universities. In the end, the scholars, RŌYAMA, TŌHATA, SUGIMURA, ŌSHIMA, SUKAWA and ITŌ, all came over to the Philippines with their able assistants and took up the survey.

Survey

As originally Philippine Islands was entirely dependent on U. S. A. as her possession; it was indeed impossible speaking only from the industrial point of view for her to be independent without relations with America. For instance, the Filipina-s are very fond of smoking cigarettes; but they produce only a lot of cigar leaves and no tobacco-leaf and import . cigarettes from America. Rice was also insufficient and about 10 percent had to be imported annually. The Philippines was in such a condition and she hardly had qualifications for an independent state, until she was able to produce ^{herself} for ^{before} anything, daily necessities as food first of all, clothing, and others necessities. Therefore, the

technical experts in various fields were sent there from
Japan by the military administration to encourage the
growing of cotton, yellow tobacco, Formosan rice, etc.,
looking beyond into the future since as early as the
time of the military administration. As for cotton,
though it had been grown to some extent since former
times, there as some dispute about whether it would
grow or not. So we engaged university professors who
were experts in cotton to have them study the matter.
As they reported that cotton-growing would be possible
in some areas, we had them carry it out. Of course it
be carried out
had to ^{with} the understanding of being prepared to take
losses for 3 or 5 years at least. We, accordingly,
tried to have influential cotton spinning companies or
colonization companies, having the capacity to bear the
burden, grow excellent cotton after designating these
areas for it. As a consequence, these various companies
paid heavily but for which they were prepared from the
outset. As for tobacco, some districts got very good
yields of the yellow leaf variety used in cigarettes.
It can be thought ^{that} up to now, although it was possible to
have been grown, they didn't allow them to and had them
depend rather upon import. The Formosan rice crop turned
out well in the first year but not so well in the second
year.

It was because Japan agreed to protect the Philippines in accordance with the treaty of alliance that an army was not organized at the time of the independence. The constabulary in charge of maintaining internal peace was already established and was reorganized by the Japanese Army. The war situation in the South-Western Pacific area was unfavorable to Japan after the independence of the Philippines. The situation was where there was no knowing when the Philippines might be attacked.

Consequently, we are not able to say that the affairs of state were conducted entirely according to the intention of the independent Philippine Government. Moreover, there was the agreement between the Philippines and Japan as mentioned above, to the effect that Japan would assume the defense of the Philippine Islands. At that time, since the Japanese Army was in the position where it had to discharge its own primary military duty on the one hand and to protect the Philippine Islands on the other, the independence of Philippines could not be considered a complete one immediately. The President was well aware of this fact. That the Army would be withdrawn when the war was over was declared by the Commander of the Army and the fact that Premier TOJO was of the same opinion was not only known very well by the President but also by myself.

G. Premier TŌJŌ's statement on the independence of the Philippines created such a sensation in the Philippine Islands that the Filipino people were greatly concerned at the time of the resignation of the TŌJŌ Cabinet. I therefore, invited the reporters of the Filipino and Japanese newspapers and told them." Even with resignation of the TŌJŌ Cabinet Japan's policy will not change. Philippine independence shall be recognized as in the past. The declaration at the Greater East Asia Conference is a permanent and immutable one," They were greatly relieved. They thought that well of TŌJŌ in connection with her independence.



Let me give an example which indicates how Premier TŌJŌ was adored by the Filipino people. It happened when he visited the Philippine Islands. Premier TŌJŌ, on alighting from the airplane, directly went to the Ministers, assembled to meet him, and shook hands with them all. As this was completely different from the attitude of the Army Commanders etc, they were very pleased. On the next day, after he spoke to a large audience numbering hundreds of thousand, he returned on foot without taking a waiting automobile to the hotel near by through a crowd of people greeting them as he went along. This was an expression of his attitude to show he was for the Filipino people, without a thought

*Tojo
after
minutes
stood back.*

*Walked
back to
hotel*

of personal danger, and they were delighted. Premier TŌJŌ's speech on this occasion gained great popularity. His speech was made at LUNETTA Park in the city of Manila. When the Mayor of Manila expressed his desire, on one occasion, to name it TŌJŌ Park in token of the Philippine people's gratitude, Mr. TŌJŌ refused, saying, "Please don't."

H. As the Commander of the Japanese Army, HOMMA, TANAKA, KURODA and finally YAMASHITA were appointed successively due to various reasons, but Chief of Staff WACHI arrived at his post one or two weeks after my arrival and was in office until YAMASHITA's arrival. He won great popularity as Chief of Staff and as military administrator of the time. He was so zealous in making the Philippines worthy of an independent state by all means that such songs as 'WACHI March' appeared among the people.

3. Now I will make a statement on the "Death March."

Death March
I don't think it is clear whether "Death March" is a term to apply to the Filipino war prisoners or to the American war prisoners. I witnessed the American war prisoners on the "March", ~~landing from Corregidor and~~ marching toward the internment camp from the street but there didn't seem to be any deaths in the procession. It was, however, true that there were some deaths among the Filipino war prisoners who marched separately.

I will now relate the state of affairs when I visited the headquarters of the Japanese Army on Bataan soon after the surrender of the U.S. army there. I witnessed then war prisoners lying on the wayside who, after surrendering at Bataan, had fallen out of the march on their way to camp. When I had a talk with the Commander of the Army, I asked him about this. He answered, saying, "Little did I expect that there were so many. Contrary to my expectations that those who offered to surrender would number 30 or 40 thousand, there were as many as 70 or 80 thousand and I had great difficulty in transporting them. First of all, we had no trucks which, accordingly, compelled us to have them walk. Neither had we so much in the way of rations. Moreover, they were suffering from malaria or other diseases, so we had a very hard time escorting them to the camp." This was the actual state of things. Although it may appear to have been done deliberately to be called the "Death March," I think its results were unavoidable.

This is something I heard from a Filipino of some war prisoners who were deeply moved by the fact that Japanese soldiers on duty in prisoner of war camp, for instance, lived under the same roof and ate the same meals with the war prisoners.

Various kinds of leaflets were said to have been distributed from airplanes during the Philippine offensive

of Commander HOMMA. Among these leaflets, was printed, "The Filipino people who will swear allegiance to us shall not be looked upon as our enemy." I think General HOMMA entertained this idea to the last, because he released war prisoners one after another in spite of the continuation of the war. This greatly pleased the Filipino people. There are other cases as having helped in getting employment for them, assisting them in their education, etc, but as they would come under hearsay I shall refrain.

On this 6th day of June, 1947

At I.M.T.F.F.

DEPONENT Murata Shozo (seal)

I, KIYOSE, Ichirō, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At same place

Witness: (signed) Ichiro Kiyose (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

- 14 - Murata Shozo (seal)

Evaluation of MURATA Shozo by Men
Who Knew Him During His Term of
Office in the Philippines

Source: Jose LAUREL, President of the Philippines, Oct. '43
to Aug. '45.

It was, however, known that high Philippine leaders brought to MURATA certain appeals such as, appeal for better treatment of the Philippine people by the Japanese military group. Thereby, MURATA was acting more or less in a capacity as a liaison between the Philippine people and the Japanese Military Authorities. To the best of his knowledge, LAUREL believes that MURATA tried his best by presenting the facts to the military leaders; however, his hands were tied and in majority of the cases, these appeals were left unheeded.

Source: OKANO Eiji, Foreign Office Employee.

There were many incidents of disorderly conduct of the Japanese soldiers, or mistreatment of the Philippine people at the hands of the occupation force. These incidents were brought before MURATA with appeal for better treatment. It was, therefore, MURATA's duty to listen to these complaints brought before him by the Philippine government officials and take the complaints to the Japanese occupation force.

Source: ROYAMA Masamichi, Professor of Economics Who Did
Research on the Philippines During
the Occupation.

Though MURATA was sent to the Philippines as a Military Advisor, his actual work was in the line of a liaison between the Philippine people and the Japanese Military Headquarters. The Philippine leaders with whom MURATA associated brought about complaints regarding the disorderly conduct of the Japanese Army toward the people and appeal to remedy the situation.

Source: TAKAGI Hiraichi, Second Secretary of Japanese Embassy
in Manila, P. I.

MURATA's chief work as Advisor was that of Political Advisor to the Japanese Army in the Philippines. MURATA often complained of the fact that although the Army consulted him on various occasions, his advices were never adopted.

When MURATA became Ambassador, he tried his utmost to check the Army's behavior. He conveyed to the Japanese Army the

complaints of the Philippine people and the Army's demands to the Philippine Government. MURATA worked for the good of the Philippine people and the whole Embassy staff worked for the same end. MURATA advised the Army against requisitioning individual houses without regard for the people's convenience. MURATA succeeded for a time, but before long the Army refused to take his advice. MURATA also tried to stop the Army from flogging Filipinos for "crimes" they were supposed to have committed.

Source: MORISHIGE Tateo, Councillor in Japanese Embassy in Manila, P. I.

MURATA was not popular with the Militarists as he always tried to curb their demands. Often MURATA would tell the Military that their demands in the line of work required of the Philippines or requisitions made of the Philippines were too severe and could not be carried out, and at the same time encouraged the Philippine government to work for true independence.

James said to world recall
his 2. (Shigenaga)

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
(March 10, 1947)
(DEFENSE - Division I, General - MURATA, Direct)

Page 2655

Page

(The witness, YAMAMOTO, Kumaichi, was absent at the opening of the session on March 10th and his further cross-examination and re-direct examination did not take place until after other evidence was introduced.)

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF MURATA, Shozo
by Mr. Roberts

18,009

The witness stated that he lived in Tokyo and was previously president of the Osaka Shosen Kaisha Shipping Company. He has been confined in Sugamo since 1945. * He was also president of the Japan Ship Owners' Association and in July 1940 he became Communications Minister and Railway Minister in the second KONOYE Cabinet. He resigned with the third KONOYE Cabinet in 1941 and in February 1942 went to the Philippines as adviser to the War Minister. He remained there and following the granting of independence he was appointed Ambassador and remained there from October 1943 * to July 1944. ✓

18,010

18,011

Since from the first he had no military knowledge or experience, his chief function as adviser was connected first with economics, and then politics. There was no special appointment of him as economic adviser. He was asked by TOJO to go and stay there and after he went there his conduct and action would depend on his personal judgment. ✓

18,012

He was in the Philippines when he heard for the first time by telegraph that a conference of the Greater East Asia nations was to be convened. He discussed the matter with Mr. Laurel, having shown him the telegram, and requested his views. Laurel expressed enthusiastic approval and rejoiced. He stated this had been in his mind for some time and was consistent with his ideas and thoughts, and although he had been president for only one month, he would overcome any obstacle so as to be able personally to attend this assembly. * He expressed nothing in writing at the time of the meeting, but the witness had known Laurel for two years previous, and he knew from his words, books, and addresses that Laurel had entertained these ideas for some time past.

18,013

By provision of the constitution of the Philippines the National Assembly was created and called, and in accordance with other provisions in the constitution Laurel was

Page

18,014 elected president by that National Assembly. After Laurel returned from the conference, he immediately brought up the subject with the witness and stated he was extremely satisfied. * He said he was treated as a head of a state and Philippine independence was fully recognized and that he was overjoyed that autonomy and independence is stipulated in one of the articles of the declaration. He was not only impressed by the speeches made by the other representatives, but was extremely elated over the opportunity to have friendly relations with them, whom he regarded as fine men and leaders.

18,015 The delegates from Manchukuo * and China did not come to Manila, but all others except Prince Wanwai Thayakon of Thailand visited Manila and were welcomed by Laurel. Laurel was a great patriot and man of strong will. He revered the

18,017 Philippine hero Rizal and was seriously concerned with the development of the Philippines. * Before Laurel became president of the Philippines he was Interior Commissioner of the Executive Commission of the Philippines under Vargas. Under the Commonwealth Government of Quezon, Laurel was a justice of the Supreme Court. He was a member of the Nacionalista Party.

CROSS-EXAMINATION by Mr. Comyns Carr

The witness stated that he remembered being asked questions by Mr. Sutton.

Exhibits 2351, 2352, and 2353, speeches of three of the representatives of the Greater East Asia Conference, were offered and received in evidence.

~~CONTINUED CROSS-EXAMINATION OF YAMAMOTO
by Mr. Comyns Carr~~

18,032 When the witness was asked whether the policy set
18,034 forth in Prosecution Exhibit 628 was the real policy of the
18,035 government on September 28, 1940, the witness stated * that
by glancing at the document it was not clear whether it was
simply an outline * of Japanese foreign policy proposed by
the Foreign Office and adopted as a plan, or a draft formulated by a secretary. He could not testify that this was the foreign policy simply on the basis of the document. This document was prepared in his department of the Foreign Office.

DATE 2 April 1947

PROGRESS REPORT OF: Murata, Shozo

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>Partially Completed</u>	<u>Fully Completed</u>
1. Information in the hands of the Investigation Division.	—	<u>X</u>
2. Statement in application for subpoena as to subject of witness's testimony.	—	<u>X</u>
3. Examination of case file, if any.	—	<u>X</u>
4. Cross-reference file on case files in office of Investigation Division.	—	<u>X</u>
5. Cross-reference card file by subject matter of evidentiary documents in Document Division.	—	<u>X</u>
6. Reference in evidence to witness or to the subject matter of his testimony.	—	<u>X</u>
7. Preparation of summary of testimony already given by witness.	—	<u>X</u>
8. Memorandum prepared by Mr. Lopez, dated March 11, 1947, relating to decorations awarded to defendants and their witnesses.	—	<u>X</u>
9. Statement of any other investigation conducted by you.	—	<u>X</u>

Lester C. Durnigan

MURATA, Shozo

Testified: 10 Mar 1947, R. 18009

File : 114
RE : MURATA, Shozo
Date : 6 March 1946

To : Mr. Joseph B. Keenan, Chief of Counsel.
From : David Nelson Sutton, Associate Counsel.

SUMMARY OF INTERROGATION OF Mr. SHOZO MURATA AND RECOMMENDATION AS TO HIM.

1. I have completed the interrogation of Shozo MURATA in Sugamo Prison. He understands English and speaks the language fairly well. The interrogation was conducted without the aid of an interpreter and was not transcribed.

2. MURATA is primarily a business man. He began as a clerk with Osaka Shosen Kaisha (Osaka Mercantile Steamship Company) and rose through successive steps to become consecutively General Manager, Vice President, and President of this Company, the second largest shipping company in Japan and according to him the tenth largest in the world. He spent several years in the United States between 1911 - 1914 as representative of this Company. The Company operates all over the world. The capital of the Company was 10,000,000 Yen; its shipping capacity in 1934 was 500,000 tons and in 1940 something over 600,000 tons. He belongs to the free traders group and is strongly opposed to tariffs. Representing big business viewpoints, he is opposed to the interference by government with the conduct of business. In his view, the wars in Manchuria, China, and with the United States grew out of the following factors: Japan was a small country with a population of over 70,000,000 which could not be supported in this country. The efforts to send the surplus population abroad were defeated by the refusal of Australia, the United States, and other countries to allow immigration or restrictions placed thereon. Japan then tried to provide employment for its population by developing industry and manufacturing establishments and sought to ship abroad its manufactured goods. Tariff walls erected by England, the United States, the Netherlands, and even China precluded the shipping of these goods and left as the only places where the surplus population might go - Korea, Manchuria and Siberia. MURATA and the business people of Osaka, whose viewpoint he represented, felt that the situation could be worked out in time, perhaps ten, perhaps twenty years but the people in Tokyo became impatient; hence the military campaign.

MURATA, Shozo

6 March 1946

(con't)

3. While not approving of the action of the military in Manchuria, MURATA is in favor of a separate state and as a buffer between China and Russia. He states that trade between Manchukuo and the United States greatly increased during the ten-year period of Japanese domination.

4. The principal weakness in the Japanese form of government is the inability of a Minister to form a Cabinet or to continue a Cabinet without the active support of the Army and the Navy. Since the recommendations of these respective bodies are a prerequisite to securing an Army or Navy Minister, the result is that the Army and Navy actually control the Japanese Government.

5. The New Order in Asia was designed for the purpose of bringing the Asiatics up to a point where they would not be looked upon as inferior by the United States, Great Britain, and other nations of the world. In this Japan was to take a leading role and in his view, play the same part that the United States has in Pan-America. He felt that this could be brought about by peaceful means and has at no time favored war anywhere. War interrupts shipping and interferes with free trade, which are the two primary interests of MURATA.

6. Matsuoka knows the whole story. Matsuoka told him when he (Matsuoka) returned from Europe after the signing of the Tri-Partite Alliance, that he expected to go to the United States and talk personally with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull. Matsuoka stated upon his return that he had talked with Stalin and everything was satisfactory. He returned as a victorious General and boasted publicly of the Alliance with Germany and the understanding with Russia. Matsuoka never anticipated war between Germany and Russia and when Prince Konoye's Cabinet resigned because of this the Emperor asked Prince Konoye to form another Cabinet stating that "the Minister of Foreign Affairs and not you (Prince Konoye) is responsible for what happened." The reason Chiang Kai-Shek could not do business with Japan was because there was no responsible head of the Government. Neither the Emperor nor the Prime Minister nor the Minister of War nor the Minister of the Navy was the actual head of the Government and one could upset or stymie the agreement or work of another.

7. The Imperial Rule Assistance Association was organized to weld the people into a single unit behind the Government in a critical time when war was imminent.

MURATA, Shozo

6 March 1946

(con't)

8. Prince Konoye's Third Cabinet resigned because the Military, represented by Tojo, were not willing to allow Prince Konoye to continue negotiations with the United States and Tojo told Prince Konoye "put pressure on, make a threat". Prince Konoye in October, 1941, talked privately with MURATA who held the post of Minister of Railways and Minister of Communications in Prince Konoye's Third Cabinet and told him the situation which had arisen between Prince Konoye and Tojo and asked his advice. He suggested to Prince Konoye that the Prime Minister request the resignation of Tojo. The Prime Minister replied that he had considered that action and concluded that if he asked Tojo to resign as Minister of War he could not secure from the Army a recommendation of another Minister; hence his Cabinet would fall. He had, therefore, determined to resign. He realized that no new Cabinet could be formed which would not represent the standpoint of the military.

9. The Ministry of Greater East Asia was established as a result of the conflict in the Cabinet between the Army and Navy on one side and the Foreign Minister on the other. It was the wish of the Army and Navy to have the occupied countries in which puppet governments had been set up continued under the control of the Army and Navy. The Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister wished to have them under the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The establishment of the Ministry of Greater East Asia represented a compromise between these conflicting views. Only those countries in which puppet governments had been established were placed under this Ministry -- Manchukuo, China, Thailand, Burma and later the Philippines. The Governments set up in those countries resented this status which placed them lower than an independent government. Aoki was not in an enviable position. Aoki did not have much influence. It was "unnatural" to set up any such Ministry.

10. Mr. T. Suzuki, the President of the Planning Board, knows more about the situation in Japan and is more responsible for its aggressive action than any other person. When asked to become civilian adviser to the military authorities in the Philippines, MURATA declined as he felt quite unqualified for any such post. When the Prime Minister urged that it was his particular duty to do his bit, he accepted. He had no particular duties assigned to him and spent his time in visiting the schools, churches, institutions, business establishments and rural areas trying to find out what was needed for the development of that country. He recommended the establishment of the Research Commission of five outstanding professors in diverse fields. He selected for this Commission the best trained men in their respective fields to study the

MURATA, Shozo

6 March 1946

(Con't)

situation just prior to the re-occupation of the Phillipines. He at no time favored the use of armed force. When he learned the result of the naval engagement at Midway, his knowledge of shipping led him to the conclusion that Japan could not win the war.

RECOMMENDATION:

I find nothing from the examination of this man or from my study and investigation of his activities, which leads to the conclusion that he should be included as a war criminal and I respectfully recommend that he not be included in the list and that he be released from confinement.

DAVID NELSON SUTTON
Associate Counsel

File : 114
RE : MURATA, Shozo
Date : 6 March 1946

To : Mr. Joseph B. Keenan, Chief of Counsel.
From : David Nelson Sutton, Associate Counsel.)

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MURATA, Shozo

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DAVID NELSON SUTTON
Associate Counsel

9 June 1947

Japanese Ambassador to puppet Philippines government
Cabinet Minister.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dunigan; Mr. Sutton

FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief,
Investigative Division, IPS

SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on
the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEWEY DANI - TOJO

The attached information has been taken from the compiled report prepared by
MIS. The report was previously classified secret however this classification
has been cancelled and at the present time does not carry any classification.
It will be noted that much of this information has been furnished in
curriculum vitae obtained from the Cabinet Secretariat's office.

1939	Member House of Peers by Imperial nomination.
1940 July-Aug.	Railways Minister in second Kato Cabinet.
1940 July-	
1941 Oct.	Communications Minister second Kato Cabinet.
1941 July-Oct.	Railways Minister in third Kato Cabinet.
1941 Feb.	Advisor to Japanese Military Administration in Manila.
1942 Sept.	Appointed Ambassador to puppet Philippine government.

WITNESS

MURATA, Shozo

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

Info from MID report

According to Japanese sources, Murata did a great deal to develop
Philippine natural resources during his year and a half of military
Administration officer. (108) Described as a top flight business
executive, particularly in handling steamship line. An official report
of July 1941 stated that he was formerly considered "rather pro-American".
(88)

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling
and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

E P M

EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

Incl
(Described above)

Shozo MURATA: Japanese Ambassador to puppet Philippine government;
former Cabinet Minister.

1878 Oct.	Born Tokyo. Son of Shozo Murata Senior. Married Tatsu, daughter of Ai Iida.
1900	Graduated Tokyo Higher Commercial School; entered Osaka Shoshen Kaisha (Osaka Mail Steamship Company).
1920	Managing Director, Osaka Shoshen Kaisha.
1920	Attended Labor Conference at Genoa, Italy as advisor to delegates representing employees.
1934-40	President, Osaka Shosen Kaisha. Honorary Consul of Argentina at Osaka. Chairman, Board of Directors, Settsu Marine & Fire Insurance Company, Nisshin Kisen (Steamship) Company and South Seas Transport Company. Vice President, Japan-American Society and Japan- British Society in Kansai. Auditor of Sumitomo Chemical Industry Company. Advisor, Osaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Member House of Peers by Imperial nomination.
1939	Railways Minister in second Konoye Cabinet.
1940 July-Sept.	
1940 July- 1941 Oct.	Communications Minister second Konoye Cabinet.
1941 July-Oct.	Railways Minister in third Konoye Cabinet.
1941 Feb.	Advisor to Japanese Military Administration in Manila.
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Administration Advisor. (102) Described as a top flight business
executive, particularly in handling steamship line. An official report
of July 1941 stated that he was formerly considered "rather pro-American".
(88)

Resume by: L. C. Dunigan

Date : 20 March 1947

MURATA, Shozo

July - September 1940 Minister of Railways, 2d KONOYE Cabinet.
July - October 1940 Minister of Communications, 2d KONOYE Cabinet.
July - October 1941 Minister of Railways, 3rd KONOYE Cabinet.
February 1942 Advisor to Japanese Administration in Manila.
October 1943 - August 1945 Ambassador to puppet Philippine Government.

Prominent in Rotary International.

Believed in free trade -- shipping his business.

Summary of interrogation. File #114. Serial 14 (6 March 1946)

Principle weakness of Japanese Government was that it allowed the Army and Navy to control it as a cabinet could not be formed or continued without the Army and Navy's active support. (page 2)

~~He~~ ^{Hissida} ~~responsible head~~ of Government in Japan--Prime Minister, Secretary of War or Secretary of the Navy could upset or stymie the work of the other. (page 2)

He wanted in East Asia sort of Pan-American idea -- Japan to take leading role but by peaceful means -- idea in his opinion to bring Asiatics up to point where they would not be considered inferior by other countries. (page 2)

The IRRA was organized to weld the people together in a single unit behind the Government in time of emergency. (page 2)

Reason the 3rd KONOYE Cabinet fell -- the military represented by TOJO were not willing to allow Prince KONOYE to continue negotiations with the U. S. and TOJO told KONOYE "Put pressure on --- make a threat."

He talked with Prince KONOYE in October 1941 and KONOYE told him of the situation which had arisen between him and TOJO. MURATA suggested that KONOYE ask TOJO to resign. KONOYE said he had considered that but if he asked TOJO to resign he would not secure from the Army recommendations for another War Minister and that he (KONOYE) had therefore determined to resign -- he realized no new cabinet could be formed which did not represent the views of the military. (page 3)

MURATA, Shozo

The Ministry of Greater East Asia grew out of a conflict in the cabinet between the Army and the Navy on one hand and Foreign Minister on the other. The Foreign Minister wanted the puppet Governments under him -- the Army and Navy, under them. Ministry GEA was a compromise. Only countries where puppet Governments were established were under the Ministry -- Manchukuo, China, Thailand, Burma, and Philippines.

It was "unnatural" Murata said to set up any such ministry -- Governments in new countries resented status which placed them lower than an independent country.

Prior to organization of GEA, Japan exercised control over business and economic life of China through the KO-A-IN (Asia Development Company) (with China Affairs Board) (page 1, interrogation 13 May 1946, File #114, Serial #22)

KO-A-IN dominated and controlled by the military for the purpose of getting materials from China, primarily for use of the military. (page 2)

Objection to KO-A-IN -- (that it was run by the military for the benefit of the military) led to formation of GEA and KO-A-IN was amalgamated into it. (page 2)

President of KO-A-IN (he was not asked who president was) issued directions. Planning Board made estimates of amount of raw materials it needed from China and gave them to the cabinet. The KO-A-IN would get its directions from the Army and Navy as to amount of raw materials needed from China and would be responsible for supplying them. (page 2)

Economic exploitation of Philippines was "all done by the military." Copper ore, coconut oil, and hemp were brought to Japan from there. Directions as to materials to be brought were given by Central Government in Japan to the military authorities in the Philippines and the military was responsible for carrying out the instructions. (page 3)

T. SUZUKI, President of Planning Board, knew more about the situation in Japan than anyone else and was more responsible for aggressive action than anyone else. (page 3)

(NOTE: MURATA's whole record and his interrogation might well lead to conclusion that his assumption of wartime positions was due to his economic interest in shipping, and perhaps patriotism, and not due to any interest in military expansion per se.

NURATA, Shozo

There is nothing to indicate any connection with ultra nationalistic sources. He does not appear to have been connected with any military enterprises ~~during the war.~~

prior to Pacific War