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DEPARTMENTAL RECORDS BRANCH, T.A.G.O.

INTERROGATION OF

(Marquis) KIDO, Koichi

(Continued)

DATE AND TIME: 23 February 1946, 0930 - 1545

PLACE : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

PRESENT : (Marquis) KIDO, Koichi
Mr. Henry R. Sackett, Interrogator
Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa, Interpreter
(Miss) S. M. Betar, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Sackett

Q I would like to talk to you some today about your 1941 diary. The reason I am jumping to 1941 is because I do not have the translation of some parts of the diary in between. I thought we would go to 1941 and then talk about that in between later on. Of course, you appreciate the fact that I am here investigating this situation from the point of view of prosecution of war crimes and the 1941 period undoubtedly is one of the most important periods involved. In all fairness to you, I will say from what I have uncovered and from what I have learned in talking with you, I learned you were pretty much in that group which was opposed to the aggression that took place but I would like to go through this chronologically and get the picture. If at any time you have any statements or information which you want to volunteer, I would like to have them so that we can understand the picture.

I wonder if you would tell me, since we are jumping several years here in our discussion, what the general political situation was on or about January 1, 1941. I am arbitrarily

Evid Doc. 4138
#375

- Q (Cont) starting at 1941 for no particular reason other than a mechanical one. We have been talking about the war situation and the political situation. Now, we are jumping several years and in order to have a meeting of the minds, I would like to know what the political situation was in January 1941.
- A The situation at that time was such that the problems of the South was becoming more and more acute and especially in February, the Army and Navy situation in regard to the South Division became very tense. This tense situation was ameliorated somewhat diplomatically but later on, the international situation was such that the pressure of Britain and America was becoming more and more felt by Japan and the entire Japanese thought that Britain and America were exerting great pressure upon Japan.
- Q Tell me this. In the internal affairs of Japan by 1941, was the Army pretty much in control of the Government's functions - that was in the Second KONOYE Cabinet?
- A In contrast to the situation hitherto, its voice was becoming more and more greatly felt and its power has increased tremendously. The feeling within the Army was very tense and especially after the embargo on oil, the situation became very aggravated and Navy was stimulated greatly by the enlargement of the United States Navy.
- Q Well, would you say that the Rightist elements in the final analysis were really controlling the Government of Japan as of January 1941?
- A At that time, the Rightists were not very active and the Rightists did not voice strong opinions against America.
- Q The greatest influence that was being exercised over the Government was Army influence rather than what we might call the Rightists' influence?
- A Yes.
- Q Of course, the Army and the Rightists, in their thinking, had many things in common, did they not?

- A Later on, talks between the central directing body of the Army and Navy progressed smoothly and agreement more or less has been reached.
- Q In other words, there was more cooperation between the Army and the Navy by 1941 than there was in the early days we were talking about? They had come closer together?
- A But the directing body of the Navy was very calm about the situation and they tried to quiet down the situation.
- Q What did you say had caused the Army and Navy to come closer together? Was it the leadership of those organizations or was it more the common cause that Japan had in China and elsewhere in its foreign policy?
- A I don't think it can be attributed to the common cause; rather the persons that had the authority, more or less the core of the Navy and the Army got together, especially the Naval General Staff and Naval Staff Headquarters.
- Q In January 1941, who were the real leaders of the Army group that were exerting such great influence in Japanese affairs?
- A In the Army, the Bureau of Military Affairs, especially the Chief of the Bureau of Military Affairs, KENRYO SATO was more or less the central figure.
- Q He was a general, was he?
- A Yes, a general and in the Staff Headquarters, the field-grade officers were all quite active.
- Q Who was the Chief of the Army General Staff in those days. Was that SUGIYAMA?
- A SUGIYAMA.
- Q Was he quite a leader of the Army movement then?
- A He was not a leader but more or less a person looked up to and respected, ~~man.~~
- Q Who was the Vice Chief of Staff in those days, do you recall?
- A I do not remember clearly who it was. I cannot recall at present.

- Q Who was the most forceful leader in staff headquarters of the Army in those days?
- A Because Headquarters was not involved at that time, I do not remember the names.
- Q When you say "not involved", what do you mean?
- A Because they were not related to my work or was not close to us.
- Q Do you mean that you had no contacts with Staff Headquarters at that time?
- A No.
- Q How about General SUZUKI. Was he on the Planning Board at that time?
- A Yes, he was on the Planning Board.
- Q Was he quite a leader of the Army group in his position on the Planning Board?
- A SUZUKI at that time was already retired and in Japan a person retired does not have any right to voice his opinion and he doesn't have much power in that respect.
- Q He had considerable power in the year 1941 by virtue of his being President of the Planning Board, did he not?
- A Yes, but he was then in a civilian status because of his retired position.
- Q How about the War Minister, TOJO? What was his relative position in January 1941 insofar as influence was concerned - retired?
- A TOJO had a great power in voicing his opinion and he had worked earnestly toward the settlement of China affairs. TOJO, upon assuming the post of War Minister, disciplined the Army very strictly and for that reason he was highly respected.
- Q Well, at the start of 1941, you say that the Army and the Navy pretty much dominated the scene in Japan and exerted great leadership insofar as Government policies were concerned. That is correct, isn't it?

- A Because war was being raised against China, the influence of the Army was great and the Cabinet had to take in its opinion.
- Q Certain individuals in all countries at particular periods dominate the scene and have the authority and make the important decisions that are involved. General SATO was very much a leader in those days and we would have to say that the War Minister likewise was a man of great influence in those days. Who else really were the outstanding leaders of the Japanese Government and its policies at the first of 1941 - Army or otherwise? I assume we would have to add KONOYE because he was Premier. Who else, besides those we have mentioned were really determining the policy of Japan?
- A Formerly, the Cabinet had great power and the influence of KONOYE was very strong, too, but the military was more or less dragging them into its opinion and its tendency was sweeping the scene.
- Q Among the military, leaders in that direction were TOJO and SATO. Who else? Who, in the Navy, for example was such a leader that he had great influence?
- A The officers active in the fleet had a very strong opinion regarding the situation and those in administrative positions did not.
- Q Who was their leader? Through whom were their feelings voiced and given expression in the Government?
- A The Staff of the Fleet voiced their opinion through the Naval General Staff.
- Q How about Fleet Admiral FUSHIMI? Was he an outstanding leader in those days?
- A No, Prince FUSHIMI was not a leader.
- Q Then, who in the Navy was if he wasn't? They must have had some leaders that dominated the scene insofar as the Navy was concerned?
- A In the Navy, Captain ISHIKAWA was a radicalist. I do not know of any other persons.
- Q That is a different man from the Kwantung Army ISHIKAWA?
- A That was ISHIWARA.

- Q How about the Foreign Minister, MATSUOKA? He certainly played an important role, did he not?
- A MATSUOKA's opinion was vacillating and he was always being cautioned.
- Q But he played an important role in determining the foreign policy of Japan in those days, did he not?
- A Yes, because he was a foreign minister, so he more or less determined the foreign policy of Japan.
- Q There were certain leaders that dominated the determination of the foreign policy of Japan in those days, were there not?
- A Yes.
- Q Among whom were MATSUOKA, TOJO and SATO? We would say those three were very prominent, would we not, in determining Japan's foreign policy. Are there others of an equal plane with them in formulating Japan's foreign Policy at that time. I assume we would have to add KONOYE.
- A Of course, KONOYE has to be included because of his position as Prime Minister but I do not believe there are others of the same level.
- Q You think those four were the real leaders of Japan at that particular period?
- A KONOYE utilized MATSUOKA but he was greatly troubled by the actions of the latter. Therefore, later on, MATSUOKA became the cause of the collapse of the KONOYE Cabinet and KONOYE did not agree to the foreign policy of MATSUOKA. KONOYE finally was more or less dragged along by MATSUOKA.
- Q But prior to his resignation from the Cabinet, MATSUOKA exerted a great deal of influence on the foreign policy of Japan, did he not?
- A Yes.
- Q What was the war situation of China, generally, as of 1941?
- A The situation of China was more or less similar to being in a quagmire and its settlement was considered very difficult. The military was trying to negotiate with CHIANG KAI SHEK behind the scenes but its negotiations collapsed.

- Q Was the situation more or less one where Japan had undertaken a campaign which had developed into something bigger and more extensive than she could well afford to carry through to a conclusion?
- A Therefore, the military wanted to settle the China incident as early as possible and when in April KONOYE started negotiating with America, the Army was greatly concerned and the military was greatly interested because it involved many of the basic problems, including the settlement of China.
- Q You mean they were interested in the success of the negotiations of the settlement of/China affair?
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- A Yes.
- Q In other words, the Army was tired of war and wanted to bring it to an end, and generally speaking, it was bogged down and it wasn't getting anywhere. Is that true?
- A And the feeling was strong within the Army that they wanted to settle the incident without losing face.
- Q In other words, the Army wanted to stop but they did not want to withdraw any troops; they wanted to retain what they had acquired but they wanted to conclude the affair? Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q Was that the attitude of TOJO pretty much?
- A When KONOYE planned to meet President Roosevelt, the military was the first to try to be on the committee going with KONOYE.
- Q Can we say that in those days, TOJO and his philosophy represented pretty much the opinion and position of the Army?
- A Yes, because TOJO, as War Minister, more or less controlled the opinion of the military. He naturally was very strong and powerful.
- Q Were there still strong factions in the Army that were advocating the spending of more money and sending of more troops into China and further expansion into China in order to conclude the China incident?

- A Such a sentiment was strong and there were many in the military that felt that due to the lack of arms and military strength, the forceful conquest of China was impossible.
- Q But the general attitude was that Japan had either acquired all she needed in China or she couldn't go any further financially or in manpower. Japan's policy was to try to call things to a halt, as they were, without the necessity of a withdrawal, and she endeavored to negotiate a peace, leaving things in status quo. Was that more or less her foreign policy at that time?
- A At that time, the military was willing to quit if the incident was to be terminated according to the fundamental treaty signed between the nineteen governments of China through Ambassador ABE.
- Q Is it true that the military people, led by TOJO, would have preferred fighting further in China and completely defeating China if Japan were financially able to do so and had sufficient manpower to do so, but because of the fact it appeared that she couldn't afford to do so, she was willing to call things to a halt and call a peace?
- A Yes, I think the Army would have gone ahead if it had the strength to do so but because the years dragged on, it was willing to stop.
- Q It was more a matter of necessity rather than a change in the fundamental policy on the part of the military to completely defeat and subjugate China?
- A Yes, you can't say any other words as to that.
- Q Can't we say that TOJO, himself, would have preferred to carry the war to a successful conclusion and really defeat China but for practical reasons, he had to compromise and attempt to negotiate a peace?
- A Yes.
- Q (Jan. 20) What was the dispute about between Thailand or Siam and French Indo-China at that time? In those days, there was some conflict between Thailand and French Indo-China. What was the nature of that conflict, as you recall? What was it about?
- A At that time, there was a border dispute between Thailand and French Indo-China and Japan was to act as a go-between to settle the dispute.

- Q And why was Japan interested in acting as a mediator of that dispute? Did she have a desire to obtain any special privileges or concessions in that territory?
- A I do not know for what reason Japan wanted to act as a mediator there. She did not have any territorial or concessionary desires. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA was very eager to settle the dispute and I believe the reason was to show Japan's leading position in East Asia.
- Q Is General SATO still living?
- A I believe so, but he probably is in China.
- Q He was Chief of the Bureau of Military Affairs in those days in the War Ministry?
- A I believe so, or he may have been General MUTO. If it was General MUTO, SATO was under him as a section chief.
- Q But SATO really was the leader of the military group in the War Ministry along with TOJO?
- A General MUTO had the same mind.
- Q Then, to our group of leaders we mentioned, we could add General MUTO?
- A Yes.
- Q Both MUTO and SA TO were in the Bureau of Military Affairs?
- A Yes.
- Q What was MATSUOKA's attitude and philosophy with reference to the China war. Did he desire to bring it to a close or did he favor the continuation of the war to a successful conclusion?
- A MATSUOKA was greatly interested in concluding the China incident as speedily as possible. He even said that the action on the part of the Rightists and military group negotiating behind the scenes with CHIANG KAI SHEK would make them lose their face in Japan because of the great number of persons acting. So, he thought it would be best if he, himself, would go directly and negotiate and manipulate.

- Q Japan, at that time, had set up and recognized an independent Government in China at Nanking?
- A Yes.
- Q But in spite of that fact, there was the feeling of the leaders in Japan that peace should be negotiated with the central government of Chungking.
- A The Nanking Government was not powerful. It was practically powerless and the military recognized the fact that the central Government had to be dealt with and negotiated with. The only factor that was bothering the military was the problem of not losing its face.
- Q The problem of having to withdraw from territory that it had acquired? Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q Japan had brought about the creation of the Nanking Government in an effort to recognize that Government and making a peace that would be favorable to Japan but that move failed. Isn't that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q She finally realized that if she were going to save face and hold on to what she had acquired, she would have to do so by dealing with the central government of Chiang Kai Shek. Therefore when the talk with AMERICA began, the military wanted to do something about having peace negotiations with China.
- Q I realize that heretofore when I have been talking to you about your diary that the periods of time were quite removed and it was difficult for you to remember and also you were not nearly so active in the Government as you were in 1941. But, I believe as of this time, you will be in a much better position to recall and know what was going on. Let us look at your diary as of January 20. You mention an audience with the Emperor when you discussed the policy of the war minister TOJO with reference to China, as disclosed to you by the Emperor. Can we say that as of that time, TOJO, himself, had concluded that less emphasis should be put on the Chinese war and a definite effort should be made to bring it to a conclusion.

- A Because of the financial difficulties, the military was even considering the decrease in its armed forces because it did not have any faith in bringing the incident to a victorious conclusion.
- Q TOJO, himself, was reconciled to the fact that Japan, financially couldn't afford to fight in China?
- A I believe so. I haven't heard him say directly to that respect.
- Q At least, he adopted a program of withdrawing troops from China according to his report to the Emperor. Is that right?
- A But this was petitioned by the Chief of Staff, SUGIYAMA, through the War Minister. This was spoken to the War Minister by the Emperor. Such a story as that was petitioned by the Chief of Staff SUGIYAMA.
- Q The Chief of Staff and War Minister TOJO, both agreed that troops would have to be withdrawn from China for financial reasons. The Emperor felt likewise about it, didn't he?
- A Yes.
- Q (Jan. 25) Who was Mr. Yukio OZAKI.
- A He is a member of the Diet, a member of the political parties and ever since the establishment of the Imperial Diet, he was a member of it. He is 80 years old and is a well-known figure in Japan. He also is a great liberalist and at this time, relations with America was very tense and he said that Japan should never go to war with America.
- Q Why were the relations so tense in those days? What was causing the tenseness in your opinion.
- A There wasn't any deep-rooted reason but I believe it had to do with Japan's relation with the southern region, especially the relation with the Netherlands.
- Q What was the relation as of that time?
- A I believe that it dealt with the problem of the Netherlands in supplying oil to Japan.
- Q And it was felt in Japan that the United States was involved in the oil supplies being cut off by the Netherlands?

- A There was sentiment that America was responsible for the embargo of oil by the Netherlands because of American capital in the Netherlands and previously America executed an oil embargo upon Japan.
- Q Japan and its leaders realized that the United States in those days was very much opposed to the campaign in China on the part of Japan and that fact was resented very vigorously by TOJO and the military group, was it not? TOJO and his followers felt that the United States was without right in interfering in Asiatic affairs.
- A Yes, such a sentiment was strong in the Army. At the beginning Japan didn't want other powers to meddle in its affairs with China but later on, the sentiment became strong that they wanted to negotiate peace with China through other nations acting as mediators.
- Q The military group felt that the fact that the United States wasn't inclined to keep out of Asiatic Affairs and permit Japan to settle its own dispute with China was interfering with Japan's rights, did it not?
- A Japan was aware of the fact that America was displeased with Japan's position in China but Japan was willing to negotiate peace or settle the incident if she could retain her face.
- Q In retaining face, involved retaining all the territory that had been acquired by Japan up to that time, did it not?
- A The territorial matter as specified in the fundamental treaty specified no territorial desires on the part of Japan.
- Q What did Japan desire to retain as a result of the incident if it wasn't territory?
- A That fundamental treaty only specified the establishment of friendly relations with China and that China and Japan were in harmony in Asia. As given by the KONOYE Cabinet at the start of the China incident, Japan proclaimed three basic principles in regard to China. The first principle is to establish friendly relations with neighboring countries; (2) economic cooperation with China; and (3) anti-communistic agreement.
- Q But the military people went a lot further than that in their policy and desired to maintain troops in China and desired to exercise control of Chinese affairs by maintaining garrisons, didn't they?

- A From a standpoint of defending itself against communism Japan had troops stationed at certain specified places and later on, Japan did not press its demands very strongly in that regard. I believe that Japan wanted to conclude the pact with China and on that it would withdraw troops completely from China.
- Q Japan never did offer in its negotiations with the United States to withdraw troops entirely from China, did she?
- A Japan was unable to carry out the November 26 ultimatum for her to withdraw its troops completely from China. If a better and more practical method was given, Japan probably would have carried it out.
- Q What, for example, would have been a better solution than withdrawing its troops from China?
- A I believe the better solution was to negotiate with China and to make a certain schedule about withdrawing troops from China.
- Q But Japan never was willing to give up her dominance of the Government and economics of at least that portion of China that she had moved into by virtue of the China War, did she?
- A In the early phase of the China incident, Japan held that sort of an opinion but at this time, she did not have any such opinion. Possibly certain elements in the Army^{which} was completely ignorant of the situation may have believed such an opinion.
- Q Did Japan offer to withdraw troops in an orderly fashion and also her control over that part of China she had moved into in the China Affair?
- A I believe that matter was taken up in negotiations with America.
- Q Do you think such an offer was made to completely withdraw from China both in a military sense and also to give up the dominant position it had acquired by virtue of the invasion?
- A If China started new without having any anti-Japanese or sentiment of abusing the Japanese, such as it had before the start of the China incident, Japan was willing to take her hands completely off of China. This was always being felt by those men that was active in China and had expressed directly the condition and situation in China.

- Q Who was Mr. HASHIMOTO you mention on January 29? Is he an entirely different HASHIMOTO than the Kwantung Army man?
- A This is an absolutely different HASHIMOTO. This is an official in the Home Ministry.
- Q On February 1, you refer to the meeting with the Chiefs of Staff with the Emperor at which time, Japan's policy towards French Indo-China and Thailand was reported. What was that policy?
- A I do not remember what that policy was but I believe it was a matter of acting as mediator in the dispute.
- Q In the light of later developments wherein Japan ultimately landed troops into French Indo-China, certainly at this time there was some sort of a policy. What was it?
- A The military wanted to assume a position of being leader there and the Navy also wanted to get Camranh Bay for a Navy base to assume a leading position there.
- Q In other words, the Army faction, through its Chief of Staff were advocating the placing of troops in French Indo-China in order to better Japan's position with reference to obtaining oil in the South.
- A At this time, Japan did not have any plan of using force in obtaining oil from the Dutch East Indies but I believe that the stationing of troops in China was aimed at attacking Kuming from that direction.
- Q But this particular policy toward French Indo-China and Thailand, as discussed as of February 1, was what? What was the policy of that date. What did Japan desire with reference to those two countries? You mention that the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff had a definite policy towards these two countries. I want to know what it was?
- A It planned to act as a mediator in the dispute between those two countries and then to assume a leadership role out there and to materialize the plan of attacking China from the South.
- Q Understand that when I ask these questions, I am not necessarily implying that you personally were fixing the foreign policy of Japan, I am trying to find out what happened. As a matter of fact, when you say that it was the policy that Japan assume a dominant position in French Indo-China, did she desire to acquire basis there for operations?

- A I believe so - Navy bases.
- Q In other words, the Chiefs of Staff felt that in the carrying out of Japan's foreign policy, Japan should acquire either peaceably or by force of arms, bases in French Indo-China for operations. That is right, isn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q And why did she need bases in French Indo-China, according to the military Chiefs of Staff?
- A I believe it was for entre into China from the South.
- Q You think this policy was tied up with the fighting of the war in China?
- A I believe it was a problem of settling the China incident as quickly as possible.
- Q Were there those among the military people that advocated forcibly establishing bases in French Indo-China, if necessary?
- A I don't believe that any forceful measures were being advocated. It was proposed that thosetwo countries, as a price for Japan acting as mediator, concede to them that right of stationing troops.
- Q In other words, for Japan's willingness to try to mediate and settle the dispute, Japan, hoped as a result of using her good offices in that respect, she might acquire bases in that territory? That really was the motivating reason why Japan was so anxious to be selected to negotiate that settlement. Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q It is true, is it not, that the establishment of bases in French Indo-China not only would be valuable in Japan's fighting the Chinese war, but it would strengthen her position insofar as her southern position was concerned in case Japan found it necessary to expand in that direction for oil.
- A That sort of an opinion may have arisen among the military men because Japan's bases had been extended down in the South but at this time, such an opinion was not existant.

- Q But because of the feeling that there was great need for a base of operations in French Indo-China, Japan did everything it could to induce these two countries to select her as mediator in order that she might, as a result of the mediation, herself obtain some concessions in that theatre?
- A By taking that opportunity, it tried to take a dominant role, there.
- Q That was a policy that was strongly advocated by Foreign Minister MATSUOKA?
- A Yes.
- Q And War Minister, TOJO, also felt that it was a proper move?
- A Yes.
- Q I take it that the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy were in accord with that procedure?
- A Yes.
- Q What was the Emperor's attitude with reference to obtaining bases in French Indo-China for further operations in the South and elsewhere?
- A The Emperor was greatly worried that the War would be enlarged to that area. The Emperor did not refuse because he was earnest about settling the China dispute as early as possible and he was impressed with the belief that to do that attack of China from the South was necessary. MATSUOKA even went to far as to say that under that plan, Japan would be able to settle the China incident by April.
- Q Do you think that the Emperor was fearful that activities on the part of Japan in negotiating this border dispute might have repercussions in world foreign relations but he was inclined to follow the advice of the Government leaders to the effect that that was the proper move to try to settle the China incident.
- A The Emperor acceded to that because they said that Japan was acting as a mediator and it had no territorial desires and that there was no aggressive significance in it. Later on, the problem of obtaining bases there came out.

- Q But even at that date, February 1, 1941, irrespective of what the Emperor himself anticipated might be involved, it was the foreign policy of Japan through MATSUOKA and the Chief of Staff to proceed on a program of obtaining bases in French Indo-China. Isn't that true?
- A The military did want to obtain bases in order to attack Kunning because it would facilitate the attack upon it from that base but previous to this time, French Indo-China was controlled by France, but at this time, French power was lessened due to her position in European affairs and so the matter of obtaining bases in French Indo-China at this time came up in the agreement with France, itself, has been obtained in settling the dispute of Thailand and French Indo-China.
- Q The truth of the matter was that it was the attitude of Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, in view of the situation in Europe and the weakened condition of France, this would be a very opportune time for Japan to come forward and obtain some bases in French Indo-China for operations in China or other uses that might be necessary in the future. Is that right?
- A Yes
- Q That was advocated by MATSUOKA? Is that right?
- A Japan did not have any territorial desires.
- Q She had a desire for bases of operations not territorial control of French Indo-China. Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q But she wanted thoses bases for operations in order to fight elsewhere other than on the soil of China. Is that right?
- A I believe such an opinion was existing but it wasn't apparent to us.
- Q By "us" whom do you mean?
- A My friends - my group.
- Q You mention all through your diary, especially after the China war starts, these liaison conferences in Imperial General Headquarters. Those are very important conferences, are they not?

- A It is not very high in its authority. It is more or less functioned as to be in harmony with the policy of the Government and it was more or less to bring forth harmony between the Government and the military.
- Q During war time, the liaison conferences in Imperial General Headquarters was the place where these important policy questions were thrashed out and really decided upon or originated. Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q You mentioned the other day that it was in those liaison conferences that normally what took place at the Imperial Conferences was thrashed out before it was presented to the Emperor at the Imperial Conferences. Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q We can say then, on February 1, at least, it was reported to the Emperor by the Chiefs of Staff at the liaison conference at Imperial General Headquarters, that the Army and the Navy decided that efforts should be made to obtain bases for operation in French Indo-China. Is that a fair statement?
- A Yes.
- Q On that same day, you mentioned having talked with Foreign Minister MATSUOKA with reference to his contemplated trip to visit HITLER. What reason did he give for wanting to make such a trip into Germany at that time?
- A Because Japan had signed a pact with Germany, he wanted to go out there to make contact.
- Q What did he want to find out and did he tell you why he wanted to make the trip? He had a reason for going.
- A He always discussed all sorts of matters with me but he didn't speak on any particular things or anything of great importance.
- Q When he told you he wanted to go to Germany on diplomatic affairs, certainly he conveyed to you in his conversation his reason for going? Why did he want to make the trip? I am not saying you sent him. What was his reasoning and thinking?

- A I believe he went out there to make contact with Germany much more closer.
- Q Did he indicate that he wanted to obtain greater cooperation from Germany in helping Japan carry out her program in the Far East?
- A At this time, I did not hear any story about Japan doing something in the Far East.
- Q Well, you still haven't answered my question as to why MATSUOKA himself thought it was an appropriate time for him to pay a visit to Germany. He, as Foreign Minister, had some reason back of his wanting to go other than just making the trip.
- A The Diet was scheduled to make a decision in its policy on the third day but at this time the policy was not made, so I do not know exactly what sort of a policy was made.
- Q What was the Diet scheduled to do on the third of February?
- A The Diet was scheduled to determine its policy in regard to Germany and Russia but I do not know what sort of a policy was decided upon.
- Q When and under what circumstances is the Diet called upon to determine/foreign policy of Japan?
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- A In the Diet liaison conferences.
- Q Do you mean that there was to be a liaison conference in Imperial General Headquarters in order to discuss and determine the question of policy as to relations between Japan and Germany and Japan and Russia?
- A Yes.
- Q And that was to take place a few days later and on this occasion he explained to you he was going to Germany in order to carry out what was determined at the liaison conference? Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q Do you recall what was determined at the liaison conference as to policy?

- A I do not know what policy was determined at that time because I have not written anything concerning it. But looking at the results, I believe that nothing positive or significant has been taken by MATSUOKA on this visit to Germany because Germany was greatly disappointed at that time and more or less, it was a courtesy call.
- Q MATSUOKA, as Foreign Minister in those days, personally was an advocate of close relations between Germany and Japan and that dominated his activities and actions as Foreign Minister in this period of time?
- A Yes and he is the Foreign Minister that concluded the German-Japan Tripartite Pact.
- Q That was in September 1940?
- A Yes.
- Q And ever since the signing of that Pact, MATSUOKA endeavored to bring Japan and Germany closer together in its international activities. Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q Did he advocate seeking military aid or information from Germany in order to help Japan in fighting its war in China and carrying on its military activities?
- A I don't believe that MATSUOKA went out there to obtain military assistance because military men like YAMASHITA was out there already.
- Q But MATSUOKA was advocating the exchange of military information between Germany and Japan, was he not?
- A Yes, but I don't believe he brought back any positive or particular information.
- Q But he advocated and lent his assistance to laying the background for such aid by going back and forth between the two countries, did he not?
- A Yes, I believe so.
- Q He negotiated all policy questions with Germany but the details were left to themselves?
- A Yes.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, Fred F. Suzukawa, 2nd Lt. 02030605
(name) (Rank) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 19 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Fred F. Suzukawa, 2nd Lt. AUS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this _____ day of _____, 1946.

(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, S. M. Betar, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

S. M. Betar

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (~~we~~) Henry R. Sackett, _____,

~~and~~ _____,

certify that on the 23rd day of February, 1946, personally appeared before me (~~we~~) KIDO, Koichi and according to Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.
Place

23 February 1946
Date