

Interr. To Jo (29 Jan 46)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



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CONTINUED INTERROGATION OF

General Hideki Tojo

Date and Time: 29 January 1946, 1405-1600 hours.

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : General Hideki Tojo
Mr. John W. Fihelly, Interrogator
Commander Yale Maxon, USNR, Interpreter
Miss Myrtle B. Mills, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Fihelly

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Q.: What arrangement, if any, was made between Japan on the one hand, and Germany and Italy on the other with regard to whose sphere of influence Africa would be a part of?

A.: I haven't the faintest idea. I haven't thought about it at all. From the Japanese Government point of view, there was no thought on the question. That's my own personal opinion; the Foreign Minister might tell you something else.

Q.: Whose sphere of influence would the United States have been in had she been conquered?

A.: I think that North and South America would have constituted one sphere - Europe another, and Greater East Asia a third.

Q.: Was Japan to have any control over the European sphere?

A.: No. No control.

Q.: Were Germany and Italy to have any control over Greater East Asia?

A.: No. No control. I might say a little more fully what I think would have happened had Japan been victorious. There would have been, I believe, four such spheres - Europe, with Germany as the center, would have been one; North and South America, with the United States as the leader, would have been a second; Greater East Asia, with Japan as the leader, would have been third; and Soviet Russia would have been the fourth. These vague ideas of mine on the subject should not be taken to represent what the Germans thought necessarily, or what the Japanese Government thought.

Continued

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Q.: At the time Japan signed the Three-Power Pact, did she not believe that Germany and Italy would be victorious in Europe?

A.: Yes, of course she hoped that Germany and Italy would be victorious.

Q.: That does not answer the question. At the time when Japan signed the Pact, did the Japanese Government not believe that a German-Italian victory was likely?

A.: Of course in warfare a final dictum that one side will surely win is impossible, but, judging by the war situation at that time, I believe that the Government thought the comparative probability was that Germany and Italy would be victorious.

Q.: Did not the cabinet, of which you were at that time a member, so feel?

A.: Yes. I think they did.

Q.: Was not that one of the reasons why Japan signed the Pact, namely, that it seemed likely that Italy and Germany would be victorious?

A.: The question of victory or defeat was not the primary one. After the lapse of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, Japan was internationally isolated. This was the primary cause of signing the Pact. Of course, if she had not believed that Germany and Italy would probably be successful in Europe, it would have been foolish for her to join the alliance as she would simply be taking a chance of getting hurt. However, the primary reason, as I have said, was that she was internationally isolated and not that she thought that Germany and Italy were going to win in Europe.

Q.: Was Japan's desire for a new order in East Asia not one of the reasons which led her to sign the Three-Power Pact?

A.: It was not a direct cause at all. The creation of a new order in East Asia was a fundamental Japanese aim which would have been continued, regardless of whether the Three-Power Pact had been signed or not. However, Japan did desire that the new order in East Asia be recognized in the Pact itself.

Q.: Did not the Japanese Government feel that by signing the Pact they would get their Far Eastern sphere more quickly?

- A.: They did hope, I believe, to utilize the strength of Germany to bring about peace between Japan and China which the Government greatly desired. As far as the Far East was concerned, the people of the Far East wanted to build their own sphere without relying on other power besides their own. Of course I am giving you my own answers to your questions, which are necessarily rather superficial since the questions are many and varied. I think that the Premier and Foreign Minister thought similarly, but I cannot guarantee it.
- Q.: At the time of the signing of the Three-Power Pact, or soon thereafter, did you not express yourself somewhat to the effect that you were "overwhelmed with a mingled feeling of austerity and joy"?
- A.: I do not use some of these words commonly so I am sure I did not say exactly what you have shown me here, but of course I did feel both solemnity and joy on that occasion due to the fact that Japan had before that been isolated internationally.
- Q.: It is reported that on 27 March 1941, Mr. Yosuke MATSUOKA, who was then Japanese Foreign Minister, said in part while enroute to Berlin, that "it is up to the Americans to leave it to Japan to maintain peace in Asia." Did you feel similarly at that time?
- A.: Yes. I think it was very appropriate.
- Q.: He is also reported to have said in part at that time, "I have been fully aware that Britain and the United States would eternally oppose the reconstruction of the Far East by Japan since I returned to Tokyo from Geneva in 1932". Did you feel similarly at that time?
- A.: Yes. I really did believe that neither England nor America felt very favorable about the new order in East Asia.
- Q.: It is reported that you stated in the Diet on 27 May 1942 that "As stated in the Imperial Declaration of War, it has been and will remain the inflexible determination of our entire nation never to sheathe the sword of righteousness unless and until the influence of the Angle-American Powers, with their dream of dominating the world, has been completely uprooted". Did you so state?

A.: Yes indeed. We were at war then and I think it was very appropriate.

Q.: By the language used, were you not referring to the influence of the Anglo-American Powers in East Asia?

A.: Yes.

Q.: How long prior to this time had you felt that such influence of the Anglo-American Powers must be uprooted?

A.: Since the beginning of the Greater East Asia War. Before the war, I thought that the rights and interests of America and England in the Far East should be adjusted, but when the war began, I changed my ideas in favor of ejecting them from the Far East by force of arms.

Q.: These are your personal thoughts?

A.: Well, I was Prime Minister at that time.

Q.: Were these not the common thoughts of your cabinet?

A.: Of course. Up until the time of the war, they thought that differences should be peacefully adjusted but, once war had broken out, that Britain and America should be forcibly ejected.

Q.: So that once the war had started, you and your cabinet were determined to secure "Asia for the Asiatics"?

A.: Once the war had started, I think it was very appropriate to drive the English and Americans out of the Far East, but this expression "Asia for the Asiatics" in itself, I think, is very narrow-minded and at the time before the war, I disapproved of it for that reason. If, as you suggested a while back, Japan had won the war, some adjustments in rights and interests would have to have been made at the peace conference. However, at the conclusion of the peace conference, the idea of "Asia for the Asiatics" would, in my opinion, have again become an unduly narrow concept. Of course at a peace conference two things have to be kept in mind; one is the military situation, the other the preservation of peace in the future.

I would like to state that during most of the period covered today, I was the Premier and hence the responsible person. However, for foreign affairs, the Foreign Minister was the responsible one.

Q.: So far as you know, your views expressed by your answers were the common views of your cabinet?

A.: I believe so. Most of the important matters were threshed out in cabinet sessions and I believe that these views were shared by most of the members.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, Yale Maxon, Cmdr., USNR, 11-35-72
(Name) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 4 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Yale Maxon
Yale Maxon, Cmdr., USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12 day of August, 1946.

John W. Fihelly
John W. Fihelly

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP

Certificate of Stenographer

I, Myrtle B. Mills, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Myrtle B. Mills
Myrtle B. Mills

Certificate of Interrogator

I, John W. Fihelly, certify that on 29th
day of January, 1946, personally appeared before me TOJO
Hideki, and according to Commander Yale Maxon, USNR,

Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

John W. Fihelly
John W. Fihelly

TOKYO
(Place)

12 August 46
(Date)