

File

HEADQUARTERS  
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
(PACIFIC)  
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. (USSBS 181)  
(NAV NO. 42)

Place: Tokyo  
Date: 30 October 1945.  
Time 1330

Division of Origin: Naval Analysis Division.

Subject: OKINAWA CAMPAIGN

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Capt. OHMAE, Toshikazu, IJN, is a Naval Officer of 25 years service. In June 1942 he was transferred from the Bureau of Military Affairs to the Staff of the Southeast Area Fleet, in which capacity he planned and directed the First Battle of SAVO ISLAND. From December 1943 he was on the Staff of the First Mobile Fleet and took part in the planning and execution of the operations for the defense of the MARIANAS and of the PHILIPPINES as Chief of Staff to Vice Admiral OZAWA, CinC First Mobile Fleet and Third Fleet. From January 1945 he has been attached to the Naval General Staff. He was also Staff Officer 11th Air Fleet and 3rd Mobile Fleet.

Where interviewed: Naval War College.

Interrogator: Capt. T.J. Hedding, USN.

Interpreter: Lt. (jg). R.P. Brown, USNR.

Allied Officers Present: None.

SUMMARY

The object of this interrogation was to clarify and amplify the reply to questionnaire Nav-7 on the OKINAWA Campaign.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. Did the Army or Navy have the responsibility for the defense of OKINAWA?

A. Local defenses were under Army command. The OKINAWA Naval Guard reported to the Commander of the 32nd Army. The supporting defense forces were in general under their respective commanders. In KYUSHU the 5th Air Fleet (Navy) and the 6th Air Army (Army) were under the tactical command of CinC Combined Fleet (TOYODA). Air Forces in FORMOSA were under the operational command of their respective commanders. After 1 July 1945 the Naval Air Forces in FORMOSA were placed under the command of the 8th Air Division. There was a very loose coordination between air forces operating from KYUSHU and FORMOSA in attacks on U.S. Forces at OKINAWA.

Q. At the beginning of the OKINAWA Campaign you state that your air forces were still in the process of training. What was the type of training?

A. Our fighters were not considered to be adequately trained and their training was being undertaken. Also training in special attack (KAMIKAZE) Tactics was being undertaken.

Q. You state that on 16 March 1945 an order to the 5th Air Fleet (KYUSHU) was issued to withdraw to KOREA and Western HONSHU, and that before this dispersal was accomplished the U.S. Carrier Force attacked Southern KYUSHU. What losses were inflicted on the 5th Air Fleet?

A. Losses were small; I think about 20 to 30 planes.

Q. During the OKINAWA Campaign you have given a figure for the Naval Air Force losses. What is your estimate of the losses of the Army Air Forces?

A. Since the Army employed about a third of the numbers employed by the Navy, I should estimate that their losses were about one third of the Navy losses.