GHQ/SCAP Records(RG 331)
Description of contents

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF THE UNITED STATES

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(2) Folder title/number : (15)
Toyo Keizai Shimpo

(3) Date : Mar. 1947 - Aug. 1947

(4) Subject :

Classification	Type of record
340	c

(5) Item description and comment :

(6) Reproduction : Yes No

(7) Film no. Sheet no.

 The Toyo Keizai Shimpo

1937	6
1938	4
1939	4
1940	8
1941	10
TOTAL	32

3. Regarding the publications of the Toyo Keizai Shimpo Sha those enumerated on sheets "C" are considered violating the Directive; the yearly number of books designated being as follow:

1937	0
1938	0
1939	1
1940	2
1941	3
TOTAL	6

ORGANIZATION OF THE TOYO KEIZAI SHIMPO-SHA
(Functions of the Staff Members)

1. The Editor-in-Chief, serving concurrently as managing director of the Toyo Keizai Shimpo-Sha (hereinafter called the company), will supervise the business of the company and also will represent the company.

2. The president will supervise and guide the business of the company and also will represent the company.

3. The executive director will supervise the business of the company by order of the president.

4. The acting Editor-in-Chief will represent the functions of the Editor-in-Chief by order of the Editor-in-Chief or in the absence of the Editor-in-Chief.

5. The chief of the editorial department will guide and direct the company employees belonging to the editorial department, will plan and supervise activities under the jurisdiction of the editorial department, will administer conferences of the editorial department, and will supervise all matters necessary for the proper functioning of the editorial department.

6. The vice-chief of the editorial department will assist the chief of the editorial department by sharing his duties. The vice-chief will represent the chief of the editorial department in the latter's absence.

7. The chief of the adjustment division, belonging to the editorial department, will supervise the allotment of space to various columns of the Toyo Keizai Shimpo, editing of contributed articles and the progress of business until the completion of proof-reading of the journal.

8. The chief of the international economic division, belonging to the editorial department, will edit articles concerning foreign economic conditions to be published in the Toyo Keizai Shimpo.

9. The chief of the domestic economic division, belonging to the editorial department, will edit articles on general domestic economic conditions to be published in the Toyo Keizai Shimpo.

10. The chief of the industrial economic division, belonging to the editorial department, will edit articles concerning domestic industrial companies or various domestic industries to be published in the Toyo Keizai Shimpo.

11. The chief of the Orient l Economist, belonging to the editorial department, will edit articles to be published in the Oriental Economist (Toyo Keizai Shimpo's English edition).

12. The chief of the research division, belonging to the editorial department, will prepare and edit various economic statistical data to be published by the Toyo Keizai Shimpo and the Oriental Economist.

13. The chief of the business department will supervise the business department and administer activities relating to the pushase of paper, printing, selling, publicity, advertising, canvassing, publication, office supplies and others necessary for carrying on the business of the company.

14. The chief of the business administration department will plan and co-ordinate activities relating to the guidance and supervision of department members, and purchasing of supplies, selling, publicity, advertisting, publication and printing and others pertaining to general business administration. He will also supervise departmental conferences and take charge of documents.

15. The vice-chief of the business administration department will assist the chief of the business administration department, and will act on behalf of the latter in his absence.

16. The chief of the interior department will guide the departmental personnel, and will supervise activities pertaining to personnel, finance, accounting, building and repairs, documents, and others under its competency. He will also supervise activities not folling under the jurisdiction of other departments.

17. The vice-chief of the interior department will assist the chief of the interior department and will act on his behalf in his absence.

18. The chief of the general affairs division will take charge of documents, personnel and confidential matters and building and repairing, and will guide the division personnel.

19. The chief of the accounts division will take charge of shares, financing, real estates, taxes, inspection, settlement of accounts, budget compilation and other matters relating to accounting, and will guide the division personnel.

20. The chief of the branch bureau will guide the personnel belonging to the branch bureau, will plan and supervise the branch bureau activities and will represent the branch bureau.

21. The chief of the general Affairs department will take charge of affirs not coming under the jurisdiction of the editorial department and the business department (welfare activities and compilation of documents, etc.).

22. The chief of the business division, belonging to the business department, will supervise the selling periodicals and books published by the company, accounting relative to publications and other essential business matters.

23. The chief of the publication division, belonging to the business department, will supervise the publication of company's periodicals and books, acquisition of paper, printing, and other essential activities not falling under the jurisdiction of other divisions.

24. The chief of the printing division, belonging to the business department, will supervise the progress of activities pertaining to the publication of periodicals and books, acquisition of paper, printing operations, etc.

25. The chief of the sales division, who replaces the chief of the business division upon the abolition of the latter post, will supervises the functions therefore discharged by the chief of the business division.

26. The chief of the advertising division will supervise activities regarding the publicity and collection of advertisements for the periodical and books published by the company.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

21 March 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: The Oriental Economist

1. Attached are the fourteen excerpts from the biweekly Japanese editions and twenty-seven excerpts from monthly english editions of the Oriental Economist published during the period of 7 July 1937 and 7 December 1941 inclusive.

2. Review of articles appearing in the issues published during the critical period reveals that the Oriental Economist, in keeping with policies of war-mongers and ultra-nationalists of the time, was most militant in promoting totalitarian economy for Japan and in advocating military aggression abroad.

3. There is no question that the Oriental Economist, the leading financial journal in Japan, consistently violated the provisions of SCAPIN 548 throughout the critical period.

T. TSUKAHARA

CIRCULATE

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

20 March 1947

EXCERPTS FROM JAPANESE EDITION OF THE
ORIENTAL ECONOMIST
APPENDIX A
(July 1937 to December 1941)

31 July 1937 World Economic Review

Title: New developments on the North China incident. What is the real cause for aggravation of the situation?

Excerpt:

With the development of the situation as such, favorable outcome would be unlikely even if an agreement is not between the Tienchin and the Kihchay authorities in the suppression of anti-Japanese activities. As a matter of fact, the non-aggravation policy with its resultant hesitancies has actually brought about, quite an (aggravated) situation contrary to expectations. Therefore, it would be to undergo a drastic operation establishing a condition enabling the Kihchay authorities to execute or to be forced to execute the spirit of the agreement.

21 August 1937

Title: German trade control and its facilities and functions.

Excerpt:

When Hitler came to power, a change for the better was soon made noticeable. The German people seemed suddenly awakened with new hopes. It was as if the sun had suddenly risen to the sky. Even the faces of unemployed on the street looked cheerful. It was a sudden change. This writer was impressed by the difference that hope can bring to people.

September 1937

Title: To the Chinese people: Solution unlikely if anti-Japanese activities continue.

Excerpt:

When Premier Konoyg was on his way back from his visit with Prince Saionji, he stated, "there is no other way but to suppress and rid China of her will to fight. And to do this not only with our military might but also with all other conceivable means".

We are heartily in accord with his statement.

14 January 1939 (Editorial)

Title: The Position of the Japanese Government in regards to China, China and the Three Great Powers must acknowledge this Position.

Excerpt:

Though Japan is said to be waging an undeclared war, she is without any question the victor. As the victor, Italy did not tell Ethiopia that she did not have any designs for territorial acquisitions, and she also did not say that she was not going to carry out a monopolistic economy. Even if Japan does have designs for territorial acquisitions, which country, aside from making protests on moral grounds, can prevent her from attaining this and in this present international situation?

18 February 1939 (Comments)

Title: The Signicance of the Occupation of Hainan Island. Important as Key Military Positions.

Excerpt:

In order to check the Chiang Kai Shek Government, which is anti-Japanese and which had its start in Southwestern China, politically and militarily, it was not enough to stop at Canton. It was necessary to advance Southward to secure key positions whereby pressure could be applied in a wide area.

Moreover, the matter which cannot be overlooked is a check against the activities of England, America and France. It is a well known fact that these countries are busy supporting the policies of the Chiang Kai Shek government, and as mentioned previously, they are active in the Louichow Peninsula, French-Indo China, and Burma. Therefore, if our troops are stationed at strategic places on the Hainan Island, it is possible to put up an adequate check against the forces mentioned above.

11 March 1939 (Editorial)

Title: An Appeal to Education Minister Araki. Necessity for Reforming the University System and its Course of Action.

Excerpt:

The "Screening" (TN Removing undesirable elements in schools, especially, liberals and communists) at Tokyo Imperial University has been generally completed. Instructions connected with the economic department, were dismissed or resigned, and the greater portion of the assistant instructors and assistants remain.

However, it is evident that the problems of the University were not solved through the resignation of some instructor. The easiest act the Education Ministry can do is to dismiss persons. The authority of the Education Ministry is limited to such rights. However, it is not profitable for the nation or the educational circles if their authority is limited as mentioned above. Rather than taking the above course, it is most necessary to reform the University System which has been a problem hitherto.

The writer thinks it is very strange that through discussions on the limits of authority of various individuals and through adjustments of a faction of the faculty, Araki, Education Minister, and the Education Ministry possess an attitude that everything will be settled. The points mentioned above are the details and not the main points. Does the Education Minister think that because several university instructors quit, the university education can be reformed? The writer thinks that reform cannot be brought about merely through such spiritual policy, and it is natural that the system must be affected. Looking at the results, doesn't it seem as if the Education Ministry is not exerting much effort.

18 January 1941 Editorial

Title: Prepare for the worst in the Japanese-American relations.

Excerpt:

"The United States has already embarked upon undeclared war against Germany. This action against Germany simultaneously is an action against Japan, the ally of Germany. Soon she, the U. S. will give open support to the Chiang Kai-Shek faction. The relations between Japan

and America have become extremely serious. It would be extremely dangerous if we overlook the ever-critical overall developments by relying on the perspective colored with slightest wishful thinking".

18 January 1941 Editorial

Excerpt:

In case of a war against the United States such a war would basically be economic. Therefore, with the outbreak of war, the problems would mainly center around the establishment of policies for the conversion of the Japanese economy appropriation of basic materials from Southern areas and maintenance of foreign markets. Preparations can never be too soon.

8 February 1941 Editorial

Title: Know position and character of America. Display utmost intricacy in strategy.

Excerpt:

The United States may believe in her sophisticated and superior position in the Orient. However, it is a reknown fact that in case of a clash between Japanese and American Naval Forces on the Western Pacific, the odds would be definitely in favor of Japan.

2 August 1941 Editorial

Title: Japanese-American Relation. What the people can expect. Mutual defensive efforts of Japan and French-Indo China and the attitudes of Britain and United States.

Excerpt:

Following the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance this writer had pointed out and warned the government and the people that it would be futile to employ soft diplomacy against United States.

It might be true that certain quarters in our country are still maintaining hopes in the "soft" policy. However, we feel that the existing situation is too alarming and dangerous to rely on such hopes. We urge the government and the people to stand in readiness.

2 August 1940 Events of the World

Title: Possibility of Japanese-American War.

Excerpt:

Even if the situation may appear somewhat modified concerning the effects of the freezing order, we must be aware that the die has already been cast.

19 November 1941 Editorial

Title: The Pacific and Singapore.

Excerpt:

Our diplomacy has reached the very last stage. We must now be ready to withdraw from the diplomatic front and embark upon the second front at a moment's notice.

29 November 1941 Editorial

Title: Need for the establishment of a lasting totalitarian structure.

Excerpt:

As repeatedly stated, the existing wartime totalitarian economic structure has been established solely to meet wartime needs. However, with the view to abundance of raw material and intensified world economic competition in the postwar period, a mechanical structure established only to meet the wartime objectives cannot be adopted. It is felt most urgent that a totalitarian structure in peacetime as well as in war be planned and put into effect. A sound planned economy must be established with due consideration to these aspects rather than as a temporary feature.

6 December 1941 Editorial

Title: Prepare for both peace and war.

Excerpt:

Frankly we feel that the situation will become worse if the negotiation is accomplished. Because when the agreement is met it will mean that Tojo's three basic principles would be carried out through diplomatic process. A third country will not interfere in the successful conclusion of the China incident. There will not be a threat of war inflicted upon the Empire by surrounding nations.

however, the problem is that the United States is only willing to come to an agreement while she is facing Germany, her strongest enemy. We have been warned of consequences if we are to rest at ease. There are enough reasons to fear without being malice of the intention of United States.

In the final analysis, the power is what count, and the most important one of all is the military strength.

In the event that the agreement is met between United States and Japan, the people must ever more exert their efforts in building the strength of our country.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

21 March 1947

EXCERPTS FROM ENGLISH EDITIONS OF THE
ORIENTAL ECONOMIST
(August 1937 to December 1941)

No. 1. EDITORIAL COMMENT ON CHINA INCIDENT (August 1937 issue, p. 452).

"It has been right along the policy of the Japanese Government to keep the present trouble localized and reach a quick solution by diplomatic negotiations. This....has been proven beyond doubt by the reiterated statements of the Government.....

.....One prominent cause of this turn (of events "counter to the hopes of Japan for a peaceful local settlement") was (according to an American journalist, Peffer) China's over-confidence in force.....(China) had become dangerously aggressive toward Japan....This (Chinese) feeling of hate and antagonism is now running so high.....

Another important factor....to aggravate the crisis is the fact that China as yet is not a unified modern state...

"After the remnants of the 29th Army have been swept out of the Peiping area, the Japanese Army would not carry the fight into the heart of China unless challenged by the Chinese Central Army. In the meantime what would be the fate and political status of the Peiping-Tientsin area? Naturally, the Chinese population there would begin setting up organization for self-government of a semi-independent character, out of reach of Nanking's power and authority and under the protection of the Japanese Army.

"As has been repeatedly announced by successive governments, Japan entertains no territorial ambitions in North China. Notwithstanding charges in China that Japan is intent upon making the region a second Manchukuo, that is farthest from the nation's thoughts.....It would appear that the longer the delay (by Nanking) in starting negotiations (with Japan), the harder it will be to arrive at an understanding".

No. 2. EDITORIAL COMMENT ON CHINESE SITUATION (September 1937 issue, pp 514 and 515).

"Under the existing conditions (in North China), however, Japan would have to assume the chief responsibility for peace. Subsequently, in the field of economic development, combinations of Japanese capital and technical talent with Chinese labor and resources should be worked out, without any opposition, of course, to rational participation by foreign countries....Even in that case, however, should Nanking interfere, North China would have to become independent of the South....

.....China blinded by an infantile anti-Japanese sentiment has lost North China when she sought to take it and brought destruction upon herself, while endeavoring to create a modern state.....That at which we aim at is not the exercise of relentless control over China. Nor are we so foolhardy as to keep on extending the fighting front with no thought for relations with a third country. Nevertheless, it must be said most plainly that as long as the anti-Japanese movement persists in China, our pressing hands will not relax".

No. 3. NINE POWER TREATY (p 587.)

"As a matter of fact, the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty absolutely have no reason to get excited or worry over Japan's actions. Not only is Japan ready to respect their rights and interests, she is prepared to invite their cooperation in the development of natural resources in China through trade and investment activities. What Japan desires to be brought about in China is stamping out of the anti-Japanese and anti-Manchukuo movement and Japan's peaceful economic expansion allowed without the past political obstruction. Even if the Nanking Government refuses to cooperate with her, Japan is determined to make North China, now completely under her influence and control, the cradle of the movement for Japan-Manchukuo-China cooperation....

...The Powers can rest assured that their vested rights and interests in the region by no means would be tampered with and their active participation will be invited in the field of capital investment and trade development".

No. 4. THE 1938 OUTLOOK (1938 page 16.)

"In North China the new regime has been established and it may be some time before orderly industrial development gets under way. It is our opinion that the longer Chiang clique continues its resistance, the better it will suit the purposes of this (Japan's) country, for as long as Gen. Chiang takes this attitude, Japan can go ahead unconcertedly with her own programs of North China development.

If Japanese Government acts with such a determination and applies a full measure of cultural deveopment, progress should be surprisingly rapid....Japan at that time (1935-1937) had not fully made up her mind to go after that objective and as her policy wavered, both the Chinese leaders and masses were inclined not to repose full confidence in what the Japanese were doing there. The past failure seems to be proving a stepping stone to success, as there are indications that Japan this time will make up her mind to see the job through....."

No. 5. WHY THE CHIANG REGIME MUST BE CRUSHED (May 1938, pp 276-277).

"These new (Chinese) regimes were set up under the protecting wing of the Japanese authorities and until they have fully consolidated the foundations of their independence they cannot exist for a day without Japanese protection and support. At the same time..... it behooves this country to extend all the aid it can and to assume the responsibility for dispelling any anxiety which Chinese Statesmen may feel about associating themselves with such movements".

No. 6. HALF WAY SOLUTION NOT DESIRABLE (May pp 276-277).

It is our experience that the more profound one's knowledge of China and the Chinese is, the more is he convinced that any halfway solution of the hostilities on such conditions would be only postponing the evil and breeding a far greater one for the future.

No. 7. THE OPEN DOOR POLICY (June 1938, p 354).

"The open door policy was a product of the Powers' egoism and self-interest and as such it cannot with fairness be applied exclusively to China. If it can be made to contribute in any way to world peace and world welfare, it must be applied to all nations of the world indiscriminately".

No. 8. TOTALITARIANISM AND INDIVIDUALISM (October 1938, p 660).

"It is not infrequently asked whether the totalitarianism of Germany or Italy will be transplanted in this country. The answer depends upon the circumstances that will be developed in this country. The principle of totalitarianism may be copied and advocated by its protagonists here, but the system would never thrive unless conditions suitable for its development exist. Some of the totalitarian followers believe that their principle will eventually sweep over the whole world. This will truly

come to pass, as is demonstrable on historical grounds, if the conditions which call it forth should develop throughout the whole world. It is quite possible in fact that it will come to pass if the world nations continue to do as they have done for some years and thus bring about another world war. If in some evil hour all the countries of the world should be plunged into conditions such as Germany and Italy faced at one time, then totalitarianism could be expected to become universal".

No. 9. NATION PREPARED FOR PROTRACTED WAR (p 716).

"....Thus, Japan has now become fully reconciled to the prospect that it will be some time before the Chiang regime capitulates. It appears, however, that a section of the Chiang Government and certain Third Power observers believe Japan is likely to abandon its plan of continuing the campaign in the not-distant future, owing to psychological and the economic causes. Their judgment seems to be in the wrong".

No. 10. THE CHINA POLICY STATEMENT (p 734).

".....In the final analysis, the fundamental significance of the November statement lies in its reference to the "Establishment of a New Order" - a phrase which frequently is used. It is obvious that herein lie Japan's aims....

What is then the so-called new order calculated to insure the permanent stability of East Asia? (Then the hope is expressed that the Government will make a clarifying statement).

No. 11. ARMY OFFICER ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (December 1938, p 798).

"Willingly or not, Japan must needs have armaments, sufficient to fight a possible war on two fronts with Soviet Russia and China. Until such preparations are made, he went on to say, Japan will not be able to end the Sino-Japanese hostilities successfully and satisfactorily; nor will a lasting peace established in East Asia". .....We scarcely need say that we sympathize with Lt. Gen. Tojo's position.....(but) his utterances may be taken to mean that Japan will have to clash with Britain, France and America, not to mention Soviet Russia. This would imply a failure on Japan's part to bear in mind those fine strokes of foreign policy which Chancellor Hitler pursued before adopting his Eastern Policy....."

No. 12. CHINA INCIDENT AND POPULATION (June 1939, p 388).

".....From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that the question of taking measures to accelerate the rate of population increase is of great importance. To accomplish this, concrete plans must be formulated to promote the welfare, the marriage and the bearing of children by the people behind the guns".

No. 13. EUROPEAN CRISIS AND JAPN (July 1939, p 434).

".....In any event what should and would engage her attention (in case a European war would break out) is the matter of preserving peace throughout eastern hemisphere by working for the sound development of Manchukuo and the construction of a new order in China. It would be impossible for Japan to disregard these fundamental considerations no matter what attitude she might take toward the European political situation. However much the anti-Comintern pact is to be strengthened and whatever the lines along which it may be directed, Japan must in every case consider it from her own position in China to which she is irredemiably committed.

No. 14. INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT QUESTION (p 444).

.....The Japanese must endeavor to give third-power nationals a clear grasp of the character of the new order which this country is at pains to construct in East Asia, so that all unnecessary friction may be averted. Some of the people of the third powers have the misconception that the concessions are their own territory, while others still cling to the old-fashioned outlook on the Far East, simply demanding that Japan observe the kind of equal opportunity and open door principles that were provided in the Nine-Power Treaty. Conditions have changed so completely, however, that it is no longer possible to preserve order and restore economic conditions in the China of today by acting upon principles of yesterday.....

No. 15. RE: AMBASSADOR GREW'S SPEECH (November 1939).

".....Ambassador Grew said that American opinion is strongly opposed to some of the things the Japanese armed forces are doing in China today and that America can hardly afford to tolerate the jeopardization of its long-established rights in East Asia. The Ambassador appears to assume that the burden of improving relations with the Japanese, presumably through reconsideration of the situation and a change of their attitude. The whole procedure has assumed the appearance of Japan being taken to task by the Ambassador, and the Japanese public cannot help being disappointed by this, for what

it wanted was a practical suggestion for improving Japanese-American relations on a constructive basis....."

No. 16. REGIONAL WORLD NEW ORDERS (March 1940, p 147).

Is there any other nation besides Japan which is capable of maintaining peace and order in the Far East? If new world orders are to be brought about regionally, there is no doubt that Japan is the only fit nation to take the lead in East Asia. What is noteworthy in this respect is that, in her efforts to dispose of the China affair, Japan is endeavoring to establish a tripartite relationship of mutual help and cooperation with Manchuokuo and China as the basis for a new order in this part of the world. Japan is planning to negotiate on a footing of equality with the new Central Government in China (that of Wang, the puppet)....."

No. 17. AMERICA'S FAR EASTERN POLICY (June 1940, p 355).

That Japan is willing to go half-way in order to realize a peaceful settlement with the United States has been shown by the recent speeches of Premier Yonai and Foreign Minister Arita. It is the United States, however, which, though avowing peace in her diplomatic policy, is in practice extremely negative and passive to peace.....

No. 18. IS JAPAN-AMERICA WAR COMING? (October 1940, p 584).

"....As long as America sticks to the policy of cooperating with Britain in applying ever increasing pressure upon Japan, war is inevitable sooner or later....."

No. 19. TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE (November 1940, p 647).

"On September 27 Japan entered into a treaty of alliance with Germany and Italy. The consensus of world opinion seems to be that the most significant point of the pact lies in Article 3, which reads "Japan, Germany and Italy ...undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three contracting parties..." There can be no doubt that this is a very important provision susceptible of more than one interpretation. Since Japan is a great naval power capable of keeping the Western Pacific under control, the occurence of such an affair (as foreseen in that article)...is likely to develop....into a world war.

Be that as it may, The Oriental Economist is of the opinion that a still more important meaning of the new triple alliance lies in the fact that a new conception

of future world order has thereby been advanced. The idea entertained by the three countries is to establish a new order independently in Greater East Asia and in Europe....In other words, the central idea is internationalism founded upon great regionalism...."

No. 20. JAPAN'S PROBLEMS IN 1941 (January 1941).

"The world will no doubt undergo great changes as the European war develops. No matter how considerable such changes may be, it is unquestionably by her own strength alone, especially economic strength, that Japan can defend herself. What Japan is up against in 1941 is how to foster and manifest this strength. Hitherto, the task has by no means been neglected, but it cannot be said that no stone has been left unturned....."

No. 21. JAPAN FACES THE INEVITABLE (February 1941, p 74).

"A Japanese ode singing of the spirit of swordsmanship says: When swords are crossed, plunge in, for nothing is lost: to withdraw is certain death. That is the only method of survival for Japan, Germany and Italy for whom there is no other choice. Hence we propose that Japan go to the aid of Germany and Italy no matter what the cost, so that they may emerge victorious in the European struggle.....This is the reason why we have for some time been urging that Japan and America should bury their hatchets and cooperate in terminating the wars in Europe and East Asia.

Conditions today have entirely changed. To attain the same objective now it is essential for Japan to make up her mind to aid Germany and Italy to the fullest extent and fight the war to the finish. The situation has become so critical that nothing could be gained now from a mere appeasement policy".

No. 22. COMMENT ON MATSUOKA'S TRIP TO EUROPE (p 176).

"Japan's first and foremost duty will be to make common cause with Germany and Italy and prepare for the worst: and then, if possible, try to straighten up relations with America. There can be no other way out....."

No. 23. JAPAN-FRENCH INDO-CHINA AGREEMENT (June 1941, p 289).

"The recent conclusion of an economic agreement between Japan and French Indo-China is a step forward in the establishment of a new order in East Asia".

No. 24. TRIPLE ALLIANCE PIVOTAL POLICY (July 1941).

"As the tension in German-American relations mounts momentarily, Japan's attitude and intentions are being watched with keen interest. If the German Italian combination finally clashes with the United States, what will Japan do?....In as much as Japan is signatory to the Tripartite Pact it is only natural that she should remain faithful to the treaty. (Then a question is raised what Japan should do if America would not attack, but will be attacked, should Japan still fulfill her obligations under the pact?) - Should the Japanese Government by any chance seek refuge in such an interpretation, Japan would be branded as a country of bad faith. It would bring on her good name shame which would not be obliterated for a long time to come....if there is any doubt about the attitude of the Japanese nation in such an emergency, it would be a gross mistake even in the absence of any elucidation from the government".

No. 25. LABOR IN TIME OF WAR (August 1941, p 404).

"....One of the most notable methods of strengthening labor control adopted in Japan is the enforcement of the National Work-Record Pass-book Registration Law to which reference has already been made. In accordance with this Law each and every wage earner in the important industry....must have (all details concerning him)....recorded in the....notebook which, while he is in employment, his employer must take custody of. The employer is authorized to refuse the return.... of the....notebook....."

(p 407)

"As of April 30 of this year, the member societies that had entered the "service-to-the-nation-through-industry" movement numbered about 50,000 with a total membership exceeding 5 million. The rate of increase is being accelerated.

This prosperity in the patriotic industrial labor movement, coupled with the growing tension of internation relations, led to the voluntary wind-up in July, 1940, of the labor union based on class consciousness. Thus ended in Japan that product of liberalistic ideology, trade unionism. That the trade union went out of existence of its own accord, and not be pressure from the government, speaks eloquently of the distinctive character of the Japanese spirit which the occidental mind has difficulty in comprehending.

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No. 26. CONFIDENCE PLACED IN TOJO CABINET (December 1941, p 640).

By assuming the duties after the Konoe Cabinet had so relinquished its work, the succeeding Tojo Administration, it is inferred, must have means of carrying out State policies without encountering a dissension of Cabinet opinion. In a Cabinet with a predetermined policy and with power and ability to translate that into action, the nation is ready to repose an unqualified confidence. Moreover the Tojo Cabinet is the most powerful one which can be desired under the present circumstances. This is conviction of all.....

Premier Tojo is in a position where the administration of the State Affairs and the Supreme Command can go well together in a much better degree that ever been the case. If so, of all the Cabinets of the past, this one under Gen. Tojo, is well qualified to handle deftly the disposition of the China Incident, general foreign relations, internal affairs, financial and economic matters. What Japan is in dire necessity today is a strong Cabinet such as the Tojo Cabinet gives every indication of being. (This issue went to press on 6 December 1941).

No. 27. COMMENT ON PEARL HARBOR (January 1941, p 24).

"All the world is planet-struck at the signal and sweeping successes achieved by the Japanese naval forces....at Pearl Harbor and off the coast of Malaya".

G.H.Q
政治部御中

Tom
See me
9/1

Dear

The criterion for the purging of journalists and publishers was decided and their purging was to be carried out without delay. In my opinion, it is essential for Japan's democratization to carry out their purging thoroughly. However, according to the recent statement made by the government, each publisher is permitted to present "counter-evidences" whereby even a publisher affected by G category may be rescued from purging. I am of the opinion that there is a danger in this measure of the journalistic purge being conducted incompletely.

At present, publishers have begun vigorous campaigns for "counter-evidences". The Toyo Keizai Shimposha (The Oriental Economist) is undoubtedly one of the influential publishers that are believed to be exempt from purging. The reason for exemption, which is generally rumored, is that it is too hard upon the Oriental Economist to purge it in view of its former "anti-militarist" stand. In connection with this, I would like to expose a concealed fact in order to prove that the Oriental Economist was not "anti-militarist", and to demonstrate the dangerous nature of the governmental measure to permit a publisher to present "counter-evidences".

As far as I know, the Toyo Keizai Shimposha utilized its "anti-militarist" mask and its reputation as such to de-

ceive foreign countries and actually co-operated with the military for its preparation for the Pacific War, at least, for the attack of Hongkong. In the autumn of 1939, the Oriental Economist sent a correspondent named Bunji Tokuhiro to Hongkong. He stayed at a Japanese-owned hotel called Matsubara, #20, Icehouse Street for about a year. During that time, he always carried a camera to take pictures of strategically important place in Hongkong. In this way, the Oriental Economist made its correspondent serve the military as its spy.

There is an undestructible evidence in an issue of the Oriental Economist proving the truth of this story. In the September 16,1939 issue of the Oriental Economist, the editor writes as follows on page 76, "Mr. Bunji Tokuhiro has been dispatched to Hongkong as our correspondent. He has already sailed for Hongkong via Shanghai in the end of August. Please take a kindly interest in him." He seems to have escaped the British police there, but he was not able to deceive the Japanese there. The Japanese correspondents, Japanese employees in Japanese firms, Japanese bankers, who were in Hongkong at that time, know full details of his actions there. If it is necessary to summon Bunji Tokuhiro, you will surely find his address through the Oriental Economist.

The above is a fact that I know full well myself. Judging from the above story, it cannot be said that the Oriental Economist did not send any other secret agent to

other places in China and the South Seas. As is evident from the above, the Oriental Economists does not only deserve to be purged, but is guilty of war criminal activity.

The Central Screening Board, which has been sympathetic toward the Oriental Economist and probably does not know anything about the above-mentioned fact, may perhaps accept the counter-evidences that the Oriental Economist will provide favorably to it. There will be no question about it.

Therefore, I feel I am bound by duty to report the fact to you.

Yours respectfully

A Journalist.

Japanese Edition of the

APPENDIX "A"

EXCERPTS FROM ORIENTAL ECONOMIST

(July 1937 to December 1941)

31 July 1937 World Economic Review

Title: New developments on the North China incident. What is the real cause for aggravation of the situation?

Excerpt:

With the development of the situation as such, favorable outcome would be unlikely even if an agreement is met between the Tienchin and the Kihchay authorities in the suppression of anti-Japanese activities. As a matter of fact, the non-aggravation policy with its resultant hesitancies has actually brought about, quite an (aggravated) situation contrary to expectations. Therefore, it would be to undergo a drastic operation establishing a condition enabling the Kihchay authorities to execute or to be forced to execute the spirit of the agreement.

21 August 1937

Title: German trade control and its facilities and functions.

Excerpt:

When Hitler came to power, a change for the better was soon made noticeable. The German people seemed suddenly awakened with new hopes. It was as if the sun had suddenly risen to the sky. Even the faces of unemployed on the street looked cheerful. It was a sudden change. This writer was impressed by the difference that hope can bring to people.

4 September 1937

Title: To the Chinese people: Solution unlikely if anti-Japanese activities continue.

Excerpt:

"When Premier Konoyg was on his way back from his visit with Prince Saionji, he stated, "there is no other way but to suppress and rid China of her will to fight. And to do this not only with our military might but also with all other conceivable means".

We are heartily in accord with his statement.

~~Oriental Economist~~ (Editorial) January 14, 1939

Title: The Position of the Japanese Government in regards to China

China and the Three Great Powers must acknowledge this Position

Excerpt: Though Japan is said to be waging an undeclared war, she is without any question the victor. As the victor, Italy did not tell Ethippia that she did not have any designs for territorial acquisitions, and she also did not say that she was not going to carry out a monopolistic economy. Even if Japan does have designs for territorial acquistions, which country, aside from making protests on moral grounds, can prevent her from attaining this end in this present international situation?

~~Oriental Economist~~ (Comments) February 18, 1939

Title: The Significance of the Occupation of Hainan Island

Important as Key Military Positions

Excerpt: In order to check the Chiang Kai Shek Government, which is anti-Japn and which had its start in Southwestern China, politically and militarily, it was not enough to stop at Canton. It was necessary to advance Southward to secure key positions whereby pressure could be applied in a wide area.

~~A Check Against England, America, and France~~

Moreover, the matter which cannot be overlooked is a check against the activities of England, America, and France. It is a well known fact that these countries are busy supporting the policies of the Chiang Kai Shek government, ans as mentioned previously, they are active in the Louichow Peninsula, French-Indo China, and Burma. Therefore, if our troops are stationed at strategic places on the Hainan Island, it is possibble to put up an adquate check against the forces mentioned above.

~~Oriental Economist~~ (Editorial) March 11, 1937

Title: An Appeal to Education Minister Araki

Necessity for Reforming the University System and its Course of Action

Excerpt: The "Screening" (TN Removing undesirable elements in schools, especially, liberals and communists) at Tokyo Imperial University has been generally completed. Instructiors connected with the economi department, were dismissed or rsigned, and the greater portion of the assistan instructors and assistants remain.

However, it is evident that the problems of the University were not solvedlthrough the resignation of some instructor. The easiest act the Education Ministry can do is to dismiss persosn. The authority of ht Education Ministry is limited to such rights. However, it is not profitable for the nation or the educational circles if their authority is limited as mentioned above. Rather than taking the above course, it is most necessary to reform the University System which has been a problem hitherto.

The writher thinks it is very strange that through discussions on the limits of authority of various individuals and through adjustments of a faction of the faculty, Araki, Education Minister, and the Education Ministry possess an attitude that everything will be settled. The points mentioned above are the details and not the main points. Does the Education Minister think that because several university instructiors quit, the university education can be reformed? The writer thanks that reform cannot be brought about merely through such spiritual policy, and it is natural that the system must be affected. Looking at the results, doesn't it seem as if the Education Ministry is not exerting much efforty.

18 January 1941 Editorial

Title: Prepare for the worst in the Japanese-American relations.

Excerpt:

"The United States has already embarked upon undeclared war against Germany. This action against Germany simultaneously is an action against Japan, the ally of Germany. Soon she, the U. S. will give open support to the Chiang Kai-shek faction. The relations between Japan and America have become extremely serious. It would be extremely dangerous if we overlook the ever-critical overall developments by relying on the perspective colored with slightest wishful thinking."

18 January 1941 Editorial

Excerpt: ~~Title:~~ In case of a war against the United States such a war would basically be economic. Therefore, with the outbreak of war, the problems would mainly center around the establishment of policies for the conversion of the Japanese economy appropriation of basic materials from Southern areas and maintenance of foreign markets. Preparations can never too soon.

8 February 1941 Editorial

Title: Know position and character of America. Display utmost intricacy in strategy.

Excerpt:

"The United States may believe in her sophisticated and superior position in the Orient. However, it is a reknown fact that in case of a clash between Japanese and American Naval Forces on the Western Pacific, the odds would be definitely in favor of Japan.

2 August 1941 Editorial

Title: Japanese-American Relation. What the people can expect. Mutual defensive efforts of Japan and French-Indo China and the attitudes of Britain and United States.

Excerpt:

"Following the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance this writer had pointed out and warned the government and the people that it would be futile to employ soft diplomacy against United States".

"It might be true that certain quarters in our country are still maintaining hopes in the "soft" policy. However, we feel that the existing situation is too alarming and dangerous to rely on such hopes. We urge the government and the people to stand in readiness".

2 August 1941 Events of the World

Title: Possibility of Japanese-American War.

Excerpt:

"Even if the situation may appear somewhat modified concerning the effects of the freezing order, we must be aware that the die has already been cast".

19 November 1941 Editorial

Title: The Pacific and Singapore.

Excerpt:

"Our diplomacy has reached the very last stage. We must now be ready to withdraw from the diplomatic front and embark upon the second front at a moment's notice".

29 November 1941 Editorial

Title: Need for the establishment of a lasting totalitarian structure.

Excerpt:

"As repeatedly stated, the existing wartime totalitarian economic structure has been established solely to meet wartime needs. However, with the view to abundance of raw material and intensified world economic competition in the postwar period, a mechanical structure established only to meet the wartime objectives cannot be adopted. It is felt most urgent that a totalitarian structure in peacetime as well as in war be planned and put into effect. A sound planned economy must be established with due consideration to these aspects rather than as a temporary feature.

6 December 1941 Editorial

Title: Prepare for both peace and war

Excerpt:

"Frankly we feel that the situation will become worse if the negotiation is accomplished. Because when the agreement is met it will mean that Tojo's three basic principles would be carried out through diplomatic process. A third country will not interfere in the successful conclusion of the China incident. There will not be a threat of war inflicted upon the Empire by surrounding nations".

"However, the problem is that the United States is only willing to come to an agreement while she is facing Germany, her strongest enemy. We have been warned of consequences if we are to rest at ease. There are enough reasons to fear without being malice of the intention of United States."

"In the final analysis, the power is what count, and the most important one of all is the military strength".

"In the event that the agreement is not between United States and Japan, the people must ever more exert their efforts in building the strength of our country".

Form 2 (2)

Notes:

By reorganization which took place later, the following changes have taken place in the organization:

1. From March 22, 1941, the system involving the managing director and concurrently editor-in-chief, and acting editor-in-chief was abolished, and the system adopting presidency took its place. At the same time, the general affairs department and the business department were abolished and the business administration department and the interior department were newly created.

2. Because of the loss of referential data, details of other changes in minor offices are not available.

3. The post of acting editor was left vacant during the period from the resignation of Shuhei KAMBARA up to the time of the reorganization abolishing that post.

4. The post of the chief of editorial department was left vacant during the period from the resignation of Hideo YAMADA on April 30, 1938 up to the time of the appointment of Tokuji UCHIYAMA to that post.

x x x x x x

Form 2

ORGANIZATION OF THE TOYO KEIZAI SHIMPO-SHA
(July, 1937 to December, 1941)

(1) Managing Director and
concurrently Editor-
in-Chief:
President:
Executive Director

-(2) Acting Editor-in-Chief:
Chief, Editorial Department:
Vice-Chief, Editorial Department:

(3) Chief, Adjustment Division:
Chief, International Economic Division:
Chief, Domestic Economic Division:
Chief, Industrial Economic Division:
Chief, The Oriental Economist:
Chief, Research Division.

-(2) Chief, Business Department:

Chief, Business Administration Department:
Vice-Chief, Business Administration Department:

(3) Chief, Business Division:
Chief, Publication Division:
Chief, Printing Division:
Chief, Sales Division:
Chief, Advertising Division.

-(2) Chief, General Affairs Department:
Vice-Chief, General Affairs Department.

-(2) Chief, Interior Department:

(3) Chief, Accounts Division:
Chief, General Affairs Division.

-(2) Branch bureau chiefs.

Please refer to notes on the following page:

JB/TOE/KP/10513

CONFIDENTIAL

CIVIL CENSORSHIP DETACHMENT
CIS—MIS—GHQ—SCAP
APO 500

Toyo Keizai

FROM: SEE COMMENT	LIST:	TO: SEE COMMENT	LIST:

DISTRIBUTION: STA LOCAL:	Date of Commun:	Dispos of Commun:	Eval-Alloc:
GS ESS/FI ESS/AC	Various	Observed	206-8-27
	Type of Commun: Telephones	Language: Japanese	Prev. Records:
	Prep. Date: 26 Aug 47	Comment by: Various	None relevant

COMMENT

FINANCE: ESTABLISHMENT OF FIRM BY PURGED

FORMER FINANCE MINISTER ASSOCIATED WITH

21 Aug 47

FROM:
SHINDWA
YAMAICHI SHOKEN
(Yamaichi Securities)
177, O-machi, Miyagi-ken,
Japan
Tel. Sendai 2836

TO:
YAMAICHI SHOKEN
(Yamaichi Securities)
1-3, Kabuto-cho, Nihonbashi,
Tokyo, Japan
Tel. No. 66-3141

Tokyo party asked SHINDWA of Sendai if the company planned to be established at Aomori Senbon has been approved yet.

Sendai party said that an application for permit to sell stocks worth four million yen (¥ 4,000,000) has been filed here, but because of the present state of affairs, he believed that it will be difficult to get the approval. He also affirmed that the remaining six million yen (¥ 6,000,000) will be furnished by the NIHON MEKKA KOGYO (Ex: Japan Mekka Industry) and notable politicians like Mr. SHIDEHARA and Mr. ISHIBASHI (List: 5094). Upon mentioning Mr. ISHIBASHI's name, Tokyo party advised the speaker to avoid mentioning the name in public, and to do all direct business with ISHIBASHI's Secretary, Mr. MIYAGAWA of TOYO KEIZAI (Ex: Asiatic Economics). (Presumably a name of magazine).

(Comment by: TG 2034)

Could be be getting instruction from ISHIBASHI on the papers' policy?
Sorrow

- 1 -

(Continued)

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CCD Form No. 1

CONFIDENTIAL

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JP/TOK/TP/10518

NEW FIRM ESTABLISHED WITH FORMER STATESMEN
AS CHAIRMEN

15 Aug 47
FROM:

YAMAICHI SHOKEN
(Yamaichi Securities)
177, 4 O-machi, Sendai,
Japan
Tele: Sendai 2838

TO:

YAMAICHI SHOKEN
(Yamaichi Securities)
Tokyo, Japan
Tele: 66-8141

Sendai party: "Have you heard about the new firm which is going to be organised soon? It's supposed to be named the NIHON MEKKA K.K. (Japan Mekka Industry) and its capital is said to be ten million yen (¥ 10,000,000). This firm is being established after it gets its independence from the YUKA KOGYO (Ex: Oil and Fat Chemical Industry). The factory is to be built at Sanbongi, Aomori Prefecture. Two of the chairmen of this new firm are ISHIBASHI Tanzan (List: 5094) (Ex: Former Finance Minister of YOSHIDA Cabinet), and SHIDEHARA Kijuro (Ex: A Former Premier)."

Examiner's Note: Meaning of 'Mekka' not clear.

(Comment by: TG 4002)

NEW COMPANY PLANNED IN AOMORI WITH FORMER
AS STOCKHOLDERS

14 Aug 47
FROM:

YAMAICHI SHOKEN K.K.
(Yamaichi Securities Co.,
Ltd.)
1-3, Kabuto-cho, Chuo-ku,
Tokyo, Japan
Tele: 66-3152

TO:

YAMAICHI SHOKEN K.K.
(Yamaichi Securities Co., Ltd.)
177, 4 O-machi, Sendai-shi,
Miyagi-ken, Japan
Tele: Sendai 2838

In a partly monitored call, Tokyo party revealed that the NIHON YUKA KOGYO was planning to establish a company in Aomori with a capital of ten million yen (¥ 10,000,000) of which six million yen (¥ 6,000,000) would be furnished by former stockholders. Among these stockholders it was revealed that Mr. SHIDEHARA's and Mr. ISHIBASHI's (List: 5094) names are included.

Examiner's Note: Mr. ISHIBASHI Tanzan, former Finance Minister.

(Comment by: TP 3034)

Confidential

Form 1

DIRECTORS AND STAFF MEMBERS OF THE TOYO KEIZAI SHIMPO-SHA (July, 1937 to December, 1941)

Positions held	Names	Assumed office	Resigned office	Present position	Address	Note
Managing Director & Chief-Editor	ISHIBASHI, Tanzan	Feb., 18, 1937	March 21, 1941	None	705 Ohmachi, Kamakura City, Kanagawa Pref.	Left company May 23, 1946
Acting Chief-Editor	KAMBARA, Shuhei	Mar., 4, 1937	Oct., 9, 1940	None	410 Keidomachi, Setagayaku, Tokyo.	Left company Oct.22, 1945
President	ISHIBASHI, Tanzan	Mar. 22, 1941	May 23, 1941	None	As listed	As listed
Executive Director	MIYAKAWA, Saburo	Mar. 22, 1941	-	Representative Director	1,143 Rokuchome, Zoshigaya, Toshimaku, Tokyo	-
"	YAMADA, Hideo	Mar. 22, 1941	-	Executive Director	1,852 Egotamachi, Itabashiku, Tokyo	-
Director	MIURA, Tetsutaro	Feb. 18, 1937	Feb. 15, 1940	-	951 Nichome Higashi, Otaku, Tokyo	-
"	KAMBARA, Shuhei	Feb. 18, 1937	Oct. 22, 1940	"	As listed	As listed
"	SATO, Ihei	Oct. 22, 1940	Oct. 31, 1946	-	Kohnoki, Otaku, Tokyo	Left company Oct. 30, 1946

Form 1 (2)

Auditor	ONO, Bun-ei	Feb. 18, 1937	Feb. 14, 1941	Member, Editorial Staff	146 Kamimachi, Kuribayashimachi, Kitakatsushikagun, Saitama Prefecture	-
"	UCHIYAMA, Tokuji	Feb. 15, 1941	Oct. 21, 1941	None	289 Mimamisenzoku-machi, Otaku, Tokyo	Left company Oct. 21, 1941
"	NOZAWA, Yoshio	Feb. 15, 1941	-	Auditor	1,275 Matsunoki-machi, Suginami-ku, Tokyo	-
Chief, Editorial Dept.	YAMADA, Hideo	May 1, 1931	April 30, 1938	As listed	As listed	-
"	UCHIYAMA, Tokuji	Sept.23, 1938	Oct. 21, 1940	None	As listed	-
"	NEZU, Tomoyoshi	Oct. 22, 1940	Sept. 3, 1941	None	419 Nichome, Saginomiya, Nakanoku, Tokyo	Left company, Oct. 21, 1941
"	SATO, Ihei	Sept. 4, 1941	March 31, 1946	None	As listed	-
"	YAMADA, Hideo	April 1, 1946	-	As listed	As listed	
Vice-Chief, Editorial Dept.	NEZU, Tomoyoshi	Nov. 15, 1939	Oct. 21, 1940	None	As listed	As listed

Form 1 (3)

Vice-Chief, Editorial Dept.	MAEDA, Kiyomi	Oct. 22, 1940	April 8, 1945	Director	316 Sanchome, Mabashi, Suginamiku, Tokyo	
"	WATANO, Shuzo	Oct. 22, 1940	Sept. 14, 1945	Director	Minamirokujo, Nikaidomura, Yamabegun, Nara Prefecture.	
Chief, Adjustment Division, Editorial Dept.	SAITO, Koji	Sept.28, 1938,	Nov. 14, 1939	Director	3240 Kichijoji, Musashinomachi, Tokyo	
Chief, International Economic Division, Editorial Dept.	NEZU, Tomoyoshi	April 8, 1937	Nov. 14, 1939	None	As listed	As listed
Chief, Domestic Economic Division, Editorial Department.	WATANO, Shuzo	Sept.8, 1938	Nov. 14, 1939	Director	As listed	
Chief, Industrial Division, Editorial Department	TOGAI, Yoshio	Nov. 13, 1939	Oct. 21, 1940	Director	As listed	
Chief, Industrial Economic Division, Editorial Dept.	OGURA, Masataro	Sept.28, 1938	April 19, 1939	Director	1856 Egotamachi, Itabashiku, Tokyo	
"	MAEDA, Kiyomi	April 30, 1939	Oct. 21 1940	Director	As listed	

Form 1 (4)

Chief, Oriental Economist.	~~OISHI, Shunosuke~~	~~Sept. 1, 1934~~	~~Dec. 7, 1941~~	~~None~~		~~Died, June 15, 1947~~
Chief, Research Division, Editorial Department	OGUMA Takashi	April 8, 1937	Nov. 19, 1940	Auditor	503 Numabukuromachi, Nakanoku, Tokyo	
Chief, Business Dept.	KAMBARA, Shuhei	Aug. 10, 1936	March 7, 1937	None	As listed	As listed
"	MIURA, Seiki	Mar. 8, 1937	Sept. 22, 1938	None	514 Nichome, Matsubaramachi, Setagayaku, Tokyo	Left company, Sept. 23, 1938
"	MIYAKAWA, Saburo	Oct. 10, 1940	March 21, 1941	As listed	As listed	
Chief, Business Division (Chief, Printing division)	YAMAMOTO, Heihachiro	Oct. 25, 1940	March 21, 1941	None	587 Itchome, Kamiuma, Setagayaku, Tokyo	Left company, June, 1941
Chief, Business Administration Dept.	YAMAMOTO, Heihachiro	March 22, 1941	July 21, 1942	None	"	"
Chief, Publication Div.	MATSUNAGA, Wakichi	Sept.23, 1938	Oct. 24, 1940	Auditor	2761 Kichijoji, Musashinomachi, Tokyo	

Form 1 (5)

Chief, Printing Division	KOYAMA, Sakuji	Feb. 7, 1939	Oct. 25, 1940	None	Konanso, 16 Sakuragaoka, Shibuyaku, Tokyo	Left company, Oct. 3, 1941
Chief, Sales Division	YAMAMOTO, Heihachiro	Feb. 7, 1939	Oct. 24, 1940	None	As listed	As listed
Chief, Accounts Division(1)	~~OHNO, Kametaro~~	~~Oct. 30, 1940~~	~~Oct. 21, 1941~~	~~None~~		~~Dead~~
" (2)	~~OHNO, Kametaro~~	~~Mar. 22, 1941~~	~~Oct. 21, 1941~~	~~None~~		~~"~~
Chief, Advertising Division	MATSUNAGA, Wakichi	Oct. 25, 1940	July 6, 1942	As listed	As listed	
Chief, General Affairs Division (3)	NOZAWA, Yoshio	Mar. 22, 1941	Mar. 21, 1942	As listed	As listed	

(1) as division of General Affairs Dept.: (2) As division of Interior Dept.: (3) concurrently held.