

The following documents are excerpts from the Pearl Harbor
Report as shown below:

- > 1500-A-2 - Pages 1006 - 1012, Volume 14
- 1500-Z-1, J-2 - Pages 1000 - 1002, Volume 14
- 1500-C-2 - Pages 1061 - 1062, Volume 14
- 1500-B-2 - Pages 1013 - 1013, Volume 14

D. D. 1500-A-2

Exhibit No. 11 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

Memorandum dated Oct. 16, 1940, from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Hart, concerning a proposed blockade of Japan in the event of aggressive action over the reopening of the Burma Road.

EXHIBIT NO. 11

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

A16/01687

Long Beach, California
October 16, 1940

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
To: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.
Subject: International situation - Reenforcement of the Asiatic Fleet.
Enclosures: (A) Copy of assumptions.
(B) Copy of tentative operations.

1. During the recent visit of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, to Washington and on October 10, the Secretary told the Commander-in-Chief that the President was considering, in connection with possible retaliatory measures taken by Japan against Great Britain upon opening of the Burma Road, the following:

- (a) Reenforcement of the Asiatic Fleet as a peace-time move.
- (b) Declaring a complete embargo on shipments to and from Japan.
- (c) Attempting to stop all trade between Japan and the Americas. To accomplish this latter measure, he (the President) proposed establishment of patrol lines of light forces from Honolulu westward to the Philippines and a second line roughly from Samoa to Singapore, "in support of" the first line. The impracticability of this and other suggestions was explained to the Secretary, and, after some further conversations dealing with eventualities and at the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, and his War Plans Officer in conjunction with the War Plans Division of the Chief of Naval Operations' office, submitted a memorandum (Enclosure A) of assumptions outlining the situation presented by the Secretary and a brief outline sketch of operations (Enclosure B) by the U. S. Fleet to meet the assumptions in a more practicable manner. This was submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations on October 11 for submission to the Secretary and the President as to what the Navy proposed to do if directed to proceed on the proposed assumptions and tentative decisions.



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Subject: International situation - Reenforcement of
the Asiatic Fleet.

2. To date, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, has had no further word in regard to the memorandum referred to above, but received a despatch today from the Chief of Naval Operations directing that a copy be forwarded to you via the HOUSTON. It is believed that further study in the Department and in the Fleet will result in some modifications in the operations proposed for the Fleet, particularly as regards distribution of patrol planes and cruisers.

3. The further operations indicated in paragraph 9 of Enclosure (B) are measures for the reduction and occupation of the Marshall Islands, or a feint in the Mid-Pacific which will be initiated when a train is assembled and transports are ready. Due to the situation in the Atlantic, the Department did not feel that our main Fleet should get too far in the Pacific, as it might be necessary to call it back on short notice. It was felt, however, that active operations against ORANGE possessions might have a deterring effect on ORANGE full scale operations in the South China Sea and Dutch East Indies.

4. It will be noted that the above operations parallel very closely the present ORANGE Plan, modified by the despatch of an Advance Force to the Asiatic and further modified by the restriction of main Fleet operations to the Mid-Pacific area.

5. I was further told, in the Department that no Army forces would be available and that the British had agreed to the United States' use of Singapore.

6. In the event that the assumptions are not realized prior to about January 1, 1941, or decision is not reached to despatch the Advance Detachment before that time, there was discussion of assembling a train and transports in West Coast ports and holding a full dress rehearsal of operations against an atoll, as a Fleet exercise utilizing Christmas Island as a site. Steps are being taken for the acquisition and conversion of the necessary transports, etc., to be ready around that time. If this is done, the reenforcement of the Asiatic Fleet may take place coincidentally with this exercise, the idea being that Japan will be impressed by this evidence of United States determination to protect its interests. I presume you will be further informed of this eventuality as plans are more fully developed.

7. My secret serial A16/01683 of this date, covering the composition and preparation of the tentative detachment slated for reenforcement of the Asiatic Fleet, in case such a move is ordered, was forwarded to

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October 16, 1940

Subject: International situation - Reenforcement of the
Asiatic Fleet.

you by clipper locked box, a copy being sent on the HOUSTON
with this letter.

8. It is hereby certified that the originator considers
it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner
as will permit a classification other than secret.

J. O. RICHARDSON

Copy to: (via airmail)

Opnav (This copy canceled by OpNav despatch
192000 of Oct. 6)

Defense Note: Portion below signature in handwriting.

SECRET

MEASURES AND OPERATIONS TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE U.S. FLEET

1. Mobilize U. S. Fleet, in accordance with Orange Plan.
2. Redispose forces now in the Atlantic as follows:
 - a. Move 2 heavy cruisers and one division of 4 Old Destroyers to Southern Brazil - Uruguay, and Argentine ports, basing locally or on Falkland Islands in order to interdict ORANGE trade and protection of U. S. Shipping.
 - b. Move 2 heavy cruisers, one aircraft carrier, and 4 destroyers (from Pacific) to cover west coast ports of South America, basing locally or at Panama.
 - c. Move 18 Old Destroyers to Pacific for local defense and protection of U. S. Shipping as follows: -
 - 9 to Puget Sound and Alaska
 - 5 to San Francisco
 - 4 to Hawaii
 - d. Move one aircraft carrier, one light cruiser, two transports, one destroyer tender, all new destroyers, one Destroyer transport, plus 1st Marine Brigade (now at Guantanamo), and three new submarines, and three old submarines to West Coast.
 - e. Move PatWing 5 (___planes) with tenders to San Diego for local coastal defense (relieve PatWings 1 and 4).
3. Take measures for defense of Alaska as follows:
 - a. Dispatch two submarines and small tender to Dutch Harbor.
 - b. Reenforce Marine garrison at Dutch Harbor by remainder of defense battalion, housing them in vessels chartered for the purpose.

Exhibit No. 11

Op-12B-2-McC

10-11-40

SECRET

- e. Dispatch 2 OSS for defense of SAMOA.
- f. Dispatch 2 Patrons of Patwing ONE to HAWAII (24 Planes) after relief by Patwing FIVE.
- 8. Dispatch remainder of Subrons FOUR and SIX (Approximately 14 SS) to CAROLINES and MARSHALLS for preliminary reconnaissance operations.
- 9. Upon completion of mobilization preparations, assemble Fleet in HAWAII prepared to initiate further measures as the situation requires.
- 10. Assist in defense of U. S. Shipping by the detail of certain Fleet Forces to Coastal Frontier forces. In the Pacific this will be comprise: -

4 DM to HAWAII

3 OCL to Pacific Coastal Frontier.

Exhibit No. 11

SECRET

October 11, 1940

U.S. FLEET Dispositions and Operations to meet special situation in Western Pacific.

ASSUMPTIONS.

1. The Gravity of the situation existing today is intensified by the opening of the Burma Road by Great Britain.

2. The Japanese announce or indicate that the opening of the Burma Road is an act unfriendly to Japan.

3. The Japanese undertake retaliatory measures to enforce cooperation with Japan by Great Britain in the Far East.

4. Japan undertakes positive aggressive action to enforce full cooperation by the Dutch East Indies.

5. The United States proclaims complete embargo on shipments from the United States or United States possessions to Japan and non-intercourse with Japan.

6. The United States undertakes by diplomatic and naval action to prevent Japanese trade, in Japanese ships and in ships of other nations, with the Western Hemisphere.

7. The United States will support British forces in the Western Pacific, - in Australia and Singapore, - and Dutch forces in the Dutch East Indies in stopping Japanese trade south of China Sea - Celebes Sea area.

8. The United States is prepared to accept war if the measures taken cause Japan to declare war.

9. Great Britain will prevent any naval aggression in the Western Atlantic against the Western Hemisphere by the Axis Powers.

10. The situations and decisions by the United States assumed herein may arise 17 October, 1940.



眞珠灣攻撃調査聯合委員會書證第一一號
 ビルマ道路再開ニ關シテ侵略行爲ガ行ハレル場合ヲ考ヘテ日本ヲ遮斷スル
 企圖ニ關シテ「リチャード海軍大將ヨリ「ハート」海軍大將ニ宛テター一九
 四〇年昭和十五年十月十六日附覺書

書證第一一號

司令長官係存書類綴第

一六〇一六八七

號

合衆國艦隊旗艦「ニューメキシコ」號

「カリフォルニア、ロングビーチ」ニテ

一九四〇年／昭和十五年十月十六日

合衆國艦隊司令長官發

合衆國アジア艦隊司令長官宛

題目。國際情勢—アジア艦隊ノ増強

添附文書(イ) 假定事項一通

(ロ) 假定作戰一通

一、合衆國艦隊司令長官が最近十月十日「ワシントン」ヲ訪問シタ際國務長官ハ彼ニ對シビルマ道路閉鎖ニ關連シテイギリスニ對シ日本ガ執ルト思ハル報復手段ニツキ大統領ハ目下次ノ事ニ考案中デアルト語ツタ。

(a) 平時編成替トシテアジア艦隊ヲ増強スルコト

(b) 日本トノ輸出入品ノ完全ナル禁止ヲ宣言スルコト

(c) 日米間ノ全通商ヲ停止スルヨウツトムルコト、コノ最後ノ方策ヲ實現スル爲、彼—大統領—ハ「ホノルル」カラ西方「フィリッピン」諸島迄輕巡艦隊ノ巡察線ヲ設定コノ第一線ヲ補助スルタメ大略「サモア」島カラ「シンガポール」ニ至ル第二線ヲ設定スルコトヲ提案シタ。コノ提案及ビ他ノ提案ノ實行困難ヲ國務長官ニ對シテ説明シタ。而シテ將來起リ得

ル事ニツイテ更ニ協議ヲ重ネタ後、海軍作戦部長ノ意見ニ從ツテ、司令長官及ビ其參謀ハ海軍作戦部長官下ノ策野部員ト協同シテ國務長官ノ述べタ狀況ヲ概観シテノ假想事項覺察一添附書類(四)及ビコノ假定事項ヲヨリ具體的ニスル爲ニ合衆國艦隊作戦計畫案大要一添附書類(五)ヲ提出シタ。コレハ國務長官及ビ大統領ニ提出スル爲ニ十月十一日海軍策野部長ニ提出サレタモノデ、若シ提案サレタ假想事項及ビ實驗的決定事項ニ從ツテ進メルベク指令サレタ場合サレタ場合海軍ノトル方針ニ關スルモノデアツタ。

ニ 今日迄合衆國艦隊司令長官ハ前述ノ覺書ニ關シテ何等ノ回答ヲ得ナカツタガ今日海軍作戦部長カラ受取ツタ通知ニヨレバ「ヒューストン」號經由ニテ費下ニソノ寫シヲ送達スル様指令シタトノコトデアル。海軍省内及ビ艦隊ニ於イテ更ニ研究ヲ重ネレバ艦隊特ニ偵察機及巡洋艦ノ配置ニ關シテ計畫サレタ策野ヲ若干變改スルコトニナルデアラウト思ハレル。

三 添附書類(五)ノ第九節ニ警イテアルソレヨリ先ノ作戦ハ「マーシャル」群島ノ征服。占領手段デアリ、又輸送隊が集結サレ輸送船ノ用意が整ツタ時ニ

始メルベキ中部太平洋ニ於ケル牽制運動デア。太西洋ノ形勢ニ鑑ミ海軍省ハ我が主力艦隊ヲ至急ニ呼ビ戻ス必要ガアルコトヲ考慮シテ太平洋ニ余リ遠スギル地誌へ出動スルノヲ好マナカツタ。タゞシカシ「オレンデ」領土ニ對スル積極的作戰ハ南支那海及蘭領東印度ヲ含ム全面的「オレンデ」作戰ヲ妨害スル結果ニナルカモ知レナイト思ハレタ。

四 上述ノ策戰ハ現「オレンデ」作戰ト非常ニ近似シタモノデアリ後者ニハアジア前衛部隊ノ派遣又更ニ中部太平洋地區ノ主力艦隊策戰制限ガ加ハツテキル。

五 我ハ更ニ海軍省ニオイテ、陸軍部隊ハ使用出來ナイトイフコト及ビ「イギリス」ハ合衆國ガ「シंगाポール」ヲ使用スルノニ同意シタトイフ事ヲ聞イタ。

六 假想ガ一九四一年昭和十六年一月一日頃以前ニ實現シナカツタ場合、又ソノ時迄ニ前進部隊ヲ派遣スル事ニ決定シナイ場合ニハ、西海岸諸港ニ輸送隊及ビ輸送船ヲ集メ「クリスマス」島ノ如キヲ利用シテ艦隊演習トシテ珊瑚環礁ニ對スル完全武裝演習ヲ行フコトヲ討議シタ其頃迄ニコレニ必要ナ

輸送船、其ノ他ヲ手ニ入レ、改装スル手成ヲトツテキル。モシ是ガ行ハレ
レバ、合衆國ハ日國ノ艦艇ヲ防衛スルトイフ決意ノ證明ヲ日本ニ應ジサセ
ル爲メニアジア艦隊ノ増強ヲコノ演習ト同時ニ行フノデアル。コノ事ハ計
算ヲモツト十分ニ練ツタ上デ詳シク貴下ニ説明スル。

同日附私ノ秘密書類A一六〇一六六三號ハアジア艦隊ノ増強ニ關スル命
令ガ出タ場合ノ質級的部隊ノ編成及ビ準備ニ關スルモノデアルガ「クリ
ツパ」機ノ嚴封箱ノ中ニ入レテ貴下ニオ送リシタ、寫シハコノ手紙ト一語
ニ「ヒュースト」宛デ送ツタ。

八 筆者ハコノ書類ハ秘密以外ニハ分類サレテハナラヌ述べ方デアルト考ヘル事
チコ、ニ證スル。

ジエ。オー。リチャードリン

寫（航空便ニテ） O P A V へ

（コノ寫ハ十月六日付一九二〇〇〇號ノ O P N A V 便ニヨル）

辯護側註

下部ニ手記署名アリ

警證第一一號

O P I - 123121H O C

10111140

秘 密

合衆國艦隊ノトルベキ手段及ビ作戦

一 「オレンヂ」計畫ニ依リ合衆國艦隊ヲ動員ス

二 現在太西洋ニ在ル軍艦ヲ左ノ如ク再配艦ス

(a) 重巡洋艦二隻及ビ舊式驅逐艦四隻ヨリナル「ブラジル」南部「ウ

ルガイ」 「アルゼンチン」ノ諸港ニ遣リ、「オレンヂ」道商ヲ禁ジ、

合衆國船舶ヲ保護スル爲ニ該地又ハ「フォークランド」島ニ基地ヲオク。

(b) 重巡洋艦二隻、航空母艦一隻、驅逐艦四隻ハ太平洋カラ「チ南」 「アメリ

カ」ノ西洋岸ノ港ヲ保護スル爲ニ移動シ、該地又ハ「パナマ」ヲ根據地

トスル。

(c) 舊式驅逐艦十八隻ヲ各地ノ防備及ビ合衆國船舶保護ノ爲左ノ道太平洋ニ

移動ス。

九隻ヲ「プエージェットサウンド」及ビ「アラスカ」へ

五隻ヲ「サンフランシスコ」へ

口隻チ「ハワイ」へ

(c) 航空母艦一隻、輕巡洋艦一隻、輸送船二隻、新式驅逐艦全部、第一海兵團へ現在「グアンタナモ」駐在し、戦セタ輸送艦一隻、新式潜水艦三隻ヲ西海岸ニ移動ス。

(o) 「バットウイング」五號へ——航空機——ヲ共ニ海岸防備ノ爲メ「サン。ディエゴ」ニ移動ス。「バットウイング」一號及四號ト交替セシム

三、左ノ如ク「アラスカ」防禦工作ヲナス

(a) 潜水艦二隻及小型母艦チ「ダツチ。ハーヴァー」ニ派遣スル。

(b) 防備大隊ノ殘余ヲソノ目的ノ爲ニ歸入レタル船舶ニ宿泊サセテ「ダツチ。ハーヴァー」駐屯ノ海兵隊ヲ増強セシメルコト。

(c) 偵察機一中隊へ六機——ヲ母艦ト共ニ「ダツチ。ハーヴァー」へ一中隊へ六機——及ビ母艦チ「コデアク」へ派遣スル。

四、四ケC A、一ケC V、九ケD D、四ケA M D、一D E A D I V 五一——一ケA C、一ケA Dヨリ成ル一隊ヲ東印度地區ニ派遣スル積リニテ用意スル事

コノ部隊ハ該地區ニ後進スル合衆國アジア艦隊ヲ増強シ「イギリス」及ビ「オランダ」海軍部隊ト共ニ作戰スル確定、「アジア」海域ニ到着セバ該部隊ハ「アジア」艦隊司令長官ノ隷下ニ入ル。一註、若シ對磁雷防絃材 *Magnum* 及ビ其ノ他ノ動員手段ガ出發前ニ完了シナイ場合ハコノ障害ハ其儘ニシテオイテ必要ナ物資ハ後日輸送スルコトトスル、シカノミナラズ、若シ中部太平洋ノ主力部隊作戰ノ準備手段ガ完了スル前ニ進發セシメタ場合ニハ艦ノ結果ハコノ貴重ナ部隊ガ危険ニサラサレ無援助ノマ、ニナツテシマフカモ知レナイトイフコトヲ認メナクテハナラナイ。

アジア艦隊ニツイテモ同様デアル。

五「ハワイ」「アリユーシャン」間ノ北部太平洋海域カラ日本ノ通商、攻撃ヲ避テスル爲ニ「ハワイ」ヨリ空母、巡洋艦及ビ駆逐艦ヨリ成ル派遣隊ヲ急イデ出スコト。戦時裝備ヲナスコト

六輸送船及ビ輸送隊ヲ集メ、西海岸諸港デ第二増強海兵團ヲ乗船セシムルト。

七太平洋諸島防備ノ爲左ノ如キ手段ヲ講ズルコト。

(a) 防衛大隊ノ殘部一ケ A S R、四ケ U S S 二ケ分隊デ「ミッドウェイ」チ増強スルコト。

(b) 「ウエーキ」島防衛ノ爲ニケ S S チ動カスコト

(c) 「ジョンストン」島カラノ母艦ト共ニ二ケ S S 及ビ一ケ分隊チ作戰ニ參加セシメ、海兵團ト通信機チオクコト。

(d) 「カントン」島防衛ノ爲六ケ V P、一ケ A V P 及ビ二ケ S S チ動カスコト。

(e) 「サモア」島チ防衛スル爲ニケ O S S チ送ルコト。

(f) 「パットウイング」五艇ト交替ニ「ハワイ」ヘ「パットウイング」一艇ノ二ケ分隊ヘ二十四機チ送ルコト。

八、「サフロン」四艇及六艇ヘ約一四ケ S S 一機チ派駐偵察作戰ノ爲「カリリン」及「マーシャル」ニ送ルコト。

九、動員準備完了後ハ事態ニ即應シテ今後ノ手段ニ着手スル準備ノ爲「ハワイ」ニ艦隊チ集合セシメルコト。

一〇、合衆國船配防衛ノ爲若干ノ艦隊ヨリナル特派隊チ以テ沿岸國境部隊ニ増援

サルコト。

太平洋ニ於イテハ以上ガ全部デアル。

四 D M 「ハワイ」へ

三 O C L 太平洋沿岸國院へ

書證第十一號

秘密

一九四〇年昭和十五年十月十一日

西部太平洋ニ於ケル特殊事態ニ相應スル爲ノ合衆國艦隊ノ配置及ビ作戰
假想

- 一、現在專局ノ重大性ハ「イギリス」ガ「ビルマ」通路ヲ開通シタ爲ニ増大シタ。
- 二、日本當局ハ「ビルマ」通路ノ開通ハ、日本ニ非友交的行動デアル聲明又ハ表示スル。
- 三、日本當局ハ暹羅ニ於ケル「イギリス」ノ日本トノ協力ヲ強メル爲メニ報復手段ヲトル。
- 四、日本ハ南領東印度ニ完全ナル協力ヲ強ヒルタメニ積極的侵略行動ヲ採ル。
- 五、合衆國當局ハ合衆國及合衆國領土カラ日本ヘノ物資ノ輸出ヲ完全ニ禁止シ及日本トノ斷交ヲ宣言スル。
- 六、合衆國當局ハ、外交及海軍行動ニヨリ日本船舶又ハソノ他ノ國ノ船舶ニヨル西半球諸國ト日本トノ通路ヲ阻止セントスル。

ニ合衆國當局ハ西部太平洋即チ「オーストラリア」及ビ「シンガポール」ニ於イテハ「イギリス」軍、蘭領東印度ニ於イテハ「オランダ」軍ヲ援助シ、南支那海乃至「セレベス」海以南ノ日本貿易ヲ停止セントスル。
ハ、合衆國ハ、萬一以上ノ手段ニヨリ日本ガ開門スル場合之ニ應ジル準備ガ出來テキル。

九、「イギリス」ハ樞軸國ガ四半球諸國ニ對シテ西部太西洋ニ於イテ行フ、如何ナル海軍ニヨル侵略ヲモ防止スルダロウ。

一〇、コ、ニ假定サレタ合衆國ノ立場及ビ決斷ハ一九四〇年昭和十五年十月十七日ニ實現スル事ニナルデアラウ。

slaf Hor # 1500-A-2

「一ナチの陰謀と侵略」より抜萃

第六卷第八、七、六、五、四、三、二、一頁

文書C-1六六號の謄譯

（一九四四年一月十日ノ！ダイと署名された、アスマン提督に封する専用封書）

一 參謀府校閲り、

ル バイバロツサ

！ ！ ！ ！ ！ ！ ！ ！ ！ ！

三 當時（前記の）總統は、ドイツに對するロシアの態度如何に拘らず、このロシアの態度なるものは入手する情報に依れば屢々變更して居たが、ロシアに對する奇襲攻撃を断乎決意して居た。松岡への通信は全くカモフラージュの手段として、且奇襲を確実ならしめるために訂畫されたものである。

總統は松岡に真相を告げると書いた手紙に就て心配して居た。

彼は當時或會合に於てさう私に語つた。