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Congress of the United States

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

February 19, 1946

Washington, D. C.

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S. Con. Res. 27

Tuesday, February 19, 1946

Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at
10:00 a.m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,
Ferguson and Brewster.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel;
Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel, and John E.
Masten, of counsel, for the Joint Committee.

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The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

Is counsel ready to proceed?

Mr. Richardson: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I have a communication from the Hawaiian Broadcasting System of Honolulu asserting that there has appeared somewhere in the record -- I haven't myself seen it -- and also in the public press reference to the fact that this broadcasting system continued its broadcast of Japanese programs and news in Hawaii up to the time of the attack. Reference has been made to that, they assert, by way of criticism at their failure to cooperate with proper defense measures in Hawaii.

You will remember that representing the FBI in Honolulu during this debatable period was Mr. Robert L. Shivers. Mr. Shivers is not now in the employ of the FBI, but is holding a position, I think, Inspector of Customs, or Customs Collector, or something of that sort, in the Hawaiian District.

Mr. Shivers is now no longer with the FBI, but he has given to Mr. J. Howard Worrall, the president of the Hawaiian Broadcasting System, a detailed letter in which he certifies that the continuance of these Japanese broadcasts by this broadcasting system was directly responsive to his request, in cooperation with the Office of Military Intelligence. Both he, representing the FBI at the time,

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2 and the Office of Military Intelligence, he asserts,
3 believed strongly it would be necessary to use those facili-
4 ties to propagandize the Japanese and to disseminate Japanese
5 information, and, therefore, they insisted that these broad-
6 casts continue despite the desire of the broadcasting company
7 to discontinue.

8 Now the request of the broadcasting system is that
9 this letter of Mr. Shivers, that is not sworn to, be in-
10 cluded in the record of this proceeding to serve as a
11 statement tending to show that they are not subject to
12 criticism because they did, in response to these requests,
13 continue their Japanese broadcasts.

14 The Chairman: Is there any objection to the inclusion
15 of this statement? If not, it will be spread on the record
16 at this point.

17 (The letter referred to is as follows:)

18 Honolulu, T. H.

19 January 16, 1946

20 Mr. J. Howard Worrall

21 President, Hawaiian Broadcasting System

22 Honolulu, T. H.

23 Dear Mr. Worrall:

24 In view of the recent disclosures at the Pearl Harbor
25 inquiry, which is being conducted by a Joint Committee of

1 the Senate and House, concerning Japanese language
2 broadcasts in Hawaii prior to December 7, 1941, I feel
3 that in all fairness to your company and for the record,
4 I should review some of the negotiations and conferences
5 between you and me which caused the Hawaiian Broadcasting
6 System to continue its Japanese language broadcasts right
7 up to the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

8 You made repeated visits to my office to discuss the
9 advisability of discontinuing the Japanese language broad-
10 casts beginning as early as June, 1941. At times, you were
11 accompanied by some of the directors of your company. I
12 informed you that from an intelligence standpoint, it was
13 highly desirable that the Japanese language broadcasts be
14 continued as it afforded a medium through which the Japanese
15 population could be propagandized and that the intelligence
16 agencies, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation
17 and the Military Intelligence, did not want these broadcasts
18 discontinued because it was felt that to do so before the
19 actual outbreak of war would result in our losing the
20 Japanese audience to the Tokio radio station and that once
21 having lost the audience, it would be very difficult to regain
22 it for the purpose of giving orders and instructions to
23 the Japanese population after the outbreak of war.

24 The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Office of
25 Military Intelligence believed very strongly it would be

1 necessary to use the facilities of the local broadcasting
2 stations to propagandize the Japanese and to disseminate
3 information to them after the outbreak of war.

4 As it became increasingly apparent that war between
8 the United States and Japan was inevitable, you became more
6 insistent in your request to discontinue the Japanese
7 language broadcasts and you were urged by me not to do so.
8 You finally agreed to compromise and continue the Japanese
9 language broadcasts if I would recommend to you some indi-
10 vidual familiar with the Japanese language whom you could
11 employ to read and edit the broadcasts before they went
12 out over your station. I accepted this compromise and did
13 recommend to you an American citizen of Japanese ancestry
14 whom you employed for that purpose at your station in Hilo,
15 Hawaii. I also recommended Mr. Akiyoshi Hayashida, whom
16 you employed for the same purpose at KGMB in Honolulu.
17 Mr. Hayashida and the employee at Hilo had been carefully
18 investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
19 their loyalty to the United States was beyond question.
20 The Federal Bureau of Investigation had utilized the services
21 of both of these men and after the war broke out, Mr.
22 Hayashida was employed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
23 as a translator. He later worked in the same capacity for
24 the Office of Military Intelligence and thereafter was
25 employed by the Office of War Information as a translator

1 and interpreter.

2 About the first of November, 1941, you came to my
3 office and informed me you had definitely decided to dis-
4 continue the Japanese language broadcasts and that you
5 would do so immediately. I urged you to defer this action
6 until I had had an opportunity to consult with the officers
7 of Military Intelligence, which you agreed to do. I con-
8 ferred with the responsible officers in the Military In-
9 telligence and advised them of your proposal to discontinue
10 the Japanese language broadcasts immediately. They agreed
11 with me that this action should not be taken and requested
12 me to urge you again to continue the Japanese language
13 broadcasts for the reasons I have previously outlined. I
14 again communicated my desire and that of the officers of
15 Military Intelligence to you and with considerable re-
16 luctance, you agreed to continue the broadcasts.

17 I have also observed statements which have been made
18 before the Investigating Committee which were inferentially
19 critical of the management of your station for having
20 destroyed the records of the Japanese language broadcasts
21 some time after the Pearl Harbor attack. I want you to
22 know that all of the Japanese language broadcasts over
23 the Hawaiian Broadcasting System for several months prior
24 to December 7, 1941, were carefully reviewed and investigated
25 by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval

1 Intelligence, and the Office of Military Intelligence
2 and nothing was found by either agency which in any way
3 remotely indicated that your broadcasting station had been
4 used for the dissemination of information to the enemy.
5 Furthermore, it was discovered that nothing of a subversive
6 nature had gone out from your stations in the Japanese
7 language. Sometime in the latter part of 1942 or the
8 early part of 1943, I was asked by officers of Military In-
9 telligence if there were any further need to retain the
10 records of the Japanese language broadcasts over your stations.
11 I informed these officers that these broadcasts had been
12 carefully reviewed and investigated by all three of the
13 intelligence agencies and that so far as the Federal Bureau
14 of Investigation was concerned, it interposed no objection
15 to their destruction.

16 I have gone into this matter very fully -- probably
17 more so than is necessary. But, since practically all
18 of our discussions and negotiations were verbal, I feel
19 that while the facts surrounding this issue are still
20 fresh in my mind, I should record them for our mutual
21 benefit.

22 Very truly yours,

23 /S/ Robert L. Shivers

24 ROBERT L. SHIVERS
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Mr. Richardson: Now I would like to bring up again at this time another matter, since open hearings are supposed to pause tomorrow, and that is the suggestion that I made concerning the memorandum which the Hawaiian Planters Association desire to have filed, tending to show their cooperation with the military forces in Hawaii during the period of the emergency.

As I stated before, that so-called memorandum is verified by the secretary of the Association.

The suggestion was made, and I think with considerable point, that there was no opportunity to cross-examine the parties and therefore it might not be a proper part of the record. I have a feeling personally, after reading it, that the factual matter therein contained recites actual acts accomplished, and so forth, and it might be of some assistance to the committee as some source of material.

The committee held no hearings in Hawaii, and therefore there would be considerable difficulty in bringing the various people before the committee for the purpose of establishing these facts, and that is the reason why it appears in connection with this memorandum.

I suggested at the time that I would hold it in abeyance and bring it again to the attention of the committee, which I do now, and whatever action the committee desires to take

Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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with reference to it will be fine.

The Chairman: Well, I suppose, for whatever weight may be given to it, it may be made part of the record.

Mr. Richardson: You can give it whatever weight you want to.

The Chairman: Without objection, it will be made a part of the record at this point.

Mr. Keefe: Do I understand it will not be spread on the record, that it will just be an exhibit?

Mr. Richardson: Yes, sir, just an exhibit.

That is all we have.

The Chairman: All right. I believe you were just about to proceed to examine this witness.

Mr. Richardson: Yes.

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL ROBERT E. SCHUKRAFT,
SIGNAL CORPS, U. S. ARMY

(Resumed)

Mr. Richardson: Will you state your full name, Colonel?

Colonel Schukraft: Robert E. Schukraft.

Mr. Richardson: How long have you been in the Army?

Colonel Schukraft: I have been an officer since 1932.

Mr. Richardson: At the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and sometime prior thereto, what was your assignment?

Colonel Schukraft: I was assigned to the Office of the

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1 Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 Chief Signal Officer in Washington, in charge of radio inter-
3 cept for the Chief Signal Officer.

4 Mr. Richardson: Who was your superior officer?

5 Colonel Schukraft: My immediate superior was Colonel
6 Minckler.

7 Mr. Richardson: As a part of your duties prior to
8 Pearl Harbor, was your attention ever called to what has
9 been familiarly referred to as the winds code?

10 Colonel Schukraft: Yes, sir, it was.

11 Mr. Richardson: Did you see the original implementing
12 intercepted dispatches which established that code?

13 Colonel Schukraft: Yes, sir, I did. I saw both of
14 them.

15 Mr. Richardson: Did you have anything to do with a
16 program of monitoring?

17 Colonel Schukraft: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Richardson: Will you state to the committee just
19 what you did in that regard?

20 Colonel Schukraft: About November 28 Colonel Minckler
21 and I went to Colonel Sadtler's office and went over the
22 two messages setting up the winds code, and Colonel Sadtler
23 desired that some action be taken --

24 Mr. Richardson: Colonel who?

25 Colonel Schukraft: Colonel Sadtler.

1 Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 Mr. Richardson: Statler?

3 Colonel Schukraft: S-a-d-t-l-e-r, Sadtler.

4 The Vice Chairman: Just a minute. Who was it you went
5 with?

6 Colonel Schukraft: With Colonel Minckler, sir,
7 M-i-n-c-k-l-e-r, my boss.

8 Mr. Richardson: Proceed.

9 Colonel Schukraft: Colonel Sadtler desired that some
10 action be taken to monitor for the winds execute message.
11 We knew at that time that the Navy was doing some monitoring
12 for this and decided to coordinate our activity with the
13 Navy. During the discussions it was decided that Station 2
14 in San Francisco would probably have about the best chance
15 of hearing this.

16 We had a double problem: One of them of getting the
17 intercept into Washington, and the other problem of not
18 telling the monitoring stations too much, not passing too
19 much information to the monitoring stations. So that
20 left the stations in the position that they had to monitor
21 almost all of the broadcasts and forward the broadcasts
22 intact to Washington, where they would be examined.

23 So to carry out this directive I had a teletype confer-
24 ence with the NCO in charge at the West Coast, and told him
25 to monitor certain specific broadcasts, the general intelligence

1 Witness Schukraft Questions by: Mr. Richardson
2 broadcasts, which they did.

3 At the same time it was decided to ask the FCC to
4 monitor for the voice broadcasts. We were to monitor the
5 code broadcasts and the FCC to monitor the voice broadcasts.
6 This was because we had no Japanese linguists at the inter-
7 cept stations.

8 Later in discussing the matter with Colonel Minckler,
9 since considerable importance appeared to be attached to
10 this, we decided we would also have Station 7, which at that
11 time was located in Fort Hunt, Virginia, monitor for the code
12 broadcasts. I made a trip to Fort Hunt and discussed the
13 matter with the officer in charge. I told him specifically
14 what we were looking for, and they monitored from that
15 point on, and I checked with them periodically.

16 That is all, Mr. Richardson.

17 Mr. Richardson: Then it was contemplated that there
18 might be responses to intercepts under this monitoring system,
19 both of voice broadcasts and of code, Morse code intercepts?

20 Colonel Schukraft: That is correct, sir, both or either.

21 Mr. Richardson: That is right. What information, with
22 reference to what key words or sentences you were looking
23 for, did you give to these monitoring stations?

24 Colonel Schukraft: We gave no information to Station 2.
25 We merely told them to monitor certain specified Japanese

1 Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 broadcast stations. To Station 7 I did give the officer

3 in charge the information that we were looking for a

4 broadcast which would follow the pattern that the Japs

5 had set up, that is, that certain code word or code words

6 would be repeated.

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1 Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 Mr. Richardson: Did you give them the code words?

3 Colonel Schukraft: I did not, sir.

4 Mr. Richardson: Just simply told them that there would
5 be a repetition of words in the message that you were looking
6 for.

7 Colonel Schukraft: That is correct, sir.

8 Mr. Richardson: That would have required them to have
9 translated every message that came in that had any such
10 repetition?

11 Colonel Schukraft: It would require Station 2 -- that
12 is correct, sir.

13 Mr. Richardson: Now, with reference to the voice
14 broadcasts, was there any information given to the monitoring
15 stations as to the precise words you were interested in?

16 Colonel Schukraft: The English translation of the
17 words was given to the FCC. It was not given to the Army
18 monitoring stations at all.

19 Mr. Richardson: Did you ever see any asserted words
20 execute message, either in a voice broadcast or teletype
21 description, as the result of these monitorings?

22 Colonel Schukraft: I have seen two such, sir.

23 I have seen the FCC one recently.

24 Mr. Richardson: That is the one that is asserted to
25 have been intercepted about the 7th or 8th of December?

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Colonel Schukraft: The 8th of December, I believe, sir.

Mr. Richardson: That is right.

Now, what was the other one?

Colonel Schukraft: The other one was a piece of teletype paper which contained what appeared to be a winds execute message.

Mr. Richardson: Who called your attention to that piece of paper?

Colonel Schukraft: Colonel Minckler brought this piece of paper into my office.

Mr. Richardson: About when?

Colonel Schukraft: It was two or three days, as I recall, prior to Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Richardson: What time of day? Do you recall?

Colonel Schukraft: I do not recall exactly, except my impression is it was sometime in the morning, prior to noon.

Mr. Richardson: Was there a conversation between you and Colonel Minckler concerning it?

Colonel Schukraft: Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson: What was it?

Colonel Schukraft: Colonel Minckler asked me what I thought of this piece of paper.

Mr. Richardson: Did he say where he got it?

Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Colonel Schukraft: I do not recall whether he said
3 exactly or not. The impression I had at the time was that
4 he had received it from Colonel Sadtler.

5 Mr. Richardson: What further conversation occurred
6 between you?

7 Colonel Schukraft: This message that he brought in
8 was obviously not a true winds execute message. There
9 were about three things wrong with it .

10 Mr. Richardson: Before you read it, was there any refer-
11 ence in the conversation to Kramer?

12 Colonel Schukraft: Yes, sir, there was.

13 Mr. Richardson: What was it?

14 Colonel Schukraft: He had indicated --

15 Mr. Richardson (interposing): Who had indicated?

16 Colonel Schukraft: Colonel Minckler. -- that the Navy
17 had thought this was a true winds execute message, and that
18 Captain Kramer had seen it and had thought that this was
19 a true winds execute message.

20 Mr. Richardson: Very well. Was that the substance of
21 the identifying information that was discussed between you
22 and Minckler?

23 Colonel Schukraft: That is correct, sir.

24 Mr. Richardson: Then, was this piece of paper handed to
25 you?

Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Colonel Schukraft: I never actually had it in my hand, sir.

Mr. Richardson: Describe the piece of paper and the message on it, as nearly as you can.

Colonel Schukraft: The piece of paper was a piece of yellow teletype paper, three or four inches wide. Colonel Minckler, at the time I saw it, had this piece of paper folded in his hand.

Mr. Richardson: How many words, or lines were there on that sheet of paper?

Colonel Schukraft: There were not more than one or two lines on that piece of paper.

Mr. Richardson: Was the language on the paper Japanese?

Colonel Schukraft: I do not know, sir.

Mr. Richardson: Did you examine the paper?

Colonel Schukraft: I did.

Mr. Richardson: Did you conclude that it was or was not a true winds execute?

Colonel Schukraft: I concluded very positively that it was not a true winds execute message.

Mr. Richardson: Why?

Colonel Schukraft: It did not follow the pattern specified by the Japanese in setting up the winds execute message.

As I remember, there were about three things wrong

1 Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 with it.

3 First of all, it was transmitted by a Morse station,
4 and the message was in the voice form, which was impossible.

5 Mr. Richardson: What do you mean by that?

6 Colonel Schukraft: Well, when you set up a code of
7 this type, it must carry some means of identifying this
8 as a message, otherwise, you have no means of knowing
9 whether the identification that was set up by the Japanese
10 was actually carried. Whereas, if sent by voice there
11 would appear in a specified place in the message in the
12 broadcast and would be repeated in a certain specified manner,
13 the words that they had set up in their code. Those were
14 the keys to the fact that this was a message and not a
15 weather report.

16 Mr. Richardson: All right.

17 Now diagnose this message you saw, and state what you
18 think were its indications.

19 Colonel Schukraft: Well, my memory on it actually is
20 rather hazy, but the one thing was that it was in a voice
21 form.

22 Mr. Richardson: What do you mean "in a voice form"?

23 Colonel Schukraft: Of the type of "East wind rain,"
24 of that type. Those were not the words on the message,
25 as I remember.

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1 Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 So it was in the voice form transmitted by Morse
3 station. It did not appear, the indications at the time
4 were that it did not appear at the beginning of the message,
5 but appeared in the middle of the broadcast, which, again
6 is not correct for the Morse broadcast.

7 There was no indication that it was repeated at the
8 end of the message.

9 Mr. Richardson: And your point is then that under the
10 original code messages, there was a difference in the posi-
11 tion of the key words where the message was to be sent in a
12 voice news broadcast, and where the message was to be sent
13 by Morse code?

14 Colonel Schukraft: That is correct, sir.

15 Mr. Richardson: With respect to the position of the
16 words?

17 Colonel Schukraft: That is correct.

18 Mr. Richardson: What was the difference?

19 Colonel Schukraft: In the voice code it was to be
20 sent in the middle of the news broadcast, repeated twice,
21 and also at the end of the broadcast and again repeated twice
22 and those are the keys which indicated that this was a code
23 message and not a weather report.

24 Mr. Richardson: Now, what was the requirement with res-
25 pect to an intercept that would come in, in code?

1 Withness Schukraft

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Colonel Schukraft: That it would be repeated five
3 times at the beginning and end of the broadcast.

4 Mr. Richardson: Now, your voice broadcast code mes-
5 sage would be No. 2353 which had the words HIGASHI NO KAZE
6 AME and the other Japanese phrases appearing in the middle
7 of the broadcast?

8 Colonel Schukraft: That is correct, sir.

9 Mr. Richardson: Whereas the second message establishing
10 a winds code was No. 2354 which had simply the single words
11 HIGASHI and KITA and NISHI with the recital, "The above
12 will be repeated five times and included at the beginning
13 and end?"

14 Colonel Schukraft: That is correct.

15 Mr. Richardson: What you are endeavoring to tell us,
16 as I understand it, is that in order to qualify as a true
17 winds execute, the executing message must comply with those
18 requirements?

19 Colonel Schukraft: Yes, sir.

20 Mr. Richardson: For you as an officer interpreting that
21 message to give it authenticity?

22 Colonel Schukraft: That is correct. It must comply
23 absolutely with the rules laid down by the Japanese, other-
24 wise they, their own people, would have no means of knowing
25 that this was an execute message.

Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Mr. Richardson: Was there any discussion to that
3 effect between you and Colonel Minckler at the time you
4 saw this message?

5 Colonel Schukraft: Only that I pointed out to him
6 what the discrepancies were.

7 Mr. Richardson: And did you conclude from that that it
8 was or was not a true winds execute?

9 Colonel Schukraft: That is very positively was not.

10 Mr. Richardson: You don't know where Minckler got the
11 message?

12 Colonel Schukraft: I do not, sir.

13 Mr. Richardson: Now, what was the color of the paper?

14 Colonel Schukraft: It was yellow.

15 Mr. Richardson: And was the message the original typed
16 message or the carbon copy?

17 Colonel Schukraft: My memory is very clear on that
18 point, that it was a carbon copy and was not an original.

19 Mr. Richardson: What became of the message after you
20 saw it?

21 Colonel Schukraft: Colonel Minckler left with the mes-
22 sage, and that is the last I ever saw it.

23 Mr. Richardson: Did you ever see any other alleged
24 winds message except the FCC one that you mentioned earlier
25 in your testimony?

1 Witness Schukraft . questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 Colonel Schukraft: No, sir.

3 Mr. Richardson: Was there ever at any time any informa-
4 tion given to you by anyone with whom you came in contact
5 that a true winds execute message had been received, except
6 the FCC one?

7 Colonel Schukraft: No, sir, there has not.

8 Mr. Richardson: You never saw another?

9 Colonel Schukraft: No, sir.

10 Mr. Richardson: And no one ever told you of another?

11 Colonel Schukraft: No, sir.

12 Mr. Richardson: And it would have been part of your
13 duty, would it, to have seen and inspected and evaluated
14 a message of that type?

15 Colonel Schukraft: Not necessarily, sir. Since I
16 was in charge of the intercepts, it very probably would
17 have been called to my attention, or I would have heard
18 about it in one way or another, but I would not necessarily
19 have seen it. I did not see nor hear of the FCC message,
20 for example, the message of December 8.

21 Mr. Richardson: The FCC message did not come in through
22 either the Army or Navy channels?

23 Colonel Schukraft: That is correct, sir.

24 Mr. Richardson: Were you supposed to have contact with
25 intercepts that came in through Army sources?

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Colonel Schukraft: I had contact with all intercepts
3 that came in, sir, regardless of where they came from.

4 Mr. Richardson: Army or Navy?

5 Colonel Schukraft: Army or Navy, that came into our
6 office.

7 Mr. Richardson: Now, Colonel, there has been some
8 explanation with reference to this but I want to ask you
9 a question about it.

10 There appears in connection with our exhibit which
11 shows these intercepted messages, and their translation and
12 deciphering a great deal of variation in point of time,
13 point of elapsed time between the receipt of the original
14 message and its ultimate decoding, translation.

15 What is the reason why one message will come in at
16 nine o'clock in the morning and be translated by 10 o'clock
17 and another message will come in at nine o'clock in the
18 morning and not be translated for two or three days?

19 Colonel Schukraft: Actually there are very many
20 reasons for that, sir.

21 First of all, in many cases, the key to a message had
22 to be obtained before the message could be deciphered. This
23 may take anywhere from 15 minutes to a week or even to a
24 month, or we may never recover it.

25 It depends on many factors.

1 Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Then, after the message is deciphered, it would go
3 to the translators, and in many cases the message would
4 be scanned for information and the more important messages
5 or the messages that appeared to the translator to be
6 more important would be pulled out and translated first,
7 and the messages which appeared of lesser importance would
8 be translated during more or less free periods of the
9 translators, when they did not have more important material
10 to work on.

11 Mr. Richardson: Then the fact that there is a differ-
12 ence in the time in which various messages have been trans-
13 lated cannot be laid to any negligence or slothfulness or
14 delay or oversight in handling the messages?

15 Colonel Schukraft: No, sir, I don't think so.

16 There is one thing on all of these messages coming in.
17 There is no way of knowing what a message is about, or the
18 importance of a message until it is actually deciphered and
19 scanned by a translator. Externally there is nothing in
20 the message except that you know that certain systems tend
21 to be of more importance than others.

22 Mr. Richardson: I have no further questions.

23 The Chairman: I have just one question.

24 You saw the message that came in, you say, on the 8th
25 of December?

Witness Schukraft

Questions by: The Chairman
Senator George

hl2

1 Colonel Schukraft: I saw that recently, sir. I
2 did not see it at the time.
3

4 The Chairman: All right. Then my question would be
5 of no value. That is all.

6 Mr. Cooper.

7 The Vice Chairman: No questions.

8 The Chairman: Senator George.

9 Senator George: In whose hands did you say you saw
10 this message?

11 Colonel Schukraft: Colonel Minckler brought it in, sir.

12 Senator George: Did you say that you did not know where
13 he got the message, from whom he got the message?

14 Colonel Schukraft: I do not recall that he specified
15 who he had obtained it from, sir.

16 Senator George: In your first examination on that
17 point, did you say you had the impression that he got it
18 from Colonel Sadtler?

19 Colonel Schukraft: I had the impression at the time
20 that he had obtained it from Colonel Sadtler.

21 Senator George: That was just an impression?

22 Colonel Schukraft: It was only an impression, sir.

23 Senator George: Do you remember the date of the message?

24 Colonel Schukraft: The only recollection I have of
25 that is that it was two or three days prior to Pearl Harbor.

Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Senator George
The Chairman

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1
2 That would be about December 4 or 5. I cannot place it any
3 close than that, sir .

4 Senator George: You are satisfied that the paper you
5 saw was not the winds execute message?

6 Colonel Schukraft: I am positive that it was not, sir.

7 Senator George: No further questions.

8 The Chairman: Let me ask this question, if you will:

9 After you saw the message that was intercepted on the
10 8th, did you interpret it as being a true execute message?

11 Colonel Schukraft: Yes, sir. I don't think there is
12 any doubt that that was a true execute message, sir.

13 The Chairman: If you had seen it on the day it had
14 come in, you would have interpreted it as being a true
15 execute message.

16 Colonel Schukraft: That is correct, sir. There would
17 have been no doubt whatever.

18 The Chairman: That is all.

19 Mr. Clark.

20 Mr. Clark: You say this was not a genuine wind execute
21 message and you give some very clear reasons for that state-
22 ment.

23 The question in my mind is as to why this matter of
24 whether this was or was not a wind execute should be debated
25 at such length as to get all around to the departments and

1 Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Mr. Clark

h14

2 have a disagreement here before this committee on it.

3 Colonel Schukraft: That was the thing that puzzled
4 me at the time, sir.

5 Mr. Clark: It was a highly important question, was
6 it not?

7 Colonel Schukraft: At that time, I don't think it was
8 so important, sir.

9 Mr. Clark: Why were you monitoring for it?

10 Colonel Schukraft: We had started monitoring for it
11 about November 26th.

12 Mr. Clark: Why did you do that, if it wasn't import-
13 ant?

14 Colonel Schukraft: I think the importance of that mes-
15 sage decreased as time went on.

16 You see, at the time that this came in, we knew that
17 the Japanese were destroying codes.

18 Mr. Clark: What I am trying to get at is why there was
19 all this debate, if I might so term it, or discussion, of
20 whether this was or was not a true execute message, in the
21 Navy Department, in the Army, and through all these hearings.

22 I am puzzled to know how that should occur if it was
23 so plain that that was not a winds execute message.

24 Colonel Schukraft: Sir, this is a guess on my part:

25 I honestly have not remembered this incident until

Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Mr. Clark

hl5

1
2 recently.

3 Mr. Clark: What was that?

4 Colonel Schukraft: I had not remembered this particu-
5 lar incident until recently.

6 I think the reason that is hazy in everyone's mind is
7 that they had thought it was a true winds execute , and then
8 had found out that it was not which more or less wiped the
9 thing from their memory.

10 Mr. Clark: But if the message so clearly indicated
11 that it was not a winds execute message, as you have stated
12 here and for the reasons you have stated here, how could
13 anybody be uncertain about it?

14 Colonel Schukraft: Sir, I believe that is the same
15 message that Captain Kramer had seen, I am positive that
16 it is, although I do not know.

17 Mr. Clark: Well, I think so too, for that matter.

18 Colonel Schukraft: Captain Kramer, if you will remember,
19 testified that he did not check that the message appeared
20 in the proper form or in the proper place in the broadcast.
21 He checked only the translation.

22 Now, the thing that puzzled me at the time was how he
23 could possibly have passed this as being a true winds message
24 when it was obviously not, and I think his explanation of
25 that explains what happened and why he did at the time think
it was a true winds execute message.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Mr. Clark
 Mr. Murphy

2 Mr. Clark: According to your testimony it showed on
 3 the face of it that it was not?

4 Colonel Schukraft: It was very obvious that it was not.

5 Mr. Clark: Still there is all this debate through all
 6 these years, which surprises me a little, coming from the
 7 Army and the Navy Departments, about a matter of that kind.
 8 It looks like it is something that could have been settled.

9 Colonel Schukraft: I think it was settled and came
 10 up again much later after people had forgotten about it.
 11 I think that is what happened.

12 Mr. Clark: It has certainly cut a big figure since
 13 that time. That is all.

14 The Chairman: Senator Lucas is not here. Mr. Murphy.

15 Mr. Murphy: Has Captain Safford talked to you?

16 Colonel Schukraft: I have not talked to Captain Safford
 17 in several years.

18 Mr. Murphy: Has he ever talked to you about this
 19 particular piece of paper?

20 Colonel Schukraft: Not to my memory.

21 Mr. Murphy: No other questions.

22 The Chairman: Senator Brewster is not here. Mr.
 23 Gearhart.

24 Mr. Gearhart: No questions.

25 Mr. Richardson: I have one further question now, Mr.

1 Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Mr. Richardson
Senator Ferguson

2 Chairman.

3 The Chairman: Mr. Richardson.

4 Mr. Richardson: Have you ever talked with Colonel
5 Minckler about this message?

6 Colonel Schukraft: Yes, sir, I have. Colonel Minckler
7 has a very hazy recollection of having handled what was
8 believed to have been a winds execute message. In other
9 words, another false alarm.

10 Mr. Richardson: Did you discuss with Colonel Minckler
11 whether he got this paper that you saw?

12 Colonel Schukraft: I did, sir, and he does not remember.

13 Mr. Richardson: That is all.

14 The Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

15 Senator Ferguson: You are unable to tell us what
16 words were used in the message you saw?

17 Colonel Schukraft: I do not remember what the words
18 were, sir.

19 Senator Ferguson: Well, were there more than one group
20 of words?

21 Colonel Schukraft: As I remember, there was one group
22 of words and the message heading and that is about all that
23 was on the paper.

24 Senator Ferguson: How large a sheet of paper was it?

25 Colonel Schukraft: It was standard teletype width; about

1 Witness Schukraft Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 three or four inches in length.

3 Senator Ferguson: Three or four inches in length.

4 Colonel Schukraft: Yes, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: Wouldn't that indicate that that
6 was not the entire broadcast?

7 Colonel Schukraft: That is correct, sir, it was not
8 the entire broadcast.

9 Senator Ferguson: Then how could you tell that this
10 wasn't used at the end of the broadcast. You say it was
11 not used at the end and was not a genuine message.

12 Colonel Schukraft: There would have had to have been
13 some explaining on the message. I do not remember why I
14 knew this had to appear at the end. There must have been
15 some comment on it, placed on it by the operator. I do
16 not remember actually.

17 Senator Ferguson: Did you see any handwriting on the
18 message, interpretations or translation?

19 Colonel Schukraft: I actually do not remember such, sir.
20 It is my impression that there was some writing on it but
21 I honestly do not remember.

22 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, did Minckler tell you
23 in substance that this was not repeated at the end of the
24 original message received?

25 Colonel Schukraft: No, sir. There was something on

1 Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 the paper, as I remember, which indicated that it had not
3 been repeated.

4 Senator Ferguson: Why are you so sure about the fact
5 that it wasn't at the end and that is the reason you discarded
6 this message?

7 Colonel Schukraft: It was not repeated, sir. You see,
8 this particular broadcast called for it being repeated five
9 times and it was not repeated five times. There was nothing
10 to indicate it had been repeated five times.

11 Senator Ferguson: Didn't you tell the stations when
12 they were monitoring not to send anything in that wasn't
13 repeated?

14 Colonel Schukraft: We told Station 7 that, but did
15 not tell Station 2. We told Station 2 to monitor those
16 particular stations and transmit all, to send in all trans-
17 missions from these particular stations.

18 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, where did it originate,
19 the one that you saw, where did that message originate?

20 Colonel Schukraft: At the time I had thought it was
21 from the FCC. It could not possibly have been from the FCC,
22 however, and it was not an Army intercept. If it had been
23 an Army intercept I would have been the first to have received
24 it.

25 Senator Ferguson: But if you didn't have the entire

1 Witness Schukraft Questions by: Senator Ferguson
2 message, I am at a loss to understand how you could tell,
3 if it indicated it was torn off, how you could tell that
4 this was not repeated at the end and repeated the proper
5 number of times. Wasn't this true, that you had difficulty
6 at times getting the entire message?

7 Colonel Schukraft: That is very true, sir.

8 Senator Ferguson: By reason of static?

9 Colonel Schukraft: Yes, sir.

10 Senator Ferguson: Therefore you would have to have
11 some direct information as to whether or not the static
12 did interfere, whether they did get the entire message?

13 Colonel Schukraft: That is correct. The operators
14 would normally indicate that on the intercepted copy. They
15 would make some such mark as "Transmission faded before the
16 end", or some remark of that nature.

17 Senator Ferguson: But this was not an Army intercept,
18 this was somebody else's?

19 Colonel Schukraft: The Navy also did that. All of
(4) 20 the intercept operators.

21 Senator Ferguson: Will you tell us if there was such
22 a message on this or not such a message? I mean writing
23 indicating that it did or did not fade?

24 Colonel Schukraft: I do not remember that there was,
25 but still there must have been a comment by an operator or

1 Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 it would not have been obviously a false message.

3 Senator, if the message had contained only the heading
4 and the message itself, "West Wind Clear", or whatever it
5 may have been in Japanese, then there would be no way of
6 knowing, except in this case there would be only one thing
7 wrong with it, it would show the station call signs and
8 frequency and one line of text, and then an operator's
9 intercept time. That must occur on every copy. So if
10 it contained the call sign of a code station and three
11 words in the voice form, then it would not comply with the
12 Japanese instructions to start with. However, that alone
13 would not be conclusive.

14 The message must have had some comment that this appeared
15 in the middle of it, weather broadcast, or some such words.
16 I do not remember what did occur on the paper, however.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: But you had forgotten all about this
3 because in your present testimony you did not even mention
4 it?

5 Colonel Schukraft: That is correct, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: And by sitting here in the room and
7 hearing testimony from the Navy your memory was refreshed?

8 Colonel Schukraft: That is correct, sir. Captain Kramer
9 when he was explaining what happened to this message, that
10 he thought it was original, explained what had puzzled me
11 at the time and that brought the whole incident back to me.

12 Senator Ferguson: But you had testified in a previous
13 hearing that you had heard of an intercepted telephone con-
14 versation in which Kurusu used the expression, - or Tokyo
15 used it to him, "East wind, rain", and that he had expressed
16 the opinion that he was sorry to hear that, isn't that cor-
17 rect?

18 Colonel Schukraft: That is correct, sir. When Colonel
19 Clausen visited me in Italy he had a number of these inter-
20 cepts with him. He did not have the complete file. He
21 showed me, as I recall, one telephone conversation between
22 Kurusu and Tokyo and I remembered very distinctly that there
23 was a telephone conversation in which they had discussed a
24 number of other things which Colonel Clausen did not have with
25 him and my memory at that time, without having a complete file,

Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 was that a direction, wind direction had been in one of the
3 conversations. My memory was faulty on that point. I had not
4 thought of those conversations since December 1941, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: But, Colonel, you swore to that in the
6 affidavit, that you had remembered of a conversation between
7 Tokyo and the embassy here in which the wind code was used,
8 "East wind, rain" and that even the Ambassador Kurusu had ex-
9 pressed the opinion that he was sorry to hear that. Now, how
10 could you be mistaken on a thing like that, which was so vital
11 and so important at the time?

12 Colonel Schukraft: I do not think it was so vital or
13 so important at the time, sir. Also, remember that this hap-
14 pened -- this was nearly four years after the event.

15 Senator Ferguson: I appreciate that.

16 Colonel Schukraft: And I had not thought of the event
17 since. There had been no reason to recall the event.

18 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, do you now testify that you
19 did never hear of a conversation between Tokyo and the embassy
20 here in which "East wind, rain" was used and the expression
21 by the Ambassador or someone at this end of the line that he
22 was sorry to hear that?

23 Colonel Schukraft: Senator, I must have been mistaken on
24 the matter, and a bad memory on my part because there is no
25

Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 such conversation in the files. There are conversations, one
3 conversation in which they are discussing a special movement.

4 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, the fact that that is not
5 in the file is what causes you to change your testimony?

6 Colonel Schukraft: No, sir, it is not. Sir, in going
7 through the file and seeing the complete things it has brought
8 back many things that I had not thought of since then which
9 fit into a pattern.

10 Senator Ferguson: And that is the reason for the change
11 of the testimony?

12 Colonel Schukraft: That is correct, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, this message that you were
14 picking up on the teletype, was it brought for you, - brought
15 to you that you might evaluate it and determine specifically
16 whether it was a genuine winds code execute message or not?

17 Colonel Schukraft: I do not think so. I think actually
18 that Colonel Minkler had intended to discuss it with another
19 officer who was out at the time and that he showed it to me
20 since I happened to be present.

21 Sir, incidentally, in respect to this message, we did
22 call in one additional officer who verified that it was a
23 false winds message.

24 Senator Ferguson: This was not your duty, then, to de-
25 termine whether or not this was a false winds message?

Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Colonel Schukraft: If we had received a winds message, it would have been passed on to other officers to evaluate in addition to myself. Sir, if we had received a winds message from Station 7, for example, it would probably have come to me and I would have evaluated it and passed it on with whatever evaluation I placed on it.

Senator Ferguson: All right. Then even though this was a false winds message your duties would have caused you to pass it on to someone else to have their determination as to whether it was true or false?

Colonel Schukraft: That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, how do you account for the one that you determined was false, as you now tell us, not being passed on by you to someone else to determine its truth or falsity?

Colonel Schukraft: Colonel Minkler was my chief at the time, sir, and we did call in an additional officer, who would have been one of the officers who would evaluate it.

Mr. Richardson: Who was that officer?

Senator Ferguson: Now, who was that officer.

Colonel Schukraft: It was Colonel Rowlett.

Senator Ferguson: I did not get the name.

Colonel Schukraft: Colonel Rowlett.

Senator Ferguson: Then would you say that he would be

Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 able to tell us about this consultation that you had over this
3 winds code?

4 Colonel Schukraft: I have asked him, sir, and again he
5 has no memory on the thing.

6 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, why did this so-called wind
7 execute message become of very little value around the fourth
8 or fifth?

9 Colonel Schukraft: Largely because we knew at that
10 time, - this winds message, sir, indicated a tenseness in rela-
11 tionship and in addition to that carried instructions to de-
12 stroy codes and confidential papers. We knew at that time
13 that the Japanese were destroying codes and confidential pa-
14 pers because we had other messages directing that that be done.

15 Senator Ferguson: Well, had you ever seen the Batavia
16 message where they interpreted the original codes as meaning
17 war?

18 Colonel Schukraft: I had not at the time, sir.

19 Senator Ferguson: You had not?

20 Colonel Schukraft: No, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: So as I understand it, then, in your
22 department at least, that when you received the other indica-
23 tion, the other notice following or indicating the destruc-
24 tion of codes and the tenseness of the situation, that you
25 disregarded the winds message idea?

Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 Colonel Schukraft: Not disregarded, sir, but the winds
3 message would have had very little importance at that time.
4 November 27th or 28th it probably would have been quite im-
5 portant but after we had the code destruction instructions,
6 then it became of less and less importance.

7 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, how do you account for the
8 fact that you did not keep in your files all of these so-
9 called wind execute messages whether they were true or false
10 for some higher authority if they ever did want to look over
11 them to determine your judgment?

12 Colonel Schukraft: Sir, I don't think there was any
13 reason for keeping them. We used to get in reams of paper
14 and there was no point in filing a piece of paper which is de-
15 termined to be worthless and that is what this piece of paper
16 was.

17 Senator Ferguson: Now, on this Batavia code it appears
18 that on the 5th of December Batavia sent to Miles -- he was
19 your chief, was he not?

20 Colonel Schukraft: That is right, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: This you see decides the code meant
22 war. You never saw that?

23 Colonel Schukraft: So far as I know that message had --
24 no, sir, I had not seen it until this hearing.

25 Senator Ferguson: And you cannot give us any idea what

Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 the words were, whether they were in Japanese or in English
3 or whether a translation was written on the margin or at the
4 bottom?

5 Colonel Schukraft: Sir, I have an idea what the words
6 would be. My memory of that, any memory I would have at this
7 moment of them would be a reconstruction of what I think was
8 on it. I do not actually remember.

9 Senator Ferguson: I do not want a guess.

10 Colonel Schukraft: Yes, sir.

11 Senator Ferguson: That is all.

12 The Chairman: Mr. Keefe?

13 Mr. Keefe: No questions.

14 The Chairman: Thank you very much, Colonel, for your ap-
15 pearance.

16 Senator Ferguson: Just one moment, Mr. Chairman.

17 Were you working the 6th and the 7th?

18 Colonel Schukraft: Yes, sir, I was.

19 Senator Ferguson: Do you have any knowledge of the pilot
20 message?

21 Colonel Schukraft: Yes, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: When did the pilot message come in
23 and when was it translated as far as the War Department was
24 concerned? You know what I mean by the pilot message?

25 Colonel Schukraft: Yes, sir, I do. Sir, Saturday morn-

Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 ing I was home sick and I was called to come to the office
3 by Colonel Minkler some time Saturday afternoon. The basis
4 for that call, to the best of my knowledge, was the pilot mes-
5 sage.

6 Senator Ferguson: And then you saw it when you came in
7 in the afternoon?

8 Colonel Schukraft: I did see it after I came in, yes.

9 Senator Ferguson: And it was completed and translated?

10 Colonel Schukraft: That is correct, sir.

11 Senator Ferguson: And what time would you say that was?

12 Colonel Schukraft: As I remember I got to the office
13 about three o'clock in the afternoon.

14 Senator Ferguson: Yes. And do you know of any reason
15 why it was not distributed, if it was not distributed, that
16 afternoon?

17 Colonel Schukraft: I am quite sure that it was, sir,
18 because a message of that type would not have been held up.

19 Senator Ferguson: That was a very important message, was
20 it not? It indicated a certain time of delivery of a four-
21 teen part message which was to be a reply to the message of
22 the 26th of Secretary Hull to the Japanese government?

23 Colonel Schukraft: That is correct, sir, and that was
24 the basis of opening up the Army SIS Saturday afternoon after
25 it had been closed.

Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 Senator Ferguson: Well, then, do you know when that pilot
3 message would be delivered to the Navy? You say it was a
4 very important message.

5 Colonel Schukraft: I do not know on that specific mes-
6 sage, sir. Normally those messages were sent over at the same
7 time or prior to their delivery by us to G-2.

8 Senator Ferguson: In other words, you would not want to
9 deliver the messages in their regular course, which was the
10 Secretary of State, Secretary of War, the War Plans and G-2
11 and the various other deliveries?

12 Colonel Schukraft: We were responsible only for delivery
13 to G-2, sir.

14 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

15 Colonel Schukraft: The distribution was made by G-2.

16 Senator Ferguson: And when you delivered to G-2 you
17 would deliver to the Navy?

18 Colonel Schukraft: At the same time.

19 Senator Ferguson: At the same time?

20 Colonel Schukraft: That is right, sir, or prior.

21 Senator Ferguson: Pardon?

22 Colonel Schukraft: Or we would deliver to the Navy
23 prior to delivery to G-2.

24 Senator Ferguson: Yes. That is, you would not deliver
25 to G-2 so that they could make their deliveries before the Navy

Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 officially knew that you had one?

3 Colonel Schukraft: No, sir, that would create an em-
4 barrassing situation. If the Secretary of State, for example,
5 had a message and the President had not had it, it would not
6 be too good.

7 Senator Ferguson: Yes. In other words, you were respon-
8 sible for the Secretary of State and they were responsible
9 for the President, so you felt that the delivery should be
10 made simultaneously?

11 Colonel Schukraft: Insofar as possible, sir.

12 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

13 Colonel Schukraft: Without unnecessarily delaying an
14 important message.

15 Senator Ferguson: That is right. And this being an im-
16 portant message you feel that it was delivered to the Navy
17 at the time?

18 Colonel Schukraft: I am quite positive that it was, sir.

19 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

20 Colonel Schukraft: Although I do not actually know.

21 Senator Ferguson: I mean you do not remember the trans-
22 action of passing over the message?

23 Colonel Schukraft: That is correct, sir, because that
24 is one thing that we used to watch carefully, is that messages
25 were delivered to the Navy.

Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 Senator Ferguson: And you being called in at this par-
3 ticular time because you had been ill and off that morning,
4 you saw to it that these important messages went out, is that
5 correct?

6 Colonel Schukraft: That is correct, sir. We got rather
7 mixed up on our days again Saturday night and Sunday and any-
8 one that happened to be there more or less took charge of
9 anything that was going on at the time.

10 Senator Ferguson: But that was later at night?

11 Colonel Schukraft: That was later at night, yes, sir.

12 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, isn't it true that
13 you then knew there was a fourteen part message coming in, -
14 in fact, it was coming in that afternoon, was it not?

15 Colonel Schukraft: That is correct, sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: You are familiar with that, are you
17 not?

18 Colonel Schukraft: Yes, sir.

19 Senator Ferguson: You did bring the staff back so that
20 they could work and get that message out?

21 Colonel Schukraft: To the best of my knowledge that was
22 the reason that they were called back, because we were antici-
23 pating the fourteen part message and we wanted to be sure that
24 we got it to the people concerned as quickly as possible.

25 Senator Ferguson: In fact, that is what the pilot mes-

Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 sage was and that is why you were going to go back, to get
3 the fourteenth part?

4 Colonel Schukraft: That is right. The pilot message was
5 alerting the Japanese, so we were alerting ourselves.

6 Senator Ferguson: That is right. When did you get the
7 thirteen parts completed?

8 Colonel Schukraft: I do not remember the exact time,
9 sir. It is in the record, I believe. It was some time Satur-
10 day evening. I do not remember the exact time, sir.

11 Senator Ferguson: Well, would it be by nine o'clock?

12 Colonel Schukraft: My memory actually is it is about
13 nine o'clock.

14 Senator Ferguson: About nine o'clock.

15 Colonel Schukraft: Yes, sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: Now, then, did you get the thirteen
17 parts -- why did you want to send out thirteen parts and not
18 send out ten or twelve? Was there any reason why you did not
19 use thirteen or decided to send thirteen parts out?

20 Colonel Schukraft: Well, actually, sir, all the de-
21 ciphering of that message was done by the Navy since they had
22 started it. The normal practice was if you had several parts
23 of a message you tried to get the message as complete as pos-
24 sible and find the set if it did not unnecessarily delay
25 things. As I remember, the thirteen parts in themselves were

Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 not too important and they were hoping they would get the
3 part which would say more or less what would happen.

4 Sen. tor Ferguson: Well, now, then, why did you deliver
5 the thirteen parts? The evidence indicates it was delivered
6 to the President around nine o'clock.

7 Colonel Schukraft: Because the fourteenth part was mis-
8 sing and we did not have it and could not find it.

9 Senator Ferguson: And did you think that you had missed
10 that entirely?

11 Colonel Schukraft: We thought that we had missed it
12 completely at the time, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: And is that the reason for delivering
14 the thirteen parts?

15 Colonel Schukraft: That is correct, sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: Now, would your department call anyone
17 to tell them that you were going to deliver a message later?

18 Colonel Schukraft: I do not know, sir. We delivered it
19 to G-2 and then further discussion would be by them.

20 Senator Ferguson: By them?

21 Colonel Schukraft: And their setup on that I do not know.

22 Senator Ferguson: Now, did you work all night that night?

23 Colonel Schukraft: Yes, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: Do you know what time the fourteenth
25 part came in?

Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Colonel Schukraft: I do not know. So far as I know the only copy of that fourteenth part that was received was a copy from, I believe it was station "S" and the Navy received that copy and it was on a Navy cryptographic date so that they would have gone ahead and deciphered it.

Senator Ferguson: When did you see the fourteenth part?

Colonel Schukraft: I saw it some time Sunday morning, sir.

Senator Ferguson: How early?

Colonel Schukraft: I do not actually remember the time. It was a considerable time before noon I recall because we had sufficient time to get the message to the Secretary of State prior to one o'clock.

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, you say you worked at the department all night?

Colonel Schukraft: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: The whole night?

Colonel Schukraft: That is right, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And you do not remember seeing it early in the morning, the fourteenth part?

Colonel Schukraft: I do not know, sir.

Senator Ferguson: When did you see the so-called one o'clock message?

Colonel Schukraft: I saw that shortly after it came in.

Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 sir.

3 Senator Ferguson: Well, at what hour?

4 Colonel Schukraft: Let's see, I might be able to find
5 that, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

7 Colonel Schukraft: Sir, my memory on that is rather hazy.
8 The times are not actually shown as to when it came in. My
9 memory actually is that I saw it shortly after I saw the four-
10 teenth part, or about the same time. I think that was around
11 nine or ten o'clock Sunday morning, but that is very, very dim.

12 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, as I understand the hours
13 that they were received it was around three or four o'clock in
14 the morning.

15 Colonel Schukraft: That was the time they were inter-
16 cepted by the intercept station, sir.

17 Senator Ferguson: Yes. And you had the key to these
18 messages, did you not, the fourteenth part, because it came in
19 in the same key as the other parts?

20 Colonel Schukraft: No, sir, it came in in a different
21 key.

22 Senator Ferguson: It did?

23 Colonel Schukraft: It came in under the date of the
24 seventh, sir. You see, part of this fourteenth part message
25 was keyed on the sixth and part was keyed on the seventh.

1 Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: Do you know if there was difficulty
3 in finding the key for the fourteenth part?

4 Colonel Schukraft: I am positive we did not have, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: Positive?

6 Colonel Schukraft: Yes, sir.

7 Senator Ferguson: Now, how do you account for the fact
8 that it took until nine o'clock? You were working there
9 all night; it came through your department. This message came
10 in around three o'clock in the morning. Why would it be until
11 nine before it would be translated?

12 Colonel Schukraft: Sir, we did not -- that was a Navy
13 date. We did not have it. However, I think I can explain it,
14 because we were looking very, very hard for the fourteenth
15 part and we had thought that we had missed it. If you will
16 notice, that fourteenth part was filed about twelve to four-
17 teen hours after the thirteenth part.

18 Senator Ferguson: Yes, it came in about twelve hours
19 later.

20 Colonel Schukraft: It was filed about twelve hours later,
21 sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: It was filed about twelve hours later?

23 Colonel Schukraft: That is right and there was no indi-
24 cation on the message that it was the fourteenth part until
25 they started on it. What we were doing was locking and check-

1 Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 ing and re-checking every message that came in from Tokyo
3 that was filed about the time of the other messages, of the
4 other parts.

5 Senator Ferguson: Well, at the top of the translation, in
6 forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this
7 part, appears the plain English phrase, "Very important".

8 Colonel Schukraft: That is correct, sir.

9 Senator Ferguson: So you had a flag right on here.

10 Colonel Schukraft: Not that it was the fourteenth part,
11 and the fourteenth part was the most important thing we were
12 looking for at the moment, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: You had a flag over here?

14 Colonel Schukraft: It does not necessarily mean anything.

15 Senator Ferguson: It does not?

16 Colonel Schukraft: No, sir. The priorities are a little
17 bit inconsistent at times. In this particular case it did, but
18 you could not use that as a rule to go by.

19 Senator Ferguson: And that "S.T.T." at the end, what
20 does that mean?

21 Colonel Schukraft: Station "S" forwarded by teletype,
22 sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: That was the Army?

24 Colonel Schukraft: No, sir, it was not. That was a Navy
25 station.

1 Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: As a matter of fact, the Army did not
3 get this message at all on teletype. They received it as
4 translated.

5 Colonel Schukraft: That is correct, sir. So far as I
6 know the statioⁿ "S" copy of that message is the only copy
7 that we ever received.

8 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, did you get the one o'clock
9 message? That is your translation, isn't it? That is on
10 page 248, "the time of delivery one o'clock on the 7th, your
11 time"?

12 Colonel Schukraft: That is correct, sir, that was trans-
13 lated because the Navy had no translators that morning. It
14 was decoded by the Navy and they sent the plain text over, the
15 plain text version to the Army and one of our translators
16 translated the message.

17 Senator Ferguson: Would that come into your department
18 to be translated?

19 Colonel Schukraft: Not the department that ¹ had direct
20 responsibility for, sir. It would have come into the section
21 of which I was a member.

22 Senator Ferguson: Do you know what time it was trans-
23 lated?

24 Colonel Schukraft: I do not know, sir.

25 Senator Ferguson: Now, look across on page 249, the top

Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: As a matter of fact, the Army did not get this message at all on teletype. They received it as translated.

Colonel Schukraft: That is correct, sir. So far as I know the station "G" copy of that message is the only copy that we ever received.

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, did you get the one o'clock message? That is your translation, isn't it? That is on page 248, "the time of delivery one o'clock on the 7th, your time"?

Colonel Schukraft: That is correct, sir, that was translated because the Navy had no translators that morning. It was decoded by the Navy and they sent the plain text over, the plain text version to the Army and one of our translators translated the message.

Senator Ferguson: Would that come into your department to be translated?

Colonel Schukraft: Not the department that I had direct responsibility for, sir. It would have come into the section of which I was a member.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know what time it was translated?

Colonel Schukraft: I do not know, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, look across on page 249, the top

1 Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 message. (Reading)

3 "After deciphering part 14 of my 902, and also 907,
4 908 and 909, please destroy at once the remaining cipher
5 machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner
6 also secret documents."

7 When did you first see that message?

8 Colonel Schukraft: I also saw that one some time Sunday
9 morning, sir.

10 Senator Ferguson: Could you give us the hour?

11 Colonel Schukraft: I cannot actually, sir. My memory
12 actually for the 7th of December is rather hazy as far as events
13 of the night and specific times. I had been there all night
14 and I was getting pretty sleepy at the time.

15 Senator Ferguson: I don't suppose you received any more
16 important message than the one that I just referred to, the 910,
17 after they got these messages to destroy at once all the re-
18 maining cipher machines and all their codes; that ended it,
19 didn't it?

20 Colonel Schukraft: That is right. As I remember it,
21 that message was given special handling, sir. That was
22 given to G-2 as quickly as possible.

23 Senator Ferguson: If it came in at five o'clock in the
24 morning when should it have reached G-2 if it had had special
25 handling?

Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 Colonel Schukraft: It would not have been by five o'clock
3 in the morning. It was intercepted by Station "S" at five
4 o'clock in the morning.

5 Senator Ferguson: How long should it take to be tele-
6 typed to your office?

7 Colonel Schukraft: It would have been teletyped to the
8 Navy office, sir, and it would take probably a minimum of
9 twenty minutes up to even two hours to be teletyped in.

10 Senator Ferguson: Did you see General Marshall at all
11 Saturday or Sunday?

12 Colonel Schukraft: No, sir, I did not.

13 Senator Ferguson: Did you see General Gerow, General
14 Miles?

15 Colonel Schukraft: No, sir. Our contacts, Senator, would
16 be with G-2.

17 Senator Ferguson: 910 was filed by the Japanese at 6:44
18 P.M., Washington time 4:44 A.M. 7th of December. Intercepted
19 in Japanese code in Naval station at Bainbridge Island,
20 Washington, 5:08. Teletyped in Japanese code to the Navy --
21 blank; decoded by the Navy -- blank; sent by the Navy to the
22 Army -- blank; translated and typed by Army SIS on basis of
23 Navy code (A) 6th of December 1941; no hours given.

24 Colonel Schukraft: That is right, sir. We checked very
25 carefully at our end to try to find times on these and there

Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 just are no times in existence unfortunately.

3 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, will you tell us what you
4 worked at? The thirteen parts was out and delivered by 9:30.
5 What did you work on the rest of the night if you did not work
6 on these messages when they came in the next morning?

7 Colonel Schukraft: We were doing a number of things,
8 sir. One of the things was trying to get the fourteenth part.
9 That was our object, our major object in there at the time.
10 We had stations send in notice of everything that they had in
11 the hopes that one of them might have the fourteenth part.
12 No one ever dreamed that the fourteenth part would have be en
13 following fourteen hours later and I was looking for, as I re-
14 call it, a message that was filed about the time of the other
15 thirteen parts and when we did not get such a message, then
16 we merely assumed or thought we had missed it.

17 Senator Ferguson: But, Colonel, you had two other very
18 important messages, 907 and 910, the one o'clock and the de-
19 struction of code messages.

20 Colonel Schukraft: Those were Navy dates, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: Pardon me?

22 Colonel Schukraft: Those were Navy dates. Those messages
23 were messages the Navy processed.

24 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, the fact that it was Navy
25 day after midnight, is that what you have in mind?

Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Colonel Schukraft: That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And, therefore, you were not personally, your department was not personally responsible?

Colonel Schukraft: Our responsibility would be to get the cipher text to the Navy, sir, if it came in from an Army station. If it came in from a Navy station, then the Navy would keep the message and process it.

Senator Ferguson: Now, as I understand it, then, you had these divided so that even though this was a very vital and important time and you were waiting for the fourteenth part and other messages in relation to it, you had split the time up so it was definite and you sat there and waited?

Colonel Schukraft: No, sir, we did not. We went over and checked and re-checked all messages coming in in the hopes that one of them might be the fourteenth part, but we would not have looked for a message that came in there fourteen hours later with any idea that it might be the fourteenth part of the message.

Senator Ferguson: Now, if you were only over there and checking and you were there working the whole night, at 5:07 in the morning this No. 910 was in.

Colonel Schukraft: It came into the Navy, sir.

Senator Ferguson: But did you go to the Navy to check it?

Colonel Schukraft: We were working very closely with

Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Colonel Schukraft: That is correct, sir.

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Colonel Schukraft: Our responsibility would be to get the cipher text to the Navy, sir, if it came in from an Army station. If it came in from a Navy station, then the Navy would keep the message and process it.

Senator Ferguson: Now, as I understand it, then, you had these divided so that even though this was a very vital and important time and you were waiting for the fourteenth part and other messages in relation to it, you had split the time up so it was definite and you sat there and waited?

Colonel Schukraft: No, sir, we did not. We went over and checked and re-checked all messages coming in in the hopes that one of them might be the fourteenth part, but we would not have looked for a message that came in there fourteen hours later with any idea that it might be the fourteenth part of the message.

Senator Ferguson: Now, if you were only over there and checking and you were there working the whole night, at 5:07 in the morning this No. 910 was in.

Colonel Schukraft: It came into the Navy, sir.

Senator Ferguson: But did you go to the Navy to check it?

Colonel Schukraft: We were working very closely with

Witness Schukraft

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 them that night, yes, sir. We did not check on this particu-
3 lar message because we did not know of the existence of that
4 message until after it was decoded and translated.

5 Senator Ferguson: You cannot give us any time then on
6 these two messages, the one o'clock and the destruction of
7 codes?

8 Colonel Schukraft: I do not remember, no, sir, except
9 that I do know that it was some time Sunday morning.

10 Senator Ferguson: That is all.

11 The Chairman: That is all. Thank you very much, Colonel.

12 (Witness excused.)

13 The Chairman: Who is the next witness?

14 Mr. Kaufman: Colonel Phillips.

15 The Chairman: Colonel Phillips, will you be sworn?

16
17 TESTIMONY OF COLONEL WALTER C. PHILLIPS

18 (sworn by the chairman)

19 Mr. Kaufman: What is your full name?

20 Colonel Phillips: Walter C. Phillips.

21 Mr. Kaufman: And will you for the record state your Army
22 experience?

23 Colonel Phillips: I have had almost twenty-nine years
24 service. I came in on the examination, headed the examination
25 in 1917, a graduate from the University of West Virginia, as a

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1
2 provisional Second Lieutenant. At the end of two years, which
3 covered the World War period, I had served in command capaci-
4 ties most of the entire time.

5 Mr. Kaufman: What do you mean by "command capacities"?

6 Colonel Phillips: I acted as a platoon commander; I
7 commanded first a platoon and a company, for a time a batal-
8 lion. I attained the rank of Captain and for a short period
9 was sent to the General Staff of the Ninth Division as As-
10 sistant G-2.

11 In 1919 I came to Washington attached to the General Staff
12 in G-2, or the Intelligence Department. I remained here until
13 1922 when I went to China in the capacity of G-2 for Major
14 General W. D. Connor. I remained in China until 1926 as G-2.

15 In 1926 I returned to Fort Benning, in which I completed
16 the Company Officer's course. In 1927 I went to the Eighth
17 Infantry in Georgia, later up at Charleston, South Carolina.
18 In 1929 I returned to Fort Benning, took the advanced course
19 and was retained as an instructor until 1934.

20 From 1934 to 1936 I was with the Sixth Infantry and in
21 1936, in the fall, I went to Fort Leavenworth, graduated in
22 1937.

23 I joined the First Division in 1937 and remained with the
24 First Division, being the G-3 or Operations and Training Of-
25 ficer of the Division until January 1941; actually till Febru-

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1
2 ary 1941.

3 In December 1940, after a very successful series of
4 maneuvers in the First Division, where I was Operations Of-
5 ficer, General Short requested that I come to Hawaii as Chief
6 of Staff. I was going with the First Division, as I thought
7 at that time; I was very well satisfied with my job and I re-
8 quested some time to think this over.

9 In the meantime, having known General Marshall for many
10 years, - he was then Chief of Staff, - I requested an ap-
11 pointment with him to talk over this jump to foreign service.
12 I came to Washington and had my appointment with General
13 Marshall, whom I had known since 1921.

14 He told me, speaking very freely, that General Short had
15 spoken to him when he had conferred with him about having me
16 come to Hawaii. General Marshall stated he thoroughly ap-
17 proved and directed that I attempt to bring the Hawaiian gar-
18 rison as to training up to the present training of the First
19 Division, which he considered the best in the Army at that
20 time.

21 I returned to my station in New York City and told my
22 commanding General, General Carl Truesdale, of this confer-
23 ence or the results of the conference. He had approved the
24 conference prior to my going to Washington.

25 In February I sailed for Hawaii and joined the staff of

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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the Hawaiian Department on March 1.

3

Mr. Kaufman: And when you joined the Hawaiian Department did you become its Chief of Staff at that time?

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Colonel Phillips: I did not.

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Mr. Kaufman: What was your first assignment when you arrived at the Hawaiian Department?

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Mr. Kaufman: And when did you become Chief of Staff?

Colonel Phillips: On November the 5th, 1941.

Mr. Kaufman: So that you had been in the Hawaiian Department since about the 1st of March?

Colonel Phillips: Since the 1st of March.

Mr. Kaufman: And became the Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Department on the 5th of November?

Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

Mr. Kaufman: Of 1941?

Colonel Phillips: 1941.

Mr. Kaufman: After the time of your appointment as Chief of Staff were you familiar with the Coastal Frontier Defense

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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Plan?

Colonel Phillips: I was.

Mr. Kaufman: Were you familiar with the message sent by the Navy to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, on November 24, 1941?

Colonel Phillips: I believe I recall it.

Mr. Kaufman: Who called your attention to that message?

Colonel Phillips: I would like to refresh my memory on that. I am not sure; I cannot recall it.

Mr. Kaufman: Have you got the message before you?

Colonel Phillips: I do not.

Mr. Kaufman: Well, we will come back to that.

Do you recall the receipt of the message from General Marshall under date of November 27, 1941, which is on page 8 of exhibit No. 32?

Colonel Phillips: I do.

Mr. Keefe: What is the answer? I did not get it.

Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: Coming back to the message of November 24th from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, which is exhibit 37, on pages 32 and 33, I ask you to tell us whether those two messages were called to your attention at that time?

Colonel Phillips: This one and the next one?

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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Mr. Kaufman: Yes, sir.

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Colonel Phillips: I have seen the first message, I recall that, but I do not recall the second.

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Mr. Kaufman: You recall the message from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet under date of November 24, 1941, which is on page 32 of exhibit No. 37, is that correct?

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Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

Mr. Kaufman: And that was called to your attention on or about the date that the message bears, that is, namely, November 24, 1941?

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Colonel Phillips: Yes, that is to the best of my recollection.

Mr. Kaufman: Up to that time you were familiar with the tenseness of the situation in the Pacific?

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Colonel Phillips: I was generally, yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: And did you become familiar with the correspondence between General Short and General Marshall which is in evidence here, exhibit No. 53?

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Colonel Phillips: I was acquainted with that.

Mr. Kaufman: And that was part of the studies that you made during the time you had this roving staff commission before you became Chief of Staff?

Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1
2 Mr. Kaufman: So that we have it that prior to the 24th
3 of November you were familiar with the correspondence between
4 General Marshall and General Short, that is correct?

5 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

6 Mr. Kaufman: And we have it that you were familiar with
7 the growing tenseness of the situation in the Pacific?

8 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

9 Mr. Kaufman: And we have it that you were familiar with
10 the Coastal Frontier Defense Plan?

11 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

12 Mr. Kaufman: And the Martin-Bellinger report of 1941?

13 Colonel Phillips: I had read that.

14 Mr. Kaufman: And we have it also that you saw the mes-
15 sage from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-
16 Chief, Pacific Fleet on or before November 24th?

17 Colonel Phillips: I am not positive about that date, on
18 or before, but to the best of my recollection that is correct.

19 Mr. Kaufman: And in that message you saw that the Chief
20 of Naval Operations advised the Commander-in-Chief of the
21 Pacific Fleet that the outcome of negotiations with Japan were
22 very doubtful and that a surprise attack might be expected in
23 any direction at any time?

24 Colonel Phillips: Particularly to Guam and the Philip-
25 pines, I believe, - including Guam and the Philippines.

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

2 Mr. Kaufman: It says that a surprise movement in any
3 direction, including attacks on the Philippines or Guam. Do
4 you recall that?

5 Colonel Phillips: That is right.

6 Mr. Kaufman: Now, a surprise move in any direction did
7 not exclude Hawaii in your mind?

8 Colonel Phillips: It did not include it at that time due
9 to the inclusion of the Philippines and Guam.

10 Mr. Kaufman: Did it exclude Hawaii in your mind?

11 Colonel Phillips: I do not know that it did entirely.
12 Such a thing was always a possibility.

13 Mr. Kaufman: Then is it one of the things that you dis-
14 cussed with General Short?

15 Colonel Phillips: I did, repeatedly.

16 Mr. Kaufman: Then on November 27th you received the mes-
17 sage from General Marshall?

18 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

19 Mr. Kaufman: That is on page 8 of exhibit No. 32.

20 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

21 Mr. Kaufman: And on the receipt of that message you con-
22 ferred with General Short?

23 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

24 Mr. Kaufman: And according to his testimony the confer-
25 ence did not include any other officers except you and General

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1
2 Short. Is that correct?

3 Colonel Phillips: I think that is correct. I was under
4 the impression at one time that G-2, Colonel Fielder, now
5 General Fielder, was present, but he may not have been present.

6 Mr. Kaufman: General Short testified that you and he
7 were the only persons that considered that message at the time
8 of its receipt.

9 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

10 Mr. Kaufman: And that within a half an hour after the
11 receipt of that message General Short made his answer.

12 Colonel Phillips: That is generally correct.

13 Mr. Kaufman: And what conference did you and General Short
14 have during the half an hour period between the receipt of this
15 message of November 27th and the time he sent his telegram,
16 his despatch to the War Department stating the receipt of that
17 message of November 27th and advising them that he has alerted
18 against sabotage and made liaison with the Navy, what confer-
19 ence did you and General Short have?

20 Colonel Phillips: I have made some notes here in regard
21 to the estimate of the situation that we made at that time.

22 The Army has always had a five-paragraph method for making
23 a formal estimate of the situation. While we did not actually
24 write this estimate out at the time, if it had been written
25 it would have followed generally this form.

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1
2 Mr. Kaufman: Now, are you answering my question, Col-
3 onel?

4 Colonel Phillips: I am.

5 Mr. Kaufman: I see.

6 Colonel Phillips: I am. This is part of the conference.

7 Mr. Kaufman: I see.

8 Colonel Phillips: This was the entire conference, which
9 consisted of the estimate of the situation, which was neces-
10 sary to arrive at a decision on General Marshall's message.

11 The first paragraph in the estimate of the situation is
12 the mission.

13 The Hawaiian Department had several missions. Our pri-
14 mary wartime job would be to defend the fleet and naval base
15 at Pearl Harbor and to defend the airfields on Oahu. In peace-
16 time our job was chiefly training and preparation for our war-
17 time mission.

18 When I went to Hawaii, General Marshall told me speci-
19 fically that he wanted the training brought up to the high
20 standard set by the First Division. In late 1941, we had the
21 very pressing duty of training air crews to ferry planes to
22 General Douglas MacArthur. We were part of MacArthur's sup-
23 port in this way.

24 No word from Washington in any way purported to relieve
25 us of our training mission. We had only six B-17 Flying

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1
2 Fortresses in condition to use, which we needed for this air
3 corps training.

4 Second paragraph. This is of the estimate of the situa-
5 tion.

6 Second, the situation and the opposing lines of action.
7 In this paragraph an army commander and his staff consider the
8 capabilities of the enemy and all the reasonable lines of ac-
9 tion open to our side. Our facts were briefly these:

10 The Navy had task forces out and was conducting that
11 kind of distant reconnaissance to the fullest extent they
12 believed necessary and to the greatest degree possible con-
13 sistent with their mission to prepare for raids on the Japan-
14 ese Mandated islands under WPL-46. The Navy was not worried,
15 and we had only 6 planes which they could have borrowed to
16 make their distant reconnaissance more effective. Six planes
17 could cover an arc of only eight degrees. Six planes could
18 only cover a small arc so far as degrees were concerned.

19 The Navy did not feel that such coverage would so sub-
20 stantially add to their security as to justify depriving
21 us of the planes so vitally needed for training and for all
22 possible support to General MacArthur in the Philippines.

23 Our enemy intelligence came from Washington and the
24 Navy. We felt they had more than they gave us but we as-
25 sumed, and reasonably, that they could not be so foolish as

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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to withhold vital intelligence from us.

Senator Lucas: You mean the Navy in Hawaii?

Colonel Phillips: No, sir.

Senator Lucas: You said "Washington and the Navy."

Colonel Phillips: I meant Washington, sir. They told us only that an attack might be expected in the Philippines, Kra, Guam, Borneo or somewhere in the East.

They told us to expect hostile action. We believed they meant sabotage. After we were alerted to prevent sabotage and so reported to them we received three more sabotage messages. This made us absolutely sure they meant sabotage and not some other unmentioned form of hostile action.

WARD A. PAUL WASHINGTON
Shack
fls

Shack
fls.
Shef
hl

Witness phillips

1
2 Since General MacArthur might expect to be attacked,
3 according to the intelligence sent from Washington, it be-
4 came even more important that we continue our training of
5 ferry crews, because our mission included this type of
6 support to him.

7 We weighed these considerations. We had three alerts
8 to choose from.

9 Under the third paragraph we analyze the opposing lines
10 of action open to the enemy. On this, planning had been
11 very careful. We knew we could prevent sabotage, and we
12 did. We knew we could not stop an air attack. We did not
13 have the necessary planes. The only way to do it is to
14 locate the carriers more than 300 miles at sea and sink
15 them by plane, or by naval bombardment before they can
16 launch their planes and begin the attack.

17 The Army could not locate the enemy at such distance.
18 Radar was considered effective only to 100 miles, and at
19 that time provided no means of friend or foe identification.

20 The Navy had the job of long distance scouting and
21 patrolling, and they were doing their job with task forces.
22 They were doing it to the greatest extent consistent with
23 their potential offensive mission to raid the Marshall Islands.

24 The Navy believed there was no danger of an air raid.
25 We were there to support the Navy, to defend their base, and

Witness Phillips

the Fleet within it.

Paragraph 4 of the estimate is:

We compared our own lines of action. Alert 2 or 3, if adopted, might help to disorganize an air raid, but an air raid was only a bare possibility. On the basis of intelligence from Washington, on the basis of what the Navy thought, and in reliance on the effectiveness of the most complete reconnaissance the Navy could furnish, we felt that preparation to defend against a bare possibility should be weighed against the urgent need to continue training. We could adopt Alert 1 and fulfill all our missions, our defense mission to prevent sabotage which we and the War Department expected, and our training mission. Or we could adopt Alert 2, or 3, and stop training, abandon our urgent training mission, to better prepare ourselves for the bare possibility of an attack which the War Department did not expect.

I knew from the dispatches which Admiral Kimmel and General Short received that the War and Navy Departments did not want the Rainbow Plan implemented until Japan committed the first overt act.

I knew also that General Short had been ordered not to alarm the public, not to disclose intent, and not to inform any more than the minimum essential officers.

You can't put people out to shoot at enemy planes, unless

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Phillips 13,150
2 Questions by: Mr. Kaufman
3 you tell them to shoot. These were the lines of action as
4 we compared them. We did not have the "magic" which Wash-
5 ington had, and we did not have the hindsight which is now
6 open to everyone.

7 Paragraph 5 in our estimate is the decision. We made
8 the decision to order an alert to prevent sabotage. We
9 ordered it. We reported to the War Department, and as
10 General Marshall testified, we were reasonable in our as-
11 sumption that if Gerow or Marshall disagreed with what we
12 had done, they would tell us what they wanted us to do.

13 In conclusion, I want to add that I fully approved
14 of General Short's decision to order Alert No. 1. I feel
15 also that I share any responsibility that he bears for that
16 decision. That decision turned out to be wrong, but it was
17 as right as we could make it at the time on the information
18 we had.

19 That is what we discussed during that 30 minute
20 period.

21 Mr. Kaufman: You could not have discussed all of it,
22 because a large part of what you have just read did not
23 happen until long after the 27th of November.

24 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

25 Mr. Kaufman: Isn't that so?

26 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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2 Mr. Kaufman: So what you have really given to us
3 is your reasons, or your justification for having agreed
4 with General Short in Alert No. 1 against sabotage. Isn't
5 that the fact?

6 Colonel Phillips: I have given you in that statement
7 exactly what we covered. Generally speaking, we covered
8 every subject, with the exception of the additions that I
9 heard here.

10 Mr. Kaufman: Who prepared this memorandum for you?

11 Colonel Phillips: I did.

12 Mr. Kaufman: Was that memorandum seen by anybody besides
13 yourself?

14 Colonel Phillips: I am not positive about that. Of
15 course I did not type it. I have no means of typing it.

16 Mr. Kaufman: Did General Short's counsel see that
17 memorandum?

18 Colonel Phillips: I showed him a copy of it, yes,
19 sir.

20 Mr. Kaufman: When did you show it to him?

21 Colonel Phillips: I cannot say. Perhaps ten days
22 or two weeks ago, when I thought I was going to testify
23 at that time.

24 Mr. Kaufman: Now, did you inform the Navy that you
25 were alerted against sabotage only?

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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Colonel Phillips: We informed the Navy that we were alerted for sabotage. We had a Naval liaison officer in the G-3 office that was thoroughly conversant with everything that was occurring in our headquarters.

Mr. Kaufman: Now, I will ask you, Colonel, whether you advised your corresponding number in the Navy, the Chief of Staff, that you were alerted only to sabotage?

Colonel Phillips: I did not, because that was not within my line of duty. That was not part of my job.

Mr. Kaufman: Well, now, you were the Chief of Staff of General Short in command of the Hawaiian Department?

Colonel Phillips: Exactly.

Mr. Kaufman: And Admiral Smith was the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, is that correct?

Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

Mr. Kaufman: And the primary function of the Army was to protect the Fleet at its base?

Colonel Phillips: Right.

Mr. Kaufman: And do you want us to understand that you did not tell Admiral Smith, then Captain Smith, the Chief of Staff that you had alerted only against Sabotage?

Colonel Phillips: Not personally. We had liaison officers in our staff, whose primary duty things of that kind

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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2 were.

3 Mr. Kaufman: Now, you heard Admiral Smith testify,
4 did you not?

5 Colonel Phillips: I do not believe I did.

6 Mr. Kaufman: Well, did you hear Admiral Kimmel testify?

7 Colonel Phillips: I did.

8 Mr. Kaufman: And you know both of them testified that
9 neither of them knew that you had any alert other than a
10 general alert? You knew that, did you not?

11 Colonel Phillips: I heard Admiral Kimmel testify to
12 that effect, yes, sir.

13 Mr. Kaufman: And you know that Admiral Smith testified
14 to the same effect?

15 Colonel Phillips: I do not know about that.

16 Mr. Kaufman: The record shows that he so testified.

17 Senator Lucas: Who is the liaison man?

18 Mr. Kaufman: Who is the liaison man?

19 Colonel Phillips: Lieutenant Burr.

20 Mr. Kaufman: Lieutenant Burr?

21 Colonel Phillips: He was at that time, yes, sir.

22 Mr. Kaufman: What did you mean in the dispatch that
23 you sent to the War Department in reply to their message
24 of November 27, that liaison with the Navy had been made?

25 Colonel Phillips: My impression of the meaning of that

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1 sentence was that General Short -- that was his message,
2 not mine -- General Short intended to convey to the War
3 Department that he was working very closely with the Navy,
4 and merely telling the War Department, or assuring them
5 that we were cooperating fully in that respect.
6

7 Mr. Kaufman: Was the Army justified in believing that
8 liaison with the Navy meant the invocation of the coastal
9 frontier defense plan?

10 Colonel Phillips: I do not think so at all.

11 Mr. Kaufman: You do not think that they were justified
12 in so believing?

13 Colonel Phillips: I do not think so.

14 Mr. Kaufman: So that the only impression you wanted to
15 create on the War Department was that you had very close
16 relations with the Navy?
17

18 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.
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1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

2 Mr. Kaufman: And those close relations did not even
3 contemplate your telling, or General Short telling to their
4 corresponding numbers in the Navy the fact that you had
5 alerted only to sabotage?

6 Colonel Phillips: That was not part of my duties, as
7 I have just stated. We had liaison officers for that purpose.

8 Mr. Kaufman: Now you had liaison officers with the
9 Navy whose purpose it was to do what?

10 Colonel Phillips: A liaison officer's purpose is to
11 keep -- liaison from the Navy -- is to keep the Navy com-
12 pletely informed of everything that occurs at our headquarters.

13 Mr. Kaufman: And that liaison officer was directly
14 under you, was he not?

15 Colonel Phillips: He was in G-3, under my G-3. No,
16 he was not under me, no sir.

17 Mr. Kaufman: Did you make any inquiry from G-3, or
18 from anyone else, as to what information the liaison officer
19 with the Navy had given to them?

20 Colonel Phillips: Personally I do not recall that I did.
21 However, that was the biggest bit of information that had
22 occurred in that headquarters for many weeks, and there
23 was no question about everybody there knowing exactly what
24 had happened.

25 Mr. Kaufman: Then can you explain the testimony of

1 Witness Phillips Questions by: Mr. Kaufman
2 Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Smith that they did not know
3 that you were not on a general alert?

4 Colonel Phillips: I cannot explain the testimony of
5 anybody.

6 Mr. Kaufman: It is apparent then that something went
7 wrong either with your headquarters or with your liaison man?

8 Colonel Phillips: Our liaison officer was a Naval
9 officer, liaison from Admiral Bloch's headquarters, whose
10 duty it was to inform the Navy, and if there was any falling
11 down or dereliction there on his part, I do not know about it.
12 He was an officer of a very high type and had been specially
13 selected, an outstanding Naval officer.

14 Mr. Kaufman: Could I suggest, Colonel, that you have
15 not answered the question that I just asked? Would you be
16 good enough to read it, Mr. Reporter?

17 (The question was read by the reporter.)

18 Colonel Phillips: It may be it is apparent, but it
19 is not particularly apparent to me that anything went wrong.
20 Of course the liaison officer perhaps did not inform him
21 about it, he may have forgotten it, but that was highly
22 important and everybody knew of it. It is possible that
23 the liaison officer from the Navy, although I do not know
24 why, had no reason for it. He would be the best witness
25 on that.

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman
Mr. Keefe

2 Mr. Keefe: Will you permit an interruption at this
3 time so I can get this clear in my mind?

4 Mr. Kaufman: Yes.

5 Mr. Keefe: Was this liaison officer sent to you from
6 Admiral Bloch's Fourteenth Naval District?

7 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Keefe: Or from Admiral Kimmel?

9 Colonel Phillips: Admiral Bloch.

10 Mr. Keefe: So he would report to Admiral Bloch, would
11 he not?

12 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

13 Mr. Keefe: And not to Kimmel?

14 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

15 Mr. Keefe: Is that correct?

16 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

17 Mr. Keefe: That man you spoke about was from the
18 Fourteenth Naval District?

19 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

20 Mr. Keefe: Under the command of Admiral Bloch, and
21 not from the Fleet Command under the command of Admiral Kimmel?

22 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

23 Mr. Kaufman: You testified before that the primary
24 duty of the Army in Hawaii was to protect the Fleet, did you
25 not?

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

2 Colonel Phillips: Protect the Fleet, the installations
3 on the Island of Oahu, the base of Oahu and the Fleet when
4 in Pearl Harbor.

5 Mr. Kaufman: That is right. So that you want this
6 committee to understand that notwithstanding the fact that
7 it was the prime duty of the Army to protect the Fleet at
8 its base, that nevertheless you did not conceive it your
9 duty to make known to Admiral Kimmel, or to his Chief of
10 Staff, that you had done nothing except to order an alert
11 against sabotage?

12 Colonel Phillips: My duty did not include informing
13 Admiral Kimmel's staff. Our liaison, I will repeat again,
14 was from Admiral Bloch's headquarters, and he knew everything
15 that was occurring in our headquarters, and it is a reasonable
16 assumption to expect that that officer was doing his duty
17 at all times. He was a very high type young officer.

18 Mr. Kaufman: I am not talking about his duty, Colonel,
19 I am talking about your duty as Chief of Staff. Within a
20 few hours after you dispatched the answer to General Marshall's
21 warning to the Army you saw a copy of the dispatch to Admiral
22 Kimmel, did you not?

23 Colonel Phillips: Which dispatch was that, sir?

24 Mr. Kaufman: Of November 27. It started "This is a war
25 warning".

1 Witness Phillips Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

2 Colonel Phillips: That is correct, yes, sir. I
3 was told of that dispatch by General Short. I did not see
4 a copy of it.

5 Mr. Kaufman: You were told about it?

6 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Kaufman: And you were told that it started out
8 with the phrase, "This is a war warning"?

9 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

10 Mr. Kaufman: Now did that put you on your toes any
11 further?

12 Colonel Phillips: Yes, but it went on to say the Kra
13 Peninsula, I believe. Could I see a copy of it to refresh
14 my memory?

15 Mr. Kaufman: Yes, sir.

16 (The document was handed to Colonel Phillips.)

17 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Kaufman: What is your answer now that you have
19 seen this dispatch?

20 Colonel Phillips: I was told of that dispatch by
21 General Short. Of course I felt, and we all did, that war
22 was a possibility, but not in Hawaii. That dispatch of
23 itself there states where we should look for war.

24 Mr. Kaufman: You say that you regarded this dispatch
25 as excluding Hawaii, is that right?

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

2 Colonel Phillips: Certainly not including it. It
3 was a possibility, but Hawaii was never mentioned.

4 Mr. Kaufman: I realize that it was not mentioned, but
5 will you point to the language in that message that excludes
6 Hawaii as one of the theaters of operation?

7 Colonel Phillips: There is nothing that excludes Hawaii.
8 I did not so state.

9 Mr. Kaufman: So that Hawaii was included with more
10 direct emphasis on other places as more likely probabilities,
11 isn't that correct?

12 Colonel Phillips: I do not know that Hawaii was in-
13 cluded at all. It does not say so.

14 Mr. Kaufman: Well, will you tell me where Hawaii is
15 excluded in that dispatch?

16 Colonel Phillips: It perhaps is excluded by not
17 naming it.

18 Mr. Kaufman: And the message of November 24 indicated
19 an attack in any possible direction, did it not?

20 Colonel Phillips: Yes; Guam and the Philippines parti-
21 cularly.

22 Mr. Kaufman: Well, then, will you explain why the
23 Army should have been warned at all if Hawaii was excluded
24 from the field of operations?

25 Colonel Phillips: Hawaii was not entirely excluded.

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

2 We were there for that purpose. Our job was a defensive
3 job.

4 Mr. Kaufman: A defensive job?

5 Colonel Phillips: Purely and simply, and we were pre-
6 paring in every possible way, if and when such a thing
7 occurred. There was no indication up to that time that it
8 was at all imminent or indicated in any way by any dispatch
9 that we had received.

10 Mr. Kaufman: After the receipt of the message from
11 General Marshall and your having been told of the Navy
12 message to Admiral Kimmel, how many meetings did you have
13 with Admiral Smith between the 27th of November and the
14 attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7?

15 Colonel Phillips: I had no meetings with Admiral Smith
16 as Chief of Staff.

17 Mr. Kaufman: No talk with him at all?

18 Colonel Phillips: No. I had some meetings with
19 General Short and Admiral Kimmel, and perhaps a member of
20 his staff would come to Fort Shafter, that is the headquarters
21 of the Army. I would attend all of those meetings. Admiral
22 Smith never came with Admiral Kimmel at that time to Fort
23 Shafter, and vice versa. I never went with General Short
24 during that period to Admiral Kimmel's headquarters.

25 Mr. Kaufman: How many meetings were there between Admiral

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

2 Kimmel and General Short during that 10-day period?

3 Colonel Phillips: I cannot say, Mr. Kaufman. I
4 believe General Short testified as to that and had the
5 dates. I should say four or five.

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Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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2 Mr. Kaufman: And you attended those meetings when
3 they were held at Fort Shafter, but you did not attend
4 them when they were held in Admiral Kimmel's office?

5 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

6 Mr. Kaufman: So how many meetings did you attend?

7 Colonel Phillips: I do not recall, during that period.

8 Mr. Kaufman:: Will you explain how it is that during the
9 several meetings you attended, there was no mention made of
10 the fact as to the alert that you had given your men, your
11 command?

12 Colonel Phillips: The subject as such perhaps did
13 not arise. These meetings were usually called for specific
14 purposes. One subject was relieving the Marine garrison
15 at Wake by the Army, and another one, I believe, was taking
16 pictures of the Marshalls. Those subjects were discussed
17 rather fully, as I recall.

18 I am not sure on that point.

19 Mr. Kaufman: Now coming back again to this message
20 of November 27, to General Short, you are familiar with
21 the words, "You are directed to undertake such reconnais-
22 sance and other measures as you deem necessary." Do you
23 recall that language?

24 Colonel Phillips: I do.

25 Mr. Kaufman: You, in the memorandum you read to the

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

2 committee a few moments ago, testified that you only had
3 six reconnaissance planes, and therefore could not under-
4 take reconnaissance.

5 Colonel Phillips: That is right.

6 Mr. Kaufman: Is that what you want us to understand?

7 Colonel Phillips: It was the Navy's job under the
8 joint Hawaiian Coastal Defense Plan to conduct distant re-
9 connaissance.

10 Mr. Kaufman: Do I understand you to say that the Army
11 could not undertake the carrying out of this order of General
12 Marshall?

13 Colonel Phillips: We were conducting at the time the
14 only reconnaissance we were required to conduct, and that
15 is inshore patrol from Bellows Field, with short distance
16 reconnaissance planes.

17 Mr. Kaufman: You know that this order from General
18 Marshall did not refer to inshore patrol, do you not?

19 Colonel Phillips: Reconnaissance.

20 Mr. Kaufman: Did not you want us to understand before
21 when you read that statement, that by reason of the fact
22 the Army only had six reconnaissance planes, it could not
23 undertake long range reconnaissance?

24 Colonel Phillips: Well, the Army's job was not to
25 conduct long range reconnaissance. Perhaps by memorandum,

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Phillips Questions by: Mr. Kaufman
2 or purely notes, was misleading in that respect. That
3 was the Navy's function entirely.

4 Mr. Kaufman: Then you want the committee to understand
5 that the Coastal Frontier Defense Plan had been invoked?
6 Is that correct?

7 Colonel Phillips: It had not, in its entirety, no, sir.

8 Mr. Kaufman: Had any part of it been invoked?

9 Colonel Phillips: We had had many exercises, about
10 one week, as I recall, as a matter of training for the dis-
11 tant reconnaissance with the Navy, and we expected that to
12 go into effect whenever the Navy required our planes.

13 Mr. Kaufman: Colonel, I think we ought to stick to
14 the question.

15 I asked you a little while ago with respect to the
16 order of General Marshall directing reconnaissance whether
17 you want us to understand that by reason of the fact that
18 the Army only had six planes, you could not undertake recon-
19 naissance. You said that your memorandum was misleading on
20 that point, because it was the Navy's job.

21 Colonel Phillips: Correct.

22 Mr. Kaufman: It was the Navy's job to do the recon-
23 naissance; is that correct?

24 Colonel Phillips: The distant reconnaissance, yes, sir.

25 Mr. Kaufman: That is right.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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Now, the distant reconnaissance that was to be undertaken, was under the Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, isn't that correct?

Colonel Phillips: Right.

Mr. Kaufman: Now, you know, do you not that the Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, before it became operative, had to be invoked by action of both General Short and Admiral Kimmel? You knew that, did not you?

Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: You know that that defense plan had not been invoked, do you not?

Colonel Phillips: Correct.

Mr. Kaufman: That is correct?

Colonel Phillips: I believe so.

Mr. Kaufman: Now, will you explain to the committee then how you could have expected the Navy to do the reconnaissance under the Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, if the plan had not been invoked?

Colonel Phillips: They had planes -- I forget the number -- of the kind that were capable of carrying on distant reconnaissance. They were to call on us for what long distance bombers we had, and if they needed them, we were to supply them.

That could have been done any time.

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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Mr. Kaufman: Colonel, I still misunderstand you.

You told us a moment ago that you expected the Navy, under the Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, to do the long range reconnaissance.

Colonel Phillips: That is right.

Mr. Kaufman: You told us also that that reconnaissance was to be done under the provisions of the Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. You told us that.

Colonel Phillips: Correct.

Mr. Kaufman: You told us also that that was not to be done until the procedure under the plan was to be invoked by Admiral Kimmel and General Short. Isn't that correct?

Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

Mr. Kaufman: You told us also that the provisions of the plan had not been invoked, did you not?

Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

Mr. Kaufman: Now, will you explain to the committee, if the plan had not been invoked, how you could have expected the Navy to make that long range reconnaissance?

Colonel Phillips: The plan, as I recall, could have been invoked at any time. I am not extremely clear on that one point.

Mr. Kaufman: Well, now, it could have been invoked at any time, but it wasn't at any time according to the

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1 Withess Phillips

questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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2 testimony of General Short, and I understand your testimony
3 to be to the same effect.

4 Colonel Phillips: Captain Ford has given me a state-
5 ment here, that I may read.

6 The Vice Chairman: Whose statement is it?

7 Colonel Phillips: This is from, General Short's state-
8 ment, which is now an exhibit, I believe, page 28,
9 covering this point.

10 The Vice Chairman: Just a minute.

11 Mr. Chairman, may I ask: Do you want to testify,
12 Colonel, from General Short's testimony, or do you want to
13 give the committee your testimony?

14 Colonel Phillips: This is a statement of testimony
15 from the Roberts Commission.

16 The Vice Chairman: Whose testimony is it before the
17 Roberts Commission?

18 Colonel Phillips: General Marshall's.

19 The Vice Chairman: Well, you want to testify from
20 someone else's testimony, or give us your testimony; that is
21 what I want to know.

22 Colonel Phillips: I merely wish to state, sir, that
23 long distant reconnaissance was the Navy's problem.

24 The Vice Chairman: Well, if counsel will permit,
25 Colonel, I don't think there is any doubt about that under

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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1 this record, sir.

2 Colonel Phillips: I don't think so either.

3
4 The Vice Chairman: Then, why not answer counsel's
5 question.

6 Colonel Phillips: I am trying to answer.

7 Mr. Kaufman: I am trying to inquire from you, Colonel
8 -- it may be that I haven't made myself clear -- I am trying
9 to inquire from you as to how you could reasonably expect
10 the Navy to make the long range reconnaissance which you
11 have testified was to be done under the provisions of the
12 Coastal Frontier Defense Plan without an invocation of that
13 plan by General Short, and Admiral Bloch or Admiral Kimmel.

14 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Kaufman: And you told us that that plan had not
16 been invoked.

17 Colonel Phillips: It was the Navy's duty to institute
18 the long range reconnaissance.

19 Mr. Kaufman: It was the Navy's duty?

20 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Kaufman: And you blame it on the Navy that they
22 didn't do their job; is that it?

23 Colonel Phillips: I do not. They were carrying out
24 their reconnaissance in the way that they thought suitable
25 for this purpose, as I stated in my notes here, with their

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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task forces and with what planes they could afford to use.

Mr. Kaufman: Now, I read to you, Colonel, the provisions of paragraph 2, under sub-head 2 of the Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department, 14th Naval District, which is part of Exhibit 44 in this record.

It says:

"When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer, (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District) agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, the Commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other Commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as circumstances warrant, in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans:"

That contemplates does it not, Colonel, that there must be an agreement by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District and General Short that conditions warrant the invocation of this plan; isn't that correct?

Colonel Phillips: It seems apparent, yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: So that until this plan was invoked, neither you as Chief of Staff, nor General Short had the right to anticipate that the Navy was doing its job under

Witness Phillips

questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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sir.

Mr. Kaufman: Have you read it?

Colonel Phillips: Somewhat.

Mr. Kaufman: What is that?

Colonel Phillips: Somewhat.

Mr. Kaufman: And you state in the statement that you make here, the memorandum that you read, that if you had had that magic you would have been able to come to a better conclusion; is that right?

Colonel Phillips: That is right.

For instance, the deadline of the 25th, 29th and the dividing up of Pearl Harbor, and things of that kind would certainly have given us a better idea of what was going on.

Mr. Kaufman: Well you say there are three things, as I understand it, which, if you had had at the time, would have given you the basis for better decision; is that right?

Colonel Phillips: That is correct. Those three things, of course, any and all of the information which was pertinent, would have given us a much better idea of what was going on, and, of course, our decision was based on the information only that we had.

Mr. Kaufman: Well, now, what information do you claim there is in the intercepts that you did not get in the messages of November 24 and November 27?

Witness Phillips

questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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2 Colonel Phillips: I cannot be specific on that, other
3 than I have been, sir.

4 Mr. Kaufman: Well, you have been specific to the extent
5 of referring to the deadline date of November 25, and
6 November 29; is that right?

7 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

8 Mr. Kaufman: Didn't you get a fair summary of every-
9 thing that went before and even what came after in the tele-
10 gram of November 27?

11 Colonel Phillips: We didn't so consider it at all.

12 Mr. Kaufman: You didn't?

13 Colonel Phillips: No, sir.

14 Mr. Kaufman: Did you disregard the message and the
15 directions that you got from the War Department?

16 Colonel Phillips: Not, at all. We didn't get anything
17 about a deadline date. We didn't get anything about dividing
18 up Pearl Harbor.

19 Mr. Kaufman: Well, we will come to the division of
20 Pearl Harbor in a minute. You are talking about the deadline
21 date.

22 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Kaufman: You have notice on the 27th that negotia-
24 tions with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical
25 purposes?

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: Isn't that a fair summary of everything that had gone before in the intercepts?

Colonel Phillips: I don't know, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: You don't know?

Colonel Phillips: I don't know about that because I am not thoroughly conversant with all the intercepts.

Mr. Kaufman: Then, if you are not thoroughly conversant with all of the intercepts, will you explain to the committee your statement that if you had had the intercepts you might have come to a different conclusion?

Colonel Phillips: I am merely stating what I heard here.

Mr. Kaufman: You stated that because you heard Admiral Kimmel and General Short state it; is that correct?

Colonel Phillips: Not at all.

Mr. Kaufman: Do you know whether there was anything in any of the intercepts that mentioned Pearl Harbor?

Colonel Phillips: I did not.

Mr. Kaufman: So that if you did have them all they wouldn't have helped you?

Colonel Phillips: Of course, the chopping up of the Harbor certainly mentioned Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Kaufman: Now, we come to that. When you are talking