

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

RESTRICTED
(Reclassify when filled out)

SECRET

(OMIT THIS SHEET IF NO ATTACK WAS MADE)

REPORT No. 6

XI. ATTACK ON ENEMY SHIPS OR GROUND OBJECTIVES (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

- (a) Target(s) and Location(s) Clark Field & Bamban Field (b) Time Over Target(s) 1450 (Zone) 9
(FOR SHIPS INCLUDE ALL IN AREA UNDER ATTACK)
- (c) Clouds Over Target Unlimited ceiling.
(BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)
- (d) Visibility of Target Clear (e) Visibility 20 Miles
(CLEAR, HAZY, PARTIALLY OBSCURED BY CLOUDS, ETC.) (MILES)
- (f) Bombing Tactics: Type Glide and Horizontal Bombing Bomb Sight Used Mark 8
(LEVEL, GLIDE OR DIVE) (TYPE)
Bombs Dropped per Run Ten 100# G.P. Spacing 25 Feet Altitude of Bomb Release 4500 - 6000 Ft.
(NUMBER) (FEET) (FEET)
- (g) Number of Enemy Aircraft Hit on Ground: Destroyed Unknown Probably Destroyed Unknown Damaged Unknown

Clark A/Bh AIMING POINT	(i) DIMENSIONS OR TONNAGE	(j) NO. A/C ATTACKING	(l) BOMBS AND AMMUNITION EXPENDED, EACH AIMING POINT	(m) NO. HITS On Aiming Point	(n) DAMAGE (None, slight, serious, destroyed or sunk)
		(k) SQUADRON			
1 Revetment area adjoining N.E.	1000' X 800'	1 VT-45	Nine	9	Serious - some planes probably destroyed
2 end of runway #2					
3 Wooded areas between runways	2800' X 1200'	4 VT-45	Thirty-seven	35	Serious
4 No. 1 and 2.					
5 Wooded area south of runway #4	3000' X 1000'	1 VT-45	Six (Paraf frags)	Unknown	Unknown
6 BAMBAN AIRFIELD					
7 Revetment area at southwest end of	1000' X 500'	1 VT-45	Ten	2 or 3	Unknown
8 runway					

(o) RESULTS: (For all hits claimed on ship targets and for land targets of special interest, draw diagram, top or side view or both, as appropriate, showing type and location of hits. For all targets give location and effect of hits, and identify by numbers above. Use additional sheets if necessary).

At least 54 enemy planes were observed parked in and close to the wooded area between runways No. 1 and No. 2 at Clark Field. It is probable that more were concealed under the trees. This area was heavily and accurately bombed at least fifteen bombs were seen to explode almost simultaneously in the wooded area near its periphery. Although planes were kept too high for accurate observation by the intense A/A fire it is believed that considerable damage must have been done to the planes on the ground in this area.

One VT-45 plane observed six or seven single engine planes parked in and near revetments at the northeast corner of runway No. 2 and dropped nine bombs directly into the area. Results were not observed but damage to some of these planes is probable.

One VT-45 plane was loaded with six paraf frag bombs for this strike. Accuracy in bombing with this load under anti-aircraft conditions encountered was impossible. The bombing run was horizontal at 4500 feet and, although the smoke from a fire on the ground was used as a wind indicator, it is felt that the bombs were widely dispersed by wind before reaching the ground. It is not known whether any hit the target area.

One VT-45 plane bombed the revetment area adjoining the southwest end of Bamban Airfield runway. At least three planes were observed in the area and the contents of several revetments could not be seen. Most of the bombs were observed to overshoot the target area, but it is believed that two or three landed in or near revetments. Damaged inflicted is unknown.

(p) Were Photographs Taken? Yes Photographs of Damage, When Taken, Should Be Attached By Staple.

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XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY

OWN AIRCRAFT

- Disposition
- Altitudes
- Speeds
- Approach Tactics
- Use of Cover, Deception
- Angles of Attack and Their Effectiveness
- Distance of Opening Fire
- Defense Tactics and Their Effectiveness

ENEMY AIRCRAFT

- Method of Locating, Distance
- Disposition
- Altitudes
- Speeds
- Approach Tactics
- Use of Cover, Deception
- Angles of Attack
- Distance of Opening Fire
- Defensive Tactics

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Own Weaknesses
- Enemy Weaknesses
- Offensive Tactics, Own
- " " " Enemy
- Defensive Tactics, Own
- " " " Enemy
- Flexible Gunnery, Own
- Escort Tactics
- Fighter Direction
- Use of Radar
- Night Fighting
- Recognition, Aircraft

ATTACK

OWN TACTICS

- Method of Locating Target
- Approach to Target
- Altitudes, Speeds
- Approach
- Dive
- Pull-Out
- Dive Angle
- Strafing
- Retirement
- Defensive Tactics
- Use of Jamming

DEFENSE, ENEMY

- Evasive Tactics, Ships
- Concealment
- Searchlights
- Night Fighter Tactics
- Use of Jamming

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Bombing Tactics
- Torpedo Tactics
- Effectiveness of Bombs, Torpedoes
- Selection of Targets
- Fuzing
- Strafing Tactics
- Defensive Tactics
- Use of Radar
- Reconnaissance
- Photography
- Briefing

OPERATIONAL

- Navigation
- Homing
- Rendezvous
- Recognition, Ships
- Communications
- Flight Operations
- Search and Tracking
- Base Operations
- Maintenance

Detailed photographic interpretation of the anti-aircraft emplacements in the Clark Field vicinity were available and used in planning attack. The attack was made from the southeast and the retirement was made to the north to avoid the heavy anti-aircraft which was located several miles to the west of the field. This, and the liberal use of 28 1/4" and 14" "window" during attack, was effective. Heavy A/A fire was seen in the vicinity of the planes for only a brief time and then was behind them. Automatic A/A positions were known to be so liberally and generally scattered throughout the area that it was not feasible to take them into account in planning the approach and retirement. However, the bombs were dropped from altitudes ranging from 4500 to 6000 feet to avoid as much of it as possible. Good accuracy was obtained from these altitudes. Push over was at about 12000 feet, angles of 30° to 40° were obtained and gliding speed averaged 310 knots.

It was noted that little or no tracer fire was observed at any time.

It was felt that parafrag, which was carried in one plane was an inappropriate loading for a strike that could not be delivered at low altitude. A horizontal bombing run was made at 4500 feet.

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XIII. MATERIAL DATA. (Comment freely on performance or suitability, following check list at left.
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ARMAMENT

- Guns, Gunsights
- Turrets
- Ammunition
- Bombs, Torpedoes
- Bomb Sights
- Bomb Releases

COMMUNICATIONS

- Radio, Radar
- Homing Devices
- Visual Signals
- Codes, Ciphers

RECOGNITION

- IFF
- Signals
- Battle Lights
- Procedures

PROTECTION

- Armor; Points and Angles
of Fire Needing Further
Protection
- Leak Proofing

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

- Parachutes
- Life Belts, Life Rafts
- Safety Belts
- Emergency Kits
- Rations, First Aid

NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT

- Compasses
- Driftsights
- Octants
- Automatic Pilots
- Charts
- Field Lighting

INSTRUMENTS

- Flight
- Power Plant

OXYGEN SYSTEM

**CAMOUFLAGE AND
DECEPTION DEVICES**

STRUCTURE

- Airframe
- Control Surfaces
- Control System
- Dive Flaps
- Landing Gear
- Heating System
- Flight Characteristics
At Various Loadings

POWER PLANT

- Engines
- Engine Accessories
- Propellers
- Lubricating System
- Starters
- Exhaust Dampers

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

- Auxiliary Plant
- Lights

FUEL SYSTEM

FLIGHT CLOTHING

MAINTENANCE

BASE FACILITIES

- Plane Servicing Equipment
- Personnel Facilities

Difficulty was again experienced by the two TBM-1c planes in making their normal gas supply last for the entire 527 mile flight in company with TBM-3 planes which have superior climb and speed characteristics. On future long flights it is expected that extra wing tanks will be used on the TBM-1c planes.

REPORT PREPARED BY:

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SIGNATURE

RANK AND DUTY

A.C.I. Officer

APPROVED BY:

J. G. Pizzari

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SIGNATURE

RANK AND DUTY

Commanding Officer

10 January 1945

DATE