

# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

## Monterey, California



SOVIET-AMERICAN EXCHANGES:  
PROMISES AND PROBLEMS

by

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# SOVIET-AMERICAN EXCHANGES: PROMISES AND PROBLEMS.\*

by

Mikhail Tsyarkin

## NEED FOR A BALANCED POLICY.

The new opportunities presented by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of *perestroika* ("restructuring) and *glasnost'* ("openness") for human contacts between American and Soviet citizens seem quite exciting. TV link-ups, free-wheeling debates at various fora, forthcoming exchanges between Soviet and American undergraduate students--all of this appears to be the first step towards something Americans have desired since World War II: a greater mutual understanding between the Soviet and American peoples, leading to a more peaceful world. There is a pronounced tendency accross the whole spectrum of political opinion in this country to see Soviet-American exchanges as unreservedly beneficial to this nation. But in the real world there is no such thing as a policy with only benefits and without any costs to it. If our hopes for Soviet-American exchanges are not to turn into a bitter disappointment (something that happens all too frequently in Soviet-American relations) we must come up with a balanced policy in this matter, which realistically takes into account both pluses and minuses of US-USSR exchanges.

There is no doubt that reducing the isolation imposed on the Soviet people by its own regime for the last seventy years generally would

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serve American national interest. But we should not make a mistake of assuming that the Soviet regime will not attempt to make wide use of increased exchanges for its own ends inimical to our national interest. The basic problem is as follows:

**It will take a very long time before the increased exposure of Soviet citizens to America results in decisive changes in Soviet political mentality and subsequently in qualitatively better character of the relations between the two nations. It will take much less time, however, before the Soviets can reap benefits from exchanges in the sphere of military technology and propaganda.**

We should recognize that exchanges require wise policy management and oversight, and that regular involvement of the CSCE in these matters can significantly contribute to making Soviet-American exchanges beneficial to the our national interest.

### UNDERSTANDING THE SOVIETS.

The one clear benefit this nation can derive from exchanges with the Soviets is our improved understanding of their system of government and society. To achieve maximum benefits for visiting Americans, exchange programs should meet the following requirements:

- American visitors should preferably stay for reasonably long periods of time in the Soviet Union, from 2 or 4 months to a year.
- American visitors, especially students, should live as their Soviet counterparts do. The Soviets have succeeded in segregating Western diplomats and journalists in special compounds in Moscow; they usually segregate exchange students as well. While it will be difficult to end isolation of American diplomats and journalists in the immediate future, the isolation of American students should be ended as soon as possible.
- Greater geographic dispersion of Americans on exchange visits to the Soviet Union should be achieved. Now they are all too frequently

concentrated in Moscow and Leningrad. This definitely limits their perspective on life in the Soviet Union.

I should say very frankly that I am sceptical of short visits to the Soviet Union so fashionable today<sup>1</sup> When I came to this country as an immigrant 10 years ago, I had to go through the process of learning about a different culture, a different society. On the basis of my own cross-cultural experience, I am confident that had I spent only several weeks in the United States, I would have understood very little about this society. Therefore, I am sure that the utility of short visits to the USSR by multitudes of Americans not speaking Russian and depending heavily on their official Soviet hosts is only marginal.

### UNDERSTANDING THE AMERICANS.

We should not be, on the basis of experience, too certain about the positive impact of exposing Soviet visitors to our democratic values. Several cautionary points should be made to avoid excessive expectations.

- Historically, penetration of Western ideas and values into the Russian society was a painful and uneven process. Indeed, throughout the XVIII, XIX and early XXth century Russia's educated classes tried to introduce Western ideas and values into their nation's political life, but with very limited success: the Russian society was too large (as it is today), the bureaucracy was too entrenched (as it is today), and the political requirements of keeping a huge multinational overland empire together were too pressing (as they are today) for drastic liberalization to occur.
- There is, unfortunately, no established correlation between visiting a democratic society and becoming a democrat. On the one hand, Vladimir Lenin, the father of Soviet totalitarian communism, spent most of his adult life in exile in such democratic nations as Great Britain and Switzerland. So did a number of other leading early Soviet communists. On the other hand, Dr. Andrei Sakharov, the most consistent proponent of democracy in the Soviet Union, has never been to the West.

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<sup>1</sup> For a description of this new fashion, see Barbara Gamarekian, "A Hot Ticket Is Round Trip, to or from Moscow," The New York Times, November 9, 1987.

• We should not assume that spending time as an exchange student in the United States necessarily makes a Soviet (or, for that matter, any other foreigner) a friend of the United States. Example: one of General Secretary Gorbachev's top foreign policy aides, Aleksandr Yakovlev, a member of the Politburo and a Secretary of the Central Committee responsible for propaganda, spent a whole year in the late 1950s as one of the first Soviet exchange students at Columbia University. He also served as a Soviet Ambassador to Canada from 1973 to 1983. Despite his great exposure to the United States as a student and as a diplomat, he is now one of the most virulently anti-American writers in the Soviet Union. His recent book, From Truman to Reagan, suggests that Americans need "a shock of pain, just like the one in Vietnam ... in order to feel shame and disenchantment instead of jingoism;" it describes the United States as "a country of generally poorly informed people indifferent to suffering and troubles of others," and the American middle class as the "carrier of nationalist, racist, chauvinistic and militaristic sentiments and strivings." Yakovlev attributes American signing of SALT I to "the defeat in Vietnam," and concludes by saying that the American state is "permeated with chauvinism and messianism."<sup>2</sup> As the official responsible for the work of Soviet mass media, Mr. Yakovlev has overseen several viciously anti-American disinformation campaigns, including the one accusing the United States Government of manufacturing the AIDS virus, accusing the CIA of organizing the Jonestown massacre, and charging the United States with importing babies from the Third World in order to obtain transplant organs from them.

• The Soviets who come to the United States as newsmen or exchange visitors in many (if not most) cases report to the Soviet public a picture of the United States so distorted that it can cause the Soviet people to hate and dislike America. Vladimir Simonov, the correspondent of the Novosti Press Agency and of the Literaturnaya Gazeta in the United States, compared the recent resurgence of patriotism in American to an "epyleptic fit."<sup>3</sup> A member of a recent delegation of young Soviet political leaders to the United States, upon his return informed the Soviet public that President Reagan allegedly

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2 A.N.Yakovlev, Ot Trumena do Reygana (Moscow: Molodaya gvardiya, 1984) pp. 12, 34, 155, 398.

3 Vladimir Simonov, "Yablochnyy pirog bez yablok," Literaturnaya Gazeta, October 16, 1985.



welcomed AIDS as the means to "destroy the scum of the society and to strengthen the family," and that Gorbachev was more popular in the US than Reagan.<sup>4</sup>

- Studying American society at first hand does not necessarily bring the Soviets to conclusions conducive to peaceful relations between both nations. Thus, a noted Soviet student of American public opinion Yuri Zamoshkin from the Institute of USA and Canada, came to believe that the best way for the Soviets to deal with the United States is by keeping American people vulnerable to nuclear threat:

The "factor of fear" of the threat of nuclear war and of the American vulnerability in such a war can apparently stimulate the anti-militarist mood of the Americans, their striving for peaceful agreements and normalization of relations with the USSR only under certain conditions. One of such conditions is destruction of the illusion that the USA can reach such a level of development of nuclear strength and ballistic missile defense that would reduce the risk of nuclear war or save Americans in case of war.<sup>5</sup>

- Even if the stream of Soviet visitors to the United States increases tenfold, the Soviet government will retain an ability to select such visitors from the ranks of the privileged, and use such visits as a reward for political loyalty. Thus, increased chances of visiting the United States might induce more Soviets to act as political conformists. Soviet-American exchanges will begin to have a genuinely positive impact on the relations between the two nations only when controls on travel of Soviet citizens to the West, including the United States, are greatly relaxed to conform with the norms accepted in most of the world, and when Soviet citizens can have a real say in their nation's political system.

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<sup>4</sup> Literaturnaya Gazeta, September 9, 1987.

<sup>5</sup> Yu. Zamoshkin, "Yadernaya opasnost' i faktor strakha," SShA. Ekonomika. Politika. Ideologiya, 1985, No.3, p.7.

## AVOIDING PITFALLS.

If Soviet-American exchanges are to further the national interest of the United States, two types of pitfalls should be avoided. One is that the Soviets will use their access to American scientific and research and development community to increase their military strength. The other one is that the Soviets will use exchanges for legitimizing their violations of human rights.

### THE ISSUE OF SCIENTIFIC CONTACTS.

The possibility that Soviet arsenal will not keep pace with the latest developments of world science and technology is haunting the Soviet leaders. Gorbachev's policy of *perestroika* (restructuring) is frequently rationalized by the Soviets themselves as the means for further improving their defense technologies. The problems of access to Western science and technology stand foremost among the Soviet concerns. Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov expressed concern that the correlation of military strength between East and West will shift against the Soviet Union if the latter is "isolated" from "modern technologies."<sup>6</sup>

In the 1970s, with the excitement over Soviet-American exchanges in the air, the security aspect of scientific exchanges was all too frequently overlooked. As a result, according to the Department of Defense, Soviet scientists used their exchange visits to American research centers to obtain information on such militarily significant projects as fuel-air explosive devices, "wing-in-ground effect" aerodynamic vehicles, and heads-up displays.<sup>7</sup> They worked on communications problems at the Operations Research Center at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); on computers at the Operations Research Center at Berkeley, the Digital Systems Laboratory at Stanford, and Computer Science Department at UCLA; on ceramic materials (crucial for space technology) at the Department of Material Science and Engineering at MIT; on aircraft gas turbine engines at the Department of Aeronautical Science and Mechanical

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6 "Kursom nauchno-tehnicheskogo progressa," *Izvestiya*, December 18, 1985.

7 The Honorable Frank Carlucci, "A Letter to Dr. William D. Carey," *Science*, January 8, 1982, pp.140-141. Fuel-air explosive munitions are based on a principle of creating an aerosol cloud of fuel-air mixture which is then detonated to achieve an explosive effect. A "wing-in-ground effect" aerodynamic vehicle is an extremely low flying aircraft; heads-up displays are used to project flight data on aircraft cockpit glass.

Engineering at Northwestern University and at the Department of Aerospace Engineering at Georgia Institute of Technology; on space technology at the Department of Aeronautics at MIT, and so on and so forth.<sup>8</sup>

Even a cursory look at the institutional affiliation of Soviet participants in only one exchange program (International Research and Exchanges Board, established in 1968 by the American Council of Learned Societies) shows that many Soviet participants were drawn from some of the most famous institutions for training military research and development specialists and conducting their own research and development programs for the military. Thus, the Moscow Institute of Engineering Physics dispatched eleven scientists to study in the U.S.; Moscow Advanced Technical School named after Bauman (the alma mater of Andrei Tupolev, the famous aircraft designer, and of Sergei Korolev, the father of the first Soviet ICBM), four; the Moscow Aviation Institute sent four; Moscow Institute of Steel and Alloys, three; Moscow Physical and Technical Institute, two; Moscow Institute of Electronic Technology, two; Kuibyshev Aviation Institute, three; Leningrad Aircraft Instrumentation Institute, two; Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute, two; and Leningrad Polytechnical Institute, three. (I should note that it was not the job of IREX to screen the Soviet exchange candidates, but of the U.S. Government, which apparently failed to do so.)

The situation has obviously improved since the beginning of 1980s, as a result of greater concern about Soviet illegal transfers of militarily significant Western technologies, as well as of the reduced flow of exchanges in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Now, with the number of Soviet exchange scientists obviously increasing, it is important to exercise caution and discretion when deciding on which Soviet scientist is to be admitted where.

It is often argued that the mere presence of Soviet scientists at American research centers tells them nothing they could not learn by reading American scientific

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<sup>8</sup> International Research and Exchanges Board, Annual Report 1977-78 (New York: IREX, 1979), pp.48-51; International Research and Exchanges Board, Annual Report 1979-80 (New York: IREX, 1981), pp.45-46; International Research and Exchanges Board, Annual Report 1980-81 (New York: IREX, 1982), pp.44-46.

literature. This is only partially true. This argument overlooks the fact, emphasized in a recent study of Soviet science by the Rand Corporation, that the critical information for linking theoretical knowledge to mass production is know-how, which is something the Soviets cannot find in journals. Obtaining know-how "requires personal contact... This applies to the transfer not only of know-how concerning a device or process, but also to purely theoretical information." In addition, because of the Russian tradition of relying on Western science and technology, information about Western developments serves as a catalyst for the Soviet decision-making in science and R&D, helping overcome bureaucratic inertia.<sup>9</sup>

The Soviets in fact have an established tradition of Western training for future leaders of their military research and development. The "father" of the first Soviet ICBMs, Sergei Korolev, had been an apprentice of a French aircraft designer, Paul Richard. So were Chief Designer of helicopters N.Kamov, Chief Designer of flying boats G. Beriev, and one of the two Chief Designers of MIG aircraft, M. Gurevich. The man who designed the gun for the famous T-34 tank of World War II, Vasily Grabin, had been trained by German artillery engineers, while the Chief Designer of magnetrons (powerful vacuum tubes) for Soviet radars, Anatoliy Fedoseev, had been a trainee at RCA in the United States. While the Soviets are much more technologically advanced now than fifty, or forty, or even twenty years ago, they still look to the West when major changes in science and technology are on the horizon.

Indeed, Soviet military leaders believe that today military affairs are undergoing a profound revolution due to the fast pace of technological development, on the scale of the one which took place after World War II with the introduction of nuclear weapons, electronics, and missile technology. Soviet authoritative sources, such as Major General M. Yasyukov, a professor at the Voroshilov Academy of the Soviet General Staff, emphasize the fact that it is becoming increasingly difficult to draw the line between what in modern science is important for military R&D and what is not:

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<sup>9</sup> Arthur Alexander, Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 1982), pp.37-39.

...the leading directions of scientific-technological progress-- the robotics, computer technology, instrument making, and electronics--are at the same time the basic catalyst of military-technical progress.<sup>10</sup>

The resulting problem for Soviet-American scientific exchanges is that it is becoming increasingly difficult to judge whether granting access to a research facility in this country to a Soviet scientist will result in enhancing Soviet military technology or not.

Forthcoming exchanges of undergraduate students is the latest step in enhanced Soviet-American human contacts. While exposing young Soviets to the American university life is certainly a good idea, it does not remove the security issue from the agenda because of the differences in Soviet and American systems of higher education, and because of the differences between Soviet and American young people.

- A Soviet undergraduate is pursuing a **strictly professional training** to a much greater degree than his/her American counterpart, and has little hope or need of ever going to graduate school or of changing the profession he/she has acquired in college. Thus, a twenty-year old student from the Moscow Institute of Electronic Technology spends a year in an American university, graduates from his own college in a couple of years, and at the age of 24 is professionally employed as an electronics engineer in Soviet research and development community. It is noteworthy that the first group of Soviet undergraduates to study in the U.S. consists only of science students: five will go to Yale to study chemistry, and five to the University of Maryland to study physics.<sup>11</sup>

- Most of male students have done their two years of military duty, which, combined with the general thrust of Soviet upbringing, makes them much more **disciplined and respectful of authority** than their American counterparts. Thus, they are reasonably likely at least to pursue scientific studies which the Soviet government wants them to pursue (rather than take un-Marxist courses in politics and

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<sup>10</sup> Major General M. Yasyukov, "Military Policies of the CPSU: Essence, Content," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, 1985, No.20, p.20.

<sup>11</sup> Fred M. Hechinger, "U.S.-Soviet Unsung Gains," The New York Times, November 3, 1987.

history), and not to divulge to Americans around them any secrets they have been entrusted with.

• In addition, most of the Soviet male undergraduate students are enrolled in **compulsory commissioned reserve officer training system**, which translates, as far as possible, their professional education into a military speciality.<sup>12</sup> I happen to think that it is important to bring Soviet undergraduates to the United States, but it is also legitimate to remember that we are educating Soviet reserve officers at American schools.

### LEGITIMIZING SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.

The Soviets are dissatisfied with geopolitical equality with the United States; they strive to be recognized as a moral equal of this nation. To this end, they rely heavily on concluding exchange agreements between bogus "public organizations" in the Soviet Union (even the Soviet press is now acknowledging that "voluntary associations" in the Soviet Union, numbering thousands of members, exist only on paper and are a form of "spiritual cheating")<sup>13</sup> and real public voluntary organizations in the U.S. Sometimes, such exchanges are used by the Soviets to give respectability to their institutions and personalities involved in violations of human rights.

The most notorious example of the latter kind has been the exchange agreement, signed in 1985, between the **American Bar Association (ABA)** and the **Association of Soviet Lawyers (ASL)**. The ASL is not a working organization of Soviet lawyers but rather a special body established in order to conduct propaganda against human rights activists and Jewish refuseniks at home and whitewash Soviet violations of human rights in the West. According to Dina Kaminskaya, a former prominent Soviet defense attorney forced into exile because of her courageous defense of human rights activists, only the most "politically reliable" lawyers were invited to join the ASL.

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<sup>12</sup> See Mikhail Tsympkin, Soviet Reserve Officer Training System: An Assessment (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, Department of National Security Affairs, 1984).

<sup>13</sup> Aleksandr Vasinskiy, "Neither for Ourselves, Nor for Our Descendants," Izvestiya, July 29, 1986.

In 1979, the ASL published an anti-Semitic and anti-American White Book, portraying Soviet Jewish would-be emigres as inspired by Western "intelligence services," and American newsmen in Moscow as "CIA agents." In 1985, just at the time the ABA was signing its exchange agreement with the ASL, the latter published the second edition of the White Book. In it, the President of ASL Aleksandr Sukharev and Soviet Army General David Dragunskiy (who presides over the Soviet Anti-Zionist Committee, a quasi-official body dedicated to struggle with Jewish emigration and cultural movement) praised the 1975 UN resolution equating Zionism with racism. Further, the White Book attacks religious education of Jewish children as "nationalistic," and describes the United States as a land of government-sponsored anti-Semitism.<sup>14</sup>

The Vice-President of ASL, Samuil Zivs (who is also the Vice-President of the Soviet Anti-Zionist Committee) described the illegal exile of Dr. Andrei Sakharov to Gorky as "in full conformity with ... legal norms," although Sakharov was never charged with any crime, never faced a court of law, and was never given a chance to defend himself. Zivs described Jewish activists Anatoly Shcharansky as a paid agent of the CIA, and accused Dr. Anatoly Koryagin, a courageous critic of Soviet abuses of psychiatry, of terrorist activity! Zivs also attacked Amnesty International for "poisoning people's minds with the disinformation about the Soviet Union."<sup>15</sup>

The President of ASL, Aleksandr Sukharev, is the Minister of Justice of the Russian Republic (RSFSR) in the Soviet Union, and thus is directly responsible for violations of human rights and persecution of dissidents. Recently, Sukharev was criticized in the Soviet press for his indifference to violations of elementary legal norms (the right of a journalist to take notes during a court session violated by a judge.)<sup>16</sup>

The decision of ABA to treat Sukharev, Zivs and ASL in a collegial fashion has caused a barrage of criticism in this country. To diffuse this criticism, the ABA insists that the exchange agreement with ASL provides the American lawyers with a valuable opportunity to press

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<sup>14</sup> Belaya kniga (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1979), pp.172-230, passim; Belaya kniga (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1985) pp.10, 13, 58-60, 90, 249-251.

<sup>15</sup> Samuil Zivs, The Anatomy of Lies (Moscow: Progress, 1984), pp.103, 46, 154.

<sup>16</sup> "V pol'zu spravedlivosti," Literaturnaya gazeta, September 24, 1986.

vigorously behind the scenes for improvement in human rights practices of the Soviets. An excellent illustration of feebleness of this pressure is contained in a memorandum from the ABA on a meeting between its delegation and the Soviet Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Andrei Gromyko on July 2, 1986. In the course of the meeting, **the only statement regarding human rights** made on behalf of ABA by then President William F. Falsgraf was as follows:

President Falsgraf ... advised President Gromyko that **Jewish groups** in the United States and **Jewish members** of the American Bar Association are concerned about U.S.S.R.'s policy with respect to emigration to Israel. Again President Falsgraf pointed out that this is a **minority view** but a minority view held with great sincerity. (Emphasis mine-M.Ts.)

(The whole text of this memorandum can be found in the Appendix .)

Thus, the leaders of the American Bar Association had nothing more to tell the Soviets about human rights than that it is a matter of one group of Jews concerned about another group of Jews! The lesson of ABA-ASL exchanges is that once an American public organization commits itself to exchanges with a bogus Soviet organization, without much preliminary research into the background of the latter, and without much understanding of the nature of the Soviet political system and society, it is bound to be embarrassed, then defend itself by claims of exaggerated achievements in their dealings with the Soviets, and stick to the agreement no matter what so as to avoid recognizing a mistake. The American public is misled (because of the ABA's enormous prestige), while conduct by ABA leaders, such as the one exhibited at the meeting with Mr. Gromyko, can earn us only contempt from the Soviets.

A related point is that **there is no clearing house of solid background information on Soviet organizations and individuals** to which anybody who wants to initiate an exchange program can turn. It is very easy to propose another Soviet-American exchange program which looks fine at first glance but contains a potential for embarrassment. For instance, Senator Paul Simon praised the idea of establishing "sister university" programs between American and Soviet universities, including Moscow State University. But Moscow University, like other Soviet schools, is the opposite of the American idea of free academic inquiry; in addition, the Admissions Board of Moscow State University practices racial



discrimination against Jews, as documented by the Moscow Helsinki Monitors group, even going as far as demanding a genealogical tree from an applicant to prove absence of "Jewish blood!"<sup>17</sup>

Perhaps it will be an appropriate role for the CSCE, with its tradition of multifaceted involvement in the issues of East-West contacts, and with the staff unparalleled on the Capitol Hill for expertise in Soviet affairs, to establish a clearing house of information on Soviet institutions and personalities helpful to those interested in Soviet-American exchanges.

### CONCLUSIONS.

Increased Soviet-American exchanges can serve our national interest provided that a balanced policy on exchanges is exercised by the Federal Government, that this policy is a beneficiary of serious interest from the U.S. Congress, especially from the CSCE, and that public groups involved in Soviet-American exchanges establish cooperative relationship with both the Administration and the Congress.

Some specific policy recommendations:

- The CSCE should make hearings on Soviet-American exchanges a regular part of its work.
- The CSCE should request reports on the status of Soviet-American exchanges both from the Interagency Coordinating Committee on U.S.-Soviet Affairs (ICCUSA), which oversees all U.S. Government activities with respect of the Soviet Union, and from the Committee on Exchanges (COMEX) of the Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee (TTIC), which deals with the security aspects of Soviet-American exchanges. <sup>18</sup>

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17 Senator Paul Simon, An Agenda for U.S.-Soviet Exchanges (Senate Chamber: May 21, 1986), p.3; "Discrimination against Jews Enrolling at Moscow University, 1979," Arkhir Samizdata, No.4695, pp.1-3.


18 For details of U.S. Government decision-making process on the matters of U.S.-Soviet exchanges, see John D. Negrofonte, "U.S.-Soviet Scientific Exchanges," Current Policy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs), No.997, p.3.

- The CSCE should invite representatives of the public, involved in Soviet-American exchanges and in monitoring the human rights situation in the Soviet Union, to testify about exchange programs and their impact on human rights.
- The CSCE should establish a clearing house of information on Soviet institutions and personalities useful for those initiating new exchange programs with the Soviets.\*

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\* Much of my research on U.S.-Soviet exchanges was done while I was the Salvatori Fellow in Soviet Studies at The Heritage Foundation, to which I express deep gratitude. My special thanks are to Burt Pines, Heritage's Senior Vice President for Research, and W. Bruce Weinrod, Director of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies. Needless to say, all the views expressed above are solely mine. I have also drawn quite heavily on my materials previously published in The Heritage Foundation Backgrounders Nos. 478, 510, and 537.

APPENDIX



AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION  
750 NORTH LAKE SHORE DRIVE  
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60611

File

DATE July 2, 1986

FROM

David J.A. Hayes, Jr.

SUBJECT Meeting with Andrei  
A. Gromyko,  
President of the  
President of the  
Supreme Soviet of  
the U.S.S.R. in the  
Kremlin Palace  
Tuesday, May 27,  
1986

9-10-86  
86  
said Falsgraf  
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P.3

On Tuesday morning at 10:00 a.m., the American Bar Association delegation consisting of President and Mrs. William W. Falsgraf, Eugene C. Thomas, Allen E. Brennecke, Weymen I. Lundquist, Thomas H. Gonser and David J.A. Hayes, Jr. met in the Catherine Hall of the Kremlin Palace with President Andrei A. Gromyko and four of his aides. We were accompanied by President Alexander Y. Sukharev of the ASL and by Vasilay A. Valsihin who acted as an interpreter.

President Gromyko welcomed the group to the USSR and specifically to the Kremlin Palace. President Gromyko then called upon President Falsgraf. President Falsgraf then developed three themes namely: 1) our perception of the lack of independence of the lawyer in the USSR, 2) our extreme concern about human rights throughout the world, 3) and the future of Soviet/American relations.

First, said President Falsgraf most of the lawyers of the American Bar Association favored a relationship with the Association of Soviet Lawyers and favored the exchange of delegations. American lawyers, however, do not understand how Soviet lawyers practice law and assume that there is a lack of independence on the part of the Soviet lawyer. Many in the USA feel that in the representation of clients the first duty of the attorney in the USSR is to the state and only secondly to the client.

President Falsgraf then moved on to his second point and advised President Gromyko that Jewish groups in the United States and Jewish members of the American Bar Association are concerned about U.S.S.R.'s policy with respect to emigration to Israel. Again, President Falsgraf pointed out that this is a minority view but a minority view that is held with great sincerity. We all recall, he commented, the suffering of the Jewish people in Europe in World War II and it is important that they have a homeland and a sanctuary as a result of all this suffering.

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With respect to Soviet-American relations, President Falsgraf commented that as a personal view he thought that the relationship between the USA and the USSR is now at its best level in his lifetime. He commented that President Gromyko would certainly remember when it was not as good as it is today and that both sides should take every opportunity to promote better relations between the two nations.

President Gromyko responded, handling the Jewish emigration issue very carefully. He commented first that it was useful to explore this issue, yet once again, and stated with considerable forcefulness that all national groups have equal rights in the USSR and all citizens have equal rights and responsibilities. He suggested that ~~misleading editorials in the Western and particular in the United States media~~ have created a misunderstanding that the American Jewish groups have with respect to Soviet policy. President Gromyko noted that the policy of the Tsars has long been repudiated by the USSR in fact, the Anti-Jewish Policies of the Tsars led in part to the Revolution in 1917. In the 1970s he continued, massive numbers of Jews left the Soviet Union to be reunited with their families in Israel, Western Europe or the United States. They are always reprimanded these days for not letting these emigrants go but such is not the fact. President Gromyko said that they look at every application as a single case and make judgements based on this single case.

President Gromyko then advised the delegation that there were limitations of this emigration policy that related to national security questions. No emigration permits can be issued for a specific period of time to a person that has worked in a national security industry; when that person took the position he signed a permit which indicated he would not seek emigration for a specified amount of time. He confided though that there were very few of these cases. He stated that there were many Jewish people who simply do not want to leave the Soviet Union yet they are on lists held by various American groups. President Gromyko said it was not their policy purpose to stop the flow of Jewish emigrants to Israel.

There is a problem said President Gromyko that many of the emigrants who have left to go to Israel and Western Europe want to return to the Soviet Union. The Soviets do process these applications to come back though they really don't want these people back because most of them are unhappy and unstable people.

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Many Soviets believe than many of the prospective Jewish emigrants are strongly pro-Israel and hence are opposed to Soviet policy in the Middle East. Soviets treat these persons with deep suspicion.

The Soviets are concerned about Israel's posture with the Syrians and with the Palestinans and although they do not officially condemn Israel for its policies, they are not policies that promote world peace. President Gromyko then concluded his discussion of Jewish emigration stating that he would have brought up the subject if President Falsgraf had not brought it up.

Then President Gromyko commented that political stability is terribly important. The whole world counts on the relationship of the USA and USSR returning to what it was during World War II. The present relationships between our two countries are not what we would like; there is too much tension present. The hope of Geneva continues and we hope that there will be no war and neither nation can have military superiority over the other. It seems to be, said President Gromyko, that the practical actions of the United States government have not been in accordance recently with the spirit of Geneva. More and more nuclear arms are being made by the United States and outer space will soon be overburdened with nuclear weapons. The Soviets are very much opposed to nuclear weapons in outer space and have proposed many times that there be no nuclear arms in space. We both also need to reduce nuclear warheads and we have recently proposed that to President Reagan.

We must reduce arms, continued President Gromyko; if the arms race does not stop, something awful will most certainly happen. Their recent experience at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant shows how dangerous nuclear weapons can be. Nuclear power must at all times be used for peace.

President Gromyko then commented that trade and cultural visits such as the ABA visits to the Soviet Union are very important and it is an excellent working proposition to have people-to-people contact.

President-Elect Eugene C. Thomas then commented that the USA and the USSR are two great countries, especially over the last forty years. This greatness suggested comes from achievement not from just size. The great powers that won the war must win the peace and above all we need to have a stability in our relationships.

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Mr. Thomas stated that his point dealt with the role of the lawyer in the USSR and USA. Lawyers represent their clients as well as the public interest, and making the law work for the accomplishment of public policy is very important. Lawyers common concerns are people and the public interest. Lawyers are expert in making the law work to its public policy ends. The hope of our exchange was that it might bring lawyers of our two countries together in a search for peace and prosperity. Terrorism and environmental problems resolving from nuclear accidents, immigration, all of these make news stories, but these problems also lend themselves to study by legal scholars that all might benefit. We can exchange and develop dialogue about these legal problems. These types of pursuits can develop a more positive attitude toward lawyers in each country and help to prevent fear and mistrust. Power stems from our American people. The flow of public opinion to the law will greatly aid all of us.

President Gromyko complimented President-Elect Thomas on his comments and stated our first client is justice in the law. The ABA, President Gromyko said, can help to influence American policy makers-only granite would not hear the ABA. Regrettably, he said, President Reagan's ideas are not in conformity with peace and control of nuclear weapons. ~~The cemetery quietness is not what the Soviets want. What they do want~~ is no barriers between purely legal items between our two countries. The dome is over the arena and we must move forward.

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
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