

G. ZINOVIEV'S
REPORT
OF THE
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

For 1920-1921.

Delivered at the Fourth Session of the Third
Congress of the Communist International, on
25th June, 1921.

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EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
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A SPEECH delivered by G. ZINOVIEV
at the Third Congress of the Communist
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Zinoviev delivering the Report of the Executive Committee.

REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE COMINTERN.

Comrades, our Communist International has now been in existence for three years. The Executive Committee, however, as an international institution, has actually been in operation only one year, since the Second Congress. Between the First and Second Congresses, our leading body consisted, in general merely of a group of Russian comrades. It was not an easy matter to get the parties at the end of the Second Congress to delegate their representatives to the Executive Committee for the entire year. The comrades who participated at the Second Congress will recall that the representatives of the German party, for example, and of other parties as well, opposed the appointment in Moscow of delegates of the various parties to the Executive Committee, and to have these delegates work here for an entire year. They preferred to leave the leadership, as it had been, in the hands of the Russian comrades. It was only when we protested and absolutely insisted on our demand that the Congress accepted our proposal, and then affiliated parties appointed their delegates to the Executive Committee. But we are compelled to declare that even during this one year not all the parties fulfilled their duty towards the International. Some of them did so only to a slight degree, and for that reason the connections were rather unsatisfactory. In this respect, no one is less satisfied with the work of the Executive Committee than that body itself. We demand that measures be taken at this Third Congress to establish a real Executive Committee, international in its make-up, an Executive

Committee which would deal with all the current daily affairs and organise the political leadership on a really international scale. We must discuss the activities of the Executive Committee with perfect frankness. These activities have been very faulty. Mistakes have been made, and we are looking forward with interest to the discussions and the proposals to be made by the various parties.

In the matter of organisation we can say right at the start that our work was imperfect, at times even bad. Nevertheless, comrades, I believe we may state with some degree of satisfaction that in spite of everything we had, during this year, a really international leadership for the first time in the history of the modern labour movement.

As you probably recall, the International Socialist Bureau of the Second International was neither a leading body politically nor an institution attending to practical, daily affairs. It used to meet once every three months, mostly on dress parade, as it were. The leadership of the Communist International during the first two years was not yet entirely international, to be sure, and only during the past year—we can say this with satisfaction—did we succeed in laying the foundations for an institution, composed of representatives of at least ten or twelve parties, and which has, at any rate, attempted to conduct the Communist labour movement along international lines also with regard to its leadership. I believe, comrades, that this is of great advantage for the International labour movement. And if we all agree that our International shall continue to develop in the same direction, if we are all determined to spare no pains and co-operate with all our power, we shall soon possess a real and efficient International leadership.

We called this Congress together somewhat earlier than required by our statutes. We were led to do so by the consciousness of the great responsi-

bility which the first really International Executive body had assumed at a time when highly important processes of development were going on in many countries, in countries of great significance for the modern labour movement. We take it for granted that between Congresses the International Executive Committee possesses decisive power. But we also felt that, whenever important questions arise, and if there are any possibilities of doing so, it is the duty of the Executive Committee to appeal to the Congress as the source of all our decisions. And in view of the fact that we have problems of prime importance to solve in a number of countries, we were of the opinion that, since the possibility existed, it was our duty to assemble the World Congress at the earliest possible moment, and have it decide on these momentous questions.

I shall now submit, comrades, a number of statistics concerning the activities of our Executive Committee. Hardly 11 months have passed since our Second Congress. During this period the Executive Committee held 31 sessions and discussed 196 questions; 128 of these were purely political, the remainder were of an organisational nature. Our best connections were with Germany, and it was just in that country that the development within the labour movement was of greatest significance. Germany appeared on the agenda of the Executive Committee 21 times during the period mentioned, Italy 12 times, America 12, England 9, Roumania 12, Checho-Slovakia 10, France 7, Bulgaria 7, and the Near and Far East 10. Then there were other countries which appeared 2, 3, or 4 times on the agenda. I also desire to point out that, as most of you know, we had a Small Bureau besides the Executive, consisting of 7 comrades, which met even more frequently than the Executive—about twice as often. We received a great number of visitors from various countries during this year. In this respect we have less to com-

plain of than during the previous year. The possibilities of journeying to Russia were much more favourable, and a number of parties took ample advantage of these possibilities. What was the political substance of our work during the past year? Of course, this political work was determined by the decision of the Second Congress. What was, in general, the work accomplished by the Second Congress? We already said that the Second Congress was as a matter of fact the First Congress, the constituent Congress of the Communist International. For the Congress which we usually refer to as the first was merely a meeting of very small number of representatives of various groups. For that reason the Second Congress was the actual constituent Congress. It drew up for the first time the statutes of the Communist International. It adopted the basic resolutions concerning the roles of the parties, and in general outlines defined the policies of the Communist International. In what directions did the Second Congress operate? There was a struggle in two directions at that Congress. On the one hand, we had to combat the ideas of some of our comrades, such as some of the English, Italian, and American delegates, who considered themselves as a "left" opposition to us. For example, the question of the participation of the English comrades in the Labour Party. The Second Congress had to discuss this matter for two days.

Our English comrades were practically unanimous in their objection to such participation. They considered such a policy as opportunistic. Our American comrades, the late John Reed and his friends, supported them in this matter. We opposed them on this point. We were of the opinion that especially in England, a country in which the mass movement was growing so splendidly, but in which the influence of the Communist Party was increasing only very gradually, that in such a country it was our un-

doubted duty to join every mass organisation embracing hundreds of thousands and millions of proletarians, to organise ourselves within these bodies, and to build Communist nuclei, in order to gain influence in the organisations. In this respect, therefore, the instructions we received from the Second Congress was quite distinct: to join these mass organisations, and to require all our young Communist groups to join such organisations as the Labour Party and the Trade Unions. We said to them: "You must organise yourselves there; you must combat the trade union bureaucracy, and reformist-socialist policies within the trade unions; you must succeed in permeating these organisations with the spirit of Communism."

On the other hand, we were also compelled to oppose the "left" elements at the Second Congress on the question of parliamentarism. You will recall that Comrade Bordiga, whom we can now consider as one of our best comrades in Italy and in the Communist International, one of the most upright revolutionaries in our ranks, that he and his group threw down the gauntlet to us in this very hall in a battle on principle against parliamentarism. They were supported by a number of Swiss and Belgian comrades. We opposed such a policy, and we succeeded in moving the Second Congress to decide that Communists must not leave unutilised the weapon of revolutionary parliamentarism. Our viewpoint was the same as that which proved decisive in the question of joining the Labour Party and participating in the Trade Unions. That was one decision taken by the Congress. The second decision found expression in the famous 21 points. This decision, which was much more decisive than the first in its influence on our activities of the past year, was directed against opportunism and the centrists as well as semi-centrist elements.

Whereas our comrades of the "left" opposition

were no enemies of ours, but merely friends with sectarian conceptions, who had not yet fully grasped many of the concrete conditions, we found a great number of enemies to the "right." You will recall that, at the time of the session of the Second Congress, the general situation in Europe and America was such that it was growing to be the fashion to belong to the Communist International. Every half-way clever centrist wanted to belong to the Communist International. America sent us a delegation of the Hillquit party, the tendency of which was just about the same as that of the right Independent Socialist Party or the Scheidemannists in Germany.

This delegation was quite surprised that we did not receive it any too hospitably. You remember that Dittmann and Crispin, who are now unofficially participating in the bourgeois government, were here and declared their desire of joining the Communist International. You also recall that the Italian reformists, d'Aragona among them, who have now proved to be open saboteurs of the proletarians, were here, too, and deemed it quite obvious that they belonged to the Third International.

On the other hand, the situation was so indefinite and our relations so insufficient that we here in Russia, on account of the blockade, were very badly informed. We were so naive as to receive such gentlemen as d'Aragona very fraternally in the beginning. And even now I feel ashamed when I recall that I am partly to blame for the fact that thousands of splendid Petrograd proletarians literally carried those persons on their shoulders through the revolutionary streets of Petrograd. We thought that real brothers had come to us.

It was during that very Second Congress that the situation began to grow rather clear. The Congress as you know had taken a sharp stand against the "right" elements. Our real enemies were to the "right." We were very well aware that these shrewd

people would swallow everything, if they could only get into the Communist International and sabotage it from within. For that reason we drew up the 21 points. These decisions influenced all our activities. After the Second Congress the situation in Germany was such that only the Spartacus Bund belonged to the Communist International, an organisation with a glorious past, but which, at that time, had not yet become a mass party. Then there was the U.S.P. (Independent Socialist Party of Germany) with its left wing. The task imposed upon us by the Second Congress was to draw in the best, really Communist elements of the U.S.P. and unite them with the Spartacists.

We had a similar task imposed upon us with regard to other countries.

Now, comrades, when, after a year of activity, we look back to the decisions of the Second Congress, we ask ourselves: Who was right in the disputes with our "left" friends and our "right" enemies? Let us take for example the question of the participation of the English Communists in the Labour Party. As you know, the Labour Party, at the behest of Henderson and Macdonald, decided, of its own accord, to refuse our comrades admission. I believe that that is the best evidence that we were right, and not our English comrades, who feared that they would lose their Communist innocence in joining the Labour Party. The opportunists felt this danger immediately, they realised immediately that, if the Communists organised within the Labour Party and attempted to exercise influence from within, it would mean a great danger to the Labour Party.

Serati, about whom we will have more to say later on, supported the "lefts" in this question. He asked, "How is it possible to join a Labour Party?" He wrote an article: "Behold the inconsistency of the Communist International! In Italy it demands the exclusion of Turati, whereas, in England, it demands

the participation of the Communists in the Labour Party!" Serati is not such an ignorant child that he does not really understand, that there is just a little difference between these two cases. He attempted with premeditation intentionally to mislead the Italian proletarians. I believe our English comrades will admit to-day, that not they, but rather the Second Congress was right in this matter, when it declared: "Not out of the Labour Party, but into it, in order to fight for Communism from within, and to brand the treacherous leaders from within." (Applause.)

As regards Parliamentarism we have as yet no big success to record for the current year. This must be admitted. After all the splits it has been revealed that the parliamentary factions comprise the most hesitating, the most moderate and the most inferior elements. This has been the case in France, as in Italy, Germany, and Switzerland. In fact, wherever we had any splits this year.

One other point. If you ask me, which of the 21 conditions have been most imperfectly fulfilled during this year, I must answer: the one which demands complete subordination of the parliamentary factions to the Party and the carrying on of real revolutionary parliamentarism. But, comrades, I believe that although we have as yet achieved very little in this respect, it is nevertheless, clear that in this question also the majority of the Second Congress was right. In several countries we may already record our initial successes, and we will urge the Third Congress to do everything necessary to have our Party advance forward in this respect.

Now, comrades, what was the mandate, what was the watchword given to the Executive by the Second Congress? The watchword was, as regards England, America, and other countries where Communism is a feeble movement as yet, but where there is a numerous working class and a great Labour movement, to urge our comrades there into close contact

with the masses, that they should not hold aloof, that they should not become a sect, but throw themselves into the movement of the masses.

The second task was this: Wherever it was fashionable to belong to the Third International, the Executive had to do everything possible to unmask all those over-wise diplomats of the Centrist camp, to whip them in front of the masses to detach from them their best elements and draw the latter into the Communist fold. These were the great political tasks and also very important problems of organisation. These were the tasks given to us by the Second Congress, and it is for us here to-day to judge as to how far we have fulfilled these tasks under the given circumstances.

To take events in their chronological order, the Party conference of the German Independents at Halle has marked the most important mile stone in the development during the past year. But politically the German situation was not quite so trying to the Communist International as was the Italian situation with regard to the difficulties, which we experienced during this year, as also with regard to the indications of a certain crisis in the Communist International. I will, therefore, deal at greater length with the Italian question.

THE ITALIAN QUESTION.

I have already explained that when the Italian Delegation came to Moscow the means of communication were so imperfect that we didn't know that reformists had come with the Delegation. We had complete confidence in Serati and also in the men that he had brought along with him. We had a notion, to be sure, that these were not quite clear-cut elements, but we thought that they were honestly for the Proletarian Revolution. And it was in this respect that we have met with a shocking disappoint-

ment. The printed record of the proceedings of the Second Congress has appeared in German translation only during the last few days. I hope that the technical apparatus will work more efficiently this time, so that perhaps we may have the record of the Third Congress within a month. The German comrades will at least be able to read the record of the Second Congress. Now, while perusing the record and scrutinising the attitude of Serati and the Italian comrades, one cannot help asking the question: How could we ever entertain any illusions, how could we hope that Serati would belong to us?

The Record contains a table showing how frequently the various speakers had spoken. Serati had spoken four times on questions of principle, the national question, the agrarian question, the question of the 21 conditions, and on the question of the principal tasks of the Communist International. As you see, all these comprise the most important questions discussed at the Congress. Serati made declarations upon all these questions, stating every time that he would vote against or abstain. He would then continue for another ten minutes reciting anecdotes, but the trend of his remarks upon these four very decisive questions was directed against the Congress. We had thought at the time that these were merely misunderstandings, and did everything possible to convince him. Later events have shown the error of our judgment. We even had to publish a special book upon the question of the relations of the Socialist Party of Italy to the Communist International.

That book mainly consisted of articles, declarations and resolutions by Serati himself. We regret that we have to report to-day upon this question in the absence of representatives of the Italian Socialist Party. But we have done everything possible to get them here, we have informed them three months and a half in advance, inviting them and requesting them to arrive at the appointed time. Upon the arrival of

the first group of Italian comrades a fortnight ago, we sent another telegram asking them to come in time. The members of the Party have so far failed to put in an appearance, although three weeks have already elapsed since the first of June, the originally appointed day for the opening of the Congress, and during this time about a thousand delegates from all countries have managed to arrive here. It means that the Italian comrades do not wish to come. I am, therefore, compelled to try and explain the Italian Socialist Party.*

The first article published by Serati in the 'Avanti' immediately on his return home, contained nothing else than an attempt by Serati to discredit the Congress of the Communist International. I shall have to quote extensively, and I ask the indulgence of the comrades beforehand. Personally I am of the opinion that the Italian question is a determining one for the political activity of the Executive during the past year. Now, here is what Serati wrote in his first article:

Firstly: "The Second Congress began under the following circumstances. The majority of the delegates had left for Russia before the 21 conditions had become known in their respective countries, and their mandates were consequently only of general and personal character."

The first Serati sentence, the first Serati truth. Then comes the following:

Secondly: "Various items on the agenda had not been discussed in the different countries, and consequently several not unimportant questions had not been made known to them at all."

I must declare that on comparing the preparations for the Second Congress and the Third, it must be

* We must explain that the Italian comrades have arrived after the speech of Comrade Zinoviev has been delivered.

admitted that the preparations for the Second Congress have been made much more carefully than for the Third. The Theses had been ready for weeks ahead, and upon all important questions we had had lengthy discussions with the Independent Socialist Party for a month previously.

Thus the second sentence, the second untruth.

Thirdly: "The far-away distance of the meeting-place of the Congress from the countries of the proletarian movement, the difficulties of communication, the blockade which had gone on for so long, the almost total absence of control on the part of the workers, who should have been admitted to the sessions, and on the part of the press, which should have been given every facility for widespread publication—all this gave the sessions the character of a closed assembly, deprived of all contact with the outside world."

This was written by Serati a few days after the Congress, a few days after he had been sitting in the presidential chair. No control by the workers, no control by the press, forsooth. Just a secret conspiracy!

Fourthly: "The members of the Congress were poorly acquainted with one another—(this is quite true, for we were certainly poorly acquainted with the real Serati)—as well as with the respective movements, with the actual forces represented by the various delegates, and with the means and influences at their disposal to affect international policy."

This assertion of Serati is, of course, also far removed from the truth.

Fifthly: "The Congress conducted its conferences under the protection of a great revolutionary government—(perhaps, this was also not to Serati's liking)—at a time when its fighting forces were engaged in a life-and-death struggle against the forces of reaction, while the Communist government was compelled—as it is compelled even now—to conduct its

own defensive and aggressive policy against international and national capitalism."

At this point begin the villainous insinuations of Serati. Here is what he says in his fifth point:

"... A policy which, while helping the Soviet Republic, at the same time, can be of undisputed benefit to the proletariat as a whole, yet it may not suit the tactical necessities of another country, which is still within the critical process of its own revolution."

I would like to ask the comrades of the Communist Labour Party of Germany (K. A. P. D.) to pay attention to this fifth point of Serati, because Serati has here in mind the Left-wingers of the Communist Labour Party of Germany, who are now making use of the articles of Hermann Gorter.

Sixthly: "There was a manifest disproportion between the qualities of the individual delegates, to an unprecedented extent, even for international congresses. This was a substantial cause of the many conceivable difficulties, pausings and waverings in the discussions."

This may be interpreted by everyone according to his taste. I, for one, am puzzled by the expression: "Different qualities at an International Communist Congress." I think he meant to say the same thing as Gilferding, when he laughed at the Mohamedan priest of Chiva. Fine Communists that they are!

Seventhly: "The allotment of votes to the individual countries did not correspond to the actual political and moral importance of the respective Parties, but rather to the capitalist importance of the countries represented. Thus, France received as many votes as Italy, although the French delegates represented only a very insignificant minority of the Party as well as of the Confederation." ...

Serati thus stops at nothing that might compromise the Second Congress.

Eighth: "The remoteness of the meeting place of

the Congress and the difficulties of communication were an obstacle to the spreading of information about its decisions, in the same or even in a higher degree than during the preparations. Suffice it is to mention that some Parties did not obtain any reports of the Congress even two months after its conclusion while the final text of the decisions were received over a month after the Congress," etc.

We thus see that Serati, but few weeks after the closing of the Second Congress in September, 1920, already did everything possible and impossible to lower the Congress in the eyes of the Italian proletariat, to represent the Congress in such a way as though it had been neither Communist nor International. Unfortunately we ourselves at the time were lacking the requisite foresight, and we were still clinging to the hope that Serati would yet prove himself a man adhering to the Communist International idea.

The situation in Italy, however, was such that Serati had to "make a jolly face while playing a losing game." Take the 21 conditions as an instance. He declared himself--as, indeed, he couldn't do otherwise--for the 21 conditions. In the article quoted he declares: "We accept the 21 conditions, which have been put to the Socialists of all countries in an excessively acute form, but we make two reservations:—

" (1) No excessive leniency should be shown to those who, contaminated by nationalistic drumbeating during the war, had betrayed the proletariat in shameful fashion, and who now, in the same light-minded manner, declare their submission to the strict discipline prescribed by Moscow, and who will betray us again to-morrow. We encounter by far too many Pauls on the way of the proletariat, which should cause us some misgivings as to whether they are all genuine; and although the moral judgment of the past record of people in the revolutionary struggle is

by no means of great significance, there is at any rate a political criterion which determines the immorality of a certain kind of conversations, and this criterion must be unrelentingly applied by the proletariat in order to prevent the presence of traitors within its ranks.

"(2) The Parties affiliated to the Third International must be given the right—under their own responsibility—to undertake the necessary cleaning operation within their ranks in such a manner that the cohesion of the proletarian movement as well as the revolution itself, which is believed in Moscow to be so close at hand, should come to no harm."

Thus, at the outset, Serati cloaks himself in the mantle of a left-winger and a revolutionist, declaring that he would make it his first condition, that a strict attitude be maintained towards the "right," particularly towards the French comrades. Our French comrades seem to be the object of his particular hatred. I do not know what his reasons are. He attempted to play before the Italian workers the part of an orthodox who would apply the strictest severity against the right-wing. Then he put up a twenty-second condition. He said that a twenty-second condition had been adopted against the Freemasons, but that Zinoviev had tucked it away in his pocket, and that condition was no more. Serati went to Italy to peddle such wares in real earnest. But what was the real position as regards the Freemasons? It was a proposal made by the Italian comrades, which we found quite sensible to accept, but at the same time we declared it impossible for the Communist International to have it published. Yet, Serati went before the Italian working class and, in full earnest, represented the situation as though I was in all probability a Freemason, and that the majority had been on the side of Freemasonry. The Second condition proposed by Serati takes an altogether nebulous form: "The

cleaning shall take place, but in such a manner that the cohesion of the proletarian movement should come to no harm." Later on he discovered other formulas, such as a combination of cleaning and autonomy, which means that the cleaning should be left entirely to the Party concerned.

This was followed by a discussion on the question at the Central Committee of the Italian Party, where two resolutions were proposed, one by Comrade Terracini and another by Comrade Baratano, a friend of Serati. Comrade Terracini demands unconditional acceptance of the 21 conditions. Comrade Baratano also demands acceptance, but that the Party shall leave to itself the interpretation of the conditions.

On a vote being taken by the Central Committee, Comrade Terracini obtained the majority, and Serati was defeated. Serati, to frighten the people, announced his resignation as editor of "Avanti." Our Italian comrades, instead of hailing this resignation with enthusiasm, declared that this wouldn't do, that Serati must stay. Our comrades have by this time found out their mistake, and we do not wish to throw salt upon their wounds. But they did commit a mistake in retaining Serati at his editorial post, on the assumption that he would carry out the decisions of the Central Committee. Serati retained control of "Avanti," the great influential newspaper with its 200,000 circulation, using it for every purpose but the carrying out of the decisions of the Central Committee. He began an outrageous polemical campaign of mud-slinging against the Executive. Later on I will read to you some of the spiciest quotations. Then came the Reformist conference at Reggio Emilia. The Reformists at that conference organised themselves into a "concentration section." They certainly did concentrate. Truati and d'Aragona took part in the conference. These people are shrewd and know better than to come directly before the Italian workers and declare themselves against the Com-

munist International. Therefore, they said in their resolution as follows: "The differences of opinion in the movement of the historical period through which we are passing, cannot serve as sufficient cause for splitting the Party. The various schools within the Socialist Party, which had always existed in the past, have by no means hindered its mighty growth; neither will they prove to be any hindrance to fraternal and common work in the future; and the fruit borne by this work will be in direct ratio to the amount of respect shown by the various factions within the Party towards one another and towards the common will, with liberty of opinion fully maintained with regard to every situation, and the strictest discipline in the manifold forms of development of the class struggle."

That is the climax of reformist diplomacy. Turati, Treves and d'Aragona are familiar with such diplomacy, and are going to become brilliant ministers some day. What have they done? They have passed the following decision: "The concentration section confirms the affiliation of the Party to the Third International as well as the uniform interpretation of the 21 points, which are to be applied in accordance with the conditions of each country. The section declares most decidedly, that the anarchist and syndicalist groups as well as the freemasons, must be excluded from the International."

They have repeated what Serati suggested to them: they are for the 21 points on condition, however, that they be carried out in accordance with the conditions of the country. They are for a united party, but against syndicalists and anarchists. It is our Communist comrades whom they call syndicalist and freemason elements. That does not cost much.

The resolution of the concentration section could not refrain from making mention of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It contained the following statement: "The dictatorship of the proletariat, when

taken in the Marxist sense—(Turati and d'Aragona as interpreters of Marx!)—is not an obligatory condition of the programme, but a temporary measure, the necessity for which is called forth by special circumstances.”

They are clever enough not to declare themselves against the “dictatorship in the Marxian sense.” It is true that the dictatorship is not meant to be a permanent measure, it is but a temporary necessity. However, they look upon the matter as if the question of the dictatorship had already been liquidated, and assert that a “revolution in Italy accompanied by violence and destruction and by the immediate establishment of the Soviet system, as was the case in Russia, for which the extremist is striving, would be doomed to rapid failure unless it could secure the active support, both political and economic, of the proletariat of the more advanced states during the period of inevitable economic decay.”

There you have the doctrine of the reformists! They do not want Italy to have a revolution accompanied by violence and destruction. They do not want the immediate establishment of a Soviet system of the Russian type. Well, we would even be satisfied with a Soviet system of the Italian type. (Laughter.)

This little matter stands in connection with the lengthy resolution on Freemasonry. That was the creed of the reformist group in Reggio Emilia, revealing the true character of this group as clearly as through a magnifying glass. Here is where we were obliged to act; we had to expel them. The whole controversy was centred around this group which has declared itself against the dictatorship of the proletariat and the revolution, and against a Soviet system of the Russian type.

After all these declarations Serati dared to say that there were no reformists in Italy, that he advocated the expulsion of reformists, that he was more strict than we are, and that we should only point out

the reformists to him. Poor Serati does not know where to find the reformists of Italy.

You will remember that when Comrade Lenin addressed an open letter to Serati, demanding the expulsion of reformists, Serati wrote an article entitled "Reply to Comrade Lenin, by an Italian Communist," in which he says the following:

"Can reformists be tolerated in the ranks of the Party? Allow me to reply to this question by another question: Who is a reformist? If, as may be inferred from your letter, by reformists you mean those who strive for the co-operation of classes and for sharing the power with the bourgeoisie, who do counter-revolutionary work and are apt to become at any time the Scheidemanns and Noskes of our country, then you are perfectly right, and I agree with you that they must be expelled."

Then Serati goes on trying to prove that Turati, Treves, etc., are not reformists. He says: "Those are the people who two months ago were asked in the name of your government by Vodovosov, one of your representatives in Italy, to exercise some pressure on Gioliti, in the name of the parliamentary section, in order to obtain some concessions."

This is Serati's method. If a question of principle is being discussed he brings in some petty gossip, talks about the money for the "Daily Herald," etc., but does not give any definite reply as to whether he is for the reformists or against them.

In an article of October 24, published in "Avanti," Serati gives some further explanations: "What then should we do? There are but two definite ways—either to get power in the legal way or to make a revolution. To get power for whom? and how? and for what? In view of the ruinous state of the country, the only result that might be obtained from the accession to power would be to shift the responsibility weighing on the bourgeoisie to the shoulders of the Socialist Party."

That was written in October, 1920. Now, what does this mean? It is the same that has been said by Dittmann and Crispian: "We are afraid to take the power into our hands even there where we could do it, because we cannot assume the responsibility for the ruinous economic conditions caused by the war." The conclusion to be drawn from the above would be to wait until the economic conditions improve and capitalism has again become strong at our expense, and only then make a revolution. Up to now this has been advocated only by Kautsky. His point of view was: First, the improvement of production, and then the fight for power, otherwise we would have only a socialism of consumers. This is the attitude openly taken by the "Communist" Serati in October, 1920.

Comrades, the real substance of the question is this. At the time of the Second Congress it was the general opinion that Italy had made the nearest approach to a proletarian revolution. This was admitted by Serati himself. If ever history gave us an example of how a party missed its opportunity, to the great detriment of the movement, it is the example of Italy. Never has such a good opportunity been lost as in the case of Italy. A year ago the working class of Italy was enthusiastic, ready to fight, and better organised than in any other country. The bourgeoisie was hard pressed. A very considerable part of the army, as well as of the peasantry, sided with us.

Then came the splendid movement in September, when the Italian workers demonstrated a new method of fighting by the seizure of the factories. The bourgeoisie was completely disorganised.

Giolitti himself said that he had not been able to do anything in September. When he was asked why he had not sent soldiers in September to clear the factories, he replied: "I had not the power to do it, I had to apply homoeopathic measures at first and resort to surgical operations only later on." With

the indirect help of Serati and his partisans he suppressed the movement by homoeopathy, and then began to resort to surgery. The fascisti are very good surgeons, indeed, who are carrying on their surgical operations upon the Italian working class very well.

The role of the party, and especially of Serati, consisted in the fact that they overlooked the situation, and delivered the working class into the hands of the bourgeoisie. The latter was given a whole year to recover itself, to improve its organisation, to accomplish the transition from homœopathy to surgical operations, and let the working class become deteriorated and disorganised.

Then the congress at Livorno came. Comrades, you know that the Executive had tried hard to send Bucharin and myself to that Congress. This, however, could not be done. The Italian Party, especially Serati, did not move a finger to render this possible. We had to form a different delegation, and sent as our representatives the Bulgarian Comrade Kabaktschiew and the Hungarian Comrade Rakosi.

Much nonsense and gossip has been circulated in the international press on the subject of both these comrades. The mover of all this was Serati: it is his method. There are some good comrades who think that matters would have been quite different in Livorno if Kabaktschiew and Rakosi had acted with more diplomacy and cunning. An attempt was made to represent Kabaktschiew as a savage dictator. Whoever knows him knows that this is altogether false. He is one of the most cultured Marxists and a very quiet comrade, with none of the passions that Serati ascribes to him, a man who has worked for years in the Bulgarian Party as a theorist, and of whom nothing but good can be said.

The comrades who were there must tell how matters looked to the outsider. The congress in Livorno was literally transformed into a circus. When

Comrade Kabaktschiew spoke, people screamed and shouted: Long live the Pope; a pigeon was let loose, and various unheard-of chauvinist scenes were enacted. And after all that, it was said that Comrade Kabaktschiew was to blame.

The events of September and October should leave no doubt in the mind of anyone. It was not a question of Comrade Kabaktschiew's speech but of the retrogression of the party, at least in its leading strata, to the role of a simple, ordinary Social Democratic Party. This is what we have in Italy, retrogression under the pressure of a whole number of circumstances; retrogression of the leaders who have to become mere Independents. I must admit that the right-wing Independents in Halle behaved much more decently towards the Communists than did Serati and his people.

The Congress took place. Serati with his group moved a resolution. He proposed that the party should call itself Social Communist, accept the 21 conditions, but remain quite free. There was no question of a split. Turati, the only one who delivered a speech on principles, was given an ovation. He is the real leading spirit of the party. He declared quite openly that he is against force: all must be carried out peacefully. And now attempts are being made to lay the blame for the split on the Executive. What other alternative did the Executive have?

It is quite clear that this was the first collision between the Communist International and the reformist elements. It was the first trial of forces. Should the Communist International have given way it must be frankly acknowledged that we would have no Communist International and no political or world significance at this time, had we given way on this question; then it would have been said that the Communist International had gone down on its knees before Turati and the other reformists. It could have continued to exist, and could have had large

parties in its ranks, but it would have morally decayed. It was the trial of forces, and we insist that it is the pride of the Communist International that it did not waver at that moment, but said firmly and resolutely: If this must be so, if we must lose a great mass of Italian workers for a time, let it be so; we are going to win them back. But not a step, not a single step backwards, because otherwise the Communist International would go to pieces. The purity of the International and the principles of communism were at stake. And we are really very sorry that some leading groups as, for instance, individual German comrades, who possess great merits, the question was not clearly understood. But the Communist International, as a whole, as an international association of the workers, very quickly understood that what we have really lost was but an illusion, and though we have sustained considerable loss, nevertheless, for the sake of the Communist principle we must hold out to the end.

Serati has begun to sing a different tune. Formerly he was the strict one, and demanded that no concessions be given to the Freemasons. It has all changed now. Serati came forward with a theory of equality. He demands equality between Italy and France. Why were more concessions made to the French comrades than to the Italian comrades? I shall have something to say on the French Party. It is our duty to treat every party according to the concrete conditions prevailing in the particular country. We must take into consideration the history of the Labour movement and the stage of maturity of the revolutionary situation. We cannot treat the French, American, Italian, Lettish and Czecho-Slovak parties according to one pattern. The internationalism of our Executive consists in the fact that we consider every party from the standpoint of concrete circumstances, and we define our attitude towards it only upon such a basis. We maintained

a special attitude towards the French Party. It is certainly clear that a real Communist would not come forward and say: "Since the French Party is backward, therefore we should treat the Italian Party in the same manner, so as to force it back, too."

This is not internationalism by any means. Serati kept up an extremely personal and vile attack against us. He wrote in one article of December 24 the following lines: "When we were discussing the Amsterdam question, I asked Comrade Zinoviev why the Russian government, which is so irreconcilable towards opportunism, has given 72,000 pounds sterling to the "Daily Herald" which is supporting opportunist Socialism in England, and why has the Communist International expressed itself in favour of entrance of Communists into the Labour Party, which is affiliated to the Second International and the "yellow" Amsterdam International?"

Comrades, this one citation should be sufficient for every true Communist to understand the character of the person the Communist International has to deal with. We told them that Turati and d'Aragona are reformists, and must be expelled. Such was the decision of the Second Congress. Serati again declared that Tchitcherin and his Government have paid £72,000 to the "Daily Herald," a story which was first circulated by Lloyd George and which served as a reason for the extradition of Comrade Kameneff. Serati has plainly played the informer. We know very well that the Russian government has to deal with all sorts of people and elements. This is a fact. Why the Russian government is dealing with such people is, of course, well known to the Communist International. One of the reasons is that the working class is still too weak in those countries. But what relation has this circumstance that the first proletarian government is compelled to deal with capitalist governments—with the question whether Turati and

all other reformists should be expelled from the Party?

I have already said that Serati has a special contempt for the French Party. He wrote an article entitled "Some Further Considerations" in "Avanti" of January, 1921, which reads as follows: "In France the majority of the Socialist delegates in the Chamber of Deputies, who have only yesterday defended the "Patrie" and the "Union Sacree," have gone over in a body to the Communist International." And in another article he states that 55 deputies have joined the Communist Party. Which is not true.

The Socialist faction comprised 67 deputies, of which only 12 or 13 joined the Communist Party; 55 remained with Longuet, Serati's friend. He is deceiving the Italian working class, and is using his position in the "Avanti" to spread lies. He tells that 55 deputies joined us. If that were so, it would be only too bad. But it is a malicious Serati lie. Serati says: "The disruption of the German Independents was caused rather by motives of national interests than by international doctrine and practice."

So the split and the going over of one half of the party membership to the Communists, was the result of national motives. What does it signify? It is sheer Chauvinism. He wants to convince the Italian workers that the German workers belong to the Communist International, not on account of their proletarian convictions, but on account of their national interests. This is a slur upon the German working class. Such are the means by which Serati is fighting the Executive and the most important section of our International. Now, if I am permitted, I shall read what Serati wrote on January 1, 1921: "As to the unknown informers, the matter deserves dwelling upon at some length. The Executive of the Communist International despatches from Moscow to every country special representatives, who are selected from the midst of the Russian comrades and

are well known to the Russian members of the Executive. Whether such representative possesses the necessary qualifications for such a mission, and whether he is able to carry out his functions properly, is exclusively the prerogative of the Executive to know. And from such a "grey cardinal" the Executive is receiving reports, which remain entirely unknown to the leaders of the party in the country in which the informer is operating. There is no control whatever over these reports."

Comrades, I have shown already that Serati is Levi's predecessor. He coined the phrase "grey cardinal," and Levi, the word "Turkestanian" (Tashkenian).

Comrades, I could cite many more quotations, but firstly, you have the book yourselves, and, secondly, I think that the citations quoted are sufficient. I would like only to read to you Bentivoglio's resolution; it was passed in Livorno after our comrades had left the Congress.

It runs as follows: "Whereas, the Seventeenth Convention of the Socialist Party of Italy has considered and confirmed the résolutions, on the basis of which the party has joined the Third International, and has accepted its principal methods without reservation—it protests against the declaration of the representative of the Executive Committee, explaining the exclusion of the party on the ground of differences of attitude towards local and casual questions, which might and should have been settled by means of friendly discussion and brotherly accord; and whereas the Convention is conforming its affiliation to the Third International, it submits the conflict to the forthcoming Congress of the Third International, pledging itself in advance to recognise and carry out its decision."

Comrades, formally the matter stands thus: when the Communists left, Serati's party passed this resolution appealing to the Third Congress of the Com-

munist International, and declaring in advance that it would submit to its decisions. This is the resolution which was passed unanimously. What happened after that? A few months have elapsed and Serati is showing no intention of submitting to this Congress; he has only employed stratagems to prevent the sending of delegates here. I ask those of you, comrades, who are members of parliament, in the French or in any other parliament, to help me to find a parliamentary expression for such a mode of proceeding. They decide, after the departure of the Communists, that they will submit to the Congress, and then, when the latter takes place, they send no delegates to it. Anyone who is capable of thinking, will understand that they do not wish to submit.

Serati said after the resolution was passed: "It is quite possible that the declarations (of the representative of the Executive) were drawn up in Livorno, but the Third International will never disavow them. Levi told me here that they had also been dealt with without consideration in Germany. Suffice it to say that the K.A.P.D., which is nationalist and has supported the Kapp-Luttwitz outbreak, has been accepted by the Third International as a sympathising party."

This was published in the "Avanti." This was written at the time of the Congress. You can read it here. Thus stands the question formally. And, comrades, you must clearly consider the fact that, since the congress in Livorno, the party has continued to develop retrogressively. Here are a few examples.

The "Avanti" of May 11th contains an article, "International Solidarity," full of enthusiasm, full of international sentiments. For what reason? Some organisation had sent the trade unions 50,000 lira. That is indeed an event of international importance. What organisation had sent it? The Amsterdam International of Trade Unions. Prompted by this fact, an inspired article is written, in which it is said: "The Amsterdam Trade Union International, which

has sent our confederation the published expression of solidarity and sympathy, does not quite share our opinion in regard to the necessary demands of the proletarian movement. Some of its leaders are very far from our political ideals. If the present moment were appropriate for personal controversies we could reproach some of them for the solidarity, which, during the war they manifested towards those who, to-day, are in our country, and in all other countries, representatives of capitalist reaction.

"But we will not diminish the significance of this international demonstration which touches us deeply. Whatever name the persons standing at the head of the Amsterdam Secretariat may bear, it is without doubt that the many millions of the international proletariat, which is united under its banner, is bound up with the oppressed of the whole world by mutual interest; and we are also cemented with similar ties to it and to you. It is also without doubt that every sincere and hearty demonstration of international solidarity will accelerate the proletarian union of the workers of all countries."

Comrades, you know how all petty bourgeois, all revisionists, all centrists cry out about the money from Moscow, although everyone understands that it is quite natural, that the victorious working class of Russia should help the workers of other countries. But when the International of the Trade Unions of Amsterdam, which is connected with the League of Nations, and whose chairman is Mr. Thomas—sends you 50,000 lira, is it not shameful to accept the money and, moreover, write about it. Serati did not notice that he was soiling his fingers by doing this. The money that he took from these traitors was not like glowing coal to him. He writes about international solidarity. You see, the dead ride quickly. The man, who is dead for the Communist International, has come to that very point.

I have a small book here entitled "Il Bolscevismo

guidicato dai socialisti Italiani."* It is written by a bourgeois. This pamphlet has been disseminated more widely than Levi's booklet. It consists of quotations from the gentlemen whom Serati had brought here, and whom we received so cordially. The latter have now written everything possible that actually happened, and had not happened, to prove how bad things look in the country where the working class holds the power.

I would like to mention a few things, comrades, of most recent occurrence, namely, the elections. In the "Soviet," published by Paul Levi, in which some of the members of the V. K. P. D. (United Communist Party of Germany) are collaborators, I read an article, by Comrade Kurt Geyer, on the Italian elections. He asserts that the elections have shown the following result: Serati's party obtained 1,400,000 votes; the Communist party about 400,000. Consequently the masses are with Serati, and this means the evident defeat of the Communist International. He affirms: the defeat of the Italian Communists is not only the defeat of the Communists, it is also the defeat of Zinoviev, the defeat of the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

When a new young party receives 400,000 votes, it is to be considered a defeat. . . . But when Scheidemann with his gang, having murdered Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, receive a million votes, no one thinks this to be a defeat of Communism. How then can one speak of a defeat of the Executive in Italy? That means that the workers and a great number of petty bourgeois still vote for these people. But where is the defeat in this case? I have an article from the "Populaire" of June 4th, signed by Cesare Alessandri, an Italian deputy who is in close relations with Serati. He writes about the elections. I shall only quote some of the figures.

* "Bolshevism as valued by the Italian Socialists."

"Le nouveau groupe du Parti socialiste est composé de 123 députés dont 3 élus en signe de protestations comme emprisonnés et non adhérents au Parti. Il reste donc 120 députés socialistes, dont 49 de droite, 42 de gauche et 30 du centre."

(The new group of the Socialist Party is composed of 123 deputies, three of which who do not belong to the Party, have been elected as a protest against their having been imprisoned. There consequently remain 120 Socialist deputies, of whom 48 belong to the Right section, 42 to the Left, and 30 to the Centre.)

Thus, Cesare Alessandri, a friend of Serati, declares that the new group consists of 120 deputies, of whom 48 belong to the Right section, 42 to the Left, and 30 to the Centre. Comrades, you must consider what the term "Right" means for Italy, when employed by Cesare Alessandri. It means simply the same as Scheidemann, Noske.

By "Right" is meant Cesare Alessandri, while the "Left" group includes Ladzari, Maffi and others, who will or will not come here. Ladzari was a decided pacifist during the war, something like Bernstein. On the "Right" there is a Mr. Dugoni.

I received a newspaper yesterday containing a description of a conference at Mantua, where Dugoni had made a report, and had the following resolution passed: "The Conference, having examined the situation created in the Trade Union and Co-operative movement by recent events, protests against any form of violence by whomever and wherever "practised." (Laughter.) Thus, at a trade union congress a friend of Serati's offers a resolution that the Congress protest against any act of violence of whatever origin. Quite a neutral attitude making no distinction between acts of violence coming from the bourgeoisie or from the proletariat:—it is always bad. Such is his view-point.

I should like to give you another quotation where

the same author advocates, as a matter of course, coalition and co-operation with the bourgeoisie.

During the election campaign, Turati himself addressed an appeal to the workers of the chemical industry, which was published in the French paper "La Vie Ouvrier," and reads as follows:—"Do not despair, brethren, do not let yourselves be beaten down or deceived. I swear to you that violence will not bring any gain to those who practice it. When the last roar of the storm will have passed, you will again be the strongest. . . . Do not listen to incitements, do not furnish any pretext for the same. Do not reply to abuses; be good, be patient, be saints. You have been all that for a thousand years; be it a little longer. Be tolerant; be compassionate; be forgiving. The less you meditate vengeance, the more will you be avenged; and those who will let loose on you the infamy of Terror, will tremble before the work of their own hands. The war is still going on to-day, and will not die. It continues to fulfil its repugnant destiny and writhes in its agony. You, peasants of Italy, represent peace and labour, therefore you have enemies; but you shall certainly attain victory. You are the future."

In regard to the above, Comrade Frossard who quotes this manifesto, makes the modest remark: "One sees that they are reformists of the purist type."

One could hardly express the situation in a more moderate way. It was by means of such election manifestoes that the elections were won, and such was the evolution of Serati's Party in 1921. I believe, comrades, that in view of this situation, it will be quite easy for us to pass a unanimous resolution on this question. Serati's Party is beginning to show signs of dissolution. Baratono has come forth with the demand that at least those people should be expelled who violated the discipline more than others. Serati was right there to oppose it. Baratono tried to publish an article on the subject. Serati did not

allow him to do so, but after the elections were over Baratono succeeded in publishing a letter in which he says the following:—"If you, Serati, and your friends, have arrived at the decision that the Party must take a turn to the "Right," you must find a possibility to convene a congress, and to propose to the Party to adopt a different policy." Of course, Serati replied as usual by anecdotes and gossip. He cast suspicion on Baratono, and at last made the definite statement: "Yes, the results of the elections ought to teach us that we must turn the rudder of our Party to the Right. This is no invention of ours or of Turati's—it is a historical necessity. Even Lenin is now inclining to the Right.

That is an argument which you will find also in the notorious magazine of Levi's, "Soviet," where Levi makes the following statement in his last article. "What are the Bolsheviks doing now? They are making concessions to the workers, and to the peasants, because it is necessary to remain in contact with the masses. I, Levi, have proposed the same thing in Germany.... In a country like Russia, where the working class is in power and the workers and peasants constitute the majority, the Party should make concessions to the masses in order to maintain the dictatorship of the proletariat and safeguard the rule of the working class. But, in Germany they usually don't notice that "trifling" difference, that it is not the Dictatorship of the Proletariat but the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie that is holding sway there, so that making concessions of this kind would be quite a different matter. Serati is no child and certainly understands that very well.

Such is the situation in Italy. There is no need to entertain any illusions. It will require time to win over the workers of Italy completely to our side. We must get to work. Serati is nothing to us; but the working masses are everything. Address a passionate appeal to these masses on behalf of the

entire Congress. We must have patience with them. The sooner we expose Serati before the whole world the sooner shall we achieve our aim. (Loud approval)

To my mind the Italian case is of fundamental importance for the whole situation within the International and the general political situation. I have already mentioned that immediately after the close of the Second Congress, there arose a grand movement in Italy which brought about the seizure of the factories by the workers. It was a new form of the proletarian struggle. In some places the workers held out two weeks. The organisation of a Red Army was started. The Confederation of Labour then came, stuck a dagger in the back of the workers and betrayed the movement. Then Serati came and declared in reply to Lenin's open letter that it was not a revolutionary but simply a trade-union movement, and that therefore the "seizure of the factories could not be regarded as a revolutionary upheaval." He claimed that it was more of the nature of a broad and deep trade-union movement which, with a few exceptions, "was proceeding in an entirely peaceful way" This was the traitor act of Serati. It is clear to everybody that this was not a peaceful trade-union movement, but the beginning of a really revolutionary struggle. The Party, under the leadership of Serati, has done all in its power to smash the movement on the rocks and throw the working class helplessly into the clutches of the bourgeoisie, which did not fail to take advantage of the situation. We must never forget this lesson. We must not start an offensive unprepared, but we cannot afford to lose a single chance for a possible offensive. But the opportunity was not used in Italy, and the movement has now been thrown back for years. The working class will have to suffer much more and make greater sacrifices; and this only because the leaders did not stand up on the side of the working class, but hampered the workers in this movement. These treach-

erous leaders became the greatest snare to the movement. This is the lesson that the Italian proletariat learned, and we shall all remember the proverb—"Not all is gold that glitters." Not all is Communist gold which appears as such.

Comrades! We must henceforth be less trustful, because we have had too many examples of treason like that of Serati. We must test every party ten times before we accord it our full confidence. And the true Communist will not object to this. This example shows us that the enemy is on the Right side and not elsewhere. (Approval.) In Italy we had an example where we made an attempt to put our Left friends on the right tracts. I have already quoted Bordiga. He stands at the head of the party in Italy. He disbanded his faction and dropped all personal and factional aims. He is a soldier of the Proletarian Revolution. Such elements we need, and with the Left-wingers we must deal as with friends, naturally, to a certain limit. In the case of the Communist Labour Party of Germany this limit has been overstepped. But the real enemy comes from the Right, not the Left. He is hiding, taking advantage of our weaknesses, and emerging from his hole at the opportune moment to stab us in the back.

Mr. Serati said: "We stand now, 'devant l'église,' outside the gates of the Vatican. We are Christian comrades, we shall wait till the door opens for us to come in." This is nicely said. But in reality he is not standing at the gates of our Communist Temple. He is lying with his nose stuck in the rubbish pile of the bourgeois ideology. (Loud approval and applause.) We have handled the Italian question resolutely. Of course we were fully aware of the responsibility which we assumed and we now confidently expect the decision of the congress upon the question whether we acted rightly when we closed the door before their nose and told them: Here is Communism,

there is Reformism. Whoever is not with us, is against us and with the bourgeoisie (Loud applause).

THE GERMAN QUESTION.

I will now take up the question of the German Party. I can naturally deal only with the more important sections that have really been influenced by our policy. Halle has been our first big success since the Second Congress. The soil had been prepared by the Congress. I believe that by our work at Halle we have shown that we fully understand that the Communist International needs no sects, but big revolutionary parties of the masses. We had tried hard to create a mass-Party in Germany. We believe that we have been successful all along the line. There were two exceedingly burning questions that arose at Halle. Firstly, whether the Spartakusbund should continue its existence as a precautionary measure, as a guarantee or as an auxiliary organisation. This I have opposed on behalf of the Executive. I believe we were right. Here in Russia we have had wide experiences with such organisations. We were of the opinion that such organisations have their inner logic for abstaining from merging whenever there is a danger of the Party becoming diluted. But once a union has been effected, it must be loyally maintained without any separate organisations. I must say that all leading comrades of the Spartakusbund were substantially of the same opinion. This question can, therefore, be quite easily and conveniently disposed of.

The second question was—as to the rate of revolutionary development to be taken by the Party as a basis for its activity. The atmosphere in Germany at the time was such that even people like Lederbour were speaking of a “Communist central execution-chamber.” The bourgeoisie were at one with the Social Democrats and with the Right I.S.P. in the

attempt to provoke the Party and to get it involved, as quickly as possible, into some big struggle, so as to prevent the Party from properly organising itself. I then advised the leading comrades, on behalf of the Executive, not to allow themselves to be drawn into a decisive struggle so quickly. Naturally, we were not such doctrinaires as to ignore the fact that not everything depends upon us alone, but upon the general situation, and upon the position and attitude of the enemy. We were of the opinion that the Party be given the greatest possible length of time for consolidating its ranks. Upon this question there were no differences of opinions between us. It was quite clear that the union of two Parties, let us say of 100,000 and 400,000 respectively, cannot run along smoothly without any friction or retrogression to Centrist or semi-Centrist ailments. Bearing in mind the entire past of the German movement, we saw quite plainly that the danger for this Party could never be so great from the Left as it would be from the Right. (Approval.)

We have seen how the Spartakusbund, even before the unification, had missed such a situation as the Kapp-Putsch. This was evidence of the fact that our Party has not been active enough in that historical movement. The same thing in a larger degree was the case with the Independent Socialist Party. On looking back upon the history of the Party, we saw the danger of disease threatening from this side. At the time of the Second Congress we told the German comrades: "We do not understand why every time when a movement meets with defeat in your country you immediately declare it to have been a putsch." We said: "Don't come along every time with the same word, putsch."

We advise against undue haste, against jumping into battle without adequate preparation. But, on looking back upon the road traversed by the German working class, we cannot say that it has all been

covered with adventures and adventurers. It's quite an easy thing to denounce as a putsch any movement that has not been directly victorious. We in Russia, before victory came, met with dozens of such defeats. Had we all considered them as putsches, we would not have conquered. (Approval.)

At the very founding of this Party we were afraid that Centrist under-currents would appear now and then. And I regret to have to say that our fears have been justified all too quickly. When speaking on the Italian question a while ago, I said it was an international question, having a close bearing upon the German question. The Executive has framed a resolution and taken disciplinary measures against leading German comrades, with our venerable Comrade Zetkin at their head. We have done this with no light heart. We have deliberated twenty times, debating as to the wisdom of this step. We were well aware that such resolutions should be resorted to only in exceptional cases; I have described to you the Italian question, where on this very ground the conflict had arisen.

How did the question stand? Levi was in Livorno with a mandate from his party. He had conspired in Italy, together with Serati, against the Communist International. Everything that occurred in Livorno served to prove this.

After that five or six members withdrew from the Central Committee because they did not agree with the Executive Committee on the Italian question, and declared: "You have made a mistake, you are creating artificial splits, sects, etc." Serati travelled to Berlin, and finds his way also to Stuttgart. He wrote in the "Avanti"—having the item printed in large type—that the German Party was on his side. The young Italian brother Party thus received a blow from behind from the German comrades.

I told the German comrades: "Just imagine that after the split in Halle some of the Russian comrades,

for example Lenin or Trotsky, coming forward and withdrawing from the Central Committee, stating as a reason that they do not agree with the Executive because of its behaviour in Halle." What would you say? It would have been just the same blow from behind as the Italian Party has received. At least everyone would consider it as such. (Cries—"Quite right.")

We said: "One must be blind not to see that Serati has retrogressed towards reformism. I have spoken to-day of the attitude that he has adopted on all important questions, how he was abusing the French and the German Parties, and how he betrayed the Party during the September movement. Thus, it was quite clear that we had here a typical reformist, and our comrades dealt us a blow from behind by withdrawing from the Central Committee. Radek wrote that we would like to know whether anyone would have dared to give up his mandate so easily in the old Social Democratic Party on the ground that he did not agree on some question. Supposing that we had been mistaken in Italy—we were only too much in the right—even in such a case, one should have been more careful. Not a word had been said beforehand to the Executive: it was simply informed of the accomplished fact. That is why we thought there must be something wrong in this. It is not only an Italian question. We are all internationalists; but we know very well that in Germany they would not be so nervous, if the question concerned the Italian Party only: people become anxious only when their own party, or their own movement is involved. The connection is all too evident.

Comrades! Should it prove that Serati had acted shrewdly and that the comrades, who are pretty experienced politicians, have been his victims, that it was nothing but only a misunderstanding, so much the better. But, comrades, there is not much ground for such a supposition.

That is why we had to interfere in this question; and we ask the Congress to tell us frankly whether it was a mistake on our part, so that the Communist International might profit by our mistakes. If it was a mistake on the part of the comrades who had withdrawn from the Committee, let them also openly acknowledge it, so that the Communist International should know it that we might at last begin to feel we are an International party.

The March action will be dealt with in a special report. I will touch upon it rather briefly. When we received the first news of it, Comrades Brass, Geyer, and Kenen were already here. After we got the first information we all felt that something had started at last in Germany; we felt a whiff of fresh air. When we wrote our first appeal after the defeat, Comrades Brass and Geyer concurred with us in the matter. (Radek—"Hear, hear.") We dictated the appeal to Comrade Kurt Geyer. (Cries—Hear, hear.) He acted as stenographer. Not a single amendment had been proposed by them. Why? Because, being revolutionaries, they said to themselves—We had fought a fight which was forced on us, the battle was lost; but we have no right to deal the workers a blow from behind.

They took a practical attitude to the question at the time. This was the reason why we issued our first appeal in which we defended the action. I am saying this quite officially, and trust that both comrades will bear me out on that. You read our theses on tactics; you saw that we do not indulge in official self-eulogy, that we speak of our faults openly and clearly. The Congress is not a mutual admiration society.

Much has been said about the theory of a revolutionary offensive. God save us from a repetition of such unanities. We are quite agreed with what Comrade Brandler said in his pamphlet: "It was no offensive, it was at best a defensive fight." The

enemy had attacked us. You need not make a fuss about offensive. Many mistakes have been made, many organisational weaknesses have been revealed. Our comrades in the Central Committee are not trying to conceal these mistakes, they wish to rectify them.

The question is whether we are to consider these fights as a step forward along the difficult path of the German working class, or merely as a putsch. The Executive is of the opinion that the March action was no putsch. It is ridiculous to speak of a putsch in connection with an action in which half-a-million workers had fought. This was no putsch, it was a fight which was forced on the German working class by the then prevailing circumstances.

We must admit our faults openly and learn by them. We do not conceal anything; we are not carrying on any "conventicle policy," or secret diplomacy. But we are of the opinion that on the whole the German Party need not be ashamed of this struggle—quite the contrary. (Animated approval.)

We must be quite outspoken and declare in plain terms without any diplomacy that there is danger of possible premature movements. When I was listening to Comrade Terracini's report in the Executive Committee, it appeared to me that the Italian Communists were saying to themselves—Now that we are rid of the "Stick-in-the-mud" party, we must strike out. No, we must not jump at conclusions, we must consider matters carefully. For to-day one must be much more circumspect and more careful, and before going into the fray we must prepare thoroughly and weigh matters repeatedly. In this respect Comrade Trotsky was quite right in his criticism concerning the French question. We must not shut our eyes to the danger, and not shrink even from somewhat exaggerating it. We are not afraid of this.

I am coming now to the K.A.P.D. (Communist Labour Party of Germany) question. You are aware

that this question also received an international significance.

At the Second Congress we made concessions to this party. We have also allowed it to put its point of view before this international tribune. But the respective representatives of the party thought it wiser to take their departure in good time. This is what Herr Otto Ruehle had done, who, as you are aware, has already travelled pretty far backwards, and has landed in the counter-revolutionary camp, although he still claims to belong to the Left wing.

In Halle and after Halle we had many conferences with the comrades of the V.K.P.D. (United Communist Party of Germany). Almost every one of them was of the opinion that the K.A.P.D. (Communist Labour Party of Germany) should not be admitted, even as a sympathising party, into the Communist International. The Executive took a different view. I have, in the name of the Executive, informed the comrades in Berlin to that effect. I can assure you that it was very unpleasant to have to act in a purely German question, against the decision of the Party. Nevertheless, comrades, formally as well as morally and politically, it was within the rights of the Executive to take such action when the occasion arose.

We were of the opinion that the K.A.P.D. must be admitted as a sympathising party for the following reasons:—(1) because we thought that nothing must be left undone in order to educate and to win over the truly revolutionary proletarian elements in this party; (2) because we thought that the past record of our German party—whose very passive policy, her great errors (as for instance at the Kapp-Putsch) would serve as a rearing ground for K.A.P.D.; (3) because we thought that it would be easiest to cure through international influence the malady afflicting the K.A.P.D.; (4) because we thought that, in spite of the fact of the smallness of the party, of its being

only a sect, we had to do our utmost to win the best elements among the workers for the International.

We recognised that all these abnormalities within the various parties and groups came as a result of the terrible crises through which the entire international Labour movement had passed during and after the war, and we also recognised that one must have patience with such revolutionary elements. The Executive, by an almost unanimous vote, had decided to receive this party into the Communist International. After a discussion, in which Comrade Gorter represented the view of the K.A.P.D., and Comrade Trotsky that of the Executive, it was decided to admit the K.A.P.D. in a consultative capacity. On behalf of the Executive I made the following concluding remarks: Logically, there are only two ways out of this dilemma. It is impossible to have two affiliating Communist parties in a country for any length of time. The K.A.P.D. will either become, in the course of time, an integral part of the Communist Party of Germany, or it will cease to be a sympathising adherent of the Communist International. Such is the position to-day, and the Congress will have to come to a decision on this dilemma. I am sorry to say that the leaders of this party are playing a relatively more important role than those of other parties. ("Hear, hear.") As far as the leading elements of the party are concerned, we regret to say that they have been retrogressing during the last year. I will prove my statement. I have here a pamphlet, "Dr. Levi's Way, the K.A.P.D.'s Way," published by the K.A.P.D. Although the name of the author is not given, it is quite clear that the pamphlet is by Gorter. The comrades of the K.A.P.D. are certainly performing a bad service to Gorter by printing everything he writes. He would be well advised to leave some of his recent writings in his table drawer, in order not to ruin his previous reputation as a good Marxist.

Now, comrades, listen of how the sympathising

party is treating the International. The third chapter bears the title "What are the pre-requisites for the conquest of the State power by the proletariat, and how is that to be accomplished?" Gorter tells you this in great detail on three whole pages. He has had great experience in the matter of acquiring the State power. He has gained it in Holland. (Laughter).

He says: "To these questions Levi answers on pages 18-42. These are the principal questions of the revolution, the main object of the revolution. They show the stupidity of the author, the stupidity of the V. K. P. D., the stupidity of the Moscow Executive Committee, and the stupidity of the Third International most distinctly." (In Dutch, the word stupidity does not mean, as I was told, the same as in German.) "Because the Executive," continues Gorter, "is committing a crime against the International revolution." Gorter's logic is such: In Russia the peasantry was a revolutionary class. In all the other countries of the world it is a counter-revolutionary class. In Western Europe there is only one revolutionary class—the proletariat. But the only revolutionary class in Western Europe, namely, the proletariat, is as a matter of fact counter-revolutionary.

Such are Gorter's postulates. According to this there is only one revolutionary class, the working class, which is also counter-revolutionary, and therefore . . . , therefore . . . one should not proceed slowly and carefully with those masses and these fools, the Trade Unions, but start a revolution at once; better to-day than to-morrow. That is the logic spiced with wicked abuse, which is presented to the Communist International, to Soviet Russia, and to the most important section of the International.

Comrade Gorter says further:—

"And now we see Levi and with him the V.K.P.D., the Third International, the Executive Committee, all the national parties with one exception. . . ." (Who the exception is remains a riddle.) I do not

know whether it is the "Dutch School" or the K.A.P. I do not know whether Gorter will give up the Dutch Party so easily. I do not think so. Look, for instance, at the "Proletarier" which is published by the K.A.P. with the modest inscription: "The Dutch Marxist School." This booklet contains the entire school. It consists of three articles: "Party and Class" by Gorter; "Marxism and Idealism" (the most burning question of the social revolution!) by Pannekoek; and the "Formation of a Communist Mass Party in France," by Henriette Roland-Holst, about whom I really must say: "I am very much grieved to see her in such company." With her brilliant capabilities she might have done more useful service in the Communist International.

Comrades, jokes aside, with their literary productions, the Communist Labour Party of Germany is gradually developing an enemy of the Communist International. Gorter says in one place: "Levi's spirit is the spirit of the V.K.P.D., the spirit of the Executive Committee, the spirit of the Third International. For, how did they act at Tours, at Halle, at Livorno?"

You see we were wrong in Halle, we have acted wrongly at Tours, when we excluded the French Centrists, and we have also erred in admitting too numerous a party at Livorno.

According to Gorter we should not have allowed such large masses to join us, because, he says—"you want only numbers, not quality." Hence the entire International does not stand for quality, it is Gorter alone who represents quality. Further, he says in his Ciceronian manner: "How long will you carry on a policy of leaders, and not of masses? Are not the examples of Russia, Bavaria, Germany, or even Russia alone, sufficient?" What is that, comrades? Is it not something very much like Dittman? What does that mean? Russia, as an example of a policy of the leaders? Let them tell us clearly where this

was the case. Where are the leaders, where is the policy, where is the proletariat which has fallen in vain? What policy of the leaders is condemned by these people? All this must be expressed clearly.

Gorter says further: "How long will the sham-struggle of the Trade Unions, these sham organisations, be supported and the struggle of the industrial organisations boycotted? How much longer will the new Marxian, scientific tactics be sabotaged?"

Consequently the Trade Unions, which are now really the motive power of the whole revolution, are sham organisations because they do not follow our policy? Noske, Scheidemann, Thomas, Ebert, Horsing are shams; Gorter alone is no sham.

The situation is not such in reality. True, the Trade Unions are arch-reactionary, but if we do not win over their weapons the proletarian revolution cannot be assured. Whoever wishes to teach the working class that the Trade Unions are a sham, is in the best of cases a thoughtless phrasemonger, and not a leader of the working class, striving to hunt down the bourgeoisie?

It says further: "The excuse that the V.K.P.D. had to fail this time because it was not strong enough, is not valid." This is printed in large type. And further on we read: "So long as it will be a mass party, it will never be strong within."

And so, on one hand, the parties must not be mass-parties, and on the other hand the Communist Labour Party is not a mass party, while demanding a policy of the masses. Let anyone understand this who can. I think, comrades, we have had enough for the time being of this pamphlet of the Dutch school. I must say, however, that the question is not so harmless. The comrades are following the example of Serati. I have here a May number of the K.A.Z. (Communist Labour Paper) which would have to manifest international solidarity, and set forth the ideas that unite us. This number contains the fol-

lowing passage: "The lessons of the recent March struggle must be comprehended by Moscow. If that does not happen, if the decision is not taken at last to put the question of the revision of the 21 points in the agenda of the next Congress, we shall have to draw the only conclusions possible."

"To which I must answer: "If you please, we shall raise no objections." (Laughter.)

Then Gorter continues: "We shall then be justified in assuming that the complete lack of comprehension of the problems of the West European revolution and, on the other hand, the considerations of the special interests of the Russian Soviet power are, for the most part to blame for the swamp into which we have been sinking ever deeper and deeper." To that I can only add what I said at Halle to the Right I.S.P. people: "To-day, gentlemen, you are for Soviet Russia, but to-morrow you will be in the enemy camp fighting against Russia." They replied: Never! And to-day they are open and decided enemies of Russia. I say the same to-day to the leaders of the K.A.P.D.; by these tactics, half childish and half criminal, you will grow to be the enemies of the proletarian Republic.

Radek—Gorter is already defending Kronstadt! Zinoviev (continuing)—The same article states: "But the political and organisational breaking away of the Third International from the system of the Russian State policies is the goal which we must try to reach if we desire to do justice to the Western-European Revolution."

This is said somewhat diplomatically, but it is clear. We declared at the Second Congress, and we declare to-day in the name of our Party: We would be most happy if the proletarian revolution would be victorious in Germany or elsewhere, and we could remove the centre of the Communist movement to Berlin.

We are naturally very proud, however, that the workers of the various countries grant us this honour at present. We have tried, and we shall continue our efforts in the future, to consider the problems of international revolution concretely for each separate country, and to study the situation in all countries, and learn from them what they know better than we. This May article proves, however, very distinctly that our comrades of the K.A.P.D. are following the footsteps of Serati, and will land in the arms of Dittman.

I have been informed by telegraph of a resolution adopted by the enlarged Central Committee of the K.A.P.D. on June 5, 1921: "The enlarged Central Committee of the K.A.P.D. declares that the affiliation of the K.A.P.D. to the Third International, either with advisory or full rights, remains dependent on the inviolability of its programme."

A splendid International that. The programme of the K.A.P.D. must be "inviolable." If so, why not the programmes of the French, Italian, and Czecho-Slovakian parties? What sort of childishness is that? There can be no International in which this party or that party is inviolable.

The Central Committee further declares: "In the matter of amalgamation with the V.K.P.D. every ultimatum has been rejected. The delegates are authorised to declare, if necessary, our immediate withdrawal from the Third International."

Comrades, if this should happen, if our comrades of the K.A.P.D. really consider it useful at present to withdraw from the International—I trust that they will consider this very carefully—if they do not recognise the decisions of the Communist International proletariat, if they take as a standard the teachings of the Dutch School, they may do so. I believe that we, this Congress, need not be sorry for these experiences. We have demonstrated to every revolutionary worker of the K.A.P.D. that we meant to be upright and fraternal, that we wished to co-

operate with them, and that we have given them time, and made concessions.

If they now withdraw, they will be withdrawing at the moment when we have a mass party in Germany, which has been tried in the struggle, which has perhaps made great mistakes—we all make mistakes—but we have now a big, experienced revolutionary party in Germany, the party of the revolutionary proletariat, possessing altogether a different moral value in the eyes of the working class. If it should be our misfortune to lose Gorter and his friends, we shall in some way or other survive this loss; we are convinced that the great majority of the workers, who are still in the K.A.P.D., will, sooner or later, realise their mistake and abandon the idea that they are inviolable. They will say: We are all quite “violable,” and the Communist International shall be law to us all. That is all I have to say to the K.A.P.D.

To conclude with Germany, I desire to say the following concerning the “case of Levi.” We have received a letter from Paul Levi, demanding a revision of his expulsion from the German Party. The presidium will submit a resolution on this question to the Congress. As you know, the Executive has confirmed the expulsion. As far as the pamphlet of Levi is dealing with tactical problems, that shall be disposed of under the item of tactics. As for that other question, the talk concerning the Turkestans and all the other nonsense, I believe, and you will no doubt be of the same opinion, that it would be doing too much honour to the pamphlet if I spoke any further about it here. (Applause.) That settles this question.

THE FRENCH PARTY.

I shall now pass on to the other parties, first of all the French Party. Our enlarged Executive has submitted a detailed report on this matter. As a matter of fact, we have treated the French Party differently

from the other parties, for we knew the situation in that country. We were of the opinion that we had to proceed very prudently with respect to this party. We have had to consider that the French Party still contained elements not only of the Longuetists type, but also of the type of Renoudel, and you must give them sufficient time to prepare. We are aware of the weaknesses of this party. Comrades, I beg you to allow me to incorporate the stenographic report of my speech on the French question delivered at the Session of the Executive Committee on June 17 into the minutes of this Congress (see Supplement), and then to proceed to the discussion of the other parties in view of my over-tired condition.

THE CZECHO-SLOVAKIAN PROBLEM.

The Czecho-Slovakian problem is a very important one for us. It, too, was discussed in great detail at the Sessions of the enlarged Executive Committee. I trust that this material as well will be inserted in the minutes (see Supplement). I shall confine myself to a few remarks. We have discussed the Smeral tendency. There is a possibility that he will be here himself, and that we shall be able to discuss the differences of opinion in his presence. The information submitted to us by Comrade Burian and others proves that the Czecho-Slovakian Party is developing into a really revolutionary party. I believe that, as we have pointed out to our Czecho-Slovak comrades in a very comradely spirit the weaknesses in their party, we shall soon have a tried Communist Party in Czecho-Slovakia as well. It is possible that certain reformist elements will find their way into this party as they did into the German Party. The entire combination of circumstances points in that direction. But we are of the opinion that this really proletarian body, carved out of good proletarian timber, will easily overcome, with the aid of the In-

ternational, the opportunist or centrist elements. We have no unified Communist Party of all nationalities there as yet; we must create one. To get a unified, internationally directed and consolidated, well organised party is the desire of the Executive Committee, which I am emphasising here again.

THE SCANDINAVIAN PARTIES.

I desire to say just a few words about the Scandinavian Parties. In Sweden and Norway there are two different parties. Sweden has experienced, to speak generally, a kind of development from a semi-pacifist party to a really Communist Party, but this development is not yet complete. In Norway there is a mass-party which has remained such, but it must still be freed from certain centrist influences. Much can be improved in Sweden in the matter of organisation. I read, for example, in paragraph 2 of the statutes of this party:

"The Riksdag faction as well as other party members, who may receive any official task from the government, must, before executing such a task, obtain the approval of the Central Committee, and, in important matters, of the party council."

I must say that I simply do not quite understand this. Neither do I understand point 3:

"The parliamentary faction must conduct its activities in strict accordance with the party programme and the decisions of the party Congress. Between Congresses the parliamentary faction is obliged to execute the tasks appointed to it by the party council of the Central Committee, and to act in accordance with the views of these bodies."

What tasks will the bourgeois government assign to the Communist deputies? It is a riddle which is entirely incomprehensible to me. It is equally so with regard to the discipline to be imposed on the parliamentary faction. It sounds so modest that in

its general conduct the faction is to be subordinated to the Party Congress, and that between the Congresses the decision of the Central Executive shall be binding upon the Communist deputies. The tone is too timid. In regard to the question of the arming of the proletariat there is in Sweden a great lack of clear understanding. When Branting comes out and says, "Our Communists are good ones, they are nice fellows," I perfectly understand that the enemy is saying such things intentionally, and I don't take it earnestly. But we must judge things much more seriously than does Mr Branting, to whom the Communists have been a source of great trouble. Furthermore, we must state that the party organ, "Politiken," has not as yet displayed the spirit of a truly militant proletarian paper. This paper refrained from taking a clear stand upon the fundamental issues of the Communist International.

With the Norwegian Party we have had some understanding regarding our common tasks. We granted it certain concessions. We are convinced that this situation is only temporary, and the party there will have to organise on the same basis as in all other countries.

ENGLAND AND AMERICA.

Comrades, we have during this year accomplished not only splits but also amalgamations, namely in England and America. At the time of the Second Congress we had in England eight small groups which were fighting each other. Now we have only one unified party, and this is to a considerable extent the result of the pressure brought to bear by the Executive. The same is true of America. We told the Americans that we shall accept none of their factions until they unite. We also advised our American friends that they must not only conduct an illegal

party, but also take upon themselves to organise, despite the white terror, a broad movement, legal or semi-legal, to work parallel with the party and strive to enlist the support of larger masses. It is of vital necessity for the American and English parties not to remain closed sects. The ground in these countries is very favourable, and the parties must learn how to scatter the seeds of our ideas broadcast. We believe that for these two parties our slogan should be: more contact with the masses, more legality. (Lively approval.)

THE OTHER COUNTRIES.

As regards events in other countries, they are as follows: In Denmark a split took place in the Syndicalist Union, and a part has joined the Communist International.

In the Austro-Hungarian Social Democratic Party a split took place, and the Left Wing joined the Communist Party.

A similar development took place in Belgium, where a group broke loose from the Socialist Party. The "Temps" is very much disconcerted by the split. But our Belgian comrades are of the opinion that this is not an important matter. I believe they are mistaken. We think that this split is of great significance. The International is greatly interested in getting this group to join the ranks of Belgian Communist Party as soon as possible.

The same occurred in Switzerland, where the Left broke away from the party and united with the Communists, having lost Nobs. In his argumentation with us Nobs referred to a letter of Clara Zetkin. I think we should keep in mind such an experience and be more careful with our correspondence. I also wrote a letter to Nobs, but he is pointing out my letter as an example of tactlessness (laughter), while comrade Zetkin's letter is being used by him against the Communist International, which is really too bad.

The movement in Switzerland, however, is making splendid progress. It achieved a great deal of success in French Switzerland. The Social Democratic Party is becoming degraded from day to day. M. Grimm, the famous leader of the Swiss Social Democrats, has become a mere caretaker of bourgeois interests and of capitalism. His main occupation now is to clean the closets for the capitalists of Bern (laughter). This founder of the Zimmerwald Party is attending to his business very well. He combines this ennobling occupation with his post as leader of the 2½ International. As a matter of fact these two occupations harmonise fully.

In Spain the same process of unification of the Communist groups took place. Here we had an interesting development. Two delegates of the old party came over here, one a worker and a Communist, and the second a professor and a reformist. The professor naively said to us: "I do not like the Third International, but the Spanish workers who delegated us desire to belong to it, so I must." (Laughter.)

We get such visits quite often. From Roumania a certain gentleman came to us by the name of Fluera, who was formerly a minister in the cabinet. He was extremely astonished when Comrade Bucharin told him in the gentle manner which is so characteristic of him: "Mr Fluera, we know that you were a bourgeois minister, and that you desire to continue in the same capacity. So we must ask you to be so kind and leave this hall." (Laughter.) He was amazed by our lack of international hospitality. For the last half a year we have had a great number of such peculiar visitors.

In Roumania the split has now been completed. We must admit before the Congress that our comrades Christensen and others, who were frequently accused of being centrist, have very loyally fulfilled the obligations they took upon themselves. They

have now been thrown into jail as adherents of the Communist International. We are still too little informed about the situation in Roumania, but we may state that we have achieved good results here.

Our Yugo-Slav Party has now been driven underground. It was a large party with a membership close to 80,000. The centrists there have the meanness to issue a legal paper, and to take advantage of the situation against the Communists. The centrist wing has been excluded, and now belongs to the 2½ International. Whether there has been left a remnant of these centrists in the party I am not in a position to vouch, because the present status of this illegal party is not quite clear to us. Let us hope that such is not the case. But if it be so, we shall use the present opportunity and ask the Yugo-Slav delegation, which is well represented here, to tell whether they are willing to start fighting the centrists to-day or to-morrow. Reformism is a specific poison. Comrade Barbusse has written a brilliant article about reformist-socialism. Barbusse declares that reformism is the specific poison for the working class. If a few drops of this poison gets into our body, an inflammation might break out just at the moment when we are engaged in a hard fight. We must be on our guard against this poison, and always be prepared to administer antidotes, and not in homeopathic doses at that.

Our Bulgarian Party is one of the few parties which, like that of the Czecho-Slovaks, seems to have the support of the majority of the working class in its country. According to the last information, this party may have to become illegal, and suffer a great deal from white terror. We do not know whether this information is correct. An accusation has been made against this party that they have not always taken up the fight en masse at the decisive moment. Investigation has proved this to be untrue. We have followed the history of this party since 1903, during

which time it has experienced a number of splits. We believe, however, that in spite of many deficiencies, the party in Bulgaria is a good, strong Communist Party. When the time comes for this party to pass from propaganda to action, it will have to show what preparations it has made during the last 20-25 years. We hope that when the hour arrives this party will not prove a disappointment to the Communist International.

I should like to say a few words about the Finnish Party. It belongs to the Communist International as an illegal party, but the legal Finnish movement is heart and soul for Communism, in spite of the White terror. According to statistical data, this legal movement has twice as many members as the old Social Democratic Party, which had completely broken down. The plain Finnish workers who come to us always tell us that the question of Communism is no longer a question of propaganda, it is a question of action. (Lively applause.)

Comrades, if I have not mentioned some of the parties it was not because there was nothing to say about them; it was because I must bring my report to a close.

THE NEAR AND FAR EAST.

We now come to our important sections in the Near and Far East. In the Near East the work has been carried on by the Council of Propaganda formed by the Baku Congress. There is still a great deal to be done as regards organisation. We find the same situation in the Far East. It is most essential that we should have better communication with Japan; we must secure a firm foothold in Japan. The situation in this country is about the same as that of Russia on the eve of 1905. There is a strong revolutionary movement of the masses. You ought to see the publications of that country. The first and second volumes of "Capital" have been translated into

Japanese, and have already been published. We have a number of labour unions in Japan that have spontaneously been formed by the workers without the help of leaders. These unions are in sympathy with the Communist International. Unfortunately, communication with Japan is very bad.

WORK AMONG THE YOUTH AND WOMEN.

Comrades, since it is our aim to be a World International, it is the duty of the Executive Committee to devote a great deal more attention and effort than was done heretofore to the following two sections of the International—the Women's International and the Young Communist International. (Cheers.)

The Women's Conference has taken place, and we have taken due note of their work. We have started an International women's journal, "The International Communist Woman." We are of the opinion that the work among the women is necessary, since the proletariat cannot win its victory without their help. We must have the women; without them the Proletarian Republic could not have existed in Russia. (Lively applause.)

Of still greater importance is the Young Communist International. We shall have a Congress of this International in this city. In the course of the past year we have used every effort to support the young Communists. Comrade Trotsky was quite right when he said that the young generation is of more importance to us than we had thought until now, because the working class had sunk to such a low level in consequence of the war.

The work that we have done and the support that we have given to the young Communists must be increased a hundred fold. It is one of the most important questions. We hope that this World Congress will promote the movement among the young people, and will support it by all available means.

Some people have attempted to create a conflict between the Young Communists and the Executive, trying to incite them against the Executive by articles in Levi's paper, "Soviet." But they will never succeed in this.

It is my opinion that the Young Communists must get their political guidance where there is the political leadership of the entire International. If orders are issued by two parallel institutions, in different countries, it goes without saying that these orders are liable to clash and give rise to misunderstandings. That is particularly dangerous with regard to the Young Communist movement. Therefore, I believe that we ought to overcome all difficulties of organisation, and concentrate the general political administration in one place, which may be in Russia to-day, and in Germany or France to-morrow, in accordance with the development of the World Revolution.

In any case, we must give much greater support to the Young Communists than we have done heretofore. They have done splendid work up to now, and have always been in the front ranks in Czecho-Slovakia, France, and other countries where we had to fight against the social patriots and centrists. The task is very important, and there is still a great deal left undone in this respect.

The Young Communists must have all the support that we can give them. (Lively applause.)

THE RED TRADE UNION INTERNATIONAL.

On the initiative of our Executive Committee the Second Congress founded the Red Trade Union International. That was something entirely new at the time; we have now proceeded quite a long way on that path. Comrade Losovsky has collected the data showing that more than 15,000,000 organised workers already belong to our Trade Union Inter-

national. Our first step was the publication of a manifesto against the Amsterdam International, and at this Congress we shall take another long step forward. I believe that the significance of this Trade Union Congress is clear to all of us. Our struggle against the Amsterdam International, this last bulwark of the bourgeoisie, must be fought to a finish. For that reason this is a most important question, and the Congress must devote its keenest attention to it. After the Congress, this question must be dealt with by all affiliated parties as the most important problem of the day.

THE FUTURE TASKS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.

This is our general report. What shall we do now? Along what lines shall we work further? I believe that the lines laid down by the Second Congress are, in general, the right ones. The deviations to the left of some of our comrades during the Second Congress must be straightened out; we need a straight line. The struggle against the Right elements has not by any means come to an end yet. As a matter of fact, it has not yet begun properly, if we consider the fact that the Amsterdam Trade Union International still has twenty million workers in its organisation. The battle against the Right is our main task. The struggle against the trade unions, and against the centrist, is a question of tactics. It was because we had decided upon effective policies that we were able to win such successes in the various countries during the course of the past year. Our policy was right, and by it we shall succeed. The great watchword in those countries, in which we have not yet obtained a majority in this third year of our struggle, must be to fight for the attainment of such a majority and to win over the masses. We had practically no International co-ordination and a com-

mon strategic system up to now. I have been asked by various comrades: "What is International strategy? Is it to wage obstruction in parliament, to hold International demonstrations, to declare a strike on any particular day?" Yes, comrades, that too, even though we have not done so as yet. We have not organised a single International demonstration. We must recognise these weaknesses and confess them frankly. We must begin to organise in that way during the coming year. We must hold International demonstrations, and act in International accord in Parliament. That will include even France. We must begin with these small matters. We must make a breach in one country in order to widen the breach in another country. We have not done that as yet. We were too weak. Our legs were still too feeble. It is our duty to do better in the future.

A few words more concerning centralism. It has been alleged that we were exercising terrible pressure, and centralism. On the contrary, our organisation has been much too loose. Of course we understand very well that many great problems are of such a nature that each party must settle them by itself within the sphere of national conditions. We demanded naively the international settlement of problems which could only be solved nationally. There are, however, problems which allow of the drawing up of international demands. We must make our organisation much more centralised; we must make the ties which bind us more numerous and better than they have been up till now. Much nonsense has been written about the dictates of Moscow. In reality the only reproach one can make against us is that our organisation was not sufficiently binding, not sufficiently centralistic. (Calls: "Quite right.") The bourgeoisie is organised much better than we are. We must at least limp along; we must grasp the fact that it is our duty to build up a United International Party

Comrades, let us have your judgment; we recognise our mistakes ourselves. You must delegate your best men from every country to the new Executive Committee. But you must not simply say: "Oh, we don't need this man at home, so we shall send him to Moscow." In this manner mistakes will increase a hundredfold unless every country sends a leading comrade who can be relied upon. It must be understood that an Executive Committee is not a matter of luxury. It must not be said: We have a sufficiency of good things—a party, trade unions organisations, etc., why then need we have an Executive Committee? That is not the way to look at the question; it must be taken seriously. If you desire to have an efficient International, a capable Executive Committee you must send us your best men. We are being reproached with having made mistakes; we are being told that our connections were very bad. But, comrades, I return the thrust and ask of the parties: "What have you done for an international organisation? Almost nothing. Your criticism is welcome, but exercise self-criticism as well!" We need the best elements, numerous men with sufficient technical assistants for the Executive Committee, and real sacrifices must be made by every party. If so, we shall have an Executive Committee which will be worthy to be called the General Staff of the Proletarian Revolution. For it was only a euphemism when we called ourselves that up to now. We have not yet merited that name. We have only been limping after the party a little, we have indicated the way. In general, however, we have not departed from the lines indicated by the Second Congress, but have executed them in concrete form. Next year it must be different. We must form a real International Executive Committee. When we have such an Executive Committee, when we shall have once more put our policies to the test, when we shall have gone

through the fire of battle and conquered our place in the vanguard of the masses, then, and not till then, will the real international work of the Executive Committee of the Third International commence. Then the Executive Committee will in point of fact represent between Congresses, the highest power in our ranks, its word will be law. There will be no "inviolable" parties, no "inviolable" programmes, but rather a single International organisation, which has been moulded out in the struggle against the bourgeoisie. (Stormy prolonged applause.)



SUPPLEMENTS.

THE CZECHO-SLOVAKIAN PROBLEM.

Zinoviev's Speech at the Session of the Executive Committee on June 14th, 1921.

I have been allotted the task of defending the resolution drawn up by the Small Bureau with regard to the Czecho-Slovakian question, which has been submitted to the Executive Committee. First of all I desire to express our regret that Comrade Smeral is not present. At the congress of his party in Praga he threw down the gauntlet, so to speak, to the Third International. In our opinion it was his duty to appear at this congress and to defend his opinions here. We have therefore, after conferring with the Czech comrades present, decided to send a telegram to Smeral requesting him, if it is at all possible, to come to the congress at Moscow and to defend his attitude here. As yet we have no reply, but we have not given up all hope that Smeral will appear here in person.

To begin with I shall discuss the National question, a problem of great importance in the Czecho-Slovakian case. We must proceed very prudently here. First I want to remark that the "Pravo Lidu" ascribed a very silly statement to the Executive Committee, and to me in particular, to the effect that I did not even recognise the Czecho-Slovakian State. (Laughter.) "Pravo Lidu" made this apocryphal statement. How is it possible that the Executive Committee, or one of its members, should not recognise an actual fact? We shall have no quarrel with the Czecho-Slovakian comrades, if they desire to work within their State, which is the result of the

war, a result of historic development; but we should not like to assert that history has spoken the last word in all these territorial questions. Of course, we are for the national self-determination. We are convinced that all these questions will be finally settled only after Soviet Governments have been instituted everywhere. The boundaries which the Soviet Governments will determine will be the final boundaries. I trust that when Czecho-Slovakia shall have become a Soviet State, the representatives of the Czecho-Slovakian Soviet Government will co-operate with us in a war to the finish against all monarchistic and "democratic" republics. At the very first Congress of the Third International we emphatically declared that the present boundaries of all countries were only very indefinite, merely temporary boundaries which would be revised by history at a very early moment. That has been the standpoint of the Communist International from the very beginning of its existence, and I trust that the Czecho-Slovakian comrades will also recognise this fact. Our Czech comrades must always support the International standpoint on this question. The bourgeois Czecho-Slovakian State is not being ignored by us; but as Internationalists we declare that our Czecho-Slovakian comrades must settle all national questions which are acute at present, and will grow more acute in the future from the viewpoint of proletarian policies. ("Hear, hear.")

Now, as to the Party of the masses. We must undoubtedly give credit to the Czecho-Slovak comrades for the fact that they are entering the Communist International with a party membership of 350,000. This is certainly a great achievement for the Czecho-Slovak comrades. It is quite manifest that in Czecho-Slovakia we have made a big step forward, having inflicted an ignominious defeat upon the Social Democratic Party. This is a great accomplishment not to be overlooked. We are more in favour of mass parties, far more indeed than the gentlemen

who, like Levi, have constantly the argument of mass party upon their lips, but who, as we can easily prove, created nothing but sects. We readily admit that the Czecho-Slovak Party is really a proletarian mass party. This is the starting point and the basis upon which we determine our policy in this question.

There are mass parties, however, which are neither Socialist nor Communist nor revolutionary. Unfortunately such mass parties do exist. We know that in Germany there is still a highly respectable mass party controlled by the Social Democrats. We know that the Labour Party in England is an even greater mass party; we know that in Italy the working class forms a big mass party; but does it suffice? Had there been no counter-revolutionary Social Democratic mass parties, we probably might long since have had the revolution all over the world. ("Hear, hear.") We can easily imagine that there are mass parties which still uphold bourgeois and semi-bourgeois ideology. A considerable part of the masses is still susceptible to Centrist influences. We must clearly see this and take it into consideration. It has long been our wish to have this party as a mass party within the frame-work of the Communist International. We have given to Comrades Muna, Zapotocki and also to Comrade Smeral no cut-and-dried scheme of organisation. On the contrary, we warned them against forming the Communist Party in a hurry. We advised them to bide their time. But we added, once a Communist Party is formed, it must be a real Communist Party. (Applause.) But when the Czecho-Slovak comrades here declare repeatedly that we are going to experience a second Livorno, every time that we speak against Smeral, then I ask what does this mean? Does it mean that they admit the Czecho-Slovak Party to have become a Centrist organisation? (Applause.) Now then, what of Livorno?

Not wishing to anticipate the Livorno debate, I will now touch but briefly upon the Livorno incident.

At Livorno we have seen a split in a mass party of 200,000 members. The majority went to the Centrists, and the minority to the Communists. The only fault on our part had been our placing too much confidence in Serati, and having failed to organise a strong opposition in the Italian Party against Serati. When they declare that if we condemn the opportunism of Smeral — the Czecho-Slovak Party will immediately break up and only a small minority will remain Communist — what does it mean? It means that they have a big mass party wherein only a minority are Communist. Were the case really so tragic, they should be entertaining no illusions. But I do hope that the case is not so tragic. We know that there exists a group within the Czecho-Slovak Party which has fully grasped these facts. For, have we not read the letter that was written from prison by Comrades Muna and Zapotocki? This letter must be very diligently studied by everyone. The letter represents a very interesting document. They say the same thing as we are saying. It is much to be regretted that they did not mention the name of Smeral. I do not know for what reason. But they see things exactly as we do. The fact that nobody dared to protest against their letter, shows that these comrades have a following in the party. It is at least the duty of the Communist International to declare its solidarity with the declarations of these comrades who are still languishing in prison. But we must go even further and speak against Smeral all that we have to say.

We do not wish to tell the comrades: "Make your revolution at once." We are not to be drawn into any such thing. Nor do we say: "You must break loose to-day, to-morrow, or within a month." But we do say that the agitation and propaganda must be revolutionary and not Centrist. As I listened to the speech of Comrade Tausik yesterday I had to say to myself: These are the words of a man of the Two-and-a-half International. He said among other things

the following: "We are surrounded by economically ruined States, therefore make no revolution." Now, what does this mean? Shall we, can we, wait until Capitalism regains all its forces, and then only set out against the flourishing Capitalist States? I also overheard an interjection by Comrade Tausik who interrupted a speaker.

The speaker was pointing out that we, Czechs, should not wait for other States. Comrade Tausik exclaimed: "Then there should be a good movement also in Poland!" Now, I am of the opinion that there ought to be a good movement in Poland, and such a movement does exist there, in spite of the White terror. But Comrade Tausik says about the same thing that is being said by the Second International. The Second International says: "I am ready to strike, but my neighbour must strike at the same time." How do they expect this to happen? Perhaps in such a manner that one fine morning the leaders will meet in common counsel and exactly appoint the date upon which the revolution shall break out everywhere. This would be a splendid thing, to be sure.

But revolutions have a habit of not arriving in such a simple manner that it should be necessary only to agree at some conference, for the revolution to break out by itself. Now, the outbreak of revolution depends upon numerous factors. Indeed, according to such theories one could ask, why should backward Russia make the first start and not capitalist, enslaved America? (Vivid approval). We must do away with these theories of the Second and Two-and-a-half International. In no case would we advise any party to strike the blow right now. No such proposal could ever come from the Executive. Such an important question must naturally be weighed a thousand times before the decision is taken. But we are dealing here with questions of quite a different nature.

Must we allow leaders to get up at a Party conference and simply spit upon the International? (Ap-

proval.) We have here about a thousand delegates; let the comrades seclude themselves by groups in different rooms and read the speech of Smeral with close attention. I am convinced that every one of the comrades would come to the conclusion that the Smeral speech is a semi-Centrist one. In this speech we find the same tone, the same method, the same insincerity as in Serati's speech a year ago. And this speech was delivered at a moment when the Party had already declared its readiness to join the Third International. The Party should have protested immediately against Smeral's speech. Now we have to take determined action against it. The situation at the time was quite different.

The resolution proposed by the Czecho-Slovaks repeats two or three times that they accept the 21 points and will carry them out. Why so many repeated assurances where it would be better to proceed at last to the carrying out of these conditions.

What's the use of the willingness to carry out the 21 conditions when the leaders of the party carry on a press campaign against them? How can they claim to be carrying out the 21 conditions, when Smeral speaks against the formation of the Communist Party, when many of them speak against joining, and against the 21 conditions, when Smeral even now begins to talk of collaboration and cooperation with other Parties, finding the plausible excuse that the party is so big that we could definitely exercise a practical influence upon the present government? He who is familiar with the history of Socialism until the year 1921 knows quite well the significance of these words in the mouth of so shrewd a diplomat as Smeral. What happened during the December strike? Everyone who has come from Czecho-Slovakia will confirm the fact that if there were any that showed childish helplessness in face of the events, it were some of the leaders. The question as to whether we ought to accept the Party, we must

answer: Yes. But what shall be the fate of Smeral?

We do not demand his expulsion, but we claim the right to tell the Czecho-Slovak workers exactly what we have to say, warning them against such speeches and public appearances as those of Smeral. We ought not to forget that Smeral's speech which lasted three hours, was by no means an improvisation. The speech had been carefully prepared beforehand, every word weighed and measured. We call upon the Czecho-Slovak workers to continue progressing and not to slide backwards. The Czecho-Slovak comrades have told us that the bourgeois press would be jubilant over our resolution. I don't know if their jubiliation would be justified. We know that the bourgeois press will attempt to make capital out of this compelled polemic. They will again indulge in foolish talk about the dictatorship of Moscow, or of the Hungarian comrades. I know also, that there are Party members who are susceptible to this kind of insinuation and sophistry. Indeed, our internationalism does not make it incumbent upon us to worry about such foolish prattle. It should therefore in no way whatever, affect our decisions. We must speak sincerely to the Czecho-Slovak workers. We have not a word to say against Smeral personally. When he came to us last year, opening his soul to us, and declaring: "I am a Social Patriot, but I have come here,"—we put no obstacle in his way. We have received him as a brother, we have supported him in the course of a whole year, to the best of our ability. We have no reason whatever to take exception to him personally. He is no doubt a man who wants to serve, unselfishly, the proletarian class. But we must point out his political flaws.

Comrade Kreibich was right when he stated that in our discussion (in the autumn of 1920 in Berlin) with him about Smeral, we took a stand against Smeral. Kreibich tried to dissuade us in a tone of conviction. He was still thinking at the time that it

was merely a matter of paltry differences of opinion regarding Smeral's tactics. Subsequent events, however, caused Kreibich to see things in a different light.

We ask the Czecho-Slovak comrades to cast aside all national considerations in regard to this question. I know we are all human, brought up upon bourgeois ideology, susceptible to the national sentiments imbibed with mother's milk. At any rate, this is by no means a national question, nor a German and Czecho-Slovak question; it is a question of the alternative between thorough-going Communism and vacillating semi-Communism. Why does Smeral just now advance the question of reconstruction and federalisation? How can one now figure the Third International to oneself otherwise than represented by a uniform Party in every country? How can this continue to be a disputed problem within the Communist Party? We must simply establish a Bureau which would carry out the centralisation as quickly as possible without putting it off any longer.

For these reasons, comrades, we must tell the Czecho-Slovak comrades quite plainly what we think about the situation. It was by no mere coincidence that the representatives of the Bulgarian, Italian, German, Russian, and Polish Party have said the same thing. We are following this question with utmost attention. I am convinced that there will be no Livorno here. We may rest assured that the majority, when hearing what the Communist International has spoken, and not only the majority but also those who are now in friendly relations with Smeral, will say: "Smeral is our friend, but the Communist International is our greater friend." I am convinced that the great majority of the workers in Czecho-Slovakia will identify themselves with our decisions, and I hope that this will also be the attitude of the great majority of comrades in other countries. We hand our resolution to the Executive with firm assurance, with complete conviction that these resolutions

will contribute much towards the development of the Czecho-Slovak Labour movement into a real Communist party, into a real militant party. (Stormy, prolonged approval and cheers.)



THE FRENCH QUESTION.

Zinoviev's Speech at the Session of the Executive Committee on June 17th, 1921.

Comrades, I would like to fully explain to the members of the Executive our attitude towards the French Party.

As a matter of fact, the old Executive in its last composition had come to accept this Party, and this decision was made known through a series of notices.

As you know, Serati complained against me and against the Executive, asserting that we, in his opinion, had made exceedingly great concessions to the French Party. As regards the attitude of the Italian Socialist Party, we have a whole collection of documents and resolutions at our disposal. This collection sets out all the alleged reasons why, as a representative of the Executive, I treated the French Party differently from the Italian; why I had signed a special covenant with the French comrades, so to speak. Serati had written a great number of articles wherein he demanded the same treatment for the Italian Party as was given to the French Party.

I deem it my duty to explain here the attitude which we have maintained towards the French comrades, and for what special reasons.

It is true that we had the intention of acting more cautiously and in a more conciliatory manner with regard to the French Party than towards the Italian

Party, which had already joined us, for the simple reason that we thought the situation in the French Party different from that of the Italian Party. At the time when Cachin and Frossard were at Moscow, we had in France a Party that had not yet experienced its first split. The French Scheidemanns — Thomas and Renaudels — were still active. We had to take into consideration that the Communist Group within the French Party was relatively weak and its leaders, without an exception, were all in jail. For this reason we considered that a much milder attitude must be taken towards the French Party as compared with the Italian Party, which was affiliated to the Third International, which had officially participated in the Second Congress, and assumed obligations which it unfortunately fails to fulfil.

The agreement with Renaudel contained one point, namely, that in case Longuet accepts the conditions laid down by the Second Congress, we would recommend to the next Congress to make an exception for Longuet. This was the concession asked from us by Renaudel on behalf of Loriot, to which we agreed. And we have never regretted it. When Longuet delivered his famous speech in Halle, it was clear that Longuet could not agree to the 21 conditions.

The French comrades insisted, however, that it be shown documentarily to the French workers that we were ready to make an exception for Longuet. I believe that in doing so we have acted quite properly, and Serati is altogether wrong when he asserts that he also would have been able to remain in the Party if given a similar right. Anyhow, Longuet did not accept these conditions, and the Party gave him up.

Even after Longuet's declaration that he would not accept the conditions, Frossard implored Longuet not to leave the Party. Those comrades who attended the Congress at Tours will readily recollect that the Executive at the very last moment addressed a telegram to the Congress, taking a very sharp atti-

tude towards Longuet, branding him as a reformist, also as an agent of capitalism, and demanding his expulsion. Frossard tried to explain away this telegram of the Executive regarding Longuet. He said: Well, those Russians are somewhat hasty in using words; it must not be taken so seriously. The telegram was written in a rather sharp language; but Longuet left the party not on account of it. I do not know whether this telegram actually did play a decisive part or not, but it certainly was a contributing factor. Frossard was wrong, of course, in persisting in the attempt to retain Longuet within the Party. After the decisions at Tours, the question arose as to what should be our attitude to the French Party. We were quite aware that the Party was not yet a Communist party, not quite a Communist party.

There have remained in the Party individual elements which are even now either Centrist or semi-Centrist, who assert these traditions everywhere in party, press and parliament. Yet we still remained of the opinion that we must treat this party differently from the Italian, which had already been affiliated to the Communist International for two years. We had a sort of tacit understanding with the French comrades of the Communist group in the French Party to allow a few months for the purpose of re-grouping and organising work. We did not bring the least pressure to bear upon the Party.

Lôriot quoted an article yesterday wherein I am supposed to have said that the French Party had in general acted rightly. This I confirm. It refers to a telegram sent by the Executive to the French Party at its last administrative congress. In this telegram the Executive declares that we still greet the Party and will discuss at the Congress with representatives of the Party, where the question of the changes in the policy of the French Party is concerned.

We must be clear in our judgment of the Party, and we must talk over its organisation. This we

have done yesterday and to-day in our debates on this platform. I believe the Executive acted rightly in maintaining during half a year the greatest foresight and toleration towards the French Party. This however should by no means be taken as a reason for preventing us from saying now what we think proper to say. I am of the opinion that just for the French Party, the so-called "Leftist foibles" are now not quite so dangerous. On considering the present situation in the French Party as a whole, everybody is bound to admit that the danger to the Party is not so much from the Left side, but rather more from the side of the opportunist elements. (Approval.)

The movement among the young people in France is weak. If it commits follies, they must be pointed out. Even if the Party, as a whole, is opportunist, the young people as the vanguard need not be opportunist too. The attitude of the young people can be very useful to the Party from a sanitary standpoint.

I believe that just in the French Party the old traditions brought in by some parliamentary deputies are very dangerous, and must be combatted at all costs. Yesterday and also to-day it was pointed out here that the "Humanité" is not quite a Communist paper. Comrade Kun was already rebuked here to-day, and I do not wish to add in any way to the unpleasantness of his existence. Already his assertion that "Humanité" is worse than the "Freiheit," does not correspond to the reality. The "Freiheit" is a directly counter-revolutionary paper, while the "Humanité" is at most not quite a Communist paper. The "Humanité" is developing forward, the "Freiheit" backwards. Frossard goes forward, slowly, hesitatingly, retreating now and then. The "Humanité" is honestly for Russia; "Freiheit" conducts a disguise...

FROELICH—An open one.

ZINOVIEV—... and dirty propaganda against the only proletarian State. It is doing black-leg work. Yet we must insist on the "Humanité" becoming a

really revolutionary paper, developing upon revolutionary lines. Comrade Trotsky in his speech yesterday gave a striking illustration. There are a score of such questions which the "Humanité" has left out of consideration. By the way, this is being admitted by French comrades themselves, in official reports as well as in private conversation. Lorient to-day gratefully said: "We are well aware that our paper, that our faction, is opportunist. We know that we are still doing many things badly." The Executive believes that the right moment has come now for the Executive to act firmly and say frankly what we expect from the French Party.

Comrade Lenin was right in stating that the French Trade Unions are in good condition, that a decided step forward can be seen in the Trade-Union movement. But when he adds that this is due to the work of the French Party, I must say that Lenin did not study the question well. Even the French comrades make no such claim. Lorient himself has said that the Party does no good work within the unions, pursuing there a rather hazy sort of policy. Should the Syndicalists obtain a majority at the next Congress, they would not know what use to make of their majority, nor would the Party be any wiser in this respect. Yet, we see a decided forward movement in the unions, in spite of the hesitation and haziness of the Party upon this question. (Approval).

The Party has not yet taken a clear course in this question, and it is because of this that the Syndicalists have no clear course. This has also given rise to the present situation, where the Syndicalists are consciously striving to create their own political party.

Here I would like to say a few words in regard to the arguments advanced by Comrade Schwab. He said that the example of France should teach us the lesson that the decisions of the Second Congress in regard to the Trade Union Congress, did not answer the purpose. On the contrary, it is just this French

example which furnishes the best proof of the soundness of our proposition to form nuclei within the Trade Unions. Had we followed the proposals of our comrades of the K.A.P.D., where would we find ourselves now? We would be even further removed from our goal than we are now, and we would have merely added water to the mills of Jouhaux. Our advice was a Communist one. In spite of the hard conditions within the Party, in spite of the unfavourable situation generally, we have a large number of the Trade Unions on our side. Relatively chaotic as the situation in France may be, there is still the hope that the Party will find the way to the Syndicalists and to the Trade Unions. It is the very example of France that shows how the Second Congress acted rightly in enjoining the Party to turn its attention to the Trade Unions.

I maintain that in spite of all the weaknesses, in spite of all the evil habits, which has been brought over from the old Party, we must have confidence in the French Party. France is the very place where during the war no confidence could be entertained in the Labour Party, and you know that also the workers were full of mistrust towards the Party.

But just because there is a Communist group present in Parliament and in the Trade Unions, we may now safely declare without exaggeration that confidence in our banner, and in our ideas, has been fully re-awakened in France. This is clear. We already have a Party of over 100,000 members. A new spirit is reigning in the French Party, although we do not close our eyes to its weaknesses and imperfections. Our greatest enemy is the opportunist tendency. Yet we must admit that we have made a big step forward, that we have regained the confidence of the workers in France.

In the French parliament there is a small and weak, but International Communist faction. The situation is yet far from favourable, but it improves day by day.

Our French comrades say themselves that they admit their mistakes. Let them, therefore, accept from the Executive the advice of the Communist International. The Executive must declare frankly and clearly, by a resolution or by a letter, what it has to say to the Party. There can, of course, be no talk of a proposal to be made by us for the expulsion of Frossard. Such a proposal cannot even be the subject of serious discussion. The development in France is moving forward, while opportunism, our enemy, is still there. We must overcome the enemy. We must tell the French workers what is at stake.

Perhaps there will be some more splits, perhaps the Party, in the course of greater struggles, will not only experience a cleavage, but also pass through a grave crisis. This is borne out by French Communists themselves. Nevertheless, we are determined to support the Party and help it remain a Party of the masses. Events in the French Party have shown that the Second Congress has adopted the right tactics upon this question. A right tactical stand against the follies of the Left, as Comrade Lenin has termed it to-day, and particularly against the opportunist crimes. The line of conduct established by the Second Congress must also be retained here at the Third Congress. (Loud applause.)



CONCLUDING ADDRESS OF COMRADE ZINOVIEV

Delivered at the Ninth Session of the Congress,
June 29th, 1921.

Not being quite well, I will be very brief and confine myself to a few remarks. I can do so the more easily since the discussion, although very extensive, has offered very little criticism of the activity of the Executive, in so far as I could see. You should have

criticised us more than you did. But, as you have not done so, I can afford to be very brief. I have nothing to add on the Italian question after the speeches of comrades Gennari, Rakosi, Lenin, Rakovsky, Trotsky and others. I am fully in accord with them. I note with satisfaction that Comrade Zetkin is now willing to support the attitude of the Executive in the Italian question. With regard to this question I should like to draw the attention of Comrade Zetkin to the following quotation that appeared in the June issue (No. 3, p. 84) of the "Soviet," published by Paul Levi, with the collaboration of a number of comrades: "The results of the election signify the defeat of the Italian Communist Party and the overwhelming victory of the Italian Socialist Party:—121 mandates for the Italian Socialist Party, 16 mandates for the Communists. Such defeat cannot be described otherwise than as a catastrophe. And this is not only the defeat of the Italian Communist Party but also of the Executive of the Third International and the V.K.P.D. as well."

As you see, there are altogether too many defeats in this little quotation, and yet—(Interjection—"The article is by Kurt Geyer!"). Yes, by Kurt Geyer, who claims to be in the Communist International, who left the Central Committee of the V.K.P.D. together with this group. I hope that Comrade Zetkin will succeed in convincing Kurt Geyer that he was wrong.

When a young Communist Party, surrounded by enemies, obtains 400,000 votes and 16 mandates, this is by no means a defeat. Still less can it be considered as a defeat for the Communist International, even as it is no defeat for the International when Scheidemann can still obtain millions of votes after the murder of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg.

Such assertions are clearly intended as a cowardly thrust in the back of the Italian Communist Party. It is also obvious that after this Congress there can be no question of tolerating things of this kind. Of

course I cannot anticipate the attitude of the new Executive to such questions. I do think, however, that after the Congress has registered—unanimously, I hope—its decision concerning the Italian question, no member of the Communist International will come out with such articles. (Approval.)

Comrades, I believe that in the Italian question, more than in all other questions, the Executive has the unanimous support of the Third World Congress. This we state with satisfaction. As has been said, the Italian question has been the most important political question of the year. It has been shown that in respect to this question, the point of view of Comrade Zetkin was wrong, while that of the Executive was right. I must emphasise this because Comrade Zetkin in her speech insisted that she was justified in leaving the Central Committee because of the Italian question. You will recollect that Comrade Zetkin said that the representative of the Executive, Comrade Rakosi, had made this and that declaration about Livorno, that he had said that Livorno was an example, that other parties should follow; that she, Comrade Zetkin, was unable to reply to this statement but that she was bound to sound the alarm, which she did by quitting the Central Committee of the V.K.P.D. I think such standpoint is entirely untenable. In the first place, there are many means of sounding the alarm, without the necessity of leaving the Central Committee. Comrade Zetkin did not write a single letter to the Executive, although she was a member of the Executive. I believe she was in Moscow much later than Rakosi; she took part in all the discussions of the Executive, but never manifested any great divergence of opinion so far as principles were concerned. She knew quite well that we were not in favour of sectarianism; it was upon her urging that I went to Halle. When I came back from Halle, if I am not mistaken, Comrade Zetkin was still stay-

ing here. She was perfectly aware that the Executive favoured not sects, but mass organisations.

Even if Comrade Rakosi did really say the words ascribed to him, Comrade Zetkin is in the wrong just the same, because she left the Central Committee together with a whole group, causing thereby a serious crisis in the Party. And that is why we maintain that the Executive was right when it rebuked this step, particularly because it has since been demonstrated that we acted quite correctly in the Italian question. I do not know what Rakosi may have said, but I would like to quote a passage from Lenin's speech of yesterday: "58,000 Communist workers in so small a country as Italy are not at all negligible. They represent the first step towards the formation of a mass organisation." Now, this passage could be taken out of its context and made the basis for an assertion that Lenin is also in favour of sectarianism. On this point, Comrade Zetkin is totally wrong, and I believe she cannot help but acknowledge her mistake.

On the question of the K.A.P.D. I have the following remark to make: The comrades of the K.A.P.D. assert that it has been no easy matter for them to decide whether or not they should leave the Third International. This we quite believe, for we too have found it no easy matter to decide this question. We think that the K.A.P.D., just like any other party, should adapt itself to international discipline.

This is the only thing that matters. The comrades say: You must tolerate opposition. But they behave as if they do not want any opposition from the International. They would like to impose their views on the Third International. This can be the only meaning of the phrase—that their programme must remain "inviolable"; that means "do whatever you wish, pass any resolutions that you like, we will laugh at your decisions." Such a situation is impossible in the long run. We have shown a fair

amount of patience in this matter; we would like the comrades to continue to attend the Congress, and we feel that the Party should be given at least two or three months before deciding, so that all the workers in the K.A.P.D. can consider the question. We consider it to be our absolute duty, in the name of the International, to allow the workers of the K.A.P.D. to make the decision themselves.

I must reply to Comrade Marcovich who protested pretty sharply against my report. He is of the opinion that I am wrong in thinking that certain Centrist elements are still to be found in the Yugo-Slavian Party, and he has begged us to remember the past of this Party. The glorious past of this party, and the glorious past of many martyred leaders of this party, is well known to us, and we have never doubted it.

I must explain what has lead to my point of view on the subject. I had an interview with the Yugo-Slavian delegation when it first arrived here. There were about fifteen comrades present, and after our interview it became clear that Comrade Marcovich, who appears to be the chairman of the delegation, does not share our point of view concerning the Italian and the German questions; on the contrary, he even opposes it. Comrade Marcovich said in his speech before the Congress that according to his present conviction, the March action meant a step forward. At our first interview he shared Levi's point point of view. I am very glad that Marcovich himself has taken a "step forward" in respect to this question.

If what I have just stated appears incomprehensible to certain comrades, this should be ascribed to the fact that Comrade Marcovich entertained grave doubts concerning both these important questions, the Italian as well as the German, and he made no secret of his difficulty. Undoubtedly he is quite justified in defending his own opinion, but it was also my very good right to state my fear that in this Party

there are still serious misconceptions, and a great lack of clarity, concerning these decisive questions. If this is not the case, then I can only congratulate the Yugo-Slavian Party, which I have always looked upon as one of the oldest proletarian parties, and which I hope will continue to fight in the foremost ranks of the International.

I cannot refrain from saying a few words concerning one point in Comrade Zetkin's speech, namely—the question of our representatives abroad. She was of the opinion that we have not always been lucky in our choice of them, or, indeed, that we have always been unlucky. It was she who coined the expression: "irresponsible representatives."

Comrades, since the friends whom we sent abroad to the different parties have been abused and decried,—designated by Levi as "Turkestaneese"; by Serati as "grey cardinals"; Turati also paid them a few compliments,—I consider it my duty to explain in the name of the Executive that, naturally, we have no infallible representatives at our disposal, just as we, poor sinners, are not quite infallible ourselves. We, as well as our representatives, have all been guilty of blunders and mistakes. But there is no ground to speak of irresponsible representatives, or to use a parliamentary expression, I mean—one ought not to do so. The comrades whom we had sent to the different countries, did all that they could for the Party: they risked all kinds of dangers, and they naturally have acted only according to their conscience as revolutionists. We did not receive a single official protest from any party or group or individual, not even from Comrade Zetkin herself. It is easy to come after the defeat and say: You have acted in an irresponsible way. It is easy to play wiseacres after the event. Naturally the Executive bears the responsibility for the representatives that it sends abroad. It is responsible for them just like the International is responsible for the Executive. We ask all parties

to kindly see to it that the future Executive should have a better staff of workers at its disposal. Perhaps then the representatives in the different countries, as well as the management and the political leadership will be better than they have been up to now. But we protest against the use of such indiscriminate expressions under the existing conditions—as has been resorted to by Levi—which are really irresponsible. Under such conditions old experienced revolutionists, who may have made mistakes as we are all liable to make, but who have frequently proved themselves as willing to make sacrifices for the proletariat, must be spared such expressions.

Comrades, I have finished with my remarks. I must only once more expressly declare with regard to the incident with the French comrades that the March action must be discussed minutely in the deliberations on the question of tactics. In the German question, on which you are to express your attitude now, there were three important moments: First, Halle, the split of the U.S.P. (Ind. Soc. Party), and the amalgamation of the Communist Party. The second important moment, Levi's expulsion. The third important moment, the March action and the consequent political confusion. The third moment, the March action will in its essentials be discussed when the question on tactics is taken up. The second moment, the split and consolidation of the party, Levi's resignation and his exclusion by us, also the censure of the Zetkin group are to be put to the vote. I think that we have shown that everything was done not to render the conflicts more acute. We are of the opinion that the comrades of the German opposition should not talk so much of the past, but should rather think more of the future. In our capacity of Executive Committee we have done everything in our power to give the comrades, who had no mandate with a decisive vote, the opportunity to defend their points of view before the congress of which they

have already availed themselves and are still going to do so. But we urgently beg the comrades to understand one thing, which must also be understood by the comrade of the K.A.P.D.; they must tell themselves, Levi may have been their friend, but the Communist International and the proletarian revolution ought to be greater friends for them. (Animated approval.) Therefore, comrades, we are convinced that the German Party will return home strengthened after this Congress, that it will shake off the people who have violated its discipline, who have attacked it from behind, as Levi has done, and that we shall all learn by the mistakes of the struggle in Germany, in which probably the first issues of the revolution are to be solved. We hope that we will have a single revolutionary party in Germany, which will march shoulder to shoulder with the Communist International, and which will accept all that will be decided here as a law to be obeyed. (Animated approval and applause.)



RESOLUTION ON THE REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.

The Congress having favourably considered the report of the Executive Committee hereby sets forth that the policy and activities of the Executive during the past year have been carried out in accordance with the resolutions of the Second Congress. The Congress approves in particular of the application of the 21 conditions in the different countries, laid down by the Second Congress, and sanctions the work of the Executive with regard to the formation of large Communist mass-parties and the relentless struggle against the opportunist tendencies which manifested themselves in various parties.

1. In Italy the attitude of leaders around Serati immediately after the Second World Congress showed that he did not take the resolutions of the World Congress and the Communist International seriously. The role played by these leaders during the September struggle, its conduct in Livorno, and still more its policy since that time, have clearly proved that Serati and his colleagues only wish to use Communism as a shield for their opportunist policy. The split was inevitable under such conditions. The Congress declares that the Executive has acted with firmness and determination in this very important situation. It sanctions the resolution of the Executive Committee which at the time recognised the Communist Party of Italy to be the only Communist section of that country.

The Communists having left the Livorno Congress, the latter adopted the following resolution by Bentivoglio:

"The Congress reaffirming its adherence to the Third International hereby refers the entire conflict to the coming Congress, and pledges itself in advance to abide by and execute its resolution."

The Third Congress of the Communist International declares that this decision of the Serati group has been forced upon them by the revolutionary workers. The Congress trusts that these same revolutionary elements of the working class are going to see to it that the decisions of the Third World Congress be actually carried out.

In reply to the appeal of the Livorno Congress the Third World Congress hereby ultimately declares as follows:

"The Socialist Party of Italy cannot remain within the ranks of the Communist International so long as the participants of the reformists-conference at Reggio-Emilia and their supporters have not been expelled from the party.

After this ultimative pledge will have been fulfilled the Executive is to take the necessary steps to bring about a union between the Socialist Party in Italy, after the latter will have purified itself from all reformist and centrist elements, and the Communist Party of Italy, and combine both organisations into a unified section of the Communist International.

2. In Germany the party conference of the U.S.P.U. in Halle was the consequence of the resolutions of the Second World Congress, which in their turn were based on the development of the labour movement. The work of the Executive was directed towards the formation of a strong Communist Party in Germany, and experience has proved that this policy was a correct one. The Congress also completely approves of the attitude of the Executive towards the events within the V.K.P.D.

It expresses the hope that the policy applied today in enforcing the fundamental principles of international revolutionary discipline will also be followed by the Executive Committee in the future.

3. The acceptance of the K.A.P.D. as a sympathising party of the Communist International had for its aim to put the K.A.P.D. on trial and ascertain if it would adopt itself to the requirements of the Communist International.

This period of trial should suffice, and the K.A.P.D. should be required to join the V.K.P.D. within a set period; otherwise the K.A.P.D. is to be excluded from the Communist International as a sympathising party.

The Congress approves of the manner in which the Executive applied the 21 conditions to the French Party. By its actions it has succeeded in getting the labouring masses, which are tending towards Communism, away from the Longuet opportunists and centrists, and to promote their development. The

Congress trusts that the Executive will do its utmost for the furtherance of an active and class-conscious Communist Party.

4. In Czecho-Slovakia the Executive has followed up with great patience and tact the revolutionary development of a proletariat, which has already given proof of its determination and readiness to take a share in the revolutionary struggle. The Congress approves of the decision of the Executive to accept the Czech Communist Party as a member of the Communist International. The Congress trusts that the Executive will insist that the 21 conditions be unswervingly carried out by the Czech Communist Party, and that a united Communist Party be formed comprising all the nationalities of Czecho-Slovakia with a purely Communist programme under firm Communist leadership and on a centralised basis, and also that the trade unions of that country will be speedily and decisively won over and united internationally in the great proletarian movement.

Finally, the Congress repudiates the objections which have been raised by the open and disguised adversaries of Communism against vigorous international centralisation of the Communist movement. It expresses its deep conviction that all the parties will send their best forces to the Executive, and thereby bring about a still more militant political central leadership, which is necessary for the indissoluble union of the affiliated Communist Parties. The lack of such a leadership made itself felt, for instance, in the unemployment and reparation questions in which the Executive did not act promptly and effectively. The Congress trusts that, with the increased co-operation of the affiliated parties in the organisation of a more efficient apparatus and with the intensified collaboration of the parties in the Executive, the latter will be enabled to fulfil its ever-

increasing tasks on a still larger scale than it has done hitherto.

For the delegations:

(Signed) Communist Party of Italy, Terracini.

Communist Party of Bulgaria, Kolaroff.

Communist Party of Germany, Thalheimer, Frolich.

Communist Party of Norway, Schafts.

Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia
(German Section), Kreibich.

Communist Party of Hungary, Szanto.

Communist Party of Austria, Frey.

Communist Party of Switzerland, Rosa
Grimm.

Communist Party of Rumania,
A. Badulescu.

Communist Party of Poland,
A. Michalek.

For the International of Youth, Willy
Munzenberg.



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