


~~TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S  
TRIP TO CHINA

OCTOBER 1975

Memos & Reports  
ORIGINALS

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~



SECRETARY KISSINGER'S VISIT TO CHINA

October 19 - 23, 1975

I. Memoranda

- A. Memo to President (Oct. 24):  
Possible approaches to your China trip
- B. Memo to President (Oct. 25):  
Analysis/Highlights of HAK's meeting with  
Chairman Mao, Oct. 21, 1975

II. Memcons

Sunday, October 19, 1975

Subjects

- C. Teng Hsiao-p'ing/HAK and party  
7:08 - 7:25 p.m.
- D. Exchange of Toasts
- E. Report to President

Welcoming before  
Banquet

Monday, October 20, 1975


- F. Teng Hsiao-p'ing/HAK  
10:00 - 11:40 a.m.
- G. Teng Hsiao-p'ing/HAK  
4:15 - 6:35 p.m.
- H. Report to President

**President's trip:**  
international situation  
US-Soviet relations.  
Global strategy;  
the 1930's

Tuesday, October 21, 1975

- I. Teng Hsiao-p'ing/HAK  
5:07 - 6:00 p.m.
- J. Mao Tse tung/HAK  
6:30 - 8:10 p.m.
- K. Report to President

Southern Flank of  
Europe




Wednesday, October 22, 1975

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| L. Lin P'ing/Habib<br>10:12 a.m. - 12:12 p.m. | Claims/assets; exchanges   |
| M. Teng Hsiao-p'ing/HAK<br>3:40 - 4:45 p.m.   | President's visit and<br>Communique: bilateral<br>relations: Indochina |
| N. Exchange of Toasts                         | MIA; Korea: South Asia   |

Thursday, October 23, 1975

- |   |            |
|---|------------|
| O. Ch'iao Kuan-hua/HAK<br>12:35 - 2:30 a.m. | Communique |
| P. Reports to President                     |            |





3

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

10/24/75

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Henry A. Kissinger *AK*

Subject: Possible Approaches to Your China Trip

As I have indicated in my reports to you, I believe that our relationship with China has cooled. Certainly Peking wishes to sustain our relations: a pronounced souring or break would expose the Chinese even further to Moscow; we remain their only real option as a counterweight. Accordingly, the Chinese will maintain our connection at about present levels. But they will not be willing to show much progress in bilateral relations or cooperation on international issues; and they will stress our differences and keep up their ideological criticism of us in the public domain. They are ready, in short, to continue their recent phase of correctness, without warmth or much vitality.

This Chinese attitude has been the general pattern of recent months. In hindsight its origins can probably be traced back to the end of 1973 when several factors coincided: the initial impact of Watergate and the first instances of Congressional hobbling of Executive authority in foreign affairs; the beginning of the fading of the authority of Chou-en lai, the chief architect of the American opening; and our goofs in sending a high-level Ambassador to Taiwan and opening up two new Chinese Nationalist consulates in the US shortly after my November trip to Peking and its positive communique, including a reasonable Chinese formulation on Taiwan.

Since then by far the key factor has been the Chinese perception of the erosion of our domestic foundation and loss of clout on the world scene. Furthermore, during my visit last year, I foreshadowed for the first time

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
E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.5

STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES

BY *lh* NARA DATE *11/2/03*

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

XGDS-3



the unlikelihood of major progress on the Taiwan issue before 1977 unless China explicitly renounced the use of force. Since then detente has run into trouble, reducing our leverage with Peking -- our best period in Chinese relations, 1971-3, was also our most active phase with the Soviet Union. We suffered a major setback in Indochina, which however ideologically pleasing to Peking, pointed up our domestic vulnerabilities and was a geopolitical reversal for the Chinese. In Europe the Chinese see the unravelling of the Southern flank of NATO and the lulling of the continent generally by what they call the "European Insecurity Conference." And the Congressional investigations and pre-election politicking have picked up steam. Finally, there has been intensive pre-succession jockeying in China itself, and their domestic politics has probably made them more musclebound in their decision-making, and perhaps includes criticism of policy toward America.

These cumulative factors over the past two years now add up to China's taking us less seriously as a world power that is capable of resisting a Soviet Union that continues to increase its military strength and expand its political influence. This changed attitude was clearly reflected in the scenario of my visit to China this time:

- Their Foreign Minister slammed us hard in the United Nations on the eve of my trip. They also needled us on the issues of Tibet and Puerto Rico.
- At the first night's banquet in Peking, their Foreign Minister publicly criticized our detente policy, knowing full well that this was bound to get major attention.
- The conversations with Vice Premier Teng were on the whole desultory, with their showing little interest in our perception of the world




scene, except for the Soviet Union and Europe where they said we were following the policies of Munich and Dunkirk.

- Chairman Mao reinforced these themes in our conversation, clearly questioning our reliability as a serious power.
- For the first time they declined to hear some special briefings, perhaps partly because of their fear of leaks in the US, but also presumably to keep their distance.
- The contentious nature of both the content of their draft communique for your visit and their procedure was their most disdainful performance so far in our relationship. On substance they indicated that they want to highlight our differences and show little advance in our relations. And they waited until just a few hours before my departure before tabling their draft--when they had known for several weeks that we wanted to reach essential agreement on the outcome of your visit during my trip; their response was a complete rejection of our approach; and they did not give us any warning at all of the chasm during three days of talks during meetings, banquets, and sightseeing.

All of this is annoying, even somewhat disturbing. It is not a major crisis, however, and should be kept in perspective. They have no real strategic options at this time to continuing our relationship. They clearly are eager to have you visit China. The forces that brought us together remain basically at work. They still treat Moscow as the principal enemy and will maintain some restraint in their posture toward us. And for all our domestic problems, they know full well that we remain the strongest power in the world and are not to be trifled with.

#### The General Prospects

Against this background let me explore the outlook for your own trip and how I believe we should now proceed. You have my telegraphed account of our final evening in Peking and the exchanges we had on the unacceptable





Chinese draft communique. On the way to the airport Thursday morning, the Foreign Minister indicated they would make an effort to meet our concerns when they get our new draft next week, though he reiterated they must have their three principles on Taiwan and the section on concrete bilateral relations would remain truncated. He said their first preference is no communique, and he doesn't understand why we think we need one. The political symbolism of your visit is the central factor in their view. He also suggested the promising possibility of a joint press statement in place of a communique. This could be a less contentious and more positive document describing the talks--instead of a formal document between two countries which would oblige them to state their principled views. I left it that we would be in touch with them early in the week through Ambassador Bush.

I made certain during my visit that you would receive a courteous and appropriate welcome. It is not in the Chinese interest to embarrass you in terms of hospitality or decorum. At the same time, it is now very clear, as we suspected all along, that there will be little drama and minimum results. We will not gain Chinese acceptance of a positive communique showing significant movement in our relations. No matter what course we pursue, we can expect domestic and international carping over the worth of a second Presidential visit to China that produces meager concrete results--notwithstanding the fact that we believe that your trip is justified by the symbolism of an ongoing relationship; the chance to exchange authoritative views on the international situation; the Soviet factor; the opportunity to size up the post-Mao, post-Chou leadership of the world's most populous nation; and whatever modest outcome we can achieve.

#### Options

We now have the following options:

- (1) Push for the most positive communique we can get.
- (2) Settle for a very brief, bland communique or none at all.



(3) Work toward a relatively brief but more upbeat joint press statement.

(4) Cancel your trip.

In considering our course of action we need to keep in mind the Chinese view of us; the Soviet reaction; our general international posture; and the American domestic reaction.

Let me briefly discuss each of the options in turn.

Positive Communique. This has been our objective. The weightier the results of the trip, of course, the more solid our bilateral relationship looks to the world, and the Soviet Union in particular, and the more justifiable your travels look to the domestic audience. We have emphasized that signs of a vital connection with Peking are required to maintain public support for our China policy and thus any help to Peking in case of Soviet pressures. On the other hand, it is now amply clear that the Chinese will continue to keep our relationship at the present level -- alive enough to suit their geopolitical purposes but without significant progress so long as we are not able to complete normalization. More fundamentally, because of our domestic weaknesses they take us less seriously as a world power, and they see our relations with Moscow as being in trouble, which reduces our leverage. Either they do not understand our need to show continued momentum, or they find it impossible to move for ideological and domestic political reasons. And they insist on underlining our differences as well as areas of common agreement.

These factors mean that we cannot expect to work out a positive communique. We went for the maximum document in our draft, and the unacceptable Chinese response demonstrates their clashing view. With maximum effort we may be able to eliminate some of the negative aspects of their version and add a few positive elements. But the starting point is so bleak and the Chinese position so firm that the very best we could come out with is a carbon copy of the Shanghai Communique and that after major bargaining right down to the wire. Even this outcome would be criticized as a stalling out of our relations after three years, and the value of your journey would be questioned.



Brief Communique or None at All. This approach would recognize the impossibility of a positive outcome and forego the arduous task of battling with the Chinese over drafts to little avail. It would state neither agreements nor disagreements but simply use adjectives to describe the conversations. We would clearly indicate in advance of your visit that the emphasis will be on your private discussions with the new leadership in Peking and major movement was neither necessary nor to be expected at this stage of our relations. This would fit the Chinese mood. And it would look more honest to our various audiences, including the domestic one, than a lengthy replay of three years ago.

On the other hand, it would be very difficult to explain a second President's going all the way to China, holding several days of discussions, and then having nothing to announce in terms of mutual agreement. Foreign and domestic audiences would probably interpret this as signifying a stagnated relationship and question the purpose of your trip. The Soviets might take heart that we were going nowhere in our Chinese opening.

Joint Press Statement. As I said, Chiao floated this concept as allowing the Chinese to be more flexible in their presentations. The document would be informal and descriptive, rather than a formal taking of positions which would inevitably involve a more extensive cataloging of differences. Its overall character would be blander - but also more positive - than a communique. Another advantage would be that, unlike a communique, it would not be comparable to the Shanghai document and thus less susceptible to comparisons. It would thus be more extensive than a brief communique (or none at all) without many of the headaches of a lengthy communique.

The drawbacks would be the inevitable carping over lack of results. By definition there would be no specific agreements, only a narrative of the discussions with a positive sense of direction. It would probably be brief. Various audiences, including Moscow, would take it as a sign that our relationship with Peking was not progressing rapidly but they would not conclude that it was in bad shape.

Cancel the Trip. This is an option that should also be considered. Clearly little concrete can be expected to




result from your journey. The sharper public rhetoric of the Chinese recently; their refusal to be visibly identified with us; the Middle Kingdom psychology of getting a second President to come to China even though he knew little would be achieved; and the disdainful way that they treated us and the communique process during my visit-- all these suggest postponement of your trip should at least be considered. Your various audiences at home and abroad, including the Soviets might well consider your cancellation an act of strength. The Chinese might secretly respect such a move. You would explain that our relations with Peking are proceeding satisfactorily, but based on our exploratory contacts you decided that a summit meeting was not really required or justified at this juncture. You look forward to going when conditions were more ripe, and meanwhile we would sustain our relationship through established channels. It could be argued that this course would invite no more criticism of failure than a trip that seemed purely cosmetic, or even highlighted our divergences.

On the other hand, a cancellation of your trip--after all the firm expectations for a full year-- would be a major event, no matter how low-keyed we tried to treat it. It would be seen probably as a major crisis in our relationship--either on general grounds or because of specific issues like detente or Taiwan. Coupled with the postponement of the Brezhnev summit, many would trumpet a general failure of our foreign policy, particularly in East-West relations. The Russians would certainly be pleased--though they might well be impressed with your sang-froid and would probably not attempt to exploit the event in strategic fashion. Finally it might well kill off the China opening. No matter how annoying some of the Chinese practices, they have made it amply clear that they look forward to your visit, and your cancellation would be a significant rebuff.

### Conclusions

I look forward to discussing these issues with you. As of now, I lean strongly toward the following procedure:

-- Reduce your China trip effectively to three-plus working days in Peking only. You would arrive on Monday afternoon, December 1 and leave Friday morning,



December 5. It would be billed as a business-like exchange of views in the capital, with limited sight-seeing and no visits to other cities.

--Work for a joint press statement which would eliminate most contentious language and be moderately upbeat.

--Proceed to the Philippines and Indonesia for a day each and return to the U.S. on Monday, December 8.

This course has the following advantages:

--It would indicate that our relationship with the PRC is being sustained and marginally advanced because of our mutual interests, though our respective differences prevent a major breakthrough.

--The stop in China could be seen as a working session with the new leader of a quarter of humanity without an extended sojourn, side trips or frills.

--The reduction of the China trip and the adding of two other countries would be an appropriate riposte to the general Chinese attitude and communique ploy. It would place them into a general Asian context rather than have the President travel all the way to Peking for meetings he knew would be marginal.

--We would strengthen our relations with the two key countries in Southeast Asia.

--Your trip (which would still only last one week), would become an Asian, rather than merely a Communist China, journey and would thus have a weightier and more balanced nature.

I recommend we proceed as follows. Ambassador Bush would present a draft of a joint press statement along the lines of Tab A. (For reference the Chinese draft communique is at Tab B.) He would be instructed to tell the Chinese the following:

- (1) After reflecting on the exchanges during my trip and studying their communique, we decided that

it would be impossible to work out an acceptable communique; in order to agree to some of their language spelling out our differences we would need a great deal of positive content elsewhere in the document--which they have made clear they are not prepared to accept. Therefore, per my conversation with the Foreign Minister on the way to the airport, we have decided that a joint press statement is the best outcome; being less formal, it would not require explicit and divisive taking of positions. Our draft picks up the positive aspects of their draft communique in verbatim fashion and expresses other sections (e.g. Taiwan) in as objective a manner as we can. Frankly we consider their positive elements inadequate, but we can live with them in a press statement that drops their contentious language.

(2) We believe it makes sense to make a working visit, keeping in mind the Chinese view that the trip itself is the significant political factor. Therefore you plan to arrive on Monday afternoon in Peking, leave Friday morning, and visit no other Chinese cities.

(3) You are reconsidering the possibility of visiting a couple of friendly Asian capitals after China; otherwise your travels would have an unbalanced coloration.

(4) We wish to announce the dates for the trip on Monday, November 3, so we need their response very quickly.

(5) Our advance team would proceed to Peking a week or so later.



Analysis of  
Mao meeting



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

(Low memo)  
HAK handed  
to President  
10/25/75

Analysis/Highlights of Secretary Kissinger's  
Meeting with Chairman Mao, October 21, 1975

The Main Themes

This meeting was on the whole disturbing, signifying a cooling of our relationship linked to the Chinese perception of the US as a fading strategic power in the face of Soviet advance. Though the session was cordial, it was considerably less so than previous encounters. In November 1973 the conversation was described by the Chinese as "friendly," "wide-ranging," and "far-sighted." This time the third adjective was omitted. We both still have a "common opponent" but whereas before there was a feeling of working in parallel to counter this threat, this time the message was that the US could not be counted upon to resist pressures and therefore China was going to have to go it alone.

To sum up the major theme in one sentence: The US is "not reliable," Europe is "soft," Japan seeks "hegemony," and therefore China will dig tunnels, store millet and oppose the Soviet Union on its own, even as a naive and appeasing world curses the Chinese as "warlords" for sounding the alarm.

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E.O. 12068, SEC. 3.5  
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY ll, NARA, DATE 11/3/00





The Soviet Union therefore is still the enemy. The US is not so much hostile as it is ineffectual (which perhaps is more insulting). For example, if Europe is attacked we would pull a Dunkirk and get out, rather than either seeing our heavily outnumbered troops get overwhelmed or resorting to nuclear weapons. If this is true in Europe, by extension it is true in Asia as well; China should not count on our defending it in a crunch; we need not discuss military matters as <sup>on</sup> previous occasions. In any event China is down the list of our priorities, and even our allies in Europe and Japan get less attention than the Soviet Union in our policies.

In our relations with Moscow the theme of appeasement (Teng used the Munich analogy) has overtaken the one of collusion. Detente is dangerous not so much because it represents ganging up on China as it undermines the morale and defenses of the West through false illusions, thus increasing the pressures on the PRC. It is true that we "stood on the shoulders" of China to gain leverage on Moscow in the 1971-3 period, but that is "useless" now -- presumably both because China won't let itself be used and because detente is in trouble. Thus our policy now is marked by maneuvering and Dr. Kissinger's very busy travels. We are flailing away in a rear guard action against the Soviet hegemonic tide which is sweeping toward war: we are "swallows" who are "busy" before "the wind and rain" come. We may be able to postpone the Soviet storm, but it is inescapably on its way.




The source of our troubles is domestic. "Not reliable" can refer to a failure of nerve, a general withdrawal from the fray, the release of classified documents, the incomprehensible (to the Chinese) destruction of a strong President over a minor incident. Our policies are increasingly hamstrung by a combination of the liberal appeasing establishment symbolized by the New York Times, and traditional conservative isolationists (and anti-PRC to boot) symbolized by Senator Goldwater.

This turbulent international situation is much more crucial than Taiwan. For now it is better to have the US keep the island under control rather than having it go independent or toward Moscow or Tokyo. The Chinese can wait patiently until the time is ripe, but then they will have to use force. By implication, the US should not ask for peaceful assurances, but it can take its time letting Taiwan go.

The future of China's policies is uncertain. Mao and his followers -- Premier Chou, Marshall Yeh, and (noticeably) Vice Premier Teng -- are all old and "will not do," "will not make it out." There is criticism, perhaps internal, of Mao as being a "warlord" (too anti-Russian?) and a "bureaucrat" (too much emphasis on production?).

Thus China will go it alone - "rifles and millet." Let all the world curse it as a "warlord" or "warmonger." That only makes



Mao happy. The Chinese will prepare for "the wind and the rain." And if Moscow attacks, Peking will suck the Russians in, let them occupy the big cities à la Napoleon, and mobilize for a victorious counter-attack.

### Some Specific Points

Mao is very sick. He looked it, despite his mental agility. He was unable to walk us to the door as on previous occasions. He had much more trouble standing. He was just about unable to speak at all, making most of his points on paper or in obscure grunts. He is "going to heaven" soon, and has an "invitation from God" (points he has made previously, however). And he described his various ailments all over him.

Mao is in charge of general international strategy. He was well briefed and he had clearly given Teng his script the day before. He hit all the major themes of their foreign policy. On the other hand, he is clearly incapable of detailed or sustained work; he himself said that he ignored "routine" affairs and suggested he confined himself to international matters.

Teng is the key official now. Mao referred to him several times in the conversation. He is certainly Chou's replacement, and perhaps Mao's. On the other hand Mao pointed to his age, grouped him with himself, Chou and Yeh, and suggested that they would all be soon irrelevant.

The US (and Kissinger) are "not reliable." See the general





themes above. We are "swallows" before the storm. We "maneuvering" and "busy" - though both are allowable, they are apparently at best delaying actions. We are prone to "Dunkirks." We won't use nuclear weapons. We are no longer "far-sighted."

Our domestic structure is weak. Watergate was mishandled and magnified. Our media (Times) and our Congress (Goldwater) are sapping our strength.

China is relatively backward -- both in strength and in our priorities. After America comes Russia, Europe, Japan and then China.

"Europe is too soft now." They are afraid of the Soviet Union. "Europe is too "scattered," "loose," "spread out." East and West Germany should unite under West German domination (so as to pressure the Soviet Union.)

"Japan is seeking hegemony."

US policy toward the Soviet Union is confused and ineffectual. It is variously described as "Dunkirk" appeasement, frantic maneuvering, using China to get to Moscow, joining Moscow in hurling epithets at the PRC. At the same time Moscow remains a "common opponent" of both China and the US and when war breaks out, then (but only then) we should consider joint cooperation.

In any event Schlesinger should come to China and visit the areas near the Soviet Union (so as to push us towards confrontation with Moscow). He is presumably welcome because he makes preparations and cries out rather than flying around like a "swallow."



"The small issue is Taiwan, the big issue is the world."


They can wait 100 years, for Taiwan is "unwantable," indigestible ("full of counter-revolutionaries"). It's better for the US to keep the island under control for the time being.

China will rely on itself. "Rifles and millet." The Dunkirk strategy if necessary. The Chairman likes to be cursed (unlike Americans who worry about their image?); only then does he pay attention to someone. Dr. Kissinger should go ahead and publicize Chinese aggression against China (Taiwan) and Korea. "I will only be happy when all foreigners slam on tables and curse me." China needs to know its enemies (including the US?) so as to be vigilant: "If you don't curse me, I won't see you, and I will just sleep peacefully."

#### Concluding Caveat

Finally, let us not pretend that we can fathom everything the Chairman had to say. Some passages might have had layers that we are incapable of sensing; others might merely be literal; others might be haphazard, even meaningless.

The Chairman's basic message and principal themes were clear. They clearly formed the strategic framework for the Kissinger visit, indeed for the evolution in our relations in the past couple of years. But there were several cryptic passages that are unclear. The tendency is to dig for the subtleties, the deeper meanings behind the Chairman's laconic, earthy prose. In most instances the larger meaning is apparent. In others, however, there



may be nothing particularly significant, or a somewhat senile man might have been wandering aimlessly for a moment. After all, he is a very frail 82. His words were either translated with great difficulty (and probably smoothed over and elaborated at times) by the three girls or written down. Chiao volunteered his own interpretation the next day, which is unprecedented, playing down the collusion theme and underlining the "common enemy" leverage.

To cite just one example of ambiguity: "Do you have any way to assist me in curing my present inability to speak clearly?" The odds are that this was basically small talk about his own health. It is very doubtful that he was seriously asking for medical assistance. But was the Chairman saying that his voice within China (or in the world) was not being heard, that his influence is being circumscribed, and that he wants US help to strengthen his position through our policies? Does he want us to help him "speak clearly" in this larger sense?

There were several other obscure passages in the talk, e.g. the reference to the anti-Chinese Korean resolution, the cracks against Jewish influence in the American media, the invitation to Bush to pay a call on the Chairman. These might have meant, in turn that the Chinese don't want to get involved in the Korean problem; that Jews are traditionally appeasers in history and are a major element in eroding American steadfastness; and that the US should pay more attention to China.

Equally the passages may have had no deeper meaning whatsoever,


despite the Chairman's well deserved reputation for the use of aphorism and symbolism and never wasting his words.



GERALD R. FOSBERG



Sunday, October 19, 1975



Teng/HAK  
and party

SEAL

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Vice Premier of the State Council, People's Republic of China  
Chiao Kuan-hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chang Han-chih (Mme. Ch'iao)  
Ambassador Huang Chen, Chief of PRCLC, Washington, and Chu Lin (Mme. Huang)  
Wang Hai-jung, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Lin P'ing, Director of American & Oceanic Affairs, MFA  
T'ang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director of American & Oceanic Affairs, MFA (Interpreter)  
Chien Ta-yung, Counselor, PRCLC, Washington  
Ting Yuan-hung, Director for U.S. Affairs, American & Oceanic Affairs, MFA  
Chao Chi-hua, Deputy Director for U.S. Affairs, American & Oceanic Affairs, MFA  
Mrs. Shih Yen-hua, MFA (Interpreter)

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and Mrs. Kissinger  
Ambassador George H. W. Bush, Chief of USLO, Peking, and Mrs. Bush  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department  
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, and Mrs. Lord  
Ambassador Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs  
Richard H. Solomon, NSC Staff  
Robert B. Oakley, NSC Staff  
William H. Gleysteen, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian & Pacific Affairs  
Oscar V. Armstrong, Country Director, EA/PRCM  
Robert L. Funseth, Director, Office of Press Relations  
Lt. Colonel Robert C. McFarlane, Military Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National

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By KBH NARA, Date 10/20/97

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger Security Affairs  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 b (3) Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff  
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det. Travelling Press Party



DATE & TIME: Sunday, October 19, 1975  
7:08 - 7:25 p. m.

PLACE: The Great Hall of the People  
Peking

SUBJECT: Welcoming Before Banquet

Teng: How are you?

Kissinger: Very well, thank you. It is a pleasure to see you again.

Teng: Yes, this is an important day. Our Long March began on the 10th of October 1934 from our capital at that time, Juichin, in the province of Kiangsi. It ended on the 19th of October 1935 in Shensi Province. So it can be said that it took one year and nine days. And we travelled 25,000 li, 12,500 kilometers, and we say we crossed 10,000 rivers and 1,000 mountains. And there is a play of that name running now.

Kissinger: It is a great tribute to the human spirit.

Teng: It should be said it was quite arduous. At the same time, quite glorious.

This is the eighth visit of the Doctor to Peking.

Kissinger: That is correct. Since 1971.


Teng: And I hope this long march you have made will also have an October 19th. [Laughter]

We think it is very beneficial to have an opportunity to exchange views from time to time.

Kissinger: We do also. For me it is very rewarding.

This is Mr. Sonnenfeldt, who is Counselor of the State Department. He is a specialist on your northern ally. He makes the same criticisms of me as your Foreign Minister.

Teng: So it seems they will get on well with each other.



Kissinger: And Mr. Funseth, who is our press spokesman.

And Mr. Oakley, who is a Middle East expert.

I think all of my other colleagues you have met before.

Teng: We welcome all of the friends who come with you.

I think Mr. Bush is the only one it is not necessary to express a welcome to. [Laughter] Because if we did that, it would have to be 365 days a year!

Kissinger: Is he behaving himself here?

Teng: I have heard that our Foreign Minister believes their cooperation with him is quite good. Sometimes there are a few small quarrels, but that doesn't matter very much.

There is only one thing we should apologize for: A few days ago one of our sentries at the Liaison Office kept out one of his guests, due to lack of knowledge of diplomatic affairs. We should take this occasion to apologize.

Bush: That is very gracious of you. It was a small matter.

Kissinger: It is very gracious of you.

Teng: We should apologize.

You must be very tired.

Kissinger: No, we had one night's rest in Tokyo.

Teng: Yes, but I know your prowess is to travel to eighteen countries in eighteen days. So this must be very relaxed.

Kissinger: It is an easy trip. We saw the Japanese Foreign Minister today. He is looking for a synonym for the word hegemony. [Laughter] He would like to say it but doesn't quite dare to.

Teng: Maybe he will think of something like, not "hegemonism" but "hegemonistic point" or . . . . [Laughter] Maybe he will end up saying nothing at all.



Kissinger: But I understand that your Foreign Minister, when he sees the Japanese Foreign Minister, thinks up Japanese poems, which is more than he does for me.

Teng: You can ask him to make up for it. He has a lot of them on his mind!

Kissinger: We are counting on it. We put the word in the Shanghai Communiqué without a poem.

Teng: Then you can talk philosophy to each other. You can discuss, for example, the unity of opposites. I have heard that you belong one to the school of Kant and one to the school of Hegel. So he will come out on top.

Kissinger: He will come out on top.

Teng: You have given up on philosophy?

Kissinger: I have given up about having him come out on top all the time.

Teng: That seems right. How can he come out on top all the time?

Kissinger: Because he fires so many cannons. He intimidates me.  
[Laughter]

Teng: They were empty!

Kissinger: The last time he told me they were only half empty.

Teng: There were some that were not empty?

Kissinger: There were some that were not empty.

You always take very good care of us.

Teng: That is due to you. Even though we may differ in view, we must say we are familiar friends.

Kissinger: That is true.



Teng: Who knows how many times you have met with our Foreign Minister? And with me, this is the third time.

Kissinger: Third.

Teng: And it seems this will continue.

Kissinger: We expect to. And the Foreign Minister and I have met ever since the second visit [October 1971]. He avoided me on the first visit [July 1971] because he was engaged in border negotiations. [Laughter] And of course I used to call on your Ambassador in Paris, Huang Chen.

Teng: Yes, and border negotiations with the Soviet Union have been going on five years, nearly six years in a few days. They were begun by him. So he must be an unlucky person. [Laughter]

Kissinger: Not very efficient. Is his successor doing better?

Teng: The record of our negotiations is not very successful. I have been doing it ten years. But my effectiveness is better than theirs. I went to Moscow seven times.

Kissinger: Oh really? I told the Foreign Minister that Mr. Sonnenfeldt once sent me a cable from Moscow after three days there saying, "The only thing keeping me here is the joy of anticipating my departure, which will be exceeded only by the joy of completing it."

Teng: Then how could he be a specialist? No, you have to keep on the run. If you don't, you can't be an expert.

They are calling us for a photograph.

[The party went out to the landing of the main staircase to pose for the official group photograph, and then went to the banquet hosted by Foreign Minister Ch'iao, which was attended by Vice Premier Teng.]



Exchange of  
Toasts





# PRESS DEPARTMENT OF STATE

6

October 20, 1975

NO. 535



EXCHANGE OF TOASTS BETWEEN  
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
AND  
FOREIGN MINISTER CH'IAO KUAN-HUA  
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA  
PEKING  
OCTOBER 19, 1975

FOREIGN MINISTER CH'IAO:


Mr. Secretary and Mrs. Kissinger, Mr. Bush, Chief of U.S.L.O., and Mrs. Bush, American guests, Comrades,

I wish to express, in the name of my Chinese colleagues present, our welcome to the Secretary of State Dr. Kissinger and his party, who have come again to Peking to prepare for President Ford's visit to China later this year.

The current international situation is characterized by great disorder under heaven, and the situation is excellent. The basic contradictions in the world are sharpening. The factors for both revolution and war are increasing. The stark reality is not that detente has developed to a new stage, but that the danger of a new world war is mounting. We do not believe there is any lasting peace. Things develop according to objective laws independently of man's will. The only way to deal with hegemonism is to wage a tit-for-tat struggle against it. To base oneself on illusions, to mistake hopes or wishes for reality and act accordingly will only abet the ambitions of expansionism and lead to grave consequences. In this regard, the history of the Second World War provides a useful lesson. In the face of the growing danger of war, China's fundamental policy is to "dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere and never seek hegemony," to persist in independence and self-reliance and make all necessary preparations. We are deeply convinced that, whatever zigzags and reverses there may be in the development of history, the general trend of the world is towards light and not darkness.

A new page was turned in the relations between China and the United States with President Nixon's visit to China and the issuance of the Shanghai Communique by our two sides in 1972. On the whole, Sino-U.S. relations have moved forward in the last few years. China and the United States have different social systems and there are essential differences between their policies. However, in the current turbulent world situation, our two sides have common points as well. This has been set forth clearly in the Shanghai Communique. So long as our two sides earnestly observe in actual practice the principles established in the Shanghai Communique, there is reason to believe that Sino-U.S. relations will continue to move ahead. This is the common desire of the Chinese and American peoples. On the Chinese side, we will do our part to promote Sino-U.S. relations in the spirit of the Shanghai Communique, as we have done all along.

For further information contact:



Now I propose a toast to the friendship between the Chinese and American peoples,

To the health of the Secretary of State and Mrs. Kissinger,

To the health of Mr. Bush, Chief of U.S.L.O and Mrs. Bush,

To the health of all American guests, and

To the health of the Chinese Comrades here!

SECRETARY KISSINGER:

Mr. Vice Premier, Mr. Foreign Minister, Chief of the Liaison Office in Washington,

On this my eighth trip to China, I have finally found the courage to say something in Chinese. I ask your indulgence to listen carefully while I say it: Pan chiu jung yi, ch'ing k'o nan, which for those of you who think I spoke Cantonese means:

It is easy to prepare a banquet, but it is hard to be a good host.


On each of my visits the table is always magnificently set. But it is the warmth of the welcome that has made all of these evenings memorable.

I understand that today is the 40th anniversary of the end of the Long March. This occasion therefore has profound meaning for the People's Republic of China and those here tonight -- including the Vice Premier and Ambassador Huang -- who made that epic march. That event was testimony to the world as well of the courage and the vision of those who set out on a path whose length and contours they could not know. Their success was a triumph of spirit as much as exertion. And it demonstrates that faith is even more important than material circumstances in achieving great things.

As I said in my speech to the United Nations, there is no relationship to which the United States assigns greater significance than its ties with the People's Republic of China.

The differences between us are apparent. Our task is not to intensify those differences. Our task is to advance our relationship on the basis of our mutual interests. Such a relationship would strengthen each of us. It would threaten no one and it would contribute to the well-being of all peoples. It is a relationship which we intend to be a durable feature of the world scene.

Each country must pursue a policy suitable to its own circumstances. The United States will resist hegemony as we have already stated in the Shanghai Communiqué. But the United States will also make every effort to avoid needless confrontations when it can do so without threatening the security of third countries. In this policy we will be guided by actions and realities and not rhetoric.



President Ford will soon be coming to China. He has visited you before, but now he comes as President with the intention of strengthening our relations on the basis of the Shanghai Communique and to give expression to the American interest in a China that is making progress in a peaceful and secure world.

During the next few days we will have the opportunity to exchange views on a wide range of matters of common interest. These regular consultations have become a valuable feature of our relationship. Once again, I look forward to my meetings with the Vice Premier and the Foreign Minister.

And now, may I propose a toast,

- . . . To the health of Chairman Mao and Premier Chou En-Lai to whom we wish a rapid recovery,
- . . . To the health of the Vice Premier and the Foreign Minister,
- . . . To the health of the Chief of the Liaison Office in Washington,
- . . . To the health of all our friends here today; and
- . . . To the friendship of the American people and Chinese peoples. Ganbei.

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Report to the  
President



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

October 19, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

GENERAL SCOWCROFT

The following is Secretary Kissinger's first report from Peking:

The Chinese greeted us on arrival at 4:00 p.m. with the same ritual as previous trips and the atmosphere if anything is a bit more cordial than on my last trip. We cannot, of course, gauge their real mood until the substantive talks begin tomorrow.

The Foreign Minister, other Chinese dignitaries, and resident ambassadors met us at the airport in warm, late afternoon sunshine. We drove the forty minutes to the guest house with golden autumn leaves framing our route. As usual the wide streets and huge Tienamen Square were dominated by bicycles, and the city seemed even more tranquil than usual. After a welcoming tea at the guest house we took a break until 7:00 p.m. At the huge Great Hall of the People, Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-Ping greeted the official party before the welcoming banquet. We exchanged some light banter, during which he needled us gently about the direction of our relations; I did the same to him on their rhetoric in the UN, and he confirmed that their Soviet relations had not improved.

The Foreign Minister's toast at the banquet opened with an explicit welcoming of your forthcoming trip, an event they clearly look forward to. The toast ended with a reference to progress in our bilateral relations that was somewhat more upbeat than last year's. In the middle of his remarks, however, he used very sharp language against detente lifted from his UN speech. He said they didn't believe in lasting peace; that hegemony should be resisted tit for tat rather than substituting wish for reality; and that the Chinese were getting prepared on their own for the probability of war.

SECRET



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

MR 97-7, # 11; NSC Letter 12/5/97

By Ut NARA, Date 1/20/98

In light of this line, I added a rejoinder to my own prepared remarks. I said in effect that our country had to pursue a policy most suited to its own circumstances; that we would resist hegemony where necessary but would also avoid needless confrontations; and that our firm actions were more meaningful than their tough words.

I am sure this exchange on detente will be the focus of the media, but it should be kept in perspective. The rest of his toast and their overall reception has been more forthcoming than last year and his sharp rhetoric was a verbatim excerpt from his New York speech. In any event, it was a major theme in my talks with him last month, and I wanted to let the Chinese know again that while they may talk a good game against Soviet expansion, only the U.S. has been actually doing something about it. I plan to take this line in my talks here. My experience with the Chinese is that they only respect strength. If we let them push us now we will be in difficulties during your visit.

My meetings with Vice Premier Teng and Foreign Minister Chiao begin at 10:00 tomorrow morning. After our initial exchanges I may table later tomorrow a draft communique for your visit along the general lines we discussed. This will be the only way to really smoke out their intentions. I fully expect that, as usual, the great bulk of our talks will center on the international situation rather than bilateral relations. In addition to working out agenda and logistics for your trip, and probing for any changes in Chinese positions, these four days will give us a further opportunity to size up Teng. He will be your primary interlocutor, aside from any meeting with Mao, since Chou is clearly gravely ill. They said Chou is too sick to receive visitors, including even Chinese. Teng is effectively running both domestic and foreign affairs, having made a remarkable comeback the past two years after his disgrace during the cultural revolution a decade ago. He is a tough, short, stocky man who continues to gain in self-assurance, though he will never have the flair, elegance, or vision of Chou.

The only noteworthy substantive note during the banquet conversations was the extreme Chinese annoyance at the French for their having joined the Soviet call for a world disarmament conference, which is anathema here.





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