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South Korea

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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South Korea

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Armed Forces

A. Defense establishment (S)

The armed forces of the Republic of Korea (ROK) have as their primary missions the defense of the country against external aggression and the maintenance of internal security. Well organized and moderately well equipped, they are considered fully capable of executing their internal security mission and adequate to protect their country against North Korean aggression. They would require prompt and extensive outside assistance, however, to do more than temporarily check a North Korean attack supported by either Chinese or Soviet forces.

The armed forces are organized into three major components and have a total personnel strength of about 622,000. The army, numbering about 548,000 men, constitutes 88% of the military manpower; it is the fifth largest ground force in the world and the third largest in non-Communist Asia. The navy, with a complement of 45,500 men (including 25,900 marines), operates a total of 240 ships and craft, including five destroyers and three destroyer escorts. The air force has approximately 28,500 personnel and 379 aircraft, including 228 jets. The Korean National Police, a civil law enforcement agency consisting of approximately 49,000 men, including 800 maritime police, could in the event of hostilities assist the ground and naval forces in the maintenance of internal security in rear and coastal areas. The Homeland Defense Reserve Force, a civil defense-type organization, also assists the military and police in apprehending North Korean agents and in guarding lines of communication and installations against sabotage. The force numbers about 2.1 million men.

The armed forces are modeled after those of the United States, utilize U.S. equipment, and employ U.S. tactical doctrine and techniques modified to meet South Korean requirements. They are well organized, well trained, and ably led. Shortcomings are primarily in logistics and air defense; ROK military personnel generally lack experience in

logistical operations, and the various services suffer from equipment shortages. Some shortages will be alleviated in time through the U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP); deficiencies in logistical skills are being overcome as a result of U.S.-sponsored technical training and through on-the-job experience gained by ROK Armed Forces personnel in managing their logistical organization.

South Korea could not support the country's military establishment without extensive U.S. assistance; accordingly, U.S. aid is a factor of paramount importance in South Korean military planning. During U.S. FY1950-72, the Republic of Korea received military assistance valued at about US\$5.7 billion. The U.S. Military Advisory Group, which has functioned in South Korea since 1950 (under an agreement signed on 26 January 1950 and amended on 21 October 1960), has also been instrumental in the development of the ROK Armed Forces. In 1970, the Military Advisory Groups of the army, navy and air force were reorganized into a Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group—Korea (JUSMAG—K). Advisory effort was reduced and emphasis placed on logistics, research and development, data processing, and other technical fields.

The U.S.-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty of November 1954 commits the United States to render assistance to the South Korean Government in the event of external armed attack against any territory recognized by the United States as being under the republic's administrative control: operational planning assumes that ROK forces will operate under U.S. control. Strategic planning has been primarily defensive in nature because Korean military leaders realize they lack the resources for successfully executing a major offensive action. ROK combat troops are disposed along the southern boundary of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) (Figures 1, 2, and 3) in semipermanent defensive positions. A continuing program of maintaining and improving these field fortifications is conducted under the supervision of the



FIGURE 1. ROK Army troops guarding the DMZ against North Korean infiltration (U/OU)



FIGURE 2. ROK observation post typical of those along the DMZ (U/OU)

Eighth U.S. Army. Plans envision maintenance of the positions along the DMZ in the face of Communist attack and withdrawal, when necessary, to previously determined defense lines. This strategy is designed to contain Communist penetration until outside aid becomes effective and a counteroffensive can be mounted.

Beginning in 1965, the South Korean Government contributed some 50,000 troops to the collective defense of South Vietnam, including two army infantry divisions, a marine corps brigade, supporting units, five amphibious vessels (three LST's and two LSM's), and a noncombat force. The marine corps brigade and a few army support units returned to South Korea in early 1972, and the remaining forces were withdrawn in early 1973. Personnel in these ROK military contingents gained significant combat and leadership experience as a result of this commitment (Figure 4). In addition, participation in the Vietnam war provided the ROK forces with a greater appreciation of, and capability to solve, logistical, training, and doctrinal problems inherent to combat operations in the field, thereby contributing to their increased operational readiness.

1. Military history

The Republic of Korea has no extensive military tradition, but since 1948 it has developed a powerful military establishment with a strongly anti-Communist orientation. The ROK Army's predecessor was the South Korean Constabulary, which was created by the U.S. Army Military Government during

the post World War II occupation of South Korea. Following establishment of the republic in August 1948, a tiny air arm, the precursor of the air force, was organized under army control. It became a separate service in 1949.

The navy originated in 1945 as a coast guard. It was designated as a navy in 1948, but at the outbreak of the Korean conflict in 1950 it had not progressed




FIGURE 3. DMZ battery commander on watch with field telescope (U/OU)

FIGURE 4. ROK troops equipped with U.S. 40 mm grenade launcher and World War II carbines in South Vietnam (U/OU)



much beyond the status of a fishery-protection and antismuggling patrol force with an aggregation of obsolete craft. Following the Communist invasion of South Korea in June 1950, the navy received a few U.S. naval vessels, and more transfers were made during the Korean war.

The marine corps was activated as part of the navy on 15 April 1949. During 1949, it took part in antiguerrilla operations; with the outbreak of the Korean war, the then-existing units were formed into a regiment and attached to the 1st Marine Division, USMC, for participation in the Inch'on¹ landing. Other operations included the Inch'on-Seoul, Wonsan, and Hamhung-Hungnam campaigns.

The ROK military forces have, since their beginning, received materiel, training, and advisory assistance under the U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP). When the United States withdrew its forces in 1949, a military advisory group remained to guide the newly established military forces. The military structure collapsed under pressure of the Communist invasion of South Korea in 1950, but the military forces were reorganized, expanded, and eventually actively employed in operations against the Communists.

Since the Korean armistice in 1953, the ROK Armed Forces have continued to develop and expand under U.S. guidance, with consequent improvement of South Korea's defense posture. The military forces have been reorganized, extensive training programs have been instituted, and additional weapons and

¹For diacritics on place names see the list of names on the apron of the Summary Map in the Country Profile chapter and the map itself.

equipment have been furnished by the United States. After 1966 certain supplementary assistance was furnished to the ROK forces from U.S. Department of Defense service budgets (Military Assistance Service Fund), e.g., items of equipment for South Korean units in South Vietnam.

The army was able to maintain its integrity and, with continued U.S. guidance and support, remained an effective force during the unstable period following the military coup of 16 May 1961. The coup brought military elements into a position of political leadership and terminated a period of instability that began in April 1960, when a student-led popular uprising toppled the 12-year regime of President Syngman Rhee.

2. Command structure

The legal basis for the armed forces is stated in general terms in Article 51 of the constitution. The article simply designates the President as Commander in Chief and declares that the organization and formation of the armed forces shall be determined by law (the South Korean national defense organization is shown in Figure 5). The President is assisted and advised on security matters by the National Security Council, established by South Korean Government Law No. 1508 of 14 December 1963. The council is composed of the President (who serves as chairman), the Prime Minister, the Director of the Economic Planning Board, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Home Affairs, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of National Defense, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although not a statutory member, is authorized to participate in the meetings.




FIGURE 5. ROK national defense organization (S)

The Minister of National Defense is assisted by the Vice Minister, the Assistant Minister for Manpower, the Assistant Minister-Comptroller, and the Assistant Minister for Installations and Logistics. Administrative and technical support is provided the ministers by a staff consisting of an administrative division and seven bureaus—Planning; Finance; Manpower; Personnel; Logistics; Installation; and Information, Education, and Public Relations. The Minister of National Defense is appointed by the President and charged with the functions of military administration, military command, and control of the armed forces; however, he is primarily an administrator, with the responsibility for implementing presidential policies and decisions.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense, was established on 1 June 1963 by Cabinet Decree No. 1325. Membership of the JCS consists of a chairman, appointed by the President for a 2-year term, and the incumbent chiefs of the three military services. It has been the practice to appoint the former army Chief of Staff to the position of chairman. Although not a regular member, the Commandant of the ROK Marine Corps may act as a member when corps matters are discussed. JCS organization, in addition to the office of the chairman, includes a director and five bureaus—Personnel Planning, Strategic Intelligence, Operations Planning, Logistics Planning, and Communications and Electronics. The JCS, organized to operate like its U.S. counterpart, is concerned with major military matters

and bears responsibility for strategic planning and for the overall operations of the armed forces. The chairman is directly responsible to the President, but the staff is administratively subordinate to the Minister of National Defense.

Operational control of the ROK Armed Forces is vested in the United Nations Command (UNC). The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), however, has delegated operational control of the individual ROK services to the Commanding General of the Eighth U.S. Army, the Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Korea, and the Commander of U.S. Air Forces Korea. In the event of hostilities, CINCUNC reassumes direct control. During the May 1961 coup, the military regime ignored the command agreement by ordering several army and marine units to Seoul to support the coup. Several troop commanders who refused to take orders from any authority other than the United Nations Command were relieved of their commands and arrested. The regime's control actions compromised the U.N. commander's operational control over South Korean forces and temporarily upset relations with the United Nations Command; the regime, however, subsequently reaffirmed its acceptance of the principle of subordination of the ROK Armed Forces to the United Nations Command.

Advice and training assistance is given to the army, navy, and air force by the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group—Korea.

B. Joint activities

1. Military manpower (S)

Manpower requirements for the large military forces maintained by the Republic of Korea since the Korean war have been met with difficulty. As of 1 January 1973 there were an estimated 8,213,000 males in South Korea between the ages of 15 and 49, of whom about 5,200,000, or roughly 63%, were fit for military service. All males are required to register at age 17 and be available for call, with certain exceptions, between ages 18 and 40. By law a 36-month period of active service is required of all able-bodied men; however, conscripts are required to serve only 30 months. The term of voluntary active service is 2 years for the army and marine corps and 3 years for the navy and air force. Voluntary enlistment and reenlistment rates in the army are negligible. The army and marine corps acquire most of their personnel through conscription; the navy and air force are composed almost entirely of volunteers.

The number of men available for military service and the maximum number considered fit for duty, by 5-year age groups, are as follows:

AGE	TOTAL NUMBER OF MALES	MAXIMUM NUMBER FIT FOR MILITARY SERVICE
15-19	1,740,000	1,200,000
20-24	1,582,000	1,035,000
25-29	1,380,000	895,000
30-34	1,246,000	790,000
35-39	999,000	600,000
40-44	678,000	380,000
45-49	588,000	300,000
Total, 15-49	8,213,000	5,200,000

The average number reaching military age (18) annually, 1973-77, is estimated at about 345,000. All males are considered to be in the military reserve until age 37 whether or not they have served in the armed forces. Only the army and marine corps have active organized reserves. The army maintains 10 reserve divisions staffed with permanent cadres. These divisions, though skeletonized, provide the means for quick expansion of the regular army in the event of mobilization. Three are ready reserve divisions with a cadre totaling about 10,800; the remaining seven are rear area security divisions with a total strength of about 18,200 regular army personnel. The marine corps has a reserve pool of about 86,000 personnel. About 300 billets are maintained to train officer and enlisted marine reservists.

During the Korean war, personnel in the armed forces demonstrated that, on the whole, Koreans are staunch, tough fighters when properly trained and led. The average Korean soldier is inured to hardship and is capable of sustained effort over long periods of time on a meager ration that would be considered barely a subsistence diet by the average Western soldier.

Trained from childhood to fit himself into a hierarchical society, the Korean adjusts readily to the discipline of military service. He may attempt to evade military service, but once inducted he generally resigns himself to duty, accepts the authority of his officers, and learns the fundamentals quickly. Korean officers have not yet thoroughly grasped the necessity of thinking problems through, of estimating possible consequences of a military maneuver, and of considering possible alternatives to a complex operation. Hence, by Western standards, Korean operational planning is frequently incomplete or ill-conceived.

Koreans tend to develop loyalty to individuals rather than to the position occupied by a superior, a service, or a unit. Basically, they rely more on specific

orders than most Western soldiers and, therefore, are more dependent on the immediate presence of their leaders. As a result, the performance of the individuals usually reflects the ability of the individual commander to a greater degree than is the case among modern Western troops. In the absence of the leader, the general lack of initiative and independent judgment of the average South Korean soldier tends to reduce his effectiveness in critical situations.

Most South Koreans lack mechanical or technical experience and require greater time, effort, and training than U.S. personnel to acquire technical skills. Few are equipped for success in highly technical and scientific fields because of their lack of a proper educational foundation. They are highly literate and learn rapidly, particularly skills that require manual dexterity.

Armed forces personnel are considered loyal and reliable. Morale in the military services is considered generally good, although the army in past years has been plagued with the problem of absences without leave and desertions. Army officials periodically take steps to reduce this problem by instituting military deserter apprehension programs and enforcing rigid punishment of deserters and AWOL personnel. Additional disruptive factors detracting from the strength and stability of the armed forces are low pay scales and the endemic factionalism and struggle for power which consumes so much of the time and energies of leading military personalities. Retirement policies not only are a source of discontent but also have resulted in a loss to the armed forces of valuable, experienced senior officers, since many officers in their early forties are being retired if passed over for promotion.

2. Strength trends (S)

With U.S. aid, the armed forces have grown rapidly and have been maintained at a relatively high strength level. In 1954 the United States agreed to support a 20-division army and other services up to a maximum strength of 720,000, although the agreed force level is now 626,800. Overall armed forces strength has steadily increased; however, the army was reduced from 19 to 18 divisions when ROK divisions returned from Vietnam. Since 1964 navy strength has grown by 21% and air force strength by 23%. Marine corps strength increased by 25% during 1966-71 but was subsequently reduced by the same percentage in early 1972, upon the deactivation of the brigade that served in Vietnam. Figure 6 shows armed forces personnel strengths since 1960.

FIGURE 6. Personnel strengths (S)

	ARMY*	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
1960.....	534,000	15,700	25,100	22,000	596,800
1961.....	525,000	15,200	24,600	22,600	587,400
1962.....	507,000	15,300	23,900	21,500	567,700
1963.....	510,000	15,800	24,500	23,300	573,600
1964.....	524,000	15,100	24,700	23,400	587,200
1965.....	524,000	15,800	24,600	25,600	590,000
1966.....	527,300	16,300	29,100	24,300	597,000
1967.....	528,500	17,000	30,600	24,500	600,600
1968.....	534,600	18,400	32,000	25,900	610,900
1969.....	548,000	19,300	32,000	27,300	626,600
1970.....	548,000	19,300	32,000	27,600	626,900
1971.....	548,000	19,300	32,000	27,600	626,900
1972.....	548,000	19,600	25,900	28,500	622,000
1973.....	548,000	19,600	25,900	28,500	622,000

*Not included are ROK Army personnel serving with U.S. units in Korea. The number of personnel so assigned varies but is generally about 10,000.

3. Training (S)

ROK military training has been supervised by U.S. Military advisers since 1948, and training units of the army, navy, and air force approximate those of the U.S. services in organization and methods.

The Ministry of National Defense operates a National Defense College, corresponding to the U.S. National War College, for senior officers and key civil servants. It also operates the Armed Forces Staff College; this school is designed to prepare selected military officers for duty in high echelons of the armed forces and is attended by field-grade officers from all services. The staff college fills the gap between senior service schools and the National Defense College. Each of the three services has an academy for training officers, and each sends selected officers and enlisted men to U.S. military schools and training establishments. In addition, between 1962 and 1970, selected army and marine corps personnel received military training in West Germany, Canada, Republic of China, France, Italy, the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia. These individuals provide a pool from which instructors are drawn. The armed forces probably will continue to depend upon U.S. military training facilities, particularly for advanced technical training.

4. Military budget (C)

The annual military budget is prepared in the Ministry of National Defense in coordination with the Economic Planning Board. This budget is incorpo-

rated in the central government budget which is submitted to the National Assembly for final approval. Since 1963, the assembly has approved the military budgets without major changes.

The budget for the armed forces, during the past decade, has ranked first among major categories of expenditures in the central government budget. During recent years, it averaged 22% of the central government budget and 4.1% of the GNP. The annual increases in the military budgets during 1968-72 averaged just over 28%. The main reason for these increases was the vastly improved Korean economy and the concurrent reduction of direct budgetary support provided by the United States. The U.S. contribution to the South Korean defense budget was reduced from 34% in 1968 to about 5% in 1972. South Korean self-financed military budgets, in millions of U.S. dollars, for 1968 through 1972 are as follows:

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
Ministry of National Defense budget ...	173.7	217.2	270.7	361.6	458.7
Military budget as percent of central government budget ...	21.0	19.3	20.7	24.3	26.4
Military budget as percent of GNP	4.2	3.9	4.0	4.3	4.4

NOTE—Converted at the exchange rate of 373 won equal US\$1.00.

5. Logistics

South Korea has little capacity to provide industrial support for its armed forces and, although largely agricultural, is not self-sufficient in food. Manufacturing is the most rapidly growing sector of the economy and provides basic consumer goods, some petroleum products, industrial chemicals, and fertilizers. Industry also assembles some transport equipment such as rolling stock and automobiles using imported components. The economy is heavily dependent on imports of crude oil and some refined petroleum products. (U/OU)

Domestic output in direct support of the armed forces is limited to small arms ammunition, uniforms, some quartermaster-type equipment, and some petroleum products. All other military materiel is imported, primarily through the U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP), which has been the only source of military assistance. During U.S. FY1950 through FY1972, U.S. equipment valued at US\$3,235.1 million was grant aid. In addition to purchases in the United States, some radar equipment has been obtained from Japan. (C)

The Bureau of Logistics in the Ministry of National Defense is responsible for overall logistical support of

the armed forces. The bureau has five sections—Plans, 1st Materiel Mobilization, 2d Materiel Mobilization, Operations, and Military Installations. These sections formulate logistic plans and policies for all the services, supervise the implementation of these plans, acquire land and supervise military construction, procure locally produced items, and receive and distribute material received under the U.S. Military Assistance Program. (C)

The Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Logistics of the army and air force and the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics submit their respective logistic programs, plans, and policies to the Bureau of Logistics through their respective service chiefs. The army has been designated the agency to procure common-use supplies for the entire military establishment. (C)

6. Uniforms and insignia (U/OU)

Military personnel are authorized dress, service, and field uniforms which are patterned after those of U.S. armed forces. Branch of service and specialty insignia are also similar to those of the U.S. armed forces. Uniforms are issued in both winter and summer versions, but due to the cool climate of South Korea, winter uniforms are most generally worn. Insignia of grade worn by officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men of the ground, naval (including marine corps), and air forces are similar in design.

In 1972, several changes were made in the armed forces' uniform and insignia. The principal change was in the styling of the service uniform worn by enlisted men of the ground and air forces. The collar style of the uniform coat has been changed from a closed rolled-collar to an open rolled-collar similar to that worn by officers. A shirt and tie are included as part of the new uniform. Another significant change took place in the design of enlisted men's grade insignia to include a new configuration of stripes and chevrons. An additional rank of sergeant major in the ground forces, master chief petty officer in the naval forces, and chief master sergeant in the air forces, was established in the enlisted grade system.

Winter uniforms and insignia for officers are shown in Figure 7, those for warrant officers and enlisted personnel in Figure 8. Summer service uniforms of ground and air force officers and warrant officers are made in the same basic style as winter uniforms. The ground forces officers' summer service uniforms are a lighter grey-green color, and the air force officers' uniforms are silver-grey. Service uniforms worn by enlisted personnel of the ground and air forces are

similar to those of officers. Summer uniforms for naval officers, warrant officers, and master and senior chief petty officers are khaki. The summer service uniform worn by naval enlisted men is the same style as that for winter, except that it is white in color. Marine corps officers and enlisted men wear uniforms similar in styling and color to those of ground forces personnel, except that the enlisted men's service uniform coat has a stiff standing collar.

General and flag rank officers wear insignia of rank consisting of five-pointed silver stars; senior and field-grade officers, clusters of nine silver bamboo leaves; and junior and company-grade officers, silver diamond-shaped insignia. Gold diamond-shaped insignia are worn by warrant officers. Rank insignia are worn either on decorative shoulderboards with dress uniforms, on shoulderloops of service uniforms, or on the right collar tab of the field uniform shirt. The blue winter service uniform with gold sleeve stripes is worn by naval officers and warrant officers. On the summer service uniform, gold stripes are displayed on shoulderboards.

Enlisted men's ranks are indicated by colored cloth stripes and chevrons displayed on a background which is of the same color as that of the uniform. The insignia colors are, crimson for ground forces on winter and summer uniforms; crimson for naval and marine corps personnel on winter, and black on summer uniforms; and white for air force personnel on winter and summer uniforms. Insignia are displayed on both sleeves between the elbow and the shoulder. Enlisted men also wear field insignia of metal on cloth when wearing cold weather clothing, fatigues, and field caps.

C. Army (S)

Judged by any standards, the ROK Army is a well-trained, reasonably well-led, and moderately well-equipped organization. Its missions are to defend the country against a North Korean attack and to preserve internal security, which includes controlling North Korean infiltration efforts. The First and Third ROK Armies, which are positioned along the 150-mile DMZ, have been successful in their control of North Korean infiltration attempts across the DMZ, and the Second ROK Army, which has the responsibility for security in the rest of the country, has also effectively performed its security mission of suppressing infiltration attempts by North Korea. The army has mostly conscripted personnel. As in the other services, morale is good and discipline is superior. Literacy is high, and the average soldier adapts to military life

readily, resulting in a fighting force of very high caliber. Well-trained and experienced officers contribute significantly to the army's high professionalism.

Except for certain equipment deficiencies, army units are combat-ready. The army can maintain internal security and, with external logistic and air support, stem a unilateral attack by North Korean forces. Even in the event of a combined Chinese/North Korean invasion, ROK ground forces could fight a strong delaying action provided U.S. air, naval, and logistic support were available. Although the army's logistical system is continually improving, combat support limitations and inadequacy of war reserves would severely restrict its ability to support sustained combat operations unaided.

Additional weaknesses of the army include an inadequate number of technically trained personnel, shortages of heavy equipment, a lack of experience in logistical operations, as well as virtually complete dependence on outside logistical support for maintaining the existing force structure. Army weaknesses are expected to be corrected gradually as the modernization program progresses.

1. Organization

The army is organized into a headquarters and three major subordinate commands—the First ROK Army, the Second ROK Army, and the Third ROK Army. ROK Army Headquarters, located at Seoul, is headed by the Chief of Staff and Vice Chief of Staff. The headquarters is organized along the lines of the U.S. General Staff and consists of general, special, administrative, and technical staffs. The general staff consists of five deputy chiefs of staff—Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, and Reserve Affairs—and the Comptroller, who has deputy chief of staff status. The office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel includes the Adjutant General, Provost Marshal General, Headquarters Commandant, and sections responsible for troop information and education, special services, and chaplains. The office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, in addition to administration and foreign liaison offices, consists of two main directorates—Intelligence and Plans and Security. The Directorate of Intelligence is subdivided into a Current Intelligence Office and four divisions—Collection and Operation, North Korean, Asian, and Joint. The Directorate of Plans and Security consists of three divisions—Plans and Management, Organization and Training, and Security. Subordinate elements of the office of Deputy

Chief of Staff for Operations include sections responsible for special warfare, army aviation, military history, and civil affairs and military government. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Reserve Affairs consists of four divisions—Personnel, Organization and Training, Logistics, and Comptroller. Subordinate to the Comptroller are the army audit agency and the finance office. The technical services are subordinate to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics.

The ROK Army is organized into three army and five corps headquarters. The First ROK Army, consisting of two corps of seven divisions, and the Third ROK Army, organized into three corps with 11 divisions, and necessary support elements, constitute the major combat organization. The First and Third ROK Armies are under the operational control of the Eighth U.S. Army; the administrative chain of command is from ROK Army Headquarters through the army headquarters to the two corps of the First ROK Army. The three corps of the Third ROK Army are under operational control of I Corps (ROK/US) Group of the Eighth U.S. Army.

The Second ROK Army is a continental army command-type organization, also under operational control of the Eighth U.S. Army. Administrative control is from ROK Army Headquarters to each of four military district commands headed by district commanders. The principal missions of the Second ROK Army are rear area security, administrative supervision of the 4 military district commands into which the rear area is subdivided, and the training of the 10 reserve infantry divisions under its command. The Second ROK Army also supervises all schools and training centers. The military district commanders are responsible for the internal security of their respective areas, control of units located within the assigned territory, and logistical support of units located in, or in transit through, their area of jurisdiction.

2. Strength, composition, and disposition²

The strength of the ROK Army is about 548,000, including 1,200 in the air arm. These figures include 47,200 officers and 500,800 enlisted men. Authorized strength is 547,470. Major formations include 18 combat divisions and 10 reserve divisions, the latter having a permanent cadre of regular army personnel. Authorized strength of the combat divisions is 13,200; average actual strength is 12,600. Three ready reserve

²For regularly updated information, refer to the *Military Intelligence Summary* and the *Order of Battle, Foreign Ground Forces—Republic of Korea*, both published by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

GROUND FORCES



SERVICE UNIFORM



GENERAL



LIEUTENANT GENERAL



MAJOR GENERAL



BRIGADIER GENERAL



CAP INSIGNIA OFFICERS AND WARRANT OFFICER



COLONEL



LIEUTENANT COLONEL



MAJOR



CAPTAIN



1ST LIEUTENANT



2D LIEUTENANT

NAVAL FORCES



SERVICE UNIFORM



ADMIRAL



VICE ADMIRAL



REAR ADMIRAL



COMMODORE



CAP INSIGNIA OFFICERS AND WARRANT OFFICER

MARINE CORPS



CAPTAIN



COMMANDER



LIEUTENANT COMMANDER



LIEUTENANT



LIEUTENANT JUNIOR GRADE



ENSIGN



CAP INSIGNIA OFFICERS AND WARRANT OFFICER


AIR FORCES



SERVICE UNIFORM



GENERAL



LIEUTENANT GENERAL



MAJOR GENERAL



BRIGADIER GENERAL



CAP INSIGNIA OFFICERS AND WARRANT OFFICER



COLONEL



LIEUTENANT COLONEL



MAJOR



CAPTAIN



1ST LIEUTENANT




2D LIEUTENANT

FIGURE 7. Officers' uniforms and insignia (U/OU)

GROUND FORCES



SERVICE UNIFORM





CAP INSIGNIA

NAVAL FORCES




SERVICE UNIFORM



AIR FORCES



SERVICE UNIFORM



CAP INSIGNIA

FIGURE 8. Warrant officers and enlisted men's uniforms and insignia (U/OU)

divisions are maintained at full cadre strength—two at 3,700, one at 3,400—and seven rear area security divisions at 2,600 (these seven divisions lack the weapons and equipment needed to bring them up to full cadre strength).

Units of the First and Third ROK Armies are deployed defensively along and behind the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and occupy approximately the northern third of the country. The First ROK Army is deployed along the eastern half of the DMZ, and its rear boundary varies from 50 to 80 miles below the DMZ. The Third ROK Army occupies the western half of the DMZ, and its rear boundary extends from 100 to 150 miles south of the DMZ. In addition to the 18 infantry divisions in the First and Third ROK Armies, major units include two armored brigades assigned to the Third ROK Army, and one Honest John Battalion and 22 field artillery battalions organic to the First and Third ROK Armies and the five corps.

The Second ROK Army, deployed in the southern two-thirds of the country, has 10 reserve divisions.

Five major combat units are subordinate to ROK Army Headquarters and located in the Third ROK Army area—the air defense artillery brigade (including two Hawk missile battalions and two composite missile battalions), three Special Forces brigades (airborne), and the Capital Security Command (two military police battalions and one provisional guard battalion). The Capital Security Command, unlike the other two organizations, is subordinate to ROK Army Headquarters for administration only; it is under the direct operational control of the Minister of National Defense.

The army's small aviation organization, which is subordinate to the ROK Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, has 358 liaison-type aircraft and helicopters which, with pilots and supporting personnel, are assigned to various army divisions as aviation observation detachments. (For further details on army aviation, see subsection C.5, below.)

3. Training

Army training and school systems are patterned after those of the U.S. Army, and training supervision and guidance is furnished by the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group—Korea (JUSMAG—K).

Under the supervision of the U.S. Military Advisory Groups (both JUSMAG—K and its predecessor, KMAG), a highly effective progressive program of individual training has been developed; it is generally considered one of the most efficient and effective of all ROK Army operations. Inductees are forwarded from provincial recruiting centers to the replacement

training center at Nonsan. Upon completion of 16-weeks basic training at the center, infantry personnel are sent directly to units as individual replacements; personnel earmarked for the other branches are sent to branch schools, then either directly to units as individual replacements, or to specialist schools for additional training before being sent to units. Specialist training courses currently taught in the various schools and time allocations for different subjects are substantially the same as for similar U.S. Army service school courses.

ROK Army divisions conduct divisional schools at which training is given to NCO's and potential NCO's of the divisions. Courses of instruction vary from unit to unit, but the usual length of each course is 5 to 6 weeks. In addition, the corps conducts NCO courses of varying lengths for nondivisional units. NCO specialists to fill specialized positions in service units are trained in branch schools.

Individual training for officers is given at the Korean Military Academy, basic branch schools, the Command and General Staff School, and the Logistical Management School.

The Korean Military Academy, located about 10 miles northeast of Seoul, provides a 4-year course leading to a commission as second lieutenant. Army officers go through their branch schools early in their careers, including in most cases both basic and advanced courses. The Command and General Staff College, at Chinhae, offers to selected officers courses patterned after those of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; and the Logistical Management School, in Seoul, provides advance training in staff-level logistical administration. All of these schools are under the command of Headquarters, ROK Army.

At the National Defense College, selected senior officers receive further training in high-level staff duty for national security planning. A small group of selected senior officers is sent each year to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Cadres from the regular army are assigned on a full-time basis to key positions in the reserve divisions, and the local unit and reinforcement reservists are called up from the nearby areas for training.

Organizational training is both intensive and comprehensive, with emphasis on combat training. Particular stress is placed on leadership training designed to develop competent junior officers and noncommissioned officers. Marksmanship, night training, and small-unit tactics are also stressed. The training cycle features two-division tree maneuvers,



FIGURE 9. ROK troops engaged in field training (U/OU)

two of which are scheduled yearly (Figures 9 and 10). Some training problems exist, particularly in the area of logistical support, where supply and maintenance procedures are weak. Service unit training lags behind that of combat units, and the capability of commanders below the division level to coordinate supporting weapons and provide logistical support is limited. In general, however, the status of training is good, and units are considered combat ready at both the division and corps levels. The First ROK Army staff is considered capable of commanding and controlling a field army in time of war.

4. Logistics

The logistical organization and procedures of the ROK Army are generally patterned after those which were in effect in the U.S. Army prior to 1 July 1962, modified to meet local conditions and ROK Army capabilities.

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics is responsible for the logistic support of the army in addition to providing common-use items for all three services. The deputy chief, through the chiefs of the technical services, controls all army logistical installations and all technical service schools. Also under the deputy chief is the Logistical Base Command, which administers and coordinates the activities of the various logistical units and installations. The headquarters of the Logistical Base Command and most of the logistical installations are located at Pusan to take advantage of that city's port and rail facilities. The army logistical installations in the Pusan area include a clothing factory, machine shop, an arsenal, and shops for rebuilding automobiles, tires, and armament. There is also a quartermaster depot at Yongdungp'o-dong, a

quartermaster reclamation and maintenance center in Taejon, and an army aviation depot at Wonju.

The First and Third ROK Armies provide direct logistical support to the combat divisions and other forces under their command through their own system of supply depots and other supply points. The Second ROK Army supports its units logistically through the four military district commands.

Weapons and equipment are of U.S. origin and largely World War II in design. The army is adequately supplied with infantry weapons but is handicapped by the limited types and obsolescence of its artillery and signal equipment. There are significant shortages in engineer equipment, vehicles, maintenance facilities, and troop housing. An urgent requirement exists for additional signal equipment. Small arms ammunition is produced in the arsenal near Pusan, and M-16 rifles will soon be made at a new plant nearby, but the army will continue to be dependent upon U.S. MAP support for other weapons and equipment and for replacements and spare parts. Except for procurement, the army is capable of operating its supply system, and in the event of hostilities probably could effectively support its operations if adequate supplies were received at the depots.

5. Army aviation

Army aviation is subordinate to the ROK Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. Its organization, mission, and training are patterned after those of its U.S. Army counterpart. It provides reconnaissance and liaison support for all elements of the army. Its 248 fixed wing liaison-type aircraft (O-1, U-6) and 110 helicopters (OH-23G, UH-1H), with pilots and supporting personnel, are assigned to the various army



FIGURE 10. ROK Army tanks crossing river during training exercise (U/OU)

divisions as aviation observation detachments. The helicopters are under operational control of the Eighth U.S. Army.

Army aviation has an authorized personnel strength of 1,183 and maintains an average strength of about 1,200 men, all volunteers. It is a small but well-trained organization. Advice and training assistance is furnished by the JUSMAG—K. The helicopters provide an extremely limited lift capability; otherwise, army aviation has no troop transport or paradrop capability. Some 400 competent pilots are actively assigned to army units. A large number of airfields in South Korea are suitable for liaison-type aircraft operations, thus giving army aviation a highly flexible dispersal capability.

D. Navy (S)

The mission of the ROK Navy (ROKN) is to conduct naval operations in support of U.N. and ROK forces, including antisubmarine warfare (ASW), amphibious and minesweeping operations, and the patrolling of coastal waters. Although similar in size to the North Korean Navy (NKN), the ROKN would be at a tactical disadvantage to the NKN during wartime conditions due to the NKN's submarines and guided missile patrol boats. In general, however, the ROKN could effectively counter the NKN, unless the NKN was supported by third-country navies. The most effective use of the ROKN during general hostilities would be as a supplement to allied naval forces. The ROKN is capable of performing its primary peacetime role of patrolling coastal waters, primarily guarding against the threat of North Korean infiltration by sea. However, the navy is hampered seriously by the small number of units available for covering the 1,500-mile coastline and by the age and slow speed of many of its ships. In spite of these deficiencies, the ROKN generally has been effective in countering this threat. The acquisition of newer and faster patrol craft in the near future will enhance the navy's counterinfiltration capability. Its ASW capability is effective against slow-to-medium speed submarines. ASW units are able to maintain contact on evasive targets and to conduct effective single and multiship close-search-and-attack plans; however, ASW search effectiveness is restricted to close-in search with conventional shipboard equipment. The minesweeping capability consists of 11 ships and 1 boat, all of which can sweep moored mines. Nine of the ships and the boat can make acoustic and magnetic sweeps. The minesweeper force is large enough to keep two adjacent ports open. Mines for any fields around Korea would have to be

prepared by U.S. forces and then be made available to the ROKN. The number of spare parts and the amount of general stores, provisions, and fuel on hand are inadequate for extended periods at sea. Although ships crews are trained in methods of transfer and replenishment at sea, insufficient logistic-support ships are available to service the fleet. Ships lack necessary spare parts to accomplish any except the most minor repairs at sea.

The ROK Marine Corps, an organic but semiautonomous part of the navy, is assigned the mission of maintaining an amphibious force in readiness and conducting such land operations as may be necessary for the prosecution of a naval campaign. Over-the-beach logistic support is lacking, however, and protracted operations are beyond the corps capability.

I. Organization

Modeled after the U.S. Navy, the ROK Navy is headed by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), an admiral, who is assisted by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and by Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations for Operations, Personnel, Logistics, Intelligence, and Comptroller. The technical bureaus and offices, the naval operating forces, and the shore establishment are nominally subordinate to the deputy CNO's but actually are under the direct control of the Chief of Naval Operations. The marine corps is responsible to the CNO through the Commandant, Marine Corps.

The naval shore establishment consists of a naval base at Chinhae and naval stations at Pusan, Inch'on, Mokp'o, Cheju, and Mukhojin-ni. The major component of the shore establishment is the Chinhae Naval Base, which includes a shipyard, the Naval Academy, the Naval War College, several service schools, recruit training center, naval hospitals, and several fleet support facilities.

Operating forces of the fleet are organized along the tactical and administrative lines of the U.S. Navy and are administratively assigned to six commands—Escort and Patrol Flotilla, Amphibious Flotilla, Mine Squadron, Service Squadron, Anti-infiltration Flotilla, and Fleet Training Group. Officially, the CNO has only administrative command of the naval operating forces, since operational control is exercised by the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, through Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Korea. However, in practice, operational control of the ROK fleet has been delegated to the CNO, who exercises his control through the Commander in Chief, ROK Fleet.

Naval headquarters in Seoul maintains administrative control over the navy through a radio, teletype,

and telephone communication system. While some improvement has been made, this system is barely adequate for operational control of the fleet and the other operating units. Inadequate preventative and routine maintenance of electronic equipment results in a marginally satisfactory operating condition of shipboard communication equipment.

2. Strength, composition, and disposition³

Personnel of the navy number about 45,500 of whom 25,900 are in the marine corps; of the remaining 19,600, approximately 7,000 serve afloat. About 2,500 are naval officers and 2,100 are marine officers, and the balance enlisted men.

The operating forces consist of 5 destroyers (Figure 11), 3 destroyer escorts, 41 patrol craft, 12 mine warfare ships, 21 amphibious warfare ships, 88 amphibious warfare craft, 10 auxiliary ships, and 60 service craft. With the exception of some of the small

³For regularly updated information, refer to the *Automated Naval Order of Battle*, the *Military Intelligence Summary*, and the *Naval Forces Intelligence Study*, all published by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

patrol craft, auxiliary ships, service craft, and minesweepers (Figure 12), all are former U.S. ships completed during World War II, and their effectiveness is limited. All naval ships operate from Chinhae and use the other naval stations at Pusan, Inch'on, Mokp'o, Cheju, and Mukhojin-ni as ports of call for replenishing.

For patrol purposes, South Korean coasts are divided into three subareas—south (including Cheju-




FIGURE 11. The ROK Navy destroyer *Seoul*, a former U.S. Navy ship (U/OU)




FIGURE 12. The ROK Navy coastal minesweeper *Samch'ok* (C)

do), east, and west—to which surface units are assigned. About one-third of the marine corps combat elements are stationed on the west flank of the DMZ.

The navy has no organized reserve. Mobilization capacity, by M+90 is estimated at 28,200 naval personnel and 63,700 marines.

3. Training

The navy closely follows the training doctrine and procedures of the U.S. Navy, and the overall training program is being supervised by a U.S. Navy Advisory Group. ROK naval training does not measure up to U.S. standards, but steady progress is being made, and efficiency has continually improved.

Naval personnel are being trained in their own service schools and at Korean civilian universities, as well as in the United States. The navy training system ashore consists of a recruit training center, service schools, the Naval Academy, and the Naval War College, all located at Chinhae. The Naval War College provides a 36-week command and staff course. Four types of training are available at the Naval Academy—the regular 4-year course, a 13-week officer candidate course, a 24-week postgraduate school course, and a 4-week warrant officer course. The Naval Training Center has seven service schools for enlisted personnel—navigation, gunnery engineering, communications, electronics, administration, and the Naval Academy Preparatory School. Recruit training covers 13 weeks and is similar to that in the U.S. Navy.

All operational ships pursue an organized training schedule under the direction of the Fleet Training Group, which was established to assist the forces afloat in developing and maintaining the highest possible standards of training and operational readiness. This organization offers numerous courses of varying duration covering all phases of shipboard technical and practical work. Navy amphibious training is directed by the Navy Amphibious Training Unit at Chinhae, which trains personnel in the various phases of amphibious warfare using U.S. training manuals. Combined exercises involving U.S. and ROK naval forces are frequently held and have provided useful training for the ROK Navy.

4. Logistics

The logistic support activities and organization of the ROK Navy are patterned after its U.S. Navy counterparts and are modified to fit Korean facilities and capabilities. The principal support facilities are at

Chinhae, and limited support is available at Pusan and Inch'on Naval Stations, both of which can supply provisions and provide minor emergency repairs. The Naval Shipyard at Chinhae is capable of accomplishing all repairs to the present fleet provided that materiel, virtually all of which is MAP supplied, is in stock. Naval ship construction facilities are also located at the Chinhae Naval Shipyard. Construction is limited to motor gunboats, patrol boats, landing craft, and small auxiliaries, and to the manufacture of various items of equipment and ordnance. Construction has also been done at the Korean Shipbuilding Corporation in Pusan. The drydock at Chinhae can accommodate ships up to destroyer size, and the Naval Supply Depot, also at Chinhae, is the principal storage point for all materiel used by the navy. Storage facilities are generally good.

The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO) for Logistics is responsible to the Chief of Naval Operations for determining logistic programs, plans, and policy. Under the DCNO for Logistics there are five technical bureaus—Ships, Medicine and Surgery, Ordnance, Supplies and Accounts, and Yards and Docks. Each of these bureaus assists in the execution of logistic functions. Responsibility for the logistic support of the ROK Navy lies with the U.S. Navy. Supply channels and procedures for this support are normal U.S. Navy supply channels and procedures. The ROK Navy is expected to supply whatever materiel it can. The U.S. Naval Advisory Group stresses logistics management and supply functions and also handles the requisitioning of materiel for the ROK Navy.

5. Marine corps

The ROK Marine Corps is directly responsible to the Chief of Naval Operations. The corps has a personnel strength of 25,900, including 2,100 officers, and an unorganized reserve pool of 86,000 men, for whom 300 active-duty training billets are maintained.

The primary missions of the marine corps are to conduct land operations essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign, to maintain an amphibious assault force in readiness, and to provide for the security and defense of naval installations.

The headquarters, in Seoul, consists of the Commandant, Assistant Commandant, and a general staff. The general staff consists of Deputies for Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, and Comptroller. In July 1973 it was announced that marine corps headquarters is to be consolidated with naval headquarters, primarily to reduce administra-

tive costs. Consolidation was to be completed by the end of 1973. Details of the new organization are not yet known.

The marine corps is broadly divided into combat and supporting forces. The combat units include the 1st Marine Division (minus detached units), with headquarters at P'ohang; the 2d Marine Brigade (Provisional), at Kimp'o; the Marine Island Security Unit deployed to provide defense for the west coast island complex; and security forces consisting of about 1,300 men, located at Seoul and at the naval base and stations.

The 11,000-man 1st Marine Division is under the operational control of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Korea exercised through the ROK Chief of Naval Operations. The 2d Marine Brigade, with about 5,000 men, is under the operational control of the U.S. 1st Corps (Group). The Marine Island Security Unit is operationally controlled by the Commander, ROK Fleet, and is centered around Paengnyong-do (island).

Major marine supporting units include the Marine Corps Base and Landing Force Training Unit at P'ohang, and the Marine Corps Base at Chinhae. The base at Chinhae includes the Supply and Maintenance Depot and various marine corps schools. Support forces total about 3,100 personnel. In addition, the corps operates 15 utility aircraft.

E. Air force (S)

The ROK Air Force is a well-trained, reasonably modern force which supplements U.S. tactical air units stationed in South Korea. Its missions are to provide air defense for South Korea and to support ROK ground and naval forces; a secondary mission is to provide, on request of the Minister of National Defense, forces required for preserving internal security.

The air force is capable of providing tactical support to ground and naval forces under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) conditions. Two tactical fighter squadrons and nine day-fighter squadrons are fully combat ready. The air force is equipped with AIM 9/B air-to-air Sidewinder missiles and would be capable of providing a high degree of defense support if additional modern radar sites were added. In the event of an attack by North Korea, the air force could not sustain either defensive or offensive operations for more than a short period without rapid and full-scale aid from friendly countries. Principal weaknesses are the lack of supersonic aircraft, a shortage of spare parts, an ineffective aircraft control and warning (ACW) system, and insufficient air facilities for

effective dispersal of units and equipment. The air force has a small transport capability. Pilot and instructor training programs are satisfactory, but the large number of pilots trained yearly in excess of actual needs has become a major problem. The generally low level of training of air force technicians constitutes a major weakness.

I. Organization

Organization of the air force is patterned generally after that of the U.S. Air Force. It is headed by the Chief of Staff, who is advised and assisted by a Vice Chief of Staff and a Deputy Chief of Staff. The Deputy Chief of Staff is charged with coordinating staff operations. The headquarters staff contains five principal directorates and seven general staff sections and/or offices. The directorates, whose functions are similar to those of their USAF counterparts, are: Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Materiel, and Comptroller. The general staff sections are: Administration, Communications, Installations, and Public Information; offices include the Inspector Judge Advocate and the Surgeon. Duties of the general staff are similar to those of USAF staff sections.

Technically, the Chief of Staff exercises only administrative control over the air force, inasmuch as operational control is formally vested in the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, through the Commander, U.S. Air Forces Korea (AFK). However, in practice, immediate operational control has been delegated to the Chief of Staff.

Operational service and other support units are grouped under 14 separate major commands or organizations which report directly to air force headquarters. These include the Combat Air Command, the Air Defense Communications Wing, the Air Base Operations Wing, the Air Base Group, and the Air Materiel Depot. Training elements consist of the Air Force Academy, the Air Command and Staff College, the Flying Training School, the Technical Training Wing, and the Training Aids Squadron. Other organizations are the Air Intelligence Squadron, Office of Special Investigation, Special Activities Service Squadron, and the Air Force Hospital.

The Combat Air Command (CAC), with headquarters at Osan, is organized into three fighter wings (11 fighter squadrons); an air transport wing (four squadrons); four training squadrons; one light reconnaissance squadron; and Control and Warning (ACW) wing.

Air defense of South Korea is performed jointly by the aircraft of the CAC and the AA and SAM battalions of the army. While the operational control of the latter units is retained by the army, all their actions are coordinated at the National Air Defense Control Center at Osan.

2. Strength, composition, and disposition⁴

The air force has a personnel strength of approximately 28,500, including 4,400 officers and 24,100 enlisted men. The total includes 750 trained pilots. Among its 379 aircraft are 187 jet fighters (F-86F, F-5A, F-4D), 8 jet reconnaissance (RF-5A), 33 jet trainers (T-33, AT-33), 39 prop trainers (T-28, T-41B), 35 prop transports (C-46, C-54, C-118), 13 helicopters (UH-19, UH-1H), 7 ocean surveillance (S-2A), 50 tactical control aircraft (O-1) and 7 other aircraft. About 372 aircraft are assigned to operational units of the Combat Air Command. All fighter aircraft are capable of utilizing AIM 9/B air-to-air Sidewinder missiles.

Principal CAC units, type of aircraft assigned, and their deployment are shown in Figure 13. Information

⁴For current and detailed information refer to the *Free World Air Order of Battle*, published by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

on airfields is provided in the Transportation and Telecommunications chapter of this General Survey.

3. Training

The ROK Air Force training system, generally patterned after that of the U.S. Air Force, functions well, but due to budget limitations produces marginal results. Basic military training and basic instruction in supply and administration are conducted under supervision of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group—Korea. The U.S. MAP also provides advanced and applied technical instruction through on-the-job training at USAF installations overseas and formal instructor and specialized training in the United States at USAF technical schools, the Air University, and civilian colleges. Impediments to training in U.S. installations include the inadequate backgrounds of Korean students, the language barrier, and lack of textual material in the Korean language. In South Korea, poor training facilities and insufficient training aids are additional handicaps.

The ROK Air Force Academy, located at Seoul, is patterned after the U.S. Air Force Academy. It offers a 4-year course leading to a B.S. degree and a commission as second lieutenant. Since 1958, entering

FIGURE 13. Principal Air Force units (S)

UNIT	AIRCRAFT TYPE	LOCATION
1st Fighter Wing:		
105th Fighter Squadron.....	F-5A/B.....	KWANGJU
111th Fighter Squadron.....	F-86F.....	KUNSAN
112th Fighter Squadron.....	F-86F.....	KWANGJU
115th Fighter Squadron.....	F-5A/B.....	Do.
120th Fighter Squadron.....	F-5A/B.....	KANGNUNG
16th Training Squadron.....	T-33.....	KWANGJU
10th Fighter Wing:		
101st Fighter Squadron.....	F-86F.....	KIMPO
102d Fighter Squadron.....	F-5A/B.....	SUWON
103d Fighter Squadron.....	F-86F.....	Do.
121st Fighter Squadron.....	F-86F.....	SEOUL
189th Flying Squadron (training).....	AT-33.....	Do.
32d Reconnaissance Squadron.....	RF-5A.....	KIMPO
11th Fighter Wing:		
110th Fighter Squadron.....	F-5A/B.....	TAEJU
151st Tactical Fighter Squadron.....	F-4D.....	Do.
5th Air Transport Wing:		
5th Air Transport Squadron.....	C-46.....	KIMHAE
6th Air Transport Squadron.....	C-46.....	KIMPO
8th Air Transport Squadron.....	C-54.....	Do.
9th Ocean Survey Squadron.....	S-2A.....	Do.
7th Air Transport Squadron.....	C-118/C-54/UH-1H.....	Do.
33d Air Rescue Squadron.....	UH-1H/UH-19.....	Do.
12th Training Squadron.....	T-41B.....	TAEJON
15th Training Squadron.....	T-28.....	SACHON
36th Tactical Control Squadron.....	O-1.....	SEOUL

classes have had 70 students. Only about 75% of the cadets complete the course. Pilot cadets receive 40 hours of primary training in the O-1A. About half the graduates go into various specialized fields, such as electronics, communications, and maintenance.

The ROK Air Command and Staff College, also located at Seoul, has three graduate courses, each of which is patterned after its counterpart at the U.S. Air University—the Command and Staff Course, for lieutenant colonels and colonels; the Squadron Officer Course, for captains and majors; and the Academic Instructors Course, for lieutenants and captains.

The 12th flying training squadron stationed at Taejon conducts primary training with T-41B's.

Basic training is conducted at the 15th Training Squadron at Sachon with T-28's, and transitional training is conducted at Kwangju in T-33's. Most students are graduates of the Air Force Academy, but some come from the Officer Candidate School. Standards are high and about 50% of the students fail, but the squadrons turn out a proficient, first-rate pilot. All three fighter wings maintain instrument sections which provide transition and proficiency flying for pilots assigned.

Most of the ground training is given by the Air Technical Training Wing at Taejon, which also operates the Officer Candidate School. Technical training is largely academic, rather than practical, because of inadequate training aids; completion of courses in the various schools under the wing must be followed by training in operational units.

Because of the ROK Air Force's close association with the USAF during and since the Korean war, the air force has received most of its training under U.S. auspices. The aim of U.S. training has been to produce instructors for air force schools and supervisors for training in the field. As the air force training capability increases, the need for training with USAF units in the continental United States and at U.S. installations overseas will decrease. No training is provided for air force reserve personnel.

4. Logistics

Air force echelons of supply are patterned after those of the U.S. Air Force. Primary direction and control are furnished by the Air Materiel Staff at Air Force Headquarters. Implementation of policy and operations are directed and monitored by materiel staffs at each lower echelon, and depot functions are managed by a subordinate air force command (Air Materiel Depot). An air materiel directorate is

included in the Combat Air Command. There is strong control through all echelons; however, policies established by headquarters are sometimes misinterpreted or dogmatically applied by lower echelons.

The air force supply system is supported through the Air Materiel Depot located at Taegu. A munitions war reserve has been established and deployed to fighter bases. Storage facilities are temporary-type military structures that were left behind by other nations in the 1945-51 period. Existing facilities are not adequate to store and maintain required in-country stocks properly or, in particular, to expand stockage to meet emergency situations. A major pipeline system, extending from Pohang to Seoul, supplies diesel, jet fuel, and gasoline to bases and airfields in that area. Elsewhere, jet fuel is transported in railroad tank cars and gasoline by trucks. At major bases, most fuel is stored in above-ground tanks; at other airfields, it is in 55-gallon drums.

The air force provides its own depot, field, and organizational maintenance for aircraft, armament, electrical equipment, and vehicles. Aircraft maintenance is good, considering strenuous flying schedules, weak management, and the shortage of skilled technicians and parts. Increased emphasis on periodic and special inspections has had a favorable impact resulting in improved aircraft reliability.

All major items of air force equipment are furnished by the United States and are MAP-supported. Cumbersome administrative practices and poor management have hindered development of efficient supply and maintenance systems; storage facilities are crowded and dilapidated. Transportation media vary from poor to only fair, except for air transport, which is good. Supply levels for ordnance, spare parts, and fuel are authorized at 60 days but, due to fund and facility limitations, cannot be maintained.

F. Paramilitary (S)

The 49,000-man Korean National Police (KNP), including the Maritime Police and the Combat Police Force, has paramilitary capabilities and in emergency or wartime situations would move under Ministry of National Defense control from its normal Ministry of Home Affairs supervision. The Maritime Police, consisting of 800 men and 45 patrol craft, is concerned with coastal security and other coastguard-type functions. The Combat Police Force, which consists of 37 companies totaling 4,800 men, is involved in the effort to counter agent infiltration from North Korea.

SECRET

The KNP maintains 10 liaison aircraft (8 fixed-wing aircraft, and 2 helicopters). Details on the police are given in the Government and Politics chapter of this General Survey.

A Homeland Defense Reserve Force (HDRF), drawn primarily from the army reserve, was established in 1968 to assist the military and police in

apprehending North Korean agents and in guarding lines of communication and installations against sabotage. Current HDRF strength is about 2.1 million, including some 12,000 women trained primarily for first aid, with expansion to 2.5 million planned. Personnel are armed only when training or mobilized for actual operations.

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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