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2

117 - .30 Cal. A.P.

3

53 - .30 Cal. Tracer.

4

12 - Pistol.

5

South Group Command Post detail at stations at 0810. NO

6

repeat NO interruption in communications in South Group during

7

this period. There was rifle and automatic rifle fire on

8

low flying enemy planes by officers and men.

9

BATTERY G 97th, were in camp at Fort Weaver. Its

10

battle position is at fixed battery at Fort Weaver.

11

Alerted at 0810

12

Ready to fire 0830

13

Engaged enemy 0830

14

Fired 30 rds - 3" A.A. Shrapnel. Approximately 200

15

rds of .30 Cal. ball Amm. One .50 Cal. Machine Gun was in

16

action at approximately 8:50 A.M. During this firing Private

17

YORK gunner was wounded while engaging the enemy, he stayed

18

at his post although ordered to take cover. Lieutenant KING

19

states that the battery fire broke up and definitely turned

20

back one formation of 15 enemy planes. Casualties - One (1)

21

Officer dead -- Killed while proceeding through Hickam Field

22

to his battle position. Four (4) enlisted men wounded.

23

BATTERY F 97th, was camped at Fort Weaver. Its

24

battle position at Fixed Battery Closson, Fort Hamehameha, T.H.

25

Alerted 0755, and moved to Battery position across

1

2

Pearl Harbor Entrance.

3

Ready to fire 0855

4

Engaged Enemy 0900 to 0920

5

Amm. fired 27 - 3" A.A., H.E., M.K. fuse M3.

6

Approximately 400 rds. .30 Cal.ball

7

Approximately 130 rds .30 Cal.A.P.

8

BATTERY G 64th, was in barracks at Fort Shafter,

9

battle position at Ahua Point.

10

Alerted approximately 0815, and moved to battery

11

position at Fort Kamehameha.

12

Ready to fire 1030

13

Engaged Enemy with .30 Cal. M.G. at 1030

14

Amm. Fired Approximately 50 rds. of .30 Cal.
ball.

15

BATTERY H 64th, was in barracks at Fort Shafter.

16

Its battle position is at Fort Weaver.

17

Alerted 0830

18

Ready to fire 1145

19

Engaged Enemy 2100

20

Amm. fired 40 rds - .50 Cal. ball.

21

40 rds - .50 Cal. A.P.

22

30 rds - .50 Cal. Tracer

23

MARINE DETACHMENT: The Fleet Machine Gun School

24

at Fort Weaver. Operations were in cooperation with South

25

1

2

Group although not tactically assigned.

3

Alerted 0800

4

Ready to fire 0810

5

Engaged Enemy 0810

6

Amm. fired

Approximately 5000 rds. of .50 Cal.

7

A.P. ball and tracer.

8

Approximately 450 rds of 20 mm A.A.

9

This Detachment shot down 4 enemy planes and saved a 4 engined bomber by causing enemy plane firing on its tail to pull out and cease its attack. Much shrapnel and some small arms bullets fell about Fleet N.G. School. There was excellent cooperation from Fort Weaver personnel in the liaison, phone, etc.

10

11

12

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14

15

b. 98th COAST ARTILLERY, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

16

Alerted at 0800

17

The communications section at the Command Post,

18

Wahiawa, shot down one enemy plane flying at

19

less than 100 feet, with their automatic

20

rifles at 0855.

21

1st Battalion 98th C.A. (AA), was in position

22

and ready for action at the following time:

23

B - 98 0955

24

D - 98 1000

25

C - 98 1030

Witness Short

1
2 BATTERY M 64th, stationed at Fort Shafter, was
3 alerted at 0815, moved to Wheeler Field, and was ready for
4 action at 1155.

5 2nd Battalion 98th C.A. (AA). This Battalion has
6 two batteries at Kaneohe and one at Waipahu School. They
7 were in position and ready for action at the following times:

8 F - 98 1315

9 G - 98 1315

10 H - 98 1330

11 c. CAMP MALAKOLE 251st C.A. (AA). All units were
12 alerted at 0805 when fired upon by a single enemy plane. All
13 units returned the fire with small arms and the plane was
14 shot down.

15 1st BATTALION 251st C.A. (AA), was in position and
16 ready for action as follows:

17 B - 251 at West Loch 1145

18 C - 251 Ewa Beach 1145

19 D - 251 South of Ewa 1145

20 2nd BATTALION 251st C.A. (AA), was in position
21 as follows:

22 E - 251 Navy Yard

23 F - 251 Navy Recreation Area

24 G - 251 Tank Farm

25 H - 251 Navy Yard

Witness Short

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2

3

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5

At 1120 and again at 1122, E, 251st fired on enemy planes, shooting down one plane. 100 rds of .50 Cal. were fired on the first plane and 200 rds of .50 Cal. were fired on the second plane.

6

7

d. FORT KANEHAMEHA. Battery A, 97th C.A. (AA) fired 1500 rds of .30 Cal. at one enemy plane offshore at 0835.

8

9

10

11

e. SAND ISLAND. The AA Detachment of Battery F, 55th C.A., present at Sand Island when the attack started was ready for action at 0815. This battery fired 89 rds of 3" AA and shot down two (2) enemy planes at 0815.

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f. FORT SHAFTER.

(1) Three (3) enemy dive bombers were fired on by the Headquarters Battery and the Intelligence Battery of this Brigade and by Battery E, 64th C.A. (AA).
Ammunition Expended - 3000 - .30 Cal.

(2) Enemy planes were fired on at 0700 and 1000 by Battery A, 64th C.A. (AA). Ammunition Expended 1000 - .30 Cal.

(3) All 3" gun batteries and Automatic Weapons Batteries of the 64th C.A. (AA) were alerted at 0815 and were in position as follows:

B - 64 at Aiea 1000

C - 64 at Aliamanu 1030

D - 64 south of Aliamanu 1100

1 Witness Short

2 F - 64 at Pearl City 1105

3 G - 64 See Par. 2 a. above

4 H - 64 See Par. 2 a. above.

5 I - 64 at Aliamanu

6 K - 64 at Hickam Field

7 L - 64 at Hickam Field

8 M - 64 See Par. 2 b. above.

9 All of these units except M, 64th fired during the
10 second attack from 1000 to 1145. Ammunition
11 expended as follows:

12 3" 23 rds.

13 .50 Cal. 2361 rds.

14 .30 Cal. 2821 rds.

15 g. FORT BARRETTE. Battery H, 97th C.A. (AA), was
16 stationed at Fort Weaver. The battery was alerted at 0755,
17 moved out of Fort Weaver at 0830, and arrived at Fort Barrette
18 at 0910. Enemy planes were engaged by small arms fire at
19 Fort Weaver, while enroute, and at Fort Barrette. The de-
20 tachment on guard at Fort Barrette shot down one enemy plane
21 at 0910 by small arms fire.

22 3. Three (3) Marine AA Batteries were attached to the
23 Brigade at 2245.

24 4. AMMUNITION.

25 Status at 0730, 7 December 1941. All units of the

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Witness Short

Brigade had in their possession, the initial issue of small arms ammunition. This included ammunition for rifles, pistols, automatic rifles and machine guns. In addition, the 3-inch ammunition was so positioned that it was readily accessible to all units of the Brigade except four (4) batteries for which ammunition was at Aliamanu Crater. These batteries completed drawing their initial allowance, 1200 rounds per battery, by 1015.

(Sgd) C. E. Wing

C. E. Wing,

Colonel, 53d C. A. Brigade (AA),
Commanding.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

1 ACTION AND DISPOSITION OF 53RD CA BRIGADE

2 (ANTI-AIRCRAFT) ON 7 DECEMBER 1941

3 64th CA (AA) Regiment

4 All 3-inch gun batteries and automatic weapons batteries of
5 the 64th CA (AA) were alerted at Fort Shafter at 8:15 a.m. and
6 were in position as follows:

7	Battery "A" (Searchlight)	at Honolulu	10:00 a.m.
8	"B" (3-inch)	at Aiea	10:00 a.m.
9	"C" "	at Aliamanu	10:30 a.m.
10	"D" "	south of Aliamanu	11:00 a.m.
11	"E" (Searchlight)	at Ewa-Pearl Harbor	time not known
12	"F" (3-inch)	at Pearl City	11:05 a.m.
13	"G" "	at Ahua Point	10:30 a.m.
14	"H" "	at Ft. Weaver	11:45 a.m.
15	"I" (37 mm.)	at Aliamanu)	known only that batteries were in position before 11:45 a.m.
16	"K" "	at Hickam Field)	
17	"L" "	at Hickam Field)	
18	"M" "	at Wheeler Field	11:55 a.m.

19 97th CA (AA) Regiment

20 Batteries of the 97th CA (AA), except Battery "A" at Fort
21 Kamehameha, were stationed at Ft. Weaver. They were alerted
22 between 7:55 and 8:10 a.m. and were in position ready to fire
23 as follows:

WLC2

1 Battery "A" (Searchlight) at Ft. Kamehameha 8:34 a.m. (Engaged enemy
2 with small
3 arms at 8:34
4 a.m.)
5 "F" (3-inch) at Ft Kamehameha 8:55 a.m. (Engaged enemy
6 at 9:00 a.m.)
7 "G" " at Ft Weaver 8:30 a.m. (Engaged enemy
8 at 8:30 a.m.)
9 "H" " at Ft Barrett 10:20 a.m.
10 "B", "C", "D", "E" and 3rd Bn not yet organized.

11 98th CA (AA) Regiment

12 Batteries of the 98th CA (AA) Regiment were stationed at
13 Schofield Barracks with the exception of Battery "D" which was
14 stationed at Camp Malakole. They were in position ready to
15 fire as follows:

16 Battery "A" (Searchlight) at Schofield Barracks time not known
17 "B" (3-inch) at Schofield Barracks 9:55 a.m.
18 "C" " at Schofield Barracks 10:30 a.m.
19 "D" " at Puuloa Dump, South
20 of Ewa 11:45 a.m.
21 "E" not yet organized
22 "F" and "G" (3-inch) at Kaneohe Naval
23 Air Station 1:15 p.m.
24 "H" (3-inch) at Waiphu High School 1:30 p.m.
25 3rd Bn 98th CA (AA) not yet organized.

WLC3

1 251st CA (AA) Regiment (less 3rd Bn)

2 All units of the 251st at Camp Malakole were alerted at 8:05
3 a.m. Batteries of the 1st Battalion were in position and ready
4 for action as follows:

5	Battery "A" (Searchlight)	at Ewa	time not known
6	"B" (3-inch)	at West Loch	11:45 a.m.
7	"C" "	at Ewa Beach	11:45 a.m.
8	"D" "	at South of Ewa	11:45 a.m.
9	"E" (50 cal.)	at Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor	12:41 p.m.
10	"F" (37 mm.)	at Navy Recrea- tion Area	12:30 p.m.
11	"G" "	at Tank Farm, Scho- field Barracks	11:00 a.m.
12	"H" "	at Navy Yard	12:05 p.m.

13 AA Det Battery "F" 55th CA


14 This detachment was at Sand Island when the attack started
15 and engaged the enemy with 3-inch guns at 8:15 a.m., shooting
16 down two enemy planes at that time.
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ORGANIZATION OF THE HAWAIIAN
DEPARTMENT AT THE OUTBREAK
OF THE WAR

XXXX (LT. GEN. W. C. SHORT)

**HAWAIIAN
DEPARTMENT**

CHIEF of STAFF
COL. W. C. PHILLIPS



1 Witness short

Questions by: The Chairman

h2

2 Mr. Kaufman: I also offer in evidence at this time
3 two reports made to General Short. It has been distributed
4 to the members of the committee today.

5 The Chairman: Do you want that made a part of the
6 testimony?

7 Mr. Kaufman: No, sir. Just as an exhibit. That will
8 be Exhibit 139.

9 The Chairman: That will be done.

10 (The document referred to was
11 marked Exhibit No. 139.)

12 The Chairman: Are you through?

13 Mr. Kaufman: Yes, sir.

14 The Chairman: General Short, I wish to ask you a
15 few questions. You were Commander of the Army in Hawaii
16 prior to the arrival of Admiral Kimmel to take charge
17 of the Fleet?

18 General Short: No, sir, he took charge of the Fleet
19 I think a week before I arrived.

20 The Chairman: You followed him?

21 General Short : By about a week.

22 The Chairman: In command of the Army forces?

23 General Short: Yes, sir.

24 The Chairman: And you were assigned there during the
25 whole time up to the attack?

1 Witness short

questions by: The Chairman

h3

2 General Short: That is correct.

3 The Chairman: Did your duties require you to remain
4 on the Island constantly?

5 General Short: I was never out of the Hawaiian
6 group. I made visits of inspection on the outlying islands.

7 The Chairman: You were going from place to place
8 within the territory under your jurisdiction?

9 General Short: That is correct.

10 The Chairman: During the entire time?

11 General Short: That is correct.

12 The Chairman: What proportion -- I am asking you
13 this question because I was unavoidably absent when Admiral
14 Kimmel's testimony was concluded, and did not get an oppor-
15 tunity to ask him any questions at all --- what proportion
16 of the time you were at Pearl Harbor -- Pearl Harbor was
17 your headquarters?

18 General Short: Fort Shafter.

19 The Chairman: Fort Shafter, on the Island of Oahu?

20 General Short: Yes, sir.

21 The Chairman: How much of the time during your presence
22 at Fort Shafter, or on the Island of Oahu, was Admiral
23 Kimmel in the Harbor at his headquarters?

24 General Short: I think he was in almost constantly.
25 He was undoubtedly out at sea for a few days at a time,

Witness short

Questions by: The Chairman

h4

1
2 but I do not remember specifically. I think the greater
3 part of his time he was in his headquarters.

4 The Chairman: He spent most of his time there on
5 the Island, at Pearl Harbor?

6 General Short: I think so.

7 The Chairman: And was only out at sea when his
8 Flagship went out?

9 General Short: Yes, sir.

10 The Chairman: Was there any time during that nearly
11 a year from the time you took over in the Army and Admiral
12 Kimmel took over in the Navy, when Pearl Harbor was com-
13 pletely empty of naval vessels?

14 General Short: I do not know, sir. Naturally you
15 could see the vessels in Pearl Harbor every time you drove
16 along the road, but I could not say definitely.

17 The Chairman: During this year, from February on up
18 until the 7th of December, you and Admiral Kimmel conversed
19 in a general way about the situation?

20 General Short: We talked about the situation, I think
21 from every angle, more or less. We talked many, many
22 times about it.

23 The Chairman: How many times would you say a week
24 during that year?

25 General Short: I probably saw him officially at least

Witness short

Questions by: The Chairman

h5

once a week, and I usually played golf with him every other Sunday, and we talked of all kinds of things around the course at that time.

Larry
fls

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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1 Witness short

Questions by: The Chairman

2 The Chairman: You talked over the international
3 situation on the Fairway?

4 General Short: Over everything, in effect, yes, sir.

5 The Chairman: Now, as time went on toward the 7th
6 of December, did he and you both recognize that the situa-
7 tion was becoming more tense?

8 General Short: I think from July 25 on, when the
9 sanctions were put into effect, that we both felt it was
10 tense, from then on.

11 The Chairman: You didn't have to have any message
12 from Washington in order to know that?

13 General Short: No. We read the papers.

14 The Chairman: Yes. And you got general information
15 from Washington, sizing up the situation as did the Admiral?

16 General Short: Not very often. The number of mes-
17 sages were very limited, but we did get them.

18 The Chairman: Did you get letters as well as cable-
19 grams?

20 General Short: I didn't get letters on the inter-
21 national situation. I got letters from General Marshall,
22 but usually pertaining to measures that were being taken
23 to strengthen our defenses.

24 The Chairman: There is voluminous correspondence
25 between Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel. It fills a

Lac
fls
Shack

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness short

Questions by: The Chairman

h2

1
2 volume as thick as Blackstone's Commentary. Did you
3 have any such correspondence as that?

4 General Short: The correspondence between General
5 Marshall, and me I think is all in this exhibit here,
6 Exhibit No. 53.

7 The Chairman: When does that start?

8 General Short: That correspondence started on, the
9 first letter was written by General Marshall on the 7th
10 of February, and the last letter written by him was on
11 October 28th.

12 The Chairman: Now, was there any touchiness between
13 Admiral Kimmel and you --

14 General Short: We were extremely friendly.

15 The Chairman: Let me finish the question before you
16 answer, please.

17 General Short: I am sorry.

18 The Chairman: Was there any feeling of touchiness
19 between Admiral Kimmel and you that might have prevented
20 either of you from making a too detailed inquiry into
21 what the other was doing, lest he be offended?

22 General Short: I don't think there was at all. I
23 think that maybe either one of us wouldn't have wanted
24 the other prying into business he thought didn't concern
25 him in any way, but our relations were extremely friendly.

1 Witness short

questions by: The Chairman

h3

2 I think I could have asked Admiral Kimmel anything
3 that really concerned me and --

4 The Chairman: Well, of course, the national defense
5 concerned both of you, did it not?

6 General Short: Oh, yes; no question about it.

7 The Chairman: Concerned you both.

8 General Short: Yes.

9 The Chairman: And as the situation grew worse, pre-
10 sumably would concern both of you more and therefore any
11 inquiry from either as to what the other was doing would
12 not necessarily be prying into his business, would it?

13 General Short: I was thinking, Senator, more in
14 the way of asking him as to details, how they performed
15 certain things, that he might possibly have figured
16 wasn't my business.

17 The Chairman: In his testimony before the Grunert
18 Committee, I believe it was, Admiral Kimmel made the state-
19 ment, or testified in effect that he hesitated sometimes to
20 ask you in too much detail for fear he might be regarded
21 as trying to pry, although I don't think he used that
22 language.

23 General Short: I think he probably meant the same
24 thing that I am trying to say, that if I would have asked
25 him how often he opened the hatches, for instance, of

1 Witness short

Questions by: The Chairman

h4

2 his ships and made an inspection, he would have thought
3 that it was not any business of mine.

4 The Chairman: But as to how many ships he might
5 have in the harbor --

6 General Short : Yes, I think anything of that kind
7 there would be no question about it.

8 The Chairman: Why was it necessary to allude to
9 that subject in the former investigation?

10 General Short: Well, I don't know. If you will
11 remember, in General Marshall's first letter to me, he
12 talked considerably about Admiral Kimmel, the type of man
13 he was. He wanted to be sure, apparently, that I did get
14 an understanding to begin with, and get off, so to speak,
15 on the right foot.

16 The Chairman: Yes.

17 General Short: And I think I took that into considera-
18 tion.

19 The Chairman: He sort of warned you against the
20 Admiral's bluntness?

21 General Short: Yes, sir.

22 The Chairman: And he wanted you to take note of
23 that in making the proper approach?

24 General Short: Yes, sir; and I think I tried to
25 carry that out; and our think our terms were excellent.

Witness short

Questions by: The Chairman

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The Chairman: Did you have any such characteristics as might have embarrassed the Admiral in approaching you?

General Short: Well, I might have, but he wasn't told about it.

The Chairman: He wasn't warned against you?

General Short: I don't believe he was.

The Chairman: I note in your statement that you have followed the pattern rather closely, in a sense, adopted by Admiral Kimmel in his statement, that if he had had all of the information that was available in Washington, he might have acted differently; you take the same position, that if you had had all of the information that was in Washington, you might have acted differently?

General Short: I am sure that we have taken that position absolutely independently, because, if you will take my statement, the statement I made before the Roberts Commission, the first 50 pages I dictated, I had never talked with Admiral Kimmel during that period, and you will find the same claims that you will find in my statement here.

The Chairman: Did you and Admiral Kimmel consult or confer about this hearing?

General Short: Oh, I have talked to him frequently about this, but at the time of the Roberts hearing we

Witness Short

Questions by: The Chairman

h6

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2 were both so busy -- I think I had three days, and spent
3 most of the nights preparing that large volume that I
4 have turned in to you, so you can see I had very little
5 time to consult with anybody.

6 The Chairman: Is it customary, or is it required,
7 or is it military or naval practice that the commanders
8 in the field shall be given copies of diplomatic messages
9 sent back and forth between their Government and other
10 governments?

11 General Short: I wouldn't say that it was, but they
12 at least, if it is anything that is going to affect them,
13 it seems to me they would always be given the substance,
14 even if they were not told where it came from.

15 The Chairman: Have you read all of the intercepts
16 that Admiral Kimmel recited in his statement that he thinks
17 he should have been entitled to see?

18 General Short : Yes, sir.

19 The Chairman: Outside of the message carving up
20 Pearl Harbor into the five divisions in which ships were
21 located, is there anything in any of those messages which
22 pointed to an attack upon Pearl Harbor any more than upon
23 any other place?

24 General Short: That was the most definite thing, and
25 then the fact that the delivery of the message was at one

1 Witness short

Questions by: The Chairman

h7

2 p. m., Washington time, which would be shortly after
3 dawn in Honolulu, which I think was an indication --

4 The Chairman: Well, you couldn't have gotten that
5 one any sonner than you got it, could you?

6 General Short: Yes, we could have gotten that, we
7 could have gotten it -- they had it all decoded in the
8 War Department between 8:30 and 9 o'clock in the morning.

9 The Chairman: That was decoded in the Navy Depart-
10 ment?

11 General Short: Yes, sir, but it was received in the
12 War Department between 8:30 and 9 a.m.

13 The Chairman: General Marshall testified as to the
14 time when he received it.

15 General Short: That is correct, but General Miles
16 and Colonel Bratton had it in their possession from at
17 least 9 o'clock to 11:25 a. m., and did nothing.

18 The Chairman: Well, General Miles testified as to
19 what he did, and Colonel Bratton will, I suppose.

20 At any rate, there were none of these messages that
21 are complained of because of their non-delivery in Hawaii,
22 these intercepts, that gave any indication of an attack on
23 Pearl Harbor, except the one dividing up Pearl Harbor?

24 General Short: No.

25 The Chairman: They all indicated, most of them, an

1 Witness short

Questions by: The Chairman

h8

2 attack somewhere.

3 General Short : Yes, sir.

4 The Chairman: But I am talking about Pearl Harbor.

5 General Short: I think those two things are the
6 really definite things that pointed to Pearl Harbor.

7 The Chairman: And the other intercepts related to
8 the more tense situation as it developed?

9 General Short: Yes, sir.

10 The Chairman: But did not give indication as to
11 where or when any attack would be made.

12 General Short: Well, I think you could get an
13 indication possibly of when. You knew when they set dead-
14 lines that something was going to happen.

15 The Chairman: That was a conclusion that might have
16 been drawn, that when they set a deadline of the 25th
17 and then moved it up to the 29th, you could draw the con-
18 clusion that something was going to happen?

19 General Short: Anybody who was familiar with the
20 weather conditions in Alaska and the Aleutian Islands and
21 happened to think along that line, I think would have drawn
22 a direct conclusion, because about that time of the year
23 the weather gets very bad out in the Aleutian Islands. I
24 happen to have spent two years in Alaska, and know that.
25 And to a Navy man that might well mean that the condition

Witness short

Questions by: The Chairman

h9

1
2 was getting to the point where the fueling of ships
3 at sea would be hazardous.

4 The Chairman: The weather in Alaska wouldn't neces-
5 sarily indicate whether the Japanese were going to make
6 an air attack or whether they would make it at Hawaii or
7 the Panama Canal or Puget Sound.

8 General Short: It would only indicate the diffi-
9 culty of proceeding by that northern route.

10 The Chairman: In other words, if anybody familiar
11 with the weather in Alaska had sat down to speculate on
12 it, he would have speculated they wouldn't send the six
13 ships through that route?

14 General Short: Not later than that. It was getting
15 about the limit on where it would be bad after that.

16 The Chairman: But even that speculation wouldn't
17 have told you anything if they were coming to Pearl Harbor?

18 General Short: If they went by the northern route,
19 they would be probably going to either Seattle or Hawaii.

20 The Chairman: Now, this message that the Navy Depart-
21 ment sent to Admiral Kimmel on the 24th was shown to you?

22 General Short: Yes, sir.

23 The Chairman: Of course, while it was shown to you
24 for information, it was also shown to you for your guidance?

25 General Short: Yes, sir.

Witness short

Questions by: The Chairman

h10

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2 The Chairman: Under the mutual arrangement that you
3 were supposed to have out there either one of you who
4 got an important message or a directive from Washington
5 was supposed to show it to the other?

6 General Short: Yes, sir.

7 The Chairman: To keep one another advised?

8 General Short : Yes, sir.

9 The Chairman: And you got this message of the 24th of
10 November, which has been read time and time again into
11 the record, but which states:

12 "CHANCES OF FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH
13 JAPAN VERY DOUBTFUL. THIS SITUATION COUPLED WITH THE
14 STATEMENTS OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND MOVEMENTS THEIR
15 NAVAL AND MILITARY FORCES INDICATE IN OUR OPINION THAT
16 A SURPRISE AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN ANY DIRECTION INCLUDING
17 ATTACK ON PHILIPPINES OR GUAM IS POSSIBILITY. CHIEF OF
18 STAFF HAS SEEN THIS DISPATCH CONCURS AND REQUESTS ACTION.
19 ADDRESSEES TO INFORM SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS THEIR AREAS.
20 UTMOST SECRECY NECESSARY IN ORDER NOT TO COMPLICATE AN
21 ALREADY TENSE SITUATION OR PRECIPITATE JAPANESE ACTION."

22 And so forth.

23 Now, this is a message saying that an aggressive attack
24 may be expected in any direction, including two places;
25 it doesn't exclude any other place, does it?

1 Witness Short

Questions by: The Chairman

hll

2 General Short: No, sir.

3 The Chairman: It emphasizes --

4 General Short: It emphasizes those two places, and
5 when some other place is equally important, I feel that
6 if they intended to include the other place they would
7 mention it.

8 The Chairman: Wouldn't a careful interpretation of
9 that message mean that the Japanese were calculated to
10 make an aggressive movement in any direction, and that "any
11 direction" means the Philippines or Guam, as well as every
12 other place, but that they emphasized those two places?

13 General Short: I would say that it was possible in
14 any direction, but probable toward the Philippines and
15 Guam because they were singled out.

16 The Chairman: Well, that is a matter of interpreta-
17 tion.

18 General Short: Yes, sir.

19 The Chairman: The word "including" means, for in-
20 stance, if I want to sell some stock, I advertise I have
21 a lot of stock for sale, including a horse and a mule,
22 that wouldn't mean that all the rest that I had for sale
23 wouldn't be sold?

24 General Short: That is true, but that would definitely
25 emphasize the horse and the mule.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: The Chairman

hl2

2 The Chairman: Yes; I wouldn't want to overlook
3 selling them.

4 General Short: No, sir.

5 The Chairman: In this message of the 27th -- which
6 was shown to you also, was it not?

7 General Short: Yes, sir.

8 The Chairman: And for the same purpose?

9 General Short: Yes, sir.

10 The Chairman: It was a little stronger. "This is to
11 be considered as a war warning."

12 General Short: There is one very significant thing
13 there, though. You notice that Guam was included in the
14 probable attack, or possible attack on the 24th, and
15 in that message they talk about Guam only in terms of
16 sabotage.

17 The Chairman: Yes.

18 General Short: It would indicate that they were
19 dwelling even more on the southwest Pacific.

20 Guam, which was very close to Japan, had been elimi-
21 nated.

22 The Chairman: Let me ask you this. Everybody in
23 Washington, all the high officers in Washington, Navy,
24 Army, Intelligence, War Plans, General Staff, all saw
25 these intercepted messages, but as to which Admiral Kimmel

Witness short

Questions by: The Chairman

hl3

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2 complains and you complain not having been transmitted
3 to you?

4 General Short: Yes, sir.

5 The Chairman: They all have testified that notwith-
6 standing those messages, they did not really expect an
7 attack at Pearl Harbor and were surprised when it came.

8 Do you think that if you had gotten all of those, or
9 if the Admiral had gotten them, or both of you together
10 had gotten them, you would have reached any different
11 conclusion from that reached by everybody in Washington?

12 General Short: I think there was a possibility be-
13 cause Pearl Harbor meant a little more to us. We were
14 a little closer to the situation, and I believe we would
15 have been inclined to look at that Pearl Harbor informa-
16 tion a little more closely.

17 We might not have made the correct decision, but I
18 believe there was more chance that either we or someone
19 on our staffs would have had the idea.

20 The Chairman: You say that Pearl Harbor meant more
21 to the Admiral and to you and that therefore you were
22 more concerned about it.

23 If that is true, why did you rely for the action you
24 took upon some definite instruction from Washington instead
25 of exercising greater judgment and discretion in doing what

1 Witness Short

Questions by: The Chairman

2 you could do with what you had?

3 General Short: Because they were my only sources
4 of information. I had no source of information outside
5 Hawaii, except the War Department.

6 The Chairman: In other words, you mean to say that
7 with your general information and sizing up the situation
8 during the whole year that you would take no action that
9 meant anything in the way of preparation until you got
10 meticulous detailed instructions from Washington to do it?

11 General Short: I mean that I knew that the War Depart-
12 ment had many sources of information. They had military
13 attaches. They got reports from the State Department and
14 the Commerce Department.

15 They had a certain number of agents scattered around
16 in the Far East. If they were in a position to get informa-
17 tion that I had no access to at all, I had every reason to
18 believe that their judgment would be better than my just
19 arriving at a conclusion from reading the newspapers.

20 The Chairman: Well, we had military attaches and
21 ambassadors in Tokyo, but due to the secretiveness of
22 the Japanese Government, we didn't get much information.

23 General Short: That is true. I didn't know whether
24 they were getting much or getting little.

25 The Chairman: Yes.

hl4

Witness short

Questions by: The Chairman

hl5

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2 Now, let me get down to the message that you got
3 yourself from General Marshall, which you call in your
4 statement the "Do-Don't" message.

5 General Short: The Army Pearl Harbor Board was the
6 one that designated it that.

7 The Chairman: Do you mean by that description to
8 rather ridicule the message that Marshall sent to you,
9 by calling it the "Do-Dont" message?

10 General Short: The Army Pearl Harbor Board gave it
11 that term, because of conflicting ideas presented, because
12 of the fact that practically everything they gave was
13 qualified, except two things. It was not my terminology.
14 I adopted it. I adopted it from the Army Pearl Harbor
15 Board.

16 The Chairman: It is not original with you, then?

17 General Short: No, sir.

18 The Chairman: Now, this message to you, No. 472 --

19 General Short: Yes, sir.

20 The Chairman: (Reading)

21 "NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN APPEAR TO BE TERMINATED
22 TO ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES WITH ONLY THE BAREST POSSIBILITIES
23 THAT THE JAPANESE MIGHT COME BACK AND OFFER TO CONTINUE."

24 That was the day following the delivery of the ten-
25 point note to the Japanese ambassador by Secretary Hull?

1 Witness short

questions by: The Chairman

h16

2 General Short : Yes, sir.

3 The Chairman: Which he delivered on the 26th?

4 General Short: Yes, sir.

5 The Chairman: (Reading)

6 "JAPANESE FUTURE ACTION UNPREDICTABLE BUT HOSTILE
7 ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT. IF HOSTILITIES CANNOT BE
8 AVOIDED THE UNITED STATES DESIRES THAT JAPAN COMMIT THE
9 FIRST OVERT ACT."

10 That was our policy in all departments. All of you
11 understood that if war had to come that our own country
12 desired that Japan precipitate it instead of our country
13 precipitating it; that is correct, isn't it?

14 General Short: Yes, sir.

15 The Chairman: You understood that?

16 General Short: Yes, sir.

17 The Chairman: And that is what the Secretary of
18 State, the President, the Secretary of War, and the Secre-
19 tary of the Navy, and all of the high officers understood
20 that if there had to be hostilities, we didn't want to
21 start them; isn't that true?

22 General Short: ..I very strongly got that impression
23 from that message.

24 The Chairman: (Reading)

25 "IF HOSTILITIES CANNOT BE AVOIDED THE UNITED STATES

1 Witness short

Questions by: The Chairman

hl7

2 DESIRES THAT JAPAN COMMIT THE FIRST OVERT ACT. THIS POLICY
3 COULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS RESTRICTING YOU TO A COURSE OF
4 ACTION THAT MIGHT JEOPARDIZE YOUR DEFENSE. PRIOR TO
5 HOSTILE JAPANESE ACTION YOU ARE DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE
6 SUCH RECONNAISSANCE AND OTHER MEASURES --"

7 As might be necessary under the circumstances.

8 General Short: It made, however, a rather difficult
9 situation. If we discovered a carrier 800 or a thousand
10 miles out at sea, it would have been a very fine point
11 whether under that we should attack.

12 The Chairman: Well, you didn't have to pass on that
13 fine point, because you were just in charge of the Army?

14 General Short : Yes, I might have had to furnish
15 bombers to do the bombing.

16 The Chairman: Yes.

17 General Short: Admiral Kimmel would be the one.

18 The Chairman: That was a naval decision.

19 General Short: Yes, sir.

20 The Chairman: (Reading)

21 "PRIOR TO HOSTILE JAPANESE ACTION" --

22 This is not a request. It is not an intimation. It
23 is a direction:

24 -- "YOU ARE DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE SUCH RECONNAISSANCE
25 --"

1 Witness short

Questions by: The Chairman

hl8

2 In general broad terms, that doesn't mean to look
3 out after sabotage, does it?

4 General Short: No, sir, but long distant reconnais-
5 sance, by the agreement with the Navy, was definitely a
6 Navy problem, and General Marshall agreed that under that
7 construction all I had to do was to turn over my planes
8 to the Navy if they were called for.

9 The Chairman: When did he agree to that?

10 General Short: I have the quotation. He was asked,
11 I think, before the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

12 The Chairman: He hadn't agreed to that before this
13 took place?

14 General Short: No, but he said that was his inter-
15 pretation, the same as it was mine.

16 The Chairman: (Reading)

17 "UNDERTAKE SUCH RECONNAISSANCE AND OTHER MEASURES
18 AS YOU DEEM NECESSARY BUT THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED
19 OUT SO AS NOT TO ALARM CIVIL POPULATION OR DISCLOSE INTENT.
20 REPORT MEASURES TAKEN."

21 In reply to that message, --

22 Then it does on to say:

23 "SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR YOU WILL CARRY OUT THE TASKS
24 ASSIGNED IN RAINBOW FIVE."

25 And so forth.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: The Chairman

2 In reply to that message -- which I believe was the
3 next day, was it?

4 General Short: No, sir, it was the same day.

5 The Chairman: The same day?

6 General Short : Yes, sir.

7 The Chairman: You cabled him that you had taken
8 steps against sabotage and had created liaison with the
9 Navy?

10 General Short: Yes, sir.

11 The Chairman: Did you regard that reply as respon-
12 sive to General Marshall's dispatch?

13 General Short : I did. There was one very important
14 part of that message you didn't read.

15 The Chairman: I tried to read it all. What part
16 did I omit?

17 General Short: "LIMIT DISSEMINATION OF THIS HIGHLY
18 SECRET INFORMATION TO MINIMUM ESSENTIAL OFFICERS."

19 The Chairman: Oh, yes. That was a direction for
20 you not to spread it around in the vicinity.

21 General Short: You couldn't possibly take up Alert
22 No. 2 or Alert No. 3 without telling all of the enlisted
23 men what they were out there for, who they were to shoot
24 at.

25 The Chairman: You had Army practices from time to

h19

Witness short

Questions by: The Chairman

h20

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2 time that involved these alerts, did you not?

3 General Short: But we didn't give them live ammuni-
4 tion and tell them to shoot at a Jap plane if one came
5 over.

6 The Chairman: The population, hearing these guns
7 firing, wouldn't like whether they had live ammunition.

8 General Short: This limited information wouldn't
9 have allowed me to disclose that to an enlisted man.
10 Merely to "minimum essential officers."

11 The Chairman: If General Marshall knew, as you say
12 he knew, that you had no responsibility as far as recon-
13 naissance was concerned, why do you suppose he directed
14 you to institute reconnaissance and take every step you
15 thought necessary to protect yourself?

16 General Short: Because he did not write that message.
17 I would like to read what he said in regard to that. This
18 is a quotation from General Marshall:

19 "Distant reconnaissance. -- was a naval function, and
20 the Army Commander was liable to furnish them such of the
21 planes suitable for that purpose that could be provided."

22 That is one quotation. There is another quotation
23 from before the Army Board.

Shf fls

1 Witness Short

Questions by: The Chairman

2 The Chairman: Well, now, if it is true that you could un-
3 derstand this message and you knew what it meant when it said
4 for you to institute reconnaissance?

5 General Short: Yes.

6 The Chairman: The words are simple, there is no ambigu-
7 ity about it. If you knew and you knew he knew that all you
8 could do about that was to make your planes available to the
9 Navy --

10 General Short: That was exactly it.

11 The Chairman: (Continuing) -- why didn't you in your re-
12 ply to him say either that you had made the planes available
13 to the Navy or you had not done so and why you had not done
14 it, instead of just saying that you had taken steps against
15 sabotage? Sabotage can be carried on where there are no
16 actual hostilities between two nations. That is something
17 that all the spies in Hawaii could indulge in, blowing up an
18 installation on the ground or things of that sort without
19 war being actually declared.

20 Why in your reply to General Marshall did you limit this
21 to sabotage instead of saying something about reconnaissance,
22 which is the only specific thing he mentioned in his direc-
23 tion to you?

24 General Short: I was directly obligated by the agreement
25 with the Navy to furnish these planes. It had been approved

Witness Short

Questions by: The Chairman

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by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations and it did not seem to me that it was necessary to reiterate that because without they told me that -- there was also a provision in that agreement that if the agreement were to be abrogated it would be in writing.

The Chairman: Was that a written agreement?

General Short: That was a written agreement signed by Admiral Bloch and me, approved by General Marshall and by Admiral Stark and it had a provision that any abrogation must be in writing.

The Chairman: I cannot understand then why if General Marshall knew that you had no duty in regard to reconnaissance that he put this in this instruction to you and that if you knew he knew that why you did not call his attention to it in your reply to him so that he would not be under any misapprehension?

General Short: Yes, I think I can possibly explain that. In the first place, General Marshall was out of town when the message was drawn. In the second place, this message was written basically for General MacArthur in the Philippines and then adopted to the rest of us, and in the Philippines they had no such agreement. The Army were responsible for reconnaissance and they got together with the Navy and agreed upon what sectors that each would cover.

Witness Short

Questions by: The Chairman

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2 Mr. Murphy: Will the Chairman yield?

3 The Chairman: Would you regard it as the duty of a high
4 commanding officer in the field, a man of your rank and you
5 obtained that rank after long, distinguished service, as the
6 Admirals in the Navy do, - if there was any possibility of
7 misunderstanding a direct instruction given by the Chief of
8 Staff or the Chief of Naval Operations to the high ranking
9 commanding officer in the field, that it is the duty of that
10 ranking officer in the field to call that to the attention of
11 the originating office and clarify it instead of just sitting
12 around waiting for further instructions?

13 It seems to me there ought to be some liaison between the
14 two respective offices; if there is any misunderstanding or
15 misapprehension or any lack of comprehension that ought to
16 be brought to the attention of the other office so as to
17 clarify it immediately. Now, it seems that after you received
18 this message on the 27th you made no further effort and so
19 far as the naval end of it is concerned they made no further
20 effort to ascertain just what it was that Washington had in
21 mind when they gave these instructions about reconnaissance
22 and defensive deployments and all that language that has been
23 used here in this hearing.

24 What have you to say about that? That bothers me, General.

25 General Short: I believe that Admiral Kimmel felt full

1 Witness Short

Questions by: The Chairman

2 responsibility for the reconnaissance, I think he realized that
3 it was his full duty.

4 The Chairman: Well, inasmuch as this message had come to
5 you about reconnaissance didn't it ever occur to you that you
6 ought to advise General Marshall that under the agreement the
7 naval end of it had assumed full responsibility for reconnais-
8 sance and that it was not a part of your responsibility, so
9 that he would not be expecting you to do it?

10 General Short: Frankly, I believed General Marshall would
11 have known it.

12 The Chairman: You believed he would have known it?

13 General Short: I believed he would have known it because
14 he personally approved that.

15 The Chairman: Well, if that is true this language in here,
16 this direct instruction to you to institute reconnaissance was
17 just idle words, it didn't mean anything so far as he was con-
18 cerned you think?

19 General Short: You will notice it says "Such reconnaissance
20 as you may deem necessary."

21 The Chairman: No, that is not what it says. "You are to
22 take such reconnaissance and other measures."

23 General Short: I think the "deem necessary" applies to
24 all. I don't think there is any question of it in reference
25 to any part of it.

Witness Short

Questions by: The Chairman

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Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman yield at that point?

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: I think I have something precisely in point. I would like to read from page 380 of the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearing, General Grunert to General Short:

"In your message of November 27th you say 'liaison with the Navy.' Just what did you mean by that? How did that cover anything required by that particular message?

"Answer: To my mind it meant I was definitely keeping in touch with the Navy, what information they had and what they were doing.

"Question: Did it indicate in any way that you expected the Navy to carry out its part of that agreement for long distance reconnaissance?

"Answer: Yes, without any question whether I had sent that or not it would have effected it because they signed a very definite agreement which was approved by the Navy as well as by our Chief of Staff."

The Chairman: What do you say about that answer to that question?

General Short: Well, I want to finish the quotation that I started to read from General Marshall because it was taken before the Army Pearl Harbor Board also.

The Chairman: Yes, go ahead.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: The Chairman

2 General Short: This is from the testimony of General Mar-
3 shall. This is the testimony on distance reconnaissance:

4 "As I recall the matter, the only way the Army would
5 have been involved in the deep reconnaissance would have
6 been in detaching units to serve under the Navy.

7 "General Russell: Well, is it your view that both
8 having seen the message of November 27, without more and
9 the Navy should have started their distant reconnaissance?

10 "General Marshall: That is right. That is my view."

11 In other words, I think he had the same view of the re-
12 sponsibility that I had there.

13 The Chairman: Do you know why, General, and can you tell
14 the committee why it was that there was no reconnaissance on
15 the 6th of December, the day before the attack?

16 General Short: I believe, it is my impression that Admiral
17 Kimmel was making a considerable reconnaissance.

18 The Chairman: He said that there were some Navy planes
19 flying to the south.

20 Senator Lucas: No, patrol planes.

21 The Chairman: I am not talking about patrol planes. I
22 am talking about reconnaissance, long distance reconnaissance.

23 General Short: I think all of his reconnaissance from
24 Johnston Island to Wake Island to Midway was very definitely
25 distance reconnaissance. He was doing it on the perimeter in

1 Witness Short

Questions by: The Chairman

2 place of flying them out and back from Oahu. He could accom-
3 plish more with the same number of planes.

4 The Chairman: He could accomplish more with the same num-
5 ber of planes if he had them at the right place at the right
6 time.

7 General Short: Yes.

8 The Chairman: But he could not accomplish more with them
9 down to the south if the attack was coming down from the north.
10 It seems to me there was no reconnaissance from that direction.

11 General Short: It is apparent the Navy had not considered
12 that because you will recall Admiral Richardson stated before
13 this committee that his reconnaissance extended from 10 de-
14 grees west of north down to the south. He did not think his
15 reconnaissance ever went to the east of north.

16 Mr. Murphy: Will the Chairman yield?

17 The Chairman: I am through. Congressman Cooper.

18 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Chairman, I suppose as usual we
19 do not want to detain General Short too long and we will quit
20 at four o'clock as we have been doing?

21 The Chairman: Unless General Short is willing to go on
22 further.

23 General Short: Just at the pleasure of the committee.

24 The Chairman: Unless there is some reason for the members
25 on the House side wanting to quit at four there is no reason

Witness Short

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 that I know of why the Senators would want to quit in view of
3 the situation in the Senate.

4 The Vice Chairman: Well, while General Short is on the
5 stand we have suspended heretofore at four o'clock and I think
6 we ought to do that.

7 The Chairman: All right.

8 The Vice Chairman: Are you through?

9 The Chairman: Yes.

10 The Vice Chairman: Pardon me. Do you have something
11 further you want to look at, General?

12 General Short: That is alright.

13 The Vice Chairman: I would like to inquire of you to
14 get some additional information, if I may, please. You had
15 served about forty years in the Army, hadn't you?

16 General Short: Yes, sir.

17 The Vice Chairman: I believe you stated that you went in
18 the military service from the State of Illinois?

19 General Short: Yes, that is correct.

20 The Vice Chairman: You did not attend the Military Academy
21 at West Point?

22 General Short: No, sir.

23 The Vice Chairman: And I understood you to say you were
24 recommended by the President of the University of Illinois for
25 a commission.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: The ViceChairman

2 General Short: That is correct.

3 The Vice Chairman: And commissioned in 1902?

4 General Short: Yes, sir.

5 The Vice Chairman: Now, at the time you were in command
6 of the Hawaiian Department you were one of the senior offi-
7 cers of the Army, weren't you?

8 General Short: Yes, sir.

9 The Vice Chairman: You at that time held the rank of
10 Lieutenant General?

11 General Short: Yes, sir.

12 The Vice Chairman: At that time there were very few hold-
13 ing the rank of Lieutenant General, weren't there?

14 General Short: I think there were nine, two of whom were
15 air officers. I am not sure.

16 The Vice Chairman: Certainly there were not near as many
17 as later developed during the war?

18 General Short: No, by no means.

19 The Vice Chairman: The rank of Lieutenant General back
20 at that time was really pretty high in the Army, wasn't it?

21 General Short: Yes, sir.

22 The Vice Chairman: Now, on December 7, 1941, General, you
23 held one of the most important commands in the Army, didn't you?

24 General Short: Yes, sir.

25 The Vice Chairman: Our fortress at Hawaii was one of the

Witness Short

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 greatest possessions for national defense that this country
3 had?

4

General Short: That is correct.

5

6

The Vice Chairman: And it was your responsibility to protect that?

7

General Short: Yes, sir.

8

The Vice Chairman: Now, you received considerable information in the form of correspondence between you and the Chief of Staff, as you have indicated in the booklet that you have up there, during the period that you were in command at Hawaii?

12

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General Short: A great deal of information on the defenses, and so forth.

14

The Vice Chairman: Yes.

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General Short: A very limited amount on the international situation.

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The Vice Chairman: Well, you kept informed on the international situation from every source that you could inform yourself, did you not?

20

General Short: That is correct.

21

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23

The Vice Chairman: And it was a matter of rather general knowledge that the situation was growing exceedingly tense between the United States and Japan, wasn't it?

24

General Short: Yes, sir.

25

The Vice Chairman: And the situation was growing more

Witness Short

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 critical all the time. You knew that as you very frankly
3 stated here.

4 General Short: Yes, sir.

5 The Vice Chairman: Did you consider that war between the
6 United States and Japan was inevitable?

7 General Short: I would not go that far. I think I would
8 say that I considered it probable but I thought that Wash-
9 ington, from the message I had, was making every possible ef-
10 fort to avoid war and to avoid an international incident in
11 Hawaii that they must, therefore, still have some hopes of
12 averting it.

13 The Vice Chairman: Well, that was your very clear and
14 definite impression of the efforts being exerted at Washing-
15 ton?

16 General Short: Yes, sir.

17 The Vice Chairman: But you also knew what Japan was do-
18 ing, too, didn't you, General?

19 General Short: I knew that she was pressing down into
20 China and getting on towards the south and that sooner or later
21 might cause a conflict.

22 The Vice Chairman: And you knew that every indication
23 pointed to Japan's further conquests, didn't you?

24 General Short: Without we were able through negotiations
25 to arrive at something that would stop them.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 The Vice Chairman: But every move Japan was making gave
3 clear indications that she was bent on further conquest,
4 didn't it?

5 General Short: It looked that way.

6 The Vice Chairman: It looked that way and you understood
7 that?

8 General Short: Yes, sir.

9 The Vice Chairman: Now, did you ever consider that Japan
10 would attack Pearl Harbor?

11 General Short: I frankly felt with the Fleet, as large
12 a Fleet as we had in the Hawaiian waters, that they would be
13 able to either keep the carriers up there from the vicinity
14 of Hawaii or at least get the information of their approach
15 in time for us to be prepared for the attack.

16 The Vice Chairman: I did not understand the last part.

17 General Short: I say if they were not able to intercept
18 them that they would at least get information in time to give
19 us sufficient time to prepare for the attack.

20 The Vice Chairman: You thought the Fleet would be able
21 to do that?

22 General Short: Yes, sir.

23 The Vice Chairman: Now, it was true that the Fleet had
24 certain units out at sea most of the time?

25 General Short: Always, I think.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 The Vice Chairman: And certain task forces were operating
3 between Hawaii and other islands such as Midway and Wake and
4 Johnston and through that area?

5 General Short: Yes, sir. They also had forces stationed
6 at those islands and they had a certain amount of reconnais-
7 sance constantly from those islands.

8 The Vice Chairman: So then you assumed that the Navy
9 would become aware if any hostile act became apparent and you
10 would receive the information through the Navy?

11 General Short: I expected to, yes, sir.

12 The Vice Chairman: I believe on page 3 of your statement,
13 General and subsequent pages -- you need not refer to it; I
14 am just going to ask a general question.

15 General Short: Yes, sir.

16 The Vice Chairman: On page 3 and subsequent pages of
17 your statement you referred to certain requests made by you
18 to the War Department for additional equipment, material, and
19 so forth.

20 General Short: Yes, sir.

21 The Vice Chairman: But the fact that you were not furn-
22 ished everything you asked for did not relieve you of the
23 duty and responsibility to use what you did have to the best
24 advantage in the defense of your Department, did it?

25 General Short: In no way.

Witness Short

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 The Vice Chairman: I believe General Marshall made one
3 statement here that I think you will agree with at least. He
4 said that no commander was ever quite satisfied with what he
5 got.

6 General Short: That is unquestionably right.

7 The Vice Chairman: They all ask for more than they are
8 able to get and he said it only indicates he was a good of-
9 ficer because he was asking for more than he could get all the
10 time.

11 Now, I believe on page 15 of your statement, General,
12 under the heading of "War Plan", among other things in that
13 paragraph there you say, "That no part of this joint plan
14 would take effect until the War Department ordered M-Day under
15 the Rainbow plan."

16 Well, now, M-Day was war with Japan, wasn't it?

17 General Short: Not necessarily war with Japan but it would
18 be the mobilization towards the preparation for war with Japan.

19 The Vice Chairman: I see. Well, anyhow, M-Day was mobili-
20 zation for war?

21 General Short: Yes, sir.

22 The Vice Chairman: And you say that no part of the joint
23 plan had to be put into effect until the War Department ordered
24 that on M-Day?

25 General Short: Yes, sir.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 The Vice Chairman: Well, this did not prevent you from us-
3 ing every possible means for a proper defense of your command,
4 did it?

5 General Short: Not if the situation I would say was just
6 definitely so that there was no time to communicate with Wash-
7 ington, but if you take their policy I think they expected
8 in all cases to indicate when the plan was to go into effect
9 and also if you couple that with their express desire not
10 to create any international incidents, not to provoke Japan,
11 I think you naturally would hesitate very seriously as long
12 as there was time to communicate with Washington and the com-
13 munications were open, to put anything into effect without
14 first communicating with them. That was my attitude.

15 The Vice Chairman: Well, naturally, that would generally
16 be true, but at the same time the responsibility rested upon
17 you to defend your Department?

18 General Short: Yes, sir, but likewise an equal respon-
19 sibility rested upon the War Department to provide me with
20 all the information that I needed.

21 The Vice Chairman: I am not arguing with you about the
22 responsibility of the War Department. I am just inquiring
23 briefly about your responsibility as a Lieutenant General of
24 the United States Army in command of the most valuable post
25 for the national defense of this country.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 General Short: Yes, sir.

3 The Vice Chairman: Now, it was your duty --

4 General Short: It was mine.

5 The Vice Chairman: (Continuing) -- to defend it?

6 General Short: But my estimate was bound to be made upon
7 the information I had.

8 The Vice Chairman: Yes, but it was your duty to defend
9 that post that had been assigned to you?

10 General Short: Yes, sir.

11 The Vice Chairman: Whether any M-Day had arrived or whether
12 any instructions had been received from Washington or anywhere
13 else if the occasion arose, why, it was your duty to defend
14 that command?

15 General Short: And when the definite occasion did arise
16 it never occurred to me to communicate with Washington then.

17 The Vice Chairman: That is right.

18 General Short: Because the situation was definitely there.
19 We went into action immediately.

20 The Vice Chairman: Well, there wasn't any declaration of
21 war at the time it happened?

22 General Short: No, sir.

23 The Vice Chairman: There wasn't any M-Day put into ef-
24 fect?

25 General Short: No, sir.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 The Vice Chairman: There wasn't any order to that effect
3 from the War Department?

4 General Short: No, sir.

5 The Vice Chairman: But when the Japanese attack came you
6 went into action?

7 General Short: Within a minute or two.

8 The Vice Chairman: Yes. Now, you have been asked a num-
9 ber of questions about these particular messages that were
10 received and the Chairman has just inquired some about the
11 message of November 24th to Admiral Kimmel. You say you saw
12 that and conferred with him about it?

13 General Short: Yes, sir.

14 The Vice Chairman: And, of course, you saw in that mes-
15 sage that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction is
16 stated there, isn't it?

17 General Short; Yes, sir, but it also points out particu-
18 lar places.

19 The Vice Chairman: It also mentions other things but
20 those words are in there?

21 General Short: Yes, sir.

22 The Vice Chairman: All right. Now, you say there a lit-
23 tle below the middle of the page:

24 "This message indicated possible movements in the direc-
25 tion of the Philippines or Guam and called for secrecy,"

1 Witness Short

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 but this is not all that it indicated, was it?

3 General Short: I would say that that was what it indicated
4 probable. The other was possible. When you say "attack in
5 any direction", that is so indefinite that you cannot point it
6 out as a probable thing.

7 The Vice Chairman: Well, your statement here is, "This
8 message indicated possible movements in the direction of the
9 Philippines or Guam and called for secrecy."

10 General Short: I believe that if the Department had con-
11 sidered Hawaii in the same way, classing it with the probable
12 as the Philippines or Guam, it would have included it.

13 The Vice Chairman: But at least the message said also
14 what is said about the Philippines and Guam?

15 General Short: But in a very general way.

16 The Vice Chairman: At least you did not accept it as mean-
17 ing anything but the Philippines and Guam?

18 General Short: That was all that it meant to me.

19 The Vice Chairman: That was all that it meant to you?

20 General Short: Yes, sir.

21 The Vice Chairman: All right.

22 General Short: I think that is all it meant to Admiral
23 Kimmel.

24 The Vice Chairman: It referred to the Philippines and Guam
25 and that is all it meant to you and you did not accept it as

Witness Short

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1

2 meaning anything else?

3 General Short: No, sir.

4 The Vice Chairman: Or as being worth anything else to you?

5 General Short: I realized that any time that there was
6 any Japanese action against the United States that sabotage
7 and subversive action might start in Hawaii even ahead of the
8 action to get the jump on us.

9 The Vice Chairman: But you did not think there was any-
10 thing in this message --

11 General Short: I did not expect an attack.

12 The Vice Chairman: Well, you did not think there was any-
13 thing in this message that should have meant anything to you
14 except the Philippines and Guam?

15 General Short: And possibly internal disorders in Hawaii.

16 The Vice Chairman: In Hawaii?

17 General Short: Yes, sir.

18 The Vice Chairman: That is all?

19 General Short: Yes, sir.

20 The Vice Chairman: And so far as all these other words
21 that we used here they were just surplusage as far as convey-
22 ing any meaning to you?

23 General Short: They were so general and so indefinite
24 that it was pretty hard to say that they conveyed any specific
25 meaning.

Witness Short

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1

2

The Vice Chairman: Well, it will not mean anything to you?

3

General Short: No, sir.

4

The Vice Chairman: All right.

5

The Chairman: The chair thinks we will suspend with you
6 until ten o'clock tomorrow morning.

7

(Whereupon, at 4:03 P.M., January 23, 1946, an
8 adjournment was taken until 10 A.M., Thursday,
9 January 24, 1946.)

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.