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**ОБВИНИТЕЛЬ ОТ СОЮЗА ССР
в Международном Военном Трибунале в Токио**

Doc. No. 2304

U.S.S.R. No. 30

Copy of instructions N. 24 of March 5
1941 of the Supreme command Headquarters of
the German Armed Forces concerning cooperation
with Japan. on 4 sheets and photostat

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2304

6 June 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

Title and Nature: Photostatic copy of Instructions N-24 of 5 March 1941, Supreme Command Headquarters of the German Armed Forces, concerning cooperation with Japan.

Date: 5 March 1941 Original () Copy (x)
Language: German

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ()
Has it been photostated? Yes (x) No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)
IMT, Nurnberg

SOURCE OF COPY: Russian Division

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Japanese-German military conspiracy against USSR

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with Page references):

Analyst: Lt. Goldstein

Doc. No. 2304

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

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INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. *2304*

Date *6/28/46*

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: *Photostatic Copy of Instructions N-24 of 5 March, 1941, Supreme Command Headquarters of the German Armed Forces*

Date: *5 March, 1941* Original Copy Language: *German*

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

Concerning Cooperation with Japan

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

IMT Nuremberg.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: *Copy Russian Docs*

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

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SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

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Analyst: *A. Goldstein*

Doc. No.

Proj. No. 299
S. A. No. _____
Sack No. _____
Item No. 13

2304

2304

30

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt.Colonel TARANENKO G.I.,
a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do here-
by certify that Copy of instructions N.24 of March 5,
1941 of the Supreme Command Headquarters of the
German Armed Forces concerning cooperation with Japan
on 4 sheets and photostat
was delivered to me by the U.S.S.R. Foreign Military
in Moscow.

on or about _____, 194____, and that the original
of the said document may be found in files of the
International Military Tribunal in Nurengberg.

I do further certify _____

_____.

Lt. Col. Taranen
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan,
June 26, 1946.

g. 30

TOP SECRET

Only by Officer

Armed Forces High Command (OKW)
Joint Operations Staff, Branch I (I Op.)
No. 44 282/41 Top Secret

Führer's Headquarters
5 March, 1941

(Various handwritten notations and stamps)

14 copies
2nd copy

Basic Order No. 24
regarding collaboration with Japan

The Führer has issued the following order regarding collaboration with Japan:

I. It must be the aim of the collaboration based on the Three Power Pact to induce Japan as soon as possible to take active measures in the Far East. Strong British forces will thereby be tied down, and the center of gravity of the interests of the United States of America will be diverted to the Pacific.

The sooner it intervenes, the greater will be the prospects of success for Japan in view of the still undeveloped preparedness for war on the part of its adversaries. The "Barbarossa" operation will create particularly favorable political and military prerequisites for this (Marginal note - "slightly exaggerated").

2. To prepare the way for the collaboration it is essential to strengthen the Japanese military potential with all means/available.

For this purpose the High Commands of the branches of the Armed Forces will comply in a comprehensive and generous manner with Japanese desires for information regarding German war and combat experience and for assistance in military economics and in technical matters. Reciprocity is desirable but this factor should not stand in the way of negotiations. Priority should naturally be given to those Japanese requests which would have the most immediate application in waging war.

In special cases the Führer reserves the decisions to himself.

3. The harmonizing of the operational plans of the two parties is the responsibility of the Navy High Command.

This will be subject to the following guiding principles:

a. The common aim of the conduct of war is to be stressed as forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the United States out of the war. Beyond this Germany has no political, military, or economic interests in the Far East which would give occasion for any reservations with regard to Japanese intentions.

b. The great successes achieved by Germany in merchantile warfare make it appear particularly suitable to employ strong Japanese forces for the same purpose. In this connection every opportunity to support German mercantile warfare must be exploited.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF
COUNSEL

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b. The great successes achieved by Germany in mercantile warfare make it appear particularly suitable to employ strong Japanese forces for the same purpose. In this connection every opportunity to support German mercantile warfare must be exploited.

c. The raw materials situation of the pact powers demands that Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital importance to Germany.

d. The Seizure of Singapore as the key British position in the Far East would mean a decisive success for the entire conduct of war of the Three Powers.

In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval power—extending to those of American naval power only if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be prevented—will result in weakening the enemy's system of power in that region and also, just like the attack on sea communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds (Australia).

A date for the beginning of operational discussions cannot yet be fixed.

4. In the Military commissions to be formed in accordance with the Three Power Pact, only such questions are to be dealt with as equally concern the three participating powers. These will include primarily the problems of economic warfare.

The working out of the details is the responsibility of the "Main Commission" with the cooperation of the Armed Forces High Command.

5. The Japanese must not be given any intimation of the Barbarossa operation.

The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command

Signed in draft: Keitel

Correctness certified by
JUNGE
Lieutenant Commander

Doc. No. 2304

Page 3

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Dept. L, 10 - 14 copies

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT C-75

21 November 1945

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document C-75.

ERNST M. COHN
Pfc. 33925738

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
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Geheime Kommandosache

Obstkommando der Wehrmacht
West/Abt. L (I. Op. Abt.)
Nr.: 44 282/41 g. S. 125.

V. H. M., den 5. III. 41



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14 Ausfertigungen
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Handwritten signatures and initials in the middle right section.

Handwritten initials 'zda' and 'LH' on the left side.

Meisung Nr. 24
über Zusammenarbeit mit Japan.

Handwritten notes: 'Nr. 2', 'Kritik 3'.

Der Führer hat für die Zusammenarbeit mit Japan folgendes befohlen:

- 1.) Das Ziel der durch den Drei-Mächte-Pakt begründeten Zusammenarbeit muss es sein, Japan so bald wie möglich zum aktiven Handeln im Fernen Osten zu bringen. Starke englische Kräfte werden dadurch gebunden, das Schwergewicht der Interessen der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika wird nach dem Pazifik abgelenkt.

Die Erfolgsaussichten für Japan werden angesichts der noch unentwickelten Kriegsbereitschaft seiner Gegner um so grösser sein, je früher es zum Eingreifen kommt. Das Unternehmen "Barbarossa" schafft hierfür besonders günstige politische und militärische Voraussetzungen.

- 2.) Zur Vorbereitung der Zusammenarbeit ist es erforderlich, die japanische Wehrkraft mit allen Mitteln zu stärken.

Hierzu ist von den Oberkommandos ein sehr grosser Teil den japanischen Wünschen auf Mitteilung tatsächlicher Kriegs- und Kampferfahrungen und Unterstützung wirtschaftlicher und technischer Art in umfassender und grosszügiger Weise zu entsprechen. Gegenseitigkeit ist erwünscht, darf aber nicht die Verhandlungen erschweren. Im Vordergrund stehen hierbei naturgemäss diejenigen japanischen Anträge, die sich in kurzer Zeit für die Kriegführung auswirken können.

In besonderen Fällen behält sich der Führer die Entscheidung vor.

- 5.) Die Abstimmung der beiderseitigen Operationspläne fällt dem Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine zu.

Hierfür gelten folgende Richtlinien:

- a) Als gemeinsames Ziel der Kriegführung ist voranzustellen, England zersch niederzuzwingen und USA dadurch aus dem Kriege herauszuhalten. Im übrigen hat Deutschland im Fernen Osten weder politische noch militärische oder wirtschaftliche Interessen, die zu einem Vorbehalt gegen japanische Absichten Anlass geben.
- b) Die von Deutschland im Handelskrieg erzielten grossen Erfolge lassen es besonders angezeigt erscheinen, starke japanische Kräfte zu gleichem Zweck einzusetzen. Daneben ist jede Unterstützungsmöglichkeit für den deutschen Handelskrieg auszunutzen.
- c) Die Rohstofflage der Mächte des Pakts verlangt, dass Japan diejenigen Gebiete an sich bringt, die es für die Fortsetzung des Krieges, besonders, wenn die Vereinigten Staaten eingreifen, braucht. Kautschuklieferungen müssen auch nach Kriegseintritt Japans durchgeführt werden, da

für Deutschland lebenswichtig.

- d) Die Wegnahme von Singapore als Schlüsselstellung Englands im Fernen Osten würde einen entscheidenden Erfolg für die Gesamtkriegführung der Drei-Mächte bedeuten.

Ausserdem sind Angriffe auf andere Stützpunkt-Systeme der englischen - der amerikanischen Seemacht nur, wenn Kriegseintritt USA nicht verhindert werden kann - geeignet, das dortige Macht-System des Feindes zu erschüttern und, ebenso wie beim Angriff auf die Seeverbindungen, wesentliche Kräfte jeder Art zu binden (Australien).

Ein Zeitpunkt für den Beginn operativer Besprechungen lässt sich noch nicht bestimmen.

- 4.) In den nach dem Drei-Mächte-Pakt zu bildenden Militär-Kommissionen sind lediglich solche Fragen zu behandeln, die gleicher Weise die drei beteiligten Mächte angehen. In erster Linie werden die Aufgaben des Wirtschaftskrieges hierunter fallen.

Festlegung im einzelnen ist Sache der "Hauptkommission" unter Mitwirkung des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht.

- 5.) Über das Barbarossa-Unternehmen darf den Japanern gegenüber keinerlei Andeutung gemacht werden.

Der Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht.

Im Entwurf gez. K e i t e l .

Für die Richtigkeit

Keitel

Verteiler:

Ob. d. H. (Genst.d.H.)	1. Ausf.
Ob.d.H. (1. Skl.)	2. Ausf.
Ob.d.H. (Lw.Fü.St.)	3. Ausf.

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W F St	4. Ausf.
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H W K	9. Ausf.
Abt. I	10.- 14. Ausf.

OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

A P O I24A U.S. Army

28 March 1946

This is to certify that the photostatic copies listed below are true copies of original enemy documents which were captured by the Allied Forces under the direction of the Supreme Allied Commander and are now in the custody of the U.S. Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality:

I877-PS Memorandum about the conference between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, at Berlin on 29 March 1941.

2929-PS Memorandum about the conference between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Ambassador Oshima on 18 April 1943 at Fuschl.

I834-PS Foreign Office, Reich Foreign Minister, #56/R. Extract of a memorandum about a conference with the new Ambassador from Japan, Oshima, at Fuschl on 23 February 1941.

2954-PS Memorandum about the conference of the Foreign Minister with Ambassador Oshima on 6 March 1943.

2897-PS Telegram, Tokyo, dated 14 July 1941. #I2I7

2898-PS Telegram, Tokyo, dated 13 November 1941. #2097

I88I-PS Memorandum about a conference between the Fuehrer and the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, in the presence of the Foreign Minister of the Reich and Minister Meissner, at Berlin, on 4 April 1941.

2896-PS Telegram, special train Westphalen, #707, dated 10 July 1941.

C-75 Directive No. 24 concerning collaboration with Japan. Fuehrer Headquarters, Dated 5 March 1941.

GERARD SCHAEFER
1st Lt. Inf.
Chief, Documentation Division.

Bepro:

