GHQ/SCAP Records(RG 331)
Description of contents

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(1) Box no. 2150

(2) Folder title/number: (19)
CINC Relief from Command - 11 April 1951

(3) Date: Apr. 1951

(4) Subject:

Classification	Type of record
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(5) Item description and comment:

Includes Contents List

(6) Reproduction: (Yes) No

(7) Film no. Sheet no.

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. CINC RELIEF FROM COMMAND -- 11 April 1951

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
28	Gen. MacArthur	15 Apr	Speech	Thanks and appreciation for cordial welcome in Honolulu.

9308—FEC P&PC—1/51—30M

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. CINC RELIEF FROM COMMAND — 11 April 1951

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
20	Gen. MacArthur	14 Apr	CG Ft Shafter	RADIO C60059: Appreciation but to be guests of Admiral Radford.
21	CG Sixth Army	14 Apr	Gen. MacArthur	RADIO AMDCG 0409: Advised Mayor Robinson of San Francisco of Gen. MacArthur's arrival. Sixth Army facilities available.
22	CG Sixth Army	14 Apr	Gen. MacArthur	Gen. Wedemeyer to meet Gen. MacArthur at San Francisco Airport.
23	Gen. MacArthur	14 Apr	Gen. Wedemeyer	RADIO C 60058: Gen. MacArthur stopping at St. Francis in San Francisco.
24	Gen. MacArthur	14 Apr	Hon. Vincent Impelliteri, Mayor of New York	Radio: Arrival New York. Gen. MacArthur staying at the Waldorf Astoria.
25	Gen. Marshall	14 Apr	Gen MacArthur	Radio DEF 88528: Senate Armed Services Committee request appearance of Gen. MacArthur, latter to give views on military situation in Far East.
26	Gen. MacArthur	14 Apr	Gen. Marshall	RADIO C-60061: Be honored to address Senate Armed Services Committee after addressing both Houses of Congress.
27	Gen. MacArthur	14 Apr	Gen. Marshall	Radio: To address Congress, both Houses; then Senate Armed Services Committee.

9308—FEC P&PC—1/51—30M

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. CINC RELIEF FROM COMMAND — 11 April 1951

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
11	Press Release	13 Apr		Gen. Whitney: Communist propoganda slanted to make Gen. MacArthur appear advocate of war expansion.
12	Gen. Whitney	14 Apr	Hon. E. E. Robinson, Mayor of San Francisco	Time of arrival of Gen. MacArthur in San Francisco.
13	Press Release	14 Apr		Departure of Gen. MacArthur's party from Haneda Air Base.
14	Press Release	14 Apr		Elaborate plans for farewell to General MacArthur.
15	Gen. Collins	14 Apr	Gen. MacArthur	Gen. Wedemeyer to meet Gen. MacArthur at airport in San Francisco. RADIO DA 88470.
16	Gen. MacArthur	14 Apr	Dept. Army, Wash D.C.	Personal for Gen. Collins: Will call upon him if necessity arises. RADIO C-60060.
17	Gen. Back	14 Apr	Col Bunker	Memo: Contents of RADIO — Eastwood wanted to be advised of Gen. MacArthur's itenerary.
18	Gen. MacArthur	14 Apr	Gen. Eastwood	RADIO Svc 5845: Thanks but do not expect to land in Chicago or St. Louis.
19	CG Ft. Shafter	13 Apr	Gen. MacArthur	RADIO R 65610: Gen. & Mrs. Aurand request company of Gen. & Mrs. MacArthur in Honolulu.

9308—FEC P&PC—1/51—30M

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. CINC RELIEF FROM COMMAND -- 11 April 1951

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
1	Washington	12 Jan		President's denial that Gen. MacArthur had been stripped of his authority to speak.
2	Washington	12 Jan		President says: Not true that MacArthur had been stripped of authority to speak.
3	Frank Tremaine	11 Apr	Gen. MacArthur	Disheartening to handle story on Gen. MacArthur's dismissal.
4	Gen. MacArthur	11 Apr	Gen. Whitney	Gen. MacArthur's pen turned over to Gen. Whitney.
5	Russel Brines	11 Apr	Gen. MacArthur	Now is appropriate time for clarifying statement on Gen. MacArthur's views on Korea.
6	Gen. Whitney	11 Apr	Press Release	Gen. MacArthur's dismissal. His finest hour.
7	Washington	12 Apr	Press Release	President's speech on dismissal of General MacArthur.
8	Press Release	12 Apr		Gen. Whitney's statement: 7 points in defense of Gen. MacArthur.
9	Japanese Liaison G-2	12 Apr	—	Radio Press: World Reaction on MacArthur Ouster.
10	Press Release	12 Apr		Gen. Whitney's request for release from active duty.

9308—FEC P&PC—1/51—30M

l-in-C

15 April 1951

It is a real pleasure for Mrs. MacArthur and myself to pass through Honolulu on our way home. I have been coming or going your way for nearly fifty years. While I have never had a military assigrment here, I am well acquainted with you because of your many sons. They have never failed splendidly to serve the country.

I have just left your 5th Regiment on the Korean fighting front. It is fit and ready and writing a proud history in a bitter campaign.

Again my thanks and appreciation for the cordial welcome you are so graciously extending.

OI
F

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
~~SECRET~~
RESTRICTED

R

CW/ah

15 APRIL 1951

FROM : GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MacARTHUR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF ARMY WASHINGTON DC

PERSONAL FOR GENERAL MARSHALL PD REFERENCE YOUR EIGHT EIGHT FIVE SIX FIVE PD PLEASE CONVEY TO SENATOR RUSSEL MY REGARDS AND STATE THAT ITEM WILL BE AVAILABLE TO APPEAR BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE AT ANY TIME AFTER ITEM HAVE ADDRESSED THE CONGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO THAT EFFECT PD SIGNED MACARTHUR

OFFICIAL:

K.B. BUSH
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

Copies to: General MacArthur
C/S

88565 27.

RESTRICTED

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

FAR EAST COMMAND

SIGNAL CORPS MESSAGE

FLASH	( )
EMERGENCY	( )
OPNL IMMEDIATE	(OI
PRIORITY	( )
ROUTINE	( )
DEFERRED	( )

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
RESTRICTED

TOP SECRET	( )
SECRET	( )
CONFIDENTIAL	( )
RESTRICTED	(R)
IN CLEAR	( )

CW/sh
(Office)

14 APRIL 1951
(Date)

140615

FROM : GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MacARTHUR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF ARMY WASHINGTON DC

C - 60061

PERSONAL FOR GENERAL MARSHALL PD REUR DOG EASY FOX EIGHT EIGHT FIVE TWO EIGHT APRIL ONE FOUR CMA PLEASE GIVE SENATOR RUSSEL MY PERSONAL REGARDS AND INFORM HIM THAT ITEM AM ADVISED RESOLUTIONS ARE PENDING IN CONGRESS INVITING ME TO ADDRESS ABLE JOINT SESSION AS WAS DONE IN THE CASES OF GENERALS EISENHOWER AND CLAY AND OTHERS WHEN THEY FIRST CAME FROM ABROAD AND THAT UNTIL ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN ON SUCH RESOLUTIONS ITEM WOULD DEEM IT INAPPROPRIATE TO MAKE ANY OTHER PLANS PD IF SUCH RESOLUTIONS ARE APPROVED CMA ITEM WOULD REGARD IT ABLE GREAT HONOR AND DISTINCTION TO ADDRESS THE CONGRESS IN GENERAL TERMS PD SIGNED MACARTHUR

OFFICIAL:

K.B. BUSH
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

RESTRICTED

Copies to: General MacArthur

This is in reply to No. DEF 88528 Apr 14.

6134.

26

SENT IN CODE

MCN 6134 III
TOO 140615Z
TOR 140635Z
TOD 140736Z

14 April 1951

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

FROM : DEPARTMENT OF ARMY (GENERAL MARSHALL)

FOR : CINCFE (PERSONAL FOR GENERAL MACARTHUR)

NUMBER: DEF 88528, 14 April 1951.

Letter received tonight from Senator Russel asks me to appear at Executive session on Wednesday next and requests following message be sent you by most expeditious means available;

"The Senate Armed Services Committee unanimously requests that you appear before it to give your views on the military situation in the Far East and the circumstances leading up to your relief from your several commands in that area. The Committee plans to hear the Secretary of Defense on Wednesday, April 18, and will schedule a subsequent meeting with you to be held at your convenience. This initial meeting will be in Executive session. Additionally, the Armed Services Committee has under consideration extending to all members of the Senate and House of Representatives an invitation to an open meeting with you to hear such views as you may care to express. Please inform me as promptly as possible when you will be available to advise with the Committee and whether you are agreeable to appearing at a meeting to which all members of the Congress will have been invited. Personal regards. Signed Richard B. Russel, United States Senator, Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Services."

Concluding paragraph Russel letter requests notification of time when you receive above message and that I transmit to Committee your reply upon receipt.

MCN: 86569

TOO: 140026Z (140926I)

TOR: 140134Z (141034I)

25

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

14 April 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL BACK:

Please transmit through your service channels the following message:

"TO : Honorable Vincent Impelliteri,
Mayor of New York City,
New York City, N.Y.

"Thank you for your fine message which I deeply appreciate. My tentative plan is to arrive at Idlewild International airport on Thursday afternoon April 19th at three thirty Eastern Standard time, proceeding to the Waldorf Astoria. Will leave the details of any ceremony to your judgment but request that formal speeches be not scheduled and that no formal function be slated for that evening. Again my thanks for offering me the gracious hospitality of your great city. Signed MacArthur."

COURTNEY WHITNEY,
Major General, U.S. Army.

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UNCLASSIFIED

SC EX GIB/rh
14 April 1951

FM: CIC CHQ FEC COMCENTER

TO: CIC DA COMCENTER . . . . . PRIORITY

_____TO CONRAD FOR KIDWELL SGD BACK PLS PASS TO HONORABLE VINCENT IMPELLITERI CMA MAYOR OF NEW YORK CITY QUOTE THANK YOU FOR YOUR FINE MSG WHICH ITEM DEEPLY APPRECIATE PD MY TENTATIVE PLAN IS TO ARRIVE AT IDLEWILD INTL AIRPORT ON THURSDAY AFTERNOON APR ONE NINE AT THREE THIRTY EASTERN STANDARD TIME CMA PROCEEDING TO THE WALDORF ASTORIA PD WILL LEAVE THE DETAILS OF ANY CEREMONY TO YOUR JUDGMENT BUT REQUEST THAT FORMAL SPEECHES BE NOT SCHEDULED AND THAT NO FORMAL FUNCTION BE SLATED FOR THAT EVENING PD AGAIN MY THANKS FOR OFFERING ME THE GRACIOUS HOSPITALITY OF YOUR GREAT CITY PD SGD MACARTHUR UNQUOTE

Copy to:
General Whitney

GENERAL WHITNEY

UNCLASSIFIED

140609

RESTRICTED

P PRIORITY R
RESTRICTED

CW/sh

14 APRIL 1951

FROM : GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MacARTHUR

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL SIXTH ARMY

C - 60058 PERSONAL FOR GENERAL WEDEMEYER PD REUR ABLE MIKE DOG CHARLIE GEORGE ZERO FOUR ONE ZERO APRIL THIRTEEN AND HALSEY APOSTROPHE SUGAR ABLE MIKE DOG CHARLIE GEORGE ZERO FOUR ZERO NINE APRIL THIRTEEN CMA THANKS AND APPRECIATION PD AM STOPPING AT SAINT FRANCIS HOTEL AND ALL ARRANGEMENTS FOR SAN FRANCISCO WELCOME HAVE BEEN LEFT IN HANDS OF MAYOR PD WOULD BE GLAD IF YOU WOULD COORDINATE WITH HIM PD SIGNED MACARTHUR

OFFICIAL:

K.B. BUSH
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General.

AG FILE

Copies to: General MacArthur.

RESTRICTED

AMDCG 0410 Apr 13; AMDCG 0409 Apr 13.

3

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RESTRICTED

14 April 1951

PRIORITY

FROM : COMMANDING GENERAL SIXTH ARMY (GENERAL WEDEMEYER)

FOR : SCAP (PERSONAL FOR GENERAL MACARTHUR)

NUMBER: AMDCG 0410, 13 April 1951.

Have been absent from my Headquarters last several days. However, will return to San Francisco in time to greet you airport. I am scheduling full military honors at airport and will make any other arrangements you may desire. Signed Wedemeyer.

MCN: 86557

TOO: 132327Z (140827I)

TOR: 140103Z (141003I)

RESTRICTED

22

14 April 1951

PRIORITY

FROM : COMMANDING GENERAL SIXTH ARMY

FOR : SCAP (PERSONAL FOR GENERAL MACARTHRU)

NUMBER: AMDCG 0409, 13 April 1951.

Have passed to the Honorable Elmer E. Robinson, Mayor of San Francisco, your radio announcing your arrival San Francisco. All facilities of the Sixth Army are at your disposal. Request details of your requirements. Signed Halsey, in the absence of Wedemeyer.

MCN: 86533

TOO: 132058Z (140558I)

TOR: 132300Z (140800I)

RESTRICTED 140611

P R

RESTRICTED
PRIORITY

CM/sh

14 APRIL 1951

FROM : GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MacARTHUR

TO : CG USARPAC FT SHAFTER TH

C - 60059 PERSONAL FOR GENERAL AURAND PD REUR ROGER SIX FIVE SIX ONE ZERO APRIL ONE THREE CMA THANKS AND DEEPEST APPRECIATION BUT ON INVITATION OF ADMIRAL RADFORD WE WILL BE HIS GUESTS PD SIGNED MacARTHUR

OFFICIAL:

K.B. BUSH,
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General.

Copies to: General MacArthur.

RETURN COPY
4

RESTRICTED

20

R E S T R I C T E D
PRIORITY

ELT/rjs

13 Apr 51

FROM : CG USARPAC FT SHAFTER TH

TO : CINCFE (TO GEN MACARTHUR) TOKYO JAPAN

NR : R 65610

Although I understand that Admiral Radford has invited you through Admiral Joy to be his guest when you pass through Hawaii, I still wish to extend to you the hospitality of USARPAC. In any event Mrs Aurand and I would welcome you and yours at our qtrs, or you may choose a separate set of qtrs at Ft Derussy on the beach or at Schofield Barracks.

AURAND

DISTRIBUTION : GENERAL MACARTHUR

03444

PRIORITY

R E S T R I C T E D

TOO : 130645 Z
MCN : 86416

UNCLASSIFIED

SC EX CIB/rh
14 April 1951

FM: OIC GHQ FEC COMCENTER

TO: OIC DA COMCENTER . . . . . PRIORITY

hr 5845 TO CONRAD FOR PALMER SGD BACK PLS PASS TO

BRIGGEN EASTWOOD CMA CONS FIFTH ARMY QUOTE THANKS FOR YOUR MSG

BUT DO NOT EXPECT TO LAND IN YOUR AREA ON MY RETURN SGD MACARTHUR

UNQUOTE

Copy to:
General Whitney

GENERAL WHITNEY

DISPATCH
14 APR 1951

UNCLASSIFIED

18

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Office of the Signal Officer

STAFF SERVICE MESSAGE

14 April 1951

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Colonel L. E. Bunker

The following Staff Service message for you was received from the Signal Officer, Washington, D.C., at 132347Z (140847I).

"Assume that on your way to New York you will touch down at or near either Chicago or St. Louis. Please advise me on point and anything at all that I can do to be of service at this end. Highest admiration and best regards to all. Signed Eastwood."

/s/G. M.
for GENERAL BACK

[illegible] 1775 672

RESTRICTED

1600 13

P PRIORITY R

RESTRICTED

CW/sh

14 APRIL 1951

FROM : General of the Army DOUGLAS MacARTHUR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF ARMY WASHINGTON DC

C - 60060

PERSONAL FOR GENERAL COLLINS PD REUR DOG ABLE

EIGHT EIGHT FOUR SEVEN ZERO APRIL ONE THREE CMA THANKS FOR YOUR CORDIAL

MESSAGE PD WILL CALL UPON YOU IF NECESSITY ARISES PD SIGNED MacARTHUR

OFFICIAL:

K.B. BUSH,
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General.

AG FILE

Copies to: General MacArthur

RESTRICTED

3

DA 88470, April 13.

16

DOWNGRADED BY AUTH: PARA SEC. 3(E) AND 3(D) OR (E) NARG # 775 012

14 April 1951

PRIORITY

FROM : DEPARTMENT OF ARMY (GENERAL COLLINS)

FOR : CINCFE (PERSONAL FOR GENERAL MACARTHUR)

NUMBER: DA 88470, 13 April 1951

Will be happy to assist you on your trip home as to arrangements, accommodations, etc., as you desire. General Wedemeyer will meet you on arrival in San Francisco and extend the customary courtesies and facilities. Best regards.

MCN: 86535

TOO: 132133Z (140633I)

TOR: 132304Z (130804I)

The above message was passed to CG, USARPAC, and CG, Sixth Army, for information, by the originator.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 SEC. 3(E) AND 3(D) OR (E) NNDG # 773 012

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
Public Information Office

2330
14 April 1951

Immediate Release:

ELABORATE PLANS FOR FAREWELL TO GENERAL MacARTHUR

Departure of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from Japan will begin on Monday morning, April 16, with a ceremony at the American Embassy at 6:30 o'clock and will be concluded when he boards his plane, "Bataan," at Haneda airport minutes later.

From the time General MacArthur, his family and other members of his party leave the Embassy to the time the plane takes off at the airport, hundreds and thousands of Americans and Japanese as well as representatives of United Nations member countries will have opportunities to bid their farewells. Many will be able only to wave a handkerchief and others will shake the General's hand.

"Sayonara" or "Good Bye" or just "God speed, General" will be repeated and repeated all along the way from the Embassy to the airport. Indications are that route of travel will be jammed with Japanese, besides the military and the police guards, who will bow in humble appreciation to the "SCAP" who came into Japan with the surrender and who departs on the eve of the peace treaty.

At the American Embassy on Monday morning the Honor Guard will be composed of the Honor Guard Company of ten American soldiers, as well as ten Naval and ten Air Force personnel and platoon of 30 Japanese policemen. The Metropolitan Police Band will play. The General's car will leave the east gate at the Embassy.

U.S. Army troops and Japanese policemen will make a formation in a double line at extended intervals along the route of march from the Embassy to the entrance of the airport. The route of march will be from the Embassy to 12th st., B ave., A ave., route 1 E (Haneda ave.) through the south gate at the Haneda air base to the plane site.

The formation and ceremony at Haneda will consist of a composite Honor Guard of Army, Navy, Air Force and British Commonwealth Occupation Forces together with the 293d Army Band and the band of Headquarters Far East Air Forces. The colors of the United Nations, the U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force and the General's own will be flown.

General MacArthur is scheduled to arrive at Haneda at 6:55 escorted by a motorcycle escort of 12 military policemen or six jeeps if weather is inclement.

At the air base the commanders, section chiefs General Headquarters, United Nations and Far East Commands and authorized spectators will be escorted by military police to designated locations. Vehicles in this group will be parked in designated areas.

The troops participating will include the Honor Guard Company, GHQ, Far East Command; the Honor Guard, Navy; the Honor Guard, Air Force; the Honor Guard, BCOF; the 293d Army Band; the FEAF Band; Air Force personnel numbering 1,400; Navy personnel numbering 500; 34th Regimental Combat Team, 56th Amtrac Battalion and Japan Logistical Command numbering 3,100; Battery A, 63d Field Artillery Battalion numbering 32 soldiers with 6 guns; Headquarters and Service Command troops numbering 400, and color bearers and guards of the Army, Navy and Air Force.

A total of 10,000 Metropolitan Tokyo Police and National Rural Police will also be spaced along the route to the airport.

Prior to the takeoff of General MacArthur's plane there will be a fly-by of 18 jet fighter planes and three B-29s which will also serve as an escort after the "Bataan" is in flight.

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNDG # 775 012

On the field there will be areas for visiting dignitaries, military and civilian, including members of the Japanese Cabinet and Diet. Ladies among the distinguished visitors will be seated in an area immediately opposite the male military and civilian dignitaries. All troops will be in place by five minutes before 6:00 and the distinguished guests by 6:25 o'clock. After the takeoff of General MacArthur's plane the troops and police will remain in position until the distinguished guests and news media representatives have cleared the field for their return to Tokyo and vicinity. Troops who will board vehicles after General MacArthur's party has passed enroute to Haneda, will not move onto the highways until the GHQ staff and visiting dignitaries, including news media representatives, have passed en route back to Tokyo.

At the airfield, the 293d Army Band and the FEAF Band will form one composite band. The Army Honor Guard company will consist of two platoons of three ranks each with an 18-man front. The Navy Honor Guard platoon will consist of three ranks and the FEAF and BCOF Honor Guard platoons will each consist of three ranks with 18-man fronts.

When the vehicle of General MacArthur enters the air strip the Honor Guard Commander, Capt. James L. Andrews of Wilmington, N. C., will call the Guard of Honor to attention. At the first note of the "General's March" following four ruffles and flourishes, the artillery battery will fire a 19-gun salute. The band will play "Auld Lang Syne" as the General boards the plane and it takes off over the horizon.

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 3(D) OR (E) NNDG # 775 012

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Public Information Office

2115
14 April 1951

Immediate Release:

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and party will depart by air from Haneda Air Base at approximately 0700 local time on 16 April 1951.

For members of the Occupation who desire to witness the takeoff at the airport, the following instructions apply:

1) Designated observation areas and parking areas will be available at the air base for a limited number of spectators.

2) The parking facilities will accommodate a maximum of 500 passenger vehicles. Spectator vehicles will enter Haneda Air Base by the North Gate only and vehicles arriving after the parking capacity is filled will be turned back.

3) The route of march for General MacArthur and party from the American Embassy to Haneda Air Base will be: 12th St. - Ave. B - Ave. A - Route 1 E - Inari Bridge Road to South Gate Haneda Air Base.

The designated route of march will be closed to and cleared of all except specifically authorized traffic at 0600 and this route will remain so closed until official departure activities are completed.

During the time the route of march is closed all traffic between Yokohama and Tokyo will be directed to the following route: 10th St. - Ave. D - 17th St. - 30th St. - Shiba St. - Ave. B - Omori Ave.

-0-

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNDG # 773 072

14 April, 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL BACK:

Please transmit through your service channels the following message:

"TO : Honorable Elmer E. Robinson,
Mayor of San Francisco,
San Francisco, California.

"Plans altered so as to arrive in San Francisco same place, same time but twenty four hours later. That is on Tuesday April 17th. Please let me know if this is satisfactory. Cordial regards. Signed MacArthur."

COURTNEY WHITNEY,
Major General, U.S. Army.

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNDG # 773 012

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

UNITED NATIONS COMMAND

13 April 1951

PRESS RELEASE:

Major General Courtney Whitney to-day made the following comment to the press:

"Led by the Communist press, advocates of the general policy of appeasement have attempted to slant their propaganda to the effect that General MacArthur has been an advocate of war expansion. Nothing could be further from the truth. His efforts in the past to abolish war and his constant warning that its growing destructiveness calls for its universal rejection as a method for settling international disputes is well known throughout the world.

"Since the beginning of the Korean conflict, his sole purpose has been to bring the campaign to an honorable end with the minimum loss of human life. Its growing bloodshed has caused him the deepest anguish and anxiety. He has never advocated or even considered extension of the war except to the limited degree necessary to accomplish this aim. He believes that appeasement would mean not less but infinitely more ultimate bloodshed and, following historical precedent, might well carry within itself the seeds of a new world war."

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 3(D) OR (E) NNDG # 773 072

C-in-C

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Public Information Office

0935
12 April 1951

Immediate Release:

Maj. Gen. Courtney Whitney, Chief, SCAP Government Section, announced this morning that he had requested retirement from active duty, in order that he might accompany General MacArthur on his departure from Japan.

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNDG # 775 012

JAPANESE LIAISON SECTION, G-2

TEL: 26-5978, 26-5859

#1493

RADIO PRESS, 1030, 12 APRIL 1951

WORLD REACTION ON MacARTHUR OUSTER

(New York VOA, 11 Apr.-RP)

The removal of General MacArthur from all of his duties in the Far East has stirred world-wide reaction both in Washington and in other capitals. Comments support President Truman's removal of General MacArthur and others oppose it; most of them praising General MacArthur as a great military leader.

EISENHOWER In Koblenz, Germany General Dwight Eisenhower said that he was surprised by the President's move. The Atlantic Pact Army commander went on to say that when you put on a uniform, there are certain restraints you have to accept. He added that he hoped General MacArthur will not return to the United States and stir up possible controversy and bitterness.

CHURCHILL In London Conservative Party leader Winsten Churchill endorsed a statement that military leaders in the field should be subordinate to higher political authority.

SHINWELL Defense Minister Emmanuel Shinwell had expressed this sentiment in an earlier statement.

FRANCE In Paris a French Foreign Office spokesman said President Truman's action in removing General MacArthur shows that the United States and its allies want to solve world problems peacefully.

REYNAUD Former premier Paul Reynaud said Mr. Truman's action solves an American problem and an inter-Allied issue.

DE GASPERI Opinion throughout most of Western Europe could be summed up in the words of Italian Premier Alcide de Gasperi who said: "We hope that what must have been a difficult and painful decision will prove to have been a contribution to peace by alleviating world tension."

Gen Whitney

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 3(D) OR (E) NNDG # 775 012

NETHERLANDS At The Hague the feeling was that President Truman's action was a wise one.

BELGIUM In Belgium Premier Pholien withheld comment.

IRON CURTAIN There was no comment from any of the countries behind the Iron Curtain.

MANILA INVITES M'ARTHUR In Manila President Elpidio Quirino cabled an invitation to General MacArthur to visit the Philippines. He said that the Philippine people want to express their gratitude personally to their wartime liberator.

In the United States Senator Herbert Lehman, Democrat of New York, said that General MacArthur was removed because an "irreconcilable difference" of opinion had created an impossible situation which threatened to impair the unity of the free world. His opinion was echoed by Senators E.W. McFarland, William Benton, Robert S. Kerr and Lister Hill, all Democrats.

Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn commended the President and said that we must never give up the principle that the military is under the control of civilians in our government.

REPUBLICANS However, the removal of General MacArthur has drawn attacks from Republican leaders. Former President Herbert Hoover regretted that a "strong pillar in our Asian defense has been removed."

Governor Thomas Dewey of New York said that the shakeup was the end of a disastrous failure of leadership in Washington.

In Both the House and Senate resolutions have been introduced inviting General MacArthur to speak to a joint session of Congress. Senator Kenneth Wherry (Rep. Neb.) said that General MacArthur agreed in a telephone conversation Wednesday morning to appear if invited.

VAN FLEET LEAVES WASHINGTON Meanwhile, General James Van Fleet has left Washington to take over command of UN forces in Korea from General Ridgway.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 SEC. 3(E) AND 3(D) OR (E) NNDG # 773 012

DISTRIBUTION:

1 - Gen Whitney thru G-2
1 - Col Bratton
1 - T/Intell
1 - MIS/SP
1 - CI&E
1 - FBIS
1 - J/L

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNDB # 775 012

~~1400~~
12 April 1951

Immediate Release:

In clarification of news dispatches from the United States making reference to the President's directive of December 6th enjoining against the issuance of public statements on foreign policy without reference to the State Department for clearance, Maj. Gen. Courtney Whitney of General MacArthur's Staff today pointed out the following:

1. The directive of December 6th was not directed to General MacArthur personally but was directed to all executive agencies of the Government.

2. Immediately after its receipt, General MacArthur submitted a proposed communique to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who informed him among other things that it was not necessary to submit communiques referencing military operations.

3. The President, in a press conference on January 13th, appeared to this headquarters to specifically define General MacArthur's authority but denied that there was any curb on his authority "to speak freely on the Korean war."

4. Furthermore, the directive of December 6th, by its terms and spirit, was interpreted at this headquarters as applying solely to formal public statements and not to communiques, correspondence, or personal conversations with others.

5. The General feels that he has complied meticulously with all directives he has received, not only recently, but throughout his entire military service.

6. The General has interpreted both his statement of March 24th and his letter to Congressman Martin, dispatched from here four days prior thereto, as dealing exclusively with the military situation and within the area of his uncontested authority to speak. The one bore no slightest relationship to the other.

7. The reference to arms for reserve elements of the Republic of Korea taken from a top secret message of early January 1951, while the Army's retrograde movement from Seoul was in process and conditions indicated the possibility of further withdrawals into a more restricted area or even the possibility of evacuation. Subsequently, when our initiative had been reassumed, General MacArthur, within his capability to arm, authorized a 25 percent increase in each Republic of Korea Division, the increase to be in infantry riflemen. It was obviously quite beyond the capability of this theater to arm and equip 500,000 more Koreans. Their utilization, therefore, became a matter of political policy under the global military assistance program.

-A-

6.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 14652 SEC. 3(E) AND 3(B) OR (E) NNDG # 775 012

WASHINGTON, APRIL 12--(AP)--THE TEXT OF PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S ADDRESS ON FAR EAST POLICY:

I WANT TO TALK PLAINLY TO YOU TONIGHT ABOUT WHAT WE ARE DOING IN KOREA AND ABOUT OUR POLICY IN THE FAR EAST.

IN THE SIMPLEST TERMS, WHAT WE ARE DOING IN KOREA IS THIS:

WE ARE TRYING TO PREVENT THIRD WORLD WAR.

I THINK MOST PEOPLE IN THIS COUNTRY RECOGNIZED THAT FACT LAST JUNE. AND THEY WARMLY SUPPORTED THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT TO HELP THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AGAINST THE COMMUNIST AGGRESSORS. NOW, MANY PERSONS, EVEN SOME WHO APPLAUDED OUR DECISION TO DEFEND KOREA, HAVE FORGOTTEN THE BASIC REASON FOR OUR ACTION.

IT IS RIGHT FOR US TO BE IN KOREA. IT WAS RIGHT LAST JUNE -- IT IS RIGHT TODAY.

I WANT TO REMIND YOU WHY THIS IS TRUE.

THE COMMUNISTS IN THE KREMLIN ARE ENGAGED IN A MONSTROUS CONSPIRACY TO STAMP OUT FREEDOM ALL OVER THE WORLD. IF THEY WERE TO SUCCEED, THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE NUMBERED AMONG THEIR PRINCIPLA VICTIMS. IT MUST BE CLEAR TO EVERYONE THAT THE UNITED STATES CANNOT --AND WILL NOT --SIT IDLY BY AND AWAIT FOREIGN CONQUEST. THE ONLY QUESTION IS: WHEN IS THE BEST TIME TO MEET THE THREAT AND HOW?

THE BEST TIME TO MEET THE THREAT IS IN THE BEGINNING. IT IS EASIER TO PUT OUT A FIRE IN THE BEGINNING WHEN IT IS SMALL THAN AFTER IT HAS BECOME A ROARING BLAZE.

AND THE BEST WAY TO MEET THE THREAT OF AGGRESSION IS FOR THE PEACE-LOVING NATIONS TO ACT TOGETHER. IF THEY DONT ACT TOGETHER, THEY ARE LIKELY TO BE PICKED OFF, ONE BY ONE.

IF THEY HAD FOLLOWED THE RIGHT POLICIES IN THE 1930S -- IF THE FREE COUNTRIES HAD ACTED TOGETHER, TO CRUSH THE AGGRESSION OF THE DICTATORS, AND IF THEY HAD ACTED IN THE BEGINNING, WHEN THE AGGRESSION WAS SMALL THERE PROBABLY WOULD HAVE BEEN NO WORLD WAR II.

(MORE)

DECLASSIFIED BY 1A052 SEC. 3(E) AND 3(D) OR (E) NNDG # 775 012

IF HISTORY HAS TAUGHT US ANYTHING. IT IS THAT AGGRESSION ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD IS A THREAT TO PEACE EVERYWHERE IN THE WORLD. WHEN THAT AGGRESSION IS SUPPORTED BY THE CRUEL AND SELFISH RULERS OF A POWERFUL NATION WHO ARE BENT ON CONQUEST, IT BECOMES A CLEAR AND PRESEN DANGER TO THE SECURITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF EVERY FREE NATION.

THIS IS A LESSON THAT MOST PEOPLE IN THE COUNTRY HAVE LEARNED THOROUGHLY. THIS IS THE BASIC REASONS WHY WE JOINED IN CREATING THE UNITED NATIONS. AND, SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAR II, WE HAVE BEEN FREE PUTTING THAT LESSON INTO PRACTICE -- WE HAVE BEEN WORKING WITH OTHER NATIONS TO CHECK THE AGGRESSIVE DESIGNS OF THE SOVIET UNION BEFORE THEY CAN RESULT IN A THIRD WORLD WAR.

THAT IS WHAT WE DID IN GREECE, WHEN THAT NATION WAS THREATENED BY THE AGGRESSION OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM.

THE ATTACK AGAINST GREECE COULD HAVE LED TO GENERAL WAR. BUT THIS COUNTRY CAME TO THE AID OF GREECE. THE UNITED NATIONS SUPPORTED GREEK RESISTANCE. WITH OUR HELP, THE DETERMINATION AND EFFORTS OF THE GREEK PEOPLE DEFEATED THE ATTACK ON THE SPOT.

ANOTHER BIG COMMUNIST THREAT TO PEACE WAS THE BERLIN BLOCKADE. THAT TOO COULD HAVE LED TO WAR. BUT AGAIN IT WAS SETTLED BECAUSE FREE MEN WOULD NOT BACK DOWN IN AN EMERGENCY.

THE AGGRESSION AGAINST KOREA IS THE BOLDEST AND MOST DANGEROUS MOVE THE COMMUNIST HAVE YET MADE.

THE ATTACK ON KOREA WAS PART OF A GREATER PLAN FOR CONQUERING ALL OF ASIA.

(MORE)

I I WOULD LIKE TO READ TO YOU FROM A SECRET INTELLIGENCE REPORT WHICH CAME TO US AFTER THE ATTACK. IT IS A REPORT OF A SPEECH A COMMUNIST ARMY OFFICER IN NORTH KOREA GAVE TO A GROUP OF SPIES AND SABOTEURS LAST MAY, ONE MONTH BEFORE SOUTH KOREA WAS INVADED.

THE REPORT SHOWS IN GREAT DETAIL HOW THIS INVASION WAS PART OF A CAREFULLY PREPARED PLAN. HERE IS PART OF WHAT THE COMMUNIST OFFICER, WHO HAD BEEN TRAINED IN MOSCOW, TOLD HIS MEN: "OUR FORCES," HE SAID, "ARE SCHEDULED TO ATTACK SOUTH KOREAN FORCES ABOUT THE MIDDLE OF JUNE. THE COMING ATTACK ON SOUTH KOREA MARKS THE FIRST STEP TOWARD THE LIBERATION OF ASIA."

NOTICE THAT HE USED THE WORD "LIBERATION." THAT IS COMMUNIST DOUBLE TALK MEANING "CONQUEST." I HAVE ANOTHER SECRET INTELLIGENCE REPORT HERE. THIS ONE TELLS WHAT ANOTHER COMMUNIST OFFICER IN THE FAR EAST TOLD HIS MEN SEVERAL MONTHS BEFORE THE INVASION OF KOREA. HERE IS WHAT HE SAID: "IN ORDER TO SUCCESSFULLY UNDERTAKE THE LONG AWAITED WORLD REVOLUTION, WE MUST FIRST UNIFY ASIA . . . JAVA, INDOCHINA, MALAYA, INDIA, TIBET, THAILAND, PHILIPPINES, AND JAPAN ARE OUR ULTIMATE TARGETS . . . THE UNITED STATES IS THE ONLY OBSTACLE ON OUR ROAD FOR TH LIBERATION OF ALL COUNTRIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. IN OTHER WORDS, WE MUST UNIFY THE PEOPLE OF ASIA AND CRUSH THE UNITED STATES."

THAT IS WHAT THE COMMUNIST LEADERS ARE TELLING THEIR PEOPLE, AND THAT IS WHAT THEY HAVE BEEN TRYING TO DO.

THEY WANT TO CONTROL THEY WANT TO CONTROL ALL ASIA FROM THE KREMLIN.

--ST 12/1307

WASHINGTON -- ADD TRUMAN TEXT (AP 45) X X X KREMLIN.

THIS PLAN OF CONQUEST IS IN FLAT CONTRADICTION TO WHAT WE BELIEVE. WE BELIEVE THAT KOREA BELONGS TO THE KOREANS, THAT INDIA BELONGS TO THE INDIANS -- THAT ALL THE NATIONS OF ASIA SHOULD BE FREE TO WORK OUT THEIR AFFAIRS IN THEIR OWN WAY. THIS IS THE BASIS OF PEACE IN THE FAR EAST AND EVERYWHERE ELSE.

THE WHOLE COMMUNIST IMPERIALISM IS BACK OF THE ATTACK ON PEACE IN THE FAR EAST. IT WAS THE SOVIET UNION THAT TRAINED AND EQUIPPED THE NORTH KOREANS FOR AGGRESSION. THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS MASSED 44 WELL TRAINED AND WELL EQUIPPED DIVISIONS ON THE KOREAN FRONTIER. THESE WERE THE TROOPS THEY THREW INTO BATTLE WHEN THE NORTH KOREAN COMMUNISTS WERE BEATEN.

THE QUESTION WE HAVE HAD TO FACE IS WHETHER THE COMMUNIST PLAN OF CONQUEST CAN BE STOPPED WITHOUT GENERAL WAR. OUR GOVERNMENT AND OTHER COUNTRIES ASSOCIATED WITH US IN THE UNITED NATIONS BELIEVE THAT THE BEST CHANCE OF STOPPING IT WITHOUT GENERAL WAR IS TO MEET THE ATTACK IN KOREA AND DEFEAT IT THERE.

THAT IS WHAT WE HAVE BEEN DOING. IT IS A DIFFICULT AND BITTER TASK.

BUT SO FAR IT HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL. FOR, WE HAVE PREVENTED WORLD WAR III.

SO FAR, BY FIGHTING A LIMITED WAR IN KOREA, WE HAVE PREVENTED AGGRESSION FROM SUCCEEDING, AND BRINGING ON A GENERAL WAR. AND THE ABILITY OF THE WHOLE FREE WORLD TO RESIST COMMUNIST AGGRESSION HAS BEEN GREATLY IMPROVED.

WE HAVE TAUGHT THE ENEMY A LESSON. HE HAS FOUND OUT THAT AGGRESSION IS NOT CHEAP OR EASY. MOREOVER, MEN ALL OVER THE WORLD WHO WANT TO REMAIN FREE HAVE BEEN GIVEN NEW COURAGE AND NEW HOPE. THEY KNOW NOW THAT THE CHAMPIONS OF FREEDOM CAN STAND UP AND FIGHT AND THAT THEY WILL STAND UP AND FIGHT.

(MORE)

/X X X X AND FIGHT.

OUR RESOLUTE STAND IN KOREA IS HELPING THE FORCES OF FREEDOM NOW FIGHTING IN INDOCHINA AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD. IT HAS ALREADY SLOWED DOWN THE TIME TABLE OF CONQUEST.

IN KOREA ITSELF, THERE ARE SIGNS THAT THE ENEMY IS BUILDING UP HIS GROUND FORCES FOR A NEW MASS OFFENSIVE.

WE ALSO KNOW THAT THERE HAVE BEEN LARGE INCREASES IN THE ENEMY'S AVAILABLE AIR FORCES.

IF A NEW ATTACK COMES, I FEEL CONFIDENT IT WILL BE TURNED BACK. THE UNITED NATIONS FIGHTING FORCES ARE TOUGH AND ABLE AND WELL EQUIPPED. THEY ARE FIGHTING FOR A JUST CAUSE. THEY ARE PROVING TO ALL THE WORLD THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY WILL WORK. WE ARE PROUD OF ALL THESE FORCES FOR THE MAGNIFICENT JOB THEY HAVE DONE AGAINST HEAVY ODDS. WE PRAY THAT THEIR EFFORTS MAY SUCCEED, FOR UPON THEIR SUCCESS MAY HINGE THE PEACE OF THE WORLD.

THE COMMUNIST SIDE MUST NOW CHOOSE ITS COURSE OF ACTION. THE COMMUNIST RULERS MAY PRESS THE ATTACK AGAINST US. THEY MAY TAKE FURTHER ACTION WHICH WILL SPREAD THE CONFLICT. THEY HAVE THAT CHOICE, AND WITH IT THE AWFUL RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHAT MAY FOLLOW. THE COMMUNISTS ALSO HAVE THE CHOICE OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WHICH COULD LEAD TO A GENERAL RELAXATION OF TENSIONS IN THE FAR EAST.

THE DECISION IS THEIRS, BECAUSE THE FORCES OF THE UNITED NATIONS WILL STRIVE TO LIMIT THE CONFLICT IF POSSIBLE.

WE DO NOT WANT TO SEE THE CONFLICT IN KOREA EXTENDED. WE ARE TRYING TO PREVENT A WORLD WAR -- NOT TO START ONE. THE BEST WAY TO DO THAT IS TO MAKE IT PLAIN THAT WE AND THE OTHER FREE COUNTRIES WILL CONTINUE TO RESIST THE ATTACK.

(MORE)

X X X THE ATTACK.

BUT YOU MAY ASK WHY CAN'T WE TAKE OTHER STEPS TO PUNISH THE AGGRESSOR. WHY DON'T WE BOMB MANCHURIA AND CHINA ITSELF?

WHY DON'T WE ASSIST CHINESE NATIONALIST TROOPS TO LAND ON THE MAINLAND OF CHINA?

IF WE WERE TO DO THESE THINGS WE WOULD BE RUNNING A VERY GRAVE RISK OF STARTING A GENERAL WAR. IF THAT WERE TO HAPPEN, WE WOULD HAVE BROUGHT ABOUT THE EXACT SITUATION WE ARE TRYING TO PREVENT.

IF WE WERE TO DO THESE THINGS, WE WOULD BECOME ENTANGLED IN A VAST CONFLICT ON THE CONTINENT OF ASIA AND OUR TASK WOULD BECOME IMMEASURABLY MORE DIFFICULT ALL OVER THE WORLD.

WHAT WOULD SUIT THE AMBITIONS OF THE KREMLIN BETTER THAN FOR OUR MILITARY FORCES TO BE COMMITTED TO A FULL SCALE WAR WITH RED CHINA?

IT MAY WELL BE THAT, IN SPITE OF OUR BEST EFFORTS, THE COMMUNISTS MAY SPREAD THE WAR. IT WOULD BE WRONG -- TRAGICALLY WRONG -- FOR US TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN EXTENDING THE WAR.

THE DANGERS ARE GREAT. MAKE NO MISTAKE ABOUT IT. BEHIND THE NORTH KOREANS AND CHINESE COMMUNISTS IN THE FRONT LINES STAND ADDITIONAL MILLIONS OF CHINESE SOLDIERS. AND BEHIND THE CHINESE STAND THE TANKS, THE PLANES, THE SUBMARINES, THE SOLDIERS, AND THE SCHEMING RULERS OF THE SOVIET UNION.

OUR AIM IS TO AVOID THE SPREAD OF THE CONFLICT.

THE COURSE WE HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING IS THE ONE BEST CALCULATED TO AVOID AN ALL-OUT WAR. IT IS THE COURSE CONSISTENT WITHOUT OBLIGATION TO DO ALL WE CAN TO MAINTAIN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. OUR EXPERIENCE IN GREECE AND BERLIN SHOWS THAT IT IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE COURSE OF ACTION WE CAN FOLLOW. THAT

FIRST OF ALL, IT IS CLEAR THAT OUR EFFORTS IN KOREA CAN BLUNT THE WILL OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS TO CONTINUE THE STURGGLE. THE UNITED NATIONS FORCES HAVE PUT UP A TREMENDOUS FIGHT IN KOREA AND HAVE INFLICTED VERY HEAVY CASUALTIES ON THE ENEMY.

(MORE)

X X X THE ENEMY.

OUR FORCES ARE STRONGER
NOW THAN THEY HAVE BEEN BEFORE. THESE ARE PLAIN FACTS WHICH MAY DISCOURAGE THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS FROM CONTINUING THEIR ATTACK.

SECOND, THE FREE WORLD AS A WHOLE IS GROWING IN MILITARY STRENGTH EVERY DAY. IN THE UNITED STATES, IN WESTERN EUROPE, AND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, FREE MEN ARE ALERT TO THE SOVIET THREAT AND ARE BUILDING THEIR DEFENSES. THIS MAY DISCOURAGE THE COMMUNIST RULERS FROM CONTINUING THE WAR IN KOREA -- AND FROM UNDERTAKING NEW ACTS OF AGGRESSION ELSEWHERE.

IF THE COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES REALIZE THAT THEY CAN NOT DEFEAT US IN KOREA, IF THEY REALIZE IT WOULD BE FOOLHARDY TO WIDEN THE HOSTILITIES BEYOND KOREA, THEN THEY MAY RECOGNIZE THE FOLLY OF CONTINUING THEIR AGGRESSION. A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT MAY THEN BE POSSIBLE. THE DOOR IS ALWAYS OPEN.

THEN WE MAY ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT IN KOREA WHICH WILL NOT COMPROMISE THE PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

I HAVE THOUGHT LONG AND HARD ABOUT THIS QUESTION OF EXTENDING THE WAR IN ASIA. I HAVE DISCUSSED IT MANY TIMES WITH THE ABLEST MILITARY ADVISERS IN THE COUNTRY. I BELIEVE WITH ALL MY HEART THAT THE COURSE WE ARE FOLLOWING IS THE BEST COURSE.

I BELIEVE THAT WE MUST TRY TO LIMIT THE WAR TO KOREA FOR THESE VITAL REASONS: TO MAKE SURE THAT THE PRECIOUS LIVES OF OUR FIGHTING MEN ARE NOT WASTED. TO SEE THAT THE SECURITY OF OUR COUNTRY AND THE FREE WORLD IS NOT NEEDLESSLY JEOPARDIZED. AND TO PREVENT A THIRD WORLD WAR.

A NUMBER OF EVENTS HAVE MADE IT EVIDENT THAT GEN. MACARTHUR DID NOT AGREE WITH THAT POLICY. I HAVE THEREFORE CONSIDERED IT ESSENTIAL TO RELIEVE GEN. MACARTHUR SO THAT THERE WOULD BE NO DOUBT OR CONFUSION AS TO THE REAL PURPOSE AND AIM OF OUR POLICY.

(MORE)

M X X OUR POLICY.

IT WAS WITH THE DEEPEST PERSONAL REGRET THAT I FOUND MYSELF COMPELLED TO TAKE THIS ACTION. GEN. MACARTHUR IS ONE OF OUR GREATEST MILITARY COMMANDERS. BUT THE CAUSE OF WORLD PEACE IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN ANY INDIVIDUAL.

THE CHANGE IN COMMANDS IN THE FAR EAST MEANS NO CHANGE WHATEVER IN THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES . WE WILL CARRY ON THE FIGHT IN KOREA WITH VIGOR AND DETERMINATION IN AN EFFORT TO BRING THE WAR TO A SPEEDY AND SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

WE ARE READY, AT ANY TIME, TO NEGOTIATE FOR A RESTORATION OF PEACE IN THE AREA. BUT WE WILL NOT ENGAGE IN APPEASEMENT. WE ARE ONLY INTERESTED IN REAL PEACE.

REAL PEACE CAN BE ACHIEVED THROUGH A SETTLEMENT BASED ON THE FOLLOWING FACTORS:

1. THE FIGHTING MUST STOP.

2. CONCRETE STEPS MUST BE TAKEN TO INSURE THAT THE FIGHTING WILL NOT BREAK OUT AGAIN.

3. THERE MUST BE AN END TO THE AGGRESSION.

A SETTLEMENT FOUNDED UPON THESE ELEMENTS WOULD OPEN THE WAY FOR THE UNIFICATION OF KOREA AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES.

IN THE MEANTIME, I WANT TO BE CLEAR ABOUT OUR MILITARY OBJECTIVE. WE ARE FIGHTING TO RESIST AN OUTRAGEOUS AGGRESSION IN KOREA. WE ARE TRYING TO KEEP THE KOREAN CONFLICT FROM SPREADING TO OTHER AREAS. BUT AT THE SAME TIME WE MUST CONDUCT OUR MILITARY ACTIVITIES SO AS TO INSURE THE SECURITY OF OUR FORCES. THIS IS ESSENTIAL IF THEY ARE TO CONTINUE THE FIGHT UNTIL THE ENEMY ABANDONS ITS RUTHLESS ATTEMPT TO DESTROY THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

(MORE)

X X X OF KOREA.

THAT IS OUR MILITARY OBJECTIVE -- TO REPEL ATTACK AND TO RESTORE PEACE.

IN THE HARD FIGHTING IN KOREA, WE ARE PROVING THAT COLLECTIVE ACTION AMONG NATIONS IS NOT ONLY A HIGH PRINCIPLE BUT A WORKABLE MEANS OF RESISTING AGGRESSION. DEFEAT OF AGGRESSION IN KOREA MAY BE THE TURNING POINT IN THE WORLD'S SEARCH FOR A PRACTICAL WAY OF ACHIEVING PEACE AND SECURITY.

THE STRUGGLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN KOREA IS A STRUGGLE FOR PEACE.

THE FREE NATIONS HAVE UNITED THEIR STRENGTH IN AN EFFORT TO PREVENT A THIRD WORLD WAR. THAT WAR CAN COME IF THE COMMUNIST RULERS WANT IT TO COME. BUT THIS NATION AND ITS ALLIES WILL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS COMING.

WE DO NOT WANT TO WIDEN THE CONFLICT. WE WILL USE EVERY EFFORT TO PREVENT THAT DISASTER. AND IN SO DOING, WE KNOW THAT WE ARE FOLLOWING THE GREAT PRINCIPLES OF PEACE, FREEDOM, AND JUSTICE.

(END TEXT) -- ST 12/1359

C-in-C

11 April 1951

I have just left the General. He received word of the President's dismissal from command, magnificently. His soldierly bearing was never more pronounced. He never turned a hair. I think this has been his finest hour.

AIR MAIL

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
TOKYO

11 April 1951

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur,
UN Headquarters,
Tokyo.

Dear General:

Alan Gould, executive editor of The Associated Press, wired me today to express his greetings to you and to report that interest in your views has reached a new peak in the United States and elsewhere in the world.

While The Associated Press has not prevailed upon you before, Mr. Gould thought the time now appropriate to ask you for a clarifying statement or amplification of your already expressed and authorized views concerning these questions:

1. Is it correct, as some contend, to construe your letter to Rep. Martin as meaning you consider unlimited, unrestricted attack on Communist China's military forces, wherever located, as preferable to the present policy of trying to contain the present conflict within Korean boundaries? Would you say this broader attack is necessary to reach a decisive military settlement of the Korean campaign, with the present strength of UN forces?

2. How do you feel that the present policy of neutralizing Formosa and immobilizing the Chinese Nationalists on the island has affected the Korean campaign; and how should alterations of that policy, if any, be put into effect?

3. Do you feel that the buildup of European forces under Gen. Eisenhower and under the present commitments involving United States reinforcements, which the senate has approved, conflicts with your views of what is needed to effectively conduct the Korean campaign?

4. How can the United Nations forces best win a military decision in Korea or, at least, gain a better bargaining position for negotiated peace?

5. Can you say whether you have received any new directives or changes of previous directives governing the Korean campaign or your sphere of authority? If so, do you care to state their contents or effect?

Please feel free to send your answers either to Mr. Gould c/o The Associated Press, New York, or to me for transmittal from here.

With appreciation for your cooperation and with warmest personal regards, I am

Sincerely Yours,

CHIEF OF BUREAU
RUSSELL BRINES

5

The above pen was used by me throughout my tenure as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Commander in Chief, Far East Command, and Commander in Chief, United Nations Command. I have turned it over to Major General Courtney Whitney of my personal staff as a token of my affection.

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR

11 April 1951

Tokyo, April 11, 1951

General Douglas MacArthur
Commander-in-Chief
General Headquarters
United Nations Command
Tokyo

My dear General:

Today's story on President Truman's announcement was one of the most disheartening I have ever been called on to handle in a long newspaper career. There is little more than can or need be said.

I have received a cable from Hugh Baillie in which he has asked me to recall to you a discussion he had with you in 1945 about your memoirs. He has asked me to see you now in that regard, since Ernie Hoberecht is out of town.

Sincerely yours,

FRANK TREMAINE

bc: Maj. Gen. Courtney Whitney
Mr. Hugh Baillie

WASHINGTON, AP -- 12 Jan 51 ---- President Truman described Thursday as not true a published report that "there is evidence that Washington has stripped" General MacArthur of"authority to speak freely on the Korean war."

12 January 1951

WASHINGTON (0735) President Truman and the Defense Department issued simultaneous denials Thursday of published stories that Gen. MacArthur has been "stripped of his authority to speak freely" in Tokyo. Mr. Truman also denied at a news conference another published report that Gen. MacArthur had recommended the withdrawal of UN troops from Korea. The Defense Department had denied this story Wednesday. Mr. Truman told newsmen that neither story was true. He referred questioners to the Pentagon for further comment on both stories. A Defense Department spokesman specifically denied the account's statement that MacArthur had been ordered from Washington to transfer authority over ground communiques to Lt. Gen. Ridgway in Korea. The spokesman after checking with Defense Secretary Marshall's office said that the delegation of authority over communiques was made by MacArthur, and that his decision was not even known in Washington until after it was announced publicly in Tokyo. He added that MacArthur still has authority to issue the communiques himself if he wishes. He said MacArthur's jurisdiction "is in no way impaired." The denial was issued concerning a story from Tokyo which said "MacArthur's headquarters is reduced to releases of a general nature, human interest stories and awards and decorations."