



**S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20330428**

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO  
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA  
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

28 April 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,  
Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for  
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-001015DP (S)

### **JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment**

#### **1. (S) Personal Information:**

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Salem Hussein Mohammed
- Current/True Name and Aliases: Husayn Salim Muhammad al-Matari Yafai, Husayn al-Adani
- Place of Birth: Aden, Yemen (YM)
- Date of Birth: 19 June 1977
- Citizenship: Yemen
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9YM-001015DP



**2. (U//FOUO) Health:** Detainee is in overall good health.

#### **3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:**

**a. (S) Recommendation:** JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for CD on 9 January 2007.

**b. (S//NF) Executive Summary:** Detainee was an al-Qaida facilitator located in Iran (IR) providing travel and false travel documents to Arab extremists attempting to enter Afghanistan (AF). Senior al-Qaida facilitator Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-10016) and other al-Qaida members reported detainee operated out of al-Qaida supported guest and safe houses in Iran and Afghanistan. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

**CLASSIFIED BY:** MULTIPLE SOURCES  
**REASON:** E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)  
**DECLASSIFY ON:** 20330428

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- A **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
- A **HIGH** threat from a detention perspective
- Of **HIGH** intelligence value

**c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes:** The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ➤ next to the footnote.)

- Added reasons for continued detention
- Added detail to detainee's prior history
- Added detail to detainee's recruitment and travel
- Added detail to detainee's training and activities

#### 4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

**The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.**

**a. (S//NF) Prior History:** Detainee finished his high school education at a literary school in Aden in 1997.<sup>1</sup> He later worked at a Hyundai plant in Yemen where he earned approximately 30,000 Yemeni Riyals per month.<sup>2</sup> Detainee lived at home with his parents, and was able to save most of his salary.<sup>3</sup> Detainee previously worked in construction, as a clothing salesman, and as a khat merchant.<sup>4</sup> Detainee speaks English fairly well.<sup>5</sup>

**b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel:** Detainee is from southern Yemen and once hoped to find more opportunities in Europe than would be available to him as a southern Yemeni (he believed that politics in Yemen were controlled by the northern part of the country).<sup>6</sup> Detainee flew from Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan (PK) in the beginning of September 2001. After four days in Karachi, detainee traveled by train to the Tabligh Center in Lahore, PK.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> ➤ Multiple ISNs Yemeni Delegation 26-MAR-2008, No. 1015, 001015 KB 03-APR-2003

<sup>2</sup> ➤ Analyst Note: In 2003, 30,000 Yemeni Riyals was equivalent to \$168.53 US. It is unclear at which Hyundai "plant" detainee worked. Hyundai is heavily involved in the Yemeni liquid natural gas industry, and has an automobile distributor in-country.

<sup>3</sup> 001015 FM40 05-OCT-2005

<sup>4</sup> 001015 KB 3-APR-2003, Analyst Note: Khat (also ghat, qat, or chat) is an evergreen shrub (*Catha edulis*) native to the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Khat is widely used in the region for its mild euphoric and stimulating effects.

<sup>5</sup> 001015 FM40 08-MAR-2005, 001015 FM40 14-JAN-2004

<sup>6</sup> 001015 FM40 04-OCT-2005

<sup>7</sup> 001015 FM40 19-DEC-2003, 001015 HANDNOTE 04-APR-2003, 001015 MFR 12-MAY-2003, Analyst Note: The Tabligh Center refers to the Jamaat Tablighi (JT) which has been identified as a Priority 3 Terrorist Support

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Detainee traveled with approximately \$2000 US and hoped to travel via the Tablighi Islamic Missionary Organization in Europe.<sup>8</sup> Detainee did not plan to go to any specific country, but hoped to be granted political asylum in whichever European country he entered.<sup>9</sup>

**c. (S//NF) Training and Activities:** While at the Tabligh Center, detainee met an individual named Mohammad Ali al-Pakistani, after he overheard detainee speaking Arabic to a security guard at the center.<sup>10</sup> Ali al-Pakistani then took detainee to a guesthouse.<sup>11</sup> Detainee explained to Ali al-Pakistani that he wanted to travel to Europe and was not interested in the Tabligh. Detainee stated Ali al-Pakistani had smuggled people in the past.<sup>12</sup> After two and a half months in Lahore (about mid November 2001), Ali al-Pakistani informed detainee it would not be possible for detainee to travel to Europe because of the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001. Ali al-Pakistani also indicated it would not be a good idea for detainee to travel because he was an Arab. Ali al-Pakistani then told detainee he should go back to Yemen or, if he wanted, Ali al-Pakistani would smuggle detainee into Europe. Detainee agreed to pay Ali al-Pakistani 8,800 Pakistani rupees (approximately \$145 US) for the service and to bring an extra \$1000 US for bribes and travel expenses. Within a month, Ali al-Pakistani and detainee traveled by rail and bus to a village near the Pakistan and Iranian border. Detainee and Ali al-Pakistani were ferried across the border by a Farsi speaking driver. Ali al-Pakistani may have bribed border guards to allow passage. Ali al-Pakistani appeared familiar with both the driver and the process of bribing border guards.<sup>13</sup> After two and a half hours, they arrived at the driver's house where they spent one day before traveling on by bus to Mashhad, IR via Tehran, IR.<sup>14</sup> After detainee and Ali al-Pakistani arrived in Mashhad, they took a taxi from the bus terminal to a home in Mashhad where detainee and Ali al-Pakistani stayed for a month. Ali al-Pakistani told detainee they were going back to Tehran, and then venture to Turkey and Greece. They took a bus back to Tehran, and then a taxi to a hotel in a primarily Iraqi and Kurdish area of the city.<sup>15</sup> During one of their stays at a guesthouse in Iran, Iranian

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Entity (TSE). Priority 3 TSEs have demonstrated intent and willingness to provide financial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack U.S. persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 1-2 terrorist groups.

<sup>8</sup> > Analyst Note: In 001015 SIR 21-OCT-2004, detainee stated he took \$1500 USD and 15,000 Pakistani Rupees (\$268.87 USD) when he left Yemen for Pakistan.

<sup>9</sup> 001015 FM40 05-OCT-2005

<sup>10</sup> > 001015 FM40 27-MAY-2005

<sup>11</sup> 001015 MFR 12-MAY-2003

<sup>12</sup> > 001015 HANDNOTE 04-APR-2003

<sup>13</sup> > IIR 6 034 0994 03

<sup>14</sup> > Analyst Note: The circuitous route/travel to and from Tehran and Meshhad, IR and amount of time in country by detainee and his facilitator suggest activities other than simply transiting a neighboring country for follow on travel to Europe, as detainee indicated.

<sup>15</sup> 001015 HANDNOTE 04-APR-2003

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intelligence operatives took photos of al-Qaida and Taliban members who were present at the house. Within four or five days, the Iranian agents returned with false passports for those fighters.<sup>16</sup>

**5. (U) Capture Information:**

**a. (S//NF)** Detainee states he was captured by non-uniformed Iranian policemen as he walked with Ali al-Pakistani in Tehran. Detainee was tried and convicted for being in Iran illegally, and was held in jail in Tehran and Mashhad for at least two months before his transfer to Afghanistan in April 2002. Detainee also stated he was tortured while in the custody of the Iranians.<sup>17</sup> Detainee was held at the Afghan prison in Kabul for approximately two and a half months before being transferred to US custody (approximately July 2002).<sup>18</sup>

**b. (S) Property Held:**

- ID Cards
  - International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) registration Card
  - Emergency card
- Various personal items including clothing and toiletries
- Though JTF-GTMO holds no money of detainee, he claims he had \$2000 US at the time of his arrest.<sup>19</sup>

**c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO:** 9 May 2003

**d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO:** To provide information on the following:

- Iranian prison system and law enforcement methods
- Iranian intelligence activities and operations
- Al-Qaida personnel in Pakistan
- Jihad recruitment procedures used in Pakistan
- Drug trade in Yemen
- Recruiter and travel facilitator, Mohammed Ali al-Pakistani

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<sup>16</sup> IIR 6 034 088 07, Analyst Note: Detainee's admitted presence in Iran, and knowledge of al-Qaida members, including Usama Bin Laden's (UBL) family members, their activities, and interaction with Iranian authorities reflects detainee's close association with al-Qaida.

<sup>17</sup> > 001015 SIR 29-MAR-2005 , IIR 6 034 5139 03

<sup>18</sup> 001015 HANDNOTE 04-APR-2003, FM40 21-JUL-2004

<sup>19</sup> 001015 FM40 31-JUL-2004

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- Terrorism targets, activities and related facilities
- Terrorism biographical/psychological information

**6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account:** Detainee continues to hide information regarding his timeline and activities in Afghanistan and Iran. Detainee has yet to provide details of his activities as a facilitator and those of other al-Qaida members during his tenure in al-Qaida safe houses in Iran. Detainee continues to deny being in Afghanistan, despite past reporting to the contrary.

**7. (U) Detainee Threat:**

**a. (S) Assessment:** Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies.

**b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention:** Detainee is a member of al-Qaida who served as a travel facilitator, providing false travel documents for Arab extremists transiting Iran for entry into Afghanistan. Detainee is reported to have operated out of al-Qaida safe houses in Iran and in guesthouses in Afghanistan.

- (S//NF) Detainee is a member of al-Qaida.
  - (S//NF) Upon detainee's transfer to Afghan control, Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) officials identified detainee as a member of al-Qaida who had fled Afghanistan.<sup>20</sup> (Analyst Note: Detainee denies being in Afghanistan.)<sup>21</sup>
  - (S//NF) According to Abd al-Rahman Ahmad Khdar, ISN US9CA-000990DP, (CA-990, transferred), he saw Marfadai (variant of detainee's alias) at al-Qaida guesthouses in Afghanistan. Khdar described detainee as an old "junior" al-Qaida member, by which he meant detainee had been around for some time but was not a "senior" or an al-Qaida leader.<sup>22</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee is an al-Qaida facilitator who provided false travel documents for other Arab extremists transiting Iran for entry into Afghanistan.
  - (S//NF) Humud Dakhil Humud Said al-Jadani, US9SA-000230DP, (SA-230) identified Husayn al-Adeni, (assessed to be detainee), as an al-Qaida facilitator in Tehran who assisted the transit of extremists to Konar, AF.<sup>23</sup> (Analyst Note: Konar

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<sup>20</sup> IIR 6 044 5140 03, IIR 6 044 5139 03, Analyst Note: Detainee's timeline and travel in Iran is similar to the movement of mujahideen, including other detainees, who escaped Afghanistan into Iran after the US bombing campaign began after 11 September 2001.

<sup>21</sup> 1015 SIR 30-JUL-2005

<sup>22</sup> > CIR-3316-14554-04, Analyst Note: Variant of detainee alias Marfadi is Marfadai.

<sup>23</sup> IIR 6 034 0395 05, 000230 SIR 28-JUL-2005, 000230 SIR 18-JUL-2005, Analyst Note: A variant of Husayn al-Adani is Hussein al-Adeni. The name Husayn al-Adani is associated to detainee through 001463 Techdoc 05-Jun-

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is probably Konar Province, AF.) SA-230 noted Husayn al-Adani (variant of detainee alias, assessed to be detainee) was at the guesthouse with Tawfiq Nasir Awadh al-Bayhani ISN US9SA-000893DP (SA-893) from late 2000 to early 2001.)

○ (S//NF) SA-230 stated detainee informed him that he (detainee) stayed at a guesthouse for lower ranking al-Qaida members in Tehran, IR, operated by Hamza al-Qaiti. Al-Qaiti received money from Usama Bin Laden (UBL) for the maintenance of the house.<sup>24</sup> Detainee also informed SA-230 that Iranian intelligence agents visited the safehouse and photographed the al-Qaida and Taliban members to prepare falsified passports for them.<sup>25</sup> (Analyst Note: The term “fighters” is assessed to be a reference to the al-Qaida associated Islamic extremists who transited to and from Afghanistan to participate in violent militant activity in country.)

▪ (S//NF) According to SA-230, Abu Hafs al-Mauritani, Hamza al-Qaiti, and Abu Hassan traveled to Iran together and founded two small guesthouses in Tehran. They had two people at the guesthouses that are now at JTF-GTMO (SA-893 and Hussain al-Adani (detainee alias)).<sup>26</sup>

○ (S//NF) According to an Egyptian government service, an individual named Hussein al-Yafi, (a variant of detainee’s alias), provided Muhammad Midhat Mursi al-Sayyid Umar with a false passport.<sup>27</sup> (Analyst Note: According to the Egyptian Ministry of Interior’s State Security Investigations Sector (SSIS), Midhat is the son of al-Qaida leader Abu Khabab aka (Abu Khabab al-Masri), a senior al-Qaida explosives trainer).

▪ (S//NF) Midhat was placed under surveillance and subsequently arrested in August 2000 following his return to Egypt. The Egyptian General Intelligence Service (EGIS) reported Midhat entered Egypt with a “flawless” Yemeni passport in the name of Muhammad Abdallah Said al-Hamidy, issued in Aden in 1999.<sup>28</sup>

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2005 1941-2041 (S//NF//OC) and through the assimilation of detainee’s name Husayn with his city of origin, Aden, YM. The timeframe of late 2000 to early 2001, reported by SA-230 and GZ-10016, place detainee in Afghanistan considerably earlier than detainee’s claimed arrival in Pakistan in September 2001.

<sup>24</sup> > IIR 6 034 0088 07, Analyst Note: According to Tolfiq Nassar Ahmed (al-Bihani) aka Tawfiq Nasir Awadh al-Bayhani, US9SA-000893DP (SA-893), SA-893 and detainee lived in the second safe house for lower ranking fighters.

<sup>25</sup> IIR 6 034 0088 07, 000230 SIR 22-SEP-2006, Analyst Note: SA-230 stated he received this information from both detainee and Tawfiq Nassar Ahmad al-Bayhani, ISN US9SA-000893DP (SA-893).

<sup>26</sup> > 000230 SIR 03-AUG-2005, 000230 SIR 22-SEP-2006,

<sup>27</sup> > TD-314/42804-01, Analyst Note: Detainee is reported to have provided Muhammad Midhat Musri al-Sayyid Umar a passport in 2000, a year earlier than his admitted travel to Pakistan. Biographic information associated with a postcard from detainee lists his name as Muhammad Hussain Salem al-Yafai. See GUAN-2005-T04415 05-SEP-2005.

<sup>28</sup> TD-314/42804-01

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- (S//NF) Midhat's father, Abu Khabab, was a well-known Derunta Camp commander and trainer, as well as a poison and explosives expert.<sup>29</sup> Abu Khabab was rumored to have been killed in a January 2006 air strike in Damadola, PK.
  - (S//NF) GZ-10016 identified detainee as someone he met at the Zubayr al-Haili Guesthouse in Kandahar, AF, where detainee worked.<sup>30</sup>
    - (S//NF) Zubayr al-Haili aka (Badr Abd al-Karim al-Sudayri), was an al-Qaida facilitator who provided money, false passports, and clothing to the al-Qaida members at the guesthouse in Kandahar.<sup>31</sup> According to GZ-10016, this individual (detainee) was sent to him seeking money to get married in early 2001. GZ-10016 gave him approximately \$2000 US and never saw him again.<sup>32</sup> (Analyst Note: It is highly improbable that GZ-10016 would provide detainee with \$2000 US unless detainee was a mujahid.)
      - ◆ (S//NF) Detainee stated \$2,000 US was taken from him when he was captured in Iran.<sup>33</sup> (Analyst Note: This is possibly the \$2000 US that GZ-10016 reported he gave detainee.)
  - (S//NF) Detainee admitted traveling in Iran before arriving in Mashhad where he stayed for over a month.<sup>34</sup> (Analyst Note: It is assessed detainee stayed at al-Qaida safe houses in Iran after his departure from Afghanistan.)

**c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct:** Detainee is assessed as a **HIGH** threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been mostly compliant and sometimes hostile to the guard force and staff. He currently has 54 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 1 April 2008, when he failed to stop talking during restraint procedures. He has four Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for major assault with the most recent occurring on 18 February 2008, when he became combative while being moved to recreation. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard instructions/camp rules, unauthorized communications, damage to government property, assaults, provoking words and gestures, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. On 25 March 2007

<sup>29</sup> TD-314/30539-01, TD-314/06941-00, TD-314/32706-01

<sup>30</sup> TD 314/37232-05, IIR 2 340 6066 02, 000516 SIR 29-JUN-2006, IIR 6 034 0284 06, IIR 6 034 0059 05, 001457 SIR 20-OCT-2004, Analyst Note: The al-Haili Guesthouse was used as a stopover for Arabs before and after training at al-Qaida's al-Faruq Militant Training Camp. Detainee would have received militant training before he would be given a position of trust and responsibility at a guesthouse. The guesthouse was also known as the Hajji Habash guesthouse, the al-Ansar Guesthouse, the Abu Khulud Guesthouse, the Zubair Guesthouse, and the Suhaib guesthouse.

<sup>31</sup> IIR 6 034 0337 06, 001457 FM40 17-JUN-2004, Analyst Note: On 10 June 2002, Moroccan Internal Intelligence Service (DGST) officers arrested Zubair al-Haili in Casablanca.

<sup>32</sup> TD-314/37232-05

<sup>33</sup> 001015 FM40 31-JUL-2004

<sup>34</sup> 001015 HANDNOTE 04-APR-2003, IIR 6 034 0088 07

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detainee was in possession of a comb hidden inside a knee brace. In 2007, he had a total of 18 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and seven so far in 2008

**8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:**

**a. (S) Assessment:** Detainee is assessed to be of **HIGH** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 3 April 2008.

**b. (S//NF) Placement and Access:** Detainee's admitted presence at a JT Center in Pakistan probably provided him with information on JT recruitment, facilitation, security procedures, and other extremists. Detainee's reported presence at al-Qaida guesthouses in Afghanistan and al-Qaida safe houses in Iran probably provided him with information on al-Qaida logistics, facilitators, and personnel. Detainee's assessed activities as a travel facilitator probably provided him with information on the illegal passport market, transiting extremists, and other facilitators.

**c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment:** Detainee is an assessed al-Qaida member who has information on al-Qaida associated guesthouses and safe houses in Afghanistan and Iran. Detainee was a travel facilitator who has information on illegal passport market, facilitation methods, transiting extremists, and al-Qaida members who sought refuge in Iran following the US and Coalition bombing campaign in Afghanistan.

**d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:**

- Iranian intelligence personnel support to al-Qaida and other extremist elements
- Al-Qaida facilitation of extremists
- Falsification of passports and other documents
- Association between JT and al-Qaida
- Routes of ingress and egress from Afghanistan and Iran
- Al-Qaida associated guesthouses
- Terrorism targets, activities and related facilities
- Iranian activities and operations
- Terrorist biographical/psychological information
- Terrorism radicalization factors



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9. **(S) EC Status:** Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 15 December 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.

v/r,  


MARK H. BUZBY  
Rear Admiral, US Navy  
Commanding

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\* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.