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Country Profile

Zaire

April 1973

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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
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This General Survey supersedes the one dated September 1970, copies of which should be destroyed.



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Zaire

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This Country Profile was prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was substantially completed by January 1973.

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During this Administration, the entire country has devoted itself singlemindedly to building the Republic and industrializing it. Our future is ever brighter. Our goal: to make swifter progress than any other developing country. Zaire's enormous material resources, plus the energies of a proud, dedicated people, guarantee that we shall achieve that goal.

June 1971

*Lt. Gen. J. D. MOBUTU
President*

The Blessings and Perils of One-Man Rule

In mid-1965, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (as Zaire was then known) was an example of practically everything that could go wrong for a newly independent country. Five years of postindependence rebellion and violence had left the political, economic, and social life of the country in ruins. The appointment in 1964 of the controversial Moise Tshombe as Prime Minister and his subsequent use of white mercenary troops to help quell widespread insurgency had alienated most of the so-called Third World. Economic activity (except for copper mining) had come to a virtual standstill. Many of the foreign experts whose skills were vital to the modern commercial, economic, and administrative sectors had fled. The treasury was bankrupt, the currency debased, and the population terrorized, divided, and demoralized. (U/OU)

Moreover, the country's existing political structure virtually precluded firm corrective action. Under the provisions of the 1964 constitution, political authority was none too clearly divided among a "strong" President, the Prime Minister, an unruly bicameral national legislature, and the governments of 21 largely autonomous provinces. Behind the scenes, a kitchen cabinet (the "Binza Group") and the military establishment wielded considerable power. All depended on close teamwork—and of that there was precious little. When President Kasavubu dismissed Tshombe in October 1965, he was unable to persuade parliament to confirm his choice for the new Prime Minister. For nearly 6 weeks, the central government all but ceased to function. (U/OU)

As he had done under similar circumstances some 5 years earlier, the Commander in Chief of the Congolese armed forces, Lt. Gen. Joseph Mobutu, stepped in to break the impasse. Backed by the army and by fellow members of the Binza Group, he summarily dismissed Kasavubu on 25 November 1965, proclaimed himself President, and installed a military colleague as Prime Minister at the head of a broadly representative civilian cabinet. And his initial lipservice to the 1964 constitution notwithstanding, he promptly set about replacing the Congo's federal

structure and disorganized parliamentary system with centralized autocratic rule. (U/OU)

Mobutu began by canceling the presidential elections scheduled for 1966 and by claiming a 5-year mandate to rule by decree. Once parliament had dutifully endorsed these moves, he adjourned that body "until its next regular session" (an event which never materialized). In the months that followed, Mobutu reduced the number of provinces to eight—plus the national capital district of Kinshasa. He made the provincial assemblies purely consultative bodies, then abolished them altogether. He gave the provinces essentially the same status as before independence: apolitical administrative units run by appointed officials. He merged the provincial police forces into a new national police organization under the Interior Ministry. He then suspended the activity of all political parties and subsumed the office of Prime Minister into the Presidency. In June of 1967, he incorporated most of his structural revisions into a new constitution, declared the suspended parliament officially ended, and postponed the election of the envisaged new unicameral National Assembly until 1970. (U/OU)

Reversion to what amounted to a slightly modified version of the former Belgian colonial administration left the Congo without a political system even theoretically responsive to the electorate. Mobutu moved to fill this void and at the same time to forge a tool for mobilizing the masses and for further consolidating his personal position. He set up the Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR) in May 1967 as his country's only sanctioned political party. (Official encouragement for the formation of a second party as originally authorized under the 1967 constitution quickly evaporated.) The MPR was designated the nation's supreme political institution—technically superior to the Presidency, army, parliament, and civil administration—in a constitutional amendment adopted in December 1970. A creature of its founder and president, the highly centralized MPR parallels the governmental hierarchy and is interchangeable with it. (C)

Mobutu's political organization has been slow to develop grassroots support. Nevertheless he has been able to use it effectively to stage-manage the referendum-style presidential and parliamentary elections in 1970, to centralize control of political patronage, and to manipulate the National Assembly. In addition, Mobutu has used his "movement" to bring the country's religious and labor organizations in line, to counterbalance the power of the military, and to supplant with its youth wing (the JMPR) all the former youth and student organizations. (C)

Thus, despite the trappings of democracy which Zaire has displayed since late 1970—when the citizenry was galvanized into giving an overwhelming vote of confidence to Mobutu as sole candidate for the 7-year post of President and to the MPR's hand-picked National Assembly slate—the government (now termed the Second Republic) remains very much a one-man show. In fact, with a presidential slush fund which amounted to about \$100 million in 1971 (i.e., around 15% of the entire government budget), Mobutu rules more as a paramount tribal chief than as a head of state in the Western sense. Secretive, ruthless, and politically astute, he has a talent for catching rivals off balance and for exploiting tribal jealousies. And while generally careful to avoid offending key military leaders, he dispenses largesse and punishment, funds pet projects, and indulges in such luxuries as a yacht and a second presidential palace without being directly accountable to any authority. (S)

With an eye to broadening support for his regime both at home and throughout Africa, Mobutu recently proclaimed national "authenticity" as a primary political goal. Similar in spirit to his earlier moves in rehabilitating Patrice Lumumba as a national hero and in posing as a champion of African liberation movements, Mobutu's call to his countrymen to reject foreign models and to draw on their own heritage in shaping their nation's future was designed to appeal to local xenophobia and to generate a unifying Congolese nationalism. In terms of developments elsewhere in Africa, Mobutu was at least a decade behind the times in attempting to develop and harness nationalistic fervor. But he approached the idea with characteristic zest. Backed by the full resources of the MPR, he began a controversial campaign to Africanize the symbols of national identity—starting with the name of the country and of its principal river—in the fall of 1971. Thus Zaire was born. The national flag and anthem were changed. Preindependence monuments were removed to museums. Street and placenames with colonial connotations were scrapped, and a law was passed requiring all Zairians to take African names. Mobutu himself adopted the names of Sese

Seko, which can be roughly translated—depending upon one's personal feelings about the Zairian President—as either "Great Chief of the Earth and Unconquerable Warrior" or "Rooster Who Leaves No Hen Intact." (C)

Behind all the ruffles and flourishes, Mobutu's highly personalized style of rule has brought Zaire some very tangible benefits. With the assistance he has been able to secure from friendly powers—chiefly the United States and Belgium—he has moved his country well down the road toward economic recovery. He has reduced factional links between segments of the military establishment and ambitious politicians and has restored a measure of discipline and cohesion to the army. He has reestablished centralized political and administrative authority, placed competent men in key positions, and given his countrymen some peace and political order for the first time since independence. And he has vastly improved Zaire's stature in Africa. (C)

Nevertheless, Zaire remains a fragile state, vulnerable to abrupt political change. There are serious flaws in the system which Mobutu has established. Some of these are inherent in one-man rule, but others are attributable to Mobutu's personal weaknesses and idiosyncrasies. In general, the political institutions he has created still have shallow roots and often appear to operate as little more than palace appendages. Mobutu's advisers, including the cabinet, are politically unimportant technocrats who owe their position to the President and who are not inclined to make waves. While all this accords with Mobutu's style and insures a sole source of authority, the risk is high that the President will become increasingly isolated and ill informed. And there is no question but that his sudden departure from the national scene would leave a serious political void. (S)

These problems are compounded by Mobutu's temperament. Despite his many talents, he seems to be able to focus on only one problem at a time. He tends to immerse himself in minutiae, to avoid following through on complicated decisions, and to wear himself out periodically. Further, his vanity and suspicion prevent him from delegating authority or grooming a successor. Potential rivals are reassigned, demoted, imprisoned, or sent into diplomatic exile. In the past few years, Mobutu has purged practically all persons with whom he once shared a measure of power, including such able and powerful figures as Justin Bomboko (long-time Foreign Minister) and Victor Nendaka (former Minister of Finance and of Interior). The atmosphere created by this sort of behavior has tended to stifle initiative, impede interdepartmental

cooperation, and reinforce the President's relative isolation. (S)

Moreover, Mobutu's system of rule depends to a degree on his ability to dispense subsidies and rewards, including unofficial payments to key army, police, party, and government officials. Yet not only does spending on the scale which Mobutu seems to feel necessary contribute to inflationary pressures, but the system could backfire if for any reason the money were to run low. In any event, the practice of buying a measure of unity and loyalty through cash gifts conflicts with concurrent attempts to reform government operations and to root out corruption. (S)

Finally, Mobutu's efforts to promote the MPR as Zaire's supreme institution have not been well received by the army. The situation is particularly delicate because it comes at a time when Mobutu has been forced to curtail military expenditures and when the long illness of the bumbling but loyal former army

chief, General Bobozo, has necessitated making sweeping changes in the military command structure. Despite Mobutu's efforts to keep the army out of politics and to develop alternate sources of support, the 44,000-man military establishment remains both his principal power base and the most serious potential threat to his regime. The sensitive balance of intra-army factional rivalries which he has so far managed to maintain could be easily upset. (S)

In sum, the strength of Zaire today is also its weakness. The country is virtually dependent on one man, President Mobutu. Except for isolated—and so far easily contained—pockets of old Simba rebels in southeastern Kivu Region, he faces no overt opposition. But the problems with which he must cope are complex indeed, conditioned as they are by Zaire's history and geography, by the continuing and uneven impact of modernization, and by his own style of rule. His prospects, and those of the Second Republic, remain uncertain. (S)

The National Heritage (u/ou)

Zaire is a country of great promise—and great problems. Its outstanding characteristics are its immense size and diversity. But, despite the fabled wealth of Zairian natural resources, the historic, geographic, and sociological heritage which Mobutu now so eloquently evokes has done more to impede than to facilitate the nation-building process.

The third largest nation in Africa, Zaire covers approximately two-thirds of central Africa and is about equal in area to the United States east of the Mississippi River. The country is roughly rectangular in shape; maximum dimensions—both north-south and east-west—are about 1,200 miles. Lying astride the equator, it is essentially an inland state with access to the sea being limited to a 23-mile strip of land along the Atlantic Ocean on the north bank of the Congo (Zaire) River estuary between Angola and the Angolan exclave of Cabinda. In addition to Angolan territory, eight independent states border on Zaire's more than 6,000-mile perimeter. Unlike many of these other former colonies, however, Zaire does constitute something of a natural geographic entity. Not only do most of its boundaries follow clearly defined topographic features, but they generally conform to the outline of the watershed of the Congo River, which, together with its most distant major tributary, the Lualaba, winds for 2,800 miles through the



eastern, central, and northwestern sections of the country.

Because of Zaire's location on the Equator, seasons are reversed in the northern and southern sections of the country. Temperature, rainfall, and humidity vary markedly with the topography, and the country's boundaries include widely differing geographic areas. The Congo Basin, a relatively low-lying plain in central Zaire, is covered by a dense equatorial rain forest and makes up about one-third of the country. This area is characterized by high temperatures, excessive humidity, torrential rains, and the prevalence of disease-bearing insects. The Congo Basin is rimmed by plateaus and hills, with extensive areas above 5,000 feet in elevation. The upland country beyond the humid central core of the basin gradually becomes cooler as elevation increases and has definite wet and dry seasons. In the northeast there are savanna lands, covered with long grasses and stunted trees; in the northwest, swamps and marshes; and in the south, scattered woodlands along the plateaus. The rest of the country is characterized by grassy hills, plains, and scrub forests. In the east, the border passes through several large lakes in the Great Rift Valley of east Africa, including Lake Tanganyika, and through a mountain chain with some of the highest peaks in Africa.

Because of its diversity of climate, terrain, and resources, Zaire perhaps has the greatest potential for economic development in sub-Saharan Africa. The full extent of the country's natural wealth has yet to be chartered, much less tapped. The Congo River has one of the greatest hydroelectric potentials in the world. Major mineral resources include copper, cobalt, industrial diamonds, zinc, tin, iron, bauxite, manganese, uranium, and gold. Offshore oilfields have recently been discovered. Despite generally poor soils, the country's differing climatic zones make possible the raising of a broad range of tropical, subtropical, and temperate crops. Its rivers and lakes abound with many species of fish. And extensive tropical forests provide an almost inexhaustible—though difficult to exploit—source of valuable timber.

But Zaire's physical size and diverse topography have severely complicated efforts to unify the nation and to promote its economic development. Despite the country's extensive river systems, great distances and natural obstacles (e.g., swamps, forest barriers, rapids, and falls) have always made travel and communication difficult. The roads and railroads built by the Belgians to complement the natural waterways were primarily oriented toward improving lateral communication. And now even these inadequate transportation facilities have deteriorated as the result of Zaire's postindependence strife.

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Thus while Zaire has a limited capacity to airlift cargo and personnel to most parts of the country, it still has no complete north-south or east-west transport system. Considerable effort has been made to repair and maintain existing railroad trackage, but road and river transportation have been badly neglected. It takes goods offloaded at the Congo River port of Matadi nearly a month to reach the capital of copper-rich Shaba Region because of costly and time-consuming transfers from rail to water transportation and back again. In the heavily populated eastern region of Kivu, travelers need 2 months to negotiate the sporadically maintained road between the capital city of Bukavu and the town of Mwenga some 100 miles to the south. And there is no usable road connection at all between Bukavu and the two fairly large Kivu cities of Kindu and Kasongo on the Lualaba river. In fact, the road system—which provides the only means of access to some parts of the country—has deteriorated so much that the unreliability and high cost of truck transport have become the principal limiting factors in the development of Zaire's rich interior. Equally important, continued difficulty of movement and communication has hindered efforts to overcome traditional regional and tribal loyalties and to unite Zaire's diverse peoples under an effective national government.

As a whole, Zaire is thinly populated in comparison with most other African countries. But even before contact with the West hastened the process of urbanization, adverse climatic and soil conditions throughout much of the area had resulted in marked variations in density of population, with the bulk of the people living in the fertile northeastern plain and along the lower reaches of the Congo River. And although about 80% of Zaire's 24 million inhabitants are of Bantu stock, history and geography have combined to create wide differences among them.

There are more than 200 tribes in Zaire, and many of these are made up of significant subtribal groupings. Bantu tribes began drifting into the area at least 1600 years ago, pushing the pygmies they found there back deep into the forests and settling in the vicinity of their present homelands by the beginning of the 15th century. There was little intertribal contact and no common language. Sharply differing forest and savanna cultures developed. And while several kingdoms emerged between the 14th and 17th centuries which united one or another of the larger tribal groupings for a century or more, none included more than a small sector of present-day Zaire.

Over the past 500 years, the impact of successive foreign interventions—most importantly, Portuguese,

Arab, and Belgian—has widened tribal and regional differences. The Portuguese arrived on the scene in 1482. They built forts along the lower reaches of the Congo River, made contact with and Christianized the then flourishing Kingdom of the Kongo, established a profitable trade in ivory and slaves, and dominated the extreme western sector of the Congo until well into the 19th century. While the span of effective Portuguese control began to decline toward the end of the 17th century, the activities of Lisbon's slave merchants (as well as of their rivals from other European countries) continued to expand. In contrast to the limited influence of early missionary efforts, the impact of the slave trade—which reached its peak during the first half of the 19th century—was felt throughout the land. Some tribes were enriched, others decimated. The constant warfare which the growing demand for slaves promoted caused great suffering and generated tribal hatreds and a distrust of foreigners that still affect the Zairian scene.

The Arabs contributed their share to this unfortunate aspect of Zaire's heritage. Long entrenched in settlements along the east African coast, they extended their operations inland in the mid-19th century. After establishing a caravan route from Zanzibar to Ujiji on Lake Tanganyika, they penetrated the Congo in search of ivory and slaves. Like the Portuguese, their policy was to get both by winning the cooperation of—and arming—selected tribes rather than by the direct use of force. They were so successful that by 1885 they controlled a large part of eastern Congo through an elaborate administrative system based on local chiefs. And although the Arabs made no effort to force their culture on their new African collaborators, their influence affected dress and manners, brought about conversions to Islam, and altered agricultural practices throughout their area of control. Even today, the so-called Arabises of Kisangani and other eastern

towns remain more Arab than African in their way of life, and hundreds of thousands of their fellow easterners speak Swahili—the lingua franca introduced by their former Arab masters.

It was also in 1885 that Belgium's King Leopold II capped a decade of devious maneuvering by founding the Congo Free State and getting the Berlin Congress to recognize it as his personal possession. Thus, the general outline of present-day Zaire was established. Within 9 years, Belgian-led contingents had ousted most of the Arab slavers, adding a new facet to Zaire's complex tribal rivalries in the process. Tribes like the Batetela which fought on the Arab side generally remained extremely hostile to Belgium rule and toward Belgium's tribal allies. Like the suspicions and animosities born of the slave trade, these old resentments still have some relevance. They account in part for separatist tendencies throughout eastern Zaire and particularly in Kisangani. And they were reflected in the inability of such postindependence leaders as Lumumba (a Batetela) and Kalonji (a Luba) to work together.

Today, as in the past, no single tribe holds sway over all of Zaire. Indeed, the largest group, the Hamitic Mangbetu-Azande cluster in the northeast, accounts for less than 15% of the total population. But Zaire's eight largest tribes dominate home areas which together cover something more than half of the country. Some of these groups—e.g., the Kongo, Luba, and Lunda—are still moved by memories of past empires. The process of modernization has further exacerbated old tribal tensions and created new ones. Despite continuing government efforts to broaden their horizons, most Zairians remain loyal to their tribal communities. In fact, many rural inhabitants are either totally unaware of existing provincial and national institutions or see them as so remote that they seem almost unreal.

Paternalism and Premature Birth (u/ou)

The difficulties which Zaire's postindependence leaders have faced in trying to establish a cohesive and viable nation are hardly unique on the African scene. But in Zaire's case, many of these problems were deeper because of Brussels' approach to colonial rule. The beginnings were particularly inauspicious. King Leopold's interest in the Congo Basin was purely commercial. A man of expensive habits, he was perpetually short of funds. The ruthless manner in which he exploited Congolese labor in order to increase his profits from rubber and ivory in time resulted in international opprobrium. After vacillating for a number of years, the Belgian Government finally annexed what had become Leopold's 900,000-square-mile private African estate and in October 1908 created a Ministry of the Colonies to oversee it. On the map, the Congo Free State was replaced by the Belgian Congo.

Brussels moved swiftly to mitigate the harsher features of Leopold's former practices, to establish tighter accountability for revenues produced, and to provide greater opportunity for foreign participation in the development and exploitation of the Congolese economy. Beyond this, however, the shift in the Congo's international status brought little change. Leopold's system of highly centralized rule was maintained. So were the alliances he had forged with the Catholic Church and with influential business circles. And the Belgians continued to regard their African subjects as children, incapable of managing their own affairs in an environment marked by modernization and rapid change.

Under these circumstances, Belgian colonial policy gradually evolved toward paternalism. The primary duty of the metropole, as the Belgians saw it, was to provide for the economic, social, and moral well-being of the native population. And, in fact, Belgium's record in this regard was impressive. With Brussels' encouragement and support, the Catholic Church established an extensive primary school system. Additional schools were provided by various Protestant denominations. Over time, increasingly substantial sums of money were poured into the construction of housing projects, hospitals, village wells, and other facilities of direct benefit to the population. Social services were expanded, and following World War II the Belgians provided the Congo with tropical Africa's first comprehensive social security program.

On the other hand, Belgium's approach to the problem of training Congolese for responsible positions



and to expansion of self-government was one of gradualism bordering on immobilism. While they paid lipservice to the role of chiefdoms as basic units of administration in rural areas, Belgian officials did not hesitate to intervene vigorously in local affairs. Until about 1950, educational opportunities for the Congolese beyond the primary level—indeed, beyond the second grade—were extremely limited. The native population was kept in check and protected against temptation by a host of discriminatory regulations, including a curfew and restrictions governing weapons, alcoholic beverages, and land ownership. And prior to 1958, when the first municipal elections were held, the Congolese were not able to form political parties or to exercise a meaningful voice in governmental affairs above the chiefdom level.

By 1958, there were at least some leaders in Brussels who were seriously considering the possibility of granting the Congo independence in perhaps another 25 or 30 years. But the times were no longer suited to a leisurely approach to decolonization. In August 1958, President de Gaulle visited Brazzaville and offered independence to the French Congo. Scarcely 4 months later, Patrice Lumumba, head of the newly formed

National Congolese Movement (MNC), returned from talks he had held with various African nationalist leaders at the first Pan-African Congress in Accra and issued a public call for independence for the Belgian Congo. And the efforts of the colonial administration to block what it feared might be a similar speech by Joseph Kasavubu, leader of the Alliance of the Bakongo People (ABAKO), in Leopoldville (renamed Kinshasa), in January 1959 touched off rioting which lasted for several days.

Shaken by this development, Brussels changed its course and for the first time offered the Congolese a program for political change explicitly directed at achievement of independence within a few years. But Belgium's retreat only fanned the nationalist fervor of the Congo's fledgling politicians. In the chaotic months that followed, political parties proliferated and vied with one another in calling for early independence. Tribal and regional tensions mounted over the issue of whether the future Congolese state should be federal or unitary in structure. Vague secessionist threats were voiced by prominent regional leaders, and bloody tribal conflicts broke out in Albertville (Kalemie), Bakwanga (Mbuji-Mayi), Elisabethville (Lubumbashi) and Tshikapa.

Faced with a rapidly deteriorating situation, Brussels capitulated in January 1960 and set 30 June of that year as the date for Congolese independence. Brussels drafted an interim constitution based on the Belgian model which, among other things, transformed the Congo's six provinces from administrative jurisdictions into political entities—each with an assembly elected by universal suffrage, a president elected by the assembly, and a full complement of ministers. National and provincial elections, contested by over 100 parties, were held in May. No single party emerged in a commanding position. A reasonable factional balance seemed to have been


struck at the last minute, however, by the election of ABAKO's federally oriented leader, Kasavubu, as President and the installation of the centralist Lumumba as Prime Minister at the head of a coalition government.

But the Congolese were grossly ill prepared to take over the administration of their new state. The Belgians had bequeathed them the most advanced economy—and the highest literacy rate—in sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, when independence day arrived, the country's three recently established universities had yet to produce a single graduate. There were, in fact, less than 25,000 citizens in the whole country who had received any kind of secondary education. While some individuals had pursued higher education abroad, there were few doctors, fewer engineers, and no lawyers at all. No Congolese had attained officer status in either the security forces or the civil service. Although there was no dearth of aspiring and vocal politicians, none had practical governmental experience above the local level. And there were no political parties of sufficient breadth to support a strong national government.

Moreover, the Republic of the Congo inherited a public debt of about \$900 million, the servicing of which promised to drain away nearly one-quarter of its annual budget. It also inherited a number of generous social welfare programs which the new regime could neither afford nor easily reduce. Finally, Belgian policies, the uneven impact of modernization, and the charged atmosphere of the immediate preindependence period had all served to strengthen regional and tribal particularism.

All told, the new Leopoldville regime's position was clearly precarious. Its prospects depended heavily on external economic and technical assistance, including the continued service of large numbers of foreign—primarily Belgian—specialists.

Decline and Fall of the First Republic (u/ou)



Unfortunately for the Republic of the Congo, there were a number of additional factors which compounded its troubles during the first few years of its existence. For example, the interim 1960 constitution—failing, as it did, to define clearly either the powers of the President and Prime Minister or the division of authority between the provincial and central echelons of government—was poorly attuned to local political realities. In addition, irresponsible electioneering rhetoric had raised false hopes about rich and immediate benefits which would more or less automatically flow from independence. Throughout the period of Kasavubu's Presidency the impact of successive foreign interventions—including some of the well-intentioned actions of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force—tended to exacerbate factional and tribal strife.

The new Congolese state was only 5 days old when its soldiers, disappointed in their belief that independence would bring immediate Africanization of the military leadership, mutinied against their Belgian officers and thereby set in motion the chain of events that eventually led to the downfall of the First Republic. Despite the relative calm which prevails in the country today, the lessons and legacies of those crisis years still bear heavily on Mobutu's attitudes, options, and problems.

Lumumba's initial efforts to cope with the mutiny proved futile, and on 10 July, Belgian paratroopers—acting without Congolese authorization—landed at Lul'abourg (Kananga) and Elisabethville to restore order. The following day, Moise Tshombe led Katanga Province (now Shaba Region) into secession. Lumumba and Kasavubu then

appealed to the United Nations for protection against foreign (i.e., Belgian) aggression. But while the first hastily assembled United Nations units arrived in the country on 15 July, the situation continued to deteriorate. In early August, Albert Kalonji proclaimed the independence of the Mining State of South Kasai (now part of Kasai-Oriental Region). Unable to persuade the United Nations to help him reintegrate his country's two secessionist provinces by force of arms, Lumumba called on Moscow for direct support. By then, however, his increasingly freewheeling behavior had placed him on a collision course with President Kasavubu. In September 1960, the world watched as Kasavubu and Lumumba attempted to dismiss each other.

The Congolese parliament refused to confirm the dismissal of either man and sought to effect a reconciliation between them. A deadlock ensued, and in mid-September, the commander of the army (or of what was left of it), Joseph Mobutu, announced that he was temporarily assuming power. A clerk in the security forces from 1950 to 1956 and subsequently a journalist, Mobutu had been appointed Chief of Staff of the army following the July mutiny and had served in that capacity until his promotion to the top military post in early September. He had joined the MNC in 1958 and, while not a Batetela but a non-Bantu Ngbandi tribesman from the north, was a close friend of Lumumba. Thus it was ironic—but indicative of the intricate twists and turns of Congolese politics—that he turned out to be the man most responsible for Lumumba's political, if not physical, demise.

Mobutu's objectives were apparently limited, at that time, to ending the factional strife which had paralyzed the central government. He undercut Lumumba's position by ousting the Communist missions which had been giving the MNC moral and material support. He replaced the cabinet with a temporary College of Commissioners composed of recent university graduates, students, and a few carefully selected former ministers. In addition, he "neutralized" parliament, thereby initiating a practice of imposing the primacy of the executive over the legislative branches of the government which, with brief lapses, has endured.

But the brief period of Mobutu's caretaker rule was also highlighted by the establishment of a rival regime in Stanleyville (Kisangani) under Lumumba's lieutenant and former Deputy Prime Minister, Antoine Gizenga. There was also the arrest and imprisonment of Lumumba after his escape from United Nations protective custody in an effort to join Gizenga. Thus when Mobutu stepped down on 9 February 1961 to

resume his military duties, the Congo had four governments—his own at Leopoldville, and the rival establishments headed by Gizenga, Tshombe, and Kalonji. The world standing of the Leopoldville regime was at a low ebb and would soon sink further with the announcement that Lumumba and two of his associates had perished during their mysterious transfer to Katanga. Only two provinces plus a portion of a third remained under the effective control of the new Kasavubu-Ileo provisional government.

Nevertheless, the secessionist phase of the Congo's postindependence crisis soon came to an end. Pressured by the United Nations, Kasavubu and Ileo opened a series of bilateral and multilateral discussions with Tshombe, Kalonji, and Gizenga during which it was finally established that the Congo would become a federal, rather than a confederal or unitary, state. Parliament was reopened on 25 July 1961 (under United Nations protection) with all areas except Tshombe's Katanga represented. After several days of spirited debate, the legislators gave nearly unanimous approval to a broad coalition government headed by Cyrille Adoula as Prime Minister. Gizenga, offered the post of First Deputy Prime Minister, chose to remain in Stanleyville. But his camp was divided, and he was deposed and arrested by some of his own colleagues—acting on Adoula's instructions and backed by United Nations units—in January 1962.

In response to the continued growth of tribal and regional particularism and to agitation for the overhaul of ineffective or inequitable institutional arrangements, the Adoula government tentatively reorganized the country into 21 provinces. Together with United Nations experts, it accelerated efforts to prepare a new constitution. The internal situation further improved in September 1962 when Kalonji's arrest fatally weakened the still recalcitrant government in South Kasai. And while Tshombe continued to hold out for a confederal solution, both international and internal support for his position was dwindling. After a third round of fighting with United Nations forces, he capitulated in January 1963 and departed for self-imposed exile in Spain a few months later. The Congo was whole once again—but not for long.

With less than a year of relative peace in which to catch its breath, the Congo moved from a period of regional secessions to one of near-general rebellion. Nearly 3 years of strife, complicated and prolonged by foreign intervention, had resulted in much suffering and in a marked decline in the material well-being of the populace in most areas of the country. Moreover, such rewards as had actually flowed from independence had been unevenly distributed. Economic

deprivation tended to be most severe in the areas farthest removed from two poles of relative prosperity, southern Katanga and the Leopoldville-Lower Congo area. Tribal jealousies had deepened and, equally important, the expectations of virtually all segments of the general population—particularly of the widely but inadequately educated postwar generation—had been bitterly disappointed. Although Leopoldville continued to benefit from generous foreign assistance, its efforts to overcome warborn social and economic ills were hampered by administrative breakdowns, clashes between radical nationalists and the military-bureaucratic oligarchy, and labor unrest. The inability of the Kasavubu-Adoula regime to cope with rising popular discontent was reflected in its decision to suspend parliament in September 1963. Thereafter, Kasavubu—backed by his powerful Binza Group advisers—ruled by presidential decree.

Deprived of their parliamentary immunity, a number of radical Congolese political leaders fled to Brazzaville, where, under the friendly protection of the newly installed Massamba-Debat government, they formed a group called the National Liberation Committee (CNL), established guerrilla training camps, and launched a number of terrorist operations against the Leopoldville establishment. The activities of the CNL were backed by a number of African countries and received some covert support and encouragement from both Moscow and Peking. The CNL sought to wrap itself in Lumumba's fallen mantle, but it was never a cohesive, disciplined group. Tensions rapidly developed over tactics, leadership, goals, and sources of external support. In fact, until January 1964, when Pierre Mulele—apparently acting on his own—successfully raised the flag of rebellion in Kwilu Province (now part of Bandundu Region) and thereby attracted the attention of other members of the CNL to the fertile target of rural discontent, the Brazzaville conspirators constituted little more than a nuisance factor for the Kasavubu-Adoula regime. The insurgency which spread through much of eastern and northeastern Congo in the ensuing months came to be known as the Simba rebellion, after the name given troops of the Batetela-Bakusu officered People's Liberation Army (APL) raised by "General" Nicholas Olenga in the spring of 1964. But it was in fact a series of revolts, strongly influenced by local contingencies and bound together only by a shifting coalition of leaders, certain common grievances, and common external support.

Stanleyville fell to the APL on 4 August, and the rebellion reached its high-water mark during the 6

weeks that followed. By early September, Leopoldville had lost control over almost all that part of the Congo—about two-thirds of the country—which had once been under Arab rule. A rival government, Christophe Gbenye's so-called People's Republic of the Congo, had been established in Stanleyville and was courting the radical African states, the Soviet bloc, and Peking. But the summer months had witnessed major and more encouraging developments in Leopoldville as well: Adoula's inability to stem the tide of revolt had cost him the confidence of the Binza Group. In late June, faced with the imminent departure of the last United Nations peacekeeping units and the additional problem of introducing a new constitution in the midst of civil strife, Kasavubu and his advisers had invited Tshombe to return home from Spain. The following month, Tshombe had been installed as Prime Minister at the head of a transitional government and had begun to organize an auxiliary military force composed of veterans of his former Katangan gendarmerie and mercenary personnel. Thus strengthened, the Congolese Army began to administer telling defeats to the rebels in mid-September. In late November, a joint Belgian-U.S. paratroop operation to rescue civilian hostages in Stanleyville facilitated the recapture of that city. By the end of 1964, the rebels had been reduced to small pockets of guerrillas who, while still receiving limited quantities of arms from Communist sources via Sudan, Uganda, and Tanzania, no longer constituted a serious threat to Leopoldville.

The suppression of the rebels did not, however, spell the end of the Congo's internal crisis. Tshombe entertained political ambitions extending far beyond the temporary fireman's role for which he had been recalled from Spain. Following the promulgation of the new constitution in August 1964, he established a power base by forming an alliance of political parties, the National Confederation of Congolese Associations (CONACO). And when CONACO won a majority in the parliamentary elections of March 1965, he emerged as the leading potential challenger to Kasavubu in the presidential race scheduled for the following year. In the fall of 1965, however, Kasavubu moved to cut Tshombe back to size. Exercising his new constitutional prerogatives, he dismissed Tshombe from office and named Evariste Kimba of the bitterly anti-Tshombe Katangan Balubakat party to take his place. But the CONACO-controlled parliament refused to confirm the Kimba government, and the impasse which triggered Mobutu's second seizure of power ensued.

Mobutu's distrust of freewheeling democratic practices, his sensitivity to the risks involved in letting any local or national leader develop too substantial a territorial or organizational power base, and his reluctance to delegate authority are firmly grounded in his appreciation of the disruptive role that divided loyalties and opportunism have played in his country's brief postindependence history. Considering the potentially destabilizing impact of the radical changes he has effected in Zaire's political and administrative systems, he has been remarkably successful in restoring and maintaining a reasonable degree of domestic peace and order. Nevertheless, his efforts to establish highly centralized one-man rule and to suppress all signs of overt opposition have not gone unchallenged.

Mobutu has had to cope with two military mutinies in eastern Zaire, one involving Katangan units in 1966,

the other—more serious—involving both white mercenary and Katangan troops in 1967. Student protests and demonstrations erupted in 1969 and again in 1971—beginning with the trial and execution of four former cabinet ministers in mid-1966, a seemingly endless series of real or alleged plots against Mobutu has been exposed to public view. And the opening months of 1972 were marked by confrontation between Mobutu and the 6 million-member Zairian Catholic Church when Cardinal Malula, Archbishop of Kinshasa and long-time Mobutu critic, took a public stand against the Africanization of Christian names and attacked certain impious activities of the MPR. (The Archbishop, fearing arrest for "treason," fled to Rome in February 1972. He was permitted to return, however, after the remaining Zairian church hierarchy capitulated and acceded to Mobutu's de-



mand that MPR youth organizations be established in the seminaries.)

Although few citizens would welcome a return to the chaos of precoup Zairian politics, Pax Mobutu is still little more than a truce enforced through presidential monopoly of the instruments of military and political coercion. Beneath the surface, tribal and regional tensions persist, and the social problems generated by urbanization and modernization are becoming more acute. Moreover, Mobutu is confronted with a number of problems of his own making. For example, his practice of assigning administrators to areas where they have no tribal ties and of frequently rotating these officials has had its intended effect in that it has kept these officials from developing a regional base of power. But it has also contributed to bureaucratic inefficiency and to widespread resentment of being governed by "foreigners." Similarly, Mobutu's efforts to suppress criticism of his regime have partially alienated the student and intellectual communities whose support he badly needs. And while Mobutu's drive to Zairianize the economy has improved his stature at home and throughout the Third World, it has resulted in less efficient operations, periodic strains in Zaire's relations with Belgium, and the flight (albeit, generally temporary) of some badly needed foreign capital and technicians.

Zaire's domestic problems have been compounded by Mobutu's tendency to accord higher priority to suppressing centrifugal currents and dissent and to propagandizing the public than to attacking the root causes of social discontent. Until recently, relatively little money has been allocated for expanding urban housing and services or for providing the technical assistance and improved transport facilities needed to restore farm output and living conditions to preindependence levels. In a period marked by high urban unemployment and spiraling living costs, Mobutu has sought to tame the trade union movement rather than allow it to develop into an independent champion of workers' interests. Student protests have been met with punishment rather than dialog.

The twin problems of tribalism and regionalism provide another case in point. Viewed by Mobutu as the source of many of Zaire's ills, overt tribalism is outlawed and routinely condemned in political discourse. But the logic of Mobutu's one-man rule has limited the scope and pace of bureaucratic reform, and tribalism remains an important factor in competition for government, party, military, and business positions as well as in popular attitudes toward the central government. Despite Mobutu's efforts to exhibit an even hand, ethnic rivalries have been exacerbated by


such widely held—and largely valid—beliefs that the Luba of Kasai-Oriental dominate the educational field, that soldiers from Mobutu's home region of Equateur have increased their proportional strength within the army, and that the Kongo and Luba dominate commerce in the key Kinshasa and mining belt areas.

Moreover, since the presence of the central government is still virtually unfelt throughout vast sections of Zaire—being manifested primarily through scattered and none-too-welcome army units—doubts flourish about the intentions of the remote elite in Kinshasa. Shaba's residents, for example, feel strongly that the central government is bleeding their copper-rich province while returning almost nothing to it. In Kivu and Haut-Zaire regions, the populace fears that Mobutu will never build up those areas that supported the Simba rebellion. A similar fear exists in Bandundu Region because of the Kwilu insurrection.

Nevertheless, the significance and depth of popular dissatisfaction with Mobutu's regime are difficult to gauge. Continued high levels of unemployment or a renewal of student agitation could result in urban disorders. But most of the rural population remains apathetic. There is at present no political nucleus around which active opposition to the regime could crystallize. And despite the clash with Cardinal Malula, there are signs that Mobutu's "authenticity" program may be having a greater stabilizing effect than most outside observers originally anticipated. All told, while Mobutu's survival depends on successfully handling a variety of interrelated problems, his most pressing difficulties are in the economic field.



Growing Pains (c)



Zaire's current economic difficulties stem from many sources, including the lingering effects of postindependence chaos (particularly the deterioration of the country's road, rail, and water transportation facilities), a continued shortage of modern technical and managerial skills, the persistence of corruption, and inconsistencies or flaws in Mobutu's own policies. In fact, the Kinshasa regime's approach to economic progress has been somewhat haphazard. It has compiled a list of projects which are to receive priority attention during the next 5 years, but it has yet to begin work on a formal development plan. Moreover, it has consistently tended to favor quick-profit or showcase ventures over badly needed but less glamorous or rapidly maturing projects in the fields of agriculture, transportation, and education.

As the result of these and other problems, economic recovery has been markedly uneven. On the positive side of the ledger, a combination of domestic calm, economic reform, substantial infusions of foreign aid, and rising copper prices yielded an average annual

increase in gross domestic product (GDP) of nearly 8% from 1968 through 1970—with the most dramatic gains being registered in the industrial field. But this period of relatively rapid growth was not accompanied by a comparable improvement in the distribution of cash income. The percentage of the work force receiving steady wages is still well below its preindependence level. There are, in fact, nearly as many unemployed workers in Zaire today as there are regular wage earners. And even those workers who hold steady jobs have suffered a marked decline in real wages over the past few years as the result of inflation.

Moreover, structural changes in Zaire's economy have eroded the fairly high degree of diversification which had been achieved under Belgian management. For example, prior to independence, agriculture constituted the backbone of the economy, and agricultural commodities—primarily rubber, coffee, palm oil, cotton, and timber—consistently accounted for between one-third and one-half of the country's foreign exchange receipts. This is no longer the case.

The production of most of Zaire's cash crops is still below preindependence levels, and the prices which the country's agricultural exports have commanded on the world market have tended to decline in recent years. Thus, while about 70% of the Zairian population is still engaged in agricultural pursuits, agriculture's share in both GDP and export earnings has sharply declined. And whereas the country was once comfortably self-sufficient in most food products, postindependence agricultural output for domestic consumption has not kept pace with population growth.

At the same time, the modern sector of the economy has become more and more dependent on minerals, especially copper. While production of some minerals has stagnated or declined, the mining industry as a whole now accounts for almost one-fourth of GDP, about one-half of government revenues, and well over three-fourths of export earnings. Zaire is currently the non-Communist world's largest producer of industrial diamonds and cobalt and its fifth largest source of copper. More important, however, is the fact that in 1969, when the world price of copper was nearing its peak, that metal alone accounted for nearly 80% of the more than \$575 million received through the sale of Zairian minerals abroad.

Overdependence on a single export commodity is a hazardous state of affairs for any developing country, particularly for one plagued with economic and social problems of the scale faced by Zaire. Zaire's net foreign trade accounts for about 25% of GDP. Despite continuing inflows of foreign aid and investment, Kinshasa needs to maintain a relatively high level of export earnings in order to pay for the import of the machinery, raw materials, equipment, and consumer goods essential to economic recovery and development as well as to cover balance-of-payment deficits in services and private transfers. Moreover, since a substantial portion of export earnings are regularly reinvested in the Zairian economy or spent on locally produced goods or services, any contraction or expansion of these receipts is certain to have a corresponding secondary effect on national income, governmental revenues, and employment.

With a per capita GDP of about \$90, Zaire ranks among the poorest nations of the world. By late 1970, however, when Mobutu was elected to a new 7-year presidential term, 3 years of near economic boom had generated high expectations for the future. Even Mobutu did not foresee the consequences of the downturn in world copper prices that had begun some 6 months earlier. During his inaugural address, he sketched out ambitious developmental plans under the

rubric "Objective 80." He pledged that henceforth the economy would be at the service of the citizenry and that the coming decade would be a period of evenly distributed social and economic progress. Within months, however, the emphasis in Kinshasa had shifted from growth to retrenchment. Mobutu had little choice. Since mid-1970, government revenues have barely risen, while foreign exchange reserves have fallen. Imports have mounted. Inflation has reappeared. And despite Mobutu's quiet postponement of a number of prestige projects, government expenditures have increased.

A prolonged economic stagnation could seriously weaken Mobutu's position, generating social unrest and jeopardizing his ability to sustain the loyalty of his subordinates through liberal material rewards. In fact, the short-term economic outlook is not particularly encouraging. Much depends on the price of copper which, while it has recovered somewhat from 1971's low, seems unlikely to regain the lucrative heights of the late 1960's very soon. Major investments now being made to expand Zaire's mining and refining capacity will not bear much fruit before the mid-1970's and will not become important sources of tax revenues until still later in the decade. Agricultural exports cannot be expected to take up much of the slack because they depend on major improvements in internal transportation and port facilities which are years away.

There is no doubt but that Mobutu is counting heavily on foreign technical and financial assistance to help him weather what promise to be 2 or 3 rather lean years ahead. To some degree, at least, his recent increase in emphasis on cultural and economic nationalism is likely to be an impediment in this regard. But so far, Mobutu has appeared willing to draw back from Zairianization, nationalization, or other popular measures when vital economic activity seemed to be threatened. Thus periodic campaigns to expel alien residents have fallen more heavily on west African and Asian traders than on Zaire's European population. Thousands of highly qualified foreign executives, educators, military officers, and technicians still hold responsible positions throughout the country. In fact, Mobutu has not only extended the use of foreign experts in various government components but has also engaged foreign firms to operate a number of public utilities and nationalized industrial plants. And while financial aid from foreign governments and international agencies has dropped off to about one-third its crisis years peak of over \$200 million annually, Kinshasa has waged a rather successful campaign over the past year or two to attract new foreign private investment.

Nonalignment-- Pragmatism With a Flair (s)



As is the case with his domestic policies, Mobutu's approach to foreign affairs has been colored by a unique mix of pragmatism and egotism. He has sought to stimulate Zairian nationalism, to loosen his dependence on Belgium, and to improve his regime's standing in African circles by portraying Zaire as a nonaligned nation firmly committed to the elimination of the political and economic vestiges of colonialism and dedicated to promoting inter-African cooperation. But his overriding concerns in the international field have been his need for financial and technical assistance from industrial countries and his fear of Communist-sponsored intervention in Zaire's internal affairs. Thus, behind his militant rhetoric and demonstrative acts, the thrust of his policy has been essentially moderate and pro-Western.

In fact, Mobutu privately calls the United States an "ally" and expects key security and economic backstopping from Washington. His hopes in this regard are understandable, for not only has the United States poured over \$650 million into Zaire since 1960 in various forms of aid and support, but U.S. advice, encouragement, and assistance proved to be of crucial importance to Mobutu during his difficulties with rebellious mercenaries and a faltering economy in 1967. And while the amount of U.S. bilateral aid has been declining, Mobutu's recent breakthrough in attracting American investors has given Washington a growing direct stake in the Zairian economy.

Periodic strains in Zaire's relations with Belgium notwithstanding, Mobutu has furnished ample evidence of the flexibility and pro-Western orientation of his foreign policy posture. He has openly entrusted the training of elite military and police units to Israeli, Italian, and U.S. advisers. Although he tolerates the existence of modest Soviet bloc missions in Kinshasa—both as "proof" of his nonalignment and as potential sources of economic aid—he monitors the activities of Communist diplomats closely and does

not hesitate to expell them if his suspicions are aroused. And while he gives lipservice and some modest material support to liberation movements in southern Africa, he has prudently sought to limit the practical consequences of such action. For example, he righteously broke relations with the colonialist government in Lisbon in 1966. But, mindful that the shortest export route for Shaban copper passes through Angola, he has restricted the activities of Holden Roberto's Kinshasa-based Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE). Indeed, in March 1970 he allowed two Portuguese representatives to establish an office in the Spanish Embassy in Kinshasa. Similarly, he has condemned the Rhodesian regime and rejected proposals for opening a diplomatic dialog with South Africa but has kept open useful trade links with both countries.

Despite his ambivalence toward nearby non-African governments and his ill-concealed ties to the West, Mobutu has managed to win a position of leadership and respect in Africa. Seeking a measure of insurance against repetition of the type of intervention which at one time or another during Zaire's postindependence troubles has been mounted across the borders of almost all nine of his country's immediate neighbors, he has consistently taken a more active role in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) than any of his predecessors. Whenever possible, he has tailored his more dramatic moves—such as his posthumous rehabilitation of Lumumba—to appeal to both OAU and domestic audiences. His early success in easing strained relations with such states as Algeria, Egypt, Guinea, and Sudan made possible his triumphant hosting of the 1967 OAU summit. Thereafter, Mobutu's regional stature—bolstered by his domestic record as well as by skilful diplomacy—grew rapidly.

Nevertheless, Mobutu's action in spending over \$20 million on preparations for the OAU summit meeting in Kinshasa was illustrative of the egocentric and less



Kinshasa's ostentatious OAU village

rational aspect of his foreign policy behavior. Mobutu firmly believes that it is Zaire's destiny—and his own—to play a leading role in African affairs, and his ambitions in this regard sometimes distort his underlying pragmatic appreciation of his country's basic material interests. In 1968, for example, he drew Chad and the Central African Republic into a mini common market in an apparent challenge to France's economic predominance in central Africa. And despite his pressing economic difficulties at home, he has paternalistically provided aid to his poorer neighbors—e.g., military training for the Chadian Army and budgetary supplements for Burundi.

Zaire's economic union with Chad and the Central African Republic was stillborn. And Mobutu's quest for glory suffered other setbacks as well—such as in June 1970 when Kinshasa's involvement in two abortive efforts to overthrow the leftist Nguabi regime in neighboring Brazzaville was revealed. But by the end of 1971, Mobutu apparently felt sure enough of his international position to assume an even more assertive foreign policy posture. In the course of the next 6 months alone he moved to improve relations with the

Soviet Union, effected an at least temporary reconciliation with Nguabi, withdrew from the French-sponsored Afro-Malagasy Common Market, and stepped up agitation for dismantling "neocolonial" barriers between French- and English-speaking African states. He also took the initiative in attempting to impose an end to the feud between two rival Angolan liberation organizations, launched a concerted drive to improve Zaire's relations with Guinea and Algeria still further, and dominated the Rabat OAU summit conference of June 1972.

While Mobutu no doubt derived a considerable degree of personal satisfaction from this flurry of activity, and while he may have at least temporarily succeeded in diverting popular attention away from Zaire's domestic problems, his is a risky course of action. For example, his campaign to reduce French influence in Africa could jeopardize the approximately \$5 million a year in bilateral assistance which Kinshasa has been receiving from Paris. Further steps to improve relations with Moscow or Peking could generate discontent in the military establishment. Mobutu's penchant for summit diplomacy could result in his absence from the country at some critical juncture. But more important, his emphasis on foreign affairs cuts down on the time and energy he is able to devote to meeting his country's pressing internal problems. And without his constant attention and encouragement, progress could be slow indeed.

Mobutu has, of course, taken many calculated risks in the past, and some of the more assertive interludes in Zairian foreign policy have yielded very tangible accomplishments. Not the least of these has been Kinshasa's success in reducing Belgian domination of the Zairian economy without sacrificing continued financial and technical support from Brussels. But the gains—apart from enhancing his domestic and regional stature—which Mobutu now hopes to achieve are not clear. Unless he is able to translate his new activism on the international scene into concrete economic benefits (e.g., modest new credits from the Soviet bloc), he may find that its net effect has been to worsen his internal problems. Despite the strength of Mobutu's current position, there is always the danger that at some point a combination of economic and political malaise will lead Zairian military leaders to decide that he is more useful as a scapegoat than as a strongman.

Chronology (u/ou)

1885

Congo Free State is established as personal domain of Belgian King Leopold II.

1908

Belgian Parliament assumes control of Congo Free State after international scandal over conditions.

1959

January

First African riots in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa).

1960

June

Congo becomes independent under President Joseph Kasavubu and Premier Patrice Lumumba.

July

Congolese National Army mutinies and Belgians flee. Katanga Province (now Shaba) under Moise Tshombe and eastern Kasai under Albert Kalonji both secede. U.N. troops arrive at request of central government.

September

Kasavubu dismisses Lumumba. Col. Joseph Mobutu and army take over and remain in control until February 1961.

1961

January

Lumumba is killed.

August

Cyrille Adoula approved as compromise Premier by near-unanimous parliamentary vote.

1962

September

Secession in Kasai ended by Congolese armed forces.

1963

January

Secession in Katanga ended by U.N. forces.

September

Kasavubu adjourns parliament indefinitely and begins to rule by decree with support of "Binza group," comprising army commander Mobutu and four key civilian officials.

December

Peasant uprising led by Pierre Mulele begins in central sector of present Bandundu Province.

1964

April

Simba uprising in eastern Congo begins to spread northward.

July

Moise Tshombe named Premier by Kasavubu with concurrence of "Binza group" and many members of still-adjourned parliament.

August

President Kasavubu promulgates new constitution ratified by referendum in June-July.

Simba guerrillas capture Stanleyville (now Kisangani).

September

Refugee politicians join Simbas in Stanleyville, declare "Popular Revolutionary Government" and gain support from radical African and Communist states.

November

U.S. planes drop Belgian paratroopers at Stanleyville and Paulis (now Isiro) to rescue white hostages held by rebels.

1965

Congolese army units with white mercenaries retake rebel-held territory as rebel leaders flee.

March-April

Parliamentary elections are held. Moise Tshombe's CONACO party gains majority.

October

Kasavubu dismisses Tshombe. New government appointed by Kasavubu fails to get parliamentary approval.

November

Mobutu seizes control of central government, announces plans to remain as president for 5 years.

December

Mobutu assumes power to rule by decree.

1966

May-June

Four former cabinet ministers are accused of plotting to overthrow Mobutu, found guilty by military tribunal, and publicly hanged.

July

Katangan units in northeastern Congo mutiny, subdued several months later by white mercenaries loyal to the government.

1966

October

Mobutu dismisses Premier Leonard Mulamba, popular army colonel, and declares himself Premier as well as President.

1967

January

Congolese Government seizes UMHK Congo-based assets and establishes its own company to run UMHK copper mines. UMHK retaliates by threatening prospective copper buyers with court action.

February

Government reaches compromise agreement with UMHK affiliate, ending for time being dispute over control of UMHK operations.

April

Mobutu publishes a new constitution, legalizing strong presidential system, and forms new party, Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR).

June

New constitution promulgated following popular referendum.

IMF-sponsored monetary reform instituted.

July

White mercenaries and Katangan troops mutiny in eastern Congo.

November

Mercenary mutiny ends with mercenaries withdrawing to Rwanda.

1968

April

Mercenaries airlifted from Rwanda to Europe.

September-October

Mulele flees to Brazzaville, is returned to Kinshasa under amnesty guarantee, and executed. Brazzaville government breaks diplomatic relations with Kinshasa.

1969

June

Lovanium University students demonstrating in Kinshasa are shot by troops; sympathy demonstrations at other universities and schools are greatest show of civilian discontent since Mobutu became President.

August

Mobutu bans independent student unions and requires all students to join MPR youth wing.

Mobutu dismisses large portion of cabinet ministers, including Victor Nendaka and Justin Bomboko, most influential members of former Biza group.

September

Final settlement of dispute between Congolese Government and UMHK.

1970

June

Mobutu and Congo (B) President Nguabi sign Manifesto of Reconciliation, agreeing to phased resumption of normal communications, trade, and diplomatic relations; their respective embassies are reopened in December.

King Baudouin attends 10th anniversary of Congolese independence, climaxing gradual return to solidly constructive relations between the two countries.

1970

August

Mobutu makes his first state visits to the United States, Romania, and Yugoslavia; he negotiates substantial industrial investments and military purchases in the U.S. while reasserting nominal policy of nonalignment.

November

Presidential and National Assembly elections complete constitutional basis for Mobutu's rule.

December

Mobutu declares amnesty for all refugee rebels, at home or abroad, who turn themselves in to authorities; two principal leaders of Stanleyville rebel regime of 1964 and some less notorious emigres accept amnesty by 31 January deadline.

1971

March-April

Mobutu makes state visits to France, Japan, and Taiwan, gaining fairly substantial increases in long-term economic aid.

June

Lovanium University students stage unauthorized demonstration commemorating students shot by troops in June 1969; Mobutu declares entire student body must serve in army for 2 years.

August

Mobutu announces that student draftees will return to campus militia units after rugged basic training; Lovanium and two other universities at Lubumbashi and Kisangani are amalgamated into the National University.

Highly publicized subversion trials are conducted for student demonstration leaders, a former rebel "general" who accepted Mobutu's amnesty, and a mixed bag of obscure dissidents.

October

Nendaka and Bomboko, who were ousted from cabinet in August 1969, are publicly accused of plotting to assassinate Mobutu and put under indefinite detention without trial.

October

Mobutu changes official title of country from Democratic Republic of the Congo to Republic of Zaire; his "return to authenticity" campaign is soon extended to the Congo River, several provinces, and other place names.

**1972
January**

"Authenticity" campaign is extended to personal names; the President declares himself Mobutu Sese Seko and orders subordinates to do likewise.

Cardinal Malula, leading Catholic prelate in Zaire, criticizes Mobutu's name-changing campaign; Mobutu threatens Malula with prosecution for treason and suspends a leading Catholic publication.

March

Belgium agrees to \$25 million in additional technical assistance and credits for Zaire, one of largest single aid packages since independence.

April

Mobutu's public confrontation with Catholic Church in Zaire winds down, with Malula sojourning at Vatican and church accepting MPR youth cadres in its seminaries.

August

Mobutu retires many senior generals and tightens the command structure of the security forces.

1973

January

Mobutu visits Peking and prepares to exchange ambassadors between China and Zaire.

Glossary (u/ou)

ABBREVIATION	FOREIGN	ENGLISH
CGTC	<i>Confederation Generale des Travailleurs Congolais</i>	General Confederation of Congolese Workers
CND	<i>Centre Nationale de Documentation</i>	National Documentation Center
DGRSM	<i>Direction Generale du Renseignement et de Surete Militaire</i>	Directorate of Information and Military Security
DIA	<i>Agence de Documentation et d'Information Africaine</i>	African Documentation and Information Agency
CECAMINES	<i>La Generale des Carrieres et des Mines du Zaire</i>	General Quarries and Mines Company of Zaire
GRAE	<i>Governo Revolucionario de Angola no Exilio</i>	Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile
INBEL	<i>Institut Belge d'Information et de Documentation</i>	Belgian Information and Documentation Agency
JMPR	<i>Jeunesse du Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution</i>	Youth of the Popular Movement of the Revolution
MPR	<i>Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution</i>	Popular Movement of the Revolution
MNC	<i>Mouvement Nationale Congolaise</i>	Congolese National Movement
SGM	<i>Societe Generale de Minerai</i>	General Ores Company
UGECC	<i>Union Generale des Etudiants Congolais</i>	General Union of Congolese Students
UMHK	<i>Union Miniere du Haut Katanga</i>	Mining Union of Upper Katanga
UPA	<i>Uniao das Populacoes de Angola</i>	Union of Angolan Peoples
UNTZA	<i>Union Nationale des Travailleurs de la Republique du Zaire</i>	National Union of Zairian Workers

SECRET

Area Brief (u/ou)

LAND

Size: 905,000 sq. mi.
Use: 22% agricultural land (2% cultivated), 45% forested, 33% other
Land boundaries: 6,153 mi.

WATER

Limits of territorial waters (claimed): 12 n. mi.
Coastline: 23 mi.

PEOPLE

Population: 23,918,000, average annual growth rate 4.2% (FY71)
Ethnic divisions: Over 200 African ethnic groups, the majority are Bantu; four largest tribes—Mongo, Luba, Kongo (all Bantu), and the Mangbetu-Azande make up about 45% of the population
Religion: 51% Christian, 45% animist, 4% other
Language: French, English, Lingala, Swahili, Kikongo, and Tshiluba are all classified as official languages
Literacy: 5% fluent in French, about 35% have an acquaintance with French
Labor force: About 8 million, but only about 12% in wage structure

GOVERNMENT

Legal name: Republic of Zaire (until October 1971 known as Democratic Republic of the Congo)
Type: Republic; constitution establishes strong presidential system
Capital: Kinshasa
Political subdivisions: 8 regions and federal district of Kinshasa
Legal system: Based on Belgian civil law system and tribal law; new constitution promulgated 1967; legal education at National University of Zaire; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
Branches: President elected 1970 for seven-year term; National Legislative Council of 420 members elected for five-year term; the official party is the supreme political institution
Government leaders: Lt. Gen. Mobutu Sese Seko, President
Elections: Presidential and legislative elections in October and November 1970
Political parties and leaders: Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR), only legal party, organized from above with actual grassroots popularity not clearly definable
Communists: No Communist Party
Member of: EAMA, FAO, IAEA, ICAO, IHB, ILO, ITU, OAU, UDEAC, U.N., UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WMO

ECONOMY

GDP: \$2.1 billion (1971 est.), under \$100 per capita; real growth rate 7.9% p.a. 1968-71
Agriculture: Main cash crops—coffee, palm oil, rubber; main food crops—cassava (manioc), bananas, root crops, corn; some regions self-sufficient
Major industries: Mining, mineral processing, light industries
Electric power: 751,380 kw. capacity (1971); 3.23 billion kw.-hr. produced (1971), 148 kw.-hr. per capita
Exports: \$669 million (f.o.b., 1971); copper, cobalt, diamonds, other minerals, coffee, palm oil
Imports: \$693 million (c.i.f., 1971); consumer goods, foodstuffs, mining and other machinery, transport equipment, fuels
Major trade partners: Belgium, U.S., West Germany, Italy, and France
Aid: Economic—U.S. (FY61-70) \$449 million; (1970 estimated disbursements) Belgium, \$27.4 million; France, \$6.9 million; other bilateral aid \$3 million; U.N., \$7.1 million; EC, \$14.1 million military—U.S., \$39.2 million (FY62-71)
Monetary conversion rate: 1 zaire = US\$2
Fiscal year: Calendar year

COMMUNICATIONS

Railroads: 3,218 miles, all single track; 2,419 miles 3'6"-gauge, 78 miles 3'3 1/2"-gauge, 85 miles 2' 1/4"-gauge, 636 miles 1'11 1/2"-gauge. 532 miles of 3'6"-gauge electrified.
Highways: 86,930 miles; 1,095 bituminous, 10,427 laterite, gravel, or crushed stone, 75,408 improved or unimproved earth
Inland waterways: 9,320 navigable; 8,390 in Congo River system, 930 miles on lakes
Ports: 2 major (Matadi and Boma), 1 minor (Banana)
Merchant Marine: 4 ships of 1,000 g.r.t. and over, totaling 35,901 g.r.t. or 45,881 d.w.t.
Civil Air: 26 major transports
Airfields: 320 usable; 1 has a runway over 12,000 feet, 2 have runways 8,000 to 11,999 feet, and 56 have runways 4,000 to 7,999 feet; 19 have permanent-surfaced runways. 166 airfield sites and 5 seaplane stations
Telecommunications: Average African system composed of radio-relay links, open-wire lines, multiconductor cables, and radio and TV stations; principal center, Kinshasa; 22,500 telephones; 800,000 radio receivers and 20,000 TV receivers; 7 AM, 1 FM, and 2 TV stations

DEFENSE FORCES

Military manpower: Males, 15-49: 5,715,000, of whom it is estimated that about 2,745,000 (or 48%) are fit for military service. About 240,000 will be coming of military age (16) each year through the period 1972-76

Places and features referred to in this General Survey (U/OU)

	COORDINATES			COORDINATES	
	° 'S.	° 'E.		° 'S.	° 'E.
Aketi.....	2 44N.	23 46	Lake Albert (lake).....	1 40N.	31 00
Akula.....	2 22N.	20 11	Lake Edward (lake).....	1 21	29 35
Ango Ango.....	5 51	13 26	Lake Mweru (lake).....	9 50	28 45
Bafwasende.....	1 05N.	27 18	Lake Tanganyika (lake).....	6 00	29 30
Banana.....	6 01	12 24	Libenge.....	3 39N.	18 38
Bandundu.....	3 19	17 22	Lienart.....	3 04N.	25 31
Bangui, Central African Republic.....	4 22N.	18 35	Likasi.....	10 59	26 44
Beni.....	0 30N.	29 28	Lisala.....	2 09N.	21 31
Binza.....	1 03	28 54	Lobito, Angola.....	12 20	13 34
Black River (strm).....	3 57	15 54	Lomami (strm).....	0 46N.	24 10
Boende.....	0 13	20 52	Lualaba (strm).....	0 26N.	25 20
Boma.....	5 51	13 03	Luapula (strm).....	9 26	28 33
Bomu (strm).....	4 08N.	22 27	Lubudi.....	9 57	25 58
Bondo.....	3 49N.	23 40	Lubudi (rr sta).....	9 57	25 57
Brazzaville, Congo.....	4 16	15 17	Lubumbashi.....	11 40	27 28
Budjala.....	2 39N.	19 42	Luena.....	9 27	25 47
Bujumbura, Burundi.....	3 23	29 22	Lukala.....	5 31	14 32
Bukama.....	9 12	25 51	Lulu (mine).....	10 38	25 21
Bukavu.....	2 30	28 52	Lulimba.....	4 42	28 38
Bumba.....	2 11N.	22 28	Madula.....	0 28N.	25 23
Bunia.....	1 34N.	30 15	Mambasa.....	1 21N.	29 03
Busanga.....	10 12	25 23	Maniema.....	1 11	28 37
Businga.....	3 20N.	20 53	Manono.....	7 18	27 25
Buta.....	2 48N.	24 44	Masina.....	5 52	17 03
Chililabombwe, Zambia.....	12 22	27 50	Matadi.....	5 49	13 27
Congo River (strm).....	6 04	12 24	Mayamba.....	4 46	16 46
Crique de Banana (tidal creek).....	6 01	12 25	Mayumba (massif).....	4 30	12 30
Dilolo.....	10 42	22 20	Mbandaka.....	0 04N.	18 16
Djelo-Binza.....	4 23	15 15	Mbanza-Ngungu.....	5 15	14 52
Douala, Cameroon.....	4 03N.	9 42	Mbengo-Mbengo (whirlpool).....	5 50	13 26
Fimi (strm).....	3 01	16 58	Mbuji-Mayi.....	6 09	23 36
Fungurume.....	10 37	26 18	Mongala (strm).....	1 53N.	19 46
Gemona.....	3 15N.	19 46	M'Pala, Angola.....	6 08	13 44
Goma.....	1 41	29 14	Muanda.....	5 56	12 21
Guba.....	10 40	26 26	Mulungwishi.....	10 47	26 37
Idiofa.....	5 02	19 36	Mungbere.....	2 38N.	28 30
Ilebo.....	4 19	20 35	Mushenge.....	4 32	21 21
Inga.....	5 39	13 39	Musoshi.....	12 15	27 38
Isiro.....	2 46N.	27 37	Mutshatsha.....	10 39	24 27
Itimbiri (strm).....	2 02N.	22 44	Mwenga.....	3 02	28 26
Ituri (strm).....	1 40N.	27 01	Ndjili.....	4 28	15 21
Kabalo.....	6 03	26 55	Ndolo.....	3 36	23 03
Kabongo.....	7 24	25 38	Ndolo (sec pool).....	4 19	15 19
Kalemie.....	5 56	29 12	Pool Malebo (pool).....	4 15	15 25
Kamina.....	8 44	25 00	Port de Kindu.....	2 57	25 57
Kananga.....	5 54	22 25	Punia.....	1 28	26 27
Kasai (strm).....	3 02	16 57	Ruzizi (strm).....	3 16	29 14
Kasee, Uganda.....	0 10N.	30 05	Sakania.....	12 45	28 34
Kasongo.....	4 27	26 40	Sake.....	1 34	29 03
Katanti (mission).....	2 18	27 08	Sankuru (strm).....	4 17	20 25
Katonto (hill).....	10 38	25 21	Shituru (mine).....	11 01	26 46
Kenge.....	4 52	16 59	Sona-Bata.....	4 54	15 09
Kiambi.....	7 20	28 01	Songololo.....	5 42	14 02
Kigali, Rwanda.....	1 57	30 04	Tenke.....	10 35	26 07
Kigoma, Tanzania.....	4 52	29 38	Titule.....	3 17N.	25 32
Kikwit.....	5 02	18 49	Tshela.....	4 59	12 56
Kimpoko-Naele.....	4 14	15 33	Tshikapa.....	6 25	20 48
Kinkuzu.....	4 58	14 28	Tshinsenda.....	12 18	27 58
Kinshasa.....	4 18	15 18	Ubangi (strm).....	3 30	17 42
Kipushi.....	11 46	27 14	Ubundi.....	0 21	25 29
Kisangani.....	0 30N.	25 12	Uvira.....	3 24	29 08
Kisenge.....	10 41	23 10	Vila Teixeira de Sousa, Angola.....	10 42	22 12
Kitona.....	5 28	17 42	Yei, Sudan.....	4 05N.	30 40
Kolwezi.....	10 43	25 28	Zonzo.....	5 44	14 39
Komba.....	2 53N.	23 59			
Kongolo.....	5 23	27 00			
Kota Koli.....	11 40	27 28			
Kwa (strm).....	3 10	16 11			
Kwango (strm).....	3 14	17 22			
Kwilu (strm).....	5 40	12 52			
Lae Kivu (lake).....	2 00	20 10			


Selected Airfields

Kamina Base.....	8 38	25 15
Kitona Base.....	5 55	12 27
Lubumbashi.....	11 35	27 32
Ndjili.....	4 23	15 27


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




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


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




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






on
 mile
 kilometer
 meters



Agriculture

- Cotton
- Rice
- ◆ Fish
- ☐ Sugar
- 🌴 Oil palm
- ☕ Coffee
- R Rubber
- 🍵 Tea
- 🍫 Cocoa






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Equateur





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Population


Persons per square mile
 0 15 30 75
 Persons per Square Kilometer
 0 5 10 25
 Based on 1970 Census



Vegetation




- Rainforest
- Dense forest or alpine scrub
- Savanna
- Tall brush and grassland
- Marsh or swamp

on
meter
ous



Agriculture

- Cotton
- Rice
- Fish
- Sugar
- Oil palm
- Coffee
- Rubber
- Tea
- Cocoa



Minerals and Industry


- Copper-cobalt-zinc mineral zone (also produces silver, gold, platinum, tin, cadmium, germanium)
- Minor minerals zone containing tin, gold, coal, columbium, tantalum, wolfram, beryl, bismuth, rare earths
- Sn Tin
- Au Gold
- Ct Columbian
- Coal

OTHER MINERALS

- Mn Manganese
- Diamond
- Oilfield
- Iron ore reserve
- Bauxite reserve

INDUSTRY

- Center of light industry
- Hydroelectric powerplant
- Metal refining
- Petroleum refining



Vegetation

- Alpine scrub
- Savannah

9

Summary Map

SECRET

SECRET