

Evidentiary Doc. # 2419

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Notice:
 Exhibit 774A to be
 Corrected in accordance with Language
 Board decision, as shown on Court
 Record ~~7884~~ ~~7885~~
 Language Board
 Dec 14 Aug. 47 (last)
 corrected pages
 also 1 Dec. 47
 24 Sept. 47

省冠大見も愈々支那行と決定相成候様候様 邦家
 候充分御活躍の程切望仕候。就ては外文問題
 懷せり卑見少く申進め度。別紙即一讀り上何
 様承致度。小生は大見が日蘇親善論者或は
 華友討論者なる事も知ると雖も未だ曾て此
 立入りの議論も下したる事なくその後即意
 化ありたりと承知致さるに付別紙本問題
 見聊か詳細に相認めたる次第に所座候

二年間の滞瑞中涉獵より得たる所及び露西
 得たる所に基き年来の所信を修正取捨し
 一に結論
 有之候もペンに依せて書きなごりたる儘に有之候
 一は趣旨或
 ハ一母貝せざる点も有之べく何れにても不
 一と書さる
 ものにかまへ何れと改めず貴意を得
 論旨聊と田仙太郎張りなれど必ずしも彼
 一交費には
 無之。又君子は人に依りて言を捨てずとも申
 一得は何れ

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虚心坦懐に 祈一讀願工候 甘歎露に 関する文献は汗

手記體なるもの米人 Chamberlain's Soviet Russia:

from Age: Russian Revolution のこと何れも願う有

益なる書物と認め申候 且 Mon Age 誌一報その由祈送

申上へきに付是非御一覽有之度候 敬具

二十月四日

有田大兄

白息生

侍史

L

拜復外交問題ニ関スル由牛見ニ対シ早速懇タル御叱正ヲ
 忝ウレ深謝仕候御指摘ノ諸点ハ或ハ小生ノ立言用意
 ニ缺クル所アリ或ハ去辭聊カ矯激ニ失セル嫌モアルベク貴
 見ハ充分尊重致シ今後ノ研究ヲ怠ラサル所存ニ有之
 候處討テ蘇問題付キハ貴兄トハ対蹠的ノ見解ヲ懷ケル
 儀ト考(居タルニ今固ノ貴翰ニヨリ以テモ然ラサルヲ知り極
 メテ欣快ニ存候何レ近ク何レカニテ拜眉ノ様マルベク之令
 ニ貴意ヲ得タク考居候畢貴翰末尾ノ人心轉換等々
 ハ實際政治家トシテハ大ニ考慮スベキ點ニシテ「軍身」以テ
 スレバ今日政界政治家等が如何ナル国内政界ヲ提シテ
 起ツモ何人モ顧ミル者ナキモ真険ニ「対蘇硬」政策ヲ
 確立シ之ヲ以テ軍部ニ折衝スルニ於テハ勘クモ此面一部ノ成功
 ハ疑ナシト存候「小生」ハ又国内改造論者ノ主張ニ之多クノ
 共鳴ヲ禁レ得サル者ニ有之候へ共今日右翼諸派ノ體ヲ
 「リクハ到底望ヲ囑スルニ足ラス」ソノ改造意見ノ如キモ誠ニ幾
 薄杜撰ナルニ呆レ居ル次オタルが一度ビ「大規模ノ戦」ヲ
 以テ彼ノ大戦中自由主義者ノイトケヨシノ下ニ「バンド完全」
 ル国家統制ヲ見スルが如ク健全ナル国家改造ノ端緒ヲ該

ニ発見シ得ベキカト存セラルル次第ニ有之候

『戦争ヲ控ユルガ故ニ極度ニ経済生活ノ動搖ヲ来スベキ方法
ハ採用シ得ルト共ニ戰時ナルガ故ニ資本家然同等ノ果
常ニ犠牲ニ甘ニスベク国民上下ノ緊張ヲ利導スル政治家
其人ヲ得ルハ豫想外ノ好果ヲ收メ得ルハ非ルカト存セラレ候
』
『所便ハ貴兄限リ而シテ讀マ願フ趣旨ニテ固ヨリ字ヲ取ラズ餘
人ニ示スベキ體裁モナシ居ラザル次第ナルガ所際ノ考慮ニ
顧ミ仰見込ニヨリテハ政友會有力者迎テ而シテ下サシニ差
支無之候』

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『尚ホ附言致シ度一点ハ日露戦争ノ可否ヲ拙論トシテ
論ズル程々ノ議論モ有之ハ生ノ如ク差違コリタル問題トシテ
見ルトハ失當ナルハ或ハ貴兄ノ通リタルベキモ問題ハ近キ將來
ニ於テ陸軍ノ意向ガ茲ニモ落着スベシト見込ノ當否如何ニ
懸ル次第ニシテ軍ニシテ方針決定セバ今日ノ状態カトシテ何物
モ之ヲ阻止シ得ザルベク外交官モ政黨モ之ヲ抑ヘ得ズトテハ寧ロ口
之ヲ翼賛シテ方法ニ萬全ヲ期スベキ非ルカト申スガハ生ノ活論ニ有
之候』

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小生歸京願ヲ出シタル處旅費が無キ故來年度ヨリト事有之
 目下已ニ旅費ハ自辦致スベシトテ押返シ交渉中ニ有之候
 表面家事ト都合ヲ理由ト致候モ固ヨリ日ヲ争フベキ程ノ事情ハ
 無之候唯御賢察モ有之ベキ通リ
 現下ノ内外情勢ヲ俾限ニ而云煙過眼スルコトハ何トシテモ
 堪ヘ難ク悪ニ損ト知リツツモ
 歸ツテ各方面ヲ説イテ見テク
 考ル次第ニ御座候
 本省幹部迷惑ニハナラヌ様注意
 スル所存モ厄介者ノ歸ラヌ方が好都合ト考ラレテモ致方
 無之理由モ有之ヤモ知ラズ候

昭和十年五月十二日

敬具

小島生

有田大兄

侍史

『帝國政府昨今の対支政策は果して的確なる目標ありや
 疑なき能はず』外務は日支親善と云ふ單なる形式
 的親善の何等價值なきは滿洲事変前のる態を
 證して餘りあり。『軍部は専ら北支に着目し、之を以て
 稍々修飾緩和せらるる滿洲を化せんとするもの、如
 し。外間の思惑は兎も角として帝國自身利益より
 見て斯かる政策の可否は少くも大なる疑問也』
 抑も滿洲と云ふ支那本部と云ふも本来之を放置す
 るは帝國の勢力圏に帰し我に必要なる限に之を
 利用し得べきは自然の致にして唯之を放置し得ざる
 所以のもの、は外部勢力の競合し来るが爲のみ、彼の
 滿洲の亦も畢竟するに滿蒙の地を外部勢力より
 完全に解放せんが爲の努力に外ならずして同る亦も
 対する最も有力にして正當なる理由は蓋し茲に本免
 ざるべからず。然らば『今後の我對支方針を一に外力
 排除を目標とすべきものにして目前の小利は斷じて
 眼中に置くべからず』對支各種工作は悉くこの目的に集
 中せられるべきものにして單なる日支親善、排日終止、北
 支進出と云ふが如きは抑も末にして根本は支那とし
 て帝國の外力排除政策に對し支那をして協力せしむる
 るに存せざるべからず

ニ 一概に外力排除と云ふも一切外玉の活動を介し
 独占的地位を獲得せんとするに非ざるは勿論にして
 例へば英米等の他、支那に於ける諸般の合法なる
 施設は固より之を尊重し進んで之と協力をすべし
 辞すべきに非ずと思考する次第にして支那より外力

を駆逐するとは所謂 Dog in the manger たるんとす
るものに非ず唯「支那」に有害にして隨つて日本にも有害
なる一切の勢力を駆除するに在り。この限りに於ては
相手の何玉たるを問はずと雖も之を概観するに
今日支那に於ける各玉の行動は往時勢力範囲
時代の面影を留めず。二三旧時代の遺物を去らず
概して無難なりと云ふべし。帝玉にして先んじて、
例へば「治外法権」その他形式的特殊權利を拋棄し
外國租界を撤去せしめ外人顧問を整理すれば他は大
体不可なからんか。

三、外力中最も排斥すべきは、云ふまでもなく赤露の
勢力にして是を今後に於ける帝玉外交の主力を集
中すべき問題なると共に、日支の提携も英米との協
力も擧げず此問題解決の爲ならずばあるべからず。
吾人が歐洲政局に何等興味を感ずるも專ら對
蘇の問題ありはなり

日本に於ては蘇露の所謂平和政策なるものに瞞着
せられ支那に對する赤化工作を輕視し北滿より大人し
く退却したるに満足し、この上は專ら日蘇親善を旨
とすべきを主張する者鮮からず。殊に蘇露昨今の兵力
甚だ侮るべからざるものありとて寧ろ恐怖を懷き之と
衝突の不利を説くものあり。小生の最も與せざる所
なり。蘇露が目前平和を欲するに實なり然れども
之を以て彼が内心平和を家に帰したるものと考ふるは
誤之より大なるはなし。何か爲めの五年計畫で
何か爲の重工業、化学工業を何かための龐大軍備をや

外冠を恐ると云はん。一切軍國の常套語なり。力あるものは必ず之を使用せんとす。況んや現下の蘇露青年等は主義に対し一種の宗教的情熱に燃ゆるもの。所謂資本主義、帝王主義に対する十字軍に參加する事こそ彼等の最も光榮と感ずる所なるに於てをや。レニこの世界革命思想は今に信奉せられ居らずと云はん。る。實今日彼等の爲す所を見れば一玉社會主義を以て甘んじ居るか如くなるもスターリンと雖も曾てその強く抱懐せる世界無産革命の夢を抛棄し去るを認むべき何等の根據なし。要はその力及ぼざるを知るかためのみ。彼等が最も希望を懸かける独逸伊太利は何れも彼等の方法とのみならず内容に對蹠的の進展を辿り来りたるに失望せるが爲めのみ。容れ知らん彼等内心の願望は再び世界大戦の慘禍繰返され、列る處共產革命の勃発を見るに非ざるを。今度の伊太利紛争に今道心の蘇露が頻りに聯盟主義を言調するは、之によりて「ム」氏の失脚となりイペリヤ半島が再び共產主義の風潮非ずる所とならんと欲すればなり。

西欧諸国の経済、社會の情は露と趣を異にし、到底蘇露に見たるが如き共產主義の勝利を期し難きは識者の一致する所にして、蘇露主腦部も或は之を知り歐洲赤化の企は抛棄しつゝあるやも知れず。

然りども『支那四億印度三億の住民こそは、今日の彼等よりも最も
着目する所にして、之等人民の無智蒙昧なる経済状況の
極度劣悪なる革命前、露西亞の鬻鬻たる自あり。

『今日地球上共產革命の可能性あるは支那と印度なり
とは屢々人の口にする所なり』吾人必し之を信する

と雖も現る蘇露政府は之を信し種々工作を施して
あるは疑ふべからず。假し百歩を譲り、蘇露の共産

化の希望を綺麗に抛棄したりとせん。然るに蘇露

は漸次資本主義的國家となり、ザール時代の南可制帝
國となるべきは現前に向を如実の物語りのあり。

前者の非人は後者、現政權の下る露が平和主義の
民主國となる可能性は絶対、之のやうに日本は

取りて厄今至極なる隣邦たる事は依然、其のやうに吾人の
として拱手傍觀せんか彼の仇牙は愈々成り赤化の

禍害か然らばは鉄火の侵略の其のやうに是れは形勢の
と相見えたり。之のやうに其の實力、尤も羽瀾支

伸びるを待つの政策は、生り断しとよし得る所也
四、蘇露現下の実力は、單に數字上より之を觀れば頗

る偉大なる加はるるも革命尚ほ日淺く國內不
平分子は所在に充満し器材物資人的要素悉く於

て未だ缺如する所多く一度大國と兵火相見せんか愈
ち内部崩壊を来せしむるは略々明瞭なり。人情を孰

知するもの意見一致する所あり。今日蘇露の取り
最望ましむるは対外關係の無き平和なるとしあり。

随つて蘇露と境を接する諸國ありて甲晚法計算を要
すべし。案件を要する者は、今日の時季を空過するに非ず

今日地球上に於る帝國を對し、眞の脅威とせり得るは、蘇露を措く之なり。健忘なる我國民は、幕末北辺の侵掠と日露大戦の危局を、遠く昔の夢とて顧みざる所あり。歴史の教訓を忘れ、遠く慮なきものあり。必ず斯き憂あり。而して、極東細亞大陸に於て、雌雄を争ふべき運命あり。彼の國情政體の一時の變遷の如きは、問題と非ず。斯く達觀すれば、今日彼等が比較的無力なる時代を於て一擧ぐす。後患を断つ。策こそは、國家民衆の福祉を念とする者あり。苟も忘るべからざる所なり。と信す。わ生は此の際、理不盡道、蘇露に向て、戦争を持ち掛けよと云ふ者非ず。唯戦争をも辭せざる覺悟を以て、直ち彼に向て交渉を開始し、彼が東亞進出を完全と封せよと云ふ者なり。

先づ東亞諸地方を對する赤化行為を絶対し、地無し。滿塩、其の他の一切武備を撤廃し、ハイカル、以東一兵をも駐めず。外蒙新疆より、完全な撤退するは、最少限度の條件なり。其の他、漁業の問題、林業利権の問題は、勿論、樺太北半島の安價讓渡等の問題もあるべし。而して、將來は、沿海洲買収も考慮せざるべからず。是等の要求は、北鉄交渉の如き、寛大なる態度に思ふも、苛くする厳平たる決心を以て、喝するべからず。

五 既に戦争をも辭せざるの決心を要する以上、之に伴ふ外交上の施措は、早き及んで講じ置かざるべからず。独逸波蘭の如きは、對蘇の關係に於て、我と同一立場に在

るを以つて散て了解等を結ぶ要なく、一度事端勃発
すれば期せずして起つべし、向題は英國のみ。果は英と
了解たえずならず、或程度まで之を抑へ得べし、殊に同
國に於ては現政權は次期も再選せられ其の不干涉政
策は少くも五年間は約束せられあるを見よべし、爲り多
く考慮し要無かるべし。

然らば如何にして英と了解を遂ぐべきか、之が喫緊の
問題なるが先づ支那と関し彼れと了解の端を開か
るべからず。それか爲るは我が対支政策の歩調を緩む
るの要あるは勿論なるも英と雖も日本より東亞に於ける
地位は充分認識し得る處なりは餘り大なる讓歩は要
せざるべく、この方は先づ却つて移する所なるに我に於ては
ろ流り来りたる実情ならば支那に關する限り問題は谷意ありと
信ず、唯々餘露に對し往年の日英同盟の如きと望むも時勢は
許さざるものあり。我とてこそ今日はその必要ありし

(次頁に続く)

唯彼の精神的援助を以て足すべし。印度中支亞細亞の關係もあり日本共
 産党を好まざる英國の事にもあり、殊に保守党の天下となつるべき今
 後四五年間の英國は此点に於て頗る有望なりと見、唯國際聯
 盟の命脈もた盡きずして蘇露がその一員たるべきは我として甚だ身
 勝手なり聯盟没落は取も望ましく英が昔日の孤立政策に返る
 独逸と接近する事が我として極めて有利なる進展なるも之は必し
 も絶対要件には非ず。日独協力して露路を侵略するが如き次々と
 ならば英を黙視得ざるべきも我は当初より領土欲を放棄して
 かつる所にはもたれりまた植民地を奪はれ西方國境の不安を認む
 独逸に對し露の犠牲に於て東方進出を認め
 するは英として亦で難色なき處なるは何れも途我對蘇露政策に對
 し英國方面より重大なる故障来るべしとは認められず、帝國外交と
 しては固より此の點に努力を拂はざるべからず。

六、對支政策の目標も上述する所により自ら明かなるべく即ち中心
 は對蘇日支同盟により、支那を以て新疆、外蒙の完全主権を固
 收せしむるに在り、共產匪の共同討伐により、支那軍隊の整理強
 化に在り、右範圍内に於ける在支日英協調により、爾餘の諸
 問題の解決は枝葉末節なり、而して右政策は如何
 なる既存條約にも反せず、國際道徳より現るも何等非難す
 き所なきものなり、今世界人類多數の敵たる共產主義に
 對する日支の同盟は世界輿論の同情を博すれ米國と雖
 も却て帝國の支那に對すると具志を了解すべく遡る滿洲事
 變に對する一般の見解も大なる変更を見るべし。要は之が實
 行の手法と準備工策の如何に在り。小生の視る所を以てすれば
 陸軍部内於ては早晩蘇露と一戦を不可避とする空氣
 は遂日濃厚化しつゝ、あり、蘇滿國境頻々たる事故外蒙
 に對する諸般の活動は明かに之を物語るものにして、我外務省

にして、東支鉄道買収位の姑息手段内至は國境委員の設置
 などを以て彌縫糊塗し得べしとなさば、再び滿洲事変の如
 き熱湯を啗せざるべからざるは甚だ明瞭なり而も相手は
 瘦せても枯れても大露西亞なり。苟も之と事を構ふるが爲には
 國を擧げて結束せざるべからず。殊に外交當局に於て萬全の
 準備を整へざるべからず其日暮しの弱体内閣の下に軍部
 外務夫々勝手に行動し國內革新運動の紛然雜然たる
 今日突如として大規模の柳條溝事件の勃發を見ば如何。願
 ふらくば今日の皇軍は然かく無統制非ざるべく少くも對蘇の
 關係に於ては全軍一致の上ならでは以て行する所なからべき
 も大勢右の如しとすれば而して國家百年の大計より打算
 し現下の國際情勢に照し三の際對蘇清算を最も利益とす
 とせば甚くも軍部外務と同心協力を要するは論を待たず
 若し外務当局にして對蘇平和策を以て最も國家の利益と合
 致すと信するならばその態度を鮮明にし堂々と國民を率ひ
 て和協工作を実施せざるべからず。其の信念なくその勇氣を缺き
 徒らに軍部の鼻息に恐れ、事勿れに其日を過し何等施す
 所なきは國家に對し最も不忠なる者と云ふべし凡そ一國の外交に
 は一定の根本策なかるべからず所謂協和外交とは滿洲事変
 の暴風の後の鎮靜劑として國家に於ては歓迎せられたる
 も翻つて考ふれば實に何等内容なき標語に過ぎず相手も品も擇
 ばず和協せんと云ふは笑婦の事也自ら持する所ある丈夫は
 必ず交を擇ぶ、一定の信念と使命とを有する國民は必ず
 敵あり味方あるべし。漫然たる平和主義國際主義は
 今日何處までも通用せず、大戦の慘禍を瑞嘆せる歐洲
 諸國民の一時的空念佛を生じ眞面目に受入れを正直に

実践し来りたるが事変前の帝王外交なり。広田外交はまさか此
 の無自覚無信念なる佳始の事能心を復活せんとするものには非ざるべし。
 然れども今日迄の実績に徴するに萬邦協和と云ふ日支親善
 と云ふ北鉄買収と云ふ、何れも消極的一面のみに非るはなし。華
 府條約の廢棄の如き同じく消極外交の範疇を越えず。少くも
 積極的施策とは視るべからず。抑も現外務当局は、帝王外交
 友の目標を何れに置きまつたりや頗る疑たき能はず。和協主
 義は外交の手法に過かぎらず技術上の事に過かぎらず、主義と云
 は、之を徹底せざるべからず。滿洲を返し、聯盟に復帰
 し罪を天下に謝するの勇氣ありや。萬邦協和とて國內の
 流行新聞は書き立て大向ふは唱ふ采せんも、海外は何等反
 響音なきは何が故ぞ。單なる抽象的の觀念や、實も甚もな
 き掛聲耳は飽くまでも實際的なる西洋人を欺くに足らざるが故
 なり。

次頁に續く。

お芽出交き日本民衆と雖も永くは瞞過し得ざるべし先づ自ら目的を自覚せざるべからず一切の抽象名辭を棄て、極めて具体的に何人も了解し得る明々白々たる言葉を以て、帝國外交は何を欲し何を爲さんとするかを明かにせざるべからず斯くして内、國民は歸趨に迷はず、外列國は、去就を明かにすべし、今日日本国内の不安は固より經濟的社會的原因もあれど主として対外關係の不明不確実なるに因るは争ふべからず、人心の歸郷向を一定し、不安を一掃するが爲にも、外交國策を明徴にするは今日の急務なりと信ず、内外の情勢は一日の偷安を許さず國家外政の局に當る者深く反省せざるべからず。

七、要之小生は此際帝國外交の大目標に關し廟議を一決するの要あるを痛感するものにして而もその目標は蘇露との關係に一大清算を爲すにあり、一切の外交工作を之に集中すべしと爲すものなり、对支問題も軍縮問題も此大目標に対しては従たる地位に置かるべきものと信ずるものなり、国内諸般の改革も一に導き此範圍に留むべしとなすものなり。此大問題によりて一先づ対内外の關係を調節し、人心の歸向を確定し不安を一掃し得べしとなすものなり、而して对蘇關係の清算たる飽まで徹底的なるを要し單に目前の不安除去に止まらず永く西北の憂患を除かんとするに在り、戦力の、戦争に到るべきは自然の教にして、外交官たるものも輕々に口にするべからざる所なるは勿論なりと雖も、今日の時機を逸してはスラヴ禍を永遠に除くの機會は再び来らざらん、今日之も決行せば比較的犠牲少なく亦三者介入の虞少なくとして結果は徹底的なるを得べきを確信するか故なり。

第一に今日の勢力を以て推移せば蘇露は後十年も出でずして極めて有力なる国家となり、一寸手の着け様もなきに至るべし。革命前に於ても露西亞の工業發達は漸く著しきものありたるが、今日は強制労働により採算をも無視して無限の資源を擁し大量制産を續行するが故に数量の増する限り到底他国の追隨を許さず。

「第二に彼の弱點は人的要素なる処、革命前の露人は漸次死滅し共產主義を幼稚園より鼓吹せられ他に如何なる文明の存在をも知らざる盲目的露人によりて代られつゝあり。時を經ると共に、人的にも抜くべからざる偉大なる強勢を束すべし。」

第三に、露西亞の脅威を永久に除去するが爲めには彼をして無力なる資本主義共和国ならしめ、その天然富源を著しく制限するを要する処、共產政府の基礎益々固まるに至らば假令外國戦争に敗るゝも、容意に及革命は成らざるべし。今日ならば未だその見込充分なり。

第四諸外國に於て共產革命の殘虐無道を憤るの感情尚ほ熾烈なるものあり。欧米資本主義の力未だ衰へず共產主義に対する及対勢力の強き今の際にるを行ふを最も有利とす。

第五國際的に蘇露の地位未だ固まらざる、独逸波蘭等がウクライナ等に対する野心を逞うしつゝあり、英佛等の大戦の疲弊未だ癒えず武力干渉を欲せざるの現時を以て最も有利なる時期と信ず。殊に佛蘭西に於て未だ蘇露に対し日露戦争当時の如く深入せず、之に財政的援助を與ふるの意思も能力もなき現下の時機を逸すべからざる。

2419 A

才六日蘇南戦までには少くとも半年一年の経緯を見越さ
 ざるべからず。現下の世界情勢に於ては、その間彼として
 財的に信用なく、物的に交換物資なければ、さして準備を
 整へ得ざるに反し我は充分の準備をなし得べし。世界不況
 の此際も以て最も適当とする所以なり。その他理由は多
 々あるべきも、唯我才と雖も餘りに大なる犠牲には堪へ得ざる
 次第なる処我精銳を以て島合の革命軍に対すれば戦
 局の大勢は察するに難からず国内の崩壊必至なれば我と
 して多く勞するを要せざるべき見込なり。

2419 A

公式入手ニ関スル證明

余リヤードH.ラーシハ余カ聯合國最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト並ニ附隨書類IPS第百一十九号ハ余カ公務上日本政府ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス

千九百四十六年/昭和二十一年/九月十七日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名棟

國際檢察部調査官

リヤードH.ラーシ

證人

ウイリヤムC.フラウト

Ex 774-A

Doc. No. 2419-A

Page 1

November 4, --.

Dear
To Mr. ARITA:

I hear that ^{*it is*} you ~~have~~ at last decided ^{*that you are*} to go to China, and I sincerely congratulate you on this for our country. I hope that you will display utmost activity. I wish to tell you of the ideas I have always had concerning diplomatic problems, which are set down in the separate sheet and I should like to hear your criticism of it after reading. Though I know you have been an advocate for friendship between Japan and U.S.S.R., or at least, opposed to war between these two countries, but we have never had any discussion on this problem. As I do not know whether or not your view has changed since then, I have put down in the separate sheet my view concerning this problem rather in detail.

revised What I have put down here is a conclusion drawn from my long-cherished ^{*and later*} ~~views, revised somewhat later~~, based on both what I ~~had~~ acquired by reading extensively during my two years' stay in SWEDEN and what I had heard from ~~an authority on~~ ~~SOVIET UNION~~. However, as it was dashed off at a sitting, there may be inconsistent points in my aim. At any rate, my bad style does not fully express my intentions. One of these days, when I see you in SHANGHAI or somewhere, I should like to talk to you about it again.

Though the point of my argument is rather after the fashion of Sentaro UYEDA, it is not necessarily borrowed from him, and, as the saying goes, "a virtuous gentleman admits the truth of other's statement," please kindly read through it without prejudice. Although I have abundant literature on SOVIET RUSSIA, I think that Soviet Russia, Iron Age, and Russian Revolution, written by CHALBERLAIN, an American, are very instructive books. I am sending you a copy of Iron Age and I hope you will read it through.

Yours respectfully,

SHIRATORI

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

IMT 474

19

12 November, Showa 10/1935/

Dear Mr. ARITA

(Dear Mr. ARITA,)

Your prompt reply and comments ^{on} ~~to~~ my humble opinion concerning diplomatic affairs is deeply appreciated. The points you have pointed out in my letter are argumentations not fully clarified or expressions a little too radical. Your opinions are highly appreciated and I will make efforts to continue the study of such affairs.

As to the U.S.S.R. problem, I have had the idea that you and I embraced opposite views but finding now, by your letter, that it is not always so, I am exceedingly pleased. I am looking forward to the opportunity of meeting you and hearing your opinion thoroughly.

Diversion of the mind as you suggested in the last part of your letter is a matter of great consideration for a statesman. In my opinion, although nobody pays any attention today to any domestic policy whatever, which politicians present, if a drastic policy towards the U.S.S.R. is sincerely established, no doubt a certain amount of success can be attained, for the present, in its negotiation with the militarists. I am not without sympathy with those who advocate domestic renovation, but nothing could be expected from the present weak-kneed right wing parties whose ideas are surprisingly shallow and crude. But if a large-scale war breaks out it may be that we will be able to discover a lead in reorganizing a sound nation just as was seen in the almost perfect control established under the liberalist, Lloyd George, in World War I.

With a war in sight, no means should be adopted which will cause an extreme agitation in the economic phase of everyday life. At the same time, during the war, capitalists and the financial clique (the Financial Clique) should submit to great sacrifices. If we could find, therefore, a suitable statesman who could lead the tension of all classes of people to good advantage, an unexpected good result might possibly be produced.

My last letter, having been written only for you without taking any copies, has not been prepared to be shown to others. But you might show my last letter in private to some influential members of the SEIYUKAI Party if you think it advisable, considering the above stated consideration.

One point I would like to add is that if we discuss for or against war with Russia as an abstract argument, there will be various opinions, and perhaps as you say, it is not to be considered as a problem so urgent as I think. It all depends upon the disposition of the militarists in the near future. If the militarist's policy is decided, nothing could prevent it under the present circumstances and if neither diplomats nor political parties could suppress them, why not support their policy and exert our best to carry it out? This is my conclusion.

Doc. No. 2419-A

Upon my application for permission to return to Tokyo, I have been notified to postpone it to next year owing to the lack of travelling expenses. I have applied again stating that I will pay my own way if need be. Outwardly, I have given family affairs to be the reason but of course, it is not a matter that requires immediate solution. As you have conjectured, it is unbearable for me to merely view the cloudy skies from a remote corner in the present internal and external situation. I know I will be the object of much criticism but I would like to go about and express my views. I will be careful not to cause trouble for the higher officials of our Office; I cannot help if they think it would be better if a parasite like me should stay away -- which may be the reason for not wanting me home.

Sincerely yours,

SHIRATORI

~~Memorandum found with letter~~

~~dated November 12, 1935~~

1. I cannot feel but doubt the recent Chinese policy of the Imperial Government as possessing any definite object. The Foreign Office should be aware that the situation prior to the Manchurian Incident had more than proved that mere formality such as "Sino-Japanese Good-Will" has none in value; ~~while~~ on the other hand, the militarists ~~appear to be~~ focusing their eyes on North China trying to build up a somewhat modified and ~~neutralized~~ *moderated* Manchukuo. ~~Notwithstanding ulterior~~ *Foreign views aside* from the standpoint *of the interests* of the Empire itself, the propriety of such policy is ~~undoubtedly most at least very~~ problematic. Intrinsicly, whether it be Manchuria or the China Proper, they would fall under our Empire's sphere of influence even if left neglected, and it would have been only natural for us to utilize them within the scope of our necessities. The reason why we cannot neglect them was due to the emulation brought about by foreign influences. After all, the Manchurian Incident was no other than an effort aimed to give complete emancipation to the Manchurian-Mongolian territories from foreign influence, and that we should demand that most valid and proper cause in regard to the said incident. Therefore, our future policy towards China should be aimed solely at the exclusion of ~~outside~~ influences, and, ~~disregarding entirely~~ *immediate* small profits ~~which we are now confronted with.~~ Each and every of the various projects for China should be directed towards this object and as such things as "Sino-Japanese Good-Will" "Cease in Anti-Japanese Movements," and "Advance into North China" being but mere trifles, the fundamentals must lie in the point of having China cooperate with our Empire's policy aimed at the exclusion of foreign influences.

2. Although, we may mention "exclusion of foreign influences," we, of course, do not mean the exclusion of all foreign activities in order to acquire monopolistic positions. For instance, I believe that due respects should be given to the various British, American and other ~~legitimate~~ establishments in China, and moreover, we should be so prepared as to give them willing cooperation. By excluding foreign influences from China, we do not mean to be the so-called "dog in the manger," but only ~~in~~ the expulsion of all influences which are harmful to China, and ~~consequently~~ to Japan. Although we may say that this shall be applicable to all, regardless of what that country may be, when we take a general view, we find that the ~~activities~~ *of the former days* of the various countries in China to-day ~~do not retain any~~ vestige, when each country had her own sphere of influences. ~~For still~~ *Only a few* relics of the former ~~age~~ *remain, but* in general, they could be said to be unarmful. If Japan takes the initiative, for instance, in discarding the rights of extraterritoriality and other ~~special rights which are perfunctory;~~ *formal* and of having the foreign settlement removed, ~~and foreign advisors reduced; wouldn't others be, as a whole,~~ *the number of* ~~possible~~ *would not the rest be satisfactory?*

3. It is needless to say that, among the foreign influences that should ~~above~~ *all* be ~~expelled~~, is that of Red Russia. This is a question ~~on~~ *on* which our Empire's diplomacy must concentrate its main force in the future, and that Sino-Japanese concert ~~must be a solution to this problem also, together with~~ *and* cooperation

are necessary for the solution of this problem.

with the Anglo-Americans. The reason why I take interest in the European political situation is because there is the problem related to the Soviets. There are some in Japan who are being deceived by the so-called "peace policy" of Soviet Russia; who ignore the red movement in China; who are satisfied with the obedient withdrawal of Soviet troops from North Manchukuo; and who advocate that Russo-Japanese good-will should be made a principle. Moreover, there are some who maintain the recent military power of Soviet Russia as something that should not be under-rated and, harbouring fear, point out the disadvantage of clashing against Russia. This is what displeases me most. It is true that Russia wants peace at present, but there will be no folly so great as this as to judge her being turned substantially into a peaceful country. For what purpose was that five-year plan made? What are the heavy industry and the chemical industry for? And for what are the huge armament preparations for? They say they fear foreign invasion. It's nothing but a hackneyed expression used by a militaristic country. The mighty always try to use this expression. Still more, when we consider the rising generation of present-day Russia burning with a kind of fervent religious order for an ideology; that is, they feel it an honor when they can enjoin in a crusade against the so-called "Capitalism" and "Imperialism"! People may say that Lenin's ideology of world revolution is no longer upheld. In fact, when we consider the ways in which they handle their matters, they seem to be satisfied with the "one nation socialism," but there is no proof to prove that STALIN himself recognized the abrogation of his dream of world proletarian revolution which he once firmly embraced. The point is that they know their deficiency in power to carry this out. It is because they have been disappointed to find that Germany and Italy, which they tied most of their hopes on, have only learned its ways whereby the contents took opposite courses.

We know that their inner desire is no other than to see Communistic revolutions break out everywhere when repetition of damages caused by another world war flare up again. The fact that Soviet Russia, a novice, should incessantly advocate the principle of "mediation by the League of Nations" in the Italo-Ethiopian controversy is because that she desires the downfall of MUSSOLINI and hope that once again Communism will over-run the Iberian Peninsula. It is a generally agreed opinion among the intelligentsia that the economic and social conditions of Western European countries are different from those of Russia, and that it is impossible to expect communistic achievements such as those seen in Russia. The leaders of Russia may have already realized this and may have given up the plan to bolshevize Europe. Nevertheless, the 400 million people of China and the 300 million people of India have become to-day their most aimed object, and the ignorance and remoteness of the economic conditions of these people resemble closely to those of Russia, which prior to the revolution was extremely inferior. It is often said that to-day, the only place on this earth that has possibilities of giving occurrence to communistic revolution are China and India. Although, I do not necessarily believe in this, the Soviet Government today does believe in this, and there is no doubt that they are now engaged in the various manipulations. Now, for instance, let us say Russia conceded to back up a hundred steps and gave up once and for all her dream of world bolshevization.

In that case, Soviet Russia will gradually turn into a capitalistic country, and into an absolute imperialistic state as in the time of the Czar, which her present tendency clearly indicates. If not the former, then the latter. And if there is absolutely no possibility for Russia, under the present Regime, to become a democratic country with peace as its principle; then it would make no difference to the fact that Russia will remain to be a troublesome neighbour of Japan. Should we remain idly by and just gaze at her with our hands locked, she would polish her claws and teeth all the more. The situation will become such that we have to choose one of the two; either submit ourselves to bolshevization or, if not, to expose ourselves to her armed invasion. I could never agree to the policy of binding ourselves with Russia and await her to replete her powers and expanding her materialistic wings.

4. Looking at the present day power of Soviet Russia as from the standpoint of figures, it does seem to be most imposing; but, as the days are still shallow since the revolution and the dissatisfied elements still infest the countryside and shortages are still acute in implements and machineries; resources and materials, and manpower, it is clear that she will immediately sustain internal collapse once she fights against some great power. This is the unanimous opinion of those who are familiar with the actual situation. ^{What} is most desirable for Soviet Russia at present, is to have peaceful and amicable relationships with the foreign powers. Therefore, countries which border Soviet Russia and who have any pending affairs that need be settled sooner or later with her, should never idle away this opportune time of today. At present there is no country on this earth except Russia that can become a real menace to Japan. Although it seems that forgetful Japanese people do not look back to the days in the latter stages of the Shogunate era when our northern borders were invaded and plundered, and look at the dangerous stages experienced during the Russo-Japanese War, as far away dreams of the past. But, beware, those who forget the teaching of history and lack far-sighted prudence will suffer troubles in the near future. ^{Fate} have that the Slavs and the Yamato race must eventually fight each other for supremacy on the Asiatic continent. The question is not of the temporary change to be made in the state of affairs or the form of government in Soviet Russia. Thus taking a far-sighted view, I believe that adoption of a policy for an instantaneous removal of future calamity at this stage when they are comparatively impotent is a ^{matter} ~~point~~ which should never be neglected by those who bear concern for the welfare of the people and nation. I am not saying that we should unreasonably force a war against Soviet Russia now. I am only saying that we should start negotiations with her with ~~resolutions~~, ^{determination} not refusing ^{war} if it is inevitable, to shut her out completely from advancing into East Asia.

Firstly, Russia should give up entirely her activities of Bolshevization in East Asia; abolish military armaments in VLADIVOSTOCK, etc.; complete withdrawal of her troops from OUTER MONGOLIA and HSINCHIANG, not stationing a single soldier in the area of LAKE BAIKAL; -- these shall be our minimum demands, and others, not to speak of the problems relative to fishing and the rights and interests regarding forestry. Problems regarding transfer of the northern half of SAGHALIEN at moderate prices are also included. In the

future, purchase of the MARITIME PROVINCE OF SIBERIA must also be considered. These demands should be made with firm determination. There would be no possibility of success if we negotiate with such a generous attitude as was done at the negotiation on the purchase of the North Manchuria Railway.

5. *On the basis that it is determined*
~~Now that we have already made up our determination of not refusing~~ *to refuse*
 war if inevitable, diplomatic measures relative to this should be ~~taken~~ *taken* as early as possible. Since the relationship of Germany and Poland with Russia ~~is in the same position~~ *is in the same position* as ours, there is no need for us to ~~try and specifically make~~ *any specific* understanding with them. Once the war breaks out they will surely rise ~~on our side~~. The only ~~problem~~ *problem* is England. As for America, she has not even reached an understanding with England and we can control her to a certain degree. Especially, ~~in America~~ *in America* the present regime will be re-elected in the next term, and it could be seen that its non-intervention policy shall be maintained, at least, for the next five years. Aside from this, there is no need to give much consideration. Then how can we reach an understanding with England? This will be the most urgent question. The first step is to open a way for an understanding on problems in regard to China. For this purpose, we, of course, must slacken the pace of our China policy but, as Britain ~~should be able~~ *to* fully recognize Japan's position in East Asia, ~~should not have to~~ *make many* concessions. The fact is that this has been what Britain desired while we, ~~on the contrary~~, have been rather reluctant ~~on the question until now~~. Therefore, as far as it concerns China, I believe the problem is soluble. Only that although I desire to see such Anglo-Japanese Alliance of the former years be formed against Russia now, the current situation will not allow it. As for us today, we do not find it necessary. It will be sufficient if we only had their spiritual aid. Now, there is question of INDIA and the CENTRAL ASIA; her primary dislike for communists; and especially while there are four to five years of domination by the conservative party, it seems most favourable for England in this regard. The only fact that is unfavourable for us is that the League of Nations still exists and Soviet Russia is one of her members. The decline of the League of Nations is most desirous. Although it would be a most advantageous development for us if England goes back to her old policy of isolation, and come closer in relation with Germany, it would not necessarily be an absolute requisite.

If JAPAN should be in a position to invade SOVIET RUSSIA in co-operation with GERMANY, GREAT BRITAIN will not remain a passive spectator. But from the outset we have abandoned territorial ambitions and furthermore, since GERMANY acknowledges the status quo of the western border and has been deprived of her colonies, GREAT BRITAIN may not be too unwilling to recognize GERMANY's eastward expansion at the expense of RUSSIA. Which ever way, I do not discern much opposition from GREAT BRITAIN in our policy to SOVIET RUSSIA. The diplomacy of the Empire must exert its efforts on this point.

6. The aim of our policy toward CHINA is self-evident from the explanation stated above. The nucleus exists in a Sino-Japanese Alliance and an anti-Soviet Russia policy. JAPAN should cooperate with CHINA in having the absolute sovereignty of INNER and OUTER MONGOLIA restored, cooperate in subjugating Communist rebels, cooperate in reorganizing and strengthening the Chinese armed forces. These are within the bounds of JAPAN-GREAT BRITAIN cooperation in CHINA. Other problems are minor details and trivialities of everyday occurrence. Furthermore, since the said policy does not infringe on any existing treaties, not only will it be free from criticism viewed from international morals but a Sino-Japanese Alliance formed to confront Communism, which is the enemy of a great number of peoples in the world today, would not only draw sympathy from world opinion but even the United States would understand the sincerity of JAPAN towards CHINA and there will be a great change of general opinion as regards the Manchurian Incident. In brief, success would depend on the method of execution and preparation.

In my opinion, the atmosphere is growing tense day by day within army circles that a war with Soviet Russia sooner or later is unavoidable. The frequent troubles on the Russo-Manchurian border and various movements against OUTER MONGOLIA proves this.

If our Foreign Office considers that it can patch up affairs by makeshift means of buying up the Eastern China Railway and establishing a border committee, it is evident that we shall again encounter the bitter experience such as the Manchurian Incident. This time our opponent is great RUSSIA although she may be withered and torn. If war with RUSSIA is unavoidable, the whole nation must unite to support it.

Especially in diplomatic circles, we must be fully prepared. Under the hand-to-mouth existence of the weak-kneed cabinet, the militarists and Foreign Office are acting arbitrarily. With complication and disorder in our internal renovation movement today, what would be the outcome if a large-scaled LIU CHOU-

KO Incident suddenly exploded. It is hoped that the Imperial Army of today would not be uncontrollable as such and at least when RUSSIA is concerned, they would not execute their plans unless the whole army is in entire accord.

Judging from a far-sighted national policy and making reference to the present international situation, if the general opinion considers that to settle the issue with RUSSIA would be most profitable, the Army and Foreign Office should at least act in harmonious cooperation. If the Foreign Office considers a peace policy toward RUSSIA would be most profitable for the country, the Foreign Office should clarify its attitude and lead the people with dignity and make provisions for a peaceful solution. Without this faith and without this courage, being afraid of the imperious militarists and letting matters take the course of least resistance is being most unloyal to our country.

Generally speaking, the diplomacy of a country must have a fundamental policy. The so-called conciliatory diplomacy was welcomed as a temporary measure in our country after the tempest of the Manchurian Incident, but upon reconsideration it was merely a slogan having no particular contents. To conciliate without selecting the opponent or offerings is like a prostitute. An upright gentleman always selects his company. A nation with a firm belief and a mission will always have friends and also enemies. Vague pacificism and internationalism without a definite object will not pass anywhere today.

It was our Empire's diplomacy before the Incident to accept seriously the momentary empty prayers of the European nations which had fully experienced the disaster and hardship of World War I and have heretofore honestly practiced them.

The FIROTA diplomacy is surely not going to revive the insensible and faithless policy of former times. But judging from the past results, only the passive phrase has been applied as in conciliation with all countries, Sino-Japanese amity, and as in purchasing of the North China Railway. The denouncement of the Washington Treaty too is within the category of passive diplomacy. At least, it cannot be deemed as being a positive diplomacy. One cannot help but entertain doubt as to the objective of Japanese diplomacy by the present Foreign Office.

Conciliation is merely a means of diplomacy and is merely technical. If it is a principle, it must be thorough. Have they enough courage to return MANCHURIA to CHINA, to get reinstated in the League of Nations and to apologize to the world for the crime? Although the popular newspapers in JAPAN

write about conciliation with the nations of the world and applaud it, why is it that there is no response abroad? Is it merely an abstract idea? It is because empty talks without substantial contents only deceive the practical western people. Even the good-natured Japanese populace will not long be satisfied. They must first understand the objectives themselves.

Discarding all abstract terms and using clear terms so that everybody can understand what the Imperial diplomacy wants and what it is going to do should be clarified. Japanese people will not be lost as to which course to take and foreign powers will clarify their attitude. It cannot be denied that the uneasiness in JAPAN at present is due to economic and social causes but the chief reason is ambiguity and uncertainty of the foreign relations. I believe it is of the utmost necessity today to clarify the foreign policy in order to settle the trend of public opinion and to sweep away the uneasiness of the people. The internal and foreign situation does not permit a day of ease. The deep reconsideration of the men who guide the national foreign policy is required.

7. (In short, at this time I keenly feel the necessity of the cabinet decision regarding the great object of the Empire's diplomacy. I believe this object to be a drastic liquidation of relations with SOVIET RUSSIA. All diplomatic activities should be concentrated on this object. I believe that the CHINA problem and the disarmament problem are secondary considerations compared to this great object. The reformation of various internal affairs should also be limited within this phase and in line with Item 1. With this great problem in mind, internal and foreign relations should be adjusted for the time being and the trend of public opinion can be settled and the uneasiness can be swept away. Moreover, it is necessary that the liquidation of relations with SOVIET RUSSIA be thoroughgoing in order to sweep away the uneasiness not only for the present but to be rid of the fears and worries from the northwest forever. Therefore, it is natural that war may be unavoidable. It is needless to say that a diplomat should not talk rashly about such matters but I believe that if we miss this opportunity today, we will never have another opportunity to oust the Slav peril forever.) If we execute this today, I firmly believe that we can accomplish it thoroughly with minimum sacrifice and with least fear of interference by third parties.

First, if SOVIET RUSSIA advances at the present pace, it will not take ten years before she will become a very powerful country which we will not be able to touch.) Even before the revolution a remarkable development of industry in RUSSIA was gradually taking place. Today, by using forced labor and ignorin

profit, and possessing inexhaustible resources and continuing mass production, so far as quantity is concerned, no other power is able to keep pace with her.

(Second, her weakness is said to lie in the manpower requisites, but Russians before the revolution have gradually died out and have been replaced by those) blind (Russians who have been inspired with communism from the kindergartens and do not know the existence of any other civilization. As time goes by, she will become so powerful in manpower also that we will not be able to overtake her.)

Third, in order to eliminate the menace of RUSSIA forever, it is necessary to make her a powerless capitalistic republic and to rigidly control her natural resources. However, when the foundation of the Communist Government becomes firm, the anti-revolution movement will not easily succeed even if she should be defeated in a war with a foreign country. At present, the chances are good.)

Fourth, in various countries, the enraged feelings against the cruel and atrocious communist revolution are still ardent. The capitalistic force of America and Europe is still strong and it is most advantageous to settle the issue now when the anti-communism force is strong.

Fifth, (the international position of SOVIET RUSSIA is not firm yet. GERMANY and POLAND are burning with aspirations for UKRAINE etc. I believe that the present time, when BRITAIN, FRANCE, etc., do not desire armed interference because of not having fully recovered from the effects of the World War, is the most opportune moment.) Especially we must not miss the present opportunity when FRANCE has no close relation with SOVIET RUSSIA as at the time of the Russo-Japanese war, and has neither intention nor ability to give financial assistance to her.

Sixth, we must anticipate that at least a half or one year will elapse before hostilities with Soviet Russia will break out. At the present world situation, during that period, she cannot make ample preparations for lack of financial credit and lack of exchangeable goods. On the other hand, we can make adequate preparations. This is the reason why I consider that this moment of world depression is the most opportune moment. There are many other reasons. However, we too cannot endure too great a sacrifice. However, if our highly trained army marches against the disorderly mob of revolutionist army, it is not difficult to predict the general outcome of the war. Internal disintegration cannot be avoided and I believe we may not have to exert much effort.

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard F. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the attached document, IPS No. 2419, was obtained by me from the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
17 day of Sept. 1946.

/s/ Richard F. Larsh
NAME

Witness: /s/ Wm. C. Prout

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2419

12 July 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Memorandum of 4 Nov 35 and letter of 12 Nov 35 re Japanese-U.S.S.R. relations from SHIRATORI, Toshio to ARITA, Kachiro

Date: (see above) Original Copy Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: KOKUSAKU ENKYUSHA (National Policy Research Association)

PERSONS IMPLICATED: SHIRATORI, Toshio; ARITA, Kachiro

CRIES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Japanese-Russian Relations; Planning aggression against Russia

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

In his letter to ARITA, SHIRATORI expresses pleasure in learning that ARITA's views re U.S.S.R. coincide with his. The following quotes are taken from this letter:

"I feel some sympathy with those who advocate internal renovation, but I find the Rightists are of very shallow nature and nothing could be hoped from them."

"If war breaks out, there may come an outstart of a healthy reformation of state just as during the world war we found an almost perfect control of state under Lloyd George, a Liberalist. If it were war time, capitalists and the ZAIBATSU may stand any sacrifice. If a suitable statesman could be found to carry out your policy, unexpectedly good results may be brought about with unity in the nation."

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"Questioning pro and con regarding war between Japan and Russia may call for an infinite number of opinions. Also, as you say, this may not be an urgent matter, but it all depends on whether the Army settles their attitude in the near future or not, i.e., whether they take a decisive step or not. If the Army's policy is decided under present circumstances, nothing can prevent that. If either diplomatic officials or political party personnel can suppress them, the best thing is to assist them in their enterprise and do our best along the line of actual methods to carry out their program." N

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"Japanese Governmental policy toward China is questionable as to its pertinence. The Army is aiming to make North China a kind of MANCHUKUO, but such is also questionable. Our fundamental principle should be the Japanese policy to exclude other power's influences from China.

The point is to drive away all harmful influences; not all kinds, but only harmful ones. Japan should cancel extra-territoriality in China and thus make other power's concessions cancelled and make their advisors go home.

The most harmful influence in China is of course U.S.S.R. who is conspiring for another World War to carry out world wide proletarian revolution. China and India are her immediate objectives. If we keep looking on her conspiracy, she is sure to give us great damage. I shall never agree with such an "on looker" policy.

Russia is the greatest threat to Japan in the world. I do not agitate the country for war right now, but start negotiations with great resolution of not shunning war against her."

SHIRATORI's plan for negotiation included:

1. Prohibition of communist movements in Asia.
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3. Fishing and forestry rights.

4. Purchase of northern half of SAGHALEN.
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In reviewing diplomatic steps necessary, SHIRATORI believed that since Germany thought as Japan did, there was no need to get an understanding from her; that U.S. would adopt a non-committal attitude; that negotiation with England was most essential. He favored conclusion of a treaty between Japan, China, and U.S.S.R. stating that a nominal peace was useless.

To quote further, SHIRATORI says, "A great need for present Japan is to make a final settlement of accounts with Russia. This necessarily means a war, and we diplomats should of course, avoid such words, but except for today, there will not be any chance to get away from Russian disaster forever. If it is left in the present situation, Russia would be a really powerful country in ten years, and no other country can stand as her rival."

"In order to make Russia weak, make her a weak capitalistic state and limit extremely, her natural resources. This cannot be done later, but now when her state is comparatively weak."

"The world in general is against the Comintern. While it is like this, we may have success in fighting against her."

"There will be about one or half a year before war breaks out between Russia and Japan. In this time Russia may not be able to really get ready, as she doesn't have adequate means."

In conclusion, SHIRATORI requests ARITA to "do his best" in China, and suggests the following literature as being of possible interest:

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Analyst: 2d Lt Blumhagen

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Date 9 July 46

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Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ()
Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

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SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: ~~9~~ KOKUSAKU KEN KYUSHA (National Policy Research Association)

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(over)

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CHARGE OUT SLIP

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10/11/86

EVIDENTIARY DOC. NO.

2419

TRIAL BRIEF

EXHIBIT NO.

774-A

BACKGROUND DOC. NO.

SIGNATURE

R. C. V. Varnum

ROOM NO.

354

CHARGE OUT SLIP

DATE 7 July 1947 .

EVIDENTIARY DOC. NO. 2419-A

TRIAL BRIEF _____

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BACKGROUND DOC. NO. _____

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Signature S. Tomita

Room # 245