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Exhibit #
1136 A

Doc. 2507 Evid

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(19)

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. Nos. 2500-2515, inclusive

25 July 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Records of Interrogations of General TOJO, Hideki

Date: Feb-Mar 46 Original Copy Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Document Division

PERSONS IMPLICATED: TOJO, Hideki

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Preparation for War, Military; Conspiracy for Aggressive Warfare; Relations with USA.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Interrogations on dates shown below given document numbers as follows:

<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Date</u>
2500	8 Feb 1946	2508	1 Mar 1946
2501	11 Feb 1946	2509	11 Mar 1946
2502	13 Feb 1946	2510	12 Mar 1946
2503	18 Feb 1946	2511	14 Mar 1946
2504	19 Feb 1946	2512	15 Mar 1946
2505	20 Feb 1946	2513	18 Mar 1946
2506	21 Feb 1946	2514	25 Mar 1946
2507	23 Feb 1946	2515	26 Mar 1946

Analyst: W.H.Wagner

Doc. Nos. 2500-2515, incl

Why Raroye cabinet fell, etc.
meeting at his home

Doe
2507

2507A
Er. 2507A
Feb. 23 A

Partial Ex. 5 p. in all
Exh. 1136-A
4 splits

Interrogation of Hideki Tojo
23 February 1946, Case File #20, Serial #83, pp. 5-6

"Q Who attended the meeting at KONOYE's home on or about October 12, 1941?

"A It is hard for me, but I am sure that the War Minister, the Navy Minister, and the Foreign Minister were there. I am not sure whether the President of the Planning Board was there or not, but the three important ones were the three I have mentioned.

"Q What was the purpose of the meeting and what occurred there?

"A As I recall them, I think the reasons for the conference were as follows: In the first place, the middle ten days of October, which had been set as the time by which we would strive for a favorable diplomatic turn, were upon us. The Japanese proposal for a meeting between Prince KONOYE and the President of the United States had been turned down by America. The international situation was becoming more tense all the time. In these circumstances, it was necessary for the Government of Japan to decide more definitely just what its policy was to be, and I believe that was the basic purpose of the conference at Premier KONOYE's home.

"Q Did you not quarrel with KONOYE at that meeting?

"A No, it was not a quarrel. Our opinions differed.

"Q Differed on what?

"A My opinion was as follows: Japan was making concession after concession in the effort to effect a diplomatic break before the middle ten days of October, but on the other hand, America refused to budge from her position and made no concessions. The meeting between Premier KONOYE and the President, by which it had been hoped that a political settlement could be reached, had been turned down. As War Minister, my opinion was that there remained practically no hope of a diplomatic break and I suggested that the time had come when we had better make up our minds for war. The longer we delayed in making this decision, the more disadvantageous the situation would be for Japan if war were decided upon later. I felt thus because we were now in the middle ten days of October."

Feb-23A

Last message of Pres. En 2507A
Exh. 1136A

Interrogation of Hideki Tojo
23 February 1946, Case File #20, Serial #83, pp. 1-2

- "Q At what time was the last message of the President to the Emperor received in Japan?
- "A As I said before, I was telephonically advised of that message by the Foreign Minister somewhere around 1 o'clock in the morning of the 8th of December 1941.
- "Q Since this message was addressed to the Emperor, why was it not reported directly to him?
- "A I don't know. That is a Foreign Ministry and an Imperial Household Ministry problem. A message of that character is not handled by the cabinet, but by the Imperial Household, though perhaps it may have come via the Foreign Minister.
- "Q Why did the Foreign Minister call you?
- "A He called me because I was a Minister of State and this was a matter affecting the nation.
- "Q What did he say to you in connection with the President's message?
- "A The Foreign Minister reported to me the fact that the message had come and said that he proposed to deliver it to the Emperor. I assented.
- "Q When did the Foreign Minister say he was going to deliver it to the Emperor?
- "A He said he was going to report it right away so I think that as soon as he hung up, he went to report it.
- "Q Do you know when the message was delivered to the Emperor?
- "A I don't know. It was about 1 o'clock, as I said before, when it was reported to me and I have the impression that it was reported to the Emperor soon after that. When I was informed of the personal telegram, I inquired if any points were conceded. The answer was that there wasn't much of any concession.
- "Q Do you not know that the message was not delivered until after the attack on Pearl Harbor?
- "Q The attack, if everything went smoothly, was to have been about 3 o'clock on the morning of the 8th, Japan time.

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EXH. 1136A

DR 2507

"Of course, we had had no reports, but the message came to me about 1 o'clock, so I think it was delivered to the Emperor soon after that and before the attack."

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Ex. 1136A

Doc 2587A

Interrogation of Hideki Tojo
23 February 1946, Case File #20, Serial #83, pp. 3

"Q Were there not certain individuals in favor of an attack on America without any warning?

"A No. It was felt, however, that this was properly a matter of justifiable self-defense. The diplomatic procedures, though disadvantageous from the military standpoint, had to be submitted to and complied with.

"Q What diplomatic procedure had to be complied with?

"A The final note had to be transmitted. Since this was a matter of legitimate self-defense, we were not bound by the anti-war treaty, but as much as possible we decided to follow diplomatic procedures and see that there were no slips."

Sept. 6th Imp. Conference

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Partial Ex. 5 p. in all
Exp. 1136-A

sr 2507A
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4 splits

Interrogation of Hideki Tojo
23 February 1946, Case File #20, Serial #83, pp. 5

- "Q For what purpose was the Imperial Conference of 6 September called?
- "A It was called to decide the question of what national policy should be adopted in view of the situation at that time. As I recall, the main question was that of war or peace and what attitude should be decided upon in either case.
- "Q At this conference, it was decided to continue negotiations with America and hope for a break by the middle ten days of October, was it not?
- "A Yes, of course I think so, but I have no materials here and it is difficult for me to make categorical statements.
- "Q It was also decided that if the break did not come by the middle ten days of October that war would be undertaken against America?
- "A It was decided to plan for a break by the middle ten days of October. The decision for war was not made at this conference.

Feb 23

Interrogation of Hideki Tojo
23 February 1946, Case File #20, Serial #83, pp. 5-6

"Q Who attended the meeting at KONOYE's home on or about October 12, 1941?

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Extract from Interrogation of Hideki TOJO, 23 February 1946, pp 1-2, 3, 5-6.

(pp. 1-2)

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(p. 3)

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* * * * *

(pp. 5-6)

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東條英機ニ對スル訊問ヨリノ抜萃

一九四六年二月二十三日

キーニニ、五、六頁

「第一一二頁」

問、天皇ニ對スル大統領ノ最後ノ親書ハ何時日本ニ於テ受領セラレマシタカ。

答、前ニ申上ゲタ通り、私ハ昭和十六年十二月八日午前一時頃外務大臣カラ電話デソノ親書ノアツタコトノ知ラセヲ受ケマシタ。

問、ソノ親書ハ天皇ニ宛テラレタモノナルニ何故直接ニ天皇ニ上奏セラレナカツタノデスカ。

答、私ハ知リマセン。ソレハ外務省及宮内省ノ問題デス。斯カル種類ノ親書ハ、外務大臣ヲ通ジテ來タカモ知レナイガ、内閣ニ於イテハ取扱ハレマセン。何時モ宮内省ニ於イテ處理セラレマス。

問、何故外務大臣ハ貴方ニ電話ヲ掛ケタノデスカ。

答、私ガ國務大臣デアリ、ソレハ國家ニ影響ヲ及ボス事柄デアツタカラ私ニ電話シタノデシタ。

問、大統領ノ親書ニ關シテ彼ハ貴方ニ何ト申シマシタカ。

答、外務大臣ハソノ親書ノ來タ事實ヲ私ニ報告シ、ソシテ之ヲ陛下ニ御渡シスル積リデアルト申シマシタ。私ハ同意致シマシタ。

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問、外務大臣ハ何時天皇ニソレヲ渡ス積リデアルト申シマシタカ。

答、直チニソレヲ上奏スルト申シテ居リマシタ。

ソレ故電話ガ済ムト直グ上奏ニ出カケタモノト私ハ思ヒマス。

問、ソノ親言ガ何時天皇ニ渡サレタカ貴方ハ知ツテキマスカ。

答、存ジマセン。先程申上ゲタ通り、ソレガ私ニ報告セラレタノハ一時頃デアリ、私ハソノ後間モ無クソノ事ガ上奏セラレタモノトノ印象ヲ受ケテ居リマス。

ソノ親電ノ事ヲ知ラサレタ際私ハ何か讓步セラレタ點ガアルカト問ヒ訊シマシタ。之ニ對シ大シテ讓步サレタ所ハナイトノ答デシタ。

問、貴方ハソノ親言ハ眞珠灣攻撃ノ後マデ天皇ニ渡サレナカツタ事ヲ知リマセンカ。

答、全ベテガ願調ニ遵ベバ眞珠灣ノ攻撃ハ日本時間ニシテ八日ノ午前三時頃ニナル筈デシタ。

勿論ソレマデニ何等ノ報告モアリマセンデシタ。然ルニ親言ハ一時頃ニ私ニ知ラサレタノデス。從ツテソレハソノ直グ後、即チ眞珠灣攻撃ノ以前ニ天皇ニ渡サレタモノト思ツテ居リマス。

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「第三頁」

問、何等ノ警告ナシニ米國ヲ攻撃スルコトニ贊成シ
タ人々ガアリマセンデシタカ。

答、アリマセンデシタ。然シ、之ハ正シク正當防衛
ノ事デアルト感ジラマシタ。

軍事の見地カラハ不利デアツテモ外交上ノ手續
ニ服シソシテ從ハネバナリマセンデシタ。

問、ドンナ外交上ノ手續ニ從ハネバナリマセンデシ
シタカ。

答、最後通牒ガ送達サレネバナリマセンデシタ。之
ハ正當防衛デアル以上不戰條約ニハ拘束サレマ
センデシタ。然シ我々ハ出來得ル限り外交上ノ
手續ニ從ヒ手落ナキヲ期スル様決定シマシタ。

X X X

「第五一六頁」

問、九月六日ノ御前會議ハドンナ目的デ召集サレ
タノデスカ。

答、ソレハ當時ノ情勢ニ鑑ミドンナ國策ヲ採ルベ
キカノ問題ヲ決定スル爲ニ召集サレマシタ。
私ノ記憶ニ依レバ、主要問題ハ戰爭カ平和カ、

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又ソノ何レカノ場合ニ於テドンナ態度ヲ執ルベキカトイフコトデアリマシタ。

問、コノ會議ニ於イテ米國トノ交渉ヲ繼續シ十月中旬迄ニ打開ヲ見ル概期待スルコトガ決定サレタノデアリマセンカ。

答、ハイ、勿論サウ思ツテ居リマス。然シ茲ニ資料ヲ持合セテ居リマセンノデ斷定的ナコトヲ申上ゲルコトハ困難デアリマス。

問、十月中旬迄ニ打開スルニ至ラナカツタナラバ米國ニ對シ戰爭ヲ開始スベキコトヲモ決定シタノデアリマセンカ。

答、十月中旬迄ニ打開スル様ニ計ルコトヲ定メマシタ。戰爭ノ爲ノ決定ハコノ會議デハナサレマセンデシタ。

問、昭和十六年十月十二日或ハソノ頃ノ近衛邸ニ於ケル會合ニハ誰ガ出席シマシタカ。

答、正確ニオ答ヘ出來彙マス。然シ陸軍大臣、海軍大臣、外務大臣ハ確ニ居リマシタ。企畫院總裁ガ出席シテ居ツタカドウカハツキリシマセン。然シ重立ツタ三人ノ出席者ハ今私ガ申上ゲタ三人デアリマシタ。

問、會合ノ目的ハ何デシタカ、又會合デハドンナ事ガ起リマシタカ。

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答、私ノ記憶スル所デハソノ會議ノ理由ハ次ノ通りデアツタト思ヒマス。先ヅ彼ノ十月中旬、即チ我々が囊ニソノ時迄ニ有利ナ外交上ノ打開ヲ齎ス様努力スルコトニ決定シテキタ時ガ既ニ到來シテ居リマシタ。

近衛公爵ト合衆國大統領ノ會見ニ關スル日本ノ申出ハ米國ニ依リ却下セラレテキタ。國際情勢ハ引續キ一層ノ緊張ヲ示シテ居リマシタ。コノ様ナ情況ニ於テ日本政府トシテハ之ニ對處スル政策ヲモツト決定的ニ決定スルコトガ必長デアリマシタ。コレガ近衛首相邸ニ於ケル會合ノ

根本ノ目的デアツタト信ジマス。ソノ會合ニ於テ貴方ト近衛公ト口詮シマセンテシタカ。

答、イ、エ、口詮デハアリマセンデシタ。唯意見ガ相異シタノデス。

問、如何ナル點デ意見ノ相異ガアリマシタカ。
答、私ノ意見ハ次ノ通りデシタ。即チ日本ハ十月中旬迄ニ外交的打開ニ達スル様努力ヲシテ議步ニ議步ヲ重ネテ來タ。然シ他方米國ハ自己ノ地位ヲ些カニテモ動カス事ヲ拒絕シ、何等ノ議步ヲ爲サナカッタ。政治的解決ノ到達ニ望ミヲ懸ケタ近衛總理大臣ト大統領ノ會見モ

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却下サレタ。ソコデ陸軍大臣トシテ私ノ意見
ハ最早外交的打開ノ望ミハ事實上殘サレテキ
ナイトイフノデアリ、ソコデ私ハ戦争ノ決定
ヲナスベキ時期ガ到來シタト云フノデアツタ。
コノ決定ヲ遅ラセバソレ丈、後ニナツテ戦争
ヲスルコトガ決定サレタ場合ニ日本ノ立場ハ
不利トナツタデアラウ。今ヤ、十月中旬ガ到
來シテ居マシタカラ私ハ斯ク考ヘタノデシタ。