

Part 11. 1. In my book "The Tragic History of Politics of Shows" I wrote as follows. (Page 13 and 14). I "showed" "At the earlier stage of the German-Soviet War, the German troops launched an incessant and irresistible attack and showed a distinguished valor in the field of battle which was worthy of a credit of being the most powerful army in West Europe. In fact it was enough to startle Japan and the whole world. An opinion was then overwhelmingly prevailing among the army circles that Japan should rise in arms at that juncture. The opinion advocated that the Soviet Union will collapse within four or six weeks and that it presented a golden opportunity to Japan to seize Siberia. The opinion further insisted that it was possible that German influence might reach the Far East across Russia, that if such should realize, it would be a cause of great alarm to Japan and that Japan should obtain in hands what she could obtain before such contingency took place. What a meanness, and what a baseness! One really feels to turn his face from this wretchedness. If Japan should resort to such means, Japan would not be able to show her cause of justice to the Soviet with whom she had just concluded a neutrality pact, to say nothing of Japan's infidelity to Germany with whom she was in alliance. This opinion was mainly advocated by the people of Alliance Group and German Section of army who, while being familiar with Germany, did not know much about the Soviet Union, and it was not the opinion of the Alliance Criticizing Group or of the people who were thoroughly acquainted with the Soviet.

(1)

More particularly, the generals of so-called KODO Group (Imperial Way) were in such state of mind that a war should not be waged without the cause of justice. That a war should not be fought unless it had sufficient cause of justice, and that the war itself was of such nature that it could be waged by the strength of her own, much less a war for mercenariness. That why did they not realize the fact that the Soviet-Japan neutrality pact had only recently been ratified by His Majesty."

(2)

This was very fair and just opinion. In fact I thanked Heaven and Earth that Japan was still sound because of this opinion. The above (1) were the contents of the story of Premier KONOE when he explained to me at the end of June, 1931, of the detailed internal conditions of the army circles. The next (2) was a correct description of what Lieutenant-General OBATA, Binshiro and Lieutenant-General YANAGAWA, Heisuke told me when I, as a journalist had the pleasure of visiting them, General OBATA on July 1st, 1931 at his house in SHIMOKITAZAWA (Tokyo) and General YANAGAWA on July 3rd, 1931 at his house in YOYOGI (Tokyo) As the opinions of the two Generals on that occasion were so perfectly identical that I surmised from it that the opinions might be the results of their previous talks with the so-called KODO (Imperial Way) Group Generals such as General ARAKI, General MASAKI and Lieutenant-

Part II. In my book "The Tragic History of Politics of Showa" I wrote as follows. (Page 13 and 14)

"At the earlier stage of the German-Soviet War, the German troops launched an incessant and distinguished irresistible attack and showed a distinguished valor in the field of battle which was worthy of a credit of being the most powerful army in West Europe. In fact it was enough to startle Japan and the whole world. An opinion was then overwhelmingly prevailing among the army circles that Japan should rise in arms at that juncture. The opinion advocated that the Soviet Union will collapse within four or six weeks and that it presented a golden opportunity to Japan to seize Siberia. The opinion further insisted that it was possible that German influence might reach the Far East across Russia, that it should realize, it would be a cause of great alarm to Japan and that Japan should obtain in hands what she could obtain before such contingence took place. What a mess, and what a mess! One really feels to turn his face from this wretchedness. If Japan should resort to such means, Japan would not be able to show her cause of justice to the Soviet Union whom she had just concluded a neutrality pact, to say nothing of Japan's infidelity to Germany with whom she was in alliance. This opinion was mainly advocated by the people of Alliance Group and German Section of army who, while being familiar with Germany, did not know much about the Soviet Union, and it was not the opinion of the Alliance Criticizing Group or of the people who were thoroughly acquainted with the Soviet.

More particularly, the generals of so-called KODO Group (Imperial Way) were in such state of mind that a war should not be waged without the cause of justice. That a war should not be fought unless it had sufficient cause of justice, and that the war itself was of such nature that it could be waged by the strength of her own, much less a war for mercenaryness. That why did they not realize the fact that the Soviet-Japan neutrality pact had only recently been ratified by His Majesty."

This was very fair and just opinion. In fact I thanked Heaven and Earth that Japan was still sound because of this opinion. The above (1) were the contents of the story of Premier KONO when he explained to me at the end of June, 1931, of the detailed internal conditions of the army circles.

The next (2) was a correct description of what Lieutenant-General OBATA, Bishiro and Lieutenant-General YANAGAWA, Heisuke told me when I, as a journalist had the pleasure of visiting them, General OBATA on July 1st, 1931 at his house in SHIMOKITAZAWA (Tokyo) and General YANAGAWA on July 3rd, 1931 at his house in YOYOJI (Tokyo). As the opinions of the two Generals on that occasion were so perfectly identical that I surmised from it that the opinions might be the results of their previous talks with the so-called KODO (Imperial Way) Group Generals such as General ARAKI, General MASAKI and Lieutenant-

General YAMAOKA, I asked them whether they had recently met the above three generals. They said they had gathered every now and then, and then they said with forced smile that the army authorities getting annoyingly censorious over their gatherings.

It meant, then, that the above was an agreed opinion and conclusion of those several generals. I thought this opinion would give an effective support to the efforts of many of the admirers of those generals, both in the War Office and the General Staff, who, while remaining in obscurity or otherwise camouflaging themselves, were zealously engaged in settlement of the China Incident and subsequently in successful conclusion of the America-Japan peace negotiation. That is why it drove me into a mood of thanking to the Heaven and Earth.

2. On page 33 of my above-mentioned book wherein the army purification movement was closely studied, there is also a description to the following effects:

"General UGAKI and General HOMMA were the members of this group, and the movement of NAKANO, AMANO and HATOYAMA, aiming at the downfall of TOJO, seemed to have maintained certain contact with this group.

In contrast to this, the group of generals such as MASAKI, ARAKI, YANAGAWA, and OBATA manifested a clear character of its own. They maintained an attitude of absolute opposition to both the incident and the great war. It was manifested in an attempt of General YANAGAWA prior to the fall of Nanking."

Above was a well known fact among those well-informed people who had made sincere efforts in the study of the undisclosed phase of the state of affairs, but personally, thanks to a relation that his father was a good friend of my father, I had an opportunity of obtaining the detailed informations from Prince KONOE, who had returned from the U.S.A. after attending the meeting of the Pacific Problems Research Council. My description was based on those informations.

After the withbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7th, 1937, Prince KONOE made a determination of preventing the expansion of this incident. Then the Prince had several contacts with various generals, exchanged views with ~~them~~ ~~in~~ ~~1941~~, strived to accomplish the America-Japan peace negotiation, and had contacts and cooperated with the negotiation. All of these will offer a ground on which truth of the above statement can be verified.

It was Prince KONOE who, while being the Premier of his First Cabinet, ordered to release General MASAKI, who had been kept in custody on a suspicion of having been concerned in the February 26 Incident. It was also the same Prince KONOE who told me of his heartfelt sympathy to Education Minister ARAKI when the latter vehemently objected from the point of view of international law as well as humanity to the bombing of several cities of China, and had a hot discussion with some cabinet members at the cabinet meeting.

During the period of his First Cabinet, Prince KONOE opined that the settlement of the China Incident was hinged upon domestic problems and that the key point of the domestic problems was in purification of the army.

Because of this consideration, he attempted to remove War Minister SUGIYAMA, to be succeeded by ITAGAKI and to appoint YANAGAWA the Chief of General Staff. His attempt along this line partly succeeded and partly failed, and because of it he had to resign from the Premiership.

In other words, those generals such as ARAKI, MASAKI, YANAGAWA and OBATA were politically the followers of KONOE, whereas they were intimate comrades in their opposition to the China Incident as well as in their attempt to avoid occurrence of a great war.

Such being the case, I had a good reason to believe that all those which Prince KONOE had told me about those generals, not only after his return from the U.S.A. but also since the time of his First Cabinet, were the truth, and so I collected them and put them in my description.

Part III.

During the period of ARAKI Education Minister, the CHUO KORONSHA published GENJI MONOGATARI, translated from classical into present day Japanese. To this some members of the right wing blamed that the publication was publication was an act of blaspheme since the book treated a love affair of the members of the Royal Families. They threatened the CHUO KORONSHA and made several suggestions to the Education Minister, but the Minister did not pay any attention to the suggestions. The movement of the right wing people on this problem was eagerly watched by the cultured people with a sense of much disgust. Personally I had some apprehensions over the attitude of the Education Minister, judging from his detestation of base ball, and worried for the sake of the president of the publishing company, Mr. SHIMANAKA, Yuze, who happened to be one of my personal friends.

I visited Lieutenant-General YANAGAWA who was an intimate friend of the Education Minister, and asked him what would be the attitude of the Minister toward the matter. Lieutenant-General YANAGAWA laughed and said,

"Even a Royal Member can have a love affair. It only shows that the reigning was successfully carried out, and it does not in any way spoil the dignity of the Royal Family. The matter concerns about literature, which is a production of the brilliant culture of the age, to be treasured by the people. The Education Minister has an opinion not to prohibit publication of such treasure, and so I do not think you need worry about it." Lieutenant-General YANAGAWA reiterated on this assertion.

On other occasion, there was a time when at the Department of Economics of the Tokyo Imperial University, a group of professors of Fascistic inclination launched an expulsion agitation against professors of socialistic tendency. The agitation so developed that several professors of left wing principle seemed to be on the point of being expelled from school. I had my friends among the group of professors, and partly because I was worried on their behalf, and partly because I thought the matter overshadowed the future of scholars, I again asked the opinion of Lieutenant-General YANAGAWA.

He said, "The Education Minister is of the opinion opinion that socialism is different in principle from communism in that the former makes it a principle of respecting democracy. The Minister prefers socialism rather than Fascism, which, like communism, purports to come into power and to set up its own dictatorial regime. Such being the case, the Minister has no intention of punishing these people. I think he is intending to settle the whole affair with the minimum sacrifice of punishing one person of each party, according to the principle of 'in a quarrel both parties are to blame'." By saying this the General hinted that he had already consulted the matter with the Education Minister and had reached a decision about it.

- 7 -

SASA, Hiroo

1. My name is SASA, Hiroo. I am living now at No. 219, 1-chome, Nozawa-machi, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo.

1. At present I am a member of the House of Councillors and I belong to the RYOKUFUKAI Party.

1. My relation with Mr. ARAKI, Sadao is such that we have never met each other by this time, except only once when at the occasion of a wedding ceremony of the daughter of my friend Mr. SHIMA, Ichiro, we were among the same company.

However, I feel it my duty as a critic and a historian to lay bare the truth about Mr. ARAKI

2

which I heard directly from Prince
KONOE, ^(Fumimaro) and other people, and also
the historical facts ^{which were} contained in the
Political Chapter of the Annual Report
of the Chuo Koron, ^{and} which were written
by me from December, 1933 and
published on the 1st of January, 1934.

" Due to my publication entitled
"Indigence of Politics" and scores of
other historical, commentarily, or
critical books ~~written by me~~ on
politics and on matters concerning
politics which I had written ~~by~~
~~me~~ with an object of criticizing
Fascism and thereby to restraint
the military clique, I was regarded
by the army circles to be an undesirous
scholar and a critic. But I can
say this that all the historical facts

in those books were written as they were, ^(and) my argument and criticism was based on those historical facts.

Never had I once resorted to ~~to~~ such despicable attitude of distorting the facts for the sake of using it as the means of attack.

Consequently, the Part I of my following statement contains the historical facts which I wrote on the afore-mentioned "Annual Report of the CHUO KORON", and Part II, the historical facts contained in my book "Tragic History of Political Affairs of SHOWA" and which had hitherto not been made public. In Part III, I shall relate ^{some} ~~one or two~~ social facts which I ^{had} learned in connection with Education Minister ARAKI's attitude toward one or two incidents

4

which took place in publishing world
and academic circles.

Part I. (1) In connection with the "Annual
Report of the CHUO KOROON."

In January, 1933, when the committee
meeting of the League of Nations on the
Manchurian Incident showed hopelessness
of coming to an agreement of a
compromising negotiation based on the
provisions of Paragraph 3, of Article 15
of the Regulations, revealing at the same
time a marked tendency that Japan
had to submit herself to moral accusation
as the result of preparation by the said
committee of a report with a recommendation,
based upon the provisions of Article 4 of
the same Regulation,

5

The views of War Minister ARAKI was as follow. I shall quote here an article on the January 31st issue of the Tokyo Asahi, which gave the following report.

" There is no need of immediate withdrawal "

— War Minister ARAKI talks Japan's attitude toward the League of Nations. —

(Former part omitted.) " Japan does not have to ^{immediately} withdraw from the league if a recommendation based ~~based~~ on ^{Paragraph} ~~Article~~ 4 of the Regulation were to be decided. ~~made~~. Japan has heaps of things that she has to talk to ^{the league.} ~~Japan~~. If the league acted in such a way that Japan could no longer stay with it, then she can

openly and squarely
walk out of ~~the~~ league. Until then,
Japan must do everything in her
power to enlighten the ~~it~~ ^{league.} This is
a policy of Japan which had been clearly
determined ^{since} before the departure of
Plenipotentiary MATSUOKA, ~~to~~ to whom
no instruction of tedious nature is
needed at this stage. All Japan has
to say to the league is that our policy
is one and consistent from the beginning,
and ^{leave} the rest ~~to be left~~ to the
skilled ^{activity} ~~care~~ of the diplomatic
people on the spot." (the rest omitted)

Needless to say that this remarks drew
attention of the people as being an
expressed views of the War Minister ~~to~~
^{in opposition to general}
~~oppose~~ the opinion that Japan should
immediately withdraw from the
league if ~~it~~ ^{the latter} decided to apply the

7

provisions of Paragraph 4 of the Regulation.

2. The Imperial Rescript after the withdrawal from the League was announced simultaneously with the dispatchment of the formal notification of withdrawal, a step which was not taken until our solicitation and other form of requests to the League were finally refused. My description in my book ^{concerning} ~~with~~ this Imperial Rescript ran as follows:-

Japan even after the withdrawal clarified the principle of "being consistent in her efforts of cooperating henceforth with all ^{the} intentions toward peace," and further ^(it is) declared in the Rescript that "although Japan would tread along the determined path, she has no ^{pre-}

intention of ^{ignoring} ~~neglecting~~ the ~~friendship~~
good will of friendly nations" from her
bias toward the Far East. This

Rescript is especially valuable in that
it made clear the foundation on
which to conduct the cooperative
diplomacy of SHOWA. (The quotation
in the above of the sentence of the
Imperial Rescript was taken from
the Extra Issue of the TOKYO NICHU NICHU
dated March 27th, 1933.) This Rescript
was granted after careful consultation
with the Army and taking into
consideration its intention. ~~War Minister~~
~~ARAKI~~ The Rescript ^{was} countersigned
by War Minister ARAKI.

3 After the withdrawal from the
League, an opinion ~~to~~ enhance
(that Japan should

the friendly relations among the neighboring nations was given rise among the diplomatic, business and military circles. The view of military and diplomatic authorities that "Japan is ready to go into a military alliance with China if only China ^{awakens to the situation} ~~realizes her part~~ mistake," was reported. (OSAKA MAINICHI, June 24). Japan's policy of concluding an American-Japanese Arbitration Treaty or a Mediation Treaty was reported. (YOMIURI, December 4). The Soviet-Japanese relation at that time was just as my description in my book, which was as follow:- "Diplomatic relation between the Soviet and Japan appeared as if approaching the xxx, but on the other hand, a suggestion for an economic concert between the

Two countries is also gaining ground throughout the diplomatic, business as well as ^{the} military circles. War Minister ARAKI in his advocacy for a Far Eastern Peace Conference referred to non-aggression between the Soviet and Japan. This could be taken as ~~so~~ representing ^{the} attitude of the military authorities. (CHUO KORON Annual Report, Page 176)

All of these reports underlay the diplomatic policy of Japan's so-called "Friendly Relations with the Good Neighborly Nations" (at the earlier ^(TOKYO ASAHI, September 17) stage of HIROTA's Foreign Ministership.

The diplomatic policy at that time was inclined to lay stress upon ~~control~~ ^{suppression} of general commotion after the withdrawal and, thereby, ^{upon} ~~an~~ (mitigation of ^{an} anti-Japanese sentiment). However, (among powers.)

11

even if the policy contained in it
~~the~~ ^{such} motive as ~~I~~ ^{this} described in the above,
the expression of the principle of a
peaceful diplomacy on the part of the
army and diplomatic authorities gave
a sense of relief to the general
populace who welcomed it. Their
sense of relief was further intensified
when a formal announcement was
made as to the result of the Five
Minister Conference of the SAITO
Cabinet, in which Ministers SAITO,
TAKAHASHI, ARAKI, OSUMI and HIROTA
decided to "base the diplomacy upon
the spirit of international harmony,
and to devise the means to promote
the friendly relations among such
neighborly ~~nations~~ ^{countries} as China, the U.S.A.
and Russia in particular" (TOKYO ASAHI,
October 21)

The War Minister ARAKI's suggestion of a Far Eastern Peace Conference (as reported by all the leading newspapers) was made in FUKUI City and it was regarded an expression of War Minister's personal belief rather than a formal announcement of the army authorities. This suggestion purported to hold a conference among powers ^(to debate) upon Manchurian problems as the leading ^{issue} ~~figure~~ and upon other Far Eastern problems which had bearing upon international peace, and to settle all of ^{those matters} ~~them~~ (once for all. (Page 182 of the Annual Report). The Foreign Office declined to agree this suggestion on the ground that it was impracticable and that it was an act denouncing the Asia Monroe

Doctrine. The ^{reaction} ~~reflection~~ of the
 foreign countries to this suggestion
 was almost imperceptible, and
 as a whole, the suggestion did
 not bring about any material
 result. Only ^{I considered that} it serves to depict
 the views of ~~the~~ War Minister ARAKI.

Part II.

1. In my book "The Tragic History of Politics of Showa" I wrote as follow. (Page 13 and 14)

" At the earlier stage of the German-Soviet War, the German troops launched an incessant and irresistible attack and showed a distinguished valor in the field of battle which was worthy of a credit of being the most powerful army in West Europe. In fact it was enough to startle Japan and the whole world. An opinion ^(overwhelmingly) was then prevailing among the army circles that Japan should rise in arms at that juncture. The opinion advocated that the Soviet Union will collapse within

four or six weeks and that it presented a golden opportunity to Japan to seize Siberia. The opinion further insisted that it was ~~probable~~ possible that German influence might reach the Far East ^{across} ~~through~~ Russia, that if such ^{realize,} ~~take place,~~ it would be a cause of great alarm to Japan and that Japan should obtain in hands what she ^{could} ~~can~~ obtain before such contingency took place.

(1.) What a meanness, and what a baseness! One really feels to turn his face from this wretchedness. If Japan should resort to such means, Japan would not be able to show her cause of justice to the Soviet with whom she had ~~only~~

just concluded a neutrality pact, to say nothing of Japan's infidelity to Germany with whom she was in alliance.

~~This opinion was advocated mainly by those who were familiar with Germany and who~~

This opinion was mainly advocated by the people of Alliance Group and German Section of the army who, while being familiar with Germany, did not know ^{much about} the Soviet Union, and it was not the opinion ~~of those~~ ~~the people~~ of ^{the} Alliance Criticizing Group or of the people who were thoroughly acquainted with the Soviet.

More particularly, the generals of so-called KODO Group (Imperial ^{Army})

were in such state of mind that a war should not be waged without the cause of justice. That a war should not be fought unless it had sufficient cause of justice, and ^{that} the war itself was of such nature that it could be waged by the strength of her own, much less ~~the~~^a war for mercenariness. That why did they not realize ^(the fact) that the Soviet-Japan neutrality pact had only recently been ratified by His Majesty."

(2) This was very fair and just opinion. In fact I thanked Heaven and Earth that Japan was still sound because of this opinion.

The above (1) were the contents

of the story of Premier KONOE when he ^{explained to} ~~told~~ me at the end of June, 1931, of the detailed internal conditions of the army circles.

The next (2)

was a correct description of what Lieutenant-General OBATA, Binshiro and Lieutenant-General YANAGAWA, Heisuke ^{told me} (When I had the ^(as a journalist) pleasure of visiting them, ~~at their private residences~~, General OBATA on July 1st, 1931 at his house in SHIMO KITAZAWA (Tokyo) and General YANAGAWA on July 3rd, 1931 at his house in YOYOGI (Tokyo)

As the opinions of the two Generals on that occasion were so perfectly identical that I surmised ^{from it} (that the opinions might be the results of

their previous talks with the so-called
 KODO (Imperial Way) Group Generals such
 as General ARAKI, General MASAKI
 and Lieutenant-General YAMAOKA,
~~and~~ I asked them whether they had
 recently met the above three generals. ~~on~~
~~this subject.~~ They said they had
 gathered every now and then, ~~and~~
~~and~~ (they said with "forced smile" ^{(that} the army
 and then) authorities ^{(getting annoyingly} were censorious over
 their gatherings.

It meant, then, that the above was
 an agreed opinion and conclusion
 of those several generals. I thought
 this opinion would give an effective
 support to the efforts of many of the
 admirers of those generals, both in the
 War Office and the General Staff,
 who, while remaining in obscurity

or otherwise camouflaging themselves, ^(zealously) were engaged in settlement of the China Incident and subsequently in successful conclusion of the America-Japan peace negotiation. That is why it ^{drove} ~~made~~ me into a mood of thanking to the Heaven and Earth.

2. On page 33 of my above-mentioned book wherein the army purification movement was closely studied, there is ^(also) a description to the following effects:

" General UGAKI and General HOMMA were the members of this group, and the movement of NAKANO, AMANO and HATAYAMA, aiming at the downfall of TOJO, ^(seemed to have) maintained certain ~~connection~~ with this group.
contact

In contrast to this, the group of generals such as MASAKI, ARAKI, YANAGAWA, ^{and} OBATA manifested a clear character of its own. They maintained an attitude of absolute opposition to both the incident and the great war. It was manifested in an attempt of General YANAGAWA prior to the fall of Nanking."

Above was a well known fact among those well-informed people who had made sincere efforts in the study of ^{the} undisclosed phase of the state of affairs, but personally, ~~I had an opportunity of obtaining a detailed information of this from Prince KONOE,~~ thanks to a relation that his father was a good friend of

my father, I had an opportunity of obtaining ~~those~~ ^{the} detailed informations from Prince KONOE, who had returned from the U.S.A. after attending the meeting of the Pacific Problems Research Council. My ~~de-art~~ description was based on those informations.

After the outbreak of the Marco Polo ^{Bridge} Incident ~~at~~ July 7th, 1937, Prince KONOE ^{made} ~~had~~ a determination of preventing the expansion of this incident. Then the Prince had several contacts with various generals, exchanged views with them, and in 1941, strived ^{to} accomplish the America-Japan peace negotiation, ^(and) had contacts ~~with~~ and cooperated with ^{the} ~~the~~ negotiation. All of these will offer a ground on which truth of the above statement can be ~~shown~~ verified.

It was Prince KONOE who, while ~~he~~
~~was~~ ^{being} the Premier of his First Cabinet, ~~ordered~~
 ordered to release General MASAKI, who
 had ~~be~~ ^{been} kept in custody on a ~~of~~ suspicion
 of having been concerned in the
 February 26 Incident. It was also
 the same Prince KONOE who told me
 of his heartfelt sympathy to Education
 Minister ARAKI when the latter vehemently
 objected from ^{(the point of view of} international law as well
 as ~~from~~ humanity to the bombing of
 several cities of China, and had a
 hot discussion with some cabinet
 members at the cabinet meeting.

During the period of his First
 Cabinet, Prince KONOE opined that
 the settlement of the China Incident
 was hinged upon domestic problems
 and that the key ~~power power~~

point of ~~his settlement~~ the domestic problems was in purification of the army. Because of this consideration, he attempted to remove War Minister SUGIYAMA, to be succeeded by ITAGAKI, and to appoint YANAGAWA ~~to~~ the Chief of General Staff. His attempt ~~was~~ ^{of this} along this line ~~partly fulfilled and~~ partly succeeded and partly failed, and because of it he had to resign from the Premiership.

In other words, those generals such as ARAKI, MASAKI, YANAGAWA and OBATA were politically ^{the followers} of ~~the~~ KONOE, ~~faction, and~~ ~~they were~~ whereas they were ^{intimate} comrades in their opposition to the China Incident ~~and~~ as well as in their attempt to avoid occurrence of a great war.

Such being the case, I had a good reason to believe that all those ^(about those generals) which Prince KONOE had told me, not only after his return from the U.S.A. but also since the time of his First Cabinet, ~~about those generals~~ were the truth, and so I ~~put them together~~ collected them and put them in my description.

Part III.

During the period of ARAKI Education Minister, the CHUO KORONSHA published GENJI MONOGATARI, & translated from classical into present day Japanese. Some ~~people~~ members of the right wing blamed that the publication was an act of blasphemy since the book contained a love affair of ^{the members of the} royal families. They ~~to~~ threatened the

CHUO KORONSHA and made several suggestions to the Education Minister, but the Minister did not pay any attention to the suggestions. ~~The~~ ~~movement~~ ~~It~~ The movement of the right wing people was being watched by the cultured ~~class~~ of people with a sense of disgust. Personally I had some apprehensions over the attitude of the Education Minister, judging from his detestation of base ball, and worried for the sake of the president of ~~the~~ the publishing ~~co~~ company, Mr. SHIMANAKA, Yuzo, who happened to be my personal friend.

I ^{visited} ~~asked~~ Lieutenant-General YANAGAWA who was an intimate friend of the Education Minister, and asked him what would be the attitude of the ~~latter~~ Minister ~~over~~ toward the matter. Lieutenant-General YANAGAWA only laughed and said, "Even a Royal Member can have love affairs. It only shows ~~that~~ that the reigning was successfully carried out, and it does not in any way spoil the dignity of the Royal Family. The matter concerns about literature, which is a production of the brilliant culture of the age, to be treasured by the people. The Education Minister has an opinion not to prohibit publication of such

treasure, and ^{so} I don't think you need worry about it."

Lieutenant-General YANAGAWA reiterated on this assurance.

On other occasion, there was a time when at the Department of Economics of the Tokyo Imperial University, a group of professors of Fascistic inclination started ~~an~~ an expulsion agitation against the professors of socialistic tendency, ~~and the~~ The agitation so developed that several professors of left wing principle seemed to be on the point of being expelled ~~out of~~ ^{from} school. I also had my friends among those professors, and partly because I was worried ~~for~~ on the behalf of them, and partly because I thought the matter

overshadowed the future of the scholars; I again ~~asked asked~~ asked the opinion of Lieutenant-General YANAGAWA.

He said, "The Education Minister ~~is~~ ^{is} of the opinion that socialism is different in principle from communism in that ^{the former} makes it a principle of respecting democracy. ~~It can be said~~ ~~The Minister~~ ~~prefers~~ The Minister prefers socialism rather than Fascism, which, like communism, ~~do~~ purports to come into power and to set up its own dictatorial regime. Such being the case, the Minister has no intention of ~~punish~~ punishing those people. I think he is intending to settle the whole affair ~~by~~ with the

minimum sacrifice of punishing one person of each party, according to the principle of 'in a quarrel both parties are to blame!' By saying this the General hinted that he had already consulted the matter with the Education Minister and had ~~decided~~ reached ~~some~~ a decision about it.