

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

RESTRICTED
(Reclassify when filled out)

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(OMIT THIS SHEET IF NO ATTACK WAS MADE)

REPORT No. ACA-1-45

XI. ATTACK ON ENEMY SHIPS OR GROUND OBJECTIVES (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

- (a) Target(s) and Location(s) NAGOYA Area (b) Time Over Target(s) 0830(I) (Zone)
(FOR SHIPS INCLUDE ALL IN AREA UNDER ATTACK)
- (c) Clouds Over Target 2,000 feet Low Stratus 10/10
(BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)
- (d) Visibility of Target Partially obscured by clouds and haze. (e) Visibility 7
(CLEAR, HAZY, PARTIALLY OBSCURED BY CLOUDS, ETC.) (MILES)
- (f) Bombing Tactics: Type Glide Bomb Sight Used Mk.8 Illuminated gunsight.
(LEVEL, GLIDE OR DIVE) (TYPE)
- Bombs Dropped per Run 2 Spacing 1/2 sec. Altitude of Bomb Release 1,500
(NUMBER) (FEET) (FEET)
- (g) Number of Enemy Aircraft Hit on Ground: Destroyed 0 Probably Destroyed 0 Damaged 0

(h) AIMING POINT	(i) DIMENSIONS OR TONNAGE	(j) NO A/C ATTACKING (k) SQUADRON	(l) BOMBS AND AMMUNITION EXPENDED, EACH AIMING POINT	(m) NO HITS On Aiming Point	(n) DAMAGE (None, slight, serious, destroyed or sunk)
Factory at Arai	300' X 400'	6 VF-49	12-500# GP	3	At least Heavy damage to factory & storage area.
2					
3 Bridge across Hamani Ko center of spans.	400' length	1 VF-49	2-500# GP	1	One span believed destroyed.
4 Radio/radar station Kami-Jima		1 VF-49	2-500# GP		Unobserved.
5					
6	Two rockets were fired at the factory (h-1); 6 rockets at bridges (h-2) Four at Tenryu airfield, hangar area; and four rockets at the trains east of Hamana-Ko				
7					
8					

(o) RESULTS: (For all hits claimed on ship targets and for land targets of special interest, draw diagram, top or side view or both, as appropriate, showing type and location of hits. For all targets give location and effect of hits, and identify by numbers above. Use additional sheets if necessary).

(p) Were Photographs Taken? Yes Photographs of Damage, When Taken, Should Be Attached By Staple.

S-E-C-R-E-T

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XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY

OWN AIRCRAFT

Disposition
Altitudes
Speeds
Approach Tactics
Use of Cover, Deception
Angles of Attack and
Their Effectiveness
Distance of Opening Fire
Defense Tactics and
Their Effectiveness

ENEMY AIRCRAFT

Method of Locating, Distance
Disposition
Altitudes
Speeds
Approach Tactics
Use of Cover, Deception
Angles of Attack
Distance of Opening Fire
Defensive Tactics

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Own Weaknesses
Enemy Weaknesses
Offensive Tactics, Own
" " " Enemy
Defensive Tactics, Own
" " " Enemy
Flexible Gunnery, Own
Escort Tactics
Fighter Direction
Use of Radar
Night Fighting
Recognition, Aircraft

ATTACK

OWN TACTICS

Method of Locating Target
Approach to Target
Altitudes, Speeds
Approach
Dive
Pull-Out
Dive Angle
Strafing
Retirement
Defensive Tactics
Use of Jamming

DEFENSE, ENEMY

Evasive Tactics, Ships
Concealment
Searchlights
Night Fighter Tactics
Use of Jamming

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Bombing Tactics
Torpedo Tactics
Effectiveness of
Bombs, Torpedoes
Selection of Targets
Fuzing
Strafing Tactics
Defensive Tactics
Use of Radar
Reconnaissance
Photography
Briefing

OPERATIONAL

Navigation
Homing
Rendezvous
Recognition, Ships
Communications
Flight Operations
Search and Tracking
Base Operations
Maintenance

Twelve Hellcats of Fighter Squadron FORTY-NINE left the USS SAN JACINTO at 0536(I) 25 July 1945, on a sweep against airfields in the Nagoya area. The flight set a course which led them east of Ise-Wan and the city of Nagoya to a point about 50 miles north of the principal assigned target, Nagoya East airfield. A heavy overcast completely covered the entire area from the coast inland, and extended from the ground to an altitude of at least 8,000 feet. For this reason, the flight was forced to return to the coast where there was a narrow area of good visibility along the shoreline. An easterly course was followed to a point just beyond Tenryu airfield, and a rocket and strafing attack was made on the installations on that field. One large building in the area adjoining the field was set on fire by a direct rocket hit made by Ensign C. Smolsky. The buildings and hangars had apparently been very heavily hit on previous raids and it was decided that a second attack would not be worth while. No operational aircraft were seen on or near the field, and the installations were a shambles. Just west of Tenryu a railway station and two railway traing were set on fire from a rocket and strafing attack, by division Three. This division was led by Lt. Neil A. MacKinnon. Two parallel bridges across Hamana Ko were also rocketed and bombed and hits were seen which probably destroyed the span. The entire sweep bombed and rocketed a factory and storage area at Arai, which is just west of Hamano Ko. At least three direct bomb and many rocket hits were seen. A number of violent explosions were observed and the entire factory was sheathed in fire and a thick oil-like smoke. The main factory building and storage area were very badly damaged if not destroyed. All installations were heavily strafed during the attack. On retirement a radio-radar station on Kami-Jima, a small island at the entrance to Ise-Wan, was bombed but results were not observed. The only flak encountered on the mission was in the attack on the factory at Arai. This target was attacked at an extremely low altitude which was made necessary by the overcast and the flight was brought under fire by a medium automatic battery. Firing from this battery, while moderate in intensity, was very accurate and three of our aircraft were seriously damaged. Ens. W.R. Doggett's plane was heavily hit on the port side of the engine cowling and a major oil leak was caused. Ensign Doggett made an attempt to bring his plane back to base, but was finally forced to ditch at the lifeguard submarine where he was immediately picked up. Ensign W.A. Yancy also sustained a bad hit in the port wing root of his plane, and the hydraulic system was made inoperative. In addition his engine developed an oil leak and he had to ditch at the destroyer screen where he was taken aboard a DD. Ensign J. A. Shealy's plane also was hit and the port elevator almost completely destroyed. Despite this crippling damage, Ensign Shealy was able to bring his plane aboard his ship. No one on the mission was injured including the pilots whose planes were hit by flak. The mission was completed at 1016(I).

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XIII. MATERIAL DATA. (Comment freely on performance or suitability, following check list at left.
Use additional sheets if necessary).

ARMAMENT

Guns, Gunsights
Turrets
Ammunition
Bombs, Torpedoes
Bomb Sights
Bomb Releases

COMMUNICATIONS

Radio, Radar
Homing Devices
Visual Signals
Codes, Ciphers

RECOGNITION

IFF
Signals
Battle Lights
Procedures

PROTECTION

Aarmor; Points and Angles
of Fire Needing Further
Protection
Leak Proofing

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Parachutes
Life Belts, Life Rafts
Safety Belts
Emergency Kits
Rations, First Aid

NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT

Compasses
Driftsights
Octants
Automatic Pilots
Charts
Field Lighting

INSTRUMENTS

Flight
Power Plant

OXYGEN SYSTEM

**CAMOUFLAGE AND
DECEPTION DEVICES**

STRUCTURE

Airframe
Control Surfaces
Control System
Dive Flaps
Landing Gear
Heating System
Flight Characteristics
At Various Loadings

POWER PLANT

Engines
Engine Accessories
Propellers
Lubricating System
Starters
Exhaust Dampers

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

Auxiliary Plant
Lights

FUEL SYSTEM

FLIGHT CLOTHING

MAINTENANCE

BASE FACILITIES

Plane Servicing Equipment
Personnel Facilities

Two rockets could not be discharged, otherwise all equipment performed normally.

REPORT PREPARED BY:

APPROVED BY:

R. A. SMYTHE, Lieut., USNR

SIGNATURE
A. C. I. Officer

RANK AND DUTY

G. M. ROUZEE, Lieut. Comdr., USN

SIGNATURE
Commanding Officer, VF-49

RANK AND DUTY

25 July 1945

DATE