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**NAVAL  
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**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

**THESIS**

**ROMANIAN SPECIAL FORCES: IDENTIFYING  
APPROPRIATE MISSIONS AND ORGANIZATIONAL  
STRUCTURE**

by

Dan Cucu

December 2004

Thesis Advisor:  
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Hy Rothstein  
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**ROMANIAN SPECIAL FORCES: IDENTIFYING APPROPRIATE MISSIONS  
AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

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## **ABSTRACT**

Trying to adapt to the post-9/11 challenges to Euro-Atlantic security, the Romanian Ministry of National Defense continues its efforts to modernize and professionalize the country's armed forces in accordance with NATO standards. Part of this process is the development of a Special Forces (SF) capability that is to accomplish initial operational readiness by FY 2005. With appropriate organizational arrangements and focused combat training the Romanian SF will increase their performance during future deployments in joint and combined settings.

This project analyzes Romania's strategic documents, identifies the missions that can be conducted by the country's General-Purpose Forces or other security services, and finally proposes five appropriate tasks for the SF: Combating Terrorism, Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Special Reconnaissance, Direct Action, and Security Detail for Romanian officials in crisis zones.

In exploring what are the most effective structural arrangements for the Romanian Special Forces, this thesis uses a design program the recommendations of which lead to the proposal of a new organizational structure. Thus, it is determined that Romania's Special Forces elements should develop into a flexible, highly-mobile and joint organization displaying a flat hierarchy and centralized command and control.



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This thesis is dedicated to the memory of Sergeant Majors Silviu Fogorasi and Mihail Samuila who were the first two Romanian *Black Wolves* lost in the war on terror in Afghanistan.

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## **I. INTRODUCTION**

### **A. BACKGROUND**

On December 18, 2001, Romania's Parliament approved the new National Security Strategy. It is a fundamental, official work that re-emphasized the importance of strengthening the country's existing democratic institutions and the desire to integrate into NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) structures as a full member, with all the attendant rights and obligations. As a proof of the Romanian leaders' commitment to provide immediate security benefits to NATO, and despite the difficulties inherent in the necessary economic transition and the reform of the Armed Forces, in 2003, approximately 2,000 military personnel were deployed, mainly in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

Today Romania is a NATO member, and it continues its efforts to fully modernize and professionalize the country's military. The new Defense White Paper of the Government ensures stable budgetary support for the Ministry of Defense, while the military leaders explore options for the Romanian Armed Forces to improve their contribution to the Euro-Atlantic security. In doing so, in 2003, the military decision makers also tried to establish the foundations of a Romanian Special Forces (ROSF) capability. Central to that new organization was the 1<sup>st</sup> Romanian Special Forces Battalion, which was expected to become a strategic-level instrument destined to address key challenges posed by the post-9/11 security environment.

### **B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE**

Taking into consideration that by FY 2007 the entire SF Battalion and the other elements belonging to ROSF are to be operationally ready, the purpose of this project is to explore the proper missions and organizational structure for ROSF. In general, due to their intrinsic nature, Special Forces can provide the National Command Authority strategic utility in terms of economy of force and expansion of options. At the same time, however, failed special operations may lead to a loss of international prestige and affect the country's morale. Because ROSF is a young defense organization that is still developing its own identity, determining appropriate tasks and structural arrangements constitute the first two steps required to pave the way toward future successes.

*Appropriate tasks* for ROSF refer to those missions that are adapted to Romania's security imperatives, which cannot be successfully addressed by the country's General Purpose Forces (GPF) or other agencies, and abiding by the principles that make Special Forces *special*. Given these conditions, the method presented in this thesis shows that ROSF should focus their training solely on Combating Terrorism (CBT), Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Special Reconnaissance (SR), Direct Action (DA), and Security Detail for Romanian officials who may visit combat or crisis zones.

Carrying out such complex missions, in addition to conceptual and financial adjustments, which are not covered in this thesis, requires important organizational changes. The conclusions that come out of this project indicate that ROSF should develop into a centralized and joint SF service, with a flat hierarchy and organic aviation assets. By adopting this flexible organizational configuration and acquiring proficiency in the fields related to its missions, ROSF will be able to conduct special operations, both independently inside Romania and, during deployments, with Allied forces in combined scenarios.

### **C. METHODOLOGY**

John Collins' framework significantly assisted in reaching the conclusions concerning assignment of ROSF's tasks. He was a paratroop colonel who served with Special Operations Task Force Europe, authored numerous books and studies on defense-related issues, and acted as an informal consultant to top decision makers within the U.S. Congress and Department of Defense. By adopting and applying his method, ROSF's tasks have been associated with Romania's strategic documents, and they have been separated from tasks applicable to conventional forces or other functions security services can or should conduct

From the literature pertaining to organizational theory, Rich Burton and Borge Öbel's work that attempts to synthesize decades of research in the field of designing effective organizations has been examined. The scholars have implemented a related software application, *Organizational Consultant*, which is a design program that assesses an organization's health and provides recommendations for its improvement. Using this software, a diagnosis of ROSF's organizational characteristics has been conducted and

presented in this thesis with several accompanying recommendations concerning the organization's structural arrangements.

Finally, based on the application of the authors' theoretical approach, and strongly supported by the results of a short analysis of two case studies, a proposed configuration for ROSF has been reached. Indeed, looking at the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and the British Special Forces Group – two well-oiled military organizations with attributions in the CBT area – it is shown that the theoretical prescriptions dealing with ROSF's proposed configuration are congruent with the structural changes recorded in the two Allied organizations' pasts.

#### **D. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY**

Chapter II begins by underscoring some similarities between the current Romanian Special Operations Doctrine and the U.S. doctrine in the field of special operations. Each U.S. doctrinal mission is briefly examined and associated with higher defense policy goals. Emulating the U.S. Special Operations community's approach, Christopher Lamb's modified framework is presented at the end of the chapter, which will be invaluable in assisting ROSF in identifying missions that will invariably support the country's defense policy.

Chapter III applies Lamb's method to the Romanian Special Forces case. The section presents, in detail, the Euro-Atlantic security environment to which Romania is intimately associated, examines the country's National Security Strategy and Defense White Paper, and finally discusses and decides on the sharing of strategic missions among General Purpose Forces or other security agencies, and the Special Forces.

Approaching the issue from two different directions, Chapter IV reaches the same conclusions regarding the most appropriate structural arrangement for ROSF. Organizational theory concepts are exploited, with the assistance of software included in the Organizational Consultant design program, and the resultant findings are presented and are shown to be reinforced by the lessons learned from the JSOC and the British Special Forces' organizational practice.

The concluding chapter summarizes the questions raised in this project and the proposed solutions, discusses their implications in leading ROSF's organizational transformation, and details the larger significance of this project.

#### **E. LIMITATIONS**

The analysis conducted with the assistance of the Organizational Consultant software focused solely on ROSF's organizational structure, and did not consider recommendations pertaining to climate, management style, and technology. The Annex comprises the program's full Report Summary, and provides a basis for future research.

Although the configuration of ROSF has represented the second priority of this thesis, only a few points have been made regarding the appropriate structure at the bottom of the hierarchy. For example, the debate continues over whether the 1<sup>st</sup> Romanian SF Battalion should adopt a 12-man U.S. SF Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) configuration. While this ODA structure fits the U.S. Army SF core task – Unconventional Warfare – the Romanian SF Battalion might consider emulating the U.S. Delta Force or SEAL configuration, or the British Special Air Service or Special Boat Service configuration, who all focus more on CBT, SR, or DA missions, and tend to use fighting patrols with less than 12 members.

## II. THE QUESTION OF SOF TASKING

Daft (2003) provides the definition used in this thesis to describe organizations: “organizations are (1) social entities that (2) are goal directed, (3) are designed as deliberately structured and coordinated activity systems, and (4) are linked to the external environment.” (p. 4) In this chapter we will focus on the second element of the definition because, as Burton & Öbel (1998) point out, the first step in organizational design is to establish the organization’s goals and missions (p.13).

Again, since the ultimate purpose of this work is to propose a credible new design for the Romanian SF (ROSF) structure, any effort in this direction should start by addressing the question of tasking. Thus, the core concern in this section is *How can one determine what should be the missions for ROSF?* A brief analysis of ROSF and U.S. SOF missions uncovers obvious similarities. The choices that the U.S. SOF has made in terms of roles and functions mirror the organization’s efforts to support U.S. defense policy goals. They result from more than fifty years of complex organizational history (Garrison, 1995, p. 17).

By contrast, ROSF was established in 2003, and its tasks have not been yet methodically adapted to the country’s new NATO-member status. The aspiration to correlate Romania’s newly gained position and ROSF’s tasks has eventually led us to adopt Christopher Lamb’s perspective on appropriate SOF tasking.

After comparing the two countries’ approaches to the SOF field with an emphasis on clarifying some SOF-related jargon, we briefly provide details about all U.S. SOF doctrinal missions, and attempt to appreciate their complexity. Finally, we introduce Lamb’s model that seeks to ensure that ROSF appropriate tasks will support the country’s defense policy goals.

### A. A COMPARISON BETWEEN ROMANIAN AND U.S. SOF TASKS

In February 2002, Romanian military leaders decided to develop a Special Forces Capability as part of the country’s military transformation and NATO integration processes. The Allies in NATO welcomed the decision since the need for more SF units in the Alliance already had been acknowledged, and specialized elite elements from many countries already had proven their utility in the Global War on Terror (GWT).



During the last two years, a number of U.S. military officials have assisted in the foundation of the new Romanian Special Forces Battalion, which has been facilitated by offering school slots for the Special Forces Qualification Course and at the Ranger Course in the U.S. They also provided a number of reference materials and documents in order to help the future SF unit prepare and train in accordance with U.S. military doctrine. The result, in April 2003, was the creation of Romania's 1<sup>st</sup> Special Forces Battalion, which mirrors the current organizational structure of a U.S. SF Battalion and, by doctrine, is assigned the same basic missions as American SOF.

According to the Romanian *Special Operations Doctrine* (2003), “*special operations* are small scale decisive actions, covert or clandestine, involving high risk and/or an unconventional nature<sup>1</sup>, conducted by a specialized component of the Armed Forces – *the Special Forces* – inside or outside the country, during peacetime, crises, or war, in order to defend Romania's fundamental interests.” (p. 7).

Special Forces include a command structure subordinated to the Chief of General Staff; a land component comprising the 1<sup>st</sup> SF Battalion and disparate elements such as reconnaissance, paratroopers, infantry, mountain troops, NBC, engineers, communications, psychological operations, and logistical support; a supporting air component with fighters, bombers, rotary-wing assets, and transportation aircraft; and a supporting naval component that includes SEAL-type elements, and transportation boats (p. 12).

As shown in Table 1, by doctrine, ROSF is expected to carry out tasks that are nearly identical to those assigned to the U.S. SOF. Indeed, the Romanian doctrinal document reveals all nine U.S. SOF core tasks except Civil Affairs Operations, which in Romania is considered a conventional mission<sup>2</sup> (Paul, 2004). The order in which the principal missions are mentioned markedly differs, reflecting differences in perceptions regarding mission priority. Also worth considering is the broader approach to terrorism

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<sup>1</sup> Doctrinally, *unconventional* operations include: organize, train, equip, support, and direct indigenous forces or ad hoc elements in order to conduct guerilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence collection, or escape and evasion.

<sup>2</sup> In Romania, as within NATO military structures, civil affairs (CA) or civil-military cooperation elements belong to the General Purpose Forces. Moreover, in Romania, CA assets have a coordinating body subordinated to J5, and create their own doctrine separate from the special operations community.

on the Romanian side, since Combating Terrorism (CBT) includes both CT (offensive countermeasures) and antiterrorism (AT) (passive protection).

Finally, it is difficult not to observe the similarities regarding collateral tasks (still *missions* on the Romanian side versus *tasks* or *activities* for U.S. SOF), where there is almost perfect mirroring, with the only additional collateral mission being Strategic Objectives Security (SOS) for the Romanian SF.

Table 1. Romanian SF and American SOF missions  
(After Romanian SO Doctrine)

<b>Romanian Special Forces</b>	<b>American Special Operations Forces</b>
<b>Principal missions</b>	<b>Core tasks</b>
1. Special Reconnaissance (SR)	1. Counterterrorism (CT)
2. Direct Action (DA)	2. Counterproliferation of WMD
3. Foreign Internal Defense (FID)	3. Special Reconnaissance
4. Unconventional Warfare (UW)	4. Direct Action
5. Combating Terrorism (CBT)	5. Unconventional Warfare
6. Psychological Operations (PSYOP)	6. Information Operations
7. Counterproliferation (CP) of WMD	7. Psychological Operations
8. Information Operations (IO)	8. Foreign Internal Defense
	9. Civil Affairs Operations (CAO)
<b>Collateral Missions</b>	<b>Collateral Activities</b>
1. Coalition Support	1. Coalition Support
2. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)	2. Combat Search and Rescue
3. Counterdrug (CD) Activities	3. Counterdrug Activities
4. Countermine (CM) Activities	4. Countermine Activities
5. Humanitarian Assistance (HA)	5. Humanitarian Assistance
6. Security Assistance	6. Security Assistance
7. Special Activities	7. Special Activities
8. Strategic Objectives Security	

A deeper look at the Romanian SO doctrine would reveal that the Romanian SF community comprises an ad hoc mix of elements belonging to each service which do not all exemplify the definition and characteristics of Special Forces mentioned in the guiding reference manuals offered by the U.S. Allies.

It also appears that there is no distinction between Special Forces and Special Operations Forces, which indicates that the U.S. doctrinal works have not been completely understood.

## **B. U.S. SOF ESTABLISHMENT**

United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is a defense organization with a \$7 billion budget (“SOF Posture”, 2003, p. 89), approximately 49,000 personnel (pp. 90-91), and over 4,900 SOF operators deployed around the world in any given week (p. 39).

The SOF community is a very diverse joint team comprising active duty officers and enlisted personnel (over 31,000), National Guard operators (over 3,700), personnel from the Reserve (more than 11,000), and civilians (over 3,300) (p. 91). These SOF operators and civilians are managed by the USSOCOM that has two main missions: (1) to plan and execute special operations using assets from subordinate SOF organizations (i.e., Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, Special Forces Command, the 75<sup>th</sup> Ranger Regiment, the 160<sup>th</sup> Special Operations Aviation Regiment, or Special Operations Support Command); and (2) to organize, train, and equip SOF provided to six Geographic Combatant Commanders (Pacific, Central, Europe, South, North, and Korea).

For concerns of clarity, it might be useful to emphasize at this point that the U.S. Army Special Forces (ARSF) (most commonly known as the Green Berets) fall into the general category of SOF, as do, for instance, Air Force, Civil Affairs, SEAL, or psychological operations personnel serving under USSOCOM or geographic Special Operations Commands. This distinction becomes important because unlike in the U.S., the European defense establishments and Romania tend to use SF and SOF interchangeably.

While U.S. Special Operation Forces comprise active duty and Reserve component forces of the Military Services that are designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support the sixteen tasks mentioned in Table 1 (Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 1998, p. viii), Special Forces encompass those U.S. Army forces subordinated to USSOCOM that are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct five primary missions: UW, FID, DA, SR, and CT (“SOF Posture”, 2003, p. 114).

However, we need to warn the reader of the disagreement that still exists occasionally within the U. S. special operations community as to what makes SOF special, or whether they ought to be ‘shooters or social workers’ (Adams, 1998, p. 8). Comparing the USSOCOM definition of special operations with the Army Special Forces Command’s (USASOC) definition, Adams (1998) uncovers a division of opinion. While the former emphasizes that SOF are special because they have unique equipment and conduct tasks that exceed the routine capabilities of General-Purpose Forces (GPF) (the tasks and methods being, by implication, conventional); the latter stresses SOF use of *unconventional* means for political, economic or informational objectives beyond military ones (pp. 7-8). Are SOF essentially conventional soldiers with a very high degree of proficiency, tailored high technology equipment, and training not available to GPF? Or are they unconventional operators dedicated to roles and using methods that are different than the ones associated with the conventional military forces?

By emulating the U.S. Doctrine, ROSF also accepted this dilemma, which reflects the complex dual nature of USSOCOM, and a real divergence of opinion within the SOF community “about the nature, purpose, functions, and methods of special operations forces.” (p. 8)

### **C. A BROAD SPECTRUM OF POSSIBLE SOF MISSIONS**

In an attempt to clarify some nuances related to each U.S. SOF task and offer a glimpse of their spirit and the context, the following paragraphs briefly expand doctrinal definitions of SOF missions, which are basically identical for both U.S. and Romanian SOF establishments (Special Operations Doctrine, 2003, pp. 13-19). According to Adams (1998), the list of SOF missions:

...is a hodge-podge of conventional, unconventional and just plain odd missions, some of which are actually subsets of others. The list results in part from a general willingness at the command levels of the SOF community to accept almost any mission as one in which SOF can succeed. There is an idea that, by accepting many missions, SOF demonstrates its fitness and remains competitive with other organizations in the struggle for a share of the diminishing military budget (p. 303).

#### **1. SOF Core Tasks**

The U.S. *Special Operations Forces Posture Statement* (2003) identifies nine enduring SOF core tasks that are relevant across the spectrum of conflict, expand the

options for the National Command Authorities, and account for a strategic economy of force (pp. 36-37). All nine are addressed below:

**a. Counterterrorism**

Striving to support the goals of the new U.S. Defense Strategy, after September 11, 2001, the U.S. SOF established CT as its first priority. The task includes “offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.” (p. 36) The *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (2003) proposes specific goals and objectives, many of which are supported by USSOCOM’s missions:

1. Defeat terrorists and their organizations: identify, locate, and destroy them (pp. 15-17)
2. Deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists: cooperating with willing and able states, and compelling the unwilling ones; enabling weak states; interdict and disrupt material support for terrorists (pp. 17-21)
3. Diminish the underlying conditions used by the terrorists: strengthen weak states, win the war of ideas (pp. 22-23).

The 2003 SOF Posture underscores SOF significance in meeting these goals and objectives through missions that include intelligence operations, hostage rescue, attacks against terrorist networks, and indirect activities designed to influence attitudes and motivations, and to discourage terrorism (role for PSYOP and CA) (p. 36).

According to Collins (1987), within the USSOCOM, the Delta Force, Seal Team 6, and the 160<sup>th</sup> Special Operations Aviation Regiment are the units that most emphasize the conduct of direct CT actions (p. 22).

**b. Counterproliferation of WMD**

The U.S. *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* (2002) states that “U.S. military and appropriate civilian agencies must possess the full range of operational capabilities to counter the threat and use of WMD by states and terrorists against the United States, our military forces, and friends and allies” (p. 2).

In 2003, the SOF Posture claimed that U.S. SOF provided “unique capabilities to monitor and support” DOD’s policy in the areas of: prevention of acquisition of WMD, rolling back of proliferation where it has occurred, and deterrence of WMD use (p. 36).

The commander of U.S. Pacific Command identified a list of 19 counterproliferation requirements, some of which display clear applicability for SOF capabilities: conduct off-site and on-site attacks in order to destroy, disable and deny WMD targets; seize, destroy, disable, and deny transport of WMD, and rogue states or terrorists' non-WMD resources; conduct IO in order to destroy, disable and deny WMD development, production, deployment, and employment; provide intelligence collection capabilities related to CP efforts; carry out Security Assistance activities by providing personnel, training, and equipment (“The Counterproliferation Imperative”, 2001, pp. 18-20).

Addressing the WMD threat as a SOF peacetime challenge, Collins (2000) identified a number of specific possible roles for SOF: participate in interagency and international intelligence-collection plans with the mission to locate, identify and follow WMD-related items aboard ships and aircraft; collect water and soil samples in the vicinity of suspicious installations; or reinforce officially sanctioned searches such as those belonging to the United Nations (pp. 3-4).

In a CP crisis situation, however, SOF would need different resources: state-of-the art infiltration platforms, lethal and non-lethal effects weapons, effective communications links, immediate access to fused intelligence, and elite soldiers with specialized training (Faulkner & Sayre, 1997, p. 23).

*c. Special Reconnaissance*

SR is normally limited in scope and duration to tasks that aim at collecting or verifying information of strategic and operational significance on the enemy, terrain, and weather. While *strategic* objectives are related to the attainment of national policy goals, *operational* objectives are of a theater value.

Through visual observation or high technology collection methods, SR intends to obtain and report information that supports the commander's decision making process. For example, in 1990 in the Persian Gulf theater SEAL squads from Navy Special Warfare Group One maintained listening and observation posts in order to gather intelligence on the Iraqi movements along the Saudi Arabian-Kuwait border, and conducted hydrographic reconnaissance off the shores of Kuwait up to the beginning of Desert Storm (Dockery, 2003, pp. 212-218).

According to Collins (1993), the contact of human-intelligence assets with resistance elements or insurgents in order to ascertain whether they deserve U.S. support (i.e., Northern Afghanistan in 2001 or Northern Iraq in 2003) also constitutes a typical strategic level reconnaissance task. Differentiating between the SEALs' specialization in SR along coasts and rivers and the Army's SF inland SR, the same analyst argues that the employment of the later is debatable:

Special Forces teams, composed mainly of seasoned, professional NCOs, are fully qualified to perform strategic-reconnaissance missions. Their employment, however, risks hard to replace personnel who spend years acquiring language proficiency and cross-cultural understanding applicable to a particular geographic area.

Therefore, Collins proposes two adjustments: the transformation of SR in a collateral activity for Army SF and the training and use of Ranger small intelligence-collection teams for SR missions (p. 23).

*d. Direct Action*

DA refers to short-duration and small-scale offensive actions against targets of strategic or operational significance that are out of reach for tactical weapons systems and conventional military capabilities. Conducting such types of operations usually requires SOF operators to be capable of employing raid and ambush tactics, providing terminal guidance for precision guided munitions, or recovering personnel or material in hostile territory.

In order to achieve decisive results at a predetermined time and place, DA missions focus on stealth, surprise, speed, and surgically precise application of violent action (Faulkner & Sayre, 1997, p. 24). In Collins' (1987) opinion, while Army SF and Navy SEALs prioritize more actions such as raids, ambushes, sabotage, and subversion, Delta Force and SEAL Team 6 focus more on hostage rescues.

Regardless of the forms adopted, the historical record shows that DA is invariably a complex task that does not tolerate poor standards in planning or execution. Developing the circumstances surrounding the raid on Son Tay in November, 1970, Vandenbroucke (1993) held that:

...the U.S. military had not conducted a successful POW rescue since the Civil War. The experience in Southeast Asia had been particularly bleak. Between 1966 and 1970, U.S. forces had mounted forty-five raids in

Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam to rescue American POWs, and had freed one. (p. 63)

Ten years after, in April 1980, another high-profile failed attempt to rescue American hostages in Iran (Operation Eagle Claw) struck a blow to the U.S.'s prestige. However, the Desert One disaster initiated a SOF reform process that culminated in the creation of USSOCOM after a seven-year fight against military and political conventionalism ("History", 2002, pp. 3-6).

*e. Unconventional Warfare*

Understanding UW requires first defining its opposite concept – conventional war. Adams (1998) views conventional war as:

...war fought by formally constituted armed forces of a state with the immediate purpose of bringing about the direct physical destruction or incapacitation of the formally constituted armed forces of some other state. (p. 20)

Citing Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, El Salvador and Nicaragua, the same author points out that UW covers a variety of ill-defined and smaller-scale conflicts that are not usually waged by the professional armed forces of a state, do not seek to seize and hold terrain, and sometimes they are not even conducted for a specific reason (p. 1).

According to Collins (1993), anticommunism and containment inspired most, if not all, U.S. UW during the Cold War. The task displays both political and military characteristics and represents the traditional Army SF mission (p. 24). By conducting UW, SOF operators seek to weaken an established government or occupying force, while increasing the control of local insurgent movements already in existence.

UW involves predominantly long duration and low visibility offensive operations alongside indigenous or surrogate forces. Focusing more on *human terrain*, UW soldiers are familiar with local customs, usually proficient in local languages, and help organize, advise, and train indigenous guerrillas.

Because UW is conducted in the midst of the population and struggles for people's minds, the contributions provided by the CA and PSYOP elements become critical. Indeed, the synergy established among the Army Special Forces, CA, and PSYOP units offers USSOCOM unique capability for conducting UW (Adams, 1998, p. 22).



After waging three notable UW operations during WWII (in the Philippines, Burma, and France), the U.S. had seen none on a comparable scale until 2001. But in the autumn of 2001 in Afghanistan, UW returned as a task with a dozen Army SF operational detachments alpha (ODA) from the 5<sup>th</sup> SF Group (Task Force Dagger). Those 12-man ODAs had to link up with various local war lords, communicate with them, gain their trust, pay them, coordinate airdrops, correlate their movements towards Taliban-occupied villages and towns, alleviate the potential for inter-tribe conflicts, and eventually call in air strikes.

Very pleased with the Special Forces' performance in Afghanistan, for FY 2004 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld awarded Army Special Forces Command a 20 percent increase in funding, an eight percent increase in personnel, and vehemently requested the use of SF elements in the campaign against Saddam Hussein (Moore, 2003, p. 418).

***f. Information Operations***

IO and Information Warfare (IW) are two relatively new concepts that cover the same forms of warfare. We will address here only the forms that are most relevant to today's U.S. SOF:

1. command-and-control warfare, involving *antihead* offensive actions (commanders and command centers are targeted), and *antineck* operations (critical communications systems are cut)
2. intelligence-based warfare that occurs notably during targeting and battle damage assessment when intelligence is used as a direct input for the operations and thus results directly in the application of fire to objective
3. psychological warfare in which information is used to influence the minds of friends, neutrals, and opponents; that is, conducting psychological operations (Libicki, 1995, p. x).

IO missions could demand that SOF elements be able to: locate and attack enemy command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) nodes; provide boots on the ground in denied territory, collect information, and call in air strikes against identified high value targets; or plan and execute tailored psychological operations campaigns.

From this perspective, one could make a case that occasionally DA and SR achieve IO gains, while PSYOP clearly represents a subset of IO.

***g. Psychological Operations***

PSYOP are planned operations aimed at influencing the perceptions, attitudes, and, ultimately, the actions of individuals, groups, organizations, and foreign governments. In order to influence these targets, PSYOP capitalizes on subtle themes, proper means of dissemination (leaflets printed in correct dialects, or air platforms for loudspeakers), and extensive knowledge of local predispositions. The active duty and reserve PSYOP units belong to the U.S. Army and the Air Force elements subordinated to USSOCOM, and support mostly conventional forces operations.

Adams (1998) points out that, although the Green Berets became organizationally allied with PSYOP and CA under the USASOC, and thus combined all the skills necessary to conduct UW, for many years the SF sought to end this association because these units “were thought to detract from the commando image desired by many SF troopers and leaders.” (p. 12)

These associations with the conventional army notwithstanding, PSYOP and special operations share a common history dating back more than half a century. According to Collins (1993), in 1952 at Fort Bragg, an imposed and artificial fusion occurred between the first Special Forces Group and a newly-formed Psychological Warfare Center. The fusion between the two organizations took place in order to “soften resistance by Army, Air Force and CIA officials who then opposed all efforts to create military SOF formations” (p. 27).

As it stands today, two apparent options are opened to the U.S. Congress (*DoD Directive 5100.1*): (1) since PSYOP normally supports conventional operations, the Congress could consider shifting PSYOP units to Army control; or (2) keep the already existing relationship, partly because, like Rangers, PSYOP elements might atrophy once under the Army’s jurisdiction (p. 27).

However, Collins seems to overlook that the fusion between Army SF and PSYOP had precedents in the establishment of the Office of Coordinator of Information (OCI) in 1941 and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1942 – two organizations headed by William Donovan for whom psychological operations encompassed both overt

and secret intelligence operations, persuasion, sabotage, subversion, partisan support, and guerrilla activities – called *special operations* (Adams, 1998, pp. 34-35).

Moreover, in 1951 General McClure, who shared Donovan's view on PSYOPS, organized a *Special Operations Division* within the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW). He recruited an OSS veteran, Colonel Aaron Bank, as operations officer. Under Colonel Bank's influence, the name was changed from Special Operations Division to *Special Forces Division*. Finally, in 1952 Col. Bank became the first commander of the newly authorized 10<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group – the first formal Army peacetime unit ever assigned with special operations (p.55).

In conclusion, one could make a case that Army Special Forces are born also from Donovan and McClure's broad vision on psychological operations, and that the alliance between SF and PSYOP units was not as artificial as Collins stated. Since the Army SF's core mission is UW, Adams (1998) envisages the creation of an *Unconventional Operations Force* that would increase the collaboration among ARSF, PSYOP and CA assets and disentangle the mix of SOF missions (p. 302).

#### ***h. Foreign Internal Defense***

Usually part of a broader and long duration interagency effort, FID is designed to assist a foreign government in protecting itself from threats ranging from internal insurgencies to external and transnational hostiles. Since this task represents the strategically defensive counterpart of UW, the Army SF has embraced FID since the late 1950s (p. 24). The SF FID activities may range from training and advising military and paramilitary forces, and assisting civilian agencies, to conducting unilateral U.S. operations (Harned, 1988, p. 6).

As Faulkner & Sayre (1997) pointed out, in order to conduct successful FID activities, the following main capabilities are required: instructional, tactical, medical and negotiation skills; foreign language proficiency; area orientation; intercultural communications; basic PSYOP and CA skills; rudimentary construction and engineering skills; and familiarity with a wide variety of weapons, communications, and demolitions equipment (p. 26).

Although he acknowledged that some UW and FID skills are interchangeable, Collins (1993) envisaged the possibility of USSOCOM devoting full

attention to FID, which would in turn require Army SF to emphasize some aspects not necessarily linked to UW, which is their primary mission today (p. 26). That being said, FID and UW have more similarities than differences, and training for one necessarily will improve the skills required for the other.

***i. Civil Affairs Operations (CAO)***

CAO facilitate civil-military cooperation by providing specialized support at national and local levels during all the phases of a crisis. CA specialists' main task is to support mission requirements concerning minimizing civilian population interference with U.S. military operations, lessening the adverse impact of military actions on civilians, and establishing and conducting provisional military government or civil administration ("SOF Posture", 2003, p. 37).

The bulk of CA missions support conventional commanders, and out of the 25 CA battalions functioning under the US Army Special Operations Command, only one is active duty (p. 14). Collins (1993) acknowledged that "even more than PSYOP, the merger of Civil Affairs with special operations was a marriage of administrative convenience" (p. 27). Without questioning the importance of independent CA support to all military commanders, we conclude that, for maximizing CA contribution to SOF, during UW and FID actions, CA should be employed in cooperation with PSYOP.

**2. SOF Collateral Activities**

In addition to these nine principal tasks, *Special Operations Forces Reference Manual* (1998) identified seven SOF collateral activities that, in contrast to the relatively stable core tasks previously addressed, may shift more readily according to the challenges imposed by the international security environment. In the following paragraphs we provide details about each of the seven.

Moreover, since the Romanian SO Doctrine lists AT (implied from CBT) and Strategic Objectives Security as SF collateral missions, we briefly discuss them as well.

***a. Coalition Support***

Coalition Support activities aim at helping integrate units into multinational coalition military operations. During Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, operators of the 5th SF Group advised Arab units of the Islamic coalition (Egypt, Syria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, the UAE and others), assessed their capabilities,

provided ground-air communication and coordinating instructions for air support, contributed to their operational planning, raised individual foreign soldiers' fighting skills, and developed control measures and coordination among different neighboring units. Within the Kuwaiti brigades, for instance, the Army SF operators' integration efforts were felt at every level of the chain of command.

The Commander of the 1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group Lt. Col. Brownlee (1993) considered the support to the coalition, which the SF units provided, a logical extension of their FID capabilities. In addition to language skills, interpersonal and negotiation capabilities, the ODAs needed to be at least as mobile as the assisted units, be able to replicate the allies' communication assets, and be competent in armor and mechanized battalion level tactics, indirect fire, air defense and countermobility/mobility (pp. 43-44).

Acknowledging that "there's a tremendous time and money requirement to make every operational detachment competent in all those skills" (p. 43), Brownlee emphasized that previous joint readiness exercises with countries from the 5th Group's Area of Operations (AO) helped his unit to accomplish the task. Finally, asked how well-suited were GPF, such as the conventional Army and the Marine Corps, to conduct coalition support activities, Brownlee held that those forces' task was to be able to fight in a combined fashion and not to train foreign troops to operate in a coalition setting (p. 43).

***b. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)***

CSAR missions usually represent joint high-risk operations aimed at the recovery of distressed personnel during wartime or contingency operations. By joint doctrine, CSAR used to be a service responsibility. According to the *US SOF Posture Statement* (1998),

SOF are equipped and manned to perform CSAR in support of SOF missions only. SOF performs CSAR in support of conventional forces on a case-by-case basis not to interfere with the readiness or operations of core SOF missions. (p. 4)

The greater the risk associated with one recovery operation, the more time SOF elements needed for planning and preparation. Moreover, since they were a strategic level tool, planners had to carefully decide where and when to employ SOF

capabilities. Indeed, the operational significance of CSAR operations could have been doubtful, or, on the contrary, rescue successes could have generated strategic results in terms of psychological impact on the public support of military campaigns.

During the Gulf War, for example, Army and Air Force SOF operators were tasked to execute CSAR missions because the Air Force assets were incapable of conducting long range infiltrations into denied territory. While that assignment might have been justifiable so long as the ongoing SOF operations and readiness were not being affected, the use of eight ODAs from the 5<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> SF Groups as ground security elements demonstrated poor tasking. Any infantry squad or fire team could have served as a standard security force for CSAR contingencies; therefore, the mission was not suitable for the Green Berets (Tovo, 1996, p. 7).

Joint Pub 3-50.2, *Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue* noted two situations when SOF teams could have been rightly directed to execute rescue tasks: (1) when the terrain, weather, or enemy air defense prohibited dedicated conventional CSAR elements to intervene, and (2) when an Army SF detachment was already present in the vicinity of distressed personnel (p. 7).

The dangers of SOF misuse for CSAR missions recently have been eliminated with the development of Program Action Directive (PAD) that directs the transfer of select CSAR assets (HC-130, HH-60s, and Combat Rescue Officers/pararescuemen) from Air Combat Command (ACC) to Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC).

Therefore, today USSOCOM has administrative control (ADCON) of these CSAR dedicated assets along with the associated force structure, manpower, and units, and it thus has become the only establishment formally responsible for all CSAR activities (“CSAR Transfer PAD”, 2003, pp. i-ii).

*c. Counterdrug Activities*

CD operations are carried out by area-oriented SOF teams who provide specific training to counternarcotics forces of the host nation in order to detect, monitor, and counter the production and trafficking of illegal drugs. During fiscal year 1997, for example, SOF teams completed more than 190 missions of this type, most of them against drug cartels, criminals, and insurgents in Latin America (Collins, 2000, p. 5).

Although they are forbidden by law to participate in counterinsurgency actions, U.S. SOF personnel are allowed to teach intelligence-collection, patrolling, infantry tactics, and counterterrorism. Of particular note, is the involvement of the American counterterrorist unit - the Delta Force - as trainers in the hunt for Pablo Escobar from 1989 to 1993, in Columbia (Bowden, 2002, p. 65).

However, not all counterdrug missions are hazardous. Developing the threat awareness among civil and military leaders of the host nations, conducting classes for school children, and teaching aircraft maintenance skills are all activities that SOF Reserve and National Guard elements conduct in order to support the fight against narcotraffickers and narcoterrorists (Collins, 2000, pp. 5-6).

***d. Countermine Activities***

CM activities refer to training missions offered to host nation forces in the location and safe disposal of mines, booby-traps, and other destructive devices. Such activities usually belong to a broader HA mission. Of note would be the involvement of Army SF in humanitarian demining in Cambodia, Namibia, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Honduras, Nicaragua, or Costa Rica (“SOF Posture Statement”, 1998, p. 9).

In order to conduct effective demining activities, SOF specialists need language skills and organic engineering and demolitions capabilities. PSYOP and CA elements can help as well, by assisting the local governments in developing and conducting public education programs designed to increase public awareness of the problem (Faulkner & Sayre, 1997, p. 27).

Finally, one could make a strong case that the last two collateral activities that we have addressed above – CD and CM – are subsets of FID (Boyatt, 1994, p. 13).

***e. Humanitarian Assistance***

Amended by the Congress in 1986, *Title 10, Section 167, United States Code* lists HA as one of the ten tasks equivalent to statutory roles and missions for special operations. But since DoD *Directive 5100.1* did not specify any function for USSOCOM, SOF doctrine downgraded HA from a statutory imperative to a collateral activity (Collins, 1993, p. 22).

These inconsistent instructions notwithstanding, when SOF personnel conduct HA, they are employed to support nonmilitary objectives that may include:

disaster relief, support to and resettlement of displaced civilians, water, sanitation, expedient communications, rudimentary construction assistance, or medical, veterinary, and dental care. Army SF, CA, and PSYOP forces are well suited to accomplish such activities (Faulkner & Sayre, 1997, p. 27). For example, U.S. SOF assets helped reduce the results of Hurricane Mitch, and assisted in the evacuation of over 900 Hondurans (“SOF Posture”, 2000, p. 19).

Collins (1993) holds that this type of HA activities is a subset of civil-military operations, which, in turn, support FID; therefore, *Title 10* could discard HA as a specific special operations activity (p. 25).

***f. Security Assistance***

Adams (1998) considered security assistance activities as representing a group of programs authorized by law, during which, the U.S. provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services in support of the country’s political objectives. For SOF operators this task primarily consists of providing mobile training teams (MTT), and other forms of training assistance (p. xxiv).

Similar to the transition from FID to coalition support activities, SOF teams may be required to shift from a security assistance posture to the combat role of coalition support in case a conflict breaks out. One could conclude that Coalition Support and Security Assistance require a great number of interchangeable skills, and could therefore belong to one single broader mission for Army SF – FID.

***g. Special Activities***

This controversial task involves clandestine activities (concealment of the operation) or covert actions<sup>3</sup> (concealment of the sponsor’s identity) executed abroad in support of national foreign policy. Conducting special activities, SOF elements may act independently and perform any of their principal missions, or in a supporting role for agencies such as the CIA or the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) that may be in charge.

Given the complexities of the task, special activities (black arts or paramilitary operations) are highly compartmented and centrally managed and controlled. In addition, the conduct of special activities is limited by *Executive Order 12333* of

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<sup>3</sup> Normally, covert actions are executed by the CIA, and not by the DoD.



December 4, 1981 (outlawing assassination), and by the requirements of a Presidential finding and congressional oversight (Collins, 2000, p. 4).

***h. Antiterrorism***

One of the most comprehensive definitions available is that offered by Adams (1998). In his view, AT consists of:

defensive measures, including intelligence and counterintelligence support, to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. It includes that part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installation, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. It also includes personal protective services that consist primarily of executive protection and training efforts in terrorist threat awareness. (p. xv)

The Romanian SO Doctrine (2003) looks at AT and CT as very closely linked missions, and underscores that, when secret services or other security agencies express the need for help in AT-related issues, SF will assist them by providing training and advice in order to reduce the existing vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks (p. 16).

Collins (1993) considers AT and CT two very distinct missions that are at the same time flip sides of the same coin. He proposes an amendment to *Title 10* and *DoD Directive 5100.1* that would allow elite counterterrorist members of the secret JSOC to educate and train State Department and FBI antiterrorist elements. An alternative would be the assignment of AT to USSOCOM as a principal mission (p. 25).

***i. Strategic Objectives Security***

As the last collateral mission of ROSF, SOS will be executed only when the conventional forces destined to guard and secure these objectives are no longer capable of combat (p. 19). Although the task is doctrinally planned to be executed by SF in extreme situations and in defense of strategic level objectives, it seems difficult to imagine a scenario in which SF elements would bring more fire power and men than additional conventional elements.

The contingencies surrounding this conventional last task should be developed in more than one paragraph, since, according to the law, security for strategic assets is Romanian gendarmes' responsibility ("Lege privind paza obiectivelor", 2003, pp. 3-4).

Illustrating the SOF' dual nature addressed earlier, SOF tasks could be separated in two main categories: one *unconventional* that is centered on UW and FID, and encompasses PSYOP, CAO, HA, Coalition Support, Security Assistance, CD and CM activities; and a second, maybe less *unconventional*, but highly specialized and demanding, that comprises CT, CP of WMD, DA, SR, CSAR, and Special Activities. IO is present in both categories. But, despite the entanglements that one could observe in the current mix of U.S. SOF tasks (of which the Romanian SOF leaders should be aware); there is a real correlation between all the U.S. SOF missions and defense-related strategic level documents.

#### **D. SOF SUPPORT TO STRATEGIC GOALS**

In developing CT and the CP of WMD, we have seen how simple it is to link U.S. SOF core tasks to their respective national strategies. Half a century ago, the *Truman Doctrine* held that the U.S., in order to protect its own national security interests, “must support free peoples who are resisting any attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” (Adams, 1998, p. 45)

That doctrine supported the engagement of assets in security assistance missions in Greece and Turkey, and it established a prototype for subsequent SOF counterinsurgency interventions. Today, in the current National Military Strategy (NMS) of the U.S., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers (2004) stated:

The NMS serves to focus the Armed Forces on maintaining US leadership in a global community that is challenged on many fronts – from countering the threat of global terrorism to fostering emerging democracies. In this environment, US presence and commitment to partners are essential. Our Armed Forces, operating at home and abroad, in peace and war, will continue to serve as a constant, visible reminder of US resolve to protect common interests. Our dedication to security and stability ensures that the United States is viewed as an indispensable partner, encouraging other nations to join us in helping make the world not just safer, but better. (p. iii)

The manner in which SOF support the 2004 *National Defense Strategy* and the ambitious goals stated in *National Military Strategy* (NMS) is acknowledged in the *U.S. SOF Posture Statement*. As shown in Table 2, the SOF Posture (2003) lists the four goals of the US defense policy, identifies the tasks that support these goals, and finally details the type of support that USSOCOM provides (pp. 27-28).

The only task that seems difficult to be associated with a specific defense policy goal would be CSAR, but personnel recovery operations could be linked to Department of Defense *Directive 2310.2* that affirms the DOD policy to preserve the well-being of US personnel who may have to evade , are detained, captured, missing or isolated (Patrick & Patterson, 2004, p. 28).

Table 2. SOF tasks support the U.S. Defense Strategy

<b>U.S. Defense Policy Goals</b>	<b>SOF tasks that implement the policy</b>	<b>Type of support</b>
1. Assuring Allies and Friends	Security Assistance; FID; CM; PSYOP; Activities; HA; CD Activities; CAO	Security cooperation plans; common training and exercises with foreign partners
2. Dissuading Adversaries	Maintain credible capabilities; PSYOP; Maximize readiness	SOF presence and unique capabilities
3. Deterring Aggression and Coercion	CT; CP of WMD; Signal US resolve; PSYOP	Deployment and employment of tailored SOF
4. Decisively Defeating Any Adversary	Coalition Support; PSYOP ; UW; IO; SR; SA; DA	SOF as a valuable source of intelligence and a force multiplier for GPF capabilities

In the final analysis, all the doctrinal tasks with which the U.S. SOF community could be tasked, implement higher policy goals, thus helping to gain acceptability and support within military and political circles.

#### **E. DEVELOPING THE METHOD FOR ROSF RE-TASKING**

How can one ensure coherence between the Romanian SF tasks and the strategic imperatives of the country? How can one emulate USSOCOM’s example and make sure that all the sixteen missions stated in the Romanian SO doctrine support the country’s strategic and/or defense policy goals?

As Cook (1994) defined it, *doctrine* should be “composed of the fundamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives.” (p. 38) Moreover, former Secretary of the Army John Marsh Jr. held:

The development of a doctrine is the cornerstone upon which a special operations capability can be erected ... our failure ... to develop doctrine has prevented special operations in the Army from gaining permanence

and acceptability within the ranks of the military. (As cited Adams, 1998, p. 13)

The following paragraphs develop the framework that eventually proposes suggestions for the development of a doctrine that would link ROSF's tasks with the country's National Security Strategy via subordinated defense policy documents (Cook, 1996, p. 37).

In his article *Perspectives on Emerging SOF Roles and Missions*, Christopher Lamb (1995) specifies that, when assessing new roles and missions for SOF, three key variables must be taken into account:

1. *The nature of the threat and the security environment we anticipate in the future.* We must prepare to meet the missions that will actually be required of our armed forces.
2. *The national security strategy that the United States is adopting to deal with the post-Cold War security environment.* Different strategies may require different missions and capabilities.
3. *The nature of the forces themselves.* If SOF are asked to conduct missions contrary to their current nature, they will eventually evolve into different types of forces. The risk inherent in such change is that SOF will duplicate the capabilities of conventional forces and will be unable to effectively conduct traditional special-operations missions. (pp. 2-3)

Combining Lamb and Cook's views and applying Lamb's suggestions to the ROSF case, we conclude that proposing new tasks for the Romanian SF, and implicitly a new doctrine, is an endeavor that should seriously consider the following four questions:

1. Given that Romania is a committed NATO ally and an aspiring EU member, what are the main features of the country's security environment in terms of threats and subsequent requirements for the military?
2. In light of the guidance provided by Romanian national security documents, what are the major military tasks of the Romanian Armed Forces to support the policy goals of the country?
3. Once these tasks are determined, which can be accomplished by the Romanian General-Purpose Forces (GPF) or other security services?
4. Of the tasks that cannot be addressed by GPF or other domestic organizations, which are appropriate SF tasks?

Answering these four questions is equivalent to applying Christopher Lamb's model. This application will eventually lead to the identification of appropriate Romanian SF tasks that will promote national strategic goals, and will be adapted to the Romania's security environment within the North Atlantic Alliance.

#### **F. SUMMARY**

This chapter has outlined the majority of the elements necessary to the future understanding of the ROSF re-tasking and re-structuring. The Romanian SO doctrine is extensively inspired by the U.S. SOF institutionalized experiences. Of the 16 ROSF principal and collateral missions, 15 of them are similar to the U.S. SOF core tasks and collateral activities.

Despite the complexity that characterizes USSOCOM's mix of missions, and although some role assignments within the American SOF community might still be debatable, all the tasks assigned to USSOCOM support national-level policy goals. In an attempt to emulate this correlation between tasks and strategy, we have adopted the method developed by Christopher Lamb. He specifies that, when tasking SOF, one must take into consideration the nature of the security environment, the country's national security documents, and the nature of the forces themselves.

With the subsequent application of Lamb's method, we intend to provide ROSF tasks that are suitable for SOF, can not be executed by GPF or other security agencies, support Romania's defense policy goals, and fit well into the country's security environment.

### **III. LAMB’S MODEL APPLIED: TASKS FOR ROSF**

The previous chapter offered details about each ROSF doctrinal task without debating the appropriateness of the Romanian SO Doctrine mission choices. At this point, however, armed with insights from the U.S. SOF experience, and with the model developed by Christopher Lamb, we are ready to put the doctrine to the test.

Out of the sixteen most likely ROSF mission-assignments, how many will prove to be appropriate once the model is applied? Will the model demonstrate the necessity for ROSF to encompass new tasks? A step by step approach in the application of Lamb’s method eventually reveals that only five strategic tasks cannot be successfully addressed by the Romanian GPF or other security organizations and thus are appropriate for ROSF. Four of these tasks are rightly anticipated by the SO Doctrine - CBT, CP of WMD, SR, and DA; one follows from the framework we are applying - VIP security in troubled areas.

A look at Romania’s allies in NATO and the EU introduces the reader to the Euro-Atlantic and Romanian security environments. Then, an analysis of Romania’s defense policy documents helps determine the RAF’s strategic tasks, and from that point, appropriate principal and collateral missions for the Romanian SF.

#### **A. THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE**

Today, in light of the Alliance’s 1999 Washington Summit and subsequent recent events, it seems accurate to describe NATO as a complex and unique political and military regional organization, with no supra-national authority. It forms an Alliance of 26 sovereign states whose fundamental purpose is the use of collective political and military means “to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members”, and to contribute to the peace and stability of the wider Euro-Atlantic area (“Reader’s Guide”, 1999, p. 48).

After ten years of collaboration with the Alliance, within the Partnership for Peace (PfP)<sup>4</sup>, on March 29, 2004 Romania formally became a member of NATO. That day, Romania – a country that was in the middle of a complex military transformation

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<sup>4</sup> Romania was the first country to have joined the PfP

process – integrated into an Alliance that was also transforming in order to meet the new security threats.

Attempting to answer the first question of Lamb’s method and develop Romania’s security environment, the following paragraphs concisely address these new threats and the requirements that NATO demands from its military components, including SF units. In doing so, we start from the assumption that, ideally, as soon as a state X voluntarily integrates into a collective security alliance A, the characteristics of both A and X’s external security environments tend to overlap, and the threats identified by the alliance A become challenges that must be dealt with by state X.

Subsequently, developing the nature of the new threats perceived by the North Atlantic Alliance is similar with defining the main aspects of Romania’s security environment. As we observe later in Romania’s case, this assumption is indeed justified since the country’s strategic level documents took the Allied security prescriptions very seriously.

### **1. New Threats**

On October 3, 2002, at the Alliance’s Conference “*NATO: A Vision for 2012*”, in his speech “*Prague 2002: Challenge and Change for NATO*”, former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson (2002) tried to predict the challenges that the international community was likely to face in the years ahead including:

1. Increased instability in Caucasus, Central Asia, Northern Africa, and the Middle East
2. More spillover effects into the local trouble areas, Europe, and North America; that is, migration, asylum seekers, people smuggling, violence, and drugs
3. More terrorism resulting in the murder of innocent people
4. More failed states that will become potential safe heavens for terrorists
5. More proliferation that will lead to the spread of WMD into the hands of non-state actors who are not always deterrable

Less than two months later, on November 21, 2002, the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague issued a

declaration that developed in technical terms the aspects previously stated by the Secretary General Robertson. Article 3 of the declaration read:

Recalling the tragic events of 11 September 2001 and our subsequent decision to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, we have approved a comprehensive package of measures, based on NATO's Strategic Concept, to strengthen our ability to meet the challenges to the security of our forces, populations, and territory, from wherever they may come. Today's decisions will provide for balanced and effective capabilities within the Alliance so that NATO can better carry out the full range of its missions and respond collectively to those challenges, including the threat posed by terrorism and by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. (Prague Summit Declaration, 2002)

In short, with the Prague Summit, the debate about the Alliance's role exclusively within the Euro-Atlantic region has ended. The strategic concepts developed during the Washington Summit in 1999 have been extrapolated, and today's NATO requires from its military the capability of addressing the "new threats", from rogue states to terrorism using WMD, *anywhere*.

## **2. New Requirements**

Holding that geography will no longer act as a shield, during the same speech Lord Robertson proposed a set of improvements that would facilitate the Alliance's efforts to cope with the threats, and prevent future tragedies. Only the suggestions that are relevant to the argument of our project are addressed herein: tailored military capabilities, such as wide-bodied aircraft capable of transporting military units that are slimmer, tougher, faster, and stay in the field longer; consultation between the Allies; a broader security cooperation that extends beyond Europe to Central Asia, and the Mediterranean; and institutional cooperation between actors such as the UN, NATO, OSCE, EU, and NGOs. Additionally, the Allied leaders decided on a range of key issues including:

1. The creation of an agile, flexible, deployable (anywhere within 5 to 30 days), combined, and joint NATO Response Force (NRF), which would be able to sustain itself for 30 days
2. The transformation of NATO's command design with a view to providing smaller, more effective, efficient, and deployable command structures



3. The strengthening of the Alliance's capabilities for defense against terrorism, NBC, and cyber attacks
4. The approval of the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), through which individual member states made "firm and specific political commitments to improve their capabilities" in various areas ranging from air-to air refueling to intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition ("NATO's contribution", 2004).

One of the main objectives behind the PCC was to encourage both old and new allies to increase and direct their defense spending towards the creation of credible capabilities in areas where serious shortfalls had been recorded: mobility and deployability, sustainability, effective engagement, interoperable communications, information superiority, and CBRN defense ("Fact Sheet: NATO", 2002).

Another main product of the NATO Prague summit was the NRF. The force was officially created on October 15, 2003, directed to achieve its Initial Operational Capability by the end of 2004, and reach its Full Operational Capability by fall 2006 ("NATO Response Force Inauguration", 2003).

In U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's opinion, expressed during the September 2002 meeting of NATO Defense Ministers, the NRF was to become "an intellectual equivalent of a raid" (Mariano & Wilson, 2003). In technical terms, the NRF is planned to provide "a coherent, high readiness, joint, multinational force package, technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable, and sustainable." ("The NATO Response Force", 2004)

As far as the force's tasks, the NRF will be tailored for specific missions and will perform some of them independently, or in conjunction with other forces. So far, there are three employment scenarios for the NRF:

1. Acting independently within this expeditionary framework, in a crisis response scenario, the NRF is expected to have the flexibility and the capabilities to: evacuate non-combatants; support consequence management (including CBNR incidents); provide support in humanitarian crises; manage crisis response operations (including peacekeeping); conduct embargo operations; execute CT missions

2. Deployed in support of a larger force, the NRF will facilitate its arrival acting as an initial entry element - “First force in, first force out”, which constitutes the NRF motto
3. Serving as a demonstrative force package, the NRF will support diplomatic efforts by deterring potential opponents (“NATO Response Force 3”, 2004).

In terms of the Alliance’s approach towards terrorism, *NATO’s Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism* (2003) was approved by the North Atlantic Council and endorsed by Heads of State and Government at the Prague Summit. The document stipulated that there were four roles that NATO military forces could play for defense against terrorism: AT, consequence management, CT, and military cooperation. Implementing the concept necessitated additional requirements in a number of fields such as specialized intelligence, more specialized AT forces, deployable CT forces that were at a high state of readiness, and an effective and timely decision-making process.

### **3. Role for SF<sup>5</sup>**

Integral elements of the future 21,000-strong NRF are already provided by ‘niche’ capabilities including Special Forces and small CBNR detection teams. The need for niche forces comes is convenient for smaller allies who can use their already existing expertise and find the right balance between specialization, pooling, and duplication of capabilities (“NATO Response Force”, 2004).

During a press conference in Romania, General Jones (2004) (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) declared:

the NRF is by concept expeditionary in nature. It’s the first time in NATO that we’ve fused air-land-sea and special operations under one command. It forces us to look at some of our other shortfalls that we didn’t fully appreciate perhaps in the twentieth century when the Alliance was more static and more linear in term of its missions.

In all three abovementioned employment scenarios for NRF, one could identify possible tasks for SF units. But the way units are used during exercises says more about the concept of employment than logical deductions. Indeed, the first two exercises mounted by the NRF made extensive use of SF from contributing NATO nations. In the

<sup>5</sup> According to the sources we have used, in NATO vocabulary *SOF* is rarely used, the preferred term being *SF*.

first NRF exercise – a mock crisis response operation executed on November 20, 2003, in Turkey – SF soldiers from the host-country rescued UN staff and civilians that were taken prisoners by terrorists (“Response Force demonstrate capability”, 2003).

On October 13, 2004, SF units from Greece, Italy, Spain, and Turkey participated in the second NRF exercise held in Italy (“NRF demonstrates initial operational capability”, 2004). They conducted helicopter insertions behind enemy lines, amphibious assaults, and secured key terrain (“Photos of Exercise Destined Glory”, 2004).

In light of the NATO’s rhetoric and analyzing the way the NRF employed SF elements during exercises, we can discern already stated and implied core tasks for SF elements belonging to the Alliance:

1. CT – a role that is both overwhelmingly emphasized in official documents, and already played during NRF exercise in Turkey
2. DA – present during both NRF exercises, a task common to all Allied SF-type units
3. SR – another universally accepted SF task, which could complement the collection capabilities of the deployed NRF, and augment intelligence collection capabilities required by the *NATO’s Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism*.
4. CP of WMD – since it is generally accepted that WMD in terrorist hands is the worst case scenario, it is not surprising that SF are directed to conduct SR and DA missions to help in countering that threat.

## **B. THE EUROPEAN UNION**

Considerations regarding the necessity to build European rapid reaction forces (now that almost all the EU members are in NATO as well) are beyond the scope of this thesis. The case today is that the two entities are able to justify their respective *raison d’être*, and that Romania aspires to become a committed member in both organizations (not only in NATO). As the Romanian Prime Minister stated, “Euro-Atlantic integration is and will continue to be the cornerstone of our present and future stability.” (Nastase, 2002, p. 8)

As it was previously the case with the Alliance, we assume that by discussing the EU's strategic environment one develops an understanding of Romania's security issues. Although not a member state yet, Romania was one of the five non-EU countries who already envisaged contributions to the European rapid reaction forces (Lindstrom, 2004, p. 1). Moreover, the country's political, economic, legal, military, and social efforts are directed toward joining the EU by 2007, and, as stated in the National Security Strategy of Romania (2001), one of the country's national security policy goals is to intensify the negotiations, and to accelerate preparations for the integration into the EU, including the involvement in the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) (p. 23).

The Military Strategy of Romania (2000) also claims that, within the framework of NATO, the country supports the development of European Security and Defense efforts. To support these claims, Romania participated in the EU-led operation CONCORDIA in Macedonia in 2003.

### **1. New Challenges**

Stating that a large-scale aggression against any Member State is today improbable, the *European Security Strategy* (2003) identifies five new key threats: terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime (pp. 5-6). In tackling these dynamic threats, the strategy specifies that the first line of defense will be often outside the EU borders, and "conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early." (p. 8)

The EU pursues three strategic objectives that will defend its security, and promote its values: addressing the threats, building security in its neighborhood, and developing an international order based on effective multilateralism (pp. 8-11). However, the *European Security Strategy* admits that the Member States need to<sup>6</sup>:

1. Be more active in the pursuit of the EU strategic objective through the application of the full mixture of instruments available for crisis management and conflict prevention, and by fostering a strategic culture that encourages "early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention" (p. 13)
2. Become more capable by: the establishment of a defense agency; the transformation of the military into more flexible, mobile, and versatile forces;

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<sup>6</sup> Only the points that are related to our argument are mentioned.

- increasing the budgets for these forces, and spending the resources more effectively; reducing duplication by using pooled and shared assets; developing civilian assets necessary for dealing with crisis and post crisis situations; improved sharing of intelligence; support for third countries in CBT; or enhanced partnership between NATO and the EU (p. 14)
3. Be more coherent in terms of defense institutions building such as the European Security and Defense Policy
  4. Increase the cooperation with partners (p. 15).

## **2. Roles for the Military**

In order to cope with the new challenges, European military means will be used as part of a full spectrum of political, economic, intelligence, police, judicial, and humanitarian instruments (p. 9).

In support of the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – the European Union’s second pillar – and within the framework of ESDP, almost five years ago in Helsinki, the European Union Member States decided on *The Headline Goal* - a military capability target that planned for the union’s capacity to deploy within 60 days a force up to a corps level, by December 2003. The corps’ 50,000-60,000 troops were to be voluntarily offered by the Member States, sustainable for one year, and employed in support of the full spectrum of the Petersberg tasks that are:

1. Humanitarian actions
2. Peacekeeping
3. Crisis-management, including peacemaking/peace enforcement
4. Rescue operations

Later on, following an evaluation of the overall project, the EU leaders identified 38 considerable shortfalls in terms of national capability commitments (ranging from lack of strategic airlift to insufficient medical support). Addressing those shortfalls, on December 2001 the EU Council initiated the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) by which 19 panels of national experts were set up and given time until March 1, 2003, to deliver solutions. The EU Military Staff (EUMS) coordinated the panels’ efforts (Schmitt, 2004, pp. 1-3).

After years of refined analysis and adjustments, the number of shortfalls could only be reduced to 15. In May 2003 via the *Declaration on EU Military Capabilities* (2003), the Ministers of the EU Member States welcomed the results provided by the panels, but, at the same time, announced a second phase of the ECAP, that would aim at implementing concrete plans and programs.

Fifteen Project Groups were subsequently set up, each headed by a ‘lead nation’, and were expected to offer solutions through: more efficient use of the already existing capabilities, new acquisitions, joint procurement, leasing, and role specialization or multinationalization, in which one or more EU-members would offer one particular capability. Today, all these elements and the remaining twelve areas in need of improvement are part of a new plan – “Headline Goal 2010” – endorsed by the European Council in June 2004.

In terms of the role that the already existing European military establishments could play in the fight against terrorism, the EU position became clearer after the bombings in Madrid on March 11, 2004. Following September 11, 2001, the EU officials only agreed that the Union should build CT and CP capabilities; therefore, in the absence of concrete adjustments, the Petersberg missions stayed unchanged (Archick & Gallis, 2004, p. 18). Two weeks after the terrorist attacks in Spain, the EU leaders announced a new *Declaration on Combating Terrorism* (2004) that called for, among other measures, the reinforcement of the role of Europol, a maximization of the effectiveness of information systems and a development of the ESDP contribution to the fight against terrorism. In other words, European military assets such as SF elements might be expected to be assigned a role in the fight, alongside police and intelligence services.

### **3. Roles for SF**

Among other capabilities, for crisis management operations, three EU members (France, Italy, and Spain) made available Special Forces units as components of the European rapid reaction forces (“The Military Balance”, 2002, p. 30). But the intended tasking for these specific units is still unclear since the Europeans have not conducted the types of exercises the NRF mounted over the last two years.

The project group that dealt with *Special Operations Forces* (the lead nation being Portugal) identified three aspects in need of deeper study and improvement: a SOF

doctrine, general interoperability, and interoperability in terms of communications and support for the deployed elements.

Germany led the project group that was assigned the *Combat Search and Rescue* (CSAR) field. The group's conclusion was that although the capabilities for such a mission were present at the European level, there was a need for qualitative improvements. Again, the lack of a joint doctrine was felt, along with the necessity to prepare and execute realistic exercises. In addition, the group agreed that the decision made by a number of member states to procure new helicopters would increase the European CSAR capabilities by 2009.

The project group led by Belgium focused on *Interoperability Issues for Evacuation and Humanitarian Operations*. The group acknowledged that, in order to accomplish such a demanding task, the Europeans would need interoperable units that were at a high level of operational readiness ("European defence", 2003).

In conclusion, in order to identify all the shortcomings and reinforce its military capabilities, the EU and its Military Staff definitely need more time. Their main objective in the elaboration of the headline goal will continue to be an effective performance in crisis management scenarios. Translated into military terminology, this effectiveness is built around capability improvements in the following areas: command and control, interoperability, deployability, sustainability, flexibility, mobility, and survivability ("Elaboration of the headline goal", 2000). As far as CBT, whether the Headline Goal will imitate the NRF and include CT into its mission spectrum still remains to be determined. In addition, in light of the new declaration mentioned above, one can speculate that in the future European SF may be organized, provided a doctrine, and tasked with CT missions outside the EU borders.

Table 3 summarizes NATO and EU views on their respective security environments. While both entities perceive basically the same challenges and display the same views on how modern and effective combined military forces should look, it is obvious that the NRF enjoys a clearer and broader spectrum of missions. The NRF is indeed a military instrument that has already proven its initial operational capability, and has boldly encompassed new and various missions. Within the NRF, SF capabilities are

being considered a priority for NATO’s defense architecture. Despite the lack of SF joint doctrine, SF elements are relevant, at least in theory, for the European Headline Goal as well, the only important difference being that the EU military forces are still in the process of formation.

Table 3. NATO and EU approaches to GPF and Special Forces employment

	<b>Identified Threats</b>	<b>Requirements for the military</b>	<b>Military missions</b>	<b>SF roles</b>
<b>NATO</b>	1) Regional conflicts (ethnic conflicts, human rights abuses) 2) Spill over 3) Terrorism 4) Failed states 5) Proliferation of WMD	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>General requirements</u></p> Mobility, Deployability, Sustainability, Efficient C2, Effective engagement, Communications, Information superiority, Defense against CBRN/terrorism/cyber, ‘Niche’ capabilities  <p style="text-align: center;"><u>The NRF</u></p> Coherence, High readiness, Joint and combined, Technologically advanced, Flexible, Interoperable  <p style="text-align: center;"><u>CBT</u></p> Effective intelligence Specialized AT forces Deployable CT forces at a high state of readiness Effective and timely decision-making process	Crisis management  <p style="text-align: center;"><u>The NRF</u></p> Non-combatants evacuation Consequence management (CBNR included) Support in humanitarian crises Crisis response ops. (peacekeeping) Embargo ops. CT Initial entry element Demonstrative package  <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Defense against terrorism</u></p> AT Consequence management CT Military cooperation	1) CT 2) DA 3) SR 4) CP
<b>EU</b>	1) Terrorism 2) Proliferation of WMD 3) Regional conflicts 4) State failure 5) Organized crime	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Headline Goal 2010</u></p> C2, Interoperability, Deployability, Sustainability, Flexibility, Mobility, Survivability, Multinationalization, Role specialization	Humanitarian actions Peacekeeping Crisis-management (peacemaking/peace enforcement) Rescue operations	Lack of doctrine and exercises



That being said, we will notice in the next sections that both organizations influence Romania's security environment and stated military priorities.

### **C. FROM STRATEGY TO RAF TASKS**

In Romania, the President of the Republic is required to submit the *National Security Strategy* (NSS) to the Parliament for approval. This strategy constitutes the key national defense planning document and will inspire the creation of the Government's *Defense White Paper* that, in turn, guides the conception of the *Military Strategy of Romania* (MSR). While the Parliament approves the NSS and the White Paper, the Government endorses the MSR. The hierarchical and sequential relationship that exists among the three key documents implies that the MSR created by the Romanian Ministry of National Defense (MoND) implements the views of the administration's White Paper that, in turn, supports the NSS ("Ordonanta privind planificarea apararii", 2000).

But due to reasons that are beyond the scope of this study, the strategic level documents mentioned above are created in a different succession. We mention them in order of their appearance, together with the key events that shape Romania's perception of its environment:

1. NATO Washington Summit – April, 1999
2. The Government White Paper – November, 1999
3. The Military Strategy – April, 2000
4. Terrorist attacks against the U.S. – September, 2001
5. The National Security Strategy – December, 2001
6. NATO Prague Summit – November, 2002
7. Romania becomes a NATO member – March, 2004
8. A renewed Government Defense White Paper – May, 2004

Although all four documents display the same openness toward Euro-Atlantic integration, only the last two are adapted to the post-9/11 security environment. In addition, the new White Paper takes into account Romania's new status as an Allied country. Consequently, because the MSR tended to focus more on Romania's defense

rather than cultivation of expeditionary capabilities in support of NATO's new agenda, in applying Lamb's method, we will limit ourselves to the NSS, and the current Defense White Paper<sup>7</sup>.

### **1. The National Security Strategy**

In December 2001, the Parliament of Romania approved the new NSS<sup>8</sup> which broadened the state's perceptions on the security environment, defined the national security interest, identified national risks, and outlined the national policy objectives (Zulean, 2004, pp. 3-4). Of the six proposed in the NSS (2001), at least three of the national interests have obvious relevance for defense issues:

1. Preservation of the integrity, unity, sovereignty and independence of the Romanian state
2. Protection of the security and safety of Romania's citizens
3. Achievement of the conditions for the country's integration into NATO and the EU – "Romania must become a component with full obligations and rights of the two organizations, the only ones capable of guaranteeing its independence and sovereignty." (National Security Strategy, 2001)

Moreover, five national security policy objectives are related to defense issues and clearly contribute to the accomplishment of the national interests mentioned above:

1. Preserving the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Romanian state, under the specific conditions of NATO and EU integrations
2. Protecting the security of the citizens
3. Optimizing the national defense capability in accordance with NATO standards

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<sup>7</sup> It is with regret that we let aside the MSR, since the document explicitly mentions Special Forces as a tool to be used along the enemy's depth.

<sup>8</sup> Both the NSS and the MSR were developed before Romania's accession to NATO in 2004. Today, the only objective left for Romania, in terms of joining Euro-Atlantic organizations, is represented by the EU integration. It is expected that, after the presidential elections in November 2004, the new administration will adopt a new MSR that will be adapted to Romania's new status as a full NATO-member.

4. Improving the capacity to participate in international actions aiming at combating terrorism and organized crime
5. Active participation in international cooperation actions aimed at combating terrorism and transnational organized crime.

With regard to challenges, the strategy identified the following main foreign risk factors to the national security: crisis at a sub-regional level; ethnic-related tensions; proliferation of WMD; development of transnational terrorist organizations; organized crime; human trafficking; refugee flows; illegal access to computer systems; or deliberate provocation of environmental catastrophes.

Underscoring that international terrorism became increasingly complex and unpredictable, the NSS prescribed that Romania's internal capabilities for crisis management should be better coordinated so that the country would meet the requirements in terms of operational and effective participation in the international efforts to counter the threat.

Finally, the NSS offered clear directions for the national security policy. We will mention at this point only those directions that pertain to national defense issues and are relevant for our argument:

1. Achievement of interoperability with NATO forces
2. Creation and strengthening of the capabilities necessary for fulfilling, in an exemplary manner, the commitments made by Romania to take part in operations of peace-keeping, rescue, crisis response, combating terrorism, and humanitarian assistance at sub-regional and regional levels
3. Operationalization of the forces assigned to participate under the ESDP framework in EU missions, as well as in NATO, UN, and sub-regional forums missions
4. Improvement of the collaboration between intelligence services in the area of sharing information concerning potential risk factors to internal security and stability
5. Support to civilian authorities in the event of emergencies and natural disasters.

## **2. The Romanian Government Defense White Paper**

The Parliament adopted the current White Paper in May 2004. The document mentions the same national interests and risks as did the NSS three years ago, and it identifies terrorism in all its forms as the major challenge to Romania's security ("Carta Alba", 2004, p. 3). Expressing the country's commitment to substantially participate in NATO and the EU efforts to cope with the new threats and build appropriate capabilities, the White Paper mentions the PCC and The Headline Goal as national defense priorities (pp. 7-8). In terms of defense policy objectives, the document mentions four:

1. Integration into NATO and the EU, and development of Romania's strategic profile within these two organizations
2. Reform of the military with the aim to develop credible, modern, and efficient defense capabilities
3. Strengthening of the civilian democratic control over the armed forces according to the values of the constitutional democracy
4. Consolidation of the Romania's status as contributor to the regional and global security (p. 11).

It also states that Romania, while building and upgrading military capabilities, takes into consideration both NATO and the ECAP shortfalls, and already offers NATO a force package that includes: strategic airlift, reconnaissance, mountain troops, mechanized brigades, military police, early warning, electronic warfare, and SEAL teams. Romania's contribution to the NRF will manifest itself through elite units and rapid reaction forces (pp. 14-15). Indeed, Romanian leaders' intentions to contribute to the full range of NATO missions, from Article 5 to CRO, is specifically expressed in the White Paper (p. 14).

## **3. Strategic Missions for the Romanian Armed Forces**

As the White Paper directs, the RAF have four main missions and each mission implies several derived tasks:

1. Contribute to Romania's security during peacetime
  - 1.1. Defend the country's airspace
  - 1.2. Contribute to the security of the maritime space
  - 1.3. Collect, process, analyze, and disseminate military intelligence

- 1.4. Extraction and evacuation of endangered Romanian citizens from abroad
- 1.5. Ensure security of military infrastructure, transportation, and communications
- 1.6. Ensure protection of military VIPs, and organize ceremonials and protocol activities on Romanian soil
2. Defend Romania and its Allies
  - 2.1. Repel military aggression against Romania or its Allies in the framework of NATO collective defense
  - 2.2. Support the functioning of the governmental institutions, and protect the population
3. Strengthen regional and global stability including the use of defense diplomacy
  - 3.1. Participate in crisis response operations (CRO)
  - 3.2. Participate in HA operations overseas
  - 3.3. Participate in operations mounted by ad-hoc coalitions
  - 3.4. Participate in military cooperation initiatives and implement measures that reinforce trust and stability
  - 3.5. Offer security assistance and support to other states
  - 3.6. Contribute to national and international efforts to control armament and combat WMD proliferation
4. Support public agencies and local authorities during civil emergencies
  - 4.1. Participate with forces and logistical support in order to limit and remove the effects of disasters
  - 4.2. Provide support in the event of CBRN accidents
  - 4.3. Support search and rescue actions for civilian population (pp. 30-32).

These tasks and sub-tasks are approved by Romania's Supreme Council of National Defense, support the NSS and the Ministerial Directions issued by NATO in 2003, and are expected to appear in the next MSR (p. 36). But in order to provide a visible and relevant participation along the entire NATO spectrum of conflict, the RAF are required to be robust, interoperable, deployable, mobile, technologically advanced, self-sustainable for up to two years, and able to participate in counterterrorist operations (p. 37). Table 4 summarizes the aspects we have covered above and presents the strategic missions of the RAF that implement Romania's defense policy priorities.

Table 4. Lamb’s model question #2 – RAF principal missions

<b>ROMANIA’S DEFENSE POLICY</b>
<b><u>National Security Policy Objectives</u></b>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Preserving the attributes of the Romanian state, under the specific conditions of NATO and EU integrations</li> <li>2) Protecting the security of the citizens</li> <li>3) Bettering the national defense capability in accordance with NATO standards</li> <li>4) Improving the capacity to participate, and actively take part in international actions aimed at combating terrorism and organized crime</li> </ol>
<b><u>Directions of Action for the National Security Policy</u></b>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Interoperability with NATO forces</li> <li>2) Capabilities necessary for conducting peace-keeping, rescue, crisis response, combating terrorism, and humanitarian assistance operations</li> <li>3) Operationalization of the forces assigned to participate in EU, NATO, UN, and other sub-regional organizations missions</li> <li>4) Improved intelligence sharing between domestic security and law enforcement agencies</li> <li>5) Support to civilian authorities in the event of emergencies and natural disasters</li> </ol>
<b><u>Defense Policy Objectives</u></b>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Integration into NATO and the EU, and development of Romania’s strategic profile within these two organizations</li> <li>2) Reform of the military with the aim to develop credible, modern, and efficient defense capabilities</li> <li>3) Strengthening of civilian democratic control over the armed forces</li> <li>4) Consolidation of Romania’s contribution to regional and global security</li> </ol>
<b>MISSIONS FOR THE ARMED FORCES</b>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Contribute to Romania’s security during peacetime</li> <li>2) Defend Romania and its Allies</li> <li>3) Fortify regional and global stability</li> <li>4) Support public agencies and local authorities during civil emergencies</li> </ol>

An additional look at the tasks derived from the RAF’s core missions will reveal that the EU’s Petersberg missions also are covered by the Romanian defense strategy. This should not be a surprise since a brief comparison between the identified threats covered in Table 3, and the external risks developed by the NSS and the White Paper display obvious similarities.

Again, NATO, the EU, and Romania essentially expect the same requirements from their militaries, a fact that supports our initial assumption concerning the overlap of

external security environments. Continuing the application of the model, we shall discover whether their resemblances go further in the SF-employment field.

#### **4. Missions for General-Purpose Forces**

Now that the specified and implied strategic missions of the RAF are determined, the next step of our inquiry is to determine which tasks can be carried out today or in the near future by the Romanian General-Purpose Forces or other domestic security services, in answer to Lamb's third question.

From the outset, one should underscore that Romania has a strong tradition of active response in the area of crisis operations. Being the first former-communist country to have joined the PfP, Romanian conventional units – as part of a coalition or under the aegis of NATO, the UN, OSCE, or the EU – have participated in twenty-one missions, and today deploy more than 1,700 civilians, military observers, civilian police, military police, gendarmes, and troops in Africa, Iraq, the Balkans, the Caspian region, and Afghanistan (“The Participation of Romania”, 2004).

According to the White Paper, from 1991 until today, more than 10,000 troops have successfully participated in peacekeeping and peace supporting operations, humanitarian activities, and combat missions. In the following Table 5, we address each RAF mission (previously specified or implied from NATO missions), and consult the White Paper (pp. 25-28) in order to inquire which missions have already been executed by the Romanian GPF or other services. Additionally, when necessary, we also provide details about who executed the mission, and under what circumstances.

Continuing the application of Lamb's model, a glance at Table 5 identifies several key missions that have not yet been addressed by the Romanian conventional forces during their numerous deployments, or other domestic security services.

At this point, we have no reason to question the ability of Romania and NATO conventional forces to repel conventional aggression, support their populations and institutions while under attack, or execute embargo operations, nor do we intend to assess the country's conventional military capabilities to support the state and local authorities during civilian emergencies or disasters. That being said, there are five other strategic missions that have never been executed by the RAF, and are open to further study: extract

and evacuate Romanian citizens from dangerous places overseas; contribute to CP actions; execute CT actions; provide support to civilian SAR activities; and conduct initial entry operations.

Table 5. Lamb's question #3 – RAF mission assessments  
(After the Government's Defense White Paper)

<b>Strategic Mission</b>	<b>Executed?</b>	<b>Circumstances</b>	<b>Comments</b>
Defend airspace	Y	24/7	Romanian Air Force
Secure waters	Y	24/7	Romanian Navy
Execute intelligence activities	Y	SFOR; OEF; Iraq	MI assets provided area HUMINT and IMINT
Extraction and evacuation of civilians	N	Peacetime mission synonym with non-combatant evacuation in NATO jargon	
Security activities	Y	Organic elements, gendarmes, MP assets	
Protection of VIPs, organize ceremonials, and protocols	Y	Task for Protection and Security Service (PSS)	
Repel aggression	N	Tasks during conflict	
Support the state and protect the population	N		
Participate in CRO	Y	IFOR; SFOR; KFOR; Angola	
Participate in HA	Y	IFOR; SFOR; Somalia	
Support ad-hoc coalitions	Y	Desert Storm; Iraqi Freedom; Concordia; Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)	
Participate in military cooperation initiatives	Y	Angola; Moldova	
Provide security assistance	Y	Operation Enduring Freedom	Training and equipment to ANA
Contribute to CP actions	N	Not executed	
Provide support during disasters, including CBNR accidents	N	Synonym with consequence management in NATO jargon	
Provide support to civilian SAR activities	N	Peacetime task	
Execute CT actions	N	During Enduring Freedom an Infantry Battalion supported Coalition SF in CT actions	
Contribute to demonstrative packages	Y	Strategic Reserve for SFOR/KFOR executed show of force activities	
Conduct initial entry	N	Synonym with establish a beachhead	
Conduct embargo	N	Role played by the NRF during its first exercise	
Execute AT activities	Y	ISAF	MP in Kabul



In addition, there are three other missions that, although practiced by conventional elements, involve sub-tasks that are still generally ignored. Thus, we assess the following tasks as well: execute intelligence activities; protection of military and civilian VIPs; and AT activities. This provides us a total of eight RAF strategic missions from which SF tasks will subsequently be derived.

#### **D. MISSIONS FOR ROSF**

We have reached the last step of the application of Lamb's model and must evaluate each proposed ROSF task "in light of the intrinsic nature of special operations forces and the roles they can play." (Lamb, 1995, p. 8) It is true that each SF mission should support higher policy goals; nonetheless, in the evaluation of a task's appropriateness for SF elements, one should also take into account the nature of these specialized forces, and the guiding principles associated with the evaluation process itself.

##### **1. The Nature of SOF**

Generally speaking, SOF are military elements organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations that cannot be performed by conventional units. Trying to determine what was *special* about SOF, Pirnie (1994) contrasted U.S. SOF and GPF according to two criteria: typical employment and force characteristics. He concluded that, in terms of typical employment, SOF are employed differently than conventional forces because of the aspects listed below:

1. SOF often break contact with friendly forces, are inserted away from friendly support, in sensitive areas or behind enemy lines from where they need to be subsequently recovered
2. SOF elements may plan to avoid contact entirely, or, because of limited resources, they are very selective with respect to targets and duration of the combat
3. Large risks of failure and loss to their forces are common features of special operations. Because the margin for error is little, SOF troops reduce risk through detailed planning, creative thinking, extensive intelligence support, stealth, surprise, and quick limited action
4. The intent of special operations may focus on exercising leverage (the use of a small element to gain operational or strategic advantage); creating indirection (by

diverting the enemy's combat power or weakening its sources); or gaining or destroying the enemy's high value targets.

Force characteristics variables pertaining to personnel, equipment, training, and size also differentiate U.S. SOF from the GPF:

1. SOF operators are rigorously selected, exceptionally motivated, and capable of unconventional approaches
2. SOF often use modified versions of standard equipment, unique items, or nonstandard items procured through civilian suppliers
3. The type of training required for SOF is lengthy, usually joint and often combined with foreign forces
4. Typically, SO dictate a small and discrete force, which represents the most obvious difference between SOF and GPF (pp. 6-12).

Detailing the unique niche capability and value that SOF can offer to the overall military architecture and to the NCA, Lamb (1995) holds that "a broad consensus on how SOF differ from conventional forces will increase the likelihood that they will be used appropriately – SOF will neither be assigned missions that rightly belong to conventional forces nor will they be denied missions that they ought to undertake." (p. 9)

## **2. Use and Misuse of SOF**

Lamb also offers a set of axioms that can guide the process of evaluation of proposed new tasks for U.S. SOF. The analyst warns us that a new mission for SOF should fit the characteristics of SOF mentioned above and that the fact a military task must be carried out does not necessarily mean that SOF should take responsibility for it. We consider his observations correct and relevant for our focal organization, and we subsequently address them in detail. Listed below are Lamb's axioms that provide focus to his own model, as it is applied in our work, and aim to further distinguish SOF primary missions, collateral missions, and the tasks that should be assigned to GPF.

1. If the mission has as a necessary condition for success the requirement that SOF operators undertake it, then it should be considered a primary SOF mission.
2. If the odds for mission success significantly increase if SOF perform or participate in the mission, then the task might constitute a collateral mission.

3. If the mission will be only marginally better performed by SOF, it probably is not a SOF mission, unless there are special circumstances. “As a general rule, such mission should not be formally assigned to SOF, and the theater commander in chief should make the call on a case-by-case basis as circumstances demand.”
4. If SOF do not perform the mission as well as or better than conventional forces, the mission is inappropriate for SOF, and should be assigned to the GPF or other services.

Developing the issue of collateral tasks, Lamb observed that:

1. A regular characteristic of collateral missions is that SOF elements cannot accomplish them independently
2. Collateral missions are often derivatives of primary tasks
3. Many, although not all, so-called emerging missions belong to the collateral tasks category
4. Because SOF resources will remain limited in real terms, before embracing a collateral mission SOF leaders should ask whether it is a lesser-included case, such as a derivative from competencies required for primary missions
5. If a collateral mission is a SOF mission only in very special circumstances, SOF probably should not undertake the entire mission

The analyst understands that there are many other factors (i.e. politics and budgets) that may play important roles in the assignment of missions to SOF units, but he also emphasizes the utility of the rules of thumb we have just mentioned, in term of ensuring SOF’s strategic relevance, their harmonious integration with conventional forces, and the maximization of their contribution to the national military strategy. By systematically re-evaluating existing SOF missions and capabilities for relevance to the country’s security environment, and to the intrinsic nature of SOF, one will allow them to pass on to the GPF or other security organizations those tasks that no longer are classified as special operations.

However, in case these guidelines are ignored, and SOF elements lose their focus on what makes SOF special, they will be assigned inappropriate missions, which will lead in turn to the following risks:

1. Inefficient use of specialized assets for conventional tasks, channeling of limited resources towards programs of conventional nature at the expense of core capabilities, and possible inter-service tensions
2. Decrease in SOF's ability to think unconventionally
3. Threat of reabsorption by the conventional forces (pp. 8-9).

With Pirnie's observations on what is specific to SOF compared to conventional forces, and Lamb's comments about SOF tasking, we are ready at this point to evaluate and propose new missions and activities for ROSF.

### **3. Tasks Assessment**

From the eight remaining strategic tasks mentioned previously, we extract and propose new main missions and collateral activities for ROSF. More than being adapted to Romania's national defense policy, these new tasks are expected to fit the general SF characteristics, and their assessment should take into account Lamb's axioms.

#### ***a. Counterterrorism***

CT should constitute the first priority for the ROSF. The Romanian 1<sup>st</sup> SF Battalion was created as a consequence of 9/11, due to the fact that the Romanian GPF did not have deployable counterterrorist capabilities. This task clearly supports at least two National Security Policy Objectives. The first objective is *protecting the security of Romanian citizens*; the second objective is *improving the capacity to participate, and actively take part in international actions aimed at combating terrorism*. CT also supports at least three Directions of Action for the National Security Policy (1, 2, and 3) and three Defense Policy Objectives (1, 2, and 4), which are all presented previously in Table 4.

Internally, although the Romanian Intelligence Service (RIS) is the main organization responsible for CT, Article 12 of the Law on Prevention and Combating Terrorism states that the RIS can be assisted by specialized assets of the MoND ("Lege privind prevenirea", 2004, p. 8). While acknowledging the need for clear collaboration protocols between the two CT organizations, we emphasize the importance of the task for the Battalion both outside the country and, if need be, domestically.

Additionally, since CT represents one of the main priorities for the NRF and may soon become a task for the EU military, by consolidating CT as the primary mission for the SF Battalion, Romania will contribute, with a specialized niche capability, to the security of the Alliance, and to the Euro-Atlantic burden-sharing efforts.

Being the only MoND organization tasked with CT, the 1<sup>st</sup> SF Battalion should train for sub-tasks that include: intelligence operations, attacks against terrorist networks and objectives, hostage rescues, recovery of sensitive material from terrorist organizations, capture of wanted individuals, and provide CT-related training to allies and partners - that is security assistance in the CT field. These activities also present features peculiar to DA and SR.

***b. Counterproliferation of WMD***

The White Paper states that RAF contribute to the national and international efforts to counter the proliferation of WMD and arms by controlling the export/import flow of its own arsenals, participating in inspections, providing expertise, and sharing intelligence (“Carta Alba”, 2004, p. 31). Since Romanian CP of WMD initiatives are limited to these elements only, we propose that ROSF be tasked with the activities that link CT with CP. Because WMD in terrorists’ possession represents the acme of terror, the Romanian SF Battalion should be prepared to contribute to CP efforts by conducting specific sub-tasks such as: attacks against sensitive WMD targets, destroy or disable rogue states or terrorists’ non-WMD assets, collect intelligence related to WMD, and provide specific training to needy partners. Similar to the sub-tasks included in CT, CP of WMD involves aspects closely related to DA and SR.

Finally, CP of WMD will be the principal task that supports at least the same defense policy objectives as does CT and will substantiate Romania’s contribution to the Euro-Atlantic security, since both NATO and the EU consider proliferation of WMD one of the major threats.

***c. Conduct Initial Entry Operations***

For the NRF, conducting initial entry operations equates to establishing beachheads for the follow-on forces. As already practiced by the NRF in Italy, these initial entry operations demanded from NATO elite forces to conduct SR (reconnaissance and surveillance actions of a strategic and operational value), and DA (small scale

offensive strikes against targets of strategic and operational significance). As we have already seen, these last two missions are arguably closely related to one another and constitute the bread and butter of all SF units within the Alliance. They should remain principal tasks for the SF Battalion as well. Moreover, in the event of aggression against Romania or its Allies, SF will be ready to provide support to GPF by maintaining a capability to conduct these two missions in the territory controlled by the aggressor.

Although Romanian GPF have military intelligence, SIGINT, HUMINT and IMINT capabilities, their proficiency is limited to a tactical and operational levels<sup>9</sup>. By perfecting the abilities to conduct DA and SR, the Romanian SF elements will improve their CT and CP skills as well, and will strategically contribute to the future initial entry operations of the NRF. Thus, Romania will participate in the entire spectrum of missions that the NRF undertakes, and will achieve its defense policy objective of contributing to regional and global security.

#### ***D. Execute Intelligence Activities***

The White Paper states that intelligence collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination represent activities that specialized MoND structures carry out in order to support military and political decision-makers (“Carta Alba”, 2004, p. 30). The Military Intelligence Directorate (MID) did participate in CRO and provided, via troops on the ground and UAVs, area studies and reconnaissance reports for military decision-makers (pp. 27-28). Nonetheless, as mentioned above, their capabilities do not cover HUMINT requirements at strategic and operational levels, and therefore necessary redundancy is lacking in the collection plan of the Romanian deployed MI assets.

Who then should conduct HUMINT at levels higher than tactical? One option would be for the MID to create its own SR elements, but this would cause an unnecessary redundancy, since we have already noticed the extent to which SR is associated with CT, CP, DA, and initial entry SF missions. Another option would be to use SF elements for SR at the operational and strategic level, while MI troops conduct HUMINT at a tactical level, and IMINT assets, according to their range, will offer positive redundancy at tactical and operational levels.

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<sup>9</sup> The MID uses Shadow 600 UAVs that have a range of 200 kilometers.

In the absence of Romanian strategic IMINT, the Allies can bring their assets to ensure redundancy. In conclusion, the Romanian SF elements should continue to train for accomplishing the strategic task of supporting the nations' military collection plan by providing information of operational and strategic significance.

*e. Non-combatant Extraction and Evacuation*

Addressing extraction and evacuation of endangered Romanian citizens from abroad, the White Paper stipulates that RAF execute or participate in this mission individually or in cooperation with allies and partners, when non-military means of intervention become ineffective ("Carta Alba", 2004, p. 30). Both NATO and the EU consider this mission a priority (non-combatant evacuation, and respectively rescue operations), and, as mentioned previously, the NRF practiced this role in November, 2003 using Turkish SF as a hostage rescue element, and conventional elements such as infantry and paratroopers for evacuation activities. Since it is a relatively new mission, Romanian GPF have not developed the capability for such a specific challenge, but does that mean that non-combatant extraction and evacuation (NCEE) should immediately become a ROSF task?

The historical record shows that well trained conventional professional troops can conduct NCEE. For example, in November 1964, more than 500 Belgian paratroopers, using 5 U.S. Air Force C-130s, evacuated from Congo nearly 2,000 European civilians in two days (Odom, 1998, p. 173). Operation *Quick Lift* in Zaire, September-October 1991 and Operation *Turquoise* in Rwanda conducted by the French in June 1994 constitute two other examples that prove conventional forces' ability to conduct this mission. That said, in the event that the extraction and evacuation involves more than assembling, protecting, and airlifting civilians (i.e., rescuing citizens held hostage, terrorist, or WMD threat), the presence on the ground of qualified Romanian SF becomes necessary. But, as Lamb observed earlier, because NCEE could become a SF mission only in very special circumstances, the Romanian SF should not undertake it as a mission.

Instead, one of the Romanian paratrooper battalions should be specifically tasked with NCEE, while the SF elements remain ready to support it if extraordinary contingencies occur. Thus, the Romanian military will be able to execute an additional

EU Petersberg task that is also required by NATO and the country's leaders. Using the SF only for contingencies, such as a hostage crisis scenario, the Romanian military will be prepared for the worst case course of action that can be associated with this mission, without, however, formally overburdening the SF.

If we consider the Romanian SF playing a role in evacuating non-combatants, albeit in extraordinary circumstances only, it would be fair to address CSAR as well. We have already underscored that the EU capabilities in this field are limited, and this could indeed constitute an opportunity for the ROSF to help the Allies in their CSAR still modest initiatives.

However, in light of the U.S. SF operators misuse as ground security elements for CSAR activities during the Gulf War, we consider that the task does not fit the characteristics of SOF discussed in the previous section. CSAR should be assigned to SF only during extraordinary circumstances; therefore, according to Lamb's axiom, it should not constitute a stand alone SF task. The Allies could emulate the example of the U.S., pool their resources, and build CSAR dedicated assets such as those that are subordinated to AFSOC.

*f. Provide Support to Civilian SAR Activities*

The White Paper explains that, when the resources allow it, the Romanian military conducts search and rescue missions in support of the civilian population, in collaboration with other agencies with responsibilities in the field (p. 32). Given the country's mountainous terrain, harsh winters, and limited civilian rotary-wing capabilities, the military unit that is tasked with SAR activities is expected to be relatively busy. Because SF elements need to train continuously in order to maintain proficiency, and because this task could be only marginally executed better by SF than a dedicated conventional element, we propose that this task be addressed by a territorial conventional unit.

*g. Protection of VIPs*

As stipulated in the White Paper, the Romanian MoND provides qualified personnel as security detail for Romanian and foreign military VIPs on Romanian soil – a strategic task for the Protection and Security Service (PSS) (“Carta Alba”, 2004, p. 31). Within the same document, one can find the two main sub-tasks of the service: (1)



protection of Romanian dignitaries, foreign dignitaries during their stay on Romanian soil, and of their families; and (2) security for these dignitaries' offices and residences. In June 2003, the Romanian Parliament adopted a new *Law on objectives, goods, and values security, and protection of persons* that reinforces in Article 3 the PSS two-fold task ("Lege privind paza obiectivelor", 2003, p. 2). What is not clear though is, who should be responsible for protecting Romanian military and political VIPs when they pay protocol visits to Romanian troops in dangerous theaters such as Iraq or Afghanistan?

This last detail has not been acknowledged by the conventional units or services. It is possible that some less cautious officials might move away from the shelter provided by the troops they visit, and thus become targets. Given their knowledge of the environment, and their experience in dealing with crisis situations, SF troops, would be the appropriate asset for this type of security detail, and they should train for this role. Subsequently, the strategic mission of protecting Romania's leaders will be covered in both its aspects internally, by the PSS, and in operational theaters, by the SF.

Since it is difficult to envisage an alternative to this arrangement without efficiency losses, we propose protection of VIPs in operational theaters as a collateral mission for ROSF. Finally, executive protection activities may arguably involve an AT aspect as well, mainly due to the reduction of the VIP's vulnerability to the terrorist threat that SF guards would provide (Adams, 1998, p. xvi).

#### ***h. Conduct AT Activities***

The fourth National Security Policy Objective introduced by Romania's NSS aims at improving the capacity to participate, and actively take part in, international actions designed to combat terrorism. As we have already mentioned in the previous chapter, combating terrorism comprises both CT and AT. According to the Romanian legislation, *antiterrorist intervention* comprises all the defensive measures taken prior to the occurrence of a terrorist attack that aim at reducing the vulnerability of specific and non-specific human factors and material factors. The same document defines *counterterrorist intervention* as the sum of all the offensive measures taken in order to capture or kill terrorists, free hostages and reestablish law and order in the event of a terrorist attack ("Lege privind combaterea", 2004, p. 5).

Because the CT training missions previously tasked to ROSF are designed to improve chosen partners' CT abilities, one could argue that being better prepared, more often than not, is being less vulnerable. By threatening with serious, credible, and immediate reprisals, a highly proficient CT unit will deter terrorists who still have survival instincts. By sharing information about the nuances of the same threat viewed from two postures (defensive and offensive), all the agencies involved in countering the threat can benefit.

At this point we agree with Collins (1993) who, as we have mentioned previously, looked at both missions as the flip sides of the same coin (p. 25). Because Romanian SF are expected to train others, share lessons learned, protect VIPs, and cooperate with domestic CBT agencies, we propose AT to be associated to CT and security assistance; consequently, CBT (CT and AT) becomes the primary mission for the Romanian SF. With such a niche capability, the Romanian military will fully support NATO's declared CBT efforts, and ROSF will implement the national security policy goal listed above in its entirety.

#### **E. FIVE MISSIONS FOR ROSF**

We have reached the end of our analysis, and are able to name appropriate tasks for ROSF. Listed below in Table 6 are the resulting missions that, as Lamb advised, are appropriate SF tasks, promote Romania's defense strategy imperatives as stated in the NSS and the White Paper, and are adapted to the country's Euro-Atlantic security environment. Since there are ROSF tasks that support several different defense-related strategic goals and missions, Table 6 attempts to present only the self-explanatory relationships.

Of the sixteen tasks formally assigned to the Romanian SF by the SO Doctrine, as it has been revealed by the application of Lamb's model and axioms, only five clearly met all the conditions necessary for being considered appropriate for the Romanian SF. If one is to categorize these five tasks in light of the dual nature that characterizes USSOCOM's missions, one would conclude that ROSF should not focus the training of its members on the unconventional aspect of the equation.

Since we cannot identify in the Romanian strategic documents elements that resonate with the *Truman Doctrine*, or with the U.S.’ ambitious strategic goals to assure allies and friends, maintain leadership in the global community, and be viewed as an indispensable partner (all addressed earlier in Chapter II); it is not surprising that Lamb’s modified framework eliminated a portion of the U.S. SOF community’s complex mix of missions.

Table 6. Appropriate missions for Romanian Special Forces

<b>ROSF Principal Missions</b>	<b>Supported Romanian Strategic Goals or Missions</b>
1. CBT (CT and AT)	Defend Romania and its Allies; Consolidation of the Romania’s status as contributor to the regional and global security; Improving the capacity to participate, and actively take part in international actions aimed at combating terrorism; Offer security assistance and support to other states
2. CP of WMD	Contribute to national and international efforts to combat WMD proliferation
3. SR	Participate in operations mounted by ad-hoc coalitions; Collect and disseminate military intelligence
4. DA	Bettering the national defense capability in accordance with NATO standards; Participate in CRO;
<b>Collateral Mission</b>	
5. VIP security detail in operational theaters	Protecting the security of the citizens; Contribute to Romania’s security during peacetime; Ensure protection of military VIPs

Accordingly, in the absence of global responsibilities for Romania, ROSF should narrow its field of specialization to the activities that orbit around CBT, SR, and DA, and try to address, if necessary, UW, FID, and all the other related tasks, in cooperation with other NATO Allies. As Adams (1998) pointed out:

In many respects, the question of what SOF does or ought to do comes down to training time. To expect a single organization, no matter how talented, to undertake missions as diverse and complex as those assigned to Army Special Forces is to expect the impossible. (p. 305)

The other eleven doctrinal tasks are ruled out because either they do not support national defense policy objectives, or, in cases where they do, they can be successfully carried out by GPF or do not constitute appropriate SF tasks. The framework also revealed the necessity for the RAF to dedicate a highly-trained paratrooper unit – a Ranger-type element - to conduct NCEE. A unit of this type may also provide invaluable fire power support to Romanian SF during CT, CP, or DA missions.

In the determination of the ROSF's missions, we consider the first phase of our organizational redesigning effort complete. In the next chapter we will continue our quest and address the best structural arrangements for ROSF establishment.

## **F. SUMMARY**

In this chapter we have focused on substantiating the framework developed by Lamb. Romania's geopolitical environment is extensively influenced by the North Atlantic Alliance and the defense and security initiatives within the EU. This reality is visible within the country's NSS and the new White Paper of the Government. These two key documents specify the national goals, national security objectives, and the strategic missions required from the armed forces.

A detailed application of the chosen model, and additional help from Lamb's expertise in the field, have produced five missions for ROSF that are at the same time easily justifiable and appropriate – CBT, CP of WMD, SR, DA, and VIP security detail in operational theaters. By contrast, the applied method did not indicate the appropriateness for ROSF of tasks that belong to the unconventional operations category of the U.S. SOF missions. By limiting the number its tasks, ROSF could finally focus its training and doctrine. From this solid basis, further organizational developments and improvements are possible.

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## IV. STRUCTURING ROSF

In this chapter, a new organizational structure has been proposed for ROSF. This recommendation was based on Burton and Öbel's (1998) organizational model, which was helpful in exploring how ROSF should be restructured and adjusted in order to become an effective, efficient, and viable defense organization.

Organizational theory is a positive science that states our understanding about how the world operates and contrasts that understanding with a view of how the world could possibly operate. It provides the theoretical underpinnings for organizational design. ...Organizational design is a normative science with the goal of prescribing how an organization should be structured in order to function effectively and efficiently. (p. xviii)

According to Burton & Öbel, organizational design is both a product and a process: it is a product that prescribes how things ought to be within an organization so it can attain its goals; and it is a continuous process of organizational learning involving errors, adjustments, and exploitation of past experiences (p. xvi). But since ROSF was founded in 2003, its organizational experiences are limited; therefore, proposing a new structure would naturally constitute a predominantly prescriptive effort, and less the product of past lessons learned.

In order to avoid this unsatisfying approach, in addition to applying Burton & Öbel's *Organizational Consultant* design program to ROSF, conclusions are drawn from the specific lessons learned from two experienced Allied SF organizations – the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command and the British Special Forces Group. In this regard, Lauren (1994) is supportive; he observed that “the richness of the past and the experiences of others in different times and places establish a historical context that can provide invaluable insights and perspectives on our contemporary concerns.” (p. 45) In other words, in proposing a new organizational structure for ROSF, both consistent design rules provided by organizational theory and prescriptions or recommendations from the Allies' experiences in the SF field are taken into consideration.

As a result of this approach, we have reached the conclusion that ROSF's configuration should become more centralized, encompassing SEAL, SF, Ranger, and dedicated aviation assets; moreover, the number of vertical levels should be reduced, and

the organization's complexity decreased through a limited number of tasks. First, Burton and Öbel's theoretical interpretations set the stage for the application of the Organizational Consultant design program. Second, the program is used to identify ROSF's internal unbalances and provides recommendations for multiple readjustments. Third, from the multitude of these suggested improvements we select only those that have direct relevance for the organization's configuration and test their viability in light of the institutional experiences recorded in the JSOC and British Special Forces Group's history. At the end of this process that uses both theoretical and practical instruments, a new structure for ROSF will emerge.

#### **A. THEORETICAL OBSERVATIONS**

According to Burton & Öbel, the key issue in organizational design is to structure an organization to meet three paramount criteria:

- 1) Effectiveness – an organization is effective if it realizes its *raison d'être* and accomplishes its missions
- 2) Efficiency – an organization is efficient when, in providing its products or services, it utilizes the least amount of resources
- 3) Viability – an organization is viable if it survives over a long period of time (p. 4)

Central to Burton & Öbel's approach is the concept of *organizational fit*. This fundamental concept measures how well organizational structure facilitates, both internally and externally, an organization's coordinated activities. Indeed, in order to obtain coordinated activities and meet the three criteria mentioned above, an organization must fit together internally and also fit its external environment (p. 46).

As previously underscored, developing an organizational design starts with an understanding of the strategic goals and missions of the organization. As depicted in Figure 1, these two elements subsequently determine six organizational dimensions, such as the boundary<sup>10</sup>, technology, strategy, size, management style, and climate of the organization, which all in turn influence the choice of a new organizational structure (pp. 12-13).

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<sup>10</sup> The boundary of an organization separates the individuals or activities that are inside the organization, from those that are outside it, and form the organization's environment.




Figure 1. Organizational Context (From Burton & Öbel, 1998, p. 12)

Since ROSF’s organizational goal is to defend Romania’s fundamental interests (Special Operations Doctrine, 2003, p. 7), and its proposed strategic missions are the five identified in the previous chapter (CBT, CP of WMD, SR, DA, and VIP security detail), it can be surmised that implications associated with these missions have a profound influence on all the organizational dimensions mentioned above, including ROSF’s structure. However, given the complexity of the organizational context, illustrated in Figure 1, and acknowledging that designing an organization may involve thousands of possible alternatives, it is desirable to develop a systematic approach that can incorporate the organizational knowledge related to the interdependence between the organizational dimensions.

## B. ORGANIZATIONAL CONSULTANT PROGRAM

At this point, Burton & Öbel’s work becomes extremely relevant for this project. Their approach is to translate the interdependences that exist between management style, climate, size, environment, strategy, and technology – called *contingency factors* – and the organizational structure into meaningful *if-then* rules<sup>11</sup>. In order to facilitate this, they developed *Organizational Consultant* – a computer-based expert system that

<sup>11</sup> There are approximately 450 such rules in the authors’ work. An example of such a rule would be: “If the organization is large, then decentralization should be high.”



operationalizes the theoretical propositions developed in their work, and helps deal with millions of design possibilities in a comprehensive manner (p. xix). By using this program, it was possible to diagnose ROSF and then provide recommendations for its improvement.

For diagnostic purposes, Organizational Consultant required answers to sixty questions concerning an organization’s current configuration, formalization, complexity, centralization, age, size, environment, management style, strategy, and cultural climate. Once these questions were addressed, the program used the answers as input data for the analysis phase. It subsequently provided all the unbalanced situations among the contingency factors. This included *the situation misfits* with recommendations for the organization’s configuration, complexity, formalization, and centralization; as well as the *organizational misfits* that compare the recommended organization with that of the current organization. Figure 2 depicts a block diagram of this process.




Figure 2. Organizational Consultant’s Method

### C. ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTORS

One cannot fully understand the design program’s outputs without addressing the meaning of the variables that describe an organization and their adaptation to ROSF. These descriptors include: configuration, formalization, organizational complexity and differentiation, centralization, environment, coordination and control, management and leadership style, organizational climate, size, technology, and strategy. The following

lines describe ROSF according to these variables, and constitute, at the same time, the foundation for the inputs used in Organizational Consultant.

### **1. ROSF Configuration**

According to Burton & Öbel (1998), the configuration of an organization specifies “the general principles for dividing work, breaking tasks into subtasks, and coordinating activities.” (p. 45) ROSF’s existing configuration is represented in an organizational chart in Figure 3. In establishing ROSF’s configuration, one of the following most common basic configuration could be chosen: simple, functional, divisional, matrix, machine bureaucracy, professional bureaucracy, and adhocracy.

A look at Figure 3 reveals that, in addition to the SF Battalion that is directly subordinated to the General Staff, there are SF elements in all three services. According to SO Doctrine (2003), all these SF units are established according to the *undetached modules, but detachable* principle. The Doctrine states that, within their parent services, all the SF-designated units have a distinct individuality and special training programs. However, they do not enjoy resource allocation freedom (p. 12).

Therefore, by doctrine, the current Romanian SF organization comprises several units that can form SF taskforces, according to the specific missions they are called to carry out. From this perspective, one can conclude that ROSF have an ad hoc configuration. However, when such taskforces are established, they comprise organizations that are themselves military hierarchies belonging to different parent services.

Given the specialization that exists within ROSF in terms of combat missions (i.e., psychological operations, air lift, close air support, operations at sea, or actions in mountainous terrain; and the geographical distance between different Romanian SF units (i.e., paratrooper battalions, the SF battalion, mountain troops, or reconnaissance elements), one notices characteristics that provide ROSF functional, divisional, or matrix attributes as well.

For these reasons, briefly expressed above, Organizational Consultant’s question concerning the configuration of ROSF is not answered.




Figure 3. ROSF Organizational Chart

## 2. Formalization

Formalization represents the quantity of written rules, and involves measurement and the degree of compliance of the employees. Formalization is one way to obtain standardized behavior from members of an organization, and it constitutes a means of coordination and control. Standardization can lead to quality work and generally efficient operations. If the managers of an organization make decisions based on rules, procedures, and policies that are in writing, it means that such organizations have higher formalization. While ad hoc structures abhor rules, written rules provide the fundamental characteristic of a bureaucracy (Burton & Öbel, 1998, p. 73-74). All the elements that

form ROSF are military organizations, and therefore it is considered that, by definition, they display a high degree of formalization.

### **3. Organizational Complexity and Differentiation**

*Organizational complexity* measures the degree of three types of differentiation. *Horizontal differentiation* is greater when there are several small tasks, and specialization by experience, training, and education. *Vertical differentiation* represents the number of hierarchical levels between top management and the bottom of the hierarchy. *Spatial differentiation* increases when there are many locations of facilities and personnel (pp. 68-69). As depicted in Figure 3, there are four vertical levels between the Chief of the General Staff and, for example, the ODAs of the SF Battalion. Given the great number of small tasks pertaining to combat activities and the various geographic locations for SF units (i.e. cities like Bucuresti, Constanta, Targu-Mures, or Buzau), ROSF's organizational complexity is considered to be high.

### **4. Centralization**

Centralization, like formalization, is a means of coordination; it represents the degree to which an individual, unit, or level concentrates its formal authority to make discretionary choices concerning issues such as: establishing the budget, exercising control over evaluations and rewards, being involved in hiring and firing personnel, purchasing supplies and equipment, or establishing programs and projects. While the SF Battalion belongs to a centralized chain of command comprising the SF and AT Service, and the J3 Directorate, the other SF-designated units are decentralized since it is their parent service (Air Force, Army, and Navy) that administers them, and not the SF and AT Service.

### **5. The Environment**

In Daft's (2003) view, the organizational environment comprises "all elements that exist outside the boundary of the organization and have the potential to affect all or part of the organization." (p. 50) The previous chapter acknowledged the importance of this contingency factor and attempted to adapt ROSF's missions to its national and international security environments. The purpose of this chapter is also to propose adjustments that would increase the necessary fit between the organization and its context. As Figure 1 indicates, organizational configurations should be designed in

relation to the environment. In our case, ROSF's environment includes factors such as: political and military requirements, financial resources, technology advances, international developments that may lead to deployment, or the enemy and his actions.

Four variables – *equivocality*, *uncertainty*, *complexity*, and *hostility* - capture important dimensions of the environment. *Equivocality* is the “existence of multiple and conflicting interpretations”; it is related to something that the organization has not experienced before and measures the organization's ignorance of whether a variable exists in the environment (Daft & Lengel, as cited Burton & Öbel, 1998, pp. 174-175). Ignorance of data and cause/effects, and an unknown or unset agenda for the organization also are incorporated into the environmental equivocality (p. 175). While *uncertainty* is not knowing the value of a variable or descriptor from the environment (p. 175), *environmental complexity* measures the number of these variables and their interdependency. Finally, *hostility* measures how benign or malevolent the organization's environment is, and it can vary from a supporting context to a predatory environment that threatens the organization's existence (pp. 176-177).

Given that ROSF is at an incipient phase with regard to building an effective capability, the levels of equivocality and uncertainty are still important. In addition, from peacetime activities to actual special operations, ROSF's environmental complexity and hostility vary from low to extreme.

## **6. Coordination and Control**

According to Burton & Öbel (1998), in order to obtain common goals, the smaller activities within an organization must be coordinated to accomplish larger tasks. Coordination and control comprise two aspects: one is to make sure that enough relevant and timely information is available so that organizational members are able to make the right decisions, and the second is to make sure that the members actually make the right decisions (p. 76).

The authors have identified four major means to obtain coordination and control: formalization, centralization (both were already addressed above), incentives (payments and rewards for groups or individuals), and lateral structures (empowered autonomous groups). ROSF's current structure does not use centralization as a means to coordinate all SF elements.

## **7. Management and Leadership Styles**

According to the contingency theory developed in Burton & Öbel's work, management and leadership styles are two other factors that determine an appropriate organizational design. Organizational Consultant differentiates between managers and leaders and assesses their styles in terms of: preference for delegation (low versus high); level of detail in decision making (very detailed versus low); reactive or proactive in decision making (reactive versus proactive); decision making time horizon (short term related to plans versus long term related to future visions); risk preference (risk averse versus risk taking); and the use of motivation and control (monitoring details versus high motivation and inspiration) (pp. 92-93).

## **8. Organizational Climate**

The climate helps determine the appropriate level of centralization; for instance a high level of trust within an organization suggests less formalization and more decentralization. In addition to the level of trust, measuring climate needs to take into consideration the following dimensions: the level of conflict, morale, equitability in rewards, resistance to change, leaders' credibility, and scapegoating (pp. 120-121).

Although the last two descriptors are very difficult to measure and are not central to this project's approach, their definitions help us gain a better understanding of the program's exhaustive recommendations for ensuring organizational fit within ROSF.

## **9. The Size of the Organization**

The larger the organization, the more management should increase the level of decentralization. But there are different views on what constitutes a small, medium, and large organization and what the correlations between size and organizational structure are. In this project, Burton & Öbel's (1998) practical and simple approach, which is to measure the number of employees adjusted for their level of professionalization or skill capability. Thus, the size category results from the relationship between the total number of employees and their professionalization, which is expressed by the proportion of advanced degrees or years of specialized training (pp. 152-153).

Due to the high percentage of SF operators with many years of training, ROSF is considered a large organization in Organizational Consultant; however, this parameter had little influence on the program's recommended configuration.

## 10. Technology

“Technology is the information, equipment, techniques, and processes required to transform inputs into outputs.” (Robbins, as cited Burton & Obel, 1998, p. 212) The connection between technology and structure first was developed by Joan Woodward who demonstrated that, for instance, the administrative component, or nondirect worker component within an organization increases with increased technological complexity (p. 212). After their literature survey, Burton & Obel found four dimensions along which one can measure technology:

1. Manufacturing, retail, wholesale, or service
2. Unit, mass, or process production
3. Routine or nonroutine
4. High or low divisibility (p. 220)

Attempting to describe ROSF along these dimensions, the following conclusions have been reached. ROSF is a *service* defense organization that conducts special operations when directed to do so by the NCA. The service is tailor made for the Romanian MoND, and thus it is a *unit production* technology that, during operations, involves *nonroutine* work with difficult problems. Because ROSF’s main tasks can be divided into smaller, relatively independent tasks, the degree of the organization’s technological *divisibility* is high (pp. 220-224).

## 11. Organizational Strategy

“The fit between the strategy and the organizational structure has crucial implications for the performance of the organization.” (Miller, as cited Burton & Obel, 1998, p. 241) The strategy represents both ends and means – it includes the specification of the overall end goals and defines the means of action needed to achieve these goals (p. 241). The debate on “what follows what” with regard to strategy and structure is still open. So far, in this thesis, it has been considered that structure follows strategy, and this perspective is in agreement with Burton & Obel’s conclusions (p. 255). Attempting to categorize ROSF’s strategy choices one must choose among at least five options:

- *Prospector* – an organization that almost continually searches for opportunities, regularly experiments with potential responses to changes in the environment, and innovates, but usually at the expense of efficiency

- *Defender* – an organization that presents a limited area of operation, a narrow focus that seldom requires major adjustments in the organization’s technology, methods, or structure; instead, primary attention is devoted to improving the efficiency of the existing operations
- *Analyzer with innovation* – combines the two strategies addressed above by entering a new domain only after viability has been shown; in addition innovations can run at the same time with the regular activity
- *Analyzer without innovation* – once that the organization has moved into new products or markets it still maintains an emphasis on its ongoing products; the organization’s limited innovation is concerned mostly with the production process and generally not with the product itself
- *Reactor* – an organization in which top management frequently perceives change and uncertainty in the environment, but they are unable to respond effectively. They will seldom make adjustments in strategy or structure unless they are forced to do so by outside pressures (p. 252).

In light of the environmental challenges that ROSF must cope with, Organizational Consultant recommends that, in addition to ROSF’s focus on the quality of the service it provides, the organization should also adopt an open attitude toward innovation, which is an *analyzer with innovation* strategy.

#### **D. ORGANIZATIONAL CONSULTANT ASSESSMENT**

At this point, all the necessary descriptors required for the Organizational Consultant program have been addressed, and some of them have been detailed according to the scope of this project. With this complete, the program can conduct its assessment after all the input data, on the variables that describe ROSF, are entered. Again, the key principle beyond Organizational Consultant’s assessments and recommendations is that good fit is necessary among the elements that form ROSF’s organizational context presented previously in Figure 1. A good fit means better performance, and it will help ROSF become effective, efficient, and viable by the time of its operational deployment.

The final observations and the misfits between the contingency factors, the structure, and the characteristics of ROSF that the program identifies are presented in the Annex and constitute useful material for deeper analysis. In this thesis, however, the



focus is solely on what should be adjusted in the ROSF's structure so that the organization matches its particular context. Accordingly, from the Report Summary offered by Organizational Consultant, only the elements pertaining to ROSF's organizational misfits and recommendations concerning organizational configuration are listed below.

Organizational misfits compare the recommended organization with the current organization. The following organizational misfits are present:

- Current and prescribed configuration do not match
- Current and prescribed complexity do not match
- Current and prescribed centralization do not match
- Current and prescribed formalization do not match

Organizational Consultant recommendations for organizational configurations:

The most likely configuration that best fits the situation has been estimated to be a simple configuration. A simple organization has a flat hierarchy and a singular head for control and decision making. The primary reason for recommending a simple configuration is that the organization has extreme environmental hostility. Extreme environmental hostility requires that the organization can respond consistently and rapidly to unforeseen challenges. Therefore, it must have a simple configuration.

Additional recommendations:

- The recommended degree of organizational complexity is low
- A highly equivocal environment requires more flexibility
- The recommended degree of horizontal differentiation is low
- The recommended degree of vertical differentiation is low
- The recommended degree of centralization is high. (Organizational Consultant Summary Report, Annex A, pp. 6-8).

From the above, it follows that ROSF should adopt a simple configuration, in which the top management dominates and assumes responsibility and authority to make decisions, coordinate and control, in short - a high degree of centralization. A simple and flexible structure is recommended for better coping with ROSF's hostile and equivocal environment. It requires a low number of vertical levels, that is a low vertical differentiation, (a flat hierarchy), and a reduced number of tasks (low horizontal differentiation).

In the previous chapter, results from Lamb's framework also concluded that a reduced number of tasks was required; in fact, the recommendation was that the number of ROSF's tasks should be reduced from sixteen to five. A brief look at two NATO

Allied SF organizations also will support Organizational Consultant conclusions related to ROSF configuration.

#### **E. THE U.S. JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (JSOC)**

One could argue that JSOC was established in response to incidents such as the failed Son Tay, Mayaguez, and Desert One operations. These events served to strengthen the resolve of politicians and top military officials to build an effective joint hostage rescue capability. Questioned by senators about the lessons he had learned from Desert One failure, Colonel Beckwith (1983) – the ground commander of the raid – replied:

In Iran we had an ad hoc affair. We went out, found bits and pieces, people and equipment, brought them together occasionally and ask them to perform a highly complex mission. The parts all performed, but they didn't necessarily perform as a team. Nor did they have the same motivation. My recommendation is to put together an organization which contains everything it will ever need, an organization which would include Delta, the Rangers, Navy SEALs, Air Force pilots, its own staff, its own support people, its own aircraft and helicopters. Make this organization a permanent military unit. Give it a place to call home. Allocate sufficient funds to run it. And give it sufficient time to recruit, assess, and train its people. Otherwise we are not serious about combating terrorism. (p. 326)

*United States Special Operations Forces Posture Statement* (1993) and the subsequent SOF Postures works provide few details about JSOC. It states that the organization was established in 1980 at Fort Bragg, is a sub-unified command of USSOCOM, and has the following directives: study requirements and techniques pertaining to joint special operation (JSO); ensure equipment standardization and interoperability; provide expertise for a standing JSO task force; plan and carry out JSO exercises and training; and develop JSO tactics (p. B-5)

Collins (1987) offers additional insight about the organization and explains that the standard U.S. DoD response to questions about JSOC is:

The U.S. Government has trained forces and equipment from all four services to cope with terrorist incidents. We have also said that command and control elements for these forces exist and have been exercised. These elements report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as do other command and control elements for military operations. We do not want to comment further on any details concerning the circumstances under which these forces may be deployed, their identity, or tactics. (p. 21)

Originally reporting directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JSOC also consolidates control of, trains, deploys, develops doctrine for, and employs elite hostage rescue and other CT and DA elements.

Figure 4 indicates that JSOC employs nearly 1,000 highly-trained operators, enjoys high priority for equipment, and comprises the Delta Force, specialized helicopter elements, SEAL Team 6, a communications element, and other aviation assets from the 2<sup>nd</sup> Air Division that support as required<sup>12</sup> (pp. 21-22).

Indeed, strategic airlift is provided by conventional aviation assets on a priority basis. JSOC represents a permanent joint organization, with a flat and centralized hierarchy that is tailored to perform a small number of tasks related mainly to the CBT field.




Figure 4. The Organizational Chart of the JSOC

With organic aviation assets, the organization can provide a flexible and immediate response and it could constitute a model for ROSF just as the British 22<sup>nd</sup> SAS Regiment represented a conceptual and organizational model for Delta in the late 1970s (Beckwith, 1983, p. 101).

#### F. THE BRITISH SF

Created during WWII with the main purpose of conducting raids in the enemy's rear, the Special Air Service (SAS) – one of the world's most viable SF organizations - and its sister organization - the Special Boat Service (SBS) - both integrated into a new

<sup>12</sup> This information about JSOC is collected from open sources, which the Pentagon does not confirm or deny.

Special Forces Headquarters Group in March 1987. Commanded by a Director of Special Forces (typically an SAS brigadier with an SBS colonel as a second-in-command), the Group constituted the response to a perceived need for closer coordination which manifested itself during the Falklands campaign. The accidental friendly fire that caused the death of an SBS marine at the hands of an SAS party demonstrated that the presence of uncoordinated SF units within the same area of operations was a poor organizational and operational choice.

With the creation of the joint SF Group - depicted in Figure 5 - the SBS freely adopted a new configuration that mirrored that of the SAS (*squadrons and troops*). Concurrently, the possibility of confusion during planning was reduced, wasteful redundancy was eliminated, and new techniques and technologies started to spread easier within the British SF community (Finlan, 2002, 92-93).

Unlike the U.S. JSOC, the British SF Group does not have organic aviation assets (Kemp, 1994, p. 208). Nonetheless, as directed, the Royal Air Force (RAF) provides specifically trained rotary-wing and C-130 SF squadrons (i.e. 7 and 47 RAF SF Squadrons) in support of the Group's missions (Ratcliffe, 2000, p. 186).

Moreover, the SAS enjoys a high priority position within the defense establishment, and it is the best equipped unit in the British Army:

The system is brilliant; in effect, the Regiment has carte blanche on weapons purchase, and all sorts of other equipment besides. Thus whatever the SAS wants, the SAS gets. If they want to try a new weapon, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) makes sure that they have the opportunity. And if they like it, then it is purchased for them. (p. 67)




Figure 5. The Organizational Structure of the British SF

As far as the British Government is concerned, since the emergence of international terrorism in the 1960s, CBT has been the first priority of the SAS, and all four active squadrons from the SAS Regiment – the 22<sup>nd</sup> - have invariably engaged in this role (p. 185). Figure 6 depicts a detailed organizational specialization of an SAS *Sabre* Squadron, as offered by Kemp (1994, p. 112).

Again, in addition to the troop-level specialization, each SAS operator must successfully complete the Close Quarter Battle (CQB) and Body Guard (BG) courses and continuously maintain proficiency in these tasks (Seymour, 1985, p. 458).

Does the British SF organization fit the recommendations that Organizational Consultant provided regarding hierarchical establishments that evolve in challenging environments? Today the SF Group is a joint organization that centralizes command and control for SF assets at a brigadier level – an influential position within the MoD.

Whenever it is required, RAF is ready to provide dedicated aviation assets, in the same manner as the entire defense organization shows willingness to keep the SAS the best equipped unit in the Army.

The number of vertical levels is low, and the organization's reduced number of missions and specialties covers the CBT, DA, and SR interrelated fields. For these reasons briefly expressed above, ROSF could follow the example of numerous Allied SF organizations and learn from the British experience as well.




Figure 6. Specializations within a SAS Squadron

**G. NEW ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR ROSF**

From the two case studies addressed above, it is deduced that Burton & Öbel’s work not only presents internal theoretical consistency, but also resonates with the empirical adjustments recorded in the U.S. and British SF organizational evolutions. Exogenous factors such as crises, failures, and accidents, or deliberate decisions made by top management led to changes within these two organizations, changes that are today supported by the Organizational Consultant design program’s conclusions.

In light of the prescriptions provided by the application of the program and assimilating the lessons learned from the Allies’ past, ROSF enjoy a strong foundation to build on, and the following organizational structure is proposed:




Figure 7. A New Structure for ROSF

Centralized command and control for ROSF fosters effectiveness and efficiency during conflicts as well as in peacetime. A reevaluation of the SO Doctrine should bring under the Special Forces Service (SFS) all the SF capabilities that belong to the Navy, Army, and Air Force today and are required to ensure SF operational readiness by the end of 2005.

The SF Service will match authority and responsibility, make sure that resources are allocated according to the SF community's needs, provide joint and combined SO doctrines, and create SF Task Forces for internal employment or deployment within NATO or EU. Being able to immediately respond to future crises necessitates:

- Coordinated SEALs and SF elements that can be supported by the fire-power and mobility provided by a Ranger-type unit. The SF Battalion should emulate the British SAS, in terms of company-level specialization, reduced horizontal differentiation, and narrow span of control within the unit.
- Organic helicopter assets with pilots trained to conduct high-risk infiltrations and extractions.

- Immediately available fixed-wing aircraft that, through specific cooperation protocols between the SF Service and the Air Force, would systematically train with SF in joint settings and under realistic conditions.

The simple reorganization depicted in Figure 7 reduces the number of vertical layers inside the SF hierarchy, enhances the organization's flexibility, and proposes a set of other marginal improvements that, as Betts (2002) observed, might spell the difference between success and failure (p. 155).

With organic intelligence, aviation assets, and specialized operators, the SFS will become a separate and self-sufficient service that will provide a strategic niche capability, and respond to the NRF, the European Headline Goal, and Romania's force structure needs.

## **H. SUMMARY**

With this chapter we have reached the end of our project aimed at proposing justifiable and coherent new missions and structure for ROSF. The adopted organizational design method identified several misfits within the organization concerning ROSF's current centralization, configuration, formalization, and complexity. The program also recommended adjustments for enhancing the organization's performance.

The appropriateness of the modifications suggested by the theory concentrated in Organizational Consultant is entirely supported by the organizational configurations that JSOC and the British SF Group adopted decades ago. For ROSF, a flexible and simple joint structure, centralized command and control for all the SF elements, and organic or immediately available SF aviation assets will pave the way for a markedly increased performance during independent missions or combined special operations.



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## V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### A. CONCLUSIONS

In this thesis, two questions were addressed: *What are the tasks that should be assigned to ROSF, and what are the most appropriate structural arrangements for ROSF?* In addressing these questions, an initial assumption was that ROSF's tasks should be derived from Romania's national defense policy goals and adapted to its security environment, but it was noted that the country's environment changed with its integration into the NATO Alliance. Therefore, it became clear that, in addition to policy-driven national imperatives stated in the Romanian National Security Strategy and Defense White Paper, the ROSF community needed to be proactive and adapt to the military requirements emphasized by the NATO Alliance and EU establishments. If implemented, the conclusions of this thesis and the final recommendations could help ROSF fit its environment and achieve operational readiness by 2007.

In this project, it also has been argued that the structure for ROSF should follow from the tasks that the organization is directed to conduct. *What, where, and in what circumstances* are the three main doctrinal considerations that determine the basic configuration of the organization. Indeed, as a SF capability within the Alliance, ROSF should be ready to conduct, *anywhere*, the five missions detailed in Chapter III - CBT, CP of WMD, SR, DA, and VIP security in troubled areas.

This requires Romanian SF elements to be able to implement structural changes that combine centralized command and control with de-centralized execution. In order to dominate any hostile environment, ROSF should tend to become a joint self-sufficient organization comprising: SEAL elements, SF, Rangers, organic or immediately available aviation assets, and intelligence support, with a reduced number of vertical levels, and clear fields of specialization. In addition, particular attention should be paid to the requirements that the Alliance and RAF are expected to meet: mobility, deployability, effective engagement, sustainability, efficient command and control, high-technology communications, information superiority, coherence, high state of readiness, joint and

combined operational skills, flexibility, interoperability, effective intelligence, and timely decision-making.

Undoubtedly, all the structural modifications we have suggested for ROSF and the requirements listed above involve changes that require ROSF's members, from the top of the organization to its periphery, to think, feel, and do things differently.

## **B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MANAGING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE**

In *The Harvard Business Review* and *California Management Review*, a number of experts have published recommendations that are relevant to the discussion of transformation in the ROSF. Kotter (1995) identifies eight steps to transforming an organization (p. 61):

1. Establishing a sense of urgency by identifying potential crises
2. Assembling and empowering a coalition to lead the change effort, and encourage the coalition's members to work as a team
3. Creating a guiding shared vision, and developing strategies for achieving that vision
4. Communicating the new vision and strategies using every means necessary; fostering consensus and teaching new behaviors by the example of the guiding coalition
5. Empowering others to act on the vision by getting rid of the systems or structures that are obstacles to change; encouraging risk taking and nontraditional ideas, activities, and actions
6. Planning for and creating visible short-term improvements; recognizing and rewarding active employees
7. Consolidating improvements using increased credibility, hiring, promoting, and developing employees who can implement the vision; producing still more change with reinvigorating projects and change agents

8. Institutionalizing new approaches by emphasizing the connection between the new behaviors and organizational success, and developing the means to ensure leadership development and succession.

Duck (1993) observes that trust is a critical factor for successful change, and, at the same time, the most difficult to establish in the midst of change. Creating a climate of trust inside the organization requires (pp. 114-115):

1. Employee trust – built through *predictability* (clear and consistent organizational goals and rules), and *capability* (stating the role that each member will play in the change process)
2. Employee empowerment – genuinely inviting everyone to contribute to the organization’s desired future.

For achieving these two requirements the author envisions the creation of a *Transition Management Team* that would have the following responsibilities (pp. 117-118):

1. Establish the context for change via organized discussions throughout the organization
2. Stimulate conversation in search of breakthrough thinking and new insights from everyone
3. Provide resources where authority is assigned
4. Coordinate projects in order to avoid confusion
5. Protect the change effort’s credibility by ensuring congruence of messages and behaviors
6. Provide opportunities for joint creation of the organization’s future
7. Anticipate and address people problems by gathering and distributing information about the change effort
8. Prepare the critical mass necessary to replicate and transfer the experience gained from the change effort.

Finally, Young (2000) offers the following lessons for managing organizational transformations (pp. 70-78):

1. Appoint leaders whose backgrounds and experiences are appropriate for the transformation efforts
2. Follow a focused and coherent plan: create a vision, adopt a new organizational structure, establish an accountability system, and modify the organization's rules and regulations
3. Persevere in the presence of imperfection
4. Match changes in the external environment with changes in the internal environment
5. Develop and manage communication channels from the top to the bottom of the organization's hierarchy
6. Do not overlook training and education
7. Find the right balance between centralization and de-centralization concerning decision-making authority.

Several of the recommendations provided by these authors might be useful in managing ROSF's transformation process. However, in order to foster a proactive environment and creative thinking, the members of the organization, at every level, must become engaged, with their hearts and minds, in the change process. The sense of urgency previously mentioned already has been created by the deadline imposed on ROSF to achieve initial operational capability (one deployable company) by the end of 2005. It is recommended that the other abovementioned prescriptions concerning organizational trust, communication, credibility, management, or accountability be addressed in combination with the conclusions provided by Organizational Consultant which have not been developed in this thesis (climate, management and leadership style, or strategy). These areas provide direction for further research.

### **C. RELEVANCE OF THE PROJECT**

One may argue that the methodology used in this project could be applied, partially or entirely, to numerous types of defense or security organizations. (1) Linking

an organization's tasks to its environment, higher policy imperatives, and other establishments' tasks; (2) theoretically deducing what the design of the organization should be like; and, for additional support, (3) identifying equivalent design characteristics within other similar organizations – all create a solid base for organizational re-tasking and re-structuring efforts.

This methodology may be particularly helpful for new NATO members, such as Bulgaria and Hungary, who intend to build SF capabilities, but face similar difficulties in determining justifiable mission tasking and effective force configuration.

It is a sincere desire that the conclusions and recommendations resulting from this project will be helpful to ROSF in becoming an effective, efficient, and viable SF instrument by the end of 2007, specialized in a field that does not threaten the General-Purpose Forces or other agencies' areas of responsibility, with advanced skills that will reassure both NATO and the Romanian Government.

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## ANNEX

### ORGANIZATIONAL CONSULTANT REPORT SUMMARY - Romanian Special Forces

#### INPUT DATA SUMMARY

The description below summarizes and interprets your answers to the questions about your organization and its situation. It states your answers concerning the organization's current configuration, complexity, formalization, and centralization. Your responses to the various questions on the contingencies of age, size, technology, environment, management style, cultural climate and strategy factors are also given. The write-up below summarizes the input data for the analysis.

- Romanian Special Forces has an other configuration (cf 100).
- Romanian Special Forces has a very large number of different jobs (cf 100).
- Of the employees at Romanian Special Forces 51 to 75 % have an advanced degree or many years of special training (cf 100).
- Romanian Special Forces has 3 to 5 vertical levels separating top management from the bottom level of the organization (cf 100).
- The mean number of vertical levels is 3 to 5 (cf 100).
- Romanian Special Forces has 3 to 5 separate geographic locations (cf 100).
- Romanian Special Forces' average distance of these separate units from the organization's headquarters is 101 to 500 miles (cf 100).
- More than 90 % of Romanian Special Forces's total workforce is located at these separate units (cf 100).
- Job descriptions are available for all employees, including senior management (cf 100).
- Where written job descriptions exist, the employees are supervised closely to ensure compliance with standards set in the job description (cf 100).
- The employees are allowed to deviate very little from the standards (cf 100).
- 81 to 100 % non-managerial employees are given written operating instructions or procedures for their job (cf 100).
- The written instructions or procedures given are followed to a very great extent (cf 100).
- Supervisors and middle managers are to a little extent free from rules, procedures, and policies when they make decisions (cf 100).
- More than 80 % of all the rules and procedures that exist within the organization are in writing (cf 100).
- Top Management is not involved in gathering the information they will use in making decisions (cf 100).
- Top management participates in the interpretation of more than 80 % of the information input (cf 100).
- Top management directly controls 0 to 20 % of the decisions executed (cf 100).



- The typical middle manager has little discretion over establishing his or her budget (cf 100).
- The typical middle manager has little discretion over how his/her unit will be evaluated (cf 100).
- The typical middle manager has great discretion over the hiring and firing of personnel (cf 100).
- The typical middle manager has great discretion over personnel rewards - (ie, salary increases and promotions) (cf 100).
- The typical middle manager has some discretion over purchasing equipment and supplies (cf 100).
- The typical middle manager has some discretion over establishing a new project or program (cf 100).
- The typical middle manager has some discretion over how work exceptions are to be handled (cf 100).
- Romanian Special Forces has 500 employees (cf 50).
- Romanian Special Forces' age is young (cf 100).
- Romanian Special Forces' ownership status is public (cf 100).
- Romanian Special Forces has few different products (cf 100).
- Romanian Special Forces has few different markets (cf 100).
- Romanian Special Forces only operates in one country (cf 100).
- Romanian Special Forces has no different products in the foreign markets (cf 100).
- Romanian Special Forces' major activity is categorized as service (cf 100).
- Romanian Special Forces has a specialized customer-oriented service technology (cf 100).
- Romanian Special Forces has a medium routine technology (cf 100).
- Romanian Special Forces' technology is highly divisible (cf 100).
- Romanian Special Forces' technology dominance is average (cf 100).
- Romanian Special Forces has either planned or already has an advanced information system (cf 100).
- Romanian Special Forces' environment is complex (cf 100).
- The uncertainty of Romanian Special Forces' environment is high (cf 100).
- The equivocality of the organization's environment is high (cf 100).
- Romanian Special Forces' environment is extremely hostile (cf 100).
- Top management prefers to make decisions in a way that is not specified (cf 100).
- Top management primarily prefers to make both long-term and short-time decisions (cf 100).
- Top management has a preference for medium detailed information when making decisions (cf 100).
- Top management has a preference for some proactive actions and some reactive actions (cf 100).
- Top management risk profile is not known (cf 100).
- Top management has a preference for a combination of motivation and control (cf 100).

- Romanian Special Forces operates in an industry with a medium capital requirement (cf 100).
- Romanian Special Forces has a low product innovation (cf 100).
- Romanian Special Forces has an undetermined level of process innovation (cf 100).
- Romanian Special Forces has a high concern for quality (cf 100).
- Romanian Special Forces' price level is undetermined relative to its competitors (cf 100).
- The level of trust is medium (cf 100).
- The level of conflict is medium (cf 100).
- The employee morale is medium (cf 100).
- Rewards are given in a not known fashion (cf 100).
- The resistance to change is not known (cf 100).
- The leader credibility is not known (cf 100).
- The level of scapegoating is not known (cf 100).

## THE SIZE

The size of the organization - large, medium, or small - is based upon the number of employees, adjusted for their level of education or technical skills.

Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your organization's size is large (cf 25).

Between 51 and 75 % of the people employed by Romanian Special Forces have a high level of education. Adjustments are made to this effect. The adjusted number of employees is lower than 2,000 but greater than 1,000 and Romanian Special Forces is categorized as large. However, for this adjusted number this size does not have a major effect on the organizational structure.

## THE CLIMATE

The organizational climate effect is the summary measure of people and behavior.

Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that the organizational climate is a developmental climate (cf 49).

The developmental climate is characterized as a dynamic, entrepreneurial and creative place to work. People stick their necks out and take risks. The leaders are considered to be innovators and risk takers. The glue that holds organizations together is commitment to experimentation and innovation. The emphasis is on being on the leading edge. Readiness for change and meeting new challenges are important. The organization's long-term emphasis is on growth and acquiring new resources. Success means having unique and new products or services and being a product or service leader is important. The organization encourages individual initiative and freedom.

When the organization has a high to medium level of trust it is likely that the organization has a developmental climate. Employees with a medium morale is frequently one element of a developmental climate.

#### THE MANAGEMENT STYLE

The level of management's microinvolvement in decision making is the summary measure of management style. Leaders have a low preference for microinvolvement; managers have a high preference for microinvolvement.

Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your management profile has a medium preference for microinvolvement (cf 86).

Management has both a short-time and long-term horizon when making decisions, which characterizes a preference for a medium microinvolvement. Since the management has a preference for medium detailed information when making decisions a medium preference for microinvolvement characterization is appropriate. The management of Romanian Special Forces has a preference for taking actions on some decisions and being reactive toward others. This will lead toward a medium preference for microinvolvement. Management has a preference for using both motivation and control to coordinate the activities, which leads toward a medium preference for microinvolvement.

#### THE STRATEGY

The organization's strategy is categorized as one of either prospector, analyzer with innovation, analyzer without innovation, defender, or reactor. These categories follow Miles and Snow's typology. Based on your answers, the organization has been assigned to a strategy category. This is a statement of the current strategy; it is not an analysis of what is the best or preferred strategy for the organization.

Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your organization's strategy is an analyzer with innovation strategy (cf 80).

It could also be: a defender (cf 72).

It could also be: an analyzer without innovation (cf 72).

An organization with an analyzer with innovation strategy is an organization that combines the strategy of the defender and the prospector. It moves into the production of a new product or enters a new market after viability has been shown. But in contrast to an analyzer without innovation, it has innovations that run concurrently with the regular production. It has a dual technology core.

An organization with a medium capital investment is likely to have some capabilities rather fixed, but can also adjust. The analyzer with innovation which seeks new opportunities but also maintains its profitable position is appropriate. For a medium routine technology, Romanian Special Forces has some flexibility. It is consistent with an analyzer with innovation strategy. With a concern for high quality an analyzer with

innovation strategy is a likely strategy for Romanian Special Forces. With top management preferring a medium level of microinvolvement top management wants some influence. This can be obtained via control over current operations. Product innovation should be less controlled. The strategy is therefore likely to be analyzer with innovation.

An organization with an analyzer without innovation strategy is an organization whose goal is to move into new products or new markets only after their viability has been shown yet maintains an emphasis on its ongoing products. It has limited innovation related to the production process; generally an analyzer without innovation does not have product innovation.

The capital requirement of Romanian Special Forces is not high, which is consistent with an analyzer without innovation strategy. With a concern for high quality an analyzer without innovation strategy is a likely strategy for Romanian Special Forces.

An organization with a defender strategy is an organization that has a narrow product market domain. Top managers in this type of organization are expert in their organization's limited area of operation but do not tend to search outside their domains for new opportunities. As a result of this narrow focus, these organizations seldom need to make major adjustments in their technology, structure, or methods of operation. Instead, they devote primary attention to improving the efficiency of their existing operations.

Romanian Special Forces has few products. It needs to defend these products well in the marketplace. Viability depends on being successful with these limited activities. With a concern for high quality a defender strategy is a likely strategy for Romanian Special Forces.

An organization with an analyzer without innovation strategy is an organization whose goal is to move into new products or new markets only after their viability has been shown yet maintains an emphasis on its ongoing products. It has limited innovation related to the production process; generally an analyzer without innovation does not have product innovation.

The capital requirement of Romanian Special Forces is not high, which is consistent with an analyzer without innovation strategy. With a concern for high quality an analyzer without innovation strategy is a likely strategy for Romanian Special Forces.

## THE CURRENT ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

Based on your answers, the organization's complexity, formalization, and centralization have been calculated. This is the current organization. Later in this report, there will be recommendations for the organization.

The current organizational complexity is high (cf 100).

The current horizontal differentiation is high (cf 100).

The current vertical differentiation is low (cf 100).

The current spatial differentiation is medium (cf 100).

The current centralization is medium (cf 100).

The current formalization is high (cf 100).

The current organization has been categorized with respect to formalization, centralization, and complexity. The categorization is based on the input you gave and does not take missing information into account.

### SITUATION MISFITS

A situation misfit is an unbalanced situation among the contingency factors of management style, size, environment, technology, climate, and strategy.

The following misfits are present: (cf 100).

Romanian Special Forces has a low product innovation but does not have a certain environment. This situation calls for a review and suggests that the organization consider greater product innovation. Low product innovation means the same products are available for an extended period. In a certain environment with little change in customer demands and preferences, there is little need for new products. But, with increasing uncertainty in customer demand, new competitor strategies, possible governmental actions, shifting customer tastes, etc., current products are likely to be mismatched with this changed environment. New products and innovation will likely be required to adapt and meet the emerging needs and opportunities of the new environment.

Romanian Special Forces has both an analyzer strategy and few products. Generally, more products are required for an analyzer. A few products may be reasonable in the short run, but an analyzer should be in constant consideration of new possibilities. When a few, unchanging products become the norm, the analyzer should broaden its scope of new opportunities.

### ORGANIZATIONAL CONSULTANT RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on your answers about the organization, its situation, and the conclusions with the greatest certainty factor from the analyses above Organizational Consultant has derived recommendations for the organization's configuration, complexity, formalization, and centralization. There are also recommendations for coordination and control, the appropriate media richness for communications, and incentives. More detailed recommendations for possible changes in the current organization are also provided.

### ORGANIZATIONAL CONFIGURATIONS

The most likely configuration that best fits the situation has been estimated to be a simple configuration (cf 70).

It is certainly not: a machine bureaucracy (cf -100).

A simple organization has a flat hierarchy and a singular head for control and decision making.

The primary reason for recommending a simple configuration is that the organization has extreme environmental hostility. Extreme environmental hostility requires that the organization can respond consistently and rapid to unforeseen challenges. Therefore, it must have a simple configuration.

When the organization is confronted with hostility, it cannot be a machine bureaucracy. A machine bureaucracy cannot act appropriately when unexpected events occur.

## ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

The recommended degree of organizational complexity is low (cf 68).

Not much is known about the environment since both the environmental uncertainty and the environmental equivocality of Romanian Special Forces are high. In this situation, the organizational complexity should be low. This allows the organization to adapt quickly. When the environmental hostility of Romanian Special Forces is high, organizational complexity should be low.

The recommended degree of horizontal differentiation is low (cf 68).

The recommended degree of vertical differentiation is low (cf 86).

The recommended degree of formalization is low (cf 70).

Since the set of variables in the environment that will be important is not known and since it is not possible to predict what will happen, no efficient rules and procedures can be developed, which implies that Romanian Special Forces' formalization should be low. When environmental hostility is high formalization should be low. A developmental climate in the organization requires a low level of formalization.

The recommended degree of centralization is high (cf 77).

There is evidence against it should be: low (cf -6).

When there is a medium capital requirement and the product innovation is low, as is the situation for Romanian Special Forces, centralization should be high to obtain efficiency. When the environment is extremely hostile, top management must take prompt action and centralization must be high. Because Romanian Special Forces has an advanced information system, centralization can be greater than it could otherwise.

Romanian Special Forces' span of control should be moderate (cf 64).

Since Romanian Special Forces has some technology routineness, it should have a moderate span of control.

Romanian Special Forces should use media with high media richness (cf 85).

The information media that Romanian Special Forces uses should provide a large amount of information (cf 85).

Incentives should be based on results (cf 85).

Romanian Special Forces should use meetings as means for coordination and control (cf 92).

When the environment of Romanian Special Forces has high equivocality, high uncertainty, and high complexity, coordination and control should be obtained through integrators and group meetings. The richness of the media should be high with a large amount of information. Incentives must be results based. Top management should play the central role in coordinating and controlling the activities of the organization as well as making strategic and operating decisions. When the organization has a developmental climate, coordination should be obtained using planning, integrators and meetings. Incentives could be results based with an individual orientation. An organization with a developmental climate will likely have to process a large amount of information and will need information media with high richness.

Top management should make many decisions. However, many individuals should be involved in gathering information and implementing those decisions.

#### ORGANIZATIONAL MISFITS

Organizational misfits compare the recommended organization with the current organization.

The following organizational misfits are present: (cf 100).

Current and prescribed configuration do not match.

Current and prescribed complexity do not match.

Current and prescribed centralization do not match.

Current and prescribed formalization do not match.

#### MORE DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS

There are a number of more detailed recommendations (cf 100).

You may consider decreasing the number of positions for which job descriptions are available.

You may consider supervising the employees less closely.

You may consider allowing employees more latitude from standards.  
You may consider fewer written job descriptions.  
Managerial employees may be asked to pay less attention to written instructions and procedures.  
You may give supervisors and middle managers fewer rules and procedures.  
You may consider having fewer rules and procedures put in writing.  
Top management may consider gathering the information needed for decision making themselves.  
Top management may control the execution of decisions more actively.  
You may give middle managers less discretion on hiring and firing personnel.  
The typical middle manager may be given less discretion over personnel rewards.

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## GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ACC	Air Combat Command
ADCON	Administrative Control
AFSOC	Air Force Special Operations Command
ANA	Afghani National Army
AO	Area of Operations
ARSF	Army Special Forces
AT	Antiterrorism
CA	Civil Affairs
CAO	Civil Affairs Operations
CBT	Combating Terrorism
CBRN	Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear
CD	Counterdrug
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
C4I	Command Control Communications Computer and Intelligence
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CM	Countermine
CP of WMD	Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
CRO	Crisis Response Operations
CSAR	Combat Search and Rescue
CT	Counterterrorism
DA	Direct Action
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DoD	Department of Defense (U.S.)
ECAP	European Capabilities Action Plan
EU	European Union
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FY	Fiscal Year
GPF	General-Purpose Forces
GWT	Global War on Terror
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IFOR	Implementation Force (Bosnia)
ILINT	Imagery Intelligence
IO	Information Operations

ISAF	International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)
IW	Information Warfare
JSOC	Joint Special Operations Command (U.S.)
KFOR	Kosovo Force
MAP	The Membership Action Plan
MI	Military Intelligence
MID	Military Intelligence Directorate (Romania)
MoND	Ministry of National Defense (Romania)
MP	Military Police
MSR	Military Strategy of Romania
MTT	Mobile Training Team
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	Nuclear Biological Chemical
NCA	National Command Authority
NCEE	Non-combattant Extraction and Evacuation
NCO	Non-commissioned Officers
NSS	National Security Strategy
NMS	National Military Strategy
NRF	NATO Response Force
OCI	Office of Coordinator of Information
OCPW	Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare
ODA	Operational Detachment Alpha
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
PAD	Program Action Directive
PCC	Prague Capabilities Commitment
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PSS	Protection and Security Service (Romania)
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
RAF	Romanian Armed Forces
ROSF	Romanian Special Forces
SAS	Special Air Service (U.K.)
SAR	Search and Rescue
SBS	Special Boat Service (U.K.)
SEAL	Sea, Air, and Land Forces (Navy)
SF	Special Forces
SFOR	Stabilization Force (Bosnia)

SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SO	Special Operations
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOS	Strategic Objectives Security
SR	Special Reconnaissance
SHAPE	NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
U.K.	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USASOC	United States Army Special Operations Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
UW	Unconventional Warfare
VIP	Very Important Person
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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