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IRISH UNIVERSITY EDUCATION.

*MEMORANDUM on Some Aspects of
The Religious Difficulty.*

IRISH UNIVERSITY EDUCATION.

MEMORANDUM ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE RELIGIOUS DIFFICULTY.

THIS memorandum is written in response to an invitation from the Chairman to put down in writing the principal opinions or considerations which I should desire to contribute towards the discussion of our report. I shall not touch on matters of practical detail, in which many of my colleagues have had so much more experience than myself, but shall confine myself to aspects of the case which are for one reason or another more or less familiar to me.

It seems to me impossible to do full justice to the attitude of the Irish Catholic bishops, which is at the root of our difficulties, without recalling a few past facts which we all know, but the full bearing of which we may sometimes forget.

The problem before us is, of course, allied to that which is occupying Parliament in reference to primary education. It is a consequence of the great revolution in education effected in the nineteenth century, of transferring it from the representatives of theology (the clergy) to the representatives of science—that is the specialists in all departments. Not among Catholics only, but universally, the universities were, during the first forty years of the nineteenth century, in the hands of the established Churches. A boy who was educated at Trinity College, Dublin, or at Oxford, in 1830, was educated almost entirely by clergymen. Now he is educated almost entirely by specialists—their being lay or clerical being an accident. The various Dissenting bodies also at that time educated their own people who were refused admission in the great universities. Education was universally

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“denominational” and ecclesiastical. Now it is in its higher grades almost universally undenominational and secular.

Most of us, I suppose, think of this state of things mainly as an advance in justice to all denominations, and in the emancipation of educational methods from fetters which were antiquated. We do not regard it as hostile to religion. But in point of fact (as we all know) the movement which effected this transformation was largely anti-theological, and even in some of its manifestations anti-religious. If it included a sense of the justice of equal treatment for all creeds, and a sense of the liberty necessary for science, it also included some of the anti-Christian spirit of Continental liberalism. The movement was inspired by a love of liberty and a hatred of its enemies—bigotry and privilege. And these enemies were supposed to be represented in concrete form by the established Churches—the embodiments of ecclesiastical privilege and clerical interference,—and especially by the Church of Rome, the surviving representative of mediæval intolerance. The Churches, then, in turn had to be on the defensive. Two ideals of education were competing, the denominational or ecclesiastical, which threatened to be obscurantist, and the undenominational or scientific, which threatened to be irreligious. The proposed Queen’s Colleges were inevitably associated in the minds of all with the latter.

And what was the concrete exhibition of the new movement which the Irish bishops had before their eyes in the very years (1845-1850) during which the proposals as to the Queen’s Colleges were threshed out? They saw it in Oxford itself, as the rapid transition of its intellectual character from a religious and theological to a freethinking tone. The Oxford of 1845 was conservative and ecclesiastical. The heads of houses were all clergymen. There were few laymen even among the Fellows. The Tests were in force. The theological party which condemned the mild liberalism of Dr. Hampden was still in the ascendant. The Oxford of 1850, on the other hand, was liberal and secularist. In 1845, after Newman’s secession, with dramatic suddenness theology went out and science came in as the ruling principle of the academic mind. “We were startled,” says Mark Pattison, “when we came to reflect that the vast domain of physical science had been hitherto wholly excluded from our programme. The great discoveries of the last half century in chemistry, physiology, &c., were not even known by report to any of us. Science was placed under a ban by the theologians,

who *instinctively felt that it was fatal to their speculations.*" This conception of science as fatal to Christian theology was the keynote of the sudden transformation which ensued. "Whereas other reactions accomplished themselves by imperceptible degrees, in 1845 the darkness was dissipated and the light was let in in an instant." A "flood of reform" followed "which did not spend itself until it had produced two Government Commissions, until we had remodelled all our institutions. In those years every Oxford man was a Liberal." "All the intellectual force in the University," writes another witness a few years later, "was on the negative and anti-Christian side." "In the first rush of intellectual freedom," continues Mr. Pattison, "we were carried beyond all bounds, sought to change everything, questioned everything, and were impatient to throw the whole cargo of tradition overboard Our *élève* resembled that *gamin de Paris* of whom Renan says *ecarté par une plaisanterie des croyances dont la raison de Pascal ne réussit pas à se dégager*, and which it took Renan himself six years to work his way out of." (Appendix to Report I., p. 315.)

The suddenness and completeness of the triumph of the liberal movement in Oxford brought into relief the various elements of which it was composed. The secularising and anti-theological tendency, the agitation for the withdrawal of Tests, the growth of specialism were parts of a whole. The undenominational movement has been the *practical* expression of the liberal and scientific movement. And in the eyes of leading men of science, and of many others, the transformation which has been effected in the nineteenth century from the old education by the parsons to the new education by the specialists has implied the recognition to a greater or less extent of the fact that the theological explanation of the world and of life has been defeated, and the scientific view has taken its place. "I conceive," wrote Huxley, "that the leading characteristic of the nineteenth century has been the rapid growth of the scientific spirit, and consequent application of scientific methods of investigation to all problems with which the human mind is occupied, and the correlative rejection of traditional beliefs, which have proved their incompetence to bear such investigation" (Life II., 374). Denominationalism is, in this view, narrow and retrograde, because it implies a check on the free development of the scientific method in the interests of traditions which are superstitious.

A part of the change in intellectual tone in Oxford, as elsewhere, was in that indefinable quantity the "atmosphere"—from the atmosphere of the Oxford of Newman to that of the Oxford of Jowett. But there were also some definite particulars in which the aggressions of science on the then existing theology directly affected the subjects with which professors and tutors had to deal in the educational programme. The following are a few well-known instances:—

(1) Biologists and ethnologists, even before the early evolutionists attacked the dogma of creation, had assailed the Scriptural account in Genesis of the descent of all men from a common ancestor.

(2) So, too, geologists attacked what was generally received as the Bible's teaching on the antiquity of the world.

(3) The empirical philosophy in the hands of Mill and Bain was avowedly anti-theistic. It attacked, both in ethics and in metaphysics, the intuitionist basis of a theistic philosophy. Dr. McIntosh, of Queen's College, Belfast, one of J. S. Mill's chief opponents on this particular point, in regarding his own lectures on philosophy as a religious work (7561), represented the prevalent idea on the subject,—still prevalent up to 1870,—that the "experience" philosophy was in direct and necessary opposition to the philosophical basis of theism.

(4) The philosophy of history was in those days a prominent subject. Mr. Wyse contemplated its being taught at the Queen's Colleges.* Mr. T. W. Allies actually did lecture on it at Dr. Newman's Catholic University. The events of the French Revolution and the dramatic career of Napoleon had given a great stimulus to this study. Frederick Schlegel and Hegel, De Tocqueville and Guizot, Chateaubriand and the German Romanticists were all in different ways witnesses to this tendency. It figured, too, in different forms and degrees in the writings of Lamennais, Bonald, Möhler and Newman from a Catholic point of view. It is clear that while the critical study of history, in which the writer or professor is intent on the evidence for isolated facts, and is very sparing of generalisation, is not contentious, the philosophy of history is almost inevitably so. One professor bases his whole account of the development of the Christian Church and of secular history on the naturalistic view which underlies the works of Gibbon and Hume; another treats the same subjects on such

* Appendix to Second Report, p. 186.

principles as those of Allies' Dublin lectures on the "Formation of Christendom." Either treatment is likely to have a deep effect on the religious faith of a thoughtful young man.

When the battle between the two ideals—the theological and the scientific—was at its height, there is no doubt that the incursion of the new methods associated with physical science and history, and the new view of the world which they brought with them, did vitally affect the religious beliefs of thinking young men. Such names as those of Matthew Arnold, Mark Pattison, Arthur Clough, and J. A. Froude remind us of a mental history which was typical of that of many others less known to fame. Theological and scientific problems, questions as to what it was reasonable to believe, were in those years constant subjects of discussion. Matters we now keep to ourselves or debate only with a few intimate friends, or regard as beyond the reach of useful discussion, were then a constant theme of conversation in common rooms or in general society. Aubrey de Vere writes to Sarah Coleridge in the forties that "everyone is talking theology": everyone was defining his *weltanschauung*. Such conversations in the Oxford which was ruled by Newman's genius brought many to Tractarianism, many to Roman Catholicism, many to the views of Arnold and Whately. At a later time they landed very many in various stages of free thought. The secularist atmosphere, which under the influence of the scientific pioneers expelled the old ecclesiastical atmosphere of the universities, *did*, as a matter of fact, take from many of the young men whose minds were of a speculative cast all effectual belief in Christianity. And such a wave tends to be corporate. Newman has placed it on record that it affected many of the young men who came in the fifties to his Catholic university in Dublin. Those whose minds in other circumstances would have been quite unspeculative were caught in it.

To all this must be added the fact that in Ireland "mixed" education had for centuries been offered to Catholics, accompanied by proselyting attempts (6947), and that even the "national" system of primary education had been regarded by Whately as a probable instrument of winning Catholics from their faith. Again, in such countries as France and Belgium the undenominational universities were avowedly free-thinking. Even so religious a man as

Lacordaire ceased to be a Christian during his university career.* "Mixed education" meant at these institutions positively anti-religious education. Until the passing of the Falloux law in 1850 effected a compromise between the State and the Church, all university education recognised by the State in France was in the hands of opponents of Christianity. To this fact Dr. Cullen, from his foreign education, was especially alive. And Dr. Newman, in a memorandum on his relations with Dr. Cullen, notes that the Irish prelate always tended to identify the English and Irish "liberalism" with Continental liberalism.

In this state of things the Irish bishops were inevitably suspicious, as representatives of theology, as Catholics, and as Irish Catholics; and it can hardly be denied that, whether their action in 1846 and 1850 was entirely wise or not, there was good reason for their anxiety as to the effect of the liberal and secularistic movement of the hour on religious faith. That anxiety was shared by some of the ablest and most religious men in the Church of England, and long survived in such representatives of the old Conservative Oxford as Dean Goulburn and Dean Burgon in a form quite as uncompromising as it took in Cardinal Cullen.

The outcry raised that the Queen's Colleges were "godless" seems, in view of the important evidence brought before the Commission by Dr. Starkie, to have been exaggerated. It was indeed explicable, because at that time an undenominational university was, as Bishop O'Dwyer has pointed out, a novel experiment. The Queen's University was the first university established in the Kingdom on a *de jure* non-religious basis—if one may so express it. Still, as Sir James Graham said (2nd report, p. 187), "The Government contemplated the foundation of halls in which religious instruction would be imparted." So, too, said Sir Robert Peel: "We have given the Catholics every facility for religious instruction." The board of visitors also was provided for the object of safeguarding the religion of undergraduates.

The bishops, however, did not originate this cry, and indeed did not, as we know, in the first instance, positively oppose the measure. They only sought to make the religious

* See Chocarne's "Inner Life of Lacordaire," pp. 17-45. Lacordaire speaks of "the doubts which I had drawn in with the very air of the university," and adds "I left college with my faith destroyed."

safeguards adequate. They suggested the four amendments enumerated by Dr. Starkie—the first demanding a fair proportion of Catholic professors, and guarantees of due influence for the Catholic bishops in the appointment of professors; the second asking for dual chairs in history, logic, metaphysic, moral philosophy, geology, and anatomy; the third demanding the dismissal of any professor or office bearer convicted of trying to undermine a student's faith; the fourth asking for a salaried dean or chaplain.

It is to be noted that the proposed dual chairs were precisely in those subjects which, though not directly religious, were at that time notoriously the battleground of religious controversy, and the means of imparting anti-Christian theories. Their supposed anti-theological bearing was urged by their most eminent exponents. Even so moderate a man as Mr. Wyse endorsed the claim for two chairs so far as moral philosophy and the philosophy of history were concerned.

Dr. Newman was, I think, the first who made quite clear, what most of us now recognise—how distinct were the different elements which were united in the "liberal" and "undenominational" movement. The recognition of the claims of science to be emancipated from theological interference, and concomitantly of the practical necessity of toleration and equality for the various denominations and for the varieties of belief which the advance of thought was constantly increasing, was one thing. Quite distinct in essence was the directly secularistic and irreligious movement, similar to Continental free-thought, which disparaged not only the undue interference of theology, but theology itself, and was jealous not only of ecclesiastical encroachment or privilege, but of all clerical influence. But as we have seen in the case of Oxford the two were united to some extent practically. The general lines of Newman's proposed solution of the difficulty raised by the scientific movement, with its just claims and its practical excesses, consisted in the presence of theology in a university, concomitantly with science, to represent aspects of the human mind and of the universe which the scientific habit disparaged or ignored, and a mutual toleration and principle of non-interference between the two, in place of the old censorship of theology over science. He advocated also Catholic (denominational) influences of a religious kind, not interfering in any way with the freedom of any branch of study to pursue its own methods, and not for the

most part of an intellectual or theological nature. Moreover, he was in favour of a strong lay element in a university for Catholics, to represent educational interests to which Churchmen, from their antecedents, were likely to be less alive. A word more shall be said shortly on this subject.

The secularist movement which was long and successfully engaged in mitigating an excessive ecclesiastical and theological predominance, seems now in many quarters to be receiving a modification in the direction indicated by Newman. We have gradually come to realise that positive religious influences, while desirable for the highest educational interests, *need* not be prejudicial to the freedom demanded by the sciences. *And we see that practically religious influences will only be strong and effective where they are denominational.* This is now openly avowed by many in the case of primary education, and I think often tacitly admitted as to secondary.

The solution whereby religious influence has been to a large extent preserved in the English universities, and whereby at the same time undue ecclesiastical privilege is avoided and theological interference with science prevented, has consisted in an English compromise, namely, the blend which arose from undenominational legislature on a strong basis of *de facto* religious tradition and institutions—that is, the union of *de jure* undenominationalism with *de facto* denominationalism of a more or less pronounced description. Thus at Oxford the secularist and anti-religious spirit described by Mark Pattison did not prove permanent. The religious tradition of the place asserted itself again in such men as Scott Holland, Liddon, Gore and others—T. H. Green's idealistic philosophy being a serviceable bridge for the return journey from the Liberalist contempt for the study of Divinity to a more or less scientific theology. *Lux Mundi* and Aubrey Moore's *Essays* mark the theological revival and development wrought out by giving free play to scientific method as a corrective to strong traditions, in which religion was deeply rooted in a prejudiced form—traditions which in turn asserted themselves in a modified and intellectually defensible form under the influence of science.

This blend is considered by many to have been the ideal before Peel's mind when he proposed to found the Queen's Colleges, and with that ideal both Dr. Delany and Dr. O'Dwyer have declared themselves to sympathise.

But in 1845, as Dr. O'Dwyer has pointed out, the experiment was new, and the evidence we now possess of its possible success did not exist. And even apart from this, in brand new colleges *without* the religious traditions and institutions of Oxford or Trinity College, Dublin—which asserted their influence automatically—the requisite *de facto* denominationalism which Peel is held to have designed, had imperatively to be secured by some reliable means. To this task the bishops devoted themselves.

In the event Peel's scheme was not carried out. Neither the bishops' nor Mr. Wyse's proposed amendments were accepted. And no other satisfactory means of ensuring due religious safeguards was devised. At the very least, the promise of Lord Clarendon, that "the Catholic religion will be fully and appropriately represented" in the appointment of professors in the colleges of Cork and Galway, seemed indispensable to the *de facto* denominational predominance which local circumstances demanded. If I am not mistaken, the Presbyterians at Belfast *were* given the safeguard they required—that is to say, their claims were fully considered in the appointment of the professors. With the Catholics it was otherwise. A change in the Ministry was, no doubt, partly responsible for the neglect in carrying out solemn assurances. But, in the event, only three out of twenty professors at Cork were Catholics. Thus a college in one of the most Catholic districts in Ireland was to have its whole trend of thought determined mainly by non-Catholics. And the college was predominantly under the control of those who were always felt to be representatives of the Protestant minority garrison which held the power and wealth in a country mainly Catholic. In Galway the case was similar. Moreover, the bishops were denied the right—which in colleges so constituted might be really vitally necessary to exercise—of preventing teaching which was dangerous to Catholic faith. We cannot doubt that the failure on so vital a point as that of the due representation of Catholics in the teaching body, to carry out the assurances of Peel and Lord Clarendon, brought home to the bishops how little they could rely, in matters which to them from their office were essential, on an English Protestant Government.

In this condition it may fairly be urged that the bishops had a very real grievance. Still, in view of the vital necessity of university education for Irish Catholics, the sympathies of many of us will be with the minority who wished nevertheless

under every disadvantage, to try and work the colleges. Dr. Newman has stated, however, that in 1853 he found the majority of Irish bishops not at all alive to the importance of university education for Catholics. And when we observe that the extreme measure which killed the colleges—of visiting with canonical censures any priest who became officially connected with them*—was passed at the Synod of Thurles by a majority of one only, we may fairly conclude that all those who represented the best intelligence of the episcopal bench were opposed to carrying the opposition to the colleges to a point which caused them to fail. I conclude then that the Queen's Colleges were very unsatisfactory, but that Dr. Murray was right in preferring them to the absence of any university education for Catholics.

The position of things is now very different from what it was in 1845-1850. Education is becoming more and more practical, technical, the affair of specialists. The attempt to argue out the grounds of religious conviction and its bearing on science is far less common. In many societies such discussions would be very unpopular. The whole subject is seen to be too vast and science too young for a satisfactory synthesis.

The intellectual temper in the universities has thus largely changed. There is a truce between the parties which fought so keenly. Science is no longer directly aggressive. It is much less occupied with speculation on the borderland between itself and theology than it was thirty years ago; and theology has adapted itself largely to the scientific movement. The anti-religious theories which are still mooted are less liable to affect the methodical *curriculum* of a university. There is less time or inclination for polemics now than in the forties. The particular form in which a student in a university now becomes acquainted with physical science, and even with history, is far less likely to touch on dangerous ground. Such is the general change in the situation. And it directly affects those elements in the subjects taught which I have above described as being in 1845 from the circumstances of the time controversial.

(1) Educated Christians, including the best Catholic professors and thinkers, have learnt to apply to Scripture very widely the lesson long ago taught in one department by the Galileo case. That is to say, they have come to be very

* Appendix to Third Report, p. 89.

slow in affirming confidently that Scripture really teaches what science or scientific criticism appears to deny. On the contrary, they look to science and criticism in many cases for the true explanation of natural phenomena with which Scripture deals, and interpret Scripture in accordance with such an explanation.

(2) Philosophy is taught far less aggressively or dogmatically, and history far less theoretically now than in 1845. In the forties, Kant was regarded as anti-religious—as the prophet of scepticism. Now, he is regarded by many Christians (including eminent Catholic philosophers) as opposing primarily an old and somewhat inadequate religious philosophy, and as aiding in the formation of a new one. Hegel was regarded as before all things a pantheist, and therefore an anti-theist. Now, we have the Christian Hegelians pointing out the profoundly Christian trend of his later teaching. And, concurrently with this, we have broken down the opposition between the “experience” school and the “intuitionist” school by a more general appreciation of Hegel’s larger conception of “experience.” Further, this wider conception has been seen to afford a theistic interpretation of many ideas of Spencer, and to suggest (as Professor Caird has shown) a theistic development of Comte himself. We do not regard either Spencer or Comte as any more satisfactory than our ancestors regarded them, but many upholders of Christianity have come to maintain that those ideas, in virtue of which their systems had life and power, are capable of being absorbed into a deeper philosophy than their authors themselves contemplated.

While such results perhaps make humorous critics smile at the tergiversations of philosophy, and talk of metaphysic as “a dog chasing its own tail,” they bring home to those who believe in philosophy the partial and non-final character of all speculative systems. The cast of thought is on the increase which holds that faith touches deeper springs of conviction than any defined philosophical system can adequately test: and in place of confidently denouncing each new system which is advanced on the ground of its *prima facie* opposition to portions of the mediæval scholasticism, most of us are, I think, learning rather to look first for its points of contact with religious faith. This change affects the best exponents of the scholastic philosophy itself. The manuals both of Father Maher and of Mgr. Mercier show great appreciation of the historical position of the philosophy with which they are

primarily concerned, and a disposition to do full justice to its affinities with other systems, and to treat it historically rather than dogmatically.

(3) In history the weight is shifted from its philosophy to the detailed study of periods, and the principles whereby evidence should be sifted. Large views are out of fashion. Among the best Catholic writers the philosophical element has receded into the background. The great names are no longer those of apologists, but of specialists. Whereas Möhler, De Maistre, Bonald, Lamennais, Schlegel, were, so far as they dealt with the subject, occupied in the apologetic bearing of history, Duchesne, Pastor, and the Bollandist Jesuits are largely occupied in what the ultra conservatives regard as merely destructive criticism—*i.e.*, in correcting exaggerations of fact which formed an effective but inaccurate defence of the Christian and Catholic position. This change among Catholic students began in the later fifties, and has been described by Lord Acton in a memorable essay in the "Home and Foreign Review" ("Home and Foreign Review," vol. 1, pp. 513 *seq.*).

(4) In geology and anatomy.

- (a) The greater prevalence of a modified view as to the practical consequences of the inspiration of the Bible has drawn the teeth of old oppositions. Monsignor Mercier told us that some of his professors were evolutionists. Dr. Delany obviously viewed with different eyes from Dr. Cullen the supposed opposition between the mosaic cosmogony and the conclusions of geology.
- (b) Further, these sciences have gained so widely in credit that most persons realise that they must go their own way in peace, and that before we can adjust their conclusions to the teaching of Scripture and to theology, they must be allowed complete freedom to work out those conclusions in their own way. Thus, any battle between the two departments is postponed at all events.
- (c) Concurrently with this, the aggressive tone of their exponents has much diminished now that they have won what they may consider to be the victory of shaking themselves free nearly everywhere from the inquisitor's animadversions.

No doubt the old oppositions have left their heirs. The contest between naturalism and supernaturalism has not

ceased. It represents, indeed, an undying contest, and is itself the heir to the opposition, far older than Christianity, between the philosophy of Providence and that of Necessity. But the enormous increase of specialism postpones such a contest almost entirely to a stage subsequent to that of university training. The theologians have admitted so much, and both history and physical science have had such eminent Christian exponents, that we have no longer, as we had half a century ago, a battle on the very threshold of these subjects. The truce proposed by Cardinal Newman in the remarkable lectures he delivered in Dublin in 1855 has been largely realised in later years.

The growth of undenominationalism from 1845 up to the present time has gone almost *pari passu* with this relaxation of acute oppositions. The change in the Irish bishops' demands, which is avowedly due to undenominationalism, is probably influenced more or less consciously by the concurrent decrease of contentious elements in the educational programme. Obviously, the more specialism increases, the less are the dangers to religious belief which arise from mixed education, because the mixture affects a far smaller field.

Perhaps we may roughly characterise the changes in the attitude dominant in the universities since 1830, as consisting of three stages—

- (1) The theologians—heirs at Oxford as well as in Rome to the mediæval synthesis of knowledge—thought that they could dictate *à priori* to the representatives of science and history.
- (2) The scientists and naturalistic historians thought that they could banish and discredit theology.
- (3) Each party is learning more effectively the proverb, "ne sutor ultra crepidam."

This great alteration in the situation inevitably brings with it a decrease in the necessity of pressing some of the denominational safeguards. The aggressions on religion have diminished, and the defences are correspondingly less necessary. Some protective machinery is demanded by the guardians of religious interests for possible future emergencies, but in present circumstances it is little likely to be used. Moreover, time has made all educated men—including the Catholic representatives of education in Ireland—see the importance of one object of the liberal movement, namely, of thoroughness in scientific method. What Newman

said in 1855 is now generally admitted—that even the errors of science must be allowed to take their course rather than that its free development should be impeded by the interference of theologians. On the lowest ground a thorough scientific training is seen to be necessary for efficiency and credit in the eyes of the world. Thus, though the bishops still demand for a college which Catholics shall frequent, an element which is *de facto* denominational, what they ask for is far less denominational than what they asked for in 1846. They no longer ask for dual chairs. They are conscious (and the facts at University College, Dublin, show this to be practice and not mere profession) that to get the best specialist professors in secular subjects is so important, that they must be ready to welcome an eminent non-Catholic if a first-rate Catholic is not to be found.* Their present claim is, indeed, a claim for little more than what Peel already seems to have felt the justice of in 1845.† They ask for a University, undenominational *de jure*, but with such a predominance of Catholics on the governing body at the outset, and such religious safeguards, as will give it the character of a *de facto* denominational institution. Trinity College, Dublin, which is a Protestant university made *de jure* undenominational, supplies *mutatis mutandis* the precedent for the Catholic demand.

But while the development of events has made it possible to the bishops conscientiously to accept less than they asked for in 1846, it has brought about the general acceptance of a principle which gives their claim a new and special force. The principle which has triumphed in the “liberal” movement to which I have referred, is the principle of religious equality;—that in the matter of education no one should be handicapped by his religious creed. On this principle they now take their stand. They demand equality; and equality, they point out, must mean that combination of *de facto* religious and denominational influences with *de jure* undenominationalism which the existing consequences of their past history have secured at Oxford and Trinity, and which consideration for the Presbyterian body on the part of the Government and the subsequent action of that body have secured at Belfast.

* Father Delany speaks on this subject with the conviction which his own experience has brought (see question 1454).

† This is distinctly intimated in the evidence both of Bishop O’Dwyer and of Dr. Delany.

To allow "denominational" influences may of course have in different instances different practical results. It may conceivably tend to what it is said to have tended to be in Dr. Cullen's hands—an exercise of such ecclesiastical predominance and interference as would handicap effective scientific teaching; or it may only mean such definite religious influences as are essential to a satisfactory education— influences which cannot be secured by a combination of persons of different creeds, and can only be effectively exerted by one denomination, with its *esprit de corps* and its definite ideals and institutions.

The opposition to the Catholic claim appears to rest on the presumption that *de facto* denominationalism, the predominance of one denomination, the presence of its religious services and its theology, its predominance on the governing body, which issue in Trinity College in giving such religious influences as parents would desire, without introducing either a strong sectarian or an anti-scientific spirit, would in the case of a Catholic institution necessarily have an essentially different result. Denominationalism in a Catholic university would, it is supposed, be different in kind from what exists in Trinity College. The claim is therefore one for privilege — for denominationalism in a sense in which it is not allowed to others.

May it not be said in reply that this is a conjectural objection on which it is very hazardous to wreck an important scheme to remedy an admitted grievance? A Catholic may indignantly repudiate the suggestion that he is less able than a non-Catholic to free himself from unreasonable ecclesiastical control, or that history and science are taught less scientifically at Louvain than at Trinity College, Dublin. A Protestant may be quite unable to agree with such a disclaimer, or to divest himself of the conviction that his own fears in the contrary direction are just. But if such a conviction on the part of the Protestant legislators, without conclusive evidence to support it, is to be a reason for not giving Irish Catholics the same opportunity and chances as Irish Protestants of exercising their educational capacities, and of proving by experiment that the suspicions of their critics are groundless, the idea of equal legislation, the principle of justice underlying the undenominational ideal, falls to the ground.

Further, what might appear to be a special insistence on the

denominational element in the Catholic demand may fairly be said to be a demand not for Catholic privilege, but for a removal of inequalities caused by Protestant privilege in the past. The Catholic asks for more because he has less. We may easily forget how much in the present state of things is due to past inequality. Therefore, the best way of testing what will give equality in the present is to suppose equality in the past, and then see the state of things which equal legislation on such a basis would have effected. Suppose, then, that in days when Trinity College was Protestant there had been also a Catholic college in Dublin University; that when Trinity was opened to Catholics, the Catholic college had been open to Protestants; that when all tests had been abolished at Trinity, the same had held in the other college. This would have been a history of parallel antecedents, equal opportunities and similar legislation—exact equality. Each college would have been first denominational and then gradually undenominational by law. It is plain that the special character of the religious arrangements and developments of the college apart from the law, has nothing to do with the undenominational character which the law requires. Whether the denominational *esprit de corps* or ecclesiastical influence were greater or less in one college than the other might be a matter of accident, or it might be connected with points in the particular creed. But it is of the essence of equal legislation not to handicap on the ground of peculiarities of creed. It might again, like the strong theological atmosphere of the Oxford of 1835, be the result of certain dominant personalities. Such things would have been outside the purview of the legislator, who gave to each equal laws, and allowed them freedom apart from the law.

For Irish Catholics, then, to ask for what they would have had under such circumstances is the nearest attainable measure of asking for equality. I should have no wish to disguise the fact that the proposed university or college is primarily for the benefit of one denomination, but to say that a college so constituted that *all* the undenominational legislation is accepted can be in any way an exception to the undenominational system, *so far as that system prevails*, seems to me quite inexact. If undenominationalism in England had been equivalent to secularism, the case would have been otherwise. Even if there had been in university legislation a Cowper-Temple clause forbidding denominational teaching, matters would be on a different footing.

Trinity College could then no longer have its divinity schools. But English universities are not undenominational in the sense of Board schools. Their undenominationalism is understood in the limited sense of all emoluments and offices being open by law to all-comers. Therefore the college or university would be, in the ordinary sense, undenominational—that is to say, *de jure* undenominational.

I submit that the only case in which, on the principle of equal legislation, regardless of creed, the legislature can take cognisance of the peculiarities of distinct denominations, and the results of these peculiarities, is where such peculiarities can be unmistakably shown to make the secular education unsatisfactory. If in the case of any denominational system it can be shown that there is ecclesiastical interference of a kind which prevents the freedom necessary for first rate education in any department, then the legislature has to consider that public money is being spent on an inferior education.

This leads me to speak more particularly of a subject to which considerable attention was given in our enquiry—the claim of the bishops to be members of a Board of Visitors which would adjudicate on any case in which a professor was supposed to have taught something offensive to the religious convictions of his pupils. The bishops claim to decide what is Catholic dogma. This claim in itself is simply the claim to carry out in a manner conformable to the Catholic principle that the bishops are official witnesses to dogma, the principle already admitted in one form or another in the Queen's Colleges and in the Scotch universities—that a professor is pledged not to offend against the religious convictions of the students. In present circumstances, we know that practically such offences have been almost unknown in the Queen's Colleges—that the regulation against them never has occasion to be practically enforced. We have evidence to the same practical state of things among Catholics in the medical schools in Cecilia Street. Bishop O'Dwyer declares that he does not believe that in a university for Irish Catholics such a case would arise once in forty years. Indeed, where professors are chosen who are in general sympathy with the spirit of the institution, it is unlikely to occur.

As however the claim is made, and might conceivably become practical, it is important to make it quite clear that such a claim on the part of the bishops is quite distinct from a claim to interfere with any branch of scientific teaching in its

own sphere—a claim which might justly be a subject of animadversion on the part of the legislator. It is *this* course which has been a source of trouble in the past. And it was with the object of pointing out that such a claim is not now preferred that I asked certain questions in the course of our enquiry.

It was, as we know, only gradually that the absolute necessity of freedom for science made itself practically realised, either among Catholics or among Protestants: and it was by means of an anti-ecclesiastical movement. Dr. Mackinnon, in his recent work on the French Monarchy, points out that the Protestant theologians “were as ready as the intolerant orthodoxy of the Sorbonne to persecute free thought in defence of their own orthodoxy.” Theoretically the freedom of science in its own sphere has always been acknowledged by the Catholic Church. And even the Galileo case was an instance in which a certain interference with theology by Galileo was the *occasion* of the adverse action of the ecclesiastical authorities. An attitude of suspicion towards science was at one time greater in the case of Protestant theologians than of Catholics, because the Bible was taken by the former more literally, and without the principle that its teaching is gradually interpreted by the Church. Thus Copernicus’ *De Revolutionibus Orbium* was dedicated to a Pope and condemned by Melancthon. But among all theologians, Catholic and Protestant, interference with scientific theories in the name of orthodoxy very long survived in practice. The Inquisition did not in the end confine itself to considering Galileo’s treatment of Scripture. It proceeded to make pronouncements on the truth or falsehood of scientific hypotheses themselves. Any survival of such a mode of procedure, belonging to a period when the nature of scientific methods and their requirements were not understood, may be reasonably objected to in the interests of education. And it has to be clearly understood that teaching offensive to faith—of which the bishops claim to take cognisance—means not a scientific theory or conclusion which is inconsistent with received theological views, but extra-scientific dissertations directly contravening dogma. Professor Butcher cites a saying in the opposite direction from Dr. Cullen. And this makes it the more important to point out that Dr. Cullen’s view is not that contemplated in the present proposal of the bishops.

It is sufficiently well known that Dr. Cullen for various reasons did not adequately realise the freedom which modern science and history demand for efficiency. Very many

people, Anglicans and Presbyterians as well as Catholics, of his generation did not realise it. It is only in our own time that it is fully understood. Dean Burgon and his friends were, it may be maintained, no more alive to it than Dr. Cullen. But the ablest Catholic educationalists equally with those of other denominations have long dissociated themselves from this position. Even as early as the fifties Cardinal Newman urged the absolute necessity for freedom of investigation and discussion in "astronomy, geology, physiology, ethnology, political economy, history." I refer to his lecture on *Christianity and scientific investigation* ("Idea of a University," pp. 456 seq.) This lecture is included in a work frequently cited with approval by the present Irish hierarchy—for instance by Archbishop Walsh in his pamphlet on the subject before us. And the evidence we have had from Dr. Delany and Dr. O'Dwyer (753, 1299) is entirely in harmony with the view of Dr. Newman, and not with that of Dr. Cullen. Broadly speaking, Dr. Newman's contention is that all the sciences, including the practical bearings of theology on the world of secular facts, are in a condition of gradual development; that each must be allowed to develop freely; that they must not be allowed to encroach on each other; and that temporary apparent contradictions between physics and history on the one hand, and theology on the other, are not to be a reason for interfering with the historians or scientists, but are to be tolerated; that such interference is liable to error—even at times if made in the name of defined dogma, as theologians may identify with dogma something which in the end proves to be separable from it; that the true solution of temporary antagonism is very likely unattainable in our time, and only to be reached eventually by a freedom which such interference would prevent. The spirit which should animate the presiding genius of a Catholic university he describes as follows: "Taking into his charge all sciences, methods, collections of facts, doctrines, truths, which are the reflexions of the universe upon the human intellect, he admits them all, he disregards none, and as disregarding none he allows none to exceed or encroach. His watchword is, live and let live. . . . If he has one cardinal maxim, it is that truth cannot be contrary to truth; if he has a second, it is that truth often seems contrary to truth; if a third, it is the practical conclusion that we must be patient with such appearances. . . . It is the highest wisdom to accept truth of whatever kind . . . though there be difficulty in adjusting it with other known truths."

. . . a scientific specialist or enquirer is not bound, in conducting his researches, to be every moment adjusting his course by the maxims of the (theological) schools . . . or to be determined to be edifying, or to be ever answering heretics or unbelievers. . . . Unless he is at liberty to investigate on the basis and according to the peculiarities of his science he cannot investigate at all. It is the very law of the human mind to make its advances by a process which consists of many stages and is circuitous . . . In scientific researches error may be said, without a paradox, to be in some instances the way to truth, and the only way." The net result is that, whether right or wrong on a particular point, all branches of scientific enquiry must be free. Authority must only interfere where there is unmistakable and direct encroachment on dogma, or a practical attempt to tamper with the religious convictions of the young.

This view was very insufficiently accepted by theologians, Catholic or Protestant, when Dr. Newman wrote. And it is known that others besides Cardinal Cullen differed from it. But it is now very generally accepted. Its main features were adopted by Monsignor d'Hulst in his inaugural address to the Catholic Scientific Congress of 1888. It is entirely in harmony with the views expressed both by Dr. O'Dwyer and Dr. Delany before the Commission. The actual facts at University College, Dublin, as placed before us in Dr. Delany's evidence, tell in the same direction. In history (which seems to some the subject in which theological and apologetic influences are most likely to be prejudicial) the growth of the scientific spirit among Catholic writers on the Continent has been most marked. History as represented now by Abbé Duchesne or even Dr. Pastor is so far specialised that theological differences hardly come into contact with it at all. At Louvain it is, I am told, so far specialised that what may be termed synthetic history receives hardly any attention. It is entirely dissociated from apologetic. Accuracy of method is the primary lesson inculcated. No doubt bias might still betray itself in a Catholic professor of history—a bias as much in favour of Catholicism as Mr. Froude betrayed in his Oxford lectures on the other side. But the present tendency among Catholic historians, so far as I am acquainted with it, is in the opposite direction. So far as bias *is* apparent, it is against their own side. The reaction from the special pleading of Abbé Darras has not yet spent itself. Certainly there has been nothing in the evidence before us to make it probable that

such an attitude as that assumed by Cardinal Cullen fifty years ago would preside in an Irish university for Catholics. And there has been considerable evidence to show that it would not. Such an attitude would be an anachronism in a Catholic as much as in a Protestant university.

The fears entertained in an opposite direction would seem to be due to the suspicion that at heart Catholics still desire a university on exactly the basis of the mediæval universities, in which the Church had direct control of all branches of study; that if they consent to less, it is under protest, and with a hope to regain for ecclesiastical control what has been lost. But to suppose this is to forget that educated Catholics, like other people, recognise that while in the Middle Ages theology was a chief instrument whereby men hoped to gain knowledge even of the world of fact, now the positive sciences occupy a large territory once claimed by the divines.

Not only then the practical claim, but the ideal of Newman differs from that of St. Thomas Aquinas.

At the risk of being a little tedious it may be worth while to enumerate the chief points in which the Church does distinctly modify even its ideal claim as that claim is presented by Dr. Newman.

The old sway of the Church over university education included in the Middle Ages—

- (a) Certain positive religious influences which were needed to guard the faith of individuals.
- (b) The presence of theology as representing the exercise of the human mind in determining the theological implications of the Christian revelation.
- (c) The checking of the speculations of the human reason where they trench on theological ground, and are opposed to the truths of revelation or its logical consequences.
- (d) The attempt—which became confident, constant and energetic under the influence of the modes of thought prevalent in the thirteenth century—to determine by means of logical deductions from theology a large number of facts, physical and historical.

It is the last of these claims which the growth of the scientific method has by universal consent so greatly affected. This has now been long admitted by the best Christian thinkers, whether at Oxford or at Louvain—although this admission has been gradual. It has been brought about largely by the pressure of the undenominational and scientific

movement. This has been, from an intellectual point of view, the really valuable achievement of that movement. No rulers readily resign a claim, whether they be successors of Charles I. or of Albertus and Aquinas. A determined effort against such encroachments of theology on the field now occupied by science was needed. A movement more or less hostile to theology was probably, *in practice*, the only effective means of teaching theology its true place. Undenominationalism in so far as it was bent on releasing education from the remains of a control which cramped the scientific spirit, was right. Its claim was strong as an alternative to bigotry.

But of the three remaining presuppositions of Church control, two remain, from the Catholic point of view, unaltered by the advance of science. And the third remains unaltered in *theory* (although not, as I shall endeavour to point out, in practice). They continue as parts of the true *ideal*. And as far as undenominationalism opposes them, it is on ground which (it may be maintained) is not from the Catholic point of view tenable.

Let us consider each of the three as applying to present conditions.

(a) A Church which regards faith as a matter of teaching and not of private judgment, and as a gift and a virtue which may be lost like any other virtue under stress of temptation, must insist on the functions of the representatives of religion in the first department. Catholic theology holds indeed in the abstract that the reason, *rightly exercised*, leads the well-disposed to Theism and to Christianity. But it recognises that in the concrete a youth's reason is impressionable and is readily swayed towards or away from the Christian view of life, the world, and history, by the surroundings in which it is educated. While it believes in the possibility of a reconciliation of all science with revelation, it does not trust the immature mind, or even the average mature mind, to effect that reconciliation, still less to do so under difficulties or on the spur of the moment. The university undergraduate cannot be expected to hold the balance justly where powerful intellectual influences are present which militate against his faith, and in the absence of the influence and aid of sacraments, liturgy, teaching, on the Christian side. The view which regards every private judgment as in all circumstances practically sufficient for the discernment of and adherence to religious truth, it regards as the unphilosophical fallacy of Protestantism.

(b) The presence of theology as representing the human reason exercised on revelation, Cardinal Newman has insisted on as the necessary counterpart of belief in revelation as representing a *fact* and not merely a *sentiment*.

As exemplified in the prescientific period, under the mediæval Church, in such a work as the *Summa* of St. Thomas Aquinas, this immediately issued in deductions, maintained as more or less probable, in the field of history and of physical science. In Newman's conception of a modern Catholic university adapted to an age of scientific advance, its practical utility was distinct from this. The presence and influence of theology has (according to his exposition) an immediate bearing on the subsequent point—namely, the claim of the Church to check the speculations of the human reason where they touch on theological ground, and oppose by implication the truths of revelation.

(c) With regard to this claim, the Chairman pointed out the real difficulty (341)—namely, that it may include a claim on the part of ecclesiastical authority to determine the limiting line between theology and science. History shows that that line shifts as knowledge grows, and that neither theologians alone nor men of science alone can be trusted to determine it accurately. Theologians have (as, for instance, when they declared in 1616 that Copernicanism was heresy) encroached on science; men of science like Huxley have encroached on theology. It is only by the presence of both to guard their own interests that the line is likely to be drawn with approximate accuracy. And accuracy is secured not merely by an artificial compromise, but still more by the mutually corrective influence which each exerts on the other. Theology consists largely in deductions from reason and revelation combined. As the data of reason change and grow (that is, as science advances) the conclusions from joint premises of reason and revelation necessarily change with the changing factor. This necessary development of theology is an additional reason for its presence in a university, that it may so far as possible keep pace with the rapidly moving reason of an age of scientific advance. Its presence, from this point of view, is likely to tend not to obscurantism, but to its elimination.

This appears to be the only fully satisfactory way of dealing with the danger of an irreligious use of the sciences. The interference of one science with the conclusions of another—including the interference of theology with secular

science—is more and more felt by educated men to be an anachronism, because, as sciences are progressive, at a given stage their mutual bearings may be largely misconceived. If theological interference only took place where defined doctrine was in so many words denied it would be defensible. If a professor of history or physics taught in so many words “the dogma of creation is false,” “the dogma of inspiration is false,” “the idea of Providence is a superstition,” the good sense of any university would hold that he should be checked. The real difficulty in former times has been that, in fact, interferences have been of another kind. And this is the cause of the deep prejudice existing against all interference with teachers of science in the name of orthodoxy. “Copernicanism contradicts the dogma of the Inspiration of Scripture,” was the plea of Melancthon and of the Roman congregations which condemned Galileo for heresy. “Evolution contradicts the dogma of creation,” was a saying of both Catholic and Anglican bishops thirty years ago. “Certain generally received conclusions of geology contradict the mosaic cosmogony” was apparently Dr. Cullen’s view. All these extra-theological assumptions are now abandoned by the large majority of educated Christians, and their abandonment teaches a lesson we must face as to the insecurity of theological judgments on half-developed sciences. Where, on the other hand, science and theology are present, represented by men of real ability, each re-acts on the other. Each learns to keep its limits. And the representatives of each will take by way of assimilation much that they would resist in the form of aggression.

The theologians have, however, in such a state of things a rôle, the importance of which varies with the circumstances of the time, in resisting the extra-scientific excursions of the exponents of the secular sciences. In point of fact the desire for knowledge as to man’s origin and destiny, and as to a multitude of subjects on which (according to many thinkers) certainty is denied us, may lead any speculative mind—modern specialist men of scientific habits of mind as well as mediæval theologians—to theological conjectures. Gibbon’s influence on the young is not likely to be entirely confined to imparting habits of critical investigation. His own naturalistic philosophy of history is certainly not hidden in the pages of the *Decline and Fall*. Specialists who have large human natures, who are men of really great and inquiring minds, rarely abstain completely

from touching the problems of religion. When Strauss and Renan brought scientific criticism to bear on the Gospels, they did not content themselves with the dry investigation of dates and documents without drawing any irreligious conclusions. They were not satisfied until they had constructed a purely human Christ directly opposed to Christian doctrine. So, too, physiologists have denied the existence of soul, and evolutionists have denied the creation. The presence of theology is needed (so Dr. Newman argues) in any world of strenuous thought, such as a university ought to be, to guard its own interests; to point out where science ends and speculation, based on an inadequate view of life, or on semi-conscious naturalistic assumptions, begins. Theology has, as we have seen, largely effected this work during the past fifty years in the larger world of thought; but, it should always hold, as it were, a watching brief in its own interests.

Theology then is needed, both in the field of fact and proof, and in the field of imaginative speculation, as a counter force to science, not to oppose its legitimate activity, from which on the contrary it should learn, as Aquinas learnt from Aristotle, but to keep it in its place, and remind its devotees of aspects of human nature, and of life, and of thought which they are liable to forget. Its presence is desirable in some form both in the interests of intellectual completeness and in the interests of the faith of the young. Such is, in outline, the Catholic ideal—what would be desirable in the circumstances of our own time on the principles sketched by Newman in his lectures.

In the absence of the mutually corrective action of science and theology, such as Newman's ideal Catholic university would have, the only possible arrangement for protecting the interests of theology without damaging scientific freedom would seem to be that contemplated by Dr. Delany, Dr. O'Dwyer and the Bishop of Clonfert* in connection with the proposal before us,—viz., that there should be some machinery for preventing (1) direct aggression on Catholic dogma or (2) attempted proselytism. An interference so limited, and with judges present on the Board of Visitors to ensure such limitation, would, as Dr. O'Dwyer pointed out, hardly ever occur. And if it did occur, it would be regarded by no

* Bishop O'Dwyer's words (753-754) are very important. His definition of the point at which interference would be necessary is drawn from distinctly extra scientific teaching on the part of men of science. So, too, Dr. Delany, 1,299 seq., and Bishop Healy, 6,585-6,588. And Dr. Delany appears to contemplate that there should be effective precautions against this limit being exceeded.

one as a hardship. A professor who went out of his way to attack religion would be obviously guilty of grave impropriety. There would probably be no objection if other denominations desired to be represented on the Board to testify to what was offensive to their creed. In the Catholic Church the claim is necessarily made because, as I have said, the bishops are the official witnesses of doctrine.

No doubt the claim is practically a far less vital matter in the present condition of the universities than it was fifty years ago ; but it cannot be dispensed with, for there is no security in the nature of things that some movement of thought might not arise so aggressive as to make such a claim, and the parallel claim in the Queen's Colleges, of practical importance once more.

The Catholic principle that *purely* denominational education is preferable to mixed education would appear then, from the above sketch, to mean practically and in reference to present circumstances, only that it is so from a religious point of view. When the sciences were in the hands of the theologians (in the Middle Ages) this was also the educational point of view. Now that the sciences belong to other guardians, it is essential that these guardians should be adequately represented in a university. And this often cannot be done if a university is not free to select the best specialists irrespective of creed. Moreover, human nature being what it is, if the theological and ecclesiastical element is allowed unduly to predominate, other interests will suffer. If science won its freedom only by an anti-ecclesiastical movement, it is likely to maintain it only by the vigilance of those who are, in however friendly a spirit, somewhat jealous of ecclesiastical encroachment. This applies in a measure to Belfast or Trinity as well as to a Catholic college. But it is a practical consideration when a new college or university is being founded. The view however that certain strong denominational influences which hostile critics are sure to decry as "clerical" are indispensable for intellectual as well as purely moral interests, remains in force ; and an education so far "mixed" as to reduce them to a *minimum*, is, from a Catholic point of view, very unsatisfactory.

On the basis of the above considerations I will attempt to answer the following questions which have been discussed among us :—

- (a) The claim to equality for all creeds being admitted

to be a valid one, is it accurate to describe the Catholic claim as a claim for privilege?

- (b) Does the opening of Trinity College to Irish Catholics really offer them equality with Protestants?
- (c) Is it the part of frankness to point out that such an institution as is contemplated is denominational, and is it uncandid to go to Parliament with the plea that no endowment is asked for denominational purposes?
- (d) Is the presence of the bishops on the governing body likely to make the institution so far clerical and sectarian as to injure the thoroughness and necessary freedom in secular education?
- (e) Is the numerical predominance of laymen on the governing body desirable? Or is it likely to be a useless pretence, disguising externally the fact that the whole real direction of the university is in episcopal hands?
- (f) Which would be preferable, a university for Catholics, or an autonomous college in a reformed Royal university?

(a) It is not a claim for privilege. It is a claim for equality. If dogma and authority would occupy a more prominent place in a Catholic than in Protestant institution, which is *de jure* undenominational, it is partly because these are more prominent in the Catholic system than in the Protestant:—and equality means equally free play for the denominational peculiarities of different creeds. If, further, bishops in Ireland have greater influence than elsewhere, that is an accidental circumstance, and does not enter into the nature of the claim. Such influence would not arise from the constitution of the proposed college or university. The view that it is a claim for privilege rests partly on forgetting (as Dr. Bernard in his evidence seemed to do) that the Bishops no longer make the claim they made in 1866, and partly on regarding the *creation* of certain denominational influences *de facto* as the according of a privilege. Yet in Trinity College such influences have always existed and do not need to be created. Their creation for a Catholic college is the giving of what Trinity has, not the according of a privilege which Trinity has not.

(b) That at Trinity, as at Oxford, the dangers to faith and morality might be regarded by Catholic authorities as a variable quantity at different times seems to me probable. I

have not myself the knowledge necessary to estimate them. But if the claim for equality be admitted to be just—the principle that creed should be no educational disadvantage—Trinity College seems to be quite inadequate to satisfy it in the case of Irish Catholics. To displace the strong Protestant predominance, if it could ever be done, would be a matter of a lifetime or more. And, meanwhile, the Catholic majority in Ireland are comparatively without any share in controlling or determining the higher education.

(c) If undenominationalism in universities meant, as in Board schools, the banishment of denominational influences and teaching *de facto* as well as *de jure*, it is true that it would be misleading to describe the proposed institution as undenominational. But as in Oxford the Church of England, and in Trinity College, Dublin, the Protestant Church of Ireland, still have a position of great influence in universities admittedly undenominational, a similar influence for the Catholic Church in the proposed university or college would not prevent its being undenominational, as that word is commonly used in the case of universities. The word is used to describe their *de jure* constitution, not their *de facto* condition.

(d) The following considerations appear to tell in mitigation of the assumption that in Ireland the Catholic laity is so far subservient to the Hierarchy that the presence of even a few bishops on the governing body would mean that they would entirely control the institution.

- (1) A largely signed memorial has recently been sent to this Commission by the Irish Catholic laity, in direct opposition to the policy of the Hierarchy. This does not appear to bear out the theory that on educational questions the laity are universally subservient to the Bishops.
- (2) Dr. Starkie and Colonel Ross appeared to agree that, so far as bishops or the clergy have undue predominance in matters educational, it is mainly due to the fact that absence of university education makes the number of Catholic laymen who take an interest in such questions unduly small. The existence then of a Catholic university or university college would gradually tend to diminish episcopal predominance (see 2402-2406).
- (3) It is noticeable that the bishops appear not to have interfered at all with the curriculum at University College, but to have left it entirely in the hands of its Rector and his staff.

- (4) In the medical schools at Cecilia Street also there is no case of interference on record.

In such a matter facts are safer guides than presumptions, especially as in the case of inter-denominational judgments the parties rarely know one another intimately enough to be competent judges, and inevitably inherit opinions respecting each other which are not favourable or sufficiently accurate.

(e) That the bishops would, for a time, have an influence somewhat beyond their numbers, and that in Ireland their influence is of a special character, seems, however, to be generally admitted. And if this arises (as Dr. Starkie and Colonel Ross have suggested) from temporary circumstances, the presence and numerical predominance of laymen on the governing body will be very important. There is unquestionably, among Catholics on the Continent, a steady growth of the influence of specialists in matters educational. And if this has not yet (as some assert) made itself duly felt in Ireland, such machinery should be created in the constitution of a college or university for Catholics, as would give this movement every facility for making itself fully felt in course of time.

This was a subject on which Dr. Newman and Dr. Cullen differed greatly in 1852, the former urging the necessity of a strong lay element to prevent undue clerical predominance. If so early as 1852 this was urged, it would by now, if the Catholic university had continued to exist, have been very possibly, an accomplished fact. As I have pointed out, in Oxford, also, clerical influence was once supreme. In Trinity College, Dublin, the clerical element has only gradually diminished. Catholic opinion does not stand still, and Catholics are more like other people than sometimes seems to be supposed. Theology is no doubt more elaborate and coherent and ecclesiasticism stronger among them than among members of the Church of England. But the recognition of new conditions exists, and exists widely, among Catholic laity and Catholic thinkers and scholars, lay and clerical, in many countries. The bishops themselves have declared their wish not to interfere in secular education, and, as we have been told, have not interfered at University College. And even those who are inclined to think that such a self-denying ordinance would not be entirely carried out at present should welcome the presence of a body of laymen which, even if it did not at first secure its due influence, still would keep places on the governing body which might later on be filled by those who were able to do so.

(f) The very uncertainty in some minds as to the manner in which a body predominantly Catholic would carry out their educational programme would appear to be a strong reason for a university rather than a college. For a university would be in the hands of the claimants, and its failure would rest entirely on their own head, while they would be placed on their mettle to show in practice that various suspicions which have been expressed in their regard were unfounded. Moreover, this alone would thoroughly satisfy the claim for equality. Both ideally and from the educational point of view I am inclined to think that this would on the whole be best.

On the other hand, so far as practical politics are concerned, it is a strong fact that University College already exists, that the Royal University already exists, and that, although indirectly, University College has already been endowed. That this is a strictly denominational endowment can hardly be maintained, as the college is open to all. Ten per cent. of its students are, we have been told, non-Catholics. It has also several Protestant professors. But it is an instance of the endowment of a *de facto* denominational institution for *Catholics*, in the case of whom the traditional prejudice appears still to be an obstacle to what is not objected to in the case of others, as is quite evident from the necessity in 1879 of concealing from Parliament the object of the endowment by which it benefits.

It might be the direction of least resistance to endow a large new university college, which might become eventually a university. The prejudices of the English House of Commons might allow of this and yet oppose the larger proposal. In that case I should still urge that the lay element should be well represented on the governing body of the college, which would be a far more representative institution in such circumstances than it is now.

WILFRID WARD.

P.S.—The Chairman's Memorandum reaches me as I am correcting the proofs of this paper. I add this note on the application of the above remarks to two of the proposals it contains. I do not see an intrinsic difference between Proposal I. and Proposal II., unless in the former the phrase "full consideration given to Roman Catholic sentiments in administration" is to be understood as falling short of the appointment in the new college at the outset of a predominantly Roman Catholic governing body. I should, on this hypo-

thesis, prefer Proposal II., but I should deny (a) that it would be denominational in the sense in which the endowment of denominational universities or colleges is now contrary to custom, and (b) I should deny that "full" consideration is given to Roman Catholic sentiments by anything less than is contemplated in Proposal II. The minimum consideration apparently contemplated in Proposal I. would no doubt make it impossible for the bishops to condemn such an institution as dangerous to faith and morals. But we desire surely to do more than this—to remedy a grievance. The grudging concession of a minimum would not secure the desired cordiality on the part of the bishops, and would be far less likely than a more generous proposal to result in a successful educational institution.

But, moreover, a decidedly predominating denominational element appears to be suitable to the conditions of the country, in which Catholic and Protestants are still to a large extent different social as well as religious bodies. The *de jure* undenominationalism of Proposal II. would provide a machinery whereby the gradual change we may hope for in these conditions in the country at large might reflect itself in the University College. But we cannot force on a country a system for which it is not yet fitted.


The undenominational system has been everywhere gradually achieved by successive stages in legislation, corresponding roughly to stages of public opinion. I submit that Irish opinion has not reached the stage contemplated in Proposal I., understood in its minimistic sense. The scheme in the Royal University, which has worked fairly well, is better described as bi-denominational than as undenominational. A Catholic university or college, made undenominational *de jure*, and thus corresponding to Trinity College, which is historically a Protestant college, made undenominational *de jure*, gives greater equality, and appears to be better suited to the state of religious parties in Ireland. Nor need it tend to make the separation between Catholics and Protestants permanent—for the absence of Tests in all institutions allows of its cessation when the abatement of sectarian feeling leads both parties to desire it. The barriers separating Catholics and Protestants are likely to be increased (it may be argued) by the continuation of what Catholics deeply feel to be a grievance.

I should, however, as Proposal II. seems to contemplate, desire such limitation of clerical control as modern educational conditions demand.



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