

S E C R E T

XX BOMBER COMMAND  
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
 Mission Number Twenty Two  
 19 December 1944

S E C R E T  
 By Authority of the  
 Commanding General:  
 1-4-45 SR

Table IV - Bomb Loading & Disposal

Group	* Type of Bombs	Bomb Loading on A/C Airborne in R. A.				On Targets			Bomb Disposal		
		Fusing		Average No. Loaded	Total Loaded	Omura	Shanghai	Nanking	Jettisoned	Returned	Unknown
		Nose	Tail								
40th	500# G.P.	.1	.025	5.2	62	41	7	5	5		4
	500# Inc	Inst	N.D.	5.8	70	47	7	5	5		6
444th	500# G.P.	.1	.025	6.6	66	26	32	7		1	
	500# Inc	Inst	N.D.	7.0	70	28	32	4	3	3	
462nd	500# G.P.	.1	.025	5.3	48		37		3	8	
	500# Inc	Inst	N.D.	8.1	73		38		29	6	
468th	500# G.P.	.1	.025	7.6	38	38					
	500# Inc	Inst	N.D.	4.8	24	24					
TOTAL	500# G.P.	.1	.025	5.9	214	105	76	12	8	9	4
	500# Inc	Inst	N.D.	6.6	237	99	77	9	37	9	6

\* 500# G.P. - AN-M 43) Actual weight 543.9 pounds.  
 AN-M 64)  
 500# Bomb Incendiary - FT-1 M-76 actual weight 483.0

NOTE: Bomb weight information supplied by Ordnance Section, XX Bomber Command.

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1-2-45 SK  
Date Initials

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Table V - Aircraft Lost and Damaged

Aircraft Lost

<u>Group</u>	<u>Serial Number</u>	<u>Combat</u>	<u>Operational</u>	<u>Explanation</u>
40th	24466		X	Shortly after take-off had a fire in #1 engine and started losing oil, were unable to feather and prop ran away. Crew forced to bail out.
462nd	63452		X	Lost #2 engine between assembly point and Omura I.P. pilot turned about. Ran low on gas and crew bailed out.
TOTAL			2	

Aircraft Damaged

Major Damage

N O N E

Minor Damage

<u>Group</u>	<u>Serial Number</u>	<u>E/A</u>	<u>A/A</u>	<u>Own Guns</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Explanation</u>
40th	N O N E					
444th	N O N E					
462nd	N O N E					
468th	24678			X		Had holes in front bomb bay doors and would not close.
TOTAL				1		

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Table VI - Attacks & Passes by Enemy Aircraft

DIRECTION	ALTITUDE												TOTAL				
	HIGH				LOW				LEVEL				40th	444th	462nd	468th	
	40th	444th	462nd	468th	40th	444th	462nd	468th	40th	444th	462nd	468th					
0800		1			1	1		1					1	2			1
0900						2	1			1	1			3		2	
1000	3	5											3	5			
1100	2	2			1	2							3	4			
1200		4							2				2	4			
0100	1		1		1		1		1				3			2	
0200	1	1	3	1	1	1	1						2	2	4		1
0300		1		1		19		2						20			3
0400		1				2		3						3			3
0500	2			2				4				3	2				9
0600								2									2
0700		1	1	2		2		1						3	1		3
TOTAL	9	16	5	6	4	29	3	13	3	1	1	3	16	46	9		22

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Mission Number Twenty Two  
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1-2-47 *SK*  
 Date Initials

Table VII - Personnel Losses

Crew Position	Killed				Missing				Seriously Injured				Slightly Injured				Total Casualties				Total Participating			
	40	444	462	468	40	444	462	468	40	444	462	468	40	444	462	468	40	444	462	468	40	444	462	468
Pilot																					12	10	9	5
Co-Pilot																					12	10	9	5
Navigator																					12	10	9	5
Bombardier											1								1		12	10	9	5
Flt. Engr.											1								1		12	10	9	5
Radar																					12	10	9	5
Radio																					12	10	9	5
CFC Spec																					12	10	9	5
Right Gnr.																					12	10	9	5
Left Gnr.																					12	10	9	5
Tail Gnr.																					12	10	9	5
R C M																								
Unknown																								
Others																					2	3		
TOTAL											2								2		134	113	99	55

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Table VIII - Expenditures of Ammunition and Claims Against Enemy Aircraft

Group	Ammunition Expended Per Plane In Combat Flying					Total Expended	Claims Against Enemy Aircraft			Per 1000 Rounds Expended in Combat		
	Upper Front	Lower Front	Upper Rear	Lower Rear	50 Cal. Tail		Destroyed	Probably Destroyed	Damaged	Destroyed	Probably Destroyed	Damaged
40th	56	64	38	81	28	3195	0	0	4	-	-	1.25
444th	150	101	60	152	78	5405	2	2	4	.37	.37	.74
462nd	21	64	15	37	0	1100	0	0	0	-	-	-
468th	25	350	31	400	175	3925	3	2	4	.77	.51	1.02
TOTAL	72	109	38	129	53	13625	5	4	12	.37	.29	.88

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 19 December 1944

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 1-2-45 SK  
 Date Initials

\*\* Table IX - Gasoline Loading and Consumption

Group	Average Gross Weight Per Plane Before Fwd. Area Take-off	Average Gals Gas Loaded Per A/C Before Fwd Area Takeoff	* Average Gallons Consumed on Mission		* Average Gallons Remaining in A/C After Mission	
			Per Aircraft Bombing Primary	Per Aircraft Not Bombing Primary	Per Aircraft Bombing Primary	Per A/C Not Bombing Primary
40th	131819	7199	6449	5787	831	1197
444th	133559	7300	6444	6470	856	830
462nd	134248	7300	--	6191	-	1109
468th	133001	7300	6400	--	900	--
TOTAL	133078	7265	6438	6218	852	1026

\* Excludes A/C which did not return directly to home fields.

\*\* Certain aircraft participating in Mission #21 remained in Forward Area to take part in Missions #22 and #23 on 19 and 21 December. A special study of the effect of this triple strike on gasoline factors will be included in mission statistical summary for Mission #23.

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Date Initials

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CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
Mission Number Twenty Two  
19 December 1944

Table XI - Engineering Malfunctions

Part I - Engineering Malfunctions Preventing Airborne A/C From Bombing Primary

		40th	444th	462nd	468th	Total
POWER PLANT & ACCESSORY SECT	Engine running rough	1		1		2
	Turbo Supercharger and/or Turbo Control System		2			2
PROPELLERS & GOVERNORS	Unsuccessful Attempts to Feather	1				1
OIL SYSTEM	Oil leaks	1				1
FUEL SYSTEM	Fuel transfer system			1		1
TOTALS		3	2	2	0	7

NOTE: For details, see Table X - "Summary of A/C Failing to Bomb Primary".

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Part II - Engineering Malfunctions Not Preventing A/C From Bombing Primary

		40th	444th	462nd*	468th	Total
POWER PLANT & ACCESSORY SECT	Engine running rough	1	1			2
	Engine running hot	1				1
	Exhaust System	1				1
	Turbo Supercharger and/or Turbo Control System	1	2			3
	Cowl Flaps		1			1
PROPELLERS & GOVERNORS	Feathered Props				1	1
	Unsuccessful Attempts to Feather Governor		1		1	2
	Governor		3		1	4
	Governor Oil Leak	1				1
OIL SYSTEM	Oil leaks	4	2		1	7
	Oil temperature regulator		1		1	2
FUEL SYSTEM	Fuel transfer System				1	1
	Fuel quantity gage		1			1
ELECTRICAL SYS- TEMP/FAILURE	Generators		2			2
	Voltage Regulator				1	1
	Bomb Bay Door System				2	2
	Inverter	1	1			2
INSTRUMENTS	Carb. Air Temp. Gage		2			2
	Cylinder Head Temp. Gage		3		1	4
	Rear oil Press. Gage	1				1
	Tachometer	1				1
	Radio Compass				1	1
	Flight Indicator				1	1
	A F C E	1	1			2
MISCELLANEOUS	Oxygen System	1				1
	Defroster	1				1
TOTALS		15	21		11	47

\* Not available.

NOTE: Pertaining to both Part I and Part II:  
Only engineering malfunctions are listed. All other malfunctions, such  
as radar, are excluded. If one aircraft had more than one engineering  
malfunction, all malfunctions have been listed.

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Table XII - Utilization of Useful Load  
 (Based on A/C Bombing P.T.)

Group	No. of Ground Miles	Number Of A/C Considered	Type Of A/C	Av. Gross Weight at Takeoff For Mission	Aver Basic Weight of A/C	Aver Useful Load	Aver. Number of Bombs Loaded	*Aver Weight of Bombs Loaded	Aver Weight of Gas Loaded at 6 Pounds Per Gal	Average Miscellaneous Weight
40th	3185	8	Center Wing Tanks	131865	75014	56851	5.1 500 # G. P. 5.9 500 # Inc.	5625	43680	7546
444th	3120	4	Center Wing Tanks	133358	75085	58273	6.5 500 # G. P. 7.0 500 # Inc.	6916	43800	7557
462nd	----		NONE	BOMBED THE PRIMARY TARGET.						
468th	3180	5	Center Wing Tanks	133014	75147	57867	7.6 500 # G. P. 4.8 500 # Inc.	6452	43800	7615
TOTAL	3160	17	Center Wing Tanks	132551	75070	57481	6.2 500 # G. P. 5.8 500 # Inc.	6172	43744	7565

\* 500# GP - AN-M43 or AN-M64, Actual weight 543.9 lbs.  
 500# Incendiary, Actual weight 483 lbs. (M-76)

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ANNEX

N

FIELD ORDERS

\*\*\*\*\*  
\*All Field Orders Material in the following \*  
\*Annex originally classified TOP SECRET, is \*  
\*hereby reclassified to SECRET \*  
\*By Authority of DEPCOM 20 AF \*  
\* 8 JAN 1945 J.L.S. Jr \*  
\* DATE INITIALS \*  
\*\*\*\*\*

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Auth: CG XX BC

Initials: ECJ

Date: 15 Dec 44

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FIELD ORDERS )

NUMBER 22 )

Copy Number \_\_\_\_\_

XX Bomber Command

APO 493

15 Dec 44 - 0800Z

MAPS: AAF Aeronautical Charts: 385, 386, 387, 388, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495,  
or equivalent International Maps of the World; 386C, 386D, 388D,  
492A, 493B.

AAF Long Range Air Navigation Chart: 17 or equivalent Naval Aviation  
Charts, V-30 series.

H. O. Chart: 5494.

1. Omitted (see Annex No. 1, Intelligence Summary).

2. On 18 December 1944 this Command attacks AAF Target 90.36-1627.

ROUTE OUT: Base Area - ANKANG AIRFIELD (32°35'N, 109°14'E) - North end of  
HUNGZE L. (33°42'N, 118°32'E) - Assembly Point #1 - Assembly Point #2  
(REIZUI IS., 33°58'N, 126°55'E) - IP (SHIRO REEF, 33°09'N, 128°54'E) -  
Target. Aircraft will climb on course to 13,000', or on Top, immed-  
iately after take-off.

BASE ALTITUDE: 4,000' pressure altitude.

ROUTE BACK: Target - 32°41'N, 130°09'E - 32°15'N, 128°45'E - KAYOU L.  
(32°45'N, 119°20'E) - LIANGSHAN AIRFIELD (30°42'N, 107°50'E) - Base  
area.

AXIS OF ATTACK: 110° Magnetic.

AIMING POINT: Northwest corner of building located at 065031 on OMURA  
mosaic.

METHOD OF BOMBING: By 12-plane formations.

BREAKAWAY: To the right.

3. a. 40th Group: ASSEMBLY POINT #1: Largest of SANTAI ISLANDS (34°23'N,  
125°17'E).

BOMBING ALTITUDE: 22,000' pressure altitude.

TIME OVER TARGET: 0219Z.

b. 444th Group: ASSEMBLY POINT #1: South Tip of KO IS. (34°40'N, 125°11'E).

BOMBING ALTITUDE: 23,000' pressure altitude.

TIME OVER TARGET: 0221Z.

c. 462nd Group: ASSEMBLY POINT #1: BANSAI IS. (34°12'N, 125°28'E).

BOMBING ALTITUDE: 21,000' pressure altitude.

TIME OVER TARGET: 0217Z.

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- d. 468th Group: ASSEMBLY POINT #1: BANSAI ISLAND (34°12'N, 125°28'E).  
BOMBING ALTITUDE: 21,000' pressure altitude.  
TIME OVER TARGET: 0217Z.
- x. (1) PRIMARY TARGET RADAR AIMING POINT: Center of signal from city  
1000' east of shoreline of OMURA BAY.
- (2) SECONDARY TARGET: AAF Target 83.1-117.  
VISUAL AIMING POINT: Center of cluster of buildings east of  
drydocks.  
RADAR AIMING POINT: Lower southeast portion of strong signal  
from city.
- (3) LAST RESORT TARGET: AAF Target 83.1-99.  
VISUAL AIMING POINT: Center of large railroad terminal build-  
ing.  
RADAR AIMING POINT: Slightly off Northwest bank of YANGTZE  
RIVER.
- (4) BOMB LOAD: A combined minimum of nine 500# GP (TNT or Amatol  
filled) bombs, fused .1 second nose and .025 second tail, and  
M-76 incendiary bombs, fused instantaneous nose and non-delay  
tail, will be carried in each aircraft, mixed in the ratio of  
one to one insofar as the supply available permits, with the  
incendiaries loaded to release last.
- (5) Each Group will furnish a maximum number of fully modified aircraft  
and a sufficient number of the best unmodified aircraft to bring  
total scheduled to 13.
- (6) Movement to the Forward Area will be completed by 17 December 1944.
- (7) Intervalometer Setting: Minimum train. Electrical not salvo release  
will be used.
- (8) Minimum formation for attacking primary target: three aircraft.
4. No change.
5. a. (1) Convoy sighting messages addressed to "CQ" will be broadcast on  
8280 kcs.  
(2) No change.
- b. No change.
- By command of MAJOR GENERAL LEMAY:

JOHN E. UPSTON  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.  
Chief of Staff

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OFFICIAL:

*Joseph J. Preston*  
JOSEPH J. PRESTON  
Colonel, Air Corps  
Deputy Chief of Staff,  
Operations

ANNEXES:

#1 - Intelligence Summary.

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - CG, Twentieth Air Force
- 1 - CG, India Burma Theatre
- 1 - CG, China Theatre
- 1 - CG, AAF, IB
- 1 - CG, Fourteenth Air Force
- 1 - CG, AAF, IBT Evaluation Board
- 1 - CG, 312th Wing (F)
- 1 - CG, XX BC
- 1 - CO, Fwd Ech Det, XX BC
- 1 - Chief, Tact. Opns Branch, XX BC
- 3 - Chief, Communications Section, XX BC
- 2 - Chief, Intelligence Section, XX BC
- 3 - CO, 40th Bomb Group
- 3 - CO, 444th Bomb Group
- 3 - CO, 462nd Bomb Group
- 3 - CO, 468th Bomb Group

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XX Bomber Command  
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ANNEX NO. 1 TO FIELD ORDERS NO. 22 XX BOMBER COMMAND

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

I - Operational Intelligence

SECTION I: ENEMY GROUND SITUATION

For exact location of the Battle Line, see "Navigator's Aid Chart", dated 16 December 1944 and refer to "Radiogram Extract Report" of 10, 13, and 17 December 1944, disseminated by this Headquarters.

SECTION II: ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE - SEA

Major enemy fleet units have been photographed operating in the Home waters and especially in the Inland Seas, Northeast of Kyushu. No major enemy fleet units are believed to operate consistently in the Yellow Sea but some Cruisers may be seen in the waters West of Kyushu.

SECTION III: ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE - AIR

1. The latest air estimate for Central and Eastern China and Kyushu, Japan based upon photo coverage, interceptions experienced, and M.I.D. estimates, shows the following:

Hankow - Wuchang	180 S/E Fighters
Hankow - Wuchang	18 T/E Fighters
Shanghai - Nanking Sector	75 S/E Fighters
Kyushu Area	300 S/E Fighters
Saishu Island	20 S/E Fighters

Total - - - 593

2. No enemy fighters are believed to be based in Southern Korea.

3. On the planned route, it is estimated that the fighter interception will be as follows:

- a. Central China - Nil to weak
- b. Eastern China - Weak
- c. Kyushu and P.T. - Moderate

SECTION IV: ENEMY AIRCRAFT

JACK 11 was reported over Omura on Mission 17.

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SECTION V: ENEMY AIR OPPOSITION:

Enemy air opposition to B-29's over Omura on 21 November was rated moderate to strong, with enemy pilots aggressive and skillful. Attacks were closely pressed - in many instances, well under 100 yards. Aerial bombs were frequently used, with attacks originating mostly from the frontal quarter, high. There were a number of coordinated attacks, employing 2 to 5 enemy planes, a favorite maneuver being the "Chow Line", executed out of the sun. One report indicated the use of a "decoy" plane which attacked from the frontal quarters to draw attention away from a coordinated "Chow Line" executed at the same time.

SECTION VI: ENEMY AIRFIELDS:

1. For enemy airfields in China, refer to "Enemy Airfield Report No. 4, this Headquarters, dated 2 November.
2. For latest available data on Japanese Air Facilities on Kyushu, see "Enemy Airfield Report No. 7", this Headquarters, dated 16 December 1944.

SECTION VII: ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT:

1. For general information refer to "Enemy Antiaircraft Defense Bulletin Number 7", this Headquarters, dated 1 December 1944.
2. Omura - refer to Flak Intelligence Bulletins J-2, dated 8 November 1944, and J-4 dated 16 December 1944.
3. Shanghai - Woosung - refer to Flak Intelligence Bulletin C-3 dated 16 December 1944, and Antiaircraft Defense Chart (14th Air Force) number 96 dated 21 November 1944.
4. Nanking - refer to Flak Intelligence Bulletin C-4 dated 16 December 1944, and to Antiaircraft Defense Chart (14th Air Force) number 46 dated 11 November 1944.

SECTION VIII: EVASION AND ESCAPE:

1. Refer to "Evasion from occupied China", published in B.E.E., 11 December 1944 with particular reference to pages 25-30.
2. Refer to "Navigators Aid Chart" dated 16 December 1944, with special reference to areas under the control of Communist New 4th Army.

SECTION IX: PRISONER OF WAR CAMPS:

None known to be in Target Areas. Refer to "Japanese P.O.W. Camps", issued by P.O.W. Unit, XX Bomber Command and distributed in July.

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SECTION X: AIR SEA RESCUE:

Details to be supplied prior to final briefing. No change in standard operating procedure -- see Signal Instructions.

SECTION XI: NAVIGATOR'S AID CHART:

A new Navigator's Aid Chart, dated 16 December 1944, has been provided. This chart portrays the latest available information on Communist hold areas, and supersedes all other data on this subject. Also shown on the chart are the battle line, radar warning nets, AA emplacements, and data on friendly emergency airfields.

II. Target Intelligence

SECTION I: LIST OF VISUAL TARGET DATA:

1. Primary Target: Omura Aircraft Plant.

Objective Folder Data 90.36 (for briefing).  
XX Bomber Command Charts: C No. 31 (2nd edition, C No. 39. TC No. 23, 23A, PC No. 23A, PC No. 23B, Mosaic.  
Enlarged Mosaic (for briefing).  
Target Model No. A40-2 (for briefing).  
Target Model Photos.

2. Secondary Target: Kiangnan Dock & Engineering Works, Shanghai, China.

Objective Folder Data 83.1 (for briefing).  
AAF Target Chart No. 83.1-108.  
Mosaic.  
Target Chart No. 83.1-113.  
XX Bomber Command Target Chart No. 51.  
Kiangnan Dock and Engineering Works plan drawing (for briefing).

3. Last Resort Target: Wharf Area, Nanking, China.

Objective Folder Data 83.1-129.  
14th AF Target Chart No. 31.  
Nanking-Pukow Shipping Mosaic.

SECTION II: LIST OF RADAR MATERIAL:

1. Primary Target: Omura Aircraft Plant.

1-1,000,000 A-5, Radar Navigation Maps.  
1-500,000 B-9, Radar Approach Charts.  
1 - 250,000 C-4, Radar Approach Chart.  
1 - 250,000 C-10, Radar Approach Chart  
1-1,000,000 A-7, Radar Navigation Map.

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Scope Sheets.

90° T, point "D", 90.36-1627 Sheet D.  
68° 12' T. point "C" 90.36-542 Sheet C.  
68° 12' T. point "A" 90.36-542 Sheet A.  
68° 12' T. point "B" 90.36-542 Sheet B.  
309° 30' T. point "Y" 90.36-843 Sheet Y.

Scope Photo Sheets

Nagasaki - Omura Area - Sheet "D" 16" X 22".  
Hungtze - Paoying Lake Area - Sheet "B".  
Hungtze Lake Area, - Sheet "A".  
Two Nagasaki Sheets - 8" X 12".  
Nagasaki, Omura Area - 90.36 - 1627 Sheet B.  
Omura Area - 90.36 - 1627 sheet A.  
Omura Area - 90.36 - 1627 sheet C.  
Saishu Island - Sheet "A".  
Yangtze River Paoying Lake Area China.

2. Secondary Target: Kiangnan Dock & Engineering Works, Shanghai, China.

1 - 500,000, B-13. Radar Approach Chart.  
1 - 250,000, C-21. Radar Approach Chart.

Scope Sheets.

278 T, point "C".  
217° 30' T. point "D". 83.1-117 Sheet D.

Scope Photo Sheet

Yangtze River, Paoying Lake, China Coast.  
XX E.C. T.C. No. 51.  
14th AF. T.C. No. 19.  
XX BC. T.C. No. 83.1-113.

3. Last Resort Target: Wharf Area, Nanking, China.

1 - 500,000, B-16, Radar Approach Chart.

Scope photo Sheet.

Yangtze River, Paoying Lake - China Coast Area.

14th A.F. T.C. No. 31.  
Photo Mosaic. Nanking Pukow Shipping.

By Command of MAJOR GENERAL LEMAY:

OFFICIAL: *Frank L. Scott, Jr.*  
FRANK L. SCOTT, JR.,  
Lt. Col., Air Corps,  
Chief, Intelligence Section.

J.E. UPSTON,  
Brigadier General, U.S.A.  
Chief of Staff.

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ANNEX

0

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

- I - Target Information
- II - Determination of Bomb Load
- III - Antiaircraft Information

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

TARGET NO. 1627

OBJECTIVE FOLDER NO. 90.36

TARGET DATA

1. OBJECTIVE:

OMURA AIRCRAFT PLANT, OMURA, JAPAN.

2. COORDINATES AND ELEVATION:

Latitude: 32° 55' N  
Longitude: 129° 56' 30" E.  
Elevation: 20'.

3. LOCATION AND IDENTIFIABLE FEATURES:

The Omura Aircraft Plant is located in the eastern shore of almost landlocked Omura Bay, approximately 20 miles SE of Sasebo Harbor and 1 mile northwest of the town of Omura.

The plant area is shaped like an isosceles triangle, the longest side being on the bay. Mino Island, shaped like a brassiere lies about 1.5 miles to the west-south-west, with heart shaped Usu Island 3/4 of a mile directly south. The airfield is located 1 mile to the north of the main plant.

4. IMPORTANCE:

The plant area is divided into three distinct parts.

- a. The old area 2200' X 1800' extending diagonally back from the main wharfs.
- b. The new south plant 2550' X 1010' extending south along the shore line.
- c. New east plant which is a continuation of the old plant.

The work involved in these three shop areas consists of repair to Zekes and Jakes, manufacture of the Pete ~~and other type aircraft~~ as well as manufacture of the new carrier-borne attack plane Grace. Engines are likewise repaired and built at the Omura Plant.

5. VULNERABLE AREAS:

Each one of the three plant areas mentioned in paragraph 4 presents a separate objective. The old plant is believed to be the preferred choice for the first attack. The large flat-topped sub-assembly building in the north central location being a particularly vulnerable target.

OCTOBER 1944

TARGET UNIT INTELLIGENCE  
XX BOMBER COMMAND

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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Authority 760063

By SG NARA Date 11/8/05

NOT TO BE TAKEN INTO THE AIR ON COMBAT MISSIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TARGET NO. 117  
OBJECTIVE FOLDER NO. 83.1

TARGET DATA

1. OBJECTIVE:

Kiangnan Dock and Engineering Works, Shanghai.

2. COORDINATES AND ELEVATION:

Latitude: 31° 12' N.  
Longitude: 121° 29' E.  
Elevation: Approximately Sea Level.

3. LOCATION AND IDENTIFIABLE FEATURES:

Commercial Shanghai is located near the mouth of the Yangtze River on the west side of the Hwangpoo River about nine miles upstream. The surrounding country is flat, criss-crossed by many canals and small streams, and has only an occasional low hill. Forty-mile-long Tsungming (Chungming) Island lies in the mouth of the Yangtze and is surrounded by many other smaller islands and mud flats. Shanghai is directly south of the center of this large island. This island, the meandering Hwangpoo and five large airfields in and about the city are the most significant identification features.

The Kiangnan Dock and Engineering Works is on the west bank of the Hwangpoo between the fourth and fifth large bends in the river. It occupies an area of about 66 acres and is the largest drydocks and yards in Shanghai. There are three drydocks in close arrangement. Their lengths are 520', 580' and 650'. The shortest is to the east, the longest to the west. Most of the buildings, consisting of an iron foundry, assembly, moulding and machine shops, storehouses, etc are located at the northeast side of the smallest drydock. Just to the west of the drydocks are the large machine shops, a brass and iron storehouse and an electric machine shop. Four slipways are located immediately west of the largest drydock.

4. IMPORTANCE:

The Kiangnan Dock and Engineering Works comprise one of the most important shipbuilding and repair facilities controlled by the enemy outside of Japan itself. The three drydocks (650', 580', and 520' long) are active in repairing Japanese cargo vessels and can accommodate naval ships up to the size of light cruisers. The four shipbuilding ways are turning out cargo vessels which ground intelligence from Shanghai describes as being principally ore carriers of from 2000 to 3000 gross tons. Construction time varies between two and four months, and from 6 to 12 ships are apparently built each year. In addition, this shipyard is reported to be constructing small wooden ships of standardized types. The Kiangnan shops are equipped with modern British machine tools and can make engines of 3000 horsepower or less. Destruction or damage suffered by this target would represent still another blow at Japan's weakening lifeline of ocean transportation.

5. AIMING POINTS:

Center of cluster of buildings east of the drydocks.

18 NOVEMBER 1944

TARGET UNIT, INTELLIGENCE  
XX BOMBER COMMAND

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NOT TO BE TAKEN INTO THE AIR ON COMBAT MISSIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TARGET NO. 129

OBJECTIVE FOLDER NO. 83.1

TARGET DATA

1. OBJECTIVE:

Wharf Area, Nanking, China.

2. COORDINATES AND ELEVATION:

Latitude: 32° 06' N.  
Longitude: 118° 43' E.  
Elevation: Approximately 60 feet.

3. LOCATION AND IDENTIFIABLE FEATURES:

Metropolis Nanking is located on the east bank of the Yangtze River about 165 miles northwest of Shanghai. A large bend in the river just north of the city is cut off by two narrow canals thus forming a small crescent shaped island and a large globular island immediately on its south side. Another large but much narrower island is just south of the city. The walled-city is somewhat elongated on a northwest-southeast axis with the southeast end blunt and the northwest end narrow at the wharf area along the river. The Pukow railroad terminus is just across the river. A conspicuous canal, confluent with the Yangtze, bounds the city on the southwest, south and east. A meandering stream enters this canal from the southeast. At the northeast corner of the city a range of hills, with the highest point about 450 feet, extends east for about four miles. At the center of the south flank of these hills is the tomb of famous Sun Yat Sen. Hsuanwu Lake with its four sizeable islands is a prominent check point of the northeast edge of the city. A canal outside the city wall connects this lake with the river. Most of the wharf area is chopped off from the rest of the city by another canal.

Other important check points in the target area are two airfields. The Ming Ku Kung field is in the southeast end of the city within the wall. It covers an area about 3,600' x 3,800'. It has two concrete runways, 2,800' and 2,600' long that forms an "X" in the middle of the field. The Tai Chiao Chan airfield is in the southeast suburbs of Nanking approximately two miles south-southeast of the Ming Ku Kung field. It measures about 4,300' x 5,000'. Three runways intersect at the southwest corner. The northeast-southwest runway is unpaved. The other two are concrete. The hangar and operations area is at the north side of the field.

4. IMPORTANCE:

The city of Nanking, on the Yangtze River, is one of the enemy's chief military centers in occupied China. The city contains a number of large barracks and storage areas. The movement of troops and supplies is accomplished by the excellent transportation facilities serving Nanking. The railroad line from Tientsin terminates at Pukow, across the river from Nanking with which it is connected by ferry. Another railroad line connects Nanking with Shanghai and continues on to Wuhu and the south. Ocean-going vessels are accommodated at the Nanking wharves.

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All these transportation services converge in the general target area, at the north of which is the Nanking R.R. terminal and R.R. ferry wharves. The area contains numerous large warehouses, a power plant, and along the waterfront are large pontoon wharves. Over a period of months an average of 424 cars has been observed in the Nanking rail yards (700 at Pukow) and shipping at the Nanking and Pukow wharves generally amounts to between 20,000 and 30,000 tons, although shipping activity has possibly declined recently.

Damage to this target area would hamper the flow of military traffic and destroy quantities of supplies stored there.

5. VULNERABLE AREAS AND AIMING POINTS:

There are two aiming points of opportunity at Nanking.

- a. The wharf area near the railway terminal on the east side of the river where ocean-going vessels may be found.
- b. The railway terminal on the Pukow or west side of the river which normally contains the greater volume of rolling stock.

6 NOVEMBER 1944

TARGET UNIT, INTELLIGENCE  
XX BOMBER COMMAND.

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S E C R E T  
DETERMINATION OF BOMB LOAD

Mission No. 22  
19 December 1944

1. The field order prescribed that each group would furnish a maximum number of full modified aircraft and a sufficient number of the best unmodified aircraft to bring the total scheduled for each group to 13. No attempt was made to establish the number of bombs to be carried by modified or unmodified aircraft. Instead each aircraft was instructed to load a minimum of nine 500# bombs in the ratio of one 500# (TNT or Amstol filled) G.P. bomb to one 500# incendiary bomb, in such a manner that the incendiary bombs would be released last. The 500# G.P. bombs, either the AN-M43 or the AN-M64's, were to be fuzed .1 second nose and .025 seconds tail delay, while the 500# Oil incendiary bomb, the M-76 was to be fuzed instantaneous nose and non-delay tail. The intervalometer setting was prescribed as minimum train and bombardiers were instructed to use electrical and not salvo release. The aiming point selected was the northwest corner of the large machine shop in the engine manufacturing component of the target.
2. In order to secure a co-extensive pattern of 500# G.P.'s and M-76 incendiary bombs in which a reasonably uniform distribution of both types of bombs could be expected, the decision was made to carry a mixed load in each aircraft. The demolition bombs were to be carried on the lower racks and the incendiary bombs on the upper racks so that the incendiary bombs would be released last.
3. Inasmuch as the aiming point was selected after due consideration of the size of the target, the probable bombing accuracy, and the expected dimensions of the formation pattern, past experience indicated that it was unlikely that the difference in the ballistic characteristics of the two types of bombs would result in any wastage of bombs. By means of loading M-76's on the top racks and the G.P.'s on the lower racks, it is possible to exploit the good ballistic characteristics of the M-76. For example, the actual time of fall of the M-76 from 25,000 ft. altitude is only .23 of a second longer than that of the 500# G.P. and the difference in trail is only 15 mils greater for the M-76 than a 500# G.P. bomb. These two factors combined result in the impact of the M-76 being 274 feet short of the impact of the 500# G.P. when both bombs are simultaneously released at a true air speed of 300 miles per hour or a ground speed of approximately 441 feet per second. A further, though not substantial, reduction in this differential is occasioned by the present method of loading the M-76's to release last. Similarly an electrical train release at minimum intervalometer setting would cause the M-76 to have a point of impact in even closer proximity to the 500# G.P. bomb, particularly when the altitude of release is lower than that cited in the above example.
4. Examination of the results obtained in previous attacks demonstrates the fact, that with few exceptions, the individual points of impact in the formation pattern will be far enough apart that the detonation of the 500# G.P. bomb will have no appreciable deleterious effect on the incendiary action of the M-76. This phenomenon is explained by the dimensions and density of the formation pattern, as well as by the normal dispersion of bombs released either in salvo or minimum train. On recommendation of the Operations Analysis Section, the fire density within the pattern was increased by changing the loading ratio used on the previous Omura attack, namely two demolition bombs to one incendiary bomb, to the present loading of one demolition bomb to one incendiary bomb.
5. Since the attack was directed at disrupting and destroying the engine manufacturing component, analysis of the target with respect to height, type of structure, roof construction, and the contents of the

O-II-1

S E C R E T

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S E C R E T

building (which was primarily machine equipment associated with engine manufacture assembly and testing) indicated that maximum damage would be inflicted on the contents of the buildings by fuzing the 500# G.P. bombs .1 second nose and .025 seconds tail delay. Study of photo cover failed to reveal that the Japanese have resorted to partitioning or the erection of blast walls within individual buildings with a view to minimizing the blast and fragmentation effect of bombs detonating in close proximity to machine equipment.

6. Similarly, analysis of the aiming point, as well as the remaining buildings which form the engine production and testing components, led to the original decision to employ the M-76 incendiary bomb. The unit fire divisions were large and previous experience had aptly demonstrated the effectiveness of the bomb against this type of structure. The height of the buildings was sufficient to insure that an M-76 fuzed instantaneous nose and non-delay tail would detonate far enough below the point of entry to provide a high degree of assurance that its contents would be widely dispersed and yet contained within the structure.

O-II-2

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
Intelligence Section  
APO 493

FLAK INTELLIGENCE  
BULLETIN NUMBER J-4

OFURA  
32°54'N - 129°57'E

16 December 1944

I. HEAVY ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSES

From photo cover of 10 December 1944, this area is known to be defended by 10 heavy anti-aircraft guns.

II. HEAVY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE ENCOUNTERED

HAA fire encountered has varied from meager to moderate and accurate to inaccurate but has generally been meager and inaccurate under visibility conditions varying from CAVU to 10/10's undercast and for altitudes from 20,000 to 33,000 feet.

III. PROBABLE ACCURACY AND INTENSITY OF HAA FIRE THAT WILL BE ENCOUNTERED

For altitudes above 20,000 feet under CAVU conditions HAA fire will generally be meager but will vary from accurate to inaccurate. Undercast conditions will have little effect on the accuracy of fire.

IV. WARNING NETS

It is expected that the enemy will have prior warning of any approach to the area because of the existence of visual and radar nets in the Northern KYUSHU Area.

V. SMOKESCREENS, BARRAGE AND HIGH-ALTITUDE BALLOONS

Several high altitude balloons have been sighted in this vicinity.

VI. SEARCHLIGHTS

No searchlights have been identified on existing photo cover.

VII. RECOMMENDED ROUTES OF APPROACH AND WITHDRAWAL

Ref: Figs 1 and 2

IN Headings: 30° through 150°  
OUT Headings: 180° through 300°

VIII. REFERENCES

Flak Intelligence Bulletin J-2, dated 8 November 1944

IX. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Photos by XX Bomber Command, photo interpretation by Target Unit, Intelligence Section, XX Bomber Command

DISTRIBUTION:  
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*Frank L. Scott, Jr.*  
FRANK L. SCOTT, JR.,  
Lt. Col., Air Corps,  
Chief, Intelligence Section.

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By SG NARA Date 11/8/05

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
F L A K C L O C K - O M U R A

Figure 1

A P P R O A C H

Flak Officer, Intelligence Section  
XX Bomber Command

This diagram when used as a map, represents an evaluation of the heavy antiaircraft defenses of the target. The shaded section represents the total probability of damage (in arbitrary units) due to flak, for any particular IN HEADING. The BEST course IN is through the narrowest sector of the shaded area. Recommended routes of approach are:



Wind: 60 mph from 300°  
Altitude: 20,000 feet  
Ground Speed: 290 mph (no wind)  
Gun: Japanese 75mm  
Group of aircraft, straight and level flight until bombs away.

Photo cover up to 10 Dec 44 shows 10 HAA guns.

TARGET: OMURA A/C FACTORY

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

F L A K C L O C K - O M U R A


Figure 2

W I T H D R A W A L

Flak Officer, Intelligence Section  
XX Bomber Command

This diagram when used as a map, represents an evaluation of the heavy antiaircraft defenses of the target. The shaded section represents the total probability of damage (in arbitrary units) due to flak for any particular OUT HEADING. The BEST course OUT is through the narrowest sector of the shaded area. Recommended routes of withdrawal are:

180° through 300°



Wind: 60 mph from 300°  
Altitude: 20,000 feet  
Ground Speed: 290 mph (no wind)  
Gun: Japanese 75mm  
Group of aircraft, straight and level flight until bombs away

Photo cover to 10 Dec 44 shows 10 HAA guns.

TARGET: OMURA A/C FACTORY

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
Intelligence Section  
APO 493

FLAK INTELLIGENCE  
BULLETIN NUMBER C-3

SHANGHAI-WOOSUNG  
31°13'N - 121°28'E

16 December 1944

I. HEAVY ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSES

This area is defended by 50 heavy antiaircraft guns (calibers of 75mm or greater) based on information contained in AA Defense Chart Number 96, 14th Air Force, dated 21 November 1944.

II. HEAVY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE ENCOUNTERED

HAA fire encountered by aircraft of this Command has varied from meager to moderate and has generally been inaccurate for headings approximately the same as those recommended in this Bulletin.

III. PROBABLE ACCURACY AND INTENSITY OF HAA FIRE THAT WILL BE ENCOUNTERED

Provided the recommended headings are followed, and for altitudes above 18,000 feet under CAVU conditions, HAA fire will generally be meager and inaccurate. If, however, headings of approach and withdrawal other than those listed in Section VII below are followed, HAA fire will vary from moderate to intense and accurate to inaccurate for the same conditions as listed above.

IV. WARNING NETS

It is believed that the enemy will have prior warning of any approach because of the existence of a probable warning net in the area.

V. SMOKESCREENS, BARRAGE AND HIGH-ALTITUDE BALLOONS AND BLACKOUT

Barrage Balloons: A 29 August report stated that following the 14th Air Force Bombings in SHANGHAI, Japs had prepared barrage balloons.

VI. SEARCHLIGHTS

This area is known to be defended by 14 searchlights from cover up to 21 November 1944.

VII. RECOMMENDED ROUTES OF APPROACH AND WITHDRAWAL

Ref: Figs 1 and 2

IN Headings: 270° through 330°  
OUT Headings: 90° through 180°

VIII. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Antiaircraft Defense Chart Number 96, 14th Air Force, dated 21 Nov 44.  
Reports of Operations, XX Bomber Command.

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FRANK L. SCOTT, JR.,  
Lt. Col., Air Corps,  
Chief, Intelligence Section

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
F L A K C L O C K - S H A N G H A I

Figure 1

A P P R O A C H

Flak Officer, Intelligence Section  
XX Bomber Command

This diagram when used as a map, represents an evaluation of the heavy antiaircraft defenses of the target. The shaded section represents the total probability of damage (in arbitrary units) due to flak, for any particular IN HEADING. The BEST course IN is through the narrowest sector of the shaded area. Recommended routes of approach are:



Wind: 50 mph from 270°  
Altitude: 20,000 feet  
Ground Speed: 290 mph (no wind)  
Gun: Japanese 75mm  
Group of aircraft, straight and level flight until bombs away.

Photo cover up to 21 Nov 44 shows 50 HAA guns.

TARGET: KIANGNAN DOCKS,  
SHANGHAI

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
F L A K C L O C K - S H A N G H A I

Figure 2

W I T H D R A W A L

Flak Officer, Intelligence Section  
XX Bomber Command

This diagram when used as a map, represents an evaluation of the heavy antiaircraft defenses of the target. The shaded section represents the total probability of damage (in arbitrary units) due to flak for any particular OUT HEADING. The BEST course OUT is through the narrowest sector of the shaded area. Recommended routes of withdrawal are:



Wind: 50 mph from 270°  
Altitude: 20,000 feet  
Ground Speed: 290 mph (no wind)  
Gun: Japanese 75mm  
Group of aircraft, straight and level flight  
until bombs away

Photo cover up to 21 Nov 44  
shows 50 HAA guns.

TARGET: KIANGMAN DOCKS,  
SHANGHAI

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HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
Intelligence Section  
APO 493

FLAK INTELLIGENCE  
BULLETIN NUMBER C-4

NANKING  
32°03'N - 118°47'E

16 December 1944

I. HEAVY ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSES

NANKING is defended by 21 heavy antiaircraft guns based on photo cover up to 11 November 1944.

II. HEAVY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE ENCOUNTERED

HAA fire has been generally meager and inaccurate at altitudes of 17,000 to 25,000 feet under CAVU conditions.

III. PROBABLE ACCURACY AND INTENSITY OF HAA FIRE THAT WILL BE ENCOUNTERED

For altitudes above 17,000 feet and under CAVU conditions HAA fire will probably continue to be meager and generally inaccurate.

IV. WARNING NETS

It is expected that the enemy will have prior warning of any approach to the area because of the existence of an early warning radar at this location plus a warning net in the area.

V. SMOKESCREENS, BARRAGE AND HIGH-ALTITUDE BALLOONS AND BLACKOUT

An ineffective attempt was made to screen the NANKING POWER HOUSE, the CAR FERRY PIER on the east bank of the YANGTZE River and the RAILROAD YARDS on the West bank of the YANGTZE on XX Bomber Command Mission #16, 11 November 1944. The enemy will probably attempt to improve the operational efficiency of his smoke generators on future missions.

Four barrage balloons were also observed in the vicinity of NANKING at 0129Z on 11 November 1944 (XX Bomber Command Mission #16) flying at approximately 5000 feet altitude, but were not located on strike photographs.

VI. SEARCHLIGHTS

Eight searchlights are known to be in the area based on AA Defense Chart (14th Air Force) Number 46, dated 11 November 1944, and photo interpretation by the Target Unit, Intelligence Section, XX Bomber Command.

VII. RECOMMENDED ROUTES OF APPROACH AND WITHDRAWAL Ref: Figs 1 and 2

IN Headings: 110° through 180°  
OUT Headings: 270° through 330° through 60°

- 1 -

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VIII. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

- A. Antiaircraft Defense Chart Number 46 (14th Air Force) 11 November 1944.
- B. Photo Interpretation by Target Unit, Intelligence Section, XX Bomber Command of cover up to 11 November 1944.

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
FLAK CLOCK - NANKING

Figure 1

A P P R O A C H

Flak Officer, Intelligence Section  
XX Bomber Command

This diagram when used as a map, represents an evaluation of the heavy antiaircraft defenses of the target. The shaded section represents the total probability of damage (in arbitrary units) due to flak, for any particular IN HEADING. The BEST course IN is through the narrowest sector of the shaded area. Recommended routes of approach are:



Wind: 50 mph from 270°  
Altitude: 20,000 feet  
Ground Speed: 290 mph (no wind)  
Gun: Japanese 75mm  
Group of aircraft, straight and level flight until bombs away.

Photo cover to 11 Nov 44 shows 21 HAA Guns.

TARGET: DOCKS ON EAST BANK OF YANGTZE RIVER

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
C O N F I D E N T I A L

F L A K C L O C K - N A N K I N G  
W I T H D R A W A L

Figure 2

Flak Officer, Intelligence Section  
XX Bomber Command

This diagram when used as a map, represents an evaluation of the heavy antiaircraft defenses of the target. The shaded section represents the total probability of damage (in arbitrary units) due to flak for any particular OUT HEADING. The BEST course OUT is through the narrowest sector of the shaded area. Recommended routes of withdrawal are:



Wind: 50 mph from 270°  
Altitude: 20,000 feet  
Ground Speed: 290 mph (no wind)  
Gun: Japanese 75mm  
Group of aircraft, straight and level flight until bombs away

Photo cover to 11 Nov 44 shows 21 HAA guns.

TARGET: DOCKS ON EAST BANK OF YANGTZE RIVER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

DISTRIBUTION -- MISSION NO. 22

19 December 1944

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3	Chief of Staff, XX Bomber Command
4	Chief, Intelligence Section, XX Bomber Command
5	Commanding Officer, Forward Echelon Detachment, Headquarters, XX Bomber Command (Attn: Intelligence Officer)
6	Commanding Officer, 40th Bombardment Group
7	Commanding Officer, 444th Bombardment Group
8	Commanding Officer, 462nd Bombardment Group
9	Commanding Officer, 468th Bombardment Group
10 - 39	Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Attention: AC/AS Intelligence, Collection Division
40	Assistant Chief Air Staff, Intelligence
41	CINCPQA (Thru DECOMAF Twenty)
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44	Chief, Air Evaluation Board, Headquarters, Army Air Forces, United States Forces, India Burma
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HEADQUARTERS  
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE  
ADJUTANT GENERAL



JAN 22 1945

