

**SECRET**SECRET  
Serial No. 175

December 6, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Jerome E. Burke  
Deputy Security Officer  
Department of Commerce

Subject: Security Clearance of Wartime Histories

Enclosure: a. Draft of History of Weather Bureau, Department of  
Commerce  
b. Draft of History of Coast and Geodetic Survey,  
Department of Commerce  
c. Copy No. 61 of SAB 6

1. Reference is made to your letter of October 28, 1946, requesting that the Security Advisory Board examine the contents of the proposed histories of the World War activities of the Weather Bureau and the Coast and Geodetic Survey, Department of Commerce, with a view to indicating which parts, if any, should be classified.

2. Following submission of these histories to the appropriate security authorities, you are hereby advised that the Security Advisory Board sees no objections on the grounds of security to the publication of these histories as unclassified documents, provided the following deletions are made in the history of the Weather Bureau:

- a. Last paragraph, page 17 and top of page 18.
- b. Subparagraph (c), page 50, paragraph headed "Janis Studies".

3. In connection with the history of the Coast and Geodetic Survey, your attention is invited to the following comments and exceptions taken by the Hydrographer, U. S. Navy:

Page 12 - Under commissions attained by U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey Personnel. Suggest that they be grouped into three categories, namely, Army, Navy and U. S. Marine Corps.

Page 15 - Statement that - "It seems paradoxical that members of the crew of these ships should be subject to induction while naval surveys ships carrying on the same kind of work in other regions were entirely free from this handicap" - is very misleading. Crews on all naval survey vessels are regular members of the Naval Service and, therefore, are not affected by selective service rulings. These trained crews on Navy survey vessels are subject to transfer to other vessels when trained personnel are necessary.



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Page 21 - Objection is raised to the following statement - "there seems to be a tendency to take over for such uses all types of vessels without much regard for their suitability for such work". This statement implies that the Navy is in no position to judge suitability of craft for their purposes. The effectiveness of submarines in the early part of the war proved that there were insufficient patrol craft to cope with the situation even after taking over practically everything that floated. As the need for survey vessels arose, they were provided in sufficient quantities.

Page 23 - Second paragraph - survey carried out by the Coast & Geodetic Survey in Jamaica was not of Kingston Harbor, but of the Galleon Harbor Area.

Page 62 - It is suggested that the following statement be deleted - "and flight planning of the Alaska-Russian area;". It is believed that this also might be misinterpreted.

Page 62 - It is recommended that the following be deleted - "and loran charts for use in long range navigation by means of special loran equipment." Work in connection with the computing of the loran tables and production of loran charts was a responsibility of the U. S. Hydrographic Office. Exception to the rule was a limited number of loran charts over the Malayan hump, prepared for the Army Air Forces by the U. S. Soil Conservation Service and data furnished by the Hydrographic Office. Although the Coast and Geodetic Survey may have produced these few charts, by inference, the casual reader will receive the impression that the Coast & Geodetic Survey produced all the loran charts during the war, which is not true.

Page 62 - Suggest changing the word "Navy" to "Hydrographic Office" in the sentence reading - "During the latter part of the war the Navy called on the Bureau for the reconstruction of numerous captured Japanese nautical charts." This work was done at the specific request of the Hydrographic Office, under contract with the U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey. Inasmuch as the Hydrographic Office is, by regulation, the Naval Agency entrusted with the responsibility for carrying out surveys and producing charts for naval use or for acting as liaison in such matters, reference to the Hydrographic Office is considered appropriate in this case.

Page 63 - Request deletion of the last sentence on this page, which reads as follows - "Considerable quantities of this type of chart were made later in connection with preparation for the invasion of Japan." By inference, the reader will get the idea that the Coast & Geodetic Survey was called upon to prepare approach and bombardment charts for the invasion of Japan, which is not true. All such work was performed by the Hydrographic Office of the Navy. The only instance in which the Coast & Geodetic Survey participated in the construction and reproduction of approach and bombardment charts was for the



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Philippine Area mentioned on the same page for which credit no question is raised and for which suitable commendation and recognition was given by the Hydrographer. As in the case of other work performed by the U. S. Coast & Geodetic Survey for the Hydrographic Office, this was done on a reimbursable basis.

Page 90 - Suggest modification of second sentence in first paragraph to read, "After a short period of duty in Alaska, this ship, under regular naval command, proceeded to the Western Pacific where she was engaged in surveying and charting operations until June, 1944."

4. In accordance with your request that a policy be established as to future clearance of these histories from a security standpoint, the Security Advisory Board is issuing this policy as Security Advisory Board Memorandum No. 6 this date. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed herewith.

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth Catlett Barton  
Secretary



CONFIDENTIAL  
Serial No. 174  
RCB/gh

CONFIDENTIAL

December 6, 1946

Mr. Alvin W. Kremer  
Security Officer  
Library of Congress  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Kremer:

Reference is made to your letter of November 26, 1946, enclosing a list of five employees of the Library of Congress for security checks as recommended in Security Advisory Board Memorandum No. 3.

A check of investigative sources reveals no reason why the five individuals listed in your letter of November 26, 1946, should not handle Top Secret and Secret files, provided other conditions set forth in SAB 3 have been met to your satisfaction.

A copy of the list of personnel which you forwarded to this office is returned herewith.

Sincerely yours,

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL



UNCLASSIFIED  
Serial No. 173

December 5, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR State Member, SAB  
War Member, SAB  
Navy Member, SAB

Subject: Declassification Questionnaire

Reference: a. Serial No. 92  
b. Serial No. 99  
c. Minutes SAB Sixth Meeting

Enclosure: Proposed Follow-up Memorandum to  
Appropriate Security Officers.

1. On October 17, 1946, the Security Advisory Board addressed a memorandum to the Security Officers of non-military departments and agencies requesting that they submit answers to certain questions regarding classification problems in their agency.

2. To date, only 8 replies to this request have been received. In view of the lapse of time since the date of this request, it is felt that a follow-up memorandum to Serial No. 99 is in order. The enclosed draft is accordingly submitted for approval.

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary



UNCLASSIFIED

Serial No. \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

MEMORANDUM FOR Security OfficerSubject: Declassification

1. On October 17, 1946, the Security Advisory Board addressed a memorandum to you in which certain questions of classified material in the possession of your agency were presented for study. (Serial No. 99). The answers to these questions were to serve as a basis for realistic approach to the overall problem of declassification in civilian agencies and departments.

2. The Security Advisory Board has now prepared the first draft of a regulation on the downgrading of classified material, upon which comments from certain interested offices are presently being secured. In order that your declassification problems may be considered in the first revision of this regulation, it is urged that you submit a reply to Serial No. 99, dated October 17, 1946, as soon as possible. If there is no classified material in the possession of your agency, it will be appreciated if you will so notify the Security Advisory Board.

3. The proposed regulation on downgrading will be submitted to you for comment before it is finally issued.

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth Catlett Barton  
Secretary



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL  
Serial No. 172

5 December 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR Director, Security Division  
Manhattan District  
Office of the District Engineer  
Oak Ridge, Tennessee

Subject: Surveys of Government Printing Office

Reference: Memorandum File No. EIDMI-50

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 22 November 1946 requesting that any security survey reports on the Government Printing Office in the possession of the Security Advisory Board be made available to your office for inspection.

2. Surveys which were made by the Security Advisory Board during its period of existence under the Office of War Information were made only on specific phases of the operations of the Government Printing Office. It should likewise be pointed out that even these survey reports are not current.

3. In view of the above, the Security Advisory Board is presently requesting that the results of more comprehensive and more recent security surveys on the Government Printing Office be made available to this office for your review. The Security Advisory Board does not presently have the staff to make a comprehensive survey of the extensive operations of the Government Printing Office, and consequently must rely upon the results of reports made by other reliable agencies and the verification of these reports by the Security Officer of the Government Printing Office. These surveys will be forwarded to you as soon as they have been received and verified as to current procedure.

4. If, upon review of the surveys which will be forwarded to you, it is your opinion that such information is not adequate, the Security Advisory Board would be glad to make arrangements for a survey of the Government Printing Office by a properly identified representative from the Manhattan District, if such a survey is desired.

For the Security Advisory Board:

CONFIDENTIAL

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary



**RESTRICTED****RESTRICTED**  
**Serial No. 171**

December 4, 1946

**MEMORANDUM FOR** State Member, SAB  
War Member, SAB  
Navy Member, SAB**Subject:** Justification for Assignment of Personnel to SAB**Reference:** g. SWN-4919**Enclosure:** Draft of Memorandum to SWNCC Secretariat

1. The Secretary, Security Advisory Board, has been requested to furnish the Secretary, SWNCC, with information to justify the request to SWNCC for the assignment of additional personnel to the Board.

2. It is requested that the Board members review the enclosure with a view to approving its contents for whatever use in connection with the SWNCC study on the SAB which the SWNCC Secretary may desire.

**For the Security Advisory Board:**Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary



RESTRICTED

MEMORANDUM FOR     The Secretary  
                          State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

Subject:             Assignment of Personnel to the Security Advisory Board

1. In order to justify the recent request which has been made to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee for additional personnel for the Security Advisory Board, the following report of Board activities is submitted. An attempt has been made in the ensuing paragraphs to enumerate actual functions of the Board, the problems involved in fulfilling these functions, the work which the Board has thus far been able to accomplish in carrying out the function, and an estimate of the work which should be done in performing the function properly.

a. Function

(1) "a. Formulating policies and procedures relating to the declassification of documents originating in non-military agencies and departments."

(2) Problems Involved in Fulfilling This Function

The main problem involved in carrying out function a is that the Security Advisory Board cannot do the amount of work required with the present personnel which it has. The work needed to perform this function properly is given below in paragraph 1 a (4).

(3) Work Which the Board Has Thus Far Been Able to Accomplish

Aside from the general declassification procedures contained as a part of SAB Memorandum No. 1, the Board has not issued a declassification policy or procedure. A survey of classified material



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throughout federal agencies has been requested by the Security Advisory Board but sufficient replies have not yet been received to enable the Board to estimate the value of this survey. A draft of a declassification policy has just been completed and an attempt is being made to coordinate the draft with certain interested offices at this time. The Board has, in addition, been servicing agencies and departments on individual classification problems as they arise.

(4) Estimate of Work Needed to Perform this Function Properly

In order to formulate a workable declassification procedure which is general enough for all federal agencies to follow, specific enough to answer declassification problems peculiar to an agency or department, and rigid enough to meet the requirements of the military services, there should be extensive research and investigation of declassification problems throughout government before any regulation is issued. First-hand knowledge of specific declassification problems in federal agencies and departments should be an initial requirement to the drafting of this regulation. Following the drafting of the regulation, thorough coordination with all interested offices should take place before the regulation is issued to insure its workability. When the regulation is issued, there should be follow-up action in agencies until an actual declassification mechanism is in operation.

b. Function

(1) "b. Establishing security requirements and procedures for clearances of civilian officers to receive classified information."



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(2) Problems Involved in Fulfilling This Function

Had the FBI been able to make checks of their subversive files directly for the Security Officers of all federal agencies and departments, there would have been no particular problem connected with the carrying out of this function. The Board has steadily maintained the position that it could not, under its terms of reference, act as the guarantor of the security of any employee of a federal department or agency. It has maintained the position that the Security Officer of the department or agency must accept final responsibility for the security of an employee of his department. Formerly, the Board acted as a channel for transmitting the opinion of the Security Officer from the agency to the office requesting the check. When the Security Officers of certain federal departments and agencies were confronted with a refusal by the FBI to make any checks on their personnel the Board, in the interest of security of the federal government, made an arrangement by which the FBI would make name checks for these civilian departments and agencies through the medium of the Security Advisory Board.

Since the resulting situation was far from satisfactory, the Board requested the FBI to make these name checks directly for civilian agencies and departments. The basis for this request was the belief that no tangible results were being obtained when the Security Advisory Board was not in a position to make recommendations to the agency or to give any derogatory information to the Security Officer concerned. The Board has just received a reply from the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, which states that the FBI not only will not make checks directly



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for civilian agencies but that they are also discontinuing this service for the Security Advisory Board. The entire problem of personnel security as the Board has seen it should probably be presented to the new inter-agency commission recently created by the President.

(3) Work Which The Board Has Thus Far Been Able to Accomplish

The Board has issued a memorandum on security clearances of personnel having access to highly classified information, which establishes certain minimum standards for security clearances. This does not preclude any federal agency or department establishing higher standards if they are felt to be necessary. This memorandum was coordinated with the Security Officers of all interested departments and agencies before it was issued. Needless to say, the refusal of the FBI to make name checks either for civilian agencies or departments directly or for the Security Advisory Board makes this memorandum practically useless.

Before the termination of the arrangement with the FBI the Board acted as the medium for obtaining security clearances on some four hundred people. Approximately 100 are still pending and probably cannot be completed.

(4) Estimate of Work Needed to Perform This Function Properly

Any enumeration of future duties in performing this function seems academic at the present time. The inter-agency commission recently created by the President will undoubtedly answer all the problems which have been met by the Security Advisory Board in fulfilling this function. The work of the Board in the meanwhile must be an attempt to see that



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government employees working with classified material are given as thorough clearance as possible without the benefit of any investigative agencies.

**g. Function**

(1) "g. Establishing standards for the conversion of security regulations for civilian agencies from a wartime to a peacetime basis including Top Secret procedure."

(2) Problems Involved in Fulfilling This Function

Before knowing what must be done in converting wartime security regulations to peacetime regulations, the Board must ascertain what has already been done in this field. It is believed that almost all civilian agencies and departments are still operating under wartime regulations, through the lack of guidance and direction needed to convert these regulations to peacetime standards. This conversion will involve on-the-spot inspection and supervision by the Security Advisory Board, which it presently does not have the staff to accomplish.

The main difficulty envisioned will be the setting up of an effective Top Secret control procedure. There is presently no such procedure for civilian agencies and departments and the Board has no central list of control officers. The Board has been waiting for a new regulation on Top Secret procedure being prepared by the Joint Security Control.

(3) Work Which the Board Has Thus Far Been Able to Accomplish

To date the Board has not made a final revision of its own general security regulations. In SAB No. 1 the Board made some slight revision of the general security regulations but the thorough



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revision of all pertinent security regulations has not yet been accomplished.

The Board has reviewed certain security policies before they were issued by civilian agencies but to date, no agency or department has submitted an entire set of regulations for review. The Board has requested information from all Security Officers as to the present security regulations under which they are operating, but all answers have not yet been returned.

(4) Estimate of Work Needed to Perform This Function Properly

Following the review of the Board on general security regulations, the Security Officers of civilian agencies must be required to undertake revision of their own regulations. It is safe to assume that these revisions will not be undertaken without considerable guidance and pressure from some central agency. It is believed that the review of the Top Secret procedure for civilian agencies cannot wait too much longer. Following the issuance of a workable procedure, the central list of Top Secret control officers must be established and maintained on a current basis in the office of the Security Advisory Board. This will require the establishment of a control office in federal agencies and departments under the guidance of the Security Advisory Board.

d. Function

(1) "d. Conducting surveys of security measures affecting administrative agencies and physical security affecting adversely security of classified information."

(2) Problems Involved in Fulfilling This Function

The imminent necessity for making security surveys in government agencies creates another danger to the Board's prestige.



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Obviously, the Board does not have adequate personnel to make security surveys of civilian agencies and departments. The lack of personnel is the main problem connected with this function.

(3) Work Which the Board Has Thus Far Been Able to Accomplish

To date the Board has done nothing toward carrying out these provisions. It has been fortunate that no specific requests for security surveys have actually been received until this time. The Board has, however, recently received a request from the Manhattan District Project in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for a survey of a government agency but through lack of personnel this request cannot be handled adequately by the Board. Certain security surveys which were made during wartime are on file in the offices of the Board but all such surveys should be maintained on a current basis.

(4) Estimate of Work Needed to Perform This Function Properly

If the Board is to operate effectively, it would have on file copies of reports of security measures employed in every federal department and agency in the government which handles classified information. This would mean surveys of a rather technical nature which would take up most of the time of one of the personnel requested for this Board.

g. Function

(1) "g. Preparing studies and recommendations on matters referred to it by SWNCC."

(2) Problems Involved in Fulfilling this Function

SWNCC, as a policy making body concerned mainly with U. S. policy with foreign governments, would logically have few questions to



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refer to the Security Advisory Board, since the Security Advisory Board is primarily an operational group in the domestic field.

f. Function

(1) "f. Coordinating with other federal agencies in developing security training programs and other procedures which are designed to promote security of classified information throughout federal agencies."

(2) Problems in Fulfilling This Function

Here again there are no particular controversial issues concerned but this function cannot be properly fulfilled until more personnel are assigned to the Board. The question of an adequate budget would naturally arise here, because no training program can be effected until sufficient materials for training are available.

(3) Work Which the Board Has Thus Far Been Able to Accomplish

Aside from the fact that the Secretary has addressed group historians and records officers, there has been no security training done since the Board became a subcommittee of SWNCC.

(4) Estimate of Work Needed to Perform this Function Properly

The Board should be equipped to do an extensive program of security training. It is contemplated that one of the officers assigned to the Board shall spend his entire time training government personnel in security.

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary



UNCLASSIFIED  
SERIAL NO. 170

December 2, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR

State Member, SAB  
War Member, SAB  
Navy Member, SAB  
Mr. Kenneth Heckler, Bureau of the Budget

Subject:

Security Clearance of Wartime Histories of  
Nonmilitary Federal Departments and Agencies

References:

- a. Minutes 8th SAB Meeting
- b. Serial No. 167
- c. Serial No. 168

Enclosure:

Corrected page 2 of Draft on Subject.

1. Holders of the draft of the proposed SAB memorandum on the security clearance of wartime histories of federal departments and agencies are requested to substitute the attached page 2 for the one contained therein.

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary



should then be forwarded to the Security Officer of the agency, with an accompanying statement from the historian as to his opinion of the correct classification.

b. If the Security Officer determines that a completed history may properly be issued as an unclassified document or if he determines that the classified portions of the history must remain classified, he should return the history to the historian with a statement to that effect. If he believes the classification might properly be removed, he should submit the history to the proper security authorities for review as to classification. If he is unable to determine which security authorities in the War or Navy Departments or other federal departments are properly interested in the contents of the history, the Security Advisory Board may be consulted for this information.

~~c. In the event disagreement as to the classification of the document results among security authorities, the Security Advisory Board will attempt to secure an agreement on the classification. Reference to the Security Advisory Board should include the history itself, and a full statement of the views of the differing agencies.~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Serial No. 169

December 3, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR State Member, SAB  
War Member, SAB  
Navy Member, SAB

Subject: Security Checks

Reference: a. Serial No. 144

Enclosure: a. Copy letter from Director, FBI  
b. Draft of Letter to Interested Security Officers

1. Enclosed is a copy of the reply to Serial No. 144, forwarded to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, from the Security Advisory Board on November 20, 1946.

2. With the refusal of the FBI to conduct name checks for certain civilian agencies, either directly or via the SAB, some civilian agencies now have no channel for securing personnel investigations. The SAB must accordingly notify those people for whom it has been making such checks that this service will no longer be available to them and SAB 3 should probably be revised if it is to remain of current interest.

3. The attached letter to those Security Officers for whom the SAB has been making security checks is submitted for approval by the SAB. This letter, together with any further action necessary by the SAB in this connection, will be discussed at the next meeting of the Security Advisory Board.

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

NND 780069

By JHM NARS, Date 22 Aug '78~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~DRAFT~~Confidential~~  
Serial No. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_ December 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. James J. Kelly, NACA  
Mr. Nathaniel Goodrich, OWM & R  
Mr. Robert S. Wallleigh, National Bureau of Standards  
Mr. Alvin W. Kresner, Library of Congress

Subject: Security Checks

Reference: a. SAB 3

1. A recent request to the Federal Bureau of Investigation from the Security Advisory Board that name checks be made directly for the Security Officers of civilian agencies and departments has been refused. At the same time the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation has terminated the arrangement by which the Board was able to obtain name checks for these agencies.

2. Since other investigative sources were being checked only when derogatory information was found as a result of FBI name checks, these sources are similarly closed to the Security Advisory Board.

2. It is therefore deeply regretted that the Security Advisory Board can no longer make name checks on behalf of your agency. [The problem is presently under consideration by the Board, particularly as concerns the revision of SAB 3. It is hoped that the findings of the new inter-agency commission, recently created by the President to determine means by which persons disloyal to the government may be removed from office, will be of substantial aid to solving this problem. Meanwhile, it is urged that you make every effort to conform with other provisions of SAB 3 in clearing employees of your agency for highly classified work.

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

NND 780069  
By JHB NARS, Date 22 Aug. '78~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Unclassified  
Serial No. 168

December 3, 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Kenneth Heckler  
Division of Administrative Management  
Bureau of the Budget  
Room 251, State Department Building

Subject:

Clearance of Wartime Histories

Enclosure:

Draft of Proposed SAB Memorandum on Subject

1. The enclosed draft of a proposed Security Advisory Board memorandum on the security clearance of wartime histories of federal departments and agencies is submitted to you for your comments. The enclosure has not yet been reviewed by the Security Advisory Board but will be discussed at the next meeting of the Board. I would like to have your comments on the draft as soon as possible in order that I may submit them to the Board sometime this week.

2. An attempt has been made to place the responsibility for securing clearance on these histories on the agency itself as you suggested in a recent telephone conversation.

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary



UnclassifiedSerial No. 167

December 2, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR

State Member, SAB  
War Member, SAB  
Navy Member, SAB

Subject:

Security Clearance of Wartime  
Histories of Nonmilitary Federal  
Agencies and Departments.

Reference:

a. Minutes 8th SAB Meeting

Enclosure:

Draft of SAB Memorandum on Subject

1. Pursuant to direction at the 8th SAB Meeting, the Secretary has now prepared a memorandum on security clearance of government histories. This memorandum is also being circulated for comment to Mr. Kenneth Heckler, Bureau of the Budget, who has had supervision over the preparation of these wartime histories.

2. In view of the imminent necessity for furnishing a policy on this matter to the Department of Commerce, the enclosure will be considered at the next meeting of the Security Advisory Board.

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary



UNCLASSIFIEDSABDatePages

COPY NO. \_\_\_\_\_

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEESECURITY ADVISORY BOARDSECURITY CLEARANCE OF WARTIME HISTORIES OF NONMILITARY  
FEDERAL AGENCIES AND DEPARTMENTSNote by the Secretary

It has come to the attention of the Security Advisory Board that there is no uniform standard for the security clearance of wartime histories of nonmilitary agencies and departments of the federal government. In order to further uniformity in this respect, the Security Advisory Board recommends that Security Officers bring the contents of the enclosure to the attention of the agency historian.

Ruth Catlett Barton  
Secretary



UNCLASSIFIED

E N C L O S U R E

SECURITY CLEARANCE OF WARTIME HISTORIES OF NONMILITARY  
FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

Memorandum by the Security Advisory Board

1. At the direction of the President of the United States and under the supervision of the Bureau of the Budget, agencies and departments of the federal government have been preparing an objective administrative analysis of their wartime activities.
2. In some instances, it has been determined that the historian himself was unable to determine the correct classification of a completed history, since individual unit histories have sometimes been submitted with no indication as to their correct classification. In other instances, a classified history might have been downgraded had its contents been reviewed. Since the future use of wartime histories might be limited by a careless classification, every effort should be made to issue these histories as unclassified documents.
3. In the interest of uniformity and the security of classified information, the Security Advisory Board recommends that the procedure outlined below be followed wherever practicable in nonmilitary agencies and departments:
  - a. Upon completion of the history, the agency historian should, ~~wherever possible~~, indicate the portions of the history which, in his opinion, merit classification. The history



should then be forwarded to the Security Officer of the agency, with an accompanying statement from the historian as to his opinion of the correct classification;

b. If the Security Officer determines that a completed history may properly be issued as an unclassified document or if he determines that the classified portions of the history must remain classified, he should return the history to the historian with a statement to that effect. If he believes the classification might properly be removed, he should submit the history to the proper security authorities for review as to classification. *Add new sentence*

c. In the event disagreement as to the classification of the document results among security authorities, the Security Advisory Board will attempt to secure an agreement on the classification. Reference to the Security Advisory Board should include the history itself, ~~and a full statement of the views of the~~ differing agencies.



Unclassified  
Serial No. 166

December 3, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. William C. Kircher  
Chief, Document Security Section  
Civilian Production Administration

Subject:

Notice of Declassification of ARCO Reports

Enclosure:

Copy Letter of September 28, 1945, from  
Acting Director, ARCO

1. Enclosed herewith is a copy of the letter, declassifying all ARCO reports as of September 28, 1945, which you requested.

2. If this is not the letter to which you had reference, will you please advise me?

For the Security Advisory Board:

*Ruth C. Barton*  
Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary



COPY

**AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION BOARD  
RESOURCES CONTROL OFFICE****Pentagon Building  
Washington 25, D. C.****September 28, 1945****In Reply Refer To:  
A:t:9-101****MEMORANDUM****FOR: All Holders of ARCO Reports**  
**SUBJECT: Declassification of ARCO Reports**

By authority of Mr. J. A. Krug, Chairman of the Aircraft Production Board, and with the concurrence of Major General E. M. Powers, Assistant Chief of Air Staff -4, AAF, and Rear Admiral Lawrence B. Richardson, Assistant Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics, Navy Dept., you are hereby informed that all Aircraft Resources Control Office Reports are declassified as of the above date.

Any reports you hold may be disposed of at will and in whatever manner you desire. This memorandum will serve as official permission for the above.

Since ARCO will be dissolved on September 30, 1945, no further reports will be issued. Any communications regarding ARCO matters should be referred to the Aeronautical Board, Room 2231 Munitions Building, Washington 25, D. C., telephone Republic 6700, Extension 78155.

**/s/ Myron A. Tracy, Acting Director  
Aircraft Resources Control Office**

COPY



Unclassified  
Serial No. 165

December 2, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR

Miss M. M. Muller  
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics  
Room 203, 415 22nd Street  
Washington 25, D.C.

Subject:

AAF Downgrading Letters

Reference:

a. Serial No. 156

Enclosures:

a. AAF Letter 46-62  
b. AAF Letter 46-75A  
c. AAF Letter 46-75  
d. AAF Letter 46-79

1. Transmitted herewith are further copies of AAF publications regarding downgraded or declassified Air Corps documents.
2. Return of enclosures a through d is requested.

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth G. Barton  
Secretary



UNCLASSIFIED  
Serial No. 164

December 2, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Kenneth Heckler  
Division of Administrative Management  
Bureau of the Budget  
Room 251, State Department Building

Subject: Classification and Downgrading Procedures

Enclosure: Copy No. 10 of SAB Draft of Classification and  
Downgrading Memorandum

1. Pursuant to our telephone conversation this date, enclosed herewith is a copy of the first draft of a proposed memorandum on classification and downgrading procedures, on which the Board is desirous of having your comments.

2. In view of the fact that this memorandum, as amended, must be further circulated to Security Officers of non-military federal departments and agencies, may we have your comments on or before December 16, 1946?

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Serial No. 163

December 2, 1946

The Honorable  
J. Edgar Hoover  
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington 25, D. C.

Attn: Mr. J. F. Doherty

Dear Mr. Hoover:

The enclosed list of names is transmitted to you  
for FBI name checks.

Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

~~NND780069~~By Z.H.M. NARS, Date 22 Aug. '78~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



1805,  
Main Navy  
Bldg  
Mr. McKenna

**Name and address:** Arble, Ralph E.  
1624 So. Pollard St.,  
Arlington, Va.

**Date of Birth:** March 14, 1903

**Place of Birth:** Altoona, Pa.

**Race:** Caucasian

**Legal Residence:** Virginia

**Marital Status:** Married

**Formerly employed by:** Pennsylvania Railroad, Altoona, Pa.,  
Apprentice and Machinist, 8-2-20  
to 9-27-29

Western Electric Co., Kearney, N. J.,  
General Machinist, from 9-27-29 to  
7-3-30



**Name and Address:** Bates, Harry A.,  
13-F Ridge Road,  
Greenbelt, Md.

**Date of Birth:** 10-2-1896

**Place of Birth:** Caton, N. Y.

**Legal Residence:** Maryland

**Race:** Caucasian

**Marital Status:** Married

**Formerly employed by:** American La France Fire Engine Co.,  
Elmira, N. Y., Machinist, Nov.  
1922 to June 1928, June 1929 to  
October 1930 and February 1931 to  
September 1932.

Morrow Mfg. Co., Inc., Elmira, N. Y.,  
Apprentice Machinist, May 1914 to  
August 1918.



Name and Address:	Bowers, Lola L., Mrs. (Nee Foster) Reading Terrace, P.O. Box 405, Rockville, Md.
Date of Birth:	2-3-1912
Place of Birth:	Fairfax County, Va.
Legal Residence:	Maryland
Race:	Caucasian
Marital Status:	Married
Formerly employed by:	Weaver Bros., Washington, D. C., Public Stenographer, Feb. 1935 to July 1940  U.S. Navy Yard, Washington, D. C., Clerk-Typist, July 1940 to November 1942



Name and Address:	Fox, Thomas L. 6961 Temple Hill Rd., S. E., Washington, D. C.
Date of Birth:	4-4-1918
Place of Birth:	Washington, D. C.
Legal Residence:	Maryland
Race:	Caucasian
Marital Status:	Married
Formerly employed by:	Washington Institute of Technology, College Park, Md., Machine Operator, April 1942 to December 1942



<b>Name and Address:</b>	Harris, Lawrence W., 616 D St., S. E., Washington, D. C.
<b>Date of Birth:</b>	10-8-1889
<b>Place of Birth:</b>	Armstrong County, Pa.
<b>Legal Residence:</b>	Pennsylvania
<b>Race:</b>	Caucasian
<b>Marital Status:</b>	Married
<b>Formerly employed by:</b>	Gears Forgings Inc., Cleveland, Ohio, Foreman of Tool Division, 4-15-1913 to 8-15-31  Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Ford City, Pa., Apprentice Machinist, 4-10-1905 to 4-15-1913



Name and Address: Hellman, Carl S.  
3809 Jocelyn St., N.W.,  
Washington 15, D. C.

Date of Birth: 10-19-1922

Place of Birth: Washington, D. C.

Legal Residence: District of Columbia

Race: Caucasian

Marital Status: Married

Formerly employed by: Johns Hopkins University Applied  
Physics Laboratory, Silver Spring,  
Md., Calibration Engineer, 3-9-45  
to 10-12-45

Schuttig and Co., 9th & Kearney  
Sts., N.E., Washington, D. C.,  
Production Engineer, 1-9-46 to  
11-1-46



Name and Address: Ingberg, Earl E.  
Hendrum, Minnesota

Date of Birth: 6-28-1917

Place of Birth: Hendrum, Minnesota

Legal Residence: Minnesota

Race: Caucasian

Marital Status: Single

Formerly employed by: Kaiser Co., Inc., (Shipbuilding),  
Portland, Oregon, Electrical  
Foreman, Sept. 1943 to May 1944

West Constr. Co., Seattle, Wash.,  
(employed at Shittier, Alaska),  
Electrical Foreman, Jan. 1943  
to August 1943



Name and Address: Lee, Helen, Miss  
3317 Holmead Place, N. W.,  
Washington, D. C.

Date of Birth: 10-6-1927

Place of Birth: Washington, D. C.

Legal Residence: District of Columbia

Race: Yellow

Marital Status: Single

Formerly employed by: Commerce Department, Coast and  
Geodetic Survey, Washington,  
D. C., Photostat Operator,  
June 1944 to February 1946



Name and Address:	Mann, Lytle E. No. 6 Keel Green, S. W., Washington 20, D. C.
Date of Birth:	12-4-1899
Place of Birth:	Dunkirk, Indiana
Legal Residence:	District of Columbia
Race:	Caucasian
Marital Status:	Married
Formerly employed by:	Fairmont Mining Machine Co., Fairmont, W. Va., Machinist, 1916 to 1920  Lynn Producer Co., Fairmont, W. Va., Machinist and Foreman, 1920 to 1922



Name and Address:	Selgin, Paul J. 3115 South Anthony Blvd., Fort Wayne, Indiana
Date of Birth:	1-29-1912
Place of Birth:	Milan, Italy
Legal Residence:	Indiana
Race:	Caucasian
Marital Status:	Married
Formerly employed by:	Halstead Traffic Communication Corp., (now dissolved), 155 E. 44th St., New York, N. Y., Development Engineer, June 1944 to August 1945 Mechanic, April 1939 to Jan. 1944 Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn, 99 Livingstone St., Brooklyn, N.Y., Instructor, June 1942 to June 1944



**Name and Address:** Warnock, Leland E.  
403 - 16th St., S. E.,  
Washington, D. C.

**Date of Birth:** 11-2-1896

**Place of Birth:** Missouri Valley, Iowa

**Legal Residence:** Michigan

**Race:** Caucasian

**Marital Status:** Single

**Formerly employed by:** Fisher Body Works, Detroit,  
Mich., Machinist, 1926 to 1939.  
Navy Yard, Washington, D. C.,  
Machinist, April 1939 to Jan. 1946



Name and Address: Wright, Russell B.,  
1619 - 30th St., N. W., Apt. 4,  
Washington, D. C.

Date of Birth: 12-30-1898

Place of Birth: Los Angeles, Calif.

Legal Residence: Massachusetts

Race: Caucasian

Marital Status: Single

Formerly employed by: Naval Research Laboratory,  
Anacostia, D. C., Physicist,  
June 1935 to March 1938



**CONFIDENTIAL****CONFIDENTIAL**  
**Serial No. 162**

2 December 1946

**MEMORANDUM FOR** Chief, Civil Affairs Division  
War Department  
Washington 25, D. C.

**Subject:** Security Clearance for U. S. Commercial Company  
Personnel

**References:** a. CAD Memo WDSCA-SY (311.22 - 8 Nov 46)  
b. SAB 3

**Enclosure:** a. Copy of letter from Security Officer,  
Reconstruction Finance Corporation

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 20 November 1946, requesting that CAD be furnished with suitable information on which to determine the suitability of ten (10) members of the U. S. Commercial Company to attend tele-conferences between the War Department and overseas theaters of operations.

2. A check of investigative sources has revealed no reason why the ten (10) members of U.S.C.C., listed on your memorandum of 20 November 1946, should not receive classified information. The Security Officer of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation has certified that other provisions of SAB 3 have been complied with in his clearance of the ten (10) U.S.C.C. members. A copy of his letter in this connection is hereby enclosed.

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary

**CONFIDENTIAL**



~~SECRET~~  
Serial No. 161  
RCB/gh

November 29, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. J. J. Weisiger  
Records Retirement Section  
Administrative Management Staff  
Office of International Trade

Subject: Reports Prepared by Board of Economic Warfare and  
Foreign Economic Administration

1. Confirming our telephone conversation of November 27, 1946, I am forwarding herewith certain reports prepared by the Board of Economic Warfare and the Foreign Economic Administration. These reports were forwarded to the Security Advisory Board on June 12, 1946, with a request for their declassification. In view of the lack of personnel to accomplish this declassification, the reports were temporarily filed here at the request of the sender.

2. It is believed these reports properly belong in your office. A list of these reports is enclosed and the sample listings of all FEA reports are likewise enclosed.

For the Security Advisory Board:

*Ruth C. Barton*  
Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary



UNCLASSIFIED  
Serial No. 160  
 RCB/hmh

November 29, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. E. T. Anderson  
 Acting Chairman, Security Advisory Board

Subject: Security Advisory Board - Work and Delinquency  
 Report and Summary of Activities

References: a. Memo from Mr. Flinn, dated October 3, 1946,  
 to Mr. E. T. Anderson  
b. Serial No. 118  
c. Memo from Mr. Flinn, dated November 18, 1946,  
 to Mr. E. T. Anderson

1. In compliance with reference a, the following information is submitted on the operations of the SAB for the month of November:

Time spent on SAB work as distinguished from work for other SWNCC subcommittees . . . . .	100%*
Number of meetings attended . . . . .	4
Security Advisory Board meetings . . . . .	3
Group meetings or conferences in which SAB had interest . . . . .	1
Number of interviews handled . . . . .	20
Introductory interviews with Security Officers . . . . .	2
Interviews with government officials who requested Board advice or help . . . . .	2
Administrative interviews incident to Board operations . . . . .	13
Exploratory interviews to War and Navy Departments on security matters . . . . .	3
Telephone calls made by Secretary incident to Security matters or Board operations . . . . .	186**

\* The work load of the SAB has increased to a point where the full-time of the Secretary must be utilized on Board operations.  
 \*\* Figure approximate only.



Serial No. 160, Ctd.  
Mr. E. T. Anderson

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November 29, 1946

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Telephone calls received from government agencies  
and departments on security matters or Board  
operations . . . . . 12½\*

The following percentage breakdown of the manner  
in which the time of the Secretary was used in November is submitted:

Time spent in preparing material for Board members or for Board meetings . . . . .	20%
Time spent in conferences, interviews, etc. . . . .	15%
Time spent on revision of regulations, preparation of policies and procedures on security . . . . .	10%
Time spent in handling phone calls and matters incident to these calls . . . . .	20%
Time spent in administrative matters, including supervision of preparation of SAB papers, handling of security checks, etc . . . . .	32%
Time spent traveling from New War Building to other government agencies . . . . .	3%

2. In compliance with reference b, the following  
progress report on the Board operations is submitted:

Work Completed

- 1946.
1. Revision of SAB 4, issued as SAB 4/2 on 20 November
  2. Security clearance for controversial government  
employee to work with Civil Affairs Division, War Department.
  3. First draft of classification and downgrading regula-  
tions for civilian agencies and departments.
  4. Formal Board request to the Director, F.B.I., asking  
that the F.B.I. service civilian agencies and departments directly on  
name checks for personnel having access to Secret and Top Secret informa-  
tion.

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\* Figure approximate only



Serial No. 160; Ctd.  
Mr. E. T. Anderson

November 29, 1946

5. Review of Introduction to Handbook of Federal Wartime Agencies, prepared by National Archives representative.
6. Review of SAB history by National Archives representative.
7. Security checks made of <sup>45</sup> Security Officers and Alternate Security Officers of non-military agencies and departments.
8. Security checks made of 36 employees of Library of Congress.
9. Security checks made of 14 employees of Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion.

Work in Progress (Percentage Completed)

1. Processing of first draft of SAB classification and downgrading regulation to certain offices interested in the policy set forth therein . . . . . 15%
2. Classification review of History prepared by Coast and Geodetic Survey . . . . . 50%
3. Classification review of History prepared by Weather Bureau . . . . . 75%
4. Security survey of the Government Printing Office requested by the Manhattan District . . . . . 5%
5. Preparation of general policy on security clearance of government histories . . . . . 75%
6. Security checks of the employees of R.F.C. for the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department . . . . . 80%
7. Security checks of 302 employees of National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics . . . . . 75%
8. Administrative survey of proper place for SAB functions . . . . . 3%
9. Security checks on 5 additional employees of Library of Congress . . . . . 5%



Serial No. 160, Ctd.  
Mr. E. T. Anderson

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November 29, 1946

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10. Declassification survey in federal agencies by Security Officer thereof at request of SAB . . . . . 25%

Work Contemplated

1. Revision of Top Secret Control Procedure and of list of Control Officers.
2. Surveys of security in certain vital government agencies.
3. Revision of SAB general security regulations.
4. Initiating a program of security training in certain vital government agencies.
5. Security checks for certain personnel of the National Bureau of Standards.

[It should be noted that Nos. 2 and 5 above are dependent on more personnel for the SAB]

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary



UNCLASSIFIED  
Serial No. 159

November 29, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR Capt. Lee W. Parke  
Chairman, Executive Committee  
Cryptographic Security Coordinating Committee

Subject: Classification and Downgrading Procedures

Enclosure: Draft of Proposed SAB Memorandum on Subject

1. The Security Advisory Board plans to issue a classification and downgrading regulation to civilian agencies as soon as possible.

2. The Security Advisory Board has not yet received copies of the downgrading suggestions regarding cryptographic material which, it is understood, had been prepared by your office. Would you be so kind as to review the enclosed draft and advise us if you wish any regulations on the downgrading of cryptographic material included therein?

3. In order that the draft as amended may be further circulated to the Security Officers of all civilian agencies, may we have your comments by 16 December 1946?

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary



UNCLASSIFIED  
Serial No. 158

November 29, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Alvin W. Kremer  
Security Officer  
Library of Congress

Subject: Classification and Downgrading Procedures

Enclosure: Draft of Proposed SAB Memorandum on Subject

1. The Security Advisory Board plans to issue a classification and downgrading regulation to civilian agencies as soon as possible.

2. In view of the interest of the Library of Congress in certain portions of this regulation, particularly Section III, 6, Disposition, thereof, it is being forwarded to you for comment and suggestions. It is suggested that Mr. Walter B. Greenwood, Exchange and Gift Division, Library of Congress, be consulted with respect to the section of this regulation which pertains to the function of his office.

3. In order that the draft as amended may be further circulated to the Security Officers of all civilian agencies, may we have your comments by 16 December 1946?

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary



Serial No. 157

November 29, 1946

To Whom It May Concern:

I have known Mr. Robert Olson for eleven months in his capacity as chief clerk for the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Secretariat. Although I have not had the pleasure of working with him closely, my work in the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee has necessitated almost daily contact with him.

In an organization like the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee composed of the Committee itself and a number of Subcommittees, it is particularly important that cordial working relationships and effective liaison be maintained between the Committee and the various subcommittees. It has been my observation that the relationship between the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Secretariat and the Subcommittee Secretariats has been considerably aided and improved by Mr. Olson. I have found him very helpful in working out administrative problems, first in the Subcommittee for the Far East and more recently in the Subcommittee for Security Control. He is cooperative, diligent, and capable and I do not hesitate to recommend him for a job of considerable responsibility and trust.

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary  
State-War-Navy Coordinating  
Subcommittee for Security  
Control



RESTRICTED  
Serial No. 156

November 27, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR

Miss M. M. Muller  
National Advisory Committee for  
Aeronautics  
Room 203, 415 22nd Street  
Washington 25, D.C.

Subject:

AAF Downgrading Letters

Enclosures:

- a. AAF Letter 46-30
- b. AAF Letter 46-30A
- c. AAF Letter 46-30B
- d. AAF Letter 46-30C
- e. AAF Letter 46-30D
- f. AAF Letter 46-30E
- g. AAF Letter 46-30F

1. Pursuant to our telephone conversation this date, transmitted herewith are copies of AAF publications regarding downgraded or declassified publications.

2. Since the Board was supplied with only one set of these letters, return of Enclosures a through g is requested.

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary



**SECRET****Serial No. 155**

27 November 1946

Memorandum for War Member, SAB

Subject: Review of Agency History

Enclosure: History of Coast and Geodetic Survey

1. The attached history of the Coast and Geodetic Survey has been reviewed by the interested offices in the Navy Department and is forwarded to you for submission to proper authorities in the War Department.

2. In view of the long delay already encountered in determining the proper classification of this document, will you please expedite a War Department decision on this matter as much as possible?

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary



**DECLASSIFIED**  
**Serial No. 154**

November 29, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Thornton Mitchell  
Acting Records Appraisal Officer  
The National Archives

Subject: Classification and Downgrading Procedures

Enclosure: Draft of Proposed SAB Memorandum on Subject

1. At the suggestion of Mrs. Elizabeth E. Hesser, Security Officer for the National Archives, the enclosed draft of a proposed Board memorandum regarding the downgrading of classified material is forwarded to you for comment and suggestions, particularly with respect to Section III, 6 - Disposition.

2. In order that the draft as amended may be further circulated to the Security Officers of all civilian agencies, may we have your comments by 16 December 1946?

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary



UNCLASSIFIED  
Serial No. 153

29 November 1496

MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary  
Joint Security Control

Subject: Classifications and Downgrading Procedures

Enclosure: Draft of Proposed SAB Memorandum on Subject

1. The Security Advisory Board plans to issue a classification and downgrading regulation to civilian agencies as soon as possible. The enclosed first draft is being circulated to certain interested offices for comment.

2. In view of the fact that the Board must coordinate this regulation with all civilian agencies following the receipt of these initial comments, it is requested that the comments of the Joint Security Control on the enclosure be received by the Security Advisory Board before 16 December 1946.

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary



UNCLASSIFIED  
Serial No. 152

29 November 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR State Member, SAB  
War Member, SAB  
Navy Member, SAB

Subject: Classification and Downgrading Procedures

Enclosure: Draft of Proposed SAB Memorandum on Subject

1. The enclosed draft of the SAB downgrading regulations is being forwarded this date to the following people for comment:

- a. Mr. John Green, Executive Secretary, Publication Board, Department of Commerce
- b. Mr. Thornton Mitchell, Acting Records Appraisal Officer, The National Archives
- c. Mr. Alvin W. Kremer, Keeper of the Collections, Library of Congress
- d. Secretary, Joint Security Control
- e. Capt. Lee W. Parks, Chairman, Executive Committee, Cryptographic Security Coordinating Committee

2. Comments are being requested from the above-listed people because of their interest from a policy standpoint in certain portions of the regulations. A deadline of 16 December 1946 is being set for the return of these comments.

3. It is suggested that the SAB Members coordinate the enclosed draft with their respective departments before 16 December 1946 and that a meeting of the Board on this draft be held as soon after that date as possible.

For the Security Advisory Boards:

Ruth G. Barton  
Secretary



Confidential  
Serial No. 151

**CONFIDENTIAL**

November 26, 1946

The Honorable  
J. Edgar Hoover  
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington 25, D.C.

Attention: Mr. J. F. Doherty

Dear Mr. Hoover:

The enclosed list of names of employees of the Library of Congress who will have access to classified information is transmitted herewith for FBI name checks.

Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary

**CONFIDENTIAL**



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Serial No. 150

November 25, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR H. W. Moseley, Secretary, SWNCC

Subject: State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee  
for Security Control

1. Any Committee, Board, Subcommittee or similar organization which is delegated certain functions under a charter must first of all take stock of the existing work load in the field of operations allotted to the organization and then begin to evaluate the work which must be done if its terms of reference are to be satisfactorily carried out. Where no precedent exists for the operations of an organization, planning is very important. In connection with the establishment of the Security Advisory Board, a precedent did exist for its operations, since the old Security Advisory Board under OWI was in existence for over three years. The Board had never been geared for peacetime operations, however, and its reestablishment as a Subcommittee of SWNCC was in many ways similar to the setting up of an unprecedented group.

2. Immediately after the Board was reestablished under SWNCC, there should have been some comprehensive planning for its future, re-surveys of security throughout federal government, and an evaluation of the future administrative needs of the Subcommittee. It cannot be taken as a condemnation of the Security Advisory Board that none of this was done. From the time the Board was established under SWNCC on 3 April 1946 until 30 June 1946, it operated with no personnel actually assigned to it for full-time duty. The Assistant Secretary of the Far Eastern Subcommittee acted additionally as the Secretary of the Security Advisory Board with the permission of the SWNCC Secretariat. Because of the fact that the Secretary of the Board left the military services 1 July 1946 and a State Department position for her was not established until 26 September 1946, the Board had a further lapse of activity.

3. At the present time the Secretary of the Board is the only person actually assigned to the Board for full-time duty. The members of the Board have primary duties in their respective departments and their membership on the Board is an additional duty. The fact that the Board ceased to operate when the services of a Secretary were not available is sufficient evidence that the members themselves do not have the time to prepare the work for the Board.

DECLASSIFIED

NND 780069  
By: J.A. NARS, Date 22 Aug '78



4. I am convinced that the Security Advisory Board not only is not carrying out its functions as enumerated in SWNCC Memorandum for Information No. 63, approved by SWNCC 4 November 1946, but also is not doing the long-range planning which is necessary for effective operations in a Board of this nature. There are several obvious reasons for this failure, among which the primary one is the lack of adequate personnel.

5. The Security Advisory Board, when operating under OWI, was composed of members from the Bureau of the Budget, Office of Censorship (now abolished), War Department, Navy Department, and the OWI, who, like the present Board members, had primary duties in their respective departments. There were two distinct differences, however, which made a noticeable difference in the operations of the Board under OWI and the Board under SWNCC.

A. The members of the Board from the OWI [the Chairman of the Board and the Executive Officer of the Board] were assigned to the Board. They were physically located in the Board offices and hence were able to concentrate their full attention on the Board activities.

B. The JCS were instrumental in securing the assignment of a staff of six officers to the Security Advisory Board to prepare staff studies on security for the approval of the Board and to do the necessary liaison work in federal agencies.

6. As a comparison, as stated in paragraph 3 above, the Security Advisory Board presently operates with a staff of one person and no clerical help. There is supposedly a CAF-5 assigned to the Board from the Department of State but since her duties include being secretary to the Board Chairman in his other capacity in the Department of State, her services for the Board have thus far been negligible. The Board members have no time to handle operational work for the Board since their own staffs have been greatly reduced.

7. It, of course, goes without saying that the volume of work to be done in security has diminished since the end of the War. In fact, if the Board could continue to accept actual incoming problems as a criterion of the work it should do, there would be no need to assign other personnel to the Board. The work which currently comes into the Board is sufficient to keep one person reasonably busy. There are not too many people in civilian government -- and, I believe, in the military services also, who voluntarily seek out security controls. Security is necessarily a religion and there are few religions which do not lapse into oblivion if they are not preached enough to become a habit.

8. If the Board continues, however, to work on actual incoming problems -- which is all that can be physically accomplished at the moment -- eventually there will be no current incoming work. The Security Officers of federal agencies expect, and have a right to expect,



concrete policies and some measure of guidance from the Security Advisory Board on security problems. When they do not receive it, their interest in the long program of security will be dulled or turned elsewhere for the guidance which they need. The loss of interest in the Board activities by its liaison officers seems an imminent happening to me at the present time. The loss of prestige for the Security Advisory Board coincidentally endangers SWNCC prestige. If the Board again loses its place in federal government, I believe it will be a difficult thing to regain. The federal agencies have been extremely patient thus far with the helter-skelter existence of the Board, but their patience cannot be expected to endure forever.

9. The only conclusion which can be drawn from the preceding paragraphs is that the Board must make an earnest effort to ascertain the work which must be done in security throughout the federal government and be given the staff with which to accomplish its work if it is to justify its existence in the eyes of civilian departments and agencies.

10. In order to set forth a detailed picture of the work and problems of the Security Advisory Board, an effort has been made below to enumerate actual functions of the Board, the problems involved in carrying out each function, the amount of work which the Board has thus far done in carrying out each function, and my own personal opinions as to the work which should be done in properly carrying out these functions:

a. Functions

(1) "a. Formulating policies and procedures relating to the declassification of documents originating in non-military agencies and departments".

(2) The Problems Involved in Fulfilling this Function

In order to formulate a workable declassification procedure which is general enough for all agencies concerned to follow, specific enough to answer declassification problems and rigid enough to meet the requirements of the military services, any regulation must be thoroughly coordinated before being issued. The Board cannot sit in an ivory tower and draft such a declassification procedure. There must be first-hand knowledge of declassification problems in every government agency as an initial requirement. When the knowledge of declassification problems throughout federal government has been obtained and the procedure drafted, thorough coordination must then take place on all interested levels.



(3) Work Which the Board has thus Far Accomplished

Aside from the general declassification regulation contained in SAB Memorandum No. 1, no "policy" or "procedure" has been established on declassification. The Secretary is drafting such a policy at this time and a survey by the Security Officers of declassification problems in federal agencies has been requested. The Board has been, however, servicing civilian agencies on specific declassification problems. Numerous declassification problems have been handled by the Board and even though decisions from the Board have been slow, the problems have been solved satisfactorily.

(4) Work Necessary to Perform this Function Effectively

If the declassification procedure were to be completely effective, it should not be drafted until a personal first-hand knowledge of declassification problems in each agency has been secured, preferably by visit and survey in the agency concerned. Necessarily there must be extensive research on all available declassification material issued by the military services or by any other department which may have succeeded in establishing an effective procedure. Following the drafting of the declassification procedure with its intended recommendations for the formulation of declassification boards throughout government, the services of the Board should be available for use in implementation of this regulation. This would necessarily require on-the-spot action by the Board.

b. (1) Functions

"b. Establishing security requirements and procedures for clearance of civilian officials to receive classified material."

(2) The Problems Involved in Fulfilling this Function

Had the FBI been able to make checks of their subversive files directly for the Security Officers of all federal agencies and departments, there would have been no particular problem connected with the carrying out of this function. It has been the position of the Board that it could not act as the guarantor of the security of any individual. It has consistently maintained the stand that the Security Officer of the department or agency must accept final responsibility for the security of an individual in his department. Formerly, the Board acted as a channel for transmitting the opinion of the Security Officer from the agency to the office requesting the check. With the refusal of the FBI to make direct name checks for certain federal departments and agencies, the Board was forced to make the checks for the agencies as a temporary resort.



The existing situation is far from satisfactory. Whenever derogatory information on any individual is discovered, the Board can do nothing but show a paraphrased version of this information to the Security Officer. The Board is bound by its agreement with the investigative agencies to prevent the information, even in paraphrased form, from leaving the Board offices and to prevent disclosure of the source of information at all costs. It is prohibited by its "advisory" status from making any recommendation to the Security Officer whatsoever. The Security Officer is thus placed in a most intangible position. From such nebulous information, he cannot succeed in obtaining permission from the head of his agency or department to close the sources of classified information to the individual.

I believe there is in this function of the Board a danger to SWICC. Investigations are at best full of ticklish situations and even though the Board is making every effort to keep away from any delicate angles, it is possible that it may not always be successful.

(3) Work Which the Board has thus Far Accomplished

This is covered in part by the preceding paragraphs. The Board has issued a memorandum on security clearances to all non-military federal departments and agencies which establishes certain minimum standards for security clearance of individuals having access to Secret and Top Secret information and does not preclude the department's establishing higher standards when felt to be necessary. This memorandum was coordinated with the Security Officers of all interested departments and agencies before being issued and is workable in civilian agencies.

The Board has been the medium for obtaining security clearances on over one hundred government officials and some two hundred are presently pending.

The Board has recently addressed a letter to the Director, FBI, asking that the FBI make name checks directly for federal departments and agencies on personnel having access to Secret and Top Secret information. Should the FBI agree to this arrangement, much of the present work load in this function could be eliminated. In addition, of course, many delicate situations could be avoided.

(4) Work Necessary to Perform this Function Effectively

I feel that the Board is fully performing its function in this matter at the present time. It will likewise be performing its duty in this respect even if the FBI agrees to make the checks directly for civilian agencies. The minimum



standards have been set. The Board must necessarily continue to act as a medium for transmitting these checks from civilian agencies to military offices but that can be done with minimum difficulty since the channels are well established. Aside from advising agencies on the means by which SAB No. 3 can be carried out and acting as the channel for the checks, I do not anticipate that the Board will have any further duties in this respect.

c. (1) Functions

"c. Establishing standards for the conversion of security regulations for civilian agencies from a war-time to a peace-time basis, including Top Secret Procedure."

(2) The Problems Involved in Fulfilling this Function

It will be necessary first of all to determine whether all civilian agencies and departments are still operating under war-time regulations. The Board must ascertain what has been done in this field before knowing what must be done. This further involves a complete revision of the Board's own general security regulations.

The main difficulty envisaged will be the setting up of an effective Top Secret control procedure. There is presently no such procedure and the Board has no central list of control officers. Thus far it has been waiting for the new regulation on Top Secret procedure now in preparation by Joint Security Control.

(3) Work Which the Board has thus Far Accomplished

To date the Board has not made a final revision of its own general security regulations. In SAB No. 1 the Board made some slight revisions of these regulations and gathered together all pertinent OWI regulations under one head.

It is believed that the majority of government agencies still operate on the basis of war-time regulations. A request for information on this phase of security regulations has been submitted to all Security Officers but all answers have not yet been returned.

The Board has reviewed certain security policies which civilian agencies were contemplating issuing, but to date no new regulations have been submitted to the Board for review.

(4) Work Necessary to Perform this Function Effectively

Following the revision of the Board's regulations, the Security Officers of civilian agencies must be requested to undertake revision of their own regulations. From past experience,



it is safe to assume that these revisions will not be undertaken without considerable guidance and "needling" from the SAB.

The revision of the Top Secret Procedure should not wait too much longer, even for the War and Navy Departments regulations. It is to be expected that the procedure must undergo a great deal of coordination in government agencies and departments before being acceptable to them. The Top Secret control procedure formerly used was very unpopular and impracticable in civilian agencies.

Following the issuance of a procedure, the central list of control officers must be established. This will require establishment of control offices and administrative procedures under the guidance of the SAB.

d. (1) Function

"d. Conducting surveys of security measures affecting administrative efficiency and physical security or affecting adversely the security of classified information."

(2) The Problems Involved in Fulfilling this Function

The imminent necessity for making these security surveys creates another danger to the prestige of the Board. Obviously, the Board does not have adequate personnel to make security surveys of civilian agencies and departments. Logically, the Board should have a team of at least two officers to make such a survey and to make recommendations on the basis of these reports. The lack of personnel is the biggest problem connected with this function.

(3) Work which the Board has thus Far Accomplished

To date the Board has done nothing toward carrying out these provisions. It has been fortunate that no specific requests have been received by the Board for security surveys until this time. The Board has just received a request from the Manhattan District Project in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for a survey of the Government Printing Office.

The Board has on file certain security surveys which were made during war-time but security surveys are useless unless they are up to date.

(4) Work Necessary to Perform this Function Effectively

To be an effectively operating Board, there should be on file in this office copies of reports on security measures employed in every federal agency and department which handles classified material.



e. (1) Function

"e. Preparing studies and recommendations on matters referred to it by SWNCC."

(2) Problems Involved in Fulfilling This Function

SWNCC as a policy-making body concerned mainly with U.S. policy with foreign governments would logically not have many questions to refer to SAB. The only study which SWNCC would possibly want the SAB to undertake would be a study of the Board's place in the sun. That, unfortunately, the Board has not seen fit to do.

f. (1) Function

"f. Coordinating with other federal agencies in developing security training programs and other procedures which are designed to promote security of classified information throughout federal agencies."

(2) The Problems Involved in Fulfilling this Function

Here again there are no controversial issues concerned but the function cannot be properly fulfilled until more personnel are available to the Board. The question of an adequate budget would arise here in some part, because no training program can be effective until sufficient materials for training are available.

(3) Work which the Board has thus Far Accomplished

Aside from the fact that the Secretary has addressed groups of government historians and records officers, there has been no security training done since the Board became a Subcommittee of SWNCC.

(4) Work Necessary to Perform this Function Effectively

The Board should be equipped to do an extensive program of security training. The Board under OWI had an officer assigned to it whose duty was to train government personnel in security. It, of course, was more necessary then than now that such training be done, but it is still of vital importance that a comprehensive program of security training be carried forward. The ideal situation would be the use of an officer for this purpose alone who would have the use of visual aids as needed.

In view of the fact that the Board members do not desire to initiate a study of the proper solution to the problem of where the Board should be placed, it is my belief that there



is sufficient administrative reason for SWNCC to make an administrative survey of the situation with a view to reaching one of three possible decisions:

(a) Leaving the Board under SWNCC and securing for it an adequate staff of at least two more persons assigned to the Secretariat, adequate clerical personnel and a possible full-time Chairman;

(b) Placing some of the SAB functions under NIA(CIG) and possibly eliminating those functions which do not properly belong to CIG or placing them under other authority;

(c) Recommending that the Board be set up under presidential authority.

12. As I see it, each of these decisions has certain merits and certain definite objections which are enumerated below:

(a) Leaving the Board under SWNCC.

(i) Pro

(a) The freedom of action of the Board is not unduly hampered. Unnecessary channels and red tape will definitely hurt the work of an organization of this nature;

(b) The Charter of SWNCC allows its acceptance of the Board functions;

(c) The Board as a SWNCC Subcommittee has the prestige it needs

(ii) Con

(a) SAB is an operational body as well as a policy-making group and the operational end of its activities outweigh any domestic security policy it might advance; (The counter-argument has been proffered here that MIC is likewise an operational subcommittee.)

(b) As a subcommittee of SWNCC, SAB does not possess the authority to do other than recommend or advise, and in order to avoid any danger to SWNCC, it is further necessary that even its recommendations be extremely tactful;

(c) SWNCC prestige stands a chance of being harmed through certain operations of the Board in spite of the efforts of the Board to prevent this;



## (b) Placing the Board under NIA (CIG)

(i) Pro

(a) The Charter of the CIG will allow it to absorb some of the functions of the Board;

(b) The presidential letter under which the CIG was formed will enable it to give authority to its recommendations;

(c) The budget of the CIG is seemingly quite elastic and will allow a properly staffed and equipped ~~staff~~ *office*;

(d) The CIG, in order to carry out its functions of protecting sources and methods of intelligence, must necessarily have a group which will work with civilian agencies. In order to avoid duplication of effort, coordination with or absorption into the CIG will be necessary for the Board's effective operations.

(ii) Con

(a) Although there is no factual basis for my belief, I am of the opinion that the SAB would lose its identity completely if placed under the CIG. I feel that the operations of the Board have been cordial and pleasant with the majority of government agencies to date because of its liaison officers throughout government and membership from the departments most concerned with security. The intelligence offices of the War and Navy Departments should be able to keep in touch with the security of all federal agencies but will lose this contact if the Board goes under CIG.

(b) The permanency of the CIG is unknown and I think it would be unfortunate if the Board were placed for the third time under an agency from which it would sooner or later have to be salvaged;

(c) The CIG is definitely limited to "intelligence" sources and certain domestic functions of the SAB would thus have to be eliminated or transferred elsewhere.

(c) Creating the Board under Presidential Order.



(i) Pro

(a) The authority of the Board on certain matters of security would be unquestioned;

(b) An Executive Order would allow sufficient funds for adequate personnel and equipment, either on a budget or loan basis;

(c) Specific recommendations have been made by congressional committees toward setting up a body similar to the SAB.

(ii) Con

(a) The possibility that a Board thus set up would be duplicating the work of several other groups would make it difficult to get a presidential order approved, in view of strict curtailment throughout government.

13. If I have any recommendations to make on the decision to be made concerning the Board, it is simply that a thorough study be made of all the possibilities enumerated above before any definite recommendations are made. In other words, it is my sincere and earnest plea that the Board be placed this time where it has the necessary personnel, freedom of action, authority, funds, and prestige to accomplish the work it should be doing or else its functions be eliminated entirely. Work of the nature, if worth doing at all, must be done effectively.

Ruth C. Baiton  
Secretary



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Serial No. 143  
RCB/gh

20 November 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR     The Secretary  
                          State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

Subject:             Security Checks

References:         a. Minutes 9th SAB Meeting  
                      b. Minutes 10th SAB Meeting

Enclosure:          cc SAB Serial No. 144

Pursuant to direction from the Security Advisory Board at its 10th meeting, 18 November 1946, enclosed is a copy of SAB Serial No. 144 for the information of the SWCC Secretariat

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary



Serial No. 148

November 20, 1948

The Honorable  
J. Edgar Hoover  
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington 25, DC

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Enclosed herewith is Copy No. 91 of Security Advisory Board Memorandum No. 3, inadvertently omitted from Serial No. 144, dispatched to you from the Security Advisory Board this date under Register Number 1396247.

Sincerely yours,

Ruth G. Barton  
Secretary



**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**Serial No. 147**

November 19, 1946

**Subject: Request for Transportation Pass**

**To: Transportation Officer, Military District of Washington  
Washington 25, D. C.**

1. It is requested that a pass for transportation on War Department buses be issued to Mrs. Ruth C. Barton, Secretary of the Security Advisory Board, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

2. Mrs. Barton is an employee of the Department of State but in her capacity as Secretary for a Board with membership from the three Departments, she often finds it necessary to travel to War Department buildings. It will be a considerable saving of time if this transportation pass can be issued.

3. The transportation pass should be sent directly to:

Mrs. Ruth C. Barton, Secretary  
Security Advisory Board  
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee  
Room 2027, New War Department Building  
Washington 25, D. C.

C. C. Blakeney  
Colonel, GSC  
War Member, SAB



CONFIDENTIAL  
Serial No. 146

CONFIDENTIAL

November 19, 1946

Mr. James E. Dodson  
Security Officer  
Department of Labor  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dodson:

The Security Advisory Board at its 10th Meeting  
November 18, 1946, approved the enclosed letter to the Civil Affairs  
Division of the War Department which has been dispatched this date.

Thank you for your expeditious handling of this  
matter.

Sincerely yours,

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary

Encl  
CC Ltr to CAD, WD

CONFIDENTIAL



**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**Serial No. 145**  
RGB/gh

**CONFIDENTIAL**

November 18, 1946

Mr. Alvin W. Kremer  
Security Officer  
The Library of Congress  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Kremer:

Reference is made to your letter of October 25, 1946, enclosing a list of personnel of the Library of Congress for security checks as recommended in Security Advisory Board Memorandum No. 3. Further reference is made to your telephone call of this date requesting that the checks be expedited, in view of the fact that these personnel would soon be handling highly classified files.

A check of investigative sources reveals no reason why the individuals listed in your letter of October 25, 1946, should not handle Top Secret and Secret files, provided other conditions set forth in SAB 3 have been met to your satisfaction.

A copy of the photostatic list which you forwarded to this office is returned herewith.

Sincerely yours,

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary

**CONFIDENTIAL**



CONFIDENTIAL  
Serial No. 144

**CONFIDENTIAL**

*Suit*

November 20, 1946

The Honorable  
J. Edgar Hoover  
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

On June 26, 1946, the Security Advisory Board of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee issued a memorandum to civilian agencies and departments of the federal government which set forth minimum standards for security clearances of personnel having access to Secret or Top Secret information. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your information.

Certain federal departments and agencies, in an attempt to follow the advice of the Board, were confronted with a refusal by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to conduct checks of FBI subversive files, enumerated in SAB Memorandum No. 3 as a basic essential for clearance of personnel. It is understood that the Federal Bureau of Investigation's refusal in this instance was occasioned by a lack of funds and personnel to conduct such checks.

The Security Advisory Board, in an attempt to obtain security checks for agencies which did not have previous liaison arrangements with the FBI for this service, made an arrangement with the FBI by which a limited number of such checks would be made on behalf of these agencies through the medium of the Security Advisory Board.

The Security Advisory Board feels that it would be a more satisfactory arrangement if the FBI could service these agencies directly on name checks for personnel having access to Secret or Top Secret information. Because of the fact that the Security Advisory Board is an advisory board only and because it is not created by an executive order or similar authority, it is not possible to enforce any recommendation which it might make to a civilian agency. Furthermore, a recent interpretation of the terms of reference of the Security Advisory Board prohibits it from making recommendations to an agency on any employee of that agency. The service of the Board in this connection is therefore limited to channeling the results of name checks from investigative sources to the civilian agency or department requesting such checks. The

**CONFIDENTIAL**



**CONFIDENTIAL**

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determination of the eligibility of an individual to receive classified information is still the responsibility of the Security Officer of the agency or department, which determination he makes on the basis of paraphrased information shown to him by the Board.

In view of the difficulties inherent in the present arrangement, the Security Advisory Board respectfully recommends that the FBI perform the service which it is presently rendering for the Board directly for agencies and departments which will be handling Top Secret and Secret information, reserving the right to refuse requests from agencies not working with classified information and to request from the Security Officer in each instance a certification that the persons whose names are submitted will have access to Top Secret or Secret information. In any instance when the Federal Bureau of Investigation considers the requests from any agency unreasonable, the Security Advisory Board will be glad to survey the situation to determine if the requests are justified.

It will be appreciated by the Security Advisory Board if a decision on this matter can be given as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours,

E. T. Anderson  
State Member, SAB

Charles C. Blakeney  
Colonel, GSC  
War Member, SAB

L. W. Gunther  
Comdr. USN  
Navy Member, SAB

Enclosure  
Copy No. 91 of SAB 3

**CONFIDENTIAL**



**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**Serial No. 144**

November 19, 1946

*Not sent*

The Honorable  
J. Edgar Hoover  
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

The Security Advisory Board of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee issued on June 26, 1946, a memorandum to civilian agencies and departments of the federal government which set forth certain minimum standards for security clearances of personnel having access to Secret or Top Secret information. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your information.

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The Security Advisory Board, in an attempt to obtain security checks for agencies which did not have previous liaison arrangements with the FBI for this service, made an arrangement with the FBI by which a limited number of such checks would be made on behalf of these agencies through the medium of the Security Advisory Board.

The Security Advisory Board feels that it would be a more satisfactory arrangement if the FBI could service these agencies directly on name checks for personnel having access to Secret or Top Secret information. Because of the fact that the Security Advisory Board is an advisory board only and because it is not created by an executive order or similar authority, it is not possible to enforce any recommendation which it might make to a civilian agency. Furthermore, a recent interpretation of the terms of reference of the Security Advisory Board prohibits it from making recommendations to an agency on any employee of that agency. The service of the Board in this connection is therefore limited to channeling the results of name checks from investigative sources to the civilian agency or department requesting name checks. The determination of the eligibility of an individual to receive

*This para changed on draft by Ed Fowley this date*

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-2-

classified information is still the responsibility of the Security Officer of the agency or department, which determination he makes on the basis of paraphrased information shown to him by the Board.

As a result of the difficulties inherent in the present arrangement, the Security Advisory Board respectfully recommends that the FBI perform the service, which it is presently rendering for the Board, directly to agencies and departments who will be handling Top Secret and Secret information, reserving the right to refuse requests from agencies not working with classified information and to request from the Security Officer in each instance a certification that the people whose names are submitted will have access to Top Secret or Secret information. In any instance when the Federal Bureau of Investigation considers the requests from any agency unreasonable, the Security Advisory Board will be glad to survey the situation to determine if the requests are justified.

It will be appreciated by the Security Advisory Board if a decision on this matter can be given as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours,

E. T. Anderson  
State Member, SAB

G. C. Blakney  
Colonel, GSC  
War Member, SAB

L. W. Gunther  
Comdr., USN  
Navy Member, SAB

**CONFIDENTIAL**



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~Serial No. 143~~  
RCB/glh

CONFIDENTIAL

18 November 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR Chief, Civil Affairs Division  
War Department  
Washington 25, D. C.

Subject: Security Clearance on Labor Department Employee

References: a. SAB Serial No. 59 dated 26 September 1946  
b. CAD letter dated 28 October 1946

Enclosures: a. Copy of letter from Security Officer,  
Department of Labor  
b. Copy No. 90 of SAB 3

1. The Security Advisory Board under its present terms of reference, as approved by SWOC 4 November 1946, has no authority by which it may make determinations on the security clearance of any government employee, as requested by the Civil Affairs Division on Dr. Oscar Weigert, employee of the Department of Labor. The Board has never considered that it had the authority to make determinations in matters of personnel security. Its function in this respect has been to act as a channel between military services and civilian agencies for receiving and transmitting security clearances. It has been noted that this policy was stated in the provisions formulated by the Military Intelligence Division to govern the release of classified information by the Civil Affairs Division to governmental agencies (MID 350.0511, paragraph 7 a thereof).

2. On June 24, 1946, the Security Advisory Board issued a memorandum to civilian agencies and departments recommending that certain minimum standards for security clearances of personnel having access to Top Secret and Secret information be followed by civilian agencies. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your information. Your attention is especially invited to paragraph 4 of this memorandum which places the final determination for the security clearance of an individual on the Security Officer of his department or agency. The only responsibility of the Security Advisory Board in this instance would be to determine that a clearance submitted by a Security Officer follows the provisions outlined in SAB 3.

3. In the case of Dr. Weigert of the Department of Labor, his file was again referred to the Security Officer of the Department of Labor. After careful reconsideration of all the facts in this case, Mr. Dodson has reiterated his belief that Dr. Weigert is satisfactory from a security standpoint to

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**CONFIDENTIAL****CONFIDENTIAL**  
**Serial No. 143**

-2-

18 November 1946

**Subject: Security Clearance on Labor Department Employee**  
-----

receive classified information. A copy of the letter from Mr. Dodson is enclosed for your files.

4. The Security Advisory Board is satisfied that the conditions of SAB 3 have been met in the determination made by Mr. Dodson on Dr. Weigert.

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary

**CONFIDENTIAL**



**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**Serial No. 142**  
RCB/gh

**CONFIDENTIAL**

15 November 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR State Member, SAB  
War Member, SAB  
Navy Member, SAB

Subject: Security Clearance of Labor Department Employee

References: a. Serial No. 122  
b. Minutes 8th SAB Meeting

Enclosure: Draft of Letter to the Chief, Civil Affairs Division

1. Pursuant to direction at the 8th meeting of the Security Advisory Board, the Secretary has discussed the security clearance of Dr. Oscar Weigert with the Department of Labor Security Officer, Mr. James E. Dodson. Mr. Dodson has again reviewed this case, together with additional information furnished him by the Secretary, and has reaffirmed the security clearance of Dr. Weigert.

2. The enclosed draft of a letter to the Chief, Civil Affairs Division, is forwarded for consideration by the Security Advisory Board.

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~CONFIDENTIAL  
Serial No. 14318 November 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR Chief, Civil Affairs Division  
War Department  
Washington 25, D. C.

Subject: Security Clearance on Labor Department Employee

References: a. SAB Serial No. 59 dated 26 September 1946  
b. CAD letter dated 28 October 1946

Enclosures: a. Copy of letter from Security Officer,  
Department of Labor  
b. Copy No. 90 of SAB 3

*2 copies*  
*copies*

1. The Security Advisory Board under its present terms of reference, as approved by SWNOC 4 November 1946, has no authority by which it may make determinations on the security clearance of any government employee, as requested by the Civil Affairs Division on Dr. Oscar Weiger, employee of the Department of Labor. The Board has never considered that it had the authority to make determinations in matters of personnel security. Its function in this respect has been to act as a channel between military services and civilian agencies for receiving and transmitting security clearances. It has been noted that this policy was stated in the provisions formulated by the Military Intelligence Division to govern the release of classified information by the Civil Affairs Division to governmental agencies (MID 350.0511, paragraph 7 a thereof).

2. On June 24, 1946, the Security Advisory Board issued a memorandum to civilian agencies and departments recommending that certain minimum standards for security clearances of personnel having access to Top Secret and Secret information be followed by civilian agencies. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your information. Your attention is especially invited to paragraph 4 of this memorandum which places the final determination for the security clearance of an individual on the Security Officer of his department or agency. The only responsibility of the Security Advisory Board in this instance would be to determine that a clearance submitted by a Security Officer follows the provisions outlined in SAB 3.

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- 2 -

3. In the case of Dr. Weigert of the Department of Labor, his file was again referred to the Security Officer of the Department of Labor. After careful reconsideration of all the facts in this case, Mr. Dodson has reiterated his belief that Dr. Weigert is satisfactory from a security standpoint to receive classified information. A copy of the letter from Mr. Dodson is enclosed for your files.

4. The Security Advisory Board is satisfied that the conditions of SAB 3 have been met in the determination made by Mr. Dodson on Dr. Weigert.

For the Security Advisory Boards

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~Serial No. 141~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

15 November 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR State Member, SAB  
War Member, SAB  
Navy Member, SAB

Subject: Security Officers

References: a. Minutes 7th SAB Meeting  
b. Serial No. 119

1. The Secretary of the Security Advisory Board has now completed a check of the FBI subversive files on all Security Officers listed on SAB 4/1, dated 4 October 1946. It will be recalled that records were previously found on five Security Officers of which only one was considered sufficiently derogatory to justify the removal of the name from the list of Security Officers.
2. In the final group of names submitted for security checks, derogatory information has been discovered on a Security Officer of a Government Department. If the Board determines, on the basis of this information, that there is sufficient reason to justify removal of the name from the list, it will be necessary to determine a definite course of action to be followed by the Board. This matter was not resolved at the 7th Meeting of the Board on October 29, 1946, at which a similar incident was discussed, in view of the fact that the agency in question was determined to be a quasi-official one which the Board could not service under its terms of reference.
3. It is requested that the Board members give some consideration to the course of action which it will follow in the event it determines the information on the Security Officer in question is sufficiently derogatory to justify his removal from the list.

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary

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**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**Serial No. 140**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

November 14, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR        State Member, SAB  
                          War Member, SAB  
                          Navy Member, SAB

Subject:                Security Checks

References:            a. Serial No. 128  
                          b. Minutes 9th SAB Meeting

Enclosure:             Proposed Draft of Letter to Director,  
                          Federal Bureau of Investigation

1.            In order that the Security Advisory Board may be able to devote more time to documentary and related security matters, it would seem advisable to make an effort to secure agreement from the FBI to conduct checks of FBI subversive files directly for civilian agencies and departments. The administrative work involved in handling security checks for these agencies has for the past week been taking the majority of the Secretary's time. While admittedly the use of the Board as a channel for making these checks can be justified as a temporary measure, it seems to me that it can be justified only if an effort has been made to secure these checks directly for agencies and departments.

2.            Enclosed is a draft of a letter to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, recommending that the FBI make these checks directly for the agency concerned and suggesting certain precautionary steps which the FBI might take before making checks for any new agency.

3.            It is requested that the Board members consider the enclosure in the light of the statement made in para. 1 above.

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary

**CONFIDENTIAL**



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Serial No. 144~~CONFIDENTIAL~~November 19, 1946

The Honorable  
J. Edgar Hoover  
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

The Security Advisory Board of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee issued on June 26, 1946, a memorandum to civilian agencies and departments of the federal government which set forth certain minimum standards for security clearances of personnel having access to Secret or Top Secret information. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your information.

Certain federal departments and agencies, in an attempt to follow the advice of the Board, were confronted with a refusal by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to conduct checks of FBI subversive files, enumerated as a basic essential for clearances of personnel in SAB Memorandum No. 3. It is understood that the Federal Bureau of Investigation's refusal in this instance was occasioned by a lack of funds and personnel to conduct such checks.

The Security Advisory Board, in an attempt to obtain security checks for agencies which did not have previous liaison arrangements with the FBI for this service, made an arrangement with the FBI by which a limited number of such checks would be made on behalf of these agencies through the medium of the Security Advisory Board.

The Security Advisory Board feels that it would be a more satisfactory arrangement if the FBI could service these agencies directly on name checks for personnel having access to Secret or Top Secret information. Because of the fact that the Security Advisory Board is an advisory board only and because it is not created by an executive order or similar authority, it is not possible to enforce any recommendation which it might make to a civilian agency. The only recourse which the Board has is to close the main sources (State, War, Navy) of classified information to an agency. This cannot be considered wholly effective since no single distribution point is employed in any of these

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departments and since classified information might conceivably come from other sources. Furthermore, a recent interpretation of the terms of reference of the Security Advisory Board prohibits it from making recommendations to an agency on any employee of that agency. Consequently, the determination of the eligibility of an individual to receive classified information is still the responsibility of the Security Officer of the agency or department, which determination he makes on the basis of paraphrased information shown to him by the Board.

As a result of the difficulties inherent in the present arrangement, the Security Advisory Board respectfully recommends that the FBI perform the service, which it is presently rendering for the Board, directly to agencies and departments who will be handling Top Secret and Secret information, reserving the right to refuse requests from agencies not working with classified information and to request from the Security Officer in each instance a certification that the people whose names are submitted will have access to Top Secret or Secret information. In any instance when the <sup>Fed Bureau of Invest.</sup> ~~Information~~ considers the requests from any agency unreasonable, the Security Advisory Board will be glad to survey the situation to determine if the requests are justified.

<sup>It will be appreciated by</sup>  
<sup>can</sup> The Security Advisory Board ~~requests that~~ <sup>if</sup> a decision in this matter <sup>can</sup> be given as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours,

ET Anderson  
 State Member, SAB

CC Blakeney  
 Colonel, GSC  
 War Member, SAB

IN Gunther  
 Comdr., USN  
 War Member, SAB

CONFIDENTIAL



RESTRICTED  
Serial No. 139

**RESTRICTED**

TO BE DECLASSIFIED WHEN ATTACHMENT IS REMOVED

14 November 1946

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** War Member, SAB  
Navy Member, SAB

**Subject:** Executive Order

**Reference:** Serial No. 126

**Enclosure:** Redraft of Executive Order for the Security  
Advisory Board

Enclosed herewith is a redraft of the Executive  
Order forwarded to you November 4, 1946, as prepared by the State  
Member.

For the Security Advisory Board:

*Ruth C. Barton*  
Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary

**RESTRICTED**



~~RESTRICTED~~

## EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. \_\_\_\_\_

## PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECURITY CONTROL BOARD

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and Statutes as President of the United States, and as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, in order to provide uniform safeguards over classified information within the Federal Government which might prove of aid or comfort to a potential enemy, and to prevent undue restriction of information which may appropriately be made available to the public, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. There is hereby created a Security Control Board (hereinafter referred to as the board), consisting of the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy. The board is charged with the responsibility for the efficient coordination and supervision of regulations and procedures pertaining to safeguarding information which affects the national security and interest, with the exception of cryptographic security, in all non-military federal departments and agencies. The functions of the board shall be, with the requirements of national security and defense as a primary consideration: (a) to formulate plans and procedures for implementing security policies among and between all federal departments and agencies; (b) to take appropriate action to correct security weaknesses and to prevent recurrence; (c) to prepare necessary regulations to effectuate the board's decisions; (d) to promulgate such directives as may be necessary to implement or interpret the aforesaid regulations; (e) to perform such other functions concerning the safeguarding of classified information in non-military departments and agencies as occasions may require.
2. The Secretaries of State, War, and Navy shall appoint one <sup>as the staff for</sup> member each to the Security Control Board. The member appointed by the Secretary of State shall act as Chairman of the Board. Such other personnel



as may be required to assist the board in the performance of its functions may be detailed from those departments in accordance with law. The board shall be empowered to appoint other committees from the three departments on a temporary working basis. Except as otherwise instructed by the board, committees appointed thereby shall have no power to make final disposition of any matter presented to them by the board for study but they shall express by written report their findings and recommendations to the board.

3. The board shall call for consultation such designated representatives of non-military government departments and agencies as may be deemed advisable in obtaining full knowledge of the matter being studied under the provisions of this order, to the end that the needs of all may be considered and provided for insofar as possible. Non-military government agencies are directed to cooperate in providing assistance required by the board in its work and to comply with directives promulgated by or on behalf of the board dealing with the protection of classified information.

4. The provisions of this order shall not apply to the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice.

5. Nothing herein shall be construed to rescind the existing Executive Order establishing the Cryptographic Security Board.

RESTRICTED



UNCLASSIFIED  
Serial No. 138

12 November 1946

**Subject:** Request for Publications

**To:** Commanding General, Army Air Forces,  
War Department, Washington 25, D. C.  
Attention: ACAS - 2  
Counter-Intelligence Branch

1. The Security Advisory Board of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee is engaged in advising civilian agencies and departments of the federal government on documentary security and related security matters.

2. In order that this Board may advise its agencies who may hold Air Corps publications (such as the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, Civil Aeronautics Administration, etc.) of the status of classification of these documents, it is requested that the Security Advisory Board be furnished with copies of any lists of downgraded publications which have been issued by the Air Corps. It is further requested that the Security Advisory Board be placed on the mailing list for any lists of downgraded publications which the Air Corps may issue in the future.

3. The mailing address of the Security Advisory Board is:

Security Advisory Board  
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee  
Room 2027, New War Department Building  
Washington 25, D. C.

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary

cc: Mr. James Kelly, Jr.  
Miss M. M. Muller



UNCLASSIFIED  
Serial No. 137  
RCB/gh

12 November 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR State Member, SAB  
War Member, SAB  
Navy Member, SAB

Subject: SAB 4, List of Security Officers

References: a. SAB 4  
b. SAB 4/1

1. In view of the constant changes involved in any list of personnel in government agencies and departments, it will be necessary to reissue the List of Security Officers whenever sufficient changes occur to justify a new memorandum.

2. It would be a considerable saving of time if the Secretary could be authorized by the Board to reissue SAB 4 whenever it is deemed necessary. Since no policy matters are involved in this revision, it is believed that this is an administrative matter within the functions of the Secretariat.

3. The opinions of the Board Members are requested.

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary



~~RESTRICTED~~  
Serial No. 136  
RCB/gh

12 November 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR Mrs. Marie Sawaya Gould  
Division of Libraries and Institutes  
Department of State

Subject: Security Regulations

1. Pursuant to our telephone conversation of November 7, 1946, I am forwarding copies of the State Department regulations needed to make your set complete.
2. I am also enclosing a copy of the file slip used by the Navy Department office indicated in logging classified material. If I receive any further forms of this nature, they will be sent to you.

For the Security Advisory Board:

*Ruth C. Barton*  
Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary



UNCLASSIFIED  
Serial No. 35

November 12, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR

Records Management Section  
Federal Security Agency  
Room 1737, Social Security Building  
Attention: Mrs. Surgeon

Subject: Examples of Information to be Classified,  
(Army).

1. Pursuant to our telephone conversation of November 8, 1946, I am enclosing a copy of the list of information which the War Department considers should be classified Top Secret, Secret, Confidential, and Restricted.

2. It should be remembered that these examples are for military usage only, as set forth in Army Regulation No. 380-5, Subject: Safeguarding Military Information. The breakdown under these classifications should be determined within a department or agency by an official who knows the nature of the material prepared in his agency or department. These examples are forwarded for whatever assistance they may be to you in making those determinations within the Federal Security Agency.

For the Security Advisory Board:

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary



The following are examples of matter which normally will be graded  
TOP SECRET, SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL:

TOP SECRET

- (1) War plans and plans of particulars of future major or special operations.
- (2) Particulars of important dispositions or impending moves of our forces or convoys in connection with (1) above.
- (3) Very important political documents dealing with such matters as negotiations for alliances and the like.
- (4) Certain information of the methods used or success obtained by our Intelligence Services and Counterintelligence Services or information which would imperil secret agents.
- (5) Certain new or specialized techniques or methods to be used in future operations and identity and composition of units, wherever located, which are especially intended for employment of such techniques or methods.
- (6) Critical information of new and important munitions of war, including scientific and technical developments.
- (7) Important particulars of cryptography and cryptanalysis.

SECRET

- (1) Particulars of operations in progress.
- (2) Plans or particulars of operations, or war plans, with necessary inclosures thereto, not included under TOP SECRET.
- (3) Instructions regarding the employment of <sup>important</sup> new munitions of war.
- (4) Important improvements to existing munitions of war until accepted for service use.
- (5) Information relating to new material of the type described in a above.
- (6) Certain information concerning specific quantities of war reserves.
- (7) Certain development projects.



- (8) Information of enemy or potential enemy material, procedure, dispositions and activities, the value of which depends upon concealing the fact that we possess it.
- (9) Certain reports of operations containing information of vital interest to the enemy.
- (10) Vital military information on important defenses.
- (11) Adverse reports on general morale affecting major operations.
- (12) Important cryptographic devices and material unless assigned to a lower category.
- (13) Certain military maps and aerial photography.
  - (a) In the continental United States, those showing vulnerable points or vital installations except that such classification must be approved by either the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, the chief of a technical service, the commanding general of a defense command, or the commanding general of a service command.
  - (b) In oversea possessions or foreign territory occupied by forces of the United States, those showing the layout of permanent defense works and naval bases, other vulnerable points or vital installations, and the adjacent terrain vital to their defense; and those that serve to fix definitely the location of any element of permanent defense works and naval bases.
  - (c) Aerial photographs and negatives of foreign areas when necessary to protect the source or to accord with conditions imposed by the foreign country concerned.
  - (d) Maps, relief maps, charts, and photomaps prepared from aerial photographs or negatives will be graded in accordance with the actual details shown thereon, and not necessarily in accordance with the classification of the photographs or negatives used. Classification of aerial photography will be determined by the content thereof or the provisions of (13) above, and not by the classification of directives ordering its accomplishment.
- (14) Information indicating the strength of our troops, identity or composition of units or quantity of specific items of equipment pertaining thereto in active theaters of operation except that mailing addresses will include organizational designations.



- (15) Information on the order of battle of a foreign nation will be classified according to the means by which it was obtained and the importance of concealing that we possess it.
- (16) Certain new or specialized techniques or methods to be used in future operations and identity and composition of units, wherever located, which are especially intended for employment of such techniques or methods.
- (17) Photographs, negatives, photostats, diagrams, or models of secret matter.

CONFIDENTIAL

- (1) Matters, investigations, and documents of a personal and disciplinary nature, the knowledge of which it is desirable to safeguard for administrative reasons.
- (2) Routine operational and battle reports which contain information of value to the enemy but are not of vital interest to him.
- (3) Routine intelligence reports.
- (4) Military radio frequency allocations of special significance or those which are changed at frequent intervals for security reasons.
- (5) Military call sign assignments of special significance which are changed at frequent intervals for security reasons.
- (6) Meteorological information of designated areas.
- (7) Information which indicates strength of our troops, identity or composition of units or quantity of specific items of equipment pertaining thereto in areas adjacent to active theaters of operation.
- (8) Certain technical documents and manuals used for training, maintenance and inspection of important new munitions of war.
- (9) General tactical lessons learned as a result of operations which it is desirable to withhold from any foreign nation.
- (10) Regulations governing joint action of the Army and the Navy.
- (11) Information relating to the design and development of new material and containing information of the type described in a above.
- (12) Certain cryptographic devices and material.



- (13) Certain military maps and aerial photography.
- (a) In the continental United States those showing layout of the permanent defense works and naval bases considered vital to the defense of the United States, and those that serve to fix definitely the location of any element of such permanent defense works and naval bases, except that when the complete map of a defense area consists of more than one sheet, only those sheets showing defense elements need be classified as CONFIDENTIAL.
  - (b) In oversea possessions and foreign territory occupied by the forces of the United States, those not classified as SECRET, showing lay-out of military and naval radio stations, air bases, airdromes, air depots, supply bases, arsenals, proving grounds, or any vital area to defense.
  - (c) Aerial photographs and negatives of foreign areas when necessary to protect the source or to accord with conditions imposed by the foreign government concerned.
  - (d) Maps, relief maps, charts, and photomaps prepared from aerial photographs or negatives will be graded in accordance with the actual details shown thereon, and not necessarily in accordance with the classification of the photographs or negatives used. Classification of aerial photography will be determined by the content thereof or the provisions of paragraph 6b (13) and not by the classification of directives ordering its accomplishment.
- (14) Technical information, such as of research or processes of manufacture which may be a distinct military asset and not a matter of general knowledge, and other technical items of the type described in a above.
- (15) Information and records compiled at the request of the War Department for its use in the assurance of adequate provision for the mobilization of material and industrial organizations essential to wartime needs. See sec. 5a, added to act 3 June 1916, by sec. 5, ~~act~~ act 4, June 1920 (41 Stat. 764; 10 U.S.C. 1193; M. L., 1939, sec. 1925).
- (16) Shipments of machine prepared and manually prepared monthly personnel rosters and WD AGO, Form 303 (Report of Change) for organizations and individuals in active theaters of operation. Rosters and reports of change included in any shipment need not be individually classified.



- (17) Certain information relative to specific quantities of war reserves.
- (18) Photographs, negatives, photostats, diagrams, or models of confidential matter.

RESTRICTED

- (1) Information indicating the strength of our troops, identity or composition of units, or the total quantity of specific items or equipment pertaining thereto in areas remote from active theaters of operation.
- (2) Training and technical documents for official use only or not intended for release to the public.
- (3) Photographs, negatives, photostats, diagrams, or models of restricted matter.
- (4) Certain parts of mobilization plans and regulations.
- (5) Documents relating to the design and development of new material containing information of the type described in a above.
- (6) Certain procurement plans.
- (7) Certain cryptographic devices and material.
- (8) Certain documents regarding engineering principles and design details, composition, method of processing or assembling, which are vital to the functioning or use of an article of material.
- (9) Certain military maps and aerial photography.
  - (a) In the continental United States, those showing military and naval radio stations, air bases, air-dromes, air depots, supply bases, and arsenals, considered vital to the defense of the United States.
  - (b) During times of active hostilities, photographs and negatives not otherwise classified of territory under our or enemy control in or adjacent to active theaters of operation, and of territories under our control remote from active theaters of operation.
  - (c) Maps, relief maps, charts, and photomaps prepared from aerial photographs or negatives will be graded in accordance with the actual details shown thereon, and not necessarily in accordance with the classification of the photographs or negatives used. Classification of aerial photography will be determined by



the content thereof or the provisions of paragraph 6b (13) and not by the classification of directives ordering its accomplishment.

- (10) Compilations of permanently assigned call signs or allocations of frequencies that are individually unclassified.



**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**Serial No. 134**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

8 November 1946

The Honorable  
J. Edgar Hoover  
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington 25, D. C.

Attn: Mr. J. F. Doherty

Dear Mr. Hoover:

The enclosed list of names is transmitted to you for FBI name checks.

Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Ruth C. Barton  
Secretary

**CONFIDENTIAL**