

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

RESTRICTED
(Reclassify when filled out)

GENERAL

SECRET

(a) Unit Reporting VF-49 (b) Based on or at USS SAN JACINTO (c) Report No. ACA-1-40
 (d) Take off: Date 18 July 1945 Time (LZT) 1340(I) (Zone); Lat. 34°35'N Long. 142°46'E
 (e) Mission Strike - KOKOSUKA (f) Time of Return 1803(I) (Zone)

II. OWN AIRCRAFT OFFICIALLY COVERED BY THIS REPORT.

(a) TYPE	(b) SQUADRON	NUMBER			(f) BOMBS AND TORPEDOES CARRIED (PER PLANE)	(g) FUZE, SETTING
		(c) TAKING OFF	(d) ENGAGING ENEMY A/C	(e) ATTACKING TARGET		
<u>P6F-5</u>	<u>VF-49</u>	<u>8</u>		<u>8</u>	<u>7 planes carried 1-1000# GP bomb apiece</u>	<u>Mk-243 .025 delay nose</u> <u>Mk-102-A-2 .24 delay tail</u>
					<u>1 photo plane ammo. only.</u>	

III. OTHER U. S. OR ALLIED AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED IN THIS OPERATION.

(a) TYPE	(b) SQUADRON	(c) NUMBER	(d) BASE	(e) TYPE	(f) SQUADRON	(g) NUMBER	(h) BASE
<u>TBU-3</u>	<u>VF-49</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>USS SAN JACINTO</u>				

IV. ENEMY AIRCRAFT OBSERVED OR ENGAGED (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) TYPE	(b) NO. OBSERVED	(c) NO. ENGAGING OWN A/C	(d) TIME ENCOUNTERED	(e) LOCATION OF ENCOUNTER	(f) BOMBS, TORPEDOES CARRIED; GUNS OBSERVED	(g) CAMOUFLAGE AND MARKING
<u>NONE</u>			<u>(ZONE)</u>			
			<u>(ZONE)</u>			
			<u>(ZONE)</u>			

(h) Apparent Enemy Mission(s) X
 Did Any Part of
 (i) Encounter(s) Occur in Clouds? X If so, Describe Clouds X (BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)
 Time of Day and Brilliance
 (j) of Sun or Moon X (NIGHT, BRIGHT MOON; DAY, OVERCAST; ETC.) (k) Visibility X (MILES)

V. ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED OR DAMAGED IN AIR (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) TYPE ENEMY A/C	(b) DESTROYED OR DAMAGED BY:				(c) WHERE HIT, ANGLE	(d) DAMAGE CLAIMED
	TYPE A/C	SQUADRON	PILOT OR GUNNER	GUNS USED		
<u>NONE</u>						

Enclosure (M)

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

REPORT No. **ACA-1-40**

VI. LOSS OR DAMAGE, COMBAT OR OPERATIONAL, OF OWN AIRCRAFT (of those listed in II only).

(a) TYPE OWN A/C	(b) SQUADRON	(c) CAUSE: TYPE ENEMY A/C, TYPE GUN, OR OPERATIONAL CAUSE	(d) WHERE HIT, ANGLE (List armor, self-sealing tanks, equipment hit)	(e) EXTENT OF LOSS OR DAMAGE, (Give Bureau serial number of planes destroyed)
1	NONE			
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				

VII. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES (in aircraft listed in II only; identify with planes listed in VI by Nos. at left).

(a) NO.	(b) SQUADRON	(c) NAME, RANK OR RATING	(d) CAUSE	(e) CONDITION OR STATUS
	NONE			

VIII. RANGE, FUEL, AND AMMUNITION DATA FOR PLANES RETURNING

(a) TYPE A/C	(b) MILES OUT	(c) MILES RETURN	(d) AV. HOURS IN AIR	(e) AV. FUEL LOADED	(f) AV. FUEL CONSUMED	(g) TOTAL AMMUNITION EXPENDED				(h) NO. OF PLANES RETURNING
						.30	.50	20MM	MM	
F6F-5	142	142	4hrs 23min	400	320		NONE			8

IX. ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT ENCOUNTERED (Check one block on each line).

CALIBER	NONE	MEAGER	MODERATE	INTENSE
HEAVY — Time-fused shells, 75mm and over				X
MEDIUM — Impact-fused shells, 20mm-50mm				X
LIGHT — Machine gun bullets, 6.5mm-13.2mm	X			

X. COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE, OWN AND ENEMY AIRCRAFT (use check list at left).

SPEED, CLIMB,
at various altitudes

- TURNES
- DIVES
- CEILINGS
- RANGE
- PROTECTION
- ARMAMENT

No airborne enemy aircraft observed.

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3

(OMIT THIS SHEET IF NO ATTACK WAS MADE)

REPORT No. _____

XI. ATTACK ON ENEMY SHIPS OR GROUND OBJECTIVES (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

DA-1-40

(a) Target(s) and Location(s) BB NAGATO, DD OF Takanami Class & ship concentration
(FOR SHIPS INCLUDE ALL IN AREA UNDER ATTACK) (b) Time Over Target(s) 1400(I) (Zone)

(c) Clouds Over Target None
(BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)

(d) Visibility of Target Target partially obscured by smoke (e) Visibility 15
(CLEAR, HAZY, PARTIALLY OBSCURED BY CLOUDS, ETC.) (MILES)

(f) Bombing Tactics: Type Dive Bomb Sight Used 2. Eliminated
(LEVEL, GLIDE OR DIVE) (TYPE)
gunsight.

Bombs Dropped per Run 1 Spacing 7 Altitude of Bomb Release 4,000
(NUMBER) (FEET) (FEET)

(g) Number of Enemy Aircraft Hit on Ground: Destroyed 0 Probably Destroyed 0 Damaged 0

(h) AIMING POINT	(i) DIMENSIONS OR TONNAGE	(j) NO A/C ATTACKING (k) SQUADRON	(l) BOMBS AND AMMUNITION EXPENDED, EACH AIMING POINT	(m) NO HITS On Aiming Point	(n) DAMAGE (None, slight, serious, destroyed or sunk)
1 Waterline on Port side amidships, BB Nagato	34000 tons (stand) length 700'; Beam 95'	5 VF-49	Five 1000 G.P.	3	Three very near misses on port side near stern. Damage could not be ob- served but from position of hits serious under- water damage must have been inflicted.
2					
3					
4					
5 Waterline amidships on port side of DD of Takanami class.	2000 tons. Length 382' Beam 34'	1 VF-49	One 1000 G.P.	1	Near misses on port side just forward of bridge. Damage not observed but hit was so close that it must have caused lethal damage. Ship seen subse- quently to be surrounded by oil & debris.
6					
7					
8 Center of Shipping con- centration south of dry dock (number 4)		1 VF-49	One 1000 G.P.	1	Not observed.

(o) RESULTS: For all hits claimed on ship targets and for land targets of special interest, draw diagram, top or side view or both, as appropriate, showing type and location of hits. For all targets give location and effect of hits, and identify by numbers above. Use additional sheets if necessary.

EXHIBIT "A": Hereto attached designated "Location Chart" shows the position of the three targets bombed in Yokosuka harbor and the approximate location of the hits. The bomb hits are numbered as follows: 1. (Ship Key number 3), position of three very near misses on BB Nagato; 2. (Ship key number 6), position of near miss on DD of Takanami class; 3. Approximate position of hit on ship concentration south of dry dock number four (Ship Key Number 10).

EXHIBIT "B": Hereto attached is a photograph of the target during the attack. An exploding bomb is shown in the position where the three very near misses were observed along-side the BB Nagato. (Marked with white ink and numbered one). The near miss on the DD of the Takanami class by Ensign H. H. Christensen is shown on the photograph and numbered 2. (Note SBXC to the right of the target. The area where the bomb was dropped into the ship concentration is obscured by smoke in the lower right hand corner of the photograph.

(p) Were Photographs Taken? Yes Photographs of Damage, When Taken, Should Be Attached By Staple.




EXHIBIT "A"
LOCATION CHART
 LAYOUT OF
 YOKOSUKA HARBOR

GRAPHIC SCALE IN YARDS
 SPECIAL REPORT No. 46

SORTIE: VD-1 SBA #58B DATE: 4 JULY 45
 INTERPRON TWO



5742 IAC 98FVJULY 18-451600 (-1) K17 12" ALT 10,000' YOKOSUKA NAVAL BASE, HONSHU CONF

EXHIBIT B

PHOTOGRAPH YOKOSUKA HARBOR

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4

REPORT No **ACA-1-40**

XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY

OWN AIRCRAFT

- Disposition
- Altitudes
- Speeds
- Approach Tactics
- Use of Cover, Deception
- Angles of Attack and Their Effectiveness
- Distance of Opening Fire
- Defense Tactics and Their Effectiveness

ENEMY AIRCRAFT

- Method of Locating, Distance
- Disposition
- Altitudes
- Speeds
- Approach Tactics
- Use of Cover, Deception
- Angles of Attack
- Distance of Opening Fire
- Defensive Tactics

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Own Weaknesses
- Enemy Weaknesses
- Offensive Tactics, Own
- " " " " Enemy
- Defensive Tactics, Own
- " " " " Enemy
- Flexible Gunnery, Own
- Escort Tactics
- Fighter Direction
- Use of Radar
- Night Fighting
- Recognition, Aircraft

ATTACK

OWN TACTICS

- Method of Locating Target
- Approach to Target
- Altitudes, Speeds
- Approach
- Dive
- Pull-Out
- Dive Angle
- Strafing
- Retirement
- Defensive Tactics
- Use of Jamming

DEFENSE, ENEMY

- Evasive Tactics, Ships
- Concealment
- Searchlights
- Night Fighter Tactics
- Use of Jamming

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Bombing Tactics
- Torpedo Tactics
- Effectiveness of Bombs, Torpedoes
- Selection of Targets
- Fuzing
- Strafing Tactics
- Defensive Tactics
- Use of Radar
- Reconnaissance
- Photography
- Briefing

OPERATIONAL

- Navigation
- Homing
- Rendezvous
- Recognition, Ships
- Communications
- Flight Operations
- Search and Tracking
- Base Operations
- Maintenance

Lt. Comdr. G. M. ROUZEE, Commander of Air Group FORTY-NINE, led eight Hellcats and nine Avengers from the USS SAN JACINTO against the battleship Nagato in Yokosuka Harbor, Honshu, at 1340(I), 18 July 1945. The flight was part of a coordinated deck-lead strike from Task Force Thirty-Eight which had as its primary target this Japanese battleship believed to be the last operational enemy capital ship. The flight reached the Japanese coast just southwest of Nojima-Zaki, where it orbited until sent in on the target by the coordinator. In the immediate approach to the target a course was held almost due north through Uraga Straits, into Tokyo Bay and across Futtsu Saki. From this point a sweeping turn was made above the target area, and the final dive was from about 16000 feet, northwest of the Naval base. The average bomb release altitude was 4000 feet. The Torpedo Bombers from the Air Group had preceded the fighters over the target in an attack on the flak area above the Naval Base. When the fighter group from VF-49 started their dive as ordered by the coordinator, another group of fighters and dive bombers were sent in almost simultaneously. This greatly narrowed the scope of the attack by both units, each of which had already been restricted by the position of the ship to a ninety degree sector on the outboard side of the target. The attack was pressed home through intense flak and on the retirement which was made at about 3500 feet on a northeasterly course, three very near misses by the flight from VF-49 were seen just outboard of the port side of the Nagato, abeam the number three turret. One of these very near misses was made by Lt. Comdr. G.M. Rouzee, the Air Group Commander, who led the attack on the target. While the extent of the damage could not be observed due to the heavy pall of smoke which partially obscured the ship, it is believed that serious underwater damage was inflicted. The bombs hit the water within a few feet of the ship and in the area in which hits could be expected to cause lethal damage. Ens. M. H. Christensen was unable to drop on the target because of the traffic problem created by the other air group and selected as an alternate target a Takanami class destroyer, which was north of the dock area and almost due west of the primary target. A near miss was made on the port side of this ship, just forward of the bridge and very serious if not lethal damage to this objective was very probable. Large quantities of oil and debris were observed around the destroyer immediately after the attack. Ensign Simon Janouzian, also was unable to drop on the primary target and placed his bomb in a group of ships which were located south of dry dock number four. Immediately after he pulled out the area was covered with smoke and for this reason damage could not be assessed. Lt(jg) R. C. Wright made several photographic runs over the target at 9000 feet and 100% coverage was obtained, except for the portion covered by smoke. Heavy and medium automatic anti-aircraft fire was very intense and accurate from the time the approach was made northward through Uraga Suido, until retirement was completed beyond gun range. Heavy flak bursts were seen from 22,000 feet down to the bomb release point, and a very heavy barrage of medium automatic fire was put up over the target area. The heavy AA was for the most part continuously pointed, but the firing over the target was at least partially a predicted concentration at several levels. The flight adopted planned course and altitude changes until committed to their attack, and fortunately escaped damage from the screen of fire, which was described by the flight leader as a 10/10 cumulus flak. No enemy aircraft were seen. Retirement was made along the approach route and the return to base was completed at 1803(I).

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

XIII. MATERIAL DATA. (Comment freely on performance or suitability, following check list at left.
Use additional sheets if necessary).

ARMAMENT

Guns, Gunsights
Turrets
Ammunition
Bombs, Torpedoes
Bomb Sights
Bomb Releases

COMMUNICATIONS

Radio, Radar
Homing Devices
Visual Signals
Codes, Ciphers

RECOGNITION

IFF
Signals
Battle Lights
Procedures

PROTECTION

Armor; Points and Angles
of Fire Needing Further
Protection
Leak Proofing

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Parachutes
Life Belts, Life Rafts
Safety Belts
Emergency Kits
Rations, First Aid

NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT

Compasses
Driftsights
Octants
Automatic Pilots
Charts
Field Lighting

INSTRUMENTS

Flight
Power Plant

OXYGEN SYSTEM

CAMOUFLAGE AND DECEPTION DEVICES

STRUCTURE

Airframe
Control Surfaces
Control System
Dive Flaps
Landing Gear
Heating System
Flight Characteristics
At Various Loadings

POWER PLANT

Engines
Engine Accessories
Propellers
Lubricating System
Starters
Exhaust Dampers

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

Auxiliary Plant
Lights

FUEL SYSTEM

FLIGHT CLOTHING

MAINTENANCE

BASE FACILITIES

Plane Servicing Equipment
Personnel Facilities

All equipment performed satisfactorily.

REPORT PREPARED BY:

APPROVED BY:

R. A. SMYTH, Lieut., USNR
SIGNATURE RANK AND DUTY
A. C. I. Officer.

G. M. ROUZEE, Lieut. Comdr., USN
SIGNATURE RANK AND DUTY
Commanding Officer, VF-49

18 July 1945
DATE