

99

SONSHI

THE CHINESE MEDICAL CLASSIC

TRANSLATED

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SHANGHAI

孫子正文

始計第一

孫子曰。兵者國之大事。死生之地。存亡之道。不可不察也。故經之以五事。校之以計。而索其情。一曰道。二曰天。三曰地。四曰將。五曰法。道者令民與上同意。可與之死。可與之生。而不畏危也。天者陰陽寒暑時制也。地者遠近險易廣狹死生也。將者智、信、仁、勇、嚴也。法者曲制、官道、主用也。凡此五者。將莫不聞。知之者勝。不知者不勝。故校之以計。而索其情。曰。主孰有道。將孰有能。天地孰得。法令孰行。兵衆孰強。士卒孰練。賞

二
罰孰明。吾以此知勝負矣。將聽吾計用之必勝。留之將不聽。吾計用之必敗。去之計利。以聽乃爲之勢。以佐其外。勢者因利而制權也。兵者詭道也。故能而示之不能。用而示之不用。近而示之遠。遠而示之近。利而誘之。亂而取之。實而備之。強而避之。怒而撓之。卑而驕之。佚而勞之。親而離之。攻其無備。出其不意。此兵家之勝。不可先傳也。夫未戰而廟筭勝者。得筭多也。未戰而廟筭不勝者。得筭少也。多筭勝。少筭不勝。而況於無筭乎。吾以此觀之。勝負見矣。

作戰第二

孫子曰。凡用兵之法。馳車千駟。革車千乘。帶甲十萬。千里饋

糧。內外之費。賓客之用。膠漆之材。車甲之奉。日費千金。然後十萬之師舉矣。其用戰也。勝久則鈍。兵挫銳。攻城則力屈。久暴師則國用不足。夫鈍兵挫銳。屈力彈貨。則諸侯乘其弊而起。雖有智者。不能善其後矣。故兵聞拙速。未覩巧之久也。夫兵久而國利者。未之有也。故不盡知用兵之害者。則不能盡知用兵之利也。善用兵者。役不再籍。糧不三載。取用於國。因糧於敵。故軍食可足也。國之貧於師者。遠輸。遠輸則百姓貧。近師者。貴賣。貴賣則百姓財竭。財竭則急於丘役。力屈財彈。中原內虛於家。百姓之費。十去其七。公家之費。破車罷馬。甲冑矢弓。戟楯矛櫓。丘牛大車。十去其六。故智將務食於敵。食

敵一鍾當吾二十鍾。芟杆一石當吾二十石。故殺敵者怒也。取敵之利者貨也。車戰得車十乘以上。賞其先得者。而更其旌旗。車雜而乘之。卒善而養之。是謂勝敵而益強。故兵貴勝。不貴久。故知兵之將。民之司命。國家安危之主也。

四

謀攻第三

孫子曰。夫用兵之法。全國爲上。破國次之。全軍爲上。破軍次之。全旅爲上。破旅次之。全卒爲上。破卒次之。全伍爲上。破伍次之。是故百戰百勝。非善之善者也。不戰而屈人之兵。善之善者也。故上兵伐謀。其次伐交。其次伐兵。其下攻城。攻城之法。爲不得已。修櫓。積糧。具器械。三月而後成。距堙。又三月而

後已。將不勝其忿而蟻附之。殺士卒三分之一。而城不拔者。此攻之災也。故善用兵者。屈人之兵。而非戰也。拔人之城。而非攻也。毀人之國。而非久也。必以全爭於天下。故兵不頓而利可全。此謀攻之法也。故用兵之法。十則圍之。五則攻之。倍則分之。敵則能戰之。少則能逃之。不若則能避之。故小敵之堅。大敵之擒也。夫將者。國之輔也。輔周則國必強。輔隙則國必弱。故君之所以患於軍者。三不知。不知軍之不可以進而謂之進。不知軍之不可以退。而謂之退。是謂糜軍。不知三軍之事。而同三軍之政。則軍士惑矣。不知三軍之權。而同三軍之任。則軍士疑矣。三軍既惑且疑。則諸侯之難至矣。是謂亂軍。引

五

勝。故知勝有五。知可以與戰。不可以與戰者。勝識衆寡之用者。勝。上下同欲者。勝。以虞待不虞者。勝。將能而君不御者。勝。此五者。知勝之道也。故曰。知彼知己。百戰不殆。不知彼而知己。一勝一負。不知彼。不知己。每戰必敗。

六

軍形第四

孫子曰。昔之善戰者。先爲不可勝。以待敵之可勝。不可勝在己。可勝在敵。故善戰者。能爲不可勝。不能使敵之必可勝。故曰。勝可知。而不可爲。不可勝者。守也。可勝者。攻也。守則不足。攻則有餘。善守者。藏於九地之下。善攻者。動於九天之上。故能自保而全勝也。見勝不過衆人之所知。非善之善者也。戰

勝而天下曰善。非善之善者也。故舉秋毫。不爲多力。見日月。不爲明目。聞雷霆。不爲聰耳。古之所謂善戰者。勝於易勝者也。故善戰者之勝也。無智名。無勇功。故其戰勝不忒。不忒者。其所措勝。勝已敗者也。故善戰者。立於不敗之地。而不失敵之敗也。是故勝兵先勝而後求戰。敗兵先戰而後求勝。善用兵者。修道而保法。故能爲勝敗之政。兵法。一曰度。二曰量。三曰數。四曰稱。五曰勝。地生度。度生量。量生數。數生稱。稱生勝。故勝兵若以鎰稱銖。敗兵若以銖稱鎰。勝者之戰。若決積水於千仞之谿者。形也。

兵勢第五

七

孫子曰。凡治衆如治寡。分數是也。鬪衆如鬪寡。形名是也。三軍之衆。可使必受敵而無敗者。奇正是也。兵之所加。如以碶投卵者。虛實是也。凡戰者。以正合。以奇勝。故善出奇者。無窮如天地。不竭如江海。終而復始。日月是也。死而更生。四時是也。聲不過五。五聲之變。不可勝聽也。色不過五。五色之變。不可勝觀也。味不過五。五味之變。不可勝嘗也。戰勢不過奇正。奇正之變。不可勝窮也。奇正相生。如循環之無端。孰能窮之哉。激水之疾。至於漂石者。勢也。鷲鳥之疾。至於毀折者。節也。故善戰者。其勢險。其節短。勢如彍弩。節如發機。紛紛紜紜。亂而不可亂。渾渾沌沌。形圓而不可敗。亂生於治。怯生於勇。

弱生於強。治亂數也。勇怯勢也。強弱形也。故善動敵者。形之敵必從之。予之敵必取之。以利動之。以卒待之。故善戰者。求之於勢。不責於人。故能擇人而任勢。任勢者。其戰人也。如轉木石。木石之性。安則靜。危則動。方則止。圓則行。故善戰人之勢。如轉圓石於千仞之山者。勢也。

虛實第六

孫子曰。凡先處戰地而待敵者。佚。後處戰地而趨戰者。勞。故善戰者。致人而不致於人。能使敵人自至者。利之也。能使敵人不得至者。害之也。故敵佚能勞之。飽能飢之。安能動之。出其不意。趨其所不意。行千里而不勞者。行於無人之地也。

攻而必取者攻其所不守也。守而必固者守其所不攻也。故善攻者敵不知其所守。善守者敵不知其所攻。微乎微乎。至於無形。神乎神乎。至於無聲。故能爲敵之司命。進而不可禦者。衝其虛也。退而不可追者。速而不可及也。故我欲戰。敵雖高壘深溝。不得不與我戰者。攻其所必救也。我不欲戰。雖畫地而守之。敵不得與我戰者。乖其所之也。故形人而我無形。則我專而敵分。我專爲一。敵分爲十。是以十攻其一也。則我衆敵寡。能以衆擊寡。則吾之所與戰者約矣。吾所與戰之地不可知。不可知則敵所備者多。敵所備者多則吾所與戰者寡矣。故備前則後寡。備後則前寡。備左則右寡。備右則左寡。

十

無所不備。則無所不寡。寡者備人者也。衆者使人備己者也。故知戰之地。知戰之日。則可千里而會戰。不知戰地。不知戰日。則左不能救右。右不能救左。前不能救後。後不能救前。而況遠者數十里。近者數里乎。以吾度之。越人之兵雖多。亦奚益於勝哉。故曰。勝可爲也。敵雖衆。可使無鬪。故策之而知得失之計。作之而知動靜之理。形之而知死生之地。角之而知有餘不足之處。故形兵之極。至於無形。無形則深閒不能窺。智者不能謀。因形而措勝於衆。衆不能知。人皆知我所以勝之形。而莫知吾所以制勝之形。故其戰勝不復。而應形於無窮。夫兵形象水。水之形避高而趨下。兵之形避實而擊虛。水

十一

因地而制流。兵因敵而制勝。故兵無常勢。水無常形。能因敵變化而取勝者。謂之神。故五行無常勝。四時無常位。日有短長。月有死生。

軍爭第七

孫子曰。凡用兵之法。將受命於君。合軍聚衆。交和而舍。莫難於軍爭。軍爭之難者。以迂爲直。以患爲利。故迂其途而誘之。以利後人發。先人至此。知迂直之計者也。軍爭爲利。衆爭爲危。舉軍而爭利。則不及。委軍而爭利。則輜重捐。是故卷甲而趨。日夜不處。倍道兼行。百里而爭利。則擒三將軍。勁者先。疲者後。其法十一而至。五十里而爭利。則蹶上將軍。其法半至。

三十里而爭利。則三分之二至。是故軍無輜重則亡。無糧食則亡。無委積則亡。故不知諸侯之謀者。不能豫交。不知山林險阻。沮澤之形者。不能行軍。不用鄉導者。不能得地利。故兵以詐立。以利動。以分合爲變者也。故其疾如風。其徐如林。侵掠如火。不動如山。難知如陰。動如雷震。掠鄉分衆。廓地分利。懸權而動。先知迂直之計者勝。此軍爭之法也。軍政曰。言不相聞。故爲之金鼓。視不相見。故爲之旌旗。夫金鼓旌旗者。所以一人之耳目也。人既專一。則勇者不得獨進。怯者不得獨退。此用衆之法也。故夜戰多火鼓。晝戰多旌旗。所以變人之耳目也。三軍可奪氣。將軍可奪心。是故朝氣銳。晝氣惰。暮氣

歸。善用兵者。避其銳氣。擊其惰歸。此治氣者也。以治待亂。以靜待譁。此治心者也。以近待遠。以佚待勞。以飽待飢。此治力者也。無邀正正之旗。勿擊堂堂之陣。此治變者也。故用兵之法。高陵勿向。背丘勿逆。佯北勿從。銳卒勿攻。餌兵勿食。歸師勿遏。圍師必闕。窮寇勿迫。此用兵之法也。

九變第八

孫子曰。凡用兵之法。將受命於君。合軍聚衆。圯地無舍。衢地合交。絕地無留。圍地則謀。死地則戰。途有所不由。軍有所不擊。城有所不攻。地有所不爭。君命有所不受。故將通於九變之利者。知用兵矣。將不通九變之利。雖知地形。不能得地之

利矣。治兵不知九變之術。雖知五利。不能得人之用矣。是故智者之慮。必雜於利害。雜於利而務可信也。雜於害而患可解也。是故屈諸侯者以害。役諸侯者以業。趨諸侯者以利。故用兵之法。無恃其不來。恃吾有以待之。無恃其不攻。恃吾有所不可攻也。故將有五危。必死可殺。必生可虜。忿速可侮。廉潔可辱。愛民可煩。凡此五者。將之過也。用兵之災也。覆軍殺將。必以五危。不可不察也。

行軍第九

孫子曰。凡處軍相敵。絕山依谷。視生處高。戰隆無登。此處山之軍也。絕水必遠水。客絕水而來。勿迎之於水。汭令半渡而

擊之利欲戰者無附於水而迎客視生處高無迎水流此處水上之軍也絕斥澤唯亟去無留若交軍於斥澤之中必依水草而背衆樹此處斥澤之軍也平陸處易右背高前死後生此處平陸之軍也凡四軍之利黃帝之所以勝四帝也凡軍好高而惡下貴陽而賤陰養生處實軍無百疾是謂必勝丘陵隄防必處其陽而右背之此兵之利地之助也上雨水沫至欲涉者待其定也凡地有絕澗天井天牢天羅天陷天隙必亟去之勿近也吾遠之敵近之吾迎之敵背之軍旁有險阻潢井蒹葭林木鬱蒼者必謹覆索之此伏姦之所也近而靜者恃其險也遠而挑戰者欲人之進也其所居易者利

也衆樹動者來也衆草多障者疑也鳥起者伏也獸駭者覆也塵高而銳者車來也卑而廣者徒來也散而條達者樵採也少而往來者營軍也辭卑而益備者進也辭強而進驅者退也輕車先出居其側者陣也無約而請和者謀也奔走而陳兵者期也半進半退者誘也杖而立者飢也汲而先飲者渴也見利而不進者勞也鳥集者虛也夜呼者恐也軍擾者將不重也旌旗動者亂也吏怒者倦也殺馬肉食者軍無糧也懸鈺不返其舍者窮寇也諄諄論譎徐與人言者失衆也數賞者窘也數罰者困也先暴而後畏其衆者不精之至也來委謝者欲休息也兵怒而相迎久而不合又不相去必謹

十八
察之。兵非貴益多。雖無武進。足以併力料敵取人而已。夫唯無慮而易敵者。必擒於人。卒未親附而罰之。則不服。不服則難用。卒已親附而罰不行。則不可用。故令之以文。齊之以武。是謂必取。令素行者。以教其民。則民服。令不素行者。以教其民。則民不服。令素行者。與衆相得也。

地形第十

孫子曰。地形有通者。有掛者。有支者。有隘者。有險者。有遠者。我可以往。彼可以來。曰通。通形者。先居高陽。利糧道。以戰則利。可以往。難以返。曰掛。掛形者。敵無備。出而勝之。敵若有備。出而不勝。難以返。不利。我出而不利。彼出而不利。曰支。支形

者。敵雖利我。我無出也。引而去之。令敵半出而擊之。利。隘形者。我先居之。必盈之。以待敵。若敵先居之。盈而勿從。不盈而從之。險形者。我先居之。必居高陽。以待敵。若敵先居之。引而去之。勿從也。遠形者。勢均。難以挑戰。戰而不利。凡此六者。地道也。將之至任。不可不察也。故兵有走者。有弛者。有陷者。有崩者。有亂者。有北者。凡此六者。非天地之災。將之過也。夫勢均。以一擊十。曰走。卒強。吏弱。曰弛。吏強。卒弱。曰陷。大吏怒。而不。服。遇敵。對而自戰。將不知其能。曰崩。將弱不嚴。教道不明。吏卒無常。陳兵縱橫。曰亂。將不能料敵。以少合衆。以弱擊強。兵無選鋒。曰北。凡此六者。敗之道也。將之至任。不可不察。

也。天地形者，兵之助也。料敵制勝，計險阨遠近，上將之道也。知此而用戰者，必勝。不知此而用戰者，必敗。故戰道必勝。主曰：無戰，必戰可也。戰道不勝，主曰：必戰，無戰可也。故進不求名，退不避罪。唯民是保，而利於主，國之寶也。視卒如嬰兒，故可與之赴深谿；視卒如愛子，故可與之俱死；愛而不能令，厚而不能使，亂而不能治，譬如驕子，不可用也。知吾卒之可以擊，而不知敵之不可擊，勝之半也。知敵之可擊，而不知吾卒之不可以擊，勝之半也。知敵之可擊，而不知吾卒之不可以擊，勝之半也。知地形之不可以戰，勝之半也。故知兵者，動而不迷，舉而不窮。故曰：知彼知己，勝乃不殆；知天知地，勝乃可全。

九地第十一

孫子曰：用兵之法，有散地，有輕地，有爭地，有交地，有衢地，有重地，有圯地，有圍地，有死地。諸侯自戰，其地者為散地；入人之地而不深者為輕地；我得亦利，彼得亦利者為爭地；我可以往，彼可以來者為交地；諸侯之地三屬，先至而得天下之衆者為衢地；入人之地深，背城邑多者為重地；山林險阻，沮澤凡難行之道者為圯地；所由入者隘，所從歸者迂，彼寡可以擊吾之衆者為圍地；疾戰則存，不疾戰則亡者為死地；是故散地則無戰，輕地則無止，爭地則無攻，交地則無絕，衢地則合交，重地則掠，圯地則行，圍地則謀，死地則戰。古之善用

兵者能使敵人前後不相及。眾寡不相恃。貴賤不相救。上下不相收。卒離而不集。兵合而不齊。合於利而動。不合於利而止。敢問敵眾整而將來待之若何。曰先奪其所愛則聽矣。兵之情主速。乘人之不及。由不虞之道。攻其所不戒也。凡為客之道。深入則專。主人不克。掠於饒野。三軍足食。謹養而勿勞。并氣積力。運兵計謀。為不可測。投之無所往。死且不北。死焉不得。士人盡力。兵士甚陷。則不懼。無所往則固。入深則拘。不得已則鬪。是故其兵不修而戒。不求而得。不約而親。不令而信。禁祥去疑。至死無所之。吾士無餘財。非惡貨也。無餘命。非惡壽也。令發之日。士卒坐者涕霑襟。偃臥者涕交頤。投之無

所往。諸劔之勇也。故善用兵者。譬如率然。率然者。常山之蛇也。擊其首則尾至。擊其尾則首至。擊其中則首尾俱至。敢問可使如率然乎。曰可。夫吳人與越人相惡也。當其同舟濟而遇風。其相救也。如左右手。是故方馬埋輪。未足恃也。齊勇若一。政之道也。剛柔皆得。地之理也。故善用兵者。攜手若使一人。不得已也。將軍之事。靜以幽。正以治。能愚士卒之耳目。使之無知。易其事。革其謀。使人無識。易其居。迂其途。使人不得慮。帥與之期。如登高而去其梯。帥與之深入。諸侯之地。而發其機。若驅群羊。驅而往。驅而來。莫知所之。聚三軍之眾。投之於險。此將軍之事也。九地之變。屈伸之利。人情之理。不可不

察也。凡爲客之道。深則專。淺則散。去國越境而師者。絕地也。四通者。衢地也。入深者。重地也。入淺者。輕地也。背固前隘者。圍地也。無所往者。死地也。是故散地。吾將一其志。輕地。吾將使之屬。爭地。吾將趨其後。交地。吾將謹其守。衢地。吾將固其結。重地。吾將繼其食。圯地。吾將進其途。圍地。吾將塞其闕。死地。吾將示之以不活。故兵之情。圍則禦。不得已則鬪。過則從。是故不知諸侯之謀者。不能豫交。不知山林險阻沮澤之形者。不能行軍。不用鄉導者。不能得地利。四五者。一不知。非霸王之兵也。夫霸王之兵。伐大國。則其衆不得聚。威加於敵。則其交不得合。是故不爭天下之交。不養天下之權。信己之私。

威加於敵。故其城可拔。其國可隳。施無法之賞。懸無政之令。犯三軍之衆。若使一人。犯之以事。勿告以言。犯之以利。勿告以害。投之亡地。然後存。陷之死地。然後生。夫衆陷於害。然後能爲勝敗。故爲兵之事。在順詳敵之意。并敵一向。千里殺將。是謂巧能成事。是故政舉之日。夷關折符。無通其使。厲於廊廟之上。以誅其事。敵人開闔。必亟入之。先其所愛。微與之期。踐墨隨敵。以決戰事。是故始如處女。敵人開戶。後如脫兔。敵不及拒。

火攻第十二

孫子曰。凡火攻有五。一曰火人。二曰火積。三曰火輜。四曰火

庫。五曰火。隊行。火必有因。煙火必素具。發火有時。起火有日。時者天之燥也。日者月在箕、壁、翼、軫也。凡此四宿者風起之日也。凡火攻必因五火之變而應之。火發於內則早應之於外。火發而其兵靜者待而勿攻。極其火力可從而從之。不可從而止。火可發於外無待於內。以時發之。火發上風無攻下。風。晝風久。夜風止。凡軍必知五火之變。以數守之。故以火佐攻者明。以水佐攻者強。水可以絕。不可以奪。夫戰勝攻取而不修其功者凶。命曰費留。故曰明主慮之。良將修之。非利不動。非得不用。非危不戰。主不可以怒而興師。將不可以愠而致戰。合於利而動。不合於利而止。怒可以復喜。愠可以復說。

亡國不可以復存。死者不可以復生。故明主慎之。良將警之。此安國全軍之道也。

用閒第十三

孫子曰。凡興師十萬。出征千里。百姓之費。公家之奉。日費千金。內外騷動。怠於道路。不得操事者。七十萬家。相守數年。以爭一日之勝。而愛爵祿百金。不知敵之情者。不仁之至也。非人之將也。非主之佐也。非勝之主也。故明君賢將。所以動而勝人。成功出於衆者。先知也。先知者。不可取於鬼神。不可象於事。不可驗於度。必取於人。知敵之情者也。故用閒有五。有因閒。有內閒。有反閒。有死閒。有生閒。五閒俱起。莫知其道。是

謂神紀。人君之寶也。因閒者。因其鄉人而用之。內閒者。因其官人而用之。反閒者。因其敵閒而用之。死閒者。為誑事於外。令吾閒知之。而傳於敵閒也。生閒者。反報也。故三軍之事。莫親於閒。賞莫厚於閒。事莫密於閒。非聖智不能用閒。非仁義不能使閒。非微妙不能得閒之實。微哉微哉。無所不用閒也。閒事未發。而先聞者。閒與所告者皆死。凡軍之所欲擊。城之所欲攻。人之所欲殺。必先知其守將。左右。謁者。門者。舍人之姓名。令吾閒必索知之。必索敵閒之來閒我者。因而利之。導而舍之。故反閒可得而用也。因是而知之。故鄉閒內閒可得而使也。因是而知之。故死閒為誑事。可使告敵。因是而知之。

故生閒可使如期。五閒之事。主必知之。知之必在於反閒。故反閒不可不厚也。昔殷之興也。伊摯在夏。周之興也。呂牙在殷。故明君賢將。能以上智為閒者。必成大功。此兵之要。三軍所恃而動也。

孫子正文 終



SONSHI

THE CHINESE MILITARY CLASSIC

TRANSLATED

BY

CAPT. E. F. CALTHROP. R. F. A.



TŌKYŌ:

SANSEIDŌ.

溫
古
知
新

There is no new thing under the Sun.

PREFACE.

The writer begs to thank Mr. H. Kanazawa of the Tokyo Higher Normal School, and Mr. M. Tayama for their kind assistance, without which the accompanying translation would have been impossible.

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CONTENTS.

1. INTRODUCTION	
2. THE ARTICLES OF SONSHI	
	Page.
I. FIRST PRINCIPLES	1
II. OPERATIONS OF WAR	4
III. THE ATTACK BY STRATAGEM.	7
IV. THE ORDER OF BATTLE	11
V. THE SHOCK OF WAR,	14
VI. EMPTINESS AND STRENGTH	17
VII. BATTLE TACTICS	21
VIII. THE NINE SITUATIONS	25
IX. MOVEMENT OF TROOPS.	27
X. TOPOGRAPHY.	32
XI. THE NINE TERRAINS.	36
XII. THE ASSAULT BY FIRE	43
XIII. THE EMPLOYMENT OF SPIES	45

INTRODUCTION.

I.

The Japanese, who until recent times, were the disciples of the Chinese, and the latter, who sit at the feet of antiquity, go back some way for their authorities on War. Sonshi* the most celebrated lived during the Shu (周) dynasty of China, about 550 B.C, and whether or no reluctance to disturb ancient axioms curbs further original efforts, subsequent writers have largely confined themselves to commentating the Master's teachings.

The broad rules of War are unchanging, and much of Sonshi is curiously modern in its application. Contrasted with Western works on strategy, it deals rather with the human, or moral side which we nowadays take for granted, and so overlook. The Chinese are not by nature soldiers, nor had the ruling powers ever a strong hold over the people; discipline was lax; and further, with vast capacity for intrigue, generals and others had little patriotism, and were easily bought.

Hence the need for diplomacy and the importance of spies; the need for considering the temper of the troops; and the sages insistent, "know your own side!"

Sonshi's preference for the defence is perhaps accounted for by the Chinese nature,—slow, ceremonious, and lacking in dash. His advice is ever to move warily at first, and not to attack until the enemy has committed himself. He has a horror of sieges, frontal attacks and assaults, and an Eastern love of crafty and subtle methods.

In short, Sonshi's cardinal rules are: preparation; a thoroughly thought out plan of campaign; importance of intelligence and knowledge of the ground; variety and non dependence on book or rule; and quickness to take and press advantage.

*Names are written as pronounced in Japan. In this case "Son" is the writers name; "Shi" is an honorific Suffix.

From the literary point of view Sonshi has a high place and many of his sayings have passed into common use. In an English translation however, it is impossible to suggest the beauties of Chinese prose. Only the bare bones of meaning—often obscure—appear.

The extraordinary terseness, the stately procession of giant parts of speech, unattended by any articles, pronouns or the pawns of grammar, seem to suit the character of a book on war: but the thought which the writer compresses, is apt to take a different form when unfolded by the reader. The exaggeration and the grandiloquent phrasing drown precision; and the reiteration, which in Chinese seems to act like the refrain of a song, is in English tedious. Thus Plain Meaning is sacrificed to Style, and thus arises the need for commentators, who cluster in armies round the Chinese sages.

Sonshi is one of the "Shichisho" (七書), a collection, of the leading Chinese authorities on War. The others are of lesser importance. Sonshi's commentators have also been sifted, and the best brought together in a collection called "The Ten Critics," (十家註) This, among others, has been consulted in the present translation.

II.

Sonshi, who as far as can be ascertained, was a contemporary of Confucius, lived at a time when China, nominally under one ruler, was divided into a number of different states (at one time some forty in number), continually at war.

These wars were not merely savage raids, but were conducted with a vast amount of intrigue and deep thinking. Strategy was highly specialised, and schools of strategy existed, which, however, were apt to ignore what Western minds consider main issues; and differ in regard to some subtle point, much after the manner of the sects of Buddhism.

In any case, the Chinese realised to the full that war was a matter for a specialist. Behind the popular general or the ambitious ruler was the strategist, who evolved the plan of campaign, and, it must be added, consulted the stars and the ancient books for signs and indications.

An account of Sonshi, who was one of these professional, strategists, is written in the Chinese history called *Shiki* (史記), a collection of the lives of celebrated men. Although giving no more than an incident in his life, it is included here as throwing some little light on the history of the time. No further facts about Sonshi appear to be known.

His other name was Bu, and his native place was in the province of Sei in South China. He was at one time in the employment of Katsuryo, the lord of the province of Go, which kingdom rose to considerable importance mainly owing to his talents.

The manner of his first meeting with Katsuryo, and what led to his employment in the latter's service were as follows. Katsuryo told him that he had read his (Sonshi's) thirteen articles, and approved them in theory; but that now he required a practical demonstration of them. Sonshi agreed; and for this purpose asked that he might be allowed to manœuvre the king's wives and women of the palace. There were 185: dividing them into two parties, he put one of the king's favorite wives in command of each.

He then explained to them their duties. When he gave the order "Left Turn," they were to move in the direction of their left hand; when he gave the order "Forward" in the direction in which they were facing; and similarly for right and rear.

Having explained these things three times, he gave a signal on the drum for the manœuvre to commence. But the leaders only giggled; so Sonshi, feeling that his instructions might have been misunderstood, again repeated what they were to do. Once more he announced to the King on his dais that the fight was about to begin, and the signal drum was beaten. The girls laughed again. This time Sonshi said, "My instructions were clear; this time it is the fault of my lieutenants, the punishment of disobedience is death"; and with that he gave orders that they should be beheaded.

Thus far the king did not wish to go, and sent down a messenger to Sonshi to say that he was already perfectly satisfied with the exposition, but that if these two wives were beheaded food would have no taste for him; he begged Sonshi to stay his hand.

To this Sonshi replied that he had been intrusted with the

army; that the king knew that interference with the general in the field was, vide The Articles, a grave error; and that therefore he must set aside this message from home. The two leaders were beheaded before their companies, and two others put in their place, who, fearful of meeting the same fate, made excellent leaders.

This is all that Chinese history has to say about Sonshi; but with its usual irrelevance, and as if to make good the deficiency, the following story is told of his descendant, Sonpin (孫賓), who lived some 145 years later.

In his youth Sonpin had studied war under a certain master, in company with a man called Hoken. The latter afterwards entered the service of a state, and rising to be generalissimo, had great ambitions, but felt that he had a superior in the art of war in Sonpin, his fellow student of former days.

He heard that Sonpin was still unemployed, and conceiving base designs, he asked the latter to come and see him. Sonpin hastened gladly to see his old schoolmate, but did not get a reception suitable to a friend of long standing. Hoken treated him as a criminal, branded his forehead, and cut the tendons of his legs; then, thinking that Sonpin was no longer in a position to use his talents, turned him adrift.

At that time an envoy from a neighbouring state was about to return to his court; to him Sonpin went and told his story. The envoy, feeling that notwithstanding the loss of his legs, Sonpin might be of service to his lord, hid him in his wagon, and took him back to his country.

Sonpin's services were retained, and in a succeeding war, his advice giving victory, he was offered the supreme command. He however refused to displace the then Commander in Chief, to whom the soldiers gave loyal support, and preferred to remain Chief of the staff.

Then came his opportunity. A neighbouring state asked for help against the country of which Hoken was generalissimo. The army was set in motion, and Sonpin, riding in a wagon, considered the plan of campaign. Instead of proceeding to the scene of hostilities, Sonpin placed the army across Hoken's line of communications, which quickly drew the latter thither. Now, Sonpin knowing that Hoken diligently followed the

teachings of his forefather Sonshi, felt that he could foretell Hoken's procedure.

It is written in the thirteen articles that a forced march of twenty leagues in one day reduces the striking force by one half, owing to stragglers and weak men.

He retreated before Hoken, and that night caused 10,000 camp fires to be lighted in the bivouac. The next day he again retreated twenty leagues, and caused only 5,000 camp fires to be lighted. The following day the number of fires was 2,000, but the number of his men was the same as at the first. Then retreating further, he took up a position in a defile which he calculated Hoken would reach shortly after dark. There was there a large tree, and, stripping from it the bark, he caused to be written "Under this tree will Hoken die".

Placing his best archers within bowshot he gave them orders to shoot when they saw the striking of a light under the tree.

Meanwhile Hoken, noting the diminution in the camp fires, and assuming in accordance with the book, that Sonpin's army was crippled to that extent, had pushed on with only a small force, and reached the defile shortly after sunset. Struck by the shaven appearance, and what looked like characters on the tree, he struck a light and was immediately riddled by arrows.

The historian explains this seeming refutation of Sonshi's doctrines by saying that Hoken placed too much reliance on the book, and so forgot one of the Sage's cardinal principles.

THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF SONSHI.

FIRST PRINCIPLES.

The words of Son the Master :—

To all nations War is a great matter. On War, death or life depend : it is the means of existence, or path to destruction.

Therefore it must be diligently studied.

Now, in war there are five important matters. The first is called The Way ;* the second, Heaven ; the third, Earth ; the fourth, the Leader ; the fifth, Law.

The *Way or the proper conduct of man*. If the ruling authority be upright, the people are united : † fearless of danger, their lives are at the service of their Lord.

Heaven. Light and darkness ; ‡ heat and cold ; and the change of time and season.

Earth. Distance ; extent ; strategic position.

* The five virtues of humanity, righteousness, politeness, wisdom and faith are known as The Way.

† Mencius speaking of war says that an united people is the most important essential of victory.

‡ The Chinese regard natural phenomena as possessing either a masculine positive or light principle or a feminine negative or dark principle. In this connection rain, mist, wind, are included.

The *Leader*. Intelligence; truth; benevolence; courage and strictness.

Law. Partition and ordering of troops.

These things must be known by the leader: to know them is to conquer; to know them not is to be defeated.

Further, with regard to these and the following seven matters, the condition of the enemy must be compared with our own.

The seven matters for comparison are:—

The virtue of the prince; the ability of the General; natural advantages; the discipline of the armies; the strength of the soldiers; training of the soldiers; justice both in reward and punishment.

Knowing these things, I can foretell the victor.

If a general under me fight according to my plans, he always conquers, and I continue to employ him: if he differ from my plans, he will be defeated and dismissed from my service.

Wherefore, with regard to the foregoing, considering that with us lies the advantage, and the generals agreeing, we create a situation which promises victory; but as the moment and method cannot be fixed beforehand, the plan must be modified according to circumstances.

War is a thing of pretence: therefore when capable of action, we pretend disability; when near to the enemy, we pretend to be far; when far away, we pretend to be near.

Allure the enemy by giving him a small advantage.

FIRST PRINCIPLES.

Pretend to be in confusion, and capture him. If there are defects, give an appearance of perfection, and awe the enemy. Pretend to be strong, and so cause the enemy to avoid you. Make him angry, and confuse his plans. Pretend to be inferior, and cause him to despise you.

If he be at ease, tire him out; if united make divisions in his camp. Attack weak points, and appear in unexpected places. Since these are the methods of the successful strategist, they cannot be learnt beforehand.*

When, before battle, in council assembled before the shrine of the ancestors, consider well the plan of campaign. For thereby victory may be gained.

They who haplessly fight without plan are courting disaster.

The resourceful in stratagem win; the poor in stratagem do not conquer; hopeless indeed are they without it.

I, knowing these things, and seeing both armies, can foretell the victor.

* There are different opinions as to the meaning of this passage; none are quite satisfactory.

II.

OPERATIONS OF WAR.

Son the master said :—

Now the requirements of War are such that we need 1,000 chariots ;* 1,000 supply wagons ; and therefore 100,000 armoured men : and we must send supplies to distant fields.

Wherefore the cost at home and at the front, including the entertainment of guests ;† glue and lacquer for repairs ; and necessities for the upkeep of wagons and armour ; are such that in one day, 1,000 pieces of gold are spent. With that amount a force of 100,000 men can be provided :—you have the instruments of victory.

But if the operations long continue, then the soldiers' ardour decreases ; the weapons become worn ; and, if a siege be undertaken, strength disappears.

Again, if the war last long the country's means do not suffice.

Then, when the soldiers are worn out ; weapons blunted ; strength gone ; and funds spent ; neighbouring princes arise and attack that weakened

* Chinese warfare was largely an affair of chariots, or might we say, "Mounted Infantry Wagons." The chariot was drawn by 2 or 4 horses and usually contained 3 archers in addition to the driver. Further, to each chariot were attached 75 footmen, and to each supply wagon 25 men.

† China was at this period full of unattached and wandering swashbucklers, who quartered themselves on states at war.

country. At such a time the wisest man cannot mend the matter.

Therefore it is acknowledged that war cannot be too short in duration.

But though conducted with the utmost art, if long continuing, misfortunes do always appear.

In fact there never has been a country which has benefited from a prolonged war.

He who does not know the evils of war, cannot appreciate its benefits ; he who is skilful in war, does not make a second levy ; does not load his supply wagons thrice.

War material and arms we obtain from home ; but supplies sufficient for the army's needs can be taken from the enemy.

The cost of supplying the army in distant fields is the chief drain on the resources of a state : if the war be distant, the citizens are impoverished.

Repeated wars cause high prices, and so the farmer's money is used up. Likewise the state funds are exhausted, and frequent levies must be made ; the strength of the army is dissipated ; money is spent ; the citizen's home is made bare ; in all 7/10ths of his income is forfeited. Again, as regards State property, chariots are broken ; horses worn out ; armour and helmet ; arrow and bow ; spear ; shield ;* pike and

* The Japanese shield was a heavy rectangular piece of wood, which was set on the ground, and kept upright by a prop at the back. The Japanese sword requires both hands, and this fact probably prevented the adoption of a light portable shield. The

fighting tower, used and gone ; so that 6/10ths of the Government's income is spent.

Therefore the intelligent general, taking thought, feeds on the enemy : one bale of the enemy's rice counts as twenty from our own wagons ; one bundle of the enemy's forage is better than twenty of our own.

Wantonly to kill and destroy the enemy must be forbidden.

They who take the enemy at a disadvantage should be rewarded.

They who are the first to lay their hands on more than ten of the enemy's chariots, should be encouraged ; the enemy's standard on the chariots exchanged for our own ; the captured chariots mixed with our own chariots, and taken into use.

The accompanying warriors must not be abused, but treated well ; so that while the enemy is beaten, our side increases in strength.

Now the object of war is victory ; not lengthy operations even skilfully conducted.

The good general is the Lord of the peoples lives ; the Guardian of the country's welfare.

"Horo," which was a peculiar device for protecting the back, was a long piece of loose cloth hung from the shoulders and smothered the arrow or sword thrust, like the Western swordsman's cloak. Latterly, the cloth was stretched on a frame work of bamboo, and reached enormous proportions.

III.

THE ATTACK BY STRATEGEM.

Son the master said :—

Now by the laws of war, better than defeating a country by fire and the sword, is to take it without strife.

Better to capture the enemy's army,* intact, than to overcome it after fierce resistance.

Better to capture the "Ryo," the "Sotsu," or the "Go," untouched, than to engage them first.

To fight and conquer one hundred times is excellent ; but better still, and the supreme art, is to subdue the enemy without fighting.

Wherefore, the most skilful warrior outwits the enemy by superior strategem ; the next in merit isolates the enemy from other states ; next to him is he who engages the enemy's forces ; while to besiege the enemy's citadel is the worst expedient.

A siege should not be undertaken if it can possibly be avoided. For, before a siege can be commenced, three months are required for the construction of stages, battering rams, and the preparation of siege engines ; then a further three months are required in

* The Chinese army (軍) consisted of 12,500, the "Ryo" (旅) of 500, "Sotsu" (卒) of 50, and the "Go" (伍) of 5 men.

front of the citadel, in order to make the "kyoin (距圍)." * Wherefore, the general angered, his patience exhausted, orders his men to the assault before the time is ripe. Thus one third of them are killed to no purpose, because the attack was ill-timed.

Therefore the master of war causes the enemy's forces to yield, but without fighting; he takes possession of his fortress, but without besieging it; he overthrows his government, but without lengthy fighting; and with his army intact takes the enemy's kingdom. Without tarnishing his weapons he gains the complete advantage.

This is the assault by strategem.

By the rules of war, if ten times as strong as the enemy, we can crush him; with five times his strength we may attack him on all sides; with double his numbers, attack from two sides. If equal in strength we must exert ourselves to the utmost, and fight; if inferior in numbers, skilfully evade him; if altogether inferior, offer no chance of battle. A determined stand by inferior numbers is admirable; but they can but become captives.

The warrior is the country's support. If the warrior is loyal and wholehearted in his endeavours, the

* The "Kyoin" was a large tower or work constructed to give command over the interior of the enemy's fortress.

High poles were also erected, from the top of which, archers, each encased in an arrow proof box and raised by a rope and pulley, shot at the besieged.

country is of necessity strong; if he is divided in his allegiance, then is the country weak.

Now the army is ever fearful that its prince and civil counsellors may err in these three ways, namely:—

Ignorant that the army in the field is unable to advance, to order it to go forward; or, ignorant that the army cannot retreat, order it to retire.

This is to tie the army as with a string.

Ignorant of the management of armies, to forget their complexity, and dictate inflexible rules for their guidance.

This is to perplex the soldiers.

Ignorant of the situation of the army, to interfere in its dispositions.

This is to fill the soldiers with distrust.

If the army be perplexed and distrustful, then do neighbouring princes conspire and the army is confounded.

This is to offer victory to the enemy.

Knowledge of these five matters bring victory:—

He conquers who knows when to fight, and when not to fight; who understands the employment of large and small numbers; whose Government and people are of one mind and of one desire; who, ever prepared, chooses the enemy's unguarded moment for his attack; who, possessing ability, is not interfered with by his prince.

Whosoever understands these five matters, is on the path to victory.

It has been said that he who knows both sides has nothing to fear in 100 fights ; he who is ignorant of the enemy, and fixes his eyes only on his own side, conquers, and the next time is defeated ; he, who not only is ignorant of the enemy, but also of his own country's requirements and resources, is invariably defeated.

IV.

THE ORDER OF BATTLE.

Son the master said :—

The ancient masters of war first made their position impregnable, then waited until the adversary's condition gave promise of victory. That was a consummation whereby success was made certain, and likewise failure to the adversary.

Skilful soldiers can make their armies invincible, but they cannot always put the enemy in a conquerable position.

The conditions necessary for victory may be present, but it cannot always be obtained.

If the enemy be invincible, we stand on the defensive and await an opportunity ; if he be vulnerable, we attack.

Conceal your strength in defence ; shew your banners in attack.

The skilful in defence, crouch, hidden in the deepest shades ; the skilful in attack, push to the topmost heaven.*

If these precepts be observed, victory is certain.

A victory, even if popularly proclaimed as such by the common folk, may not be a true success. To win in fight, and for the kingdom to say, "Well done", is not the perfection of attainment. To lift an

* Literally 9th heaven, and 9th earth. The Chinese divided the earth and sky each into 9 strata.

autumn fleece* is no mark of strength ; the eyes that only see the sun and moon are not the eagles ; to hear the thunder is no great thing.

As has been said aforetime, the able warrior gains the victory without desperate and bloody engagements, but wins thereby no reputation for wisdom or brave deeds, for it seems a thing that cannot be helped ; his performance is such that the enemy seems preordained to defeat.

Moreover, the skilful soldier in a secure position, does not let pass the moment when the enemy should be attacked.

The army that conquers decides before fighting that victory can be gained.

The army destined to defeat, fights, trusting that chance may bring success to its arms.

The state whose general is careful in his treatment of the people, and upright in his dealing, cannot be shaken.

Touching the laws of war, it is said :—first, the rule ; second, the measure ; third, the tables ; fourth, the scales ; fifth, the foretelling of victory.

For the rule is the survey of land ; the measure tells the amount of that land's produce ; the tables its population ; from the scales their weight or quality is made known ; and then can we calculate victory or defeat.

The army fit to conquer as against the army des-

* An animal's coat is thinnest in autumn.

tined to defeat, is as the feather against the beam in the scales. Conquering forces are as the rush of long pent up waters into sunken valleys. Such is the shock of war.

V.

THE SHOCK OF WAR.

Son the Master said :—

The control of large numbers is possible, and like unto that of small numbers, if we subdivide them.

If we use drum, bell, and flag,* the direction of large forces is possible, and like unto the direction of small forces.

By the skilful interchange of ordinary and extraordinary manœuvres, is the enemy most certainly defeated.

Like the fall of a jagged rock upon an egg, so should the forces, strong and united, be dashed against the enemy's empty unpreparedness.

Moreover, the collision with the enemy having occurred, victory is obtained with the "strategic" force.†

* The drum was used to beat the assembly and in the advance, the bell as a signal for "cease fire." The bell was not used in the wars in Japan, a large conch took its place. Flags were of two kinds, signalling flags and distinguishing banners. The fondness of the Chinese for banners seems to arise, partly from the posteresque quality of the Chinese written character with which the banners are usually adorned, and partly from a feeling of security and liveliness imparted by the many coloured cloth strips waving in the wind.

† The character (奇), which is here translated "strategic," alludes to that portion of an army which executes a flank attack, creates a diversion, or lies in ambush, while the enemy's attention is occupied by the evident, or detaining force.

The methods of skilful employment of the strategic force are, like the heaven and earth, infinite and without end; as the tides and the flow of rivers, unceasing; like the sun and moon, forever interchanging; coming and passing, as the seasons.

There are five notes; but by combinations, innumerable harmonies are produced. There are but five colours; but if we mix them, the shades are infinite. There are five tastes but if we mix them there are more flavours than the palate can distinguish.*

Similarly, there is the detaining, or evident force, and the strategic force; but how many plans of battle can we not get from their combination! It is like unto a revolving wheel, perpetually changing, and without finality.

Like the rush of maddened torrents which carries away rocks, so is the shock† of battle.

Like the well judged cast of the falcon, in a flash crushing its quarry, so should that force be exerted.

Wherefore the good fighter, his force ever ready to be launched, and that swiftly, is like the stretched cross-bow, whose string is released at the touch of the trigger.

In the confusion of the attack, order is still preserved; the battle array is perfect, impenetrable.

* The five cardinal tastes are, acidity, bitterness, sourness, sweetness and saline taste.

† No one word in English quite conveys the meaning of (勢). Force, élan, the Latin "vis," the shock-energy of troops flushed with success are suggestive.

If discipline be perfect, disorder can be simulated ; if truly bold, we can feign fear ; if really strong, we can feign weakness.

We simulate disorder by numbers ; fear, by attitude ; weakness, by battle formation.

By making skilful dispositions, we may cause the enemy to conform to them. If we offer the enemy a point of advantage ; he will certainly take it : we give him an advantage, set him in motion and then fall upon him.

Wherefore, the good fighter seeks victory from battle force, and not simply at the expense of his men : while careful in his choice, he does not regard his soldiers as his only weapons ; yet, when an opening or advantage shews, he pushes it to its limits.

As a log or rock which, motionless on flat ground, yet moves with ever increasing force when set on an incline, so await the opportunity, and so act when the opportunity arrives.

Therefore the force of the skilful fighter is as the impetus of a round stone rolled from the top of a high mountain.

VI.

EMPTINESS AND STRENGTH.

Son the Master said :—

To be the first in the field, and there to await the enemy, is to husband strength.

To be late, and hurrying to advance to meet the foe, is exhausting.

The good fighter contrives to make the enemy approach ; he does not allow himself to be beguiled by the enemy.

By offering an apparent advantage, he induces the enemy to take up a position that will cause his defeat ; he plants obstructions to dissuade him from acting in such a way as to threaten his own dispositions.

If the enemy be at rest in comfortable quarters, harass him ; if he be living in plenty, cut off his supplies ; if sitting composedly awaiting attack, cause him to move.

This may be done by appearing in seemingly impossible quarters, and assaulting at unexpected points.

If we go where the enemy is not, we may go 1000 leagues without exhaustion.

If we attack those positions which the enemy has not defended, we invariably take them : but on the defence we must be strong, even where we are not likely to be attacked.

Against those skilful in attack, the enemy does not

know where to defend: against those skilful in defence, the enemy does not know where to attack.

Now the secrets of the art of offence are not to be easily apprehended, as a certain shape or noise can be understood, of the senses; but when these secrets are once learnt, the enemy is mastered.

We attack, and the enemy cannot resist, because we attack his weakly held positions; we retire, and the enemy cannot pursue, because we retire too quickly.

Again, when we are anxious to fight, but the enemy is serenely secure behind high walls and deep moats; we attack some such other place that he must certainly come out to relieve.

When we do not want to fight, we occupy an unfortified line; and prevent the enemy from attacking by keeping him in suspense.

By making feints, and causing the enemy to be uncertain as to our movements, we unite, whilst he must divide.

We become one body; the enemy being separated into ten parts. We attack the divided ten with the united one. We are many, the enemy is few, and in numbers there is strength.

The place selected for attack must be kept secret. If the enemy knows not where he will be attacked, he must prepare in every quarter, and so be weak at every point of attack.

If the enemy strengthens his front, he must weaken his rear; if he strengthens his right, his left

is weakened; and if he strengthens his left, his right is weakened.

Everywhere to make preparations, is to be everywhere weak. The enemy is weakened by his extended preparations, and we gain in strength.

Having decided on the place and day of attack, though the enemy be a hundred leagues away, we can defeat him.

If the ground and occasion be not known, the front cannot help the rear; the left cannot support the right; nor the right the left; nor the rear the front. For on occasion, the front and rear are two score leagues apart. To be separated a league or so, is to be called near.

The soldiers of Go* are less than the soldiers of Etsu; but as superiority in numbers does not of necessity bring victory, I say then, that we may obtain the victory.

If the enemy be many in number, prevent him from using his multitudes simultaneously with effect, and ascertain his plan of operations. Challenge the enemy and discover the weak and strong points of his position. Flap the wings, and unmask his sufficiency or insufficiency. By constant feints and excursions, we may produce on the enemy an impression of intangibility, which neither spies nor art can dispel.

A victory so gained cannot be understood by the

* Sonshi, as has been said, was a man of Go. Go and Etsu were continually at war.

soldiers; they see the result but they cannot appreciate the means.

If we gain a victory by a certain stratagem, we do not repeat it. Vary the stratagem according to circumstances.

An army is comparable to water.

Water avoids high places, and takes the easiest downward path. So an army chooses weak points in preference to strong.

The course of water is regulated by the shape of the ground; that of the army by the condition of the enemy.

Water has no settled shape; an army is no mechanical engine of destruction.

He who, varying his plans according to the enemy, gains the victory, is called a god.

Among the five elements* there is no settled precedence; the four seasons have no fixed rank; the days are long and short; and the moon waxes and wanes. So in war there is no fixity.

* Wood, fire, earth, metal, and water.

VII.

BATTLE TACTICS.

Son the Master said :—

For the most part, military procedure is as follows.

The General receives orders from his Lord; assembles the forces, and settles the order of encampments.

There is nothing more difficult than Battle Tactics. Their difficulty lies in the calculation of time and distance, and the facing of sudden emergencies.

To take a circuitous route, and give the enemy an advantage, and then, whilst drawing him out and starting after him, to arrive before him, is to be a master of the art of marching.

So to do is well; but beware of arriving after the enemy, and finding him in position.

Employing our whole force at one time in order to gain advantage over the enemy, we may not have time enough to gain our object. If, with the same object, we push on with the main force only, we may lose the transport. Discarding helmet and armour; stopping neither day nor night; marching double distance; and finally contending with the enemy at a distance of a hundred leagues; leads to the capture of three generals. Since the strong men arrive first, and the tired drop in rear; only one tenth of the forces arrives.

A forced march of fifty miles to secure an advantage, may result in failure to the leader of the vanguard; for only half his men will arrive.

After a forced march of thirty leagues to secure an

advantage, only two-thirds of the army will be available.

Further, a lack of ammunition, of supplies, or of base, may lead to disaster.

The ruler who is ignorant of the designs of neighbouring princes, cannot treat with them.

He who is ignorant of mountain and forest, defile and marsh, cannot conduct a march.

He who does not employ a guide, cannot gain advantage from the ground.

Disguise your movements ; await a favourable opportunity ; divide or unite according to circumstance.

Let your attack be swift as the wind ; your march ordered like the forest ; * your occupation devastating as fire. In defence, as a mountain rest firm ; like darkness impenetrable to the enemy. Let your movements be swift as the lightning.

Let as many as possible take part in the plunder : distribute the profit from the produce of the country.

So he who understands the crooked and the straight way, conquers. That is the art of Battle Tactics.

According to the ancient books on war : the drum and bell are used, because the voice does not carry ; the flag is used to assist the sight. The use of bell, drum, banner, and flag, is to attract the united attention of eye and ear.

When all are united, the strong are not left to go

* This passage was written on the standard of Takeda Shingen, one of Japan's most famous generals.

forward alone, the cowardly are not free to retreat unrestricted. In the simultaneous employment of large numbers lies strength.

Therefore in night fighting, beacons and drums are largely used ; in day fighting, a great number of banners and flags to confound the enemy's eyes and ears.

We thus awe his army, and defeat his general's ambition.

In the morning the spirits are keen ; at midday there is a laziness ; in the evening a desire to return. Wherefore, he who uses his soldiers well, avoids the time when the spirits are keen ; but attacks the enemy when he is tired, or seeking his camp.

This is to have the spirit under control.

He who opposes confusion with order, clamour with quiet, can remain self-possessed.

Those who have long distances to march as opposed to those situated in a convenient neighbourhood are tired, while the latter are at ease. Satiety is opposed to hunger. In this case we have strength at our command.

Do not attack where serried rows of banners shew, nor a regular battle array ; but patiently await your time.

Do not attack an enemy on high ground, nor one who has high ground at his back. Do not pursue an enemy who is imitating flight ; do not attack a spirited enemy.

If the enemy offers an allurement, do not be caught by it.

Do not interfere with an enemy who has struck camp ; and is about to retire. When surrounding an enemy ; allow him an outlet.

This is the method of employing troops.

VIII.

THE NINE SITUATIONS.

Son the Master said :—

In general, the procedure of war is :—the General, having received orders from his lord, assembles the army.

Do not camp on marshy, or low lying ground ; enter into friendly relations with neighbouring states ; do not linger at a distance from the base ; be prepared in mountainous and wooded country ; when reduced to the last extremity, fight.

The general who knows the Nine Situations understands the use of troops ; on the contrary, he who does not understand them, can make no use of his topographical knowledge.

In the management of armies, if the art of the Nine Situations be not understood, a knowledge of the Five Advantages is of no avail.

The wise man perceives clearly wherein lies advantage and disadvantage. While recognising an opportunity, he does not overlook the risks, and saves future anxiety.

In reducing an enemy to submission, inflict all possible damage upon him ; make him undertake useless adventures ; also make neighbouring rulers depend on your good offices.

Wherefore in the conduct of war do not depend on

the enemy's not coming, but rely on your own preparations ; do not count on the enemy not attacking your fortress, but leave nothing undefended.

Generals must be on their guard against these five dangerous faults :—

Blind impetuosity, which leads to death.

Over cautiousness, which leads to capture.

Quick temper, which brings insult.

A too rigid propriety, which invites disgrace.

Over regard for the troops, which causes inconvenience.

With a view to their avoidance, these five dangers must be borne in mind.

IX.

MOVEMENT OF TROOPS.

Son the Master said :—

Touching the disposal of troops and observation of the enemy in relation to mountain warfare :—

Cross mountains and camp in valleys, selecting positions of safety.

Place the army on high ground, and avoid an enemy in high places.

In relation to water :—

After crossing waters, pass on immediately to a distance. When the enemy is crossing a stream, do not meet and engage him. Do not advance on an enemy near water ; but having decided where safety lies, place the army on high ground.

Do not cross rivers in the face of the stream.

With regard to marshes :—

Cross salty marshes quickly ; do not linger near them.

If by chance compelled to fight in the neighbourhood of a marsh, seek a place where there is water and grass, and trees in plenty in the rear.

In open country place the army in a convenient place with rising ground in the right rear ; so that while in front lies death, behind there is safety.

Such is war in flat country.

Kōtei, by observing these things, gained the victory over four Emperors.

As a rule, the soldiers prefer high ground to low. They prefer sunny places to those the sun does not reach.

If the health of the troops be considered, and they are encamped on high and sunny ground, diseases will be avoided, and victory made certain.

If there be rising ground, encamp on its sunny side and in front of it; for thereby the soldiers are benefited, and the ground used to our advantage.

If, owing to rains in the upper reaches, the river becomes turbulent, do not cross until the waters have quieted.

Steep and impassable valleys; well-like places; confined places; tangled impenetrable ground; swamps and bogs; narrow passages with pitfalls;—quickly pass from these, and approach them not. Cause the enemy to approach near to them, but keep yourself from these places; face them, so that the enemy has them in his rear.

If there are near to the army, precipices; ponds; meres; reeds and rushes; or thick forests and trees; search them thoroughly.

These are places where the enemy is likely to be in ambush.

When the enemy is close, but quiet, he is strong in reliance on natural defences.

If the enemy challenges to fight from afar, he wishes you to advance.

If the enemy be encamped in open country, it is with some special object in view.

Movement among the trees shows that the enemy is advancing. Broken branches and trodden grass, as of the passing of a large host, must be regarded with suspicion.

The rising of birds shews an ambush.*

Startled beasts shew that the enemy is stealthily approaching from several sides.

High, straight spurts of dust betoken that chariots are coming.

Long low masses of dust shew the coming of infantry.

Here and there, thin and high columns of dust are signs that firewood and fodder are being collected.

Small clouds of dust moving to and fro are signs that the enemy is preparing to encamp for a short time.

Busy preparations and smooth words shew that the enemy is about to advance to attack.

Big words, and a driving of chariots as if to the attack, are signs that the enemy is about to retire.

An advance of the light chariots to the flanks of the camp is a sign that the enemy is coming forth to fight.

Without consultation, suddenly to desire an armistice, is a mark of ulterior design.

The passing to and fro of messengers, and the forming up of troops, shew that the enemy has some movement on foot.

* Minamoto Yoshiie by remembering this saying gained a celebrated victory, which is often the subject of illustration.

An advance, followed by sudden retirement, is a lure to attack.

When the enemy use their weapons to rest upon, they are hungry.

If the drawers of water drink at the the river, the enemy is suffering from thirst.

Disregard of booty that lies ready at hand is a sign of exhaustion.

The clustering of birds round a position shews that it is unoccupied.

Clamour at night betokens alarm.

Disorder in the army is a sign that the general is disregarded.

A changing about of flags and banners is a sign that the army is unsettled.

If the officers are angry, it is because the soldiers are tired, and slow to obey.

The killing of horses for food shews that the enemy is short of provisions.

When they cast away their cooking-pots, as if with no intention of returning, the soldiers are desperate.

Exceeding graciousness and familiarity on the part of the general shews that he has lost the favour of the soldiers.

Frequent rewards shew that discipline is at an end.

Frequent punishments shew that the army is weary and troubled.

The general who first blusters, and then over-fearful, has faulty information.

He who offers apologies and hostages, is anxious for a truce.

When both sides, eager for a fight, face each other for a considerable time, neither advancing nor retiring, the occasion requires the utmost vigilance and circumspection.

Numbers are no certain mark of strength.

Even if incapable of a headlong assault, if the forces be united, and the enemy's condition ascertained, victory is possible.

He who without taking thought makes light of the enemy, is certain to be captured.

If a general who is strange to the troops punishes them, they cease to obey him. If they are not obedient, they cannot be usefully employed.

If the troops know the general, but are not affected by his punishments, they are useless.

By humane treatment we obtain obedience; authority brings uniformity. Thus we obtain victory.

If the men have been trained in obedience from the beginning, they respect their leader's commands.

If the men are not early trained to obedience, they do not respect their leaders commands.

Orders are always obeyed, if the General and soldiers are in sympathy.

X.

TOPOGRAPHY.

Son the Master said :—

With regard to the different natures of ground there are :—

Open ground ; enveloped ground ; suspended ground ; defiles ; precipices ; far countries.

Open ground is that where either side has liberty of movement : be quick to occupy any high ground in the neighbourhood and consider well the line of supplies.

Hanging ground. Advance is easy, but retreat from it is difficult. Here, if the enemy is not prepared, we may win : but should he be prepared ; and defeat us ; and retreat be impossible ; then there is disaster.

Suspended ground. The side that takes the initiative is under a disadvantage. Here, if the enemy offer some allurement, we should not advance : but rather, by feigning retreat wait until he has put forth half his force. Then we may attack him with advantage.

Defiles, make haste to occupy ; garrison strongly and await the enemy.

Should the enemy be before you, and in strength, do not engage him : but if he has not prepared the position attack him.

In precipitous ground quickly occupy a position on

a sunny height, and await the enemy. If the enemy should be before you, withdraw and do not attack him.

If distant, and separated from the enemy, and the forces are equal, to take the initiative is disadvantageous.

Now, these are the six kinds of ground. Generals in responsible positions must study them in their various relations.

Again, there are six calamities ; arising, not from defect of ground, or lack of opportunity ; but from the general's incapacity.

These are : repulse ; relaxation ; distress ; disorganisation ; confusion ; and rout.

If troops are sent to attack an enemy of equal quality, but ten times their number, they retire discomfited.

Strong soldiers with weak under officers, cause relaxation.

Able officers with feeble soldiers cause distress.

Enraged senior officers, who take the law into their own hands because the general cannot appreciate their ability, produce disorganisation.

Weak and amiable generals, whose directions and leadership are vague ; whose officer's and men's duties are not fixed ; and whose disposition of troops are contradictory ; produce confusion.

Generals, ignorant of the enemy, who oppose small numbers to large ; weakness to strength ; and who do not put picked men in the van of the army ; cause it to be routed.

These six things lead to defeat. It is the duty of the general to study them carefully.

Topography has an important bearing on war.

Knowledge of the enemy; proper calculation of chances of victory; an eye for steepness, command and distances; these are the essentials of the good general.

He who understands the application of these principles, conquers; he who understands them not, is defeated.

If victory is certain from the military standpoint, fight, even if the Lord forbids.

If defeat is certain from the military standpoint, do not fight, even though the Lord commands it.

The general, who advances, from no thought of his own glory, or retires, regardless of punishment; but merely strives for the peoples welfare, and his Lord's advantage, is a treasure to the state.

The good general cares for his soldiers, and lovingly treats them as his children; as a consequence they follow him through deep valleys, and are with him in death.

Nevertheless, overcare for the soldiers may cause disobedience; overattention may make them unserviceable; overindulgence may produce disorder: they become like spoilt children, and cannot be used.

He who is confident of his own men, but is ignorant that the enemy should not be attacked, has no certainty of victory.

He who knows that the enemy may be attacked

with advantage, but knows not that his own men are incompetent, has no certainty of victory.

Confidence in the troops, right judgment when to attack the enemy, but improper appreciation of terrain, bring uncertain victory.

The wise soldier, once in motion, does not waver, and is never at a loss.

As has been said; "Know thyself; know the enemy; fear not for victory."

Also, if the season and the opportunity be realised, and the ground known, complete victory is certain.

XI.

THE NINE TERRAINS.

Son the Master said :—

In respect to the conduct of war there are :—

Distracting ground ; disturbing ground ; ground of contention ; intersecting ground ; path-ridden ground ; deeply involved ground ; difficult ground ; enclosed ground ; death ground.

At all times, when the prince fights in his own territory it is called distracting* ground.

That ground a short way inside the enemy's border is called disturbing ground.

Ground giving advantage to whichever side is in possession, is called ground of contention.

Ground to which either side has access, is called intersecting ground.

The intersection of three provinces from which three peoples can be controlled, is called path-ridden ground.

The interior of the enemy's country with fortified towns in rear, is called deeply involved ground.

Mountain and forest ; precipices ; ravines ; marsh and swamp ; all places where passage is hard, is called difficult ground

A narrow entrance and winding outlet, where a

* This and the following are so called because the men are continually thinking of, and slipping back to their homes.

small number can oppose a large force, is called enclosed ground.

That ground where delay means disaster, is called death ground.

Wherefore, do not fight on distracting ground ; do not linger on disturbing ground.

If the enemy be in possession of disputed ground, do not attack.

In intersecting ground, do not interrupt the highways.

At the crossing of highways cultivate intercourse.

When deeply involved, levy and store up the enemy's property.

Quickly depart from difficult ground.

Enclosed ground requires a careful plan of operations.

On death ground, fight.

The skilful fighters of old were at pains to disconnect the enemy's front and rear ; to prevent cooperation between small and large forces of the enemy ; to prevent mutual help between his officers and men ; and to spread mistrust between the soldiers and those in authority.

Scatter the enemy, and prevent him from concentrating. If there be a chance of victory move ; if there be no chance of success stand fast.

If I were asked how a powerful and united force of the enemy should be met, I would say : lay hands on such of the enemy's possessions as will confound his plans.

In the conduct of war, before all, strike quickly before the enemy is ready; and attack his unpreparedness from an unexpected quarter.

The way to fight in foreign lands. When in the heart of the enemy's country the soldiers' minds are united in the presence of danger, their hosts cannot defeat them. Plunder fertile plains, then the army's provisions are sufficient; be careful of the health of the soldiers; do not tire them uselessly; keep courage; store up strength; plan well and secretly; if there be no refuge the soldiers will not fly from death.

If there be no alternative but death, the soldiers exert themselves to the utmost.

In desperate places, soldiers lose the sense of fear.

If there be no place of refuge, there will be no wavering.

If deeply involved in the enemy's country, there is unity.

If it be unavoidable, the soldiers will fight their hardest.

Even without warnings they are vigilant; they comply without insistence; without restrictions they are tractable; without explicit instructions they will trust the general and obey him.

Prohibit the discussion of signs and omens, and remove the soldiers' doubts; then to the moment of death they will be undistracted.

Our soldiers are poor, not because they hate money; they court danger, not because they dislike long life.

When the order for attack is given, the collars of

those who are sitting with bowed heads may be wet with tears; tears may roll down the cheeks of those reclining; but these men when in a desperate place, will fight with the courage of Sho Kwai.

Soldiers should be used like the snakes on Mt. Tosan; which, if you hit on the head, the tail will strike you; if you hit the tail, the head will strike you; if you strike its middle, head and tail will strike you together.

Should any one ask me whether men can be made to move like these snakes, I say, yes. The men of Go and Etsu hate each other; but if they cross a river in a boat and a storm overtake them, they help each other like the two hands.

The horses may be tied, and the chariot wheels sunk in the mud; but that does not prevent flight.

Universal courage, and unity of the soldiers, depend on good management.

To get the best results from both weak and strong depends upon the nature of the situation.

Under such conditions, it is quite natural that the skilful should lead his men where he will, as it were by the hand.

The qualities of a good general are, calmness and justice; and from these spring inscrutability and good government. The general keeps his officers and men in ignorance of his plans, and informs no one of any changes or fresh departures. By changing his camps, and taking devious and unexpected routes, his plans cannot be guessed.

As one taking away the ladder from under those mounted upon the roof, so acts the general when his men are assembled to fight.

When far involved in a hostile country, he cuts off his paths of retreat; thus the men have nothing left but to fight. He burns his boats, and breaks his cooking pots, and drives the army hither and thither like a flock of sheep, knowing not whither they go.

Therefore the general should assemble the armies, and place them in a desperate position.

The different natures of the nine grounds; the suiting of the means to the occasion; the hearts of men; these are things which must be studied.

When deep in the interior of a hostile country, there is cohesion; if only on the borders, there is distraction.

Wherefore on distracting ground, concentrate the soldiers thoughts.

On disturbing ground, keep in close order.

In disputed ground, try to take the enemy in rear.

In intersecting ground, use caution as regards defences.

In path ridden ground, cultivate intercourse.

In deeply involved, ground, be careful of supplies.

In difficult ground, hurry away.

In enclosed ground, reject an opening offered by the enemy.

On death ground, make it plain that without fighting there is no chance of survival.

Wherefore if the soldiers are surrounded, their

hearts are in the defence. When compelled thereto, they fight with energy.

When in a position of great danger they are easily led.

He who knows not the ambitions of other rulers, cannot make profitable alliances with them.

He who knows not mountain and forest; cliffs; ravines; lakes and marshes; cannot conduct an army.

He who uses not guides, cannot draw advantage from the locality.

He who has not a complete knowledge of the Nine Grounds, cannot rise superior to neighbouring rulers.

An able ruler, when attacking an important state, can prevent the enemy from concentrating his forces.

If he exercise his influence, other states cannot join against him.

He does not struggle for the favour of other states.

He does not give support to them (with a view to subsequent benefits). He has confidence in himself, and awes the enemy with his influence.

Therefore he easily takes the fortress, or reduces the country to subjection.

In the bestowal of rewards, or in his orders, he is not bound by ancient rule.

He manages his forces as though they were one man.

Orders should not reveal the plan of the leader; nor should the soldiers be informed of any accompanying risks.

If the forces be plunged into danger, there is sur-

vival ; from death ground there is retrieval ; for the force in danger, gains victory and defeats the enemy.

Discover the enemy's precise intentions by yielding tactics. When discovered, then, with one stroke, the general may be killed, even though he be one hundred leagues distant.

When war is declared, close the barriers ; destroy passports ; prevent the passage of the enemy's spies ; conduct the business of the Government with vigilance.

Take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness ; quickly invade his country ; and try to seize the places which he most values.

Shape your plans according to rule, and the circumstances of the enemy.

At first behave with the discretion of a maiden ; then, when the enemy gives an opening, dart in like a rabbit.

The enemy cannot defend himself.

XII.

ASSAULT BY FIRE.

Son the Master said :—

There are five ways of attack by fire :

The first is called barrack burning ; the second, Store depot burning ; the third, commissariat burning ; the fourth, Armoury and store house burning ; the fifth, the company burning.

Fire assault requires an incendiary. Further ; appliances must always be kept at hand.

There is a time and day proper for the setting and carrying out of the fire assault ; namely : such time as the weather is dry ; and a day when the moon is in the quarters of the stars Ki-Heki Yoku Chin : for these are days of wind.

Regard well the five burnings in their various relations. When fire breaks out in the enemy's lines, thrust upon him with all speed.

If fire breaks out in the enemy's camp, but his soldiers are quiet, wait, and do not attack.

When fully satisfied that the fire is at its height, attack or not, as it may seem fit unto you.

If the opportunity be favourable, set fire to the outside of the enemy's camp, without waiting for the fire to originate.

When fire breaks out on the windward side, do not attack from the leeward.

Wind that rises in the day lasts long. Wind that rises in the night time quickly passes away.

If the peculiarities of the five burnings are known, and the almanac studied, then, when the army brings fire to the attack, victory is clear.

The attack assisted by water is strong.

Water may be used to divide the enemy in two ; but it only causes him temporary inconvenience. For, a victory or a capture which has no important results, and from which the enemy quickly recovers, is to be condemned. The war drags on, and money is spent.

Let the enlightened Lord consider well ; and the good general keep the main object in view. If no advantage is to be gained thereby do not move ; without prospect of victory, do not use the soldiers ; fight not unless the country be endangered.

War should not be undertaken because the Lord is in a moment of passion. The general must not fight nursing passion in his heart.

Do not make war unless victory may be gained thereby ; if there be prospect of victory move, if there is no prospect do not move.

For anger may change to gladness, passion to joy : but a country once overturned, cannot be restored ; the dead cannot be brought to life.

Wherefore, the enlightened Lord is circumspect, and the good general takes good heed ; then is the country tranquil, and the army preserved intact.

XIII.

THE EMPLOYMENT OF SPIES.

Son the Master said :—

Calling 10,000 men to arms, and transporting them a hundred leagues, is such that in one day 1,000 taels of the citizens' and state's money are spent ; domestic and foreign complications arise ; industrial pursuits are neglected on the line of march of the army ; and the occupations of 70,000* homes are upset.

Again, for years the armies may face each other ; yet the issue may depend on a single day's victory.

Wherefore, by grudging slight expense in titles† and salaries to spies, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's circumstances, is the personification of cruelty. Such a person is no general ; he is no assistance to his lord ; he is no master of victory.

The enlightened ruler and the able general who act, win, and are distinguished beyond the common, are informed beforehand.

* The population was divided for military purposes into groups of 8 families, from which, in time of war, one was taken, wherefore if 10,000 men are taken, 70,000 homes are affected.

In Japan the unit was five, and a survival of this exists today. When moving into a new house presents of *soba* are sent to the two adjoining and three opposite houses—"Mukosangen, Ryodonari."

† This shows the importance and respect which spies were regarded. Spies toiled for years in the enemy's service waiting their opportunity, and instances are known of their obtaining high rank and office without discovery.

A spy was not infrequently a priest.

This knowledge is not to be got by calling on gods and demons; nor does it come of past experience; nor calculation. It is through men that knowledge of the enemy is gained.

Now the five kinds of spies are these; local spies, inner spies, converted spies, death spies, living spies.

If these five means be employed simultaneously, none can discover their working. It is called the Mysterious Thread: it is the Lord's Treasure.

Social spies are such people of the country as give information.

Inner spies are those of the enemy's officials employed by us.

Converted spies are those of the enemy's spies in our pay.

Death* spies are sent to misinform the enemy; and to spread false reports through our spies already in the enemy's lines.

Living spies return to report.

In connection with the main army, spies should be treated with the greatest confidence; and in dealing out reward, they should receive the most generous treatment. All matters relating to spies are secret.

Without infinite capacity in the general, the employment of spies is impossible. Their treatment requires benevolence and uprightness. Except they be treated

* So called because they are put to death when the enemy finds out that he has been tricked.

with the nicest discretion, the truth will not be obtained from them.

There is no occasion when they cannot be used.

If a secret matter be spoken of before the time is ripe, the spy who told the matter, and the man who repeated the same, should be put to death.

If desirous of attacking an army; of besieging a fortress; or of killing a certain person; first of all, learn the names of the general in charge; of his right-hand* men; of those who introduce visitors to the Presence; of the gate keeper and the sentries. Then set the spies to watch them.

Seek out the enemy's spies who come to spy on us; give them money; cause them to be lodged and cared for; and convert them to the service. Through them we are enabled to obtain spies among the enemy's villagers and officials.

By means of the converted spy, we can construct a false story for the death spy to carry to the enemy.

It is through the converted spy that we are able to use the five varieties, to their utmost advantage; therefore he must be liberally treated.

In ancient times the rise to power of the province of In was due to Ishi, who was of the country of Ka. Likewise Ryoga (Taikōbō) of the province of In, was of the greatest help to the country of Shu.

Wherefore, intelligent rulers and wise generals

* Literally, right and left men, i.e. they who sat on either side.


use the cleverest men as spies, and invariably acquire great merit. The spy is a necessity to the army. Upon him the movement of the army depends.


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