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“ Ἀρχὴ τῆς παιδείας ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπίσκεψις.”—*Epictetus*.

“ Nomina si nescis, perit et cognitio rerum.”

“ He has been at a great feast of languages, and stolen the scraps.

O! they have lived long in the alms-basket of words.”

Love's Labours Lost, Act v., Sc. 1.

“ If we knew the original of all the words we meet with, we should thereby be very much helped to know the ideas they were first applied to, and made to stand for.”—*Locke*.

“ In a language like ours, so many words of which are derived from other languages, there are few modes of instruction more useful or more amusing than that of accustoming young people to seek the etymology or primary meaning of the words they use. There are cases in which more knowledge, of more value, may be conveyed by the history of a word than by the history of a campaign.”—*Coleridge's Aids to Reflection*, Aphor. 12.

“ In words contemplated singly, there are boundless stores of moral and historic truth.”—*Trench on Study of Words*, 12mo, Lond., 1853.

“ Jock Ashler, the stane-mason that ca's himsell an arkiteck—there's nae living for new words in this new warld neither, and that's anither vex to auld folks such as me.”—Quoth Meg Dods (*St. Ronan's Well*, chap. 2).

“ A good dictionary is the best metaphysical treatise.”

“ Etymology, in a moderate degree, is not only useful, as assisting the memory, but highly instructive and pleasing. But if pushed so far as to refer all words to a few primary elements, it loses all its value. It is like pursuing heraldry up to the first pair of mankind.”—*Copleston's Remains*, p. 101.

THE
VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY,

MENTAL, MORAL, AND METAPHYSICAL;

WITH

QUOTATIONS AND REFERENCES;

FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS.

BY

WILLIAM FLEMING, D.D.,

PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW.

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PREFACE.

THE aim of the following work, as its title indicates, is humble. It is not proposed to attempt an adequate illustration of the difficult and important topics denoted or suggested by the several vocables which are successively explained. All that is intended is, to assist the student towards a right understanding of the language of philosophy, and a right apprehension of the questions in discussing which that language has been employed. Instead of affixing a positive or precise signification to the vocables and phrases, it has been thought better to furnish the student with the means of doing so for himself—by showing whence they are derived, or of what they are compounded, and how they have been employed. In like manner, the quotations and references have not been selected with the view of supporting any particular system of philosophy, but rather with the view of leading to free inquiry, extended reading, and careful reflection, as the surest means of arriving at true and sound conclusions.

In our Scottish Universities, the study of philosophy is entered upon by those who, in respect of maturity of

years and intellect, and in respect of previous preparation and attainment, differ widely from one another. To many, a help like the present may not be necessary. To others, the author has reason to think it may be useful. Indeed, it was the felt want of some such help, in the discharge of professional duty, which prompted the attempt to supply it. The labour has been greater than the result can indicate or measure. But should THE VOCABULARY assist the young student by directing him what to read, and how to understand what he reads, in philosophy, the labourer shall have received the hire for which he wrought.

THE COLLEGE, GLASGOW,

Nov., 1856.

THE
VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY.

ABILITY and INABILITY—(NATURAL and MORAL).

Ability (Nat.) is power to do certain acts, in consequence of being possessed of the requisite means, and being unrestrained in their exercise; thus we say ability to walk, the power of seeing, &c.

Inability (Nat.) is the opposite of this; as when we say of a blind man, he cannot or is unable to see; or when an object is too distant, we say we are unable to see it.

Ability (Mor.) is the disposition to use rightly the powers and opportunities which God has given, as when it is written, "It is a joy to the just to do judgment."

Inability (Mor.) is the want of a right disposition, as in those of whom it is written, "They have eyes full of adultery, and *cannot* cease from sin." "If there is anything besides want of inclination which prevents a man from performing a particular act, he is said to be *naturally* unable to do it. If unwillingness is the only obstacle in the way, he is said to be *morally* unable. That which prevents a man from doing *as he will*, is *natural inability*. That which prevents him from doing *as he ought*, is *moral inability*."—Day, *On the Will*, pp. 96, 97.

This distinction is much insisted on by theologians. *Natural inability*, according to some, excuses from *moral obligation*. *Moral inability* is the ground of condemnation.

ABILITY—

Thus, the heathen *cannot* hear the gospel, for no preacher has been sent to them; and their not hearing is not sin. But to the Jews our Lord said, “*Why cannot ye hear my speech? Even because ye cannot hear my word.*”

See this distinction upheld by Baxter (*Cath. Theol.*, book i. and book iii., and *Meth.*, pars iii., c. 25), and impugned by Tappan (*Doctrine of the Will, applied to Moral Agency*, chap. iii., sect. 5; *Doctrine of the Will as determined by Consciousness*, chap. vii., sect. 3).

ABSOLUTE (*Absolutum*, from *ab* and *solvere*, to free or loose from)—signifies what is free from restriction or limit.

“We must know what is to be meant by *absolute* or *absoluteness*; whereof I find two main significations. First, *absolute* signifieth *perfect*, and *absoluteness*, *perfection*; hence we have in Latin this expression—*Perfectum est omnibus numeris absolutum*. And in our vulgar language we say a thing is *absolutely* good when it is *perfectly* good. Next, *absolute* signifieth *free from tie or bond*, which in Greek is *απολελυμενον*.”—Knox, *Hist. of Reform.*, pref.

“I fear

My soul hath her content so *absolute*
That not another comfort like to this
Succeeds in unknown fate.”—*Othello*.

1. As meaning what is complete or perfect in itself, as a man, a tree, it is opposed to what is relative.

2. As meaning what is free from restriction, it is opposed to what exists *secundum quid*. The soul of man is immortal *absolutely*; man is immortal *only* as to his soul.

3. As meaning what is underived, it denotes self-existence, and is predicable only of the First Cause.

4. It signifies not only what is free from external cause, but also free from *condition*.

“O! pass not, Lord, an *absolute* decree,
Or bind thy sentence *unconditional*!
But in thy sentence our remorse foresee,
And in that foresight this thy doom recall.”

Dryden, *Annus Mirabilis*.

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“He means an infallibility *absolute*, antecedent, *unconditionate*, such as will not permit the church to err.”—Jeremy Taylor, *Dissuasive from Popery*, part 2, introd.

According to Sir William Hamilton (*Discussions*, p. 13), “The *unconditioned* denotes the genus of which the *infinite* and the *absolute* are the species.”

As to our knowledge or conception of the *absolute*, there are different opinions.

1. According to Sir William Hamilton, “The mind can conceive, and consequently can know, only the limited, and the *conditionally* limited. The *unconditionally unlimited*, or the *infinite*, the *unconditionally limited*, or the *absolute*, cannot positively be construed to the mind; they can be conceived at all only by thinking away, or abstraction of those very conditions under which thought itself is realized; consequently the notion of the *unconditioned* is only negative—negative of the conceivable itself.”

2. According to Kant, the *absolute* or *unconditioned* is not an object of knowledge; but its notion as a regulative principle of the mind itself, is more than a mere negation of the conditioned.

3. According to Schelling, it is cognizable, but not conceivable; it can be known by a sinking back into identity with the Absolute, but is incomprehensible by consciousness and reflection, which are only of the relative and the different.

4. According to Cousin, it is cognizable and conceivable by consciousness and reflection, under relation, difference, and plurality.

Instead of saying that God is *absolute* and *infinite*, Krause, and his admirer, Tiberghien (*Essai des Connaissances Humaines*, pp. 738, 745), ascribe to Him *Sèité* (*selbheit*) and Totality. Totality or the Infinite manifests itself everywhere in nature. *Nature* is made up of wholes, and all these constitute one whole. In *spirit* everything

ABSOLUTE—

manifests itself under the character of spontaneity or *sèité*. *Spirit* always is what it is by its own individual efforts.

All philosophy aims at a knowledge of the absolute under different phases. In psychology, the fundamental question is, have we ideas that are *à priori* and absolute?—in logic, is human knowledge absolute?—in ethics is the moral law absolute rectitude?—and in metaphysics, what is the ultimate ground of all existence or absolute being?

See *Edinburgh Review* for October, 1829; Sir William Hamilton (*Discussions*); Tiberghien (*Essai des Connaissances Humaines*); Whately (*Logic*, book ii., chapter 5, sect. 1).—*V. INFINITE, UNCONDITIONED.*

ABSTINENCE (*abs tenēre*, to hold from or off,)—"is whereby a man refraineth from anything which he may lawfully take."—Elyot, *Governour*, b. iii., c. 16.

Abstinence is voluntarily refraining from things which nature, and especially physical nature, needs or delights in, for a moral or religious end. It corresponds to the *Ἀπεχου* of the precept of Epictetus, *Ἀνεχου και απεχου*; *Sustine et abstine*. The Stoics inculcated abstinence in order to make the soul more independent of the body and the things belonging to the body.—Christian abstinence is founded in humility and self-mortification.—*V. ASCETICISM.*

ABSTRACT, ABSTRACTION (*Abstractio*, from *abs trahere*, to draw away from; in Greek *αφαιρεσις*, is also called *separatio* and *resolutio*).

Abstraction is leaving some things out of consideration and attending to others.—S. Bailey, *Letters on Phil. of Human Mind*, p. 87.

Dobrisch observes that the term *abstraction* is used sometimes in a psychological, sometimes in a logical sense. In the former, we are said to abstract the attention from certain distinctive features of objects presented (*abstrahere [mentem] a differentiis*). In the latter, we are said to abstract certain portions of a given concept from the remainder (*abstrahere differentias*).—Mansell, *Prolegomena Log.*, note, p. 26.

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Abstraction (Psychological), says Mr. Stewart (*Elements of the Philosophy of Human Mind*, chap. iv.), “is the power of considering certain qualities or attributes of an object apart from the rest; or, as I would rather choose to define it, the power which the understanding has of separating the combinations which are presented to it.” Perhaps it may be more correctly regarded as a *process* rather than a *power*—as a *function* rather than a *faculty*. Dr. Reid has called it (*Intell. Powers*, essay v., chap. 3) “an *operation* of the understanding. It consists in the resolving or analyzing a subject (object) into its known attributes, and giving a name to each attribute, which shall signify that attribute and nothing more.” Attributes are not presented to us singly in nature, but in the *concrete* or growing together, and it is by *abstraction* that we consider them separately. In looking at a tree we may perceive simultaneously its trunk, and its branches, and its leaves, and its fruit; or we may contemplate any one of these to the exclusion of all the rest; and when we do so it is by the operation of mind which has been called *abstraction*. It implies an exercise of will as well as of understanding; for there must be the determination and effort to fix the energy of the mind on the attribute specially contemplated.

The chemist really separates into their elements those bodies which are submitted to his analysis. The psychologist does the same thing mentally. Hence *abstraction* has been distinguished as *real* and *mental*. But as the object presented to the psychologist may be an object of sense or an object of thought, the process of *abstraction* may be either *real* or *mental*. He may pluck off a branch from a tree, or a leaf from a branch, in order to consider the sensation or perception which is occasioned in him. And in contemplating mind, he may think of its capacity of feeling without thinking of its power of activity, or of the faculty of memory apart from any or all of the other faculties with which it is allied.

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Abstraction (Logical), “As we have described it,” says Mr. Thomson (*Outline of the Laws of Thought*, p. 107), “would include three separate acts: first, an act of *comparison*, which brings several intuitions together; next, one of *reflection*, which seeks for some marks which they all possess, and by which they may be combined into one group; and last, one of *generalization*, which forms the new general notion or conception. Kant, however, confines the name of *abstraction* to the last of the three; others apply it to the second. It is not of much consequence whether we enlarge or narrow the meaning of the word, so long as we see the various steps of the process. The word means a drawing away of the common marks from all the distinctive marks which the single objects have.”

“The process,” says Dr. Whately (*Logic*, book i., sect. 6), “by which the mind arrives at the notions expressed by ‘common’ (or in popular language, ‘general’) terms is properly called ‘generalization,’ though it is usually (and truly) said to be the business of *abstraction*; for generalization is one of the purposes to which *abstraction* is applied. When we draw off and *contemplate separately* any part of an object presented to the mind, disregarding the rest of it, we are said to *abstract* that part of it. Thus, a person might, when a rose was before his eye or his mind, make the scent a distinct object of attention, laying aside all thought of the colour, form, &c.; and thus, even though it were the *only* rose he had ever met with, he would be employing the faculty of *abstraction*; but if, in contemplating several objects, and finding that they agree in certain points, we abstract the circumstances of agreement, disregarding the differences, and give to all and each of these objects a name applicable to them in respect of this agreement,—*i. e.*, a *common* name, as ‘rose;’ or, again, if we give a name to some attribute wherein they agree, as ‘fragrance,’ or ‘redness,’ we are then said to ‘generalize.’ *Abstraction*, therefore, does not necessarily

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imply *generalization*, though *generalization* implies *abstraction*."

"A person who had never seen but one rose," says Mr. Stewart (Addenda to vol. i., *Phil. of Hum. Mind*), "might yet have been able to consider its *colour* apart from its other qualities; and, therefore, there may be such a thing as an idea which is at once *abstract* and *particular*. After having perceived this quality as belonging to a variety of individuals, we can consider it without reference to any of them, and thus form the notion of redness or whiteness in general, which may be called a general abstract idea. The words *abstract* and *general*, therefore, when applied to ideas, are as completely distinct from each other as any two words to be found in the language. It is indeed true, that the formation of every general notion presupposes *abstraction*, but it is surely improper, on this account, to call a *general* term an *abstract* term, or a *general* idea an *abstract* idea."

Mr. John S. Mill also censures severely (*Logic*, vol. i., 2d edition, p. 35) the practice of applying the expression "abstract name" to all names which are the result of *abstraction* or *generalization*, and consequently to all general names, instead of confining it to the names of attributes. He uses the term *abstract* as opposed to *concrete*. By an abstract name he means the name of an attribute—by a concrete name the name of an object. The sea is a concrete name. Saltness is an abstract name. Some abstract names are general names, such as colour; but rose-colour, a name obtained by abstraction, is not a general name.

"By *abstract* terms, which should be carefully distinguished from *general* names, I mean those which do not designate any object or event, or any class of objects or events, but an attribute or quality belonging to them, and which are capable of standing grammatically detached, without being joined to other terms: such as, the words roundness, swiftness, length, innocence, equity, health,

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whiteness.”—S. Bailey, *Letters on Phil. Human Mind*, p. 195.

“When the notion derived from the view taken of any object,” says Dr. Whately (*Logic*, book ii., chap. 5, sect. 1), “is expressed with a reference to, or as in conjunction with, the object that furnished the notion, it is expressed by a *concrete* term; as ‘foolish’ or ‘fool;’ when without any such reference by an *abstract* term, as ‘folly.’” And he adds in a note, “It is unfortunate that some writers have introduced the fashion of calling all *common* terms *abstract* terms.”

A French philosopher has expressed himself on this point to the following effect:—“In every class, genus or species, there are two things which may be conceived distinctly, the objects united in the class, and the characters which serve to unite them. Hence it follows, that under every term which represents that ideal whole which we call *genus*, under the term ‘bird,’ for example, there are two different ideas,—the idea of the number of the objects united, and the idea of the common characters; this is what is called the *extension* and the *comprehension* of general terms. Sometimes there is a word to denote the *extension*, and another word to denote the *comprehension*; as ‘mortals’ ‘and mortality.’ And this has led some philosophers to say that there are general ideas which are *concrete*, and general ideas which are *abstract*—the latter referring only to the qualities which are common, and the former to the qualities and to the objects which possess them.”

“The mind,” says Mr. Locke (*Essay on Hum. Under.*, book ii., chap. 11, sect. 9), “makes particular ideas received from particular objects to become general, which is done by considering them as they are in the mind such appearances, separate from all other existences, and the circumstances of real existence, as time, place, or any other concomitant ideas. This is called *abstraction*, whereby ideas taken from particular beings, become general representatives of all of the same kind; and

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their names *general* names, applicable to whatever exists conformable to such *abstract* ideas.”—See also book iv., chap. 7, sect. 9.

In reference to this, Bishop Berkeley has said (*Principles of Hum. Know.*, introd., sect. 10), “I own myself able to *abstract* ideas, in one sense, as when I consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which, though they are united in some object, yet it is possible they may really exist without them. But I deny that I can *abstract* one from another, or conceive separately those qualities which it is impossible should exist separately; or that I can frame a general notion by *abstracting* from particulars, as aforesaid, which two last are the proper acceptation of *abstraction*.”

“It seems to me,” says Mr. Hume (*Essays*, p. 371, n. c. edit., 1758), “not impossible to avoid these absurdities and contradictions” (see his *Essay on Sceptical Philosophy*), “if it be admitted that there are no such things as abstract in general ideas, properly speaking, but that all general ideas are in reality particular ones attached to a general term which recalls, upon occasion, other particular ones that resemble in certain circumstances the idea present to the mind. Thus, when the term ‘horse’ is pronounced, we immediately figure to ourselves the idea of a black or white animal of a particular size or figure; but as that term is also used to be applied to animals of other colours, figures, and sizes, their ideas, though not actually present to the imagination, are easily recalled, and our reasoning and conclusion proceed in the same way as if they were actually present.”

In reference to the views of Berkeley and Hume, which are supported by S. Bailey in *Letters on Phil. Hum. Mind*, see Dr. Reid (*Essays on Intellectual Powers*, Essay v., chap. 6).

The Rev. Sidney Smith (*Lectures on Mor. Phil.*, lect. iii.) mentions an essay on *Abstraction* by Dumarsais, and

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calls it an admirable abridgment of Locke's *Essay*.—V.
COMMON, CONCRETE, GENERALIZATION.

Abstractive (Knowledge) and Intuitive.

The knowledge of the Deity has been distinguished into *abstractive* and *intuitive*, or knowledge of simple *intelligence* and knowledge of *vision*, or immediate beholding. By the former mode of knowing, God knows all things possible, whether they are actually to happen or not. By the latter He knows things future as if they were actually beheld or envisaged by him.—Baronius, *Metaphys.*, sect. xii., disput. 2.

ABSURD (*ab surdo*, a reply from a deaf man who has not heard what he replies to, or that which should be heard with deaf ears)—properly means that which is logically contradictory; as, a triangle with four sides. What is contrary to experience merely cannot be called *absurd*, for experience extends only to facts and laws which we know; but there may be facts and laws which we have not observed and do not know, and facts and laws not actually manifested may yet be possible.

Absurdum (Reductio ad)—A mode of reasoning which was so called by Aristotle. In those sciences which depend upon definition and demonstration, as geometry, there is nothing intermediate between what is true and what can be shown to be self-contradictory or absurd. Hence it is that in geometry this mode of reasoning is much employed, by which, instead of demonstrating what is asserted, everything which contradicts that assertion is shown to be absurd. For if everything which contradicts a proposition be absurd or unthinkable, the proposition itself must be accepted as true. In other sciences, however, which do not depend upon definition, nor proceed by demonstration, the supposable and the false find a place between what is true and what is absurd.

ACADEMICS.—“There are some philosophers who have made denying their profession, and who have even established on

ACADEMICS—

that foundation the whole of their philosophy; and amongst these philosophers, some are satisfied with denying certainty, admitting at the same time probability, and these are the *new academics*; the others, who are the *pyrronhists*, have denied even this probability, and have maintained that all things are equally certain and uncertain.”—*Port Roy. Logic*, part iv., chap. 1.

The name is derived from the garden of Academus, in which Plato taught.

The Academic school embraces a period of four ages, from Plato to Antiochus. Some admit three academies—first, that of Plato, 388 B.C.; middle, that of Arcesilas, 244 B.C.; new, that of Carneades and Clitomachus, 160 B.C. To these some add a fourth, that of Philon and Charmides, and a fifth, that of Antiochus. But Plato and his true disciples, Speusippus and Xenocrates, should not be classed with these semi-sceptics, whose characteristic doctrine was *το πιθανον*, or the probable.

See Foucher (*Dissertatio de Phil. Academic.*, 12, Paris, 1692); Gerlach (*Commentatio Exhibens de Probabilitate Disputationes* 4, Goett.)

ACATALEPSY (α , privative; and *καταληψις*, *comprehensio*, incomprehensibility)—is the term employed by Bacon (*Adv. of Learning*, Moffet's Trans., p. 140) to denote the doctrine held by the ancient academics and sceptics that human knowledge never amounts to certainty, but only to probability. “Their chief error,” says Bacon, “lay in this, that they falsely charged the perceptions of the senses; by doing which they tore up the sciences by the roots. But the senses, though they may often either deceive or fail us, yet can afford a sufficient basis for real science.” Hence he says (*Novum Organum*, b. i., aphor. 126), “We do not meditate or propose *acatalepsy*, but *euacatalepsy*, for we do not derogate from sense, but help it, and we do not despise the understanding, but direct it.” Arcesilas, chief of the second Academy, taught that we know nothing with certainty, in opposition to the dogmatism of the Stoics,

ACATALEPSY—

who taught *καταληψις*, or the possibility of seizing the truth. All Sceptics and Pyrrhonians were called Acataleptics.—*V. ACADEMICS.*

ACCIDENT (*accidere*, to happen; in Greek, *συμβεβηκος*, contingent)—is a modification or quality which does not essentially belong to a thing, nor form one of its constituent and invariable attributes; as motion in relation to matter, or heat to iron. The scholastic definition of it is *ens entis*, or *ens in alio*, while substance was defined to be *ens per se*.

Aristotle (*Metaphys.*, lib. vi.) says, “Suppose that in digging a trench to plant a tree you found a treasure, that is *accident*, for the one is neither the effect nor the consequent of the other; and it is not ordinarily that in planting a tree you find a treasure. If, then, a thing happen to any being, even with the circumstances of place and time, but which has no cause to determine its being, either actually, or in such a place, that thing is an *accident*. An *accident*, then, has no cause determinate, but only fortuitous; but a fortuitous cause is undetermined. *Accident* is also that which exists in an object without being one of the characters distinctive of its essence; such is the property of a triangle that its three angles are equal* to two right angles. Such *accidents* may be eternal; *accidents* properly so called are not.”

A *phenomenon* may be constant, inherent in the nature of things, and in that sense essential, as the sparkling of the diamond in light, or the sinking of a stone in the water; but an *accident*, according to Aristotle, is that which neither occurs necessarily nor ordinarily.

“*Accident*, in its widest technical sense (equivalent to *attribute*), is anything that is attributed to another, and can only be conceived as belonging to some substance (in which sense it is opposed to *substance*); in its narrower and

* You do not define a triangle as a figure whose three angles are equal to two right angles; this is shown by demonstration.

ACCIDENT—

more properly logical sense, it is a predicable which may be present or absent, the essence of the species remaining the same; as for a man to be 'walking,' or 'a native of Paris.' Of these two examples, the former is what logicians call a *separable* accident, because it may be separated from the *individual* (e. g., he may sit down); the latter is an *inseparable* accident, being not separable from the individual (i. e., he who is a native of Paris can never be otherwise); *from the individual*, I say, because *every accident* must be separable from the *species*, else it would be a property."—Whately, *Logic*, book ii., chap. 5, sect. 4, and index.—V. SUBSTANCE, PHENOMENON.

ACROAMATICAL (from *ακροασθαι*, to hear).—"Aristotle was wont to divide his lectures and readings into *Acroamatical* and *Exoterical*: some of them contained only choice matter, and they were read privately to a select auditory; others contained but ordinary stuff, and were promiscuously and in public, exposed to the hearing of all that would."—Hales, *Golden Remains* (on John xviii. 36).—V. EXOTERIC.

"In the life of Aristotle, by Mr. Blakesley" (published in the *Encyclop. Metrop.*), "it has been shown, we think most satisfactorily, that the *acroamatic* treatises of Aristotle differed from the *exoteric*, not in the abstruseness or mysteriousness of their subject-matter, but in this, that the one formed part of a course or system, while the other were casual discussions or lectures on a particular thesis."—*Mor. and Met. Phil.*, by Maurice, note, p. 165.

Some of the early Fathers adopted a similar distinction, in giving instructions to the Catechumens, beginners (*κατα ηχος*, according to sound—*viva voce* instruction), and the Teleioi (finished, or thoroughly instructed, from *τελος*, an end).

This corresponds to the difference between the written law and the traditions of the elders.

Plutarch (in *Alexand.*) and Aulus Gellius (l. xx., c. 4)

ACROAMATICAL—

maintain that the *acroamatic* works had natural philosophy and logic for their subjects, whereas the *exoteric* treated of rhetoric, ethics, and politics. Strabo (l. 13, p. 608), Cicero (*ad Atticum*, 13, 19), and Ammonius Herm. (*ad Categor. Aristot.*), maintain that they were distinguished, not by difference of subject, but of form; the *acroamatic* being discourses, the *exoteric* dialogues. Simplicius (*ad Categor. in Proem.*) thus characterizes the *acroamatic* in contradistinction to the *exoteric* works, "distinguished by pregnant brevity, closeness of thought, and quickness of transitions," from his more expanded, more perspicuous, and more popular productions.

Aristotle's lectures were of two kinds: scientific and popular; *acroamatic* or *acroatic*, and *exoteric*. The former were for the more advanced students and those who were capable of pursuing scientific subjects; he delivered these in the morning. The latter were afternoon lectures to a much larger class, and treated of popular subjects, rhetoric, politics, and sophistics.—Lewes, *Biograph. Phil.*, vol. ii., p. 107.

Buhle has a *Commentatio de Libris Arist.*, Exot. et Acroam., in his edit. of the works of Aristotle, 5 vols., 8vo, Deux Ponts, 1791, pp. 142, 143.

ACT.—An act is *Immanent* or *Transient*. An *immanent* act has no effect on anything out of the agent. Sensation is an *immanent* act of the senses, cognition of the intellect. A *transient* act produces an operation or result out of and beyond the agent. The *act* of writing and of building are *transient* acts—they begin with the agent, but produce results which may affect others.

An act of the will is *Elicit* or *Imperate*. An *elicit* act of will is an act produced immediately by the will, and contained within it, as *velle* and *nolle*, to determine to do or not to do. An *elicit* act of will is either *volition*, which has reference to an end or ultimate object, or *election*, which has reference to means.—V. VOLITION, ELECTION.

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An *imperate* act of will is a movement of body or mind following on a determination of will, as running after or running away, attending or not attending. Also an act done by others, when we order or forbid them to do, encourage or dissuade, assist or prevent.

Act in Metaphysics and in Logic is opposed to *power*. *Power* is simply a faculty or property of anything, as gravity of bodies. *Act* is the exercise or manifestation of a power or property, the realization of a fact, as the falling of a heavy body. We cannot conclude from *power* to *act*, *a posse ad actum*, but from *act* to *power* the conclusion is good.

Actions in Morals are distinguished, according to the manner of their being called forth, into spontaneous or instinctive, voluntary or reflective, and free or deliberate; according to the faculty from which they proceed, into physical, intellectual, and moral; and according to the nature of the action and character of the agent, into right and wrong, virtuous or vicious, praiseworthy or blameworthy.

Acts are *perfect*, when done for themselves without respect to some other act, and *imperfect*, when directed to another act.

Action.—"The word *action* is properly applied to those exertions which are consequent on volition, whether the exertion be made on external objects, or be confined to our mental operations. Thus we say the mind is active when engaged in study."—Stewart, *Outlines*, No. 111.

Leibnitz (*Nouv. Essais*, liv. ii., sect. 72) says, "There are only two kinds of *action* of which we have any idea, viz., movement and thinking."

Action and Act are not synonymous. 1. *Act* does not necessarily imply an external result, *action* does. We may speak of repentance as an *act*, we could not call it an *action*. 2. An *act* must be *individual*; we may speak of a *course of action*. Lastly, *act*, when qualified, is oftener, though not universally coupled with another substantive:

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action always by an adjective preceding it. We say a *kind action*, but an *act of kindness*. A *kind act* might be admissible, though not usual, but an *action of kindness* is not used, though an *action of great kindness* might be. *Deed* is synonymous with *act*.

An *action* was considered by Aristotle (*Ethic. Nicom.*, lib. vii., c. 3) as a practical syllogism:—"As for instance, a person knows that dry food is good for every man, and that *this* is a man, or that such and such a thing is dry; but as to whether this is such and such a thing either he does not possess the knowledge, or does not use it."

In Morals, conscience gives the law; this *action* is or is not conform to it—then comes the conclusion.

Active.—That which causes change is *active*; that which is changed is *passive*.—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

Activity.—V. WILL.

Actual (*quod est in actu*—το ου κατ' ενεργειαν)—is opposed to *potential*. Before a thing is, it has a capacity of becoming. A rough stone is a statue *potentially*, when chiselled *actually*.

Actual is also opposed to *virtual*. The oak is shut up in the acorn *virtually*.

Actual is also opposed to *real*. My will, though really existing as a faculty, only begins to have an *actual* existence from the time that I will anything.

Actus Primus (in scholastic philosophy)—*est rei esse*. *Actus secundus*, *est rei operari*, or *actus quidditativus*, and *actus entitativus*.

ADAGE (*ad agendum aptus*)—a practical saying, fit for use, a rule of action. On the disagreement and similitude between *adagies*, *apophthegms*, and moral Γνωμαί, see Erasmus, in his Prolegomena to his *Adagia*.

ADJURATION (from *ad-jurare*, to put upon oath.)—"Our Saviour, when the high priest *adjured* him by the living God, made no scruple of replying upon that *adjuration*."—Clarke, *Works*, vol. ii., ser. 125.

ADMIRATION.—"We shall find that *admiration* is as superior to surprise and wonder, simply considered, as knowledge is superior to ignorance; for its appropriate signification is that act of the mind by which we discover, approve, and enjoy some unusual species of excellence."—Cogan, *On the Passions*, part i., c. 2.

ADSCITITIOUS (from *ad-sciscere*, to seek after) — that which is added or assumed. "You apply to your hypothesis of an *adscititious spirit*, what he (Philo) says concerning this *πνευμα θειον*, divine spirit or soul, infused into man by God's breathing."—Clarke, *Letter to Dodwell*.

ÆSTHETICS (*αισθησις*, perception or feeling.) — "That science which refers the first principles in the arts to sensation and sentiment, as distinguished from mere instruction and utility."

The science of the beautiful and the philosophy of the fine arts. Various theories have been entertained as to the idea of the beautiful, by Plato, Plotinus, and Augustine. In modern times, the term *æsthetics* was first used in a scientific sense by A. Baumgarten, a disciple of Christian Wolf. In his *Æsthetica*, 2 vols., 8vo, Frankf., 1750-8, he considered the idea of the beautiful as an indistinct perception or feeling accompanying the moral ideas. Mendelssohn and others identified the idea of the beautiful with the idea of the good. Shaftesbury and Hutcheson regarded the two ideas as intimately connected. At the close of the eighteenth century, *æsthetics* was scientifically developed in Germany by Kant, and has been zealously prosecuted by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Besides the writings of these philosophers, consult *Cours d'Esthetique publie par Ph. Damiron*, 8vo, Paris, 1842. *The Philosophy of the Beautiful*, by John G. MacVicar, D.D., Edin., 1855. Reid's *Intell. Powers*, essay viii., lib. 4. — V. BEAUTY, IDEAL (BEAU).

AFFECTION.—"There are various principles of action in man which have *persons* for their immediate object, and imply, in their very nature, our being well or ill affected to

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some *person*, or at least to some animated being. Such principles I shall call by the general name of *affections*, whether they dispose us to do good or hurt to others.”—Reid, *Act. Pow.*, essay iii., part 2, chap. 3-6.

They are usually distinguished into *benevolent*, as esteem, gratitude, friendship; and *malevolent*, as hatred, envy, jealousy, revenge.

This term is applied to all the modes of the sensibility, or to all states of mind in which we are purely passive. By Descartes (*Traité des Passions*, art. 83) it is employed to denote some degree of love.—*V. LOVE, SENSIBILITY.*

AFFINITY is a relation contracted by or resulting from marriage; in contradistinction to *consanguinity*, or relation by blood.—*V. CONSANGUINITY.*

AFFIRMATION (*καταφασις*)—is the attributing of one thing to another, or the admitting simply that something exists. A mental affirmation is a judgment, when expressed it becomes a proposition.—*V. JUDGMENT, PROPOSITION.*

In Law, *affirmation* is opposed to *oath*. There are certain separatists, who, from having scruples as to the lawfulness of oath-taking, are allowed to make a solemn *affirmation* that what they say is true; and if they make a false *affirmation* they are liable to the penalties of perjury.

A FORTIORI.—An expression used in arguing from the greater to the less. “He who hath given us His only begotten Son, will He not with Him also freely give us all things?” “If when we were enemies we were reconciled by the blood of the cross, *how much more* being reconciled shall we have peace with God?”

“In reasoning from analogy or comparison, if the case to be proved appears to be stronger even than the case with which it is compared, the analogy is called by scholastic logicians an *argumentum à fortiori*. This kind of argument is often denoted in Scripture by the words ‘How,’ ‘How much more,’ ‘How much rather.’”—*Logic for the Million*. “If ye being evil know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your Father which is

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in heaven give good things to them that ask him." (Matt. vii. 11.) "If God so clothe the grass of the field, which to-day is, and to-morrow is cast into the oven, shall he not much more clothe you, O ye of little faith?" (Matt. vi. 30.)

AGENT (*agens, agere*, to act)—one who, that which, *acts*. "Nor can I think that anybody has such an idea of chance as to make it an *agent*, or really existing and *acting* cause of anything, and much less sure of all things."—Wollaston, *Relig. of Nat.*, 8, 5.

ALLEGORY.—V. MYTH.

AMBITION (from *ambire*, to go about seeking place or power)—is the desire of power, which is regarded as one of the primary or natural desires of human nature. See Reid, *Active Powers*, essay iii., part 2, chap. 2. Stewart, *Active Powers*, book i., chap. ii., sect. 4.

AMPHIBOLOGY (*αμφιβολία*, ambiguity)—denotes a proposition which presents not an obscure, but a doubtful or double sense. It is enumerated among the sophisms by Aristotle, who distinguishes it from *equivocatio*, *ὀμωνυμία*, by which he understands ambiguity in terms taken separately.

Amphiboly is applied by Kant to that kind of amphibology which is natural, and consists in confounding pure notions of the understanding with objects of experience, and attributing to the one characters and qualities which belong to the other; as when we make *identity*, which is a notion *à priori*, a real quality of phenomena, or objects which experience makes known to us.

ANALOGY (*αναλογία, ανα* and *λογος*)—has been defined, "The similarity of ratios or relations." "But in popular language we extend the word to resemblances of things as well as relations. Employed as an argument, *analogy* depends upon the canon, the same attributes may be assigned to distinct, but similiar things, provided they can be shown to accompany the points of resemblance in the things, and not the points of difference."—Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, p. 363, 1st edit.

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“Analogy does not mean the similarity of two *things*, but the similarity, or sameness, of two *relations*. There must be more than two *things* to give rise to two *relations*; there must be at least *three*, and in most cases there are *four*. Thus A may be *like* B, but there is no *analogy* between A and B: it is an abuse of the word to speak so, and it leads to much confusion of thought. If A has the same relation to B which C has to D, then there is an *analogy*. If the first relation be well known, it may serve to explain the second, which is less known; and the transfer of name from one of the terms in the relation best known to its corresponding term in the other, causes no confusion, but on the contrary, tends to remind us of the similarity that exists in these relations, and so assists the mind instead of misleading it.”—Coplestone, *Four Discourses*, p. 122, 8vo, London, 1821.

“*Analogy* implies a difference in sort, and not merely in degree; and it is the sameness of the end with the difference of the means which constitutes *analogy*. No one could say the lungs of a man were *analogous* to the lungs of a monkey, but any one might say that the gills of fish and the spiracula of insects are *analogous* to lungs.”—Coleridge, *Physiology of Life*, p. 64.

Between one man and another, as belonging to the same genus, there is *identity*. Between a flint and a flower, as belonging to different genera, there is *diversity*. Between the seasons of the year and the periods of human life, or between the repose of an animal and the sleep of a plant, when we think wherein they agree, without forgetting wherein they differ, there is *analogy*.

“When some course of events seems to follow the same order with another, so that we may imagine them to be influenced by similar causes, we say there is an *analogy* between them. And when we infer that a certain event will take place in some other case of a similar nature, we are said to reason from *analogy*; as when we suppose that the stars, like the sun, are surrounded with planets, which

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derive from them light and heat. The word *analogy* is employed with strict propriety only in those cases where there is supposed to be a *sameness* in the causes of similar effects. When there is a mere similarity in effects or appearances, the word *resemblance* should be used. Resemblances may be well adduced in *illustration* of an argument; but then they should be proposed merely as similes, or metaphors, not as *analogies*.”—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

“The meaning of *analogy* is resemblance (?), and hence all reasoning from one case to others resembling it might be termed *analogical*; but the word is usually confined to cases where the resemblance is of a slight or indirect kind. We do not say that a man reasons from *analogy* when he infers that a stone projected into the air will fall to the ground. The circumstances are so essentially similar to those which have been experienced a thousand times, that we call the cases *identical*, not *analogical*. But when Sir Isaac Newton, reflecting on the tendency of bodies at the surface of the earth to the centre, inferred that the moon had the same tendency, his reasoning, in the first instance, was *analogical*.

“By some writers the term has been restricted to the resemblance of relations; thus knowledge is said to bear the same relation to the mind as light to the eye—to enlighten it. But although the term is very properly applied to this class of resemblances, I think it is not generally confined to them; it is commonly used with more latitude, except, indeed, in mathematics, when it is employed to designate the identity of ratios.”—Sam. Bailey, *Discourses*, p. 181, 8vo, London, 1852.

“As *analogy* is the resemblance of ratios (or relations), two things may be connected by *analogy*, though they have in *themselves* no *resemblance*; thus, as a sweet taste gratifies the palate, so does a sweet sound gratify the ear, and hence the same word, ‘sweet,’ is applied to both, though no flavour can resemble a sound in itself. To bear

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this in mind would serve to guard us against two very common errors in the interpretation of the analogical language of Scripture.—1. The error of supposing the things themselves to be similar, from their bearing similar relation to other things. 2. The still more common error of supposing the *analogy* to extend farther than it does, or to be more complete than it really is, from not considering *in what* the analogy in each case consists.”—Whately.

“*Analogy* is a Greek word used by mathematicians to signify a similitude of proportions. For instance, when we observe that two is to six as three is to nine, this similitude or equality of proportion is termed *analogy*. And although proportion strictly signifies the habitude or relation of one quantity to another, yet, in a looser and translated sense, it hath been applied to signify every other habitude, and consequently the term *analogy* all similitude of relations or habitudes whatsoever. Hence the schoolmen tell us there is *analogy* between intellect and sight; forasmuch as intellect is to the mind what sight is to the body: and that he who governs the state is analogous to him who steers a ship. Hence a prince is analogically styled a pilot, being to the state as a pilot is to his vessel.* For the further clearing of this point, it is to be observed, that a twofold *analogy* is distinguished by the schoolmen, *metaphorical* and *proper*. Of the first kind there are frequent instances in Holy Scripture, attributing human parts and passions to God. When He is represented as having a finger, an eye, or an ear; when He is said to repent, to be angry, or grieved, every one sees the *analogy* is merely *metaphorical*; because these parts and passions, taken in the proper signification, must in every degree necessarily, and from the formal nature of the thing, include imperfection. When, therefore, it is said the finger of God appears in this or that event, men of common sense mean no more, but that it is as truly ascribed to God as the works wrought by human fingers

* *Vide Cajetan, de Nom. Analog., c. iii.*

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are to man; and so of the rest. But the case is different when wisdom and knowledge are attributed to God. Passions and senses, as such, imply defect; but in knowledge simply, or as such, there is no defect. Knowledge, therefore, in the proper formal meaning of the word, may be attributed to God proportionally, that is, preserving a proportion to the infinite nature of God. We may say, therefore, that as God is infinitely above man, so is the knowledge of God infinitely above the knowledge of man, and this is what Cajetan calls *analogia proprie facta*.—And after this same *analogy* we must understand all those attributes to belong to the Deity, which in themselves simply, and as such, denote perfection.”—Berkeley, *Min. Philosoph.*, dialog. 4.

Analogy and Metaphor.—“*Analogy* is the substituting the idea or conception of one thing to stand for and represent another on account of a true resemblance and correspondent reality in the very nature of the things compared. It is defined by Aristotle—*Ισοτης τε λογος*—an equality or parity of reason; though, in strictness and truth, the parity of reasoning is rather built on the *similitude* and *analogy*, and consequent to them, than the same thing with them.”

“*Metaphor* is a substitution of the idea or conception of one thing with the term belonging to it, to stand for another thing, on account of an appearing similitude only, without any real resemblance and true correspondency between the things compared; as when the Psalmist describes the verdure and fruitfulness of valleys by laughing and singing.”—Cumberland, *Enquiry*, prolegom., p. 29.

“I am not of the mind of those speculators who seem assured that all states have the same period of infancy, manhood, and decrepitude that are found in individuals. Parallels of this sort rather furnish *similitudes* to illustrate or to adorn, than supply *analogies* from whence to reason. The objects which are attempted to be forced into an *analogy* are not found in the same classes of existence. Individuals are physical beings—commonwealths are not

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physical, but moral essences.”—Burke, *Letters on Regicide Peace*, b. 4.

Many fallacies become current through false metaphorical *analogies*. See an example of false *analogy* (Butler, *Analogy*, part i., chap. i.) in the supposed likeness between the decay of vegetables and of living creatures.

Analogy and Example.—*Analogy* is not unfrequently used to mean mere similarity. But its specific meaning is *similarity of relations*, and in this consists the difference between the argument by *example* and that by *analogy*,—that in the one we argue from mere *similarity*, from *similarity of relations* in the other. In the one we argue from Pisistratus to Dionysius, who resembles him; in the other, from the *relation of induction to demonstration*, to the corresponding *relation of the example to the enthymeme*.—Karslake, *Aids to Logic*, vol. ii., p. 74.

Analogy and Experience.—“*Experience* is not the mere collection of observations; it is the methodical reduction of them to their principles. . . . *Analogy* supposes this, but it goes a step farther. *Experience* is mere analysis. *Analogy* involves also a synthesis. It is applied to cases in which some difference of circumstances is supposed; as for instance, in arguing from the formation of particular parts of one class of animals to the correspondence in another, the different nature, habits, circumstances, of the one class, are considered and allowed for, in extending the given observation.”—Hampden, *Introd. Mor. Phil.*, lect. 5.

In the *schools*, what was termed the *analogy* of faith (see Rom. xii. 6), was showing that the truth of one scripture is not repugnant to the truth of another, or of the whole. “*Analogia vero est, cum veritas unius scripturæ ostenditur veritati alterius non repugnare.*” —Thom. Aquinas, *Summ. Theolog.*, pars. prima, qu. i., art. 10.

In *Logic*, an *analogous* noun has only one signification, but admits of being applied in a modified or subordinate sense to objects which bear no more than an *analogy* or similarity to its original signification; as the noun *sting*, of

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an animal, of conscience, of an epigram. "A term is *analogous* whose single signification applies with equal propriety to more than one object—as the *leg* of the table, the *leg* of the animal."—Whately, *Logic*, book iii., s. 10.

In *Logic*, three modes of reasoning are called analogical. 1. From effect to cause, or from cause to effect. 2. From means to ends, or from ends to means. 3. From mere resemblance or concomitance. Condillac (*Art de Raisonner*) has shown how these modes of reasoning all concur to prove that the human beings around us, who are formed like ourselves (*analogy of resemblance*), who act as we act (*analogy of cause*), who have the same organs (*analogy of means*), should be in all respects like ourselves, and have the same faculties.

Analogy and Induction.—"There are two requisites in order to every analogical argument:—1. That the two or several particulars concerned in the argument should be known to agree in some one point; for otherwise they could not be referable to any one class, and there would consequently be no basis to the subsequent inference drawn in the conclusion. 2. That the conclusion must be modified by a reference to the circumstances of the particular to which we argue. For herein consists *the essential distinction between an analogical and an inductive argument.*"—Hampden, *Essay on Phil. Evid. of Christianity*, pp. 60-64.

Locke, *On Hum. Understand.*, book iv., chap. 16, sect. 12; Beattie's *Essay on Truth*, part i., chap. 2, sect. 7; Stewart's *Elements*, vol. ii., chap. 4, sect. 4; Stewart's *Essays*, v., c. 3.

ANALYSIS and SYNTHESIS (*αναλυσις, συντιθησις, resolutio, compositio*)—or decomposition and recomposition. Objects of sense and of thought are presented to us in a complex state, but we can only, or at least best understand what is simple. Among the varied objects of a landscape I behold a tree, I separate it from the other objects, I examine separately its different parts—trunk, branches, leaves, &c., and then reuniting them into one whole I form a notion

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of the tree. The first part of this process is *analysis*, the second is *synthesis*. If this must be done with an individual it is more necessary with the infinitude of objects which surround us, to evolve the one out of many, to recall the multitude to unity. We compare objects with one another to see wherein they agree; we next, by a synthetical process, infer a general law, or generalize the coincident qualities, and perform an act of induction which is purely a synthetical process, though commonly called analytical. Thus, from our experience that bodies attract within certain limits, we infer that all bodies gravitate towards each other. The antecedent here only says that certain bodies gravitate, the consequent says all bodies gravitate. They are brought together by the mental insertion of a third proposition, which is, "that nature is uniform." This is not the product of induction, but antecedent to all induction. The statement fully expressed is, this and that body which we know gravitate, but nature is uniform, this and that body represent all bodies—all bodies gravitate. It is the mind which connects these things, and the process is synthetical. This is the one universal *method* in all philosophy, and different schools have differed only in the way of employing it. *Method* is the following of one thing *through* another. *Order* is the following of one thing *after* another. *Analysis* is *real*, as when a chemist separates two substances. *Logical*, as when we consider the properties of the sides and angles of a triangle separately, though we cannot think of a triangle without sides and angles.

Analysis and *synthesis*, *abstraction* and *generalization*, *induction* and *deduction*. In demonstrations which consist of a series of reasonings there is both *analysis* and *synthesis*. For an explanation of the processes of *analysis* and *synthesis*, see Stewart, *Phil.*, part ii., chap. 4.

The instruments of *analysis* are *observation* and *experiment*; of *synthesis*, *definition* and *classification*.

Take down a watch, *analysis*; put it up, *synthesis*.—Lord Brougham, *Prelimin. Discourse*, part i., sect. 7.

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“Hac *analysisi* licebit, ex rebus compositis ratiocinatione colligere simplices; ex motibus, vires moventes; et in universum, ex effectis causas; ex causisque particularibus generales; donec ad generalissimas tandem sit deventum.”

—Newton, *Optices*, 2d edit., p. 413.

Analysis is decomposing what is compound to detect its elements. Objects may be compound, as consisting of several distinct parts united, or of several properties equally distinct. In the former view, *analysis* will divide the object into its parts, and present them to us successively, and then the relations by which they are united. In the second case, *analysis* will separate the distinct properties, and show the relations of every kind which may be between them.—Cardaillac, *Etudes Element.*, tom. 1, pp. 8, 9.

Analysis is the resolving into its constituent elements of a compound heterogeneous substance. Thus, water can be analyzed into oxygen and hydrogen, atmospheric air into these and azote.—Peemans, *Introd. ad Philosoph.*, p. 75, 12mo, Lovan., 1840.

Abstraction is *analysis*, since it is decomposition, but what distinguishes it is that it is exercised upon qualities which by themselves have no real existence. *Classification* is *synthesis*. *Induction* rests upon *analysis*. *Deduction* is a *synthetical process*. *Demonstration* includes both.

ANALYTICS (τα αναλυτικά)—is the title which in the second century was given, and which has since continued to be applied to a portion of the Organon or Logic of Aristotle. This portion consists of two distinct parts; the *First Analytics*, which teaches how to reduce the syllogism to its divers figures and most simple elements, and the *Posterior Analytics*, which lays down the rules and conditions of demonstration in general. It was in imitation of this title that Kant gave the name of *Transcendental Analytic* to that part of the criticism of Pure Reason which reduces the faculty of knowing to its elements.

ANIMA MUNDI (soul of the world).—*Animism* is the doctrine

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of the *anima mundi* as held by Stahl. The hypothesis of a force, immaterial, but inseparable from matter, and giving to matter its form and movement, is coeval with the birth of philosophy. Pythagoras obscurely acknowledged such a force, but held that there was an infinitely perfect being above it. From Pythagoras it passed into the system of Plato, who could not conceive how pure spirit, the seat of eternal ideas, could act directly upon matter. He thought also that the world would be more perfect if endowed with life. The soul of the world was the source of all life, sensibility, and movement. The school of Alexandria adhered to the views of Plato, and recognized intelligence and Deity as above the *anima mundi*, which in the system of the Stoics usurped the place of God, and even His name; while Straton of Lampsacus called it *nature*. The hypothesis of the *anima mundi* was not entertained by the scholastic philosophers. But it reappeared under the name of the *Archæus*, in the systems of Cornelius Agrippa, Paracelsus, and Van Helmont; while Henry More recognized a *principium hylarchicum*, and Cudworth a *plastic nature*, as the universal agent of physical phenomena, the cause of all forms of organization, and the spring of all the movements of matter. About the same time, some German divines, as Amos Comenius, and John Bayer, attempted to rest a similar opinion on Genesis i. 2, and maintained that the spirit which moved on the face of the waters still gives life to all nature.—Buddeus, *Elem. Phil.*, pars. 3, cap. 6, sect. 11, 12, *et seq.*

The doctrine of the *anima mundi*, as held by the Stoics and Stratonicians, is closely allied to pantheism; while according to others this soul of the universe is altogether intermediate between the Creator and His works.

See *Timæus of Plato*, 29 D.—30 C. του κοσμου ζωον ενψυχου εννοου τε.

Schelling, *De l'Ame de Monde*, 8vo, Hamb., 1809.

ANTECEDENT (*antecedere*, to go before).—“And the *antecedent* shall you fynde as true when you rede over my

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letter as himself can not say nay, but that the *consecusyon* is formal.”—*Sir T. More’s Works*, p. 1115.

In a relation, whether logical or metaphysical, the first term is the *antecedent*, the second the *consequent*. Thus in the relation of causality—the cause is the *antecedent*, and the effect the *consequent*.

In Logic, *antecedent* is the former of two propositions, in a species of reasoning, which, without the intervention of any middle proposition, leads directly to a fair conclusion; and this conclusion is termed the *consequent*. Thus, I reflect, therefore I exist. I reflect, is the *antecedent*—therefore I exist, is the *consequent*.—Euler, *Letters to German Princess*.

ANTHROPOLOGY (*ανθρωπος* and *λογος*, the science of man)

—Among naturalists it means the natural history of the human species. According to Dr. Latham (*Nat. Hist. of Varieties of Man*, Lond., 1830), *anthropology* determines the relations of man to the other mammalia; *ethnology*, the relations of the different varieties of mankind to each other, (p. 559). The German philosophers since the time of Kant have used it to designate all the sciences which in any point of view relate to man—soul and body—individual and species—facts of history and phenomena of consciousness—the absolute rules of morality as well as interests material, and changing; so that works under the general title of *anthropology* treat of very different topics.

“*Anthropology* is the science of man in all his natural variations. It deals with the mental peculiarities which belong specifically to different races, ages, sexes, and temperaments, together with the results which follow immediately from them in their application to human life. Under *psychology*, on the other hand, we include nothing but what is *common to all mankind*, and forms an essential part of human nature. The one, accordingly, may be termed the science of mental *variables*; the other, the science of mental *constants*.”—Morell, *Psychology*, pp. 1, 2.

ANTHROPOMORPHISM (*ανθρωπος*, man; *μορφη*, form) —“It was the opinion of the *Anthropomorphites* that God had all the parts of a man, and that we are, in this sense, made according to His image.”—More, *Def. of Cabbala*, c. 1.

Melito, of Sardis, was the first Christian writer who ascribed body to Deity. The ascribing of bodily parts or members to Deity is too gross a delusion to call for refutation. But there is a spiritual *anthropomorphism*, sometimes also called *anthropopathy*, which ascribes to Him the acts, passions, sentiments, and proceedings of human nature.

Among the early Christians there was a sect called *Anthropomorphists*.

“We ought not to imagine that God is clothed with a human body, as the *Anthropomorphites* asserted, under colour that that figure was the most perfect of any.”—Malebranche, *Search after Truth*, book iii., chap. 9.

Hume applies the name to those who think the mind of God is like the mind of man.

“When it is asked, what cause produces order in the ideas of the Supreme Being, can any other reason be assigned by you *Anthropomorphites*, than that it is a *rational* faculty, and that such is the nature of Deity?”—*Dialogues on Nat. Relig.*, parts 4, 5.

ANTICIPATION (*Anticipatio*, *προληψις*) — is a term which was first used by Epicurus to denote a general notion which enables us to conceive beforehand of an object which had not yet come under the cognizance of the senses. But these general notions being formed by abstraction from a multitude of particular notions, were all originally owing to sensation, or mere generalizations *à posteriori*. Buhle (*Hist. de la Phil. Mod.*, tom. i., pp. 87, 88) gives the following account:—“The impressions which objects make on the senses, leave in the mind traces which enable us to recognize these objects when they present themselves anew, or to compare them with others, or to distinguish them. When we see an animal for the first

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time, the impression made on the senses leaves a trace which serves as a type. If we afterwards see the same animal, we refer the impression to the type already existing in the mind. This type and the relation of the new impression to it, constituted what Epicurus called the *anticipation of an idea*. It was by this *anticipation* that we could determine the identity, the resemblance or the difference of objects actually before us, and those formerly observed."

The language of Cicero (*De Nat. Deor.*, lib. i., cap. 16) seems to indicate that by Epicurus the term *προληψις* was extended to what is supersensual, and included what is now called knowledge *à priori*. "Quæ est enim gens, aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat, sine doctrina, *anticipationem* quandam Deorum? quam appellat *προληψιν* Epicurus, id est, anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nec intelligi quidquam, nec quæri, nec disputari potest." And according to Diogenes Laertius (lib. 7, sect. 51, 53, 54), the Stoics defined *προληψις* to mean "a natural conception of the universal." It would appear, however, that this definition was not adopted by all. And Sir William Hamilton has said (*Reid's Works*, note A, p. 774): "It is not to be supposed that the *κοιναι εννοιαι*, *Φυσικαι προληψεις*, of the Stoics, far less of the Epicureans, were more than generalizations *à posteriori*. Yet this is a mistake, into which, among many others, Lipsius and Leibnitz have fallen in regard to the former." See *Manuductio ad Stoicam Phil.*, lib. ii., dissert. 11. And Leibnitz, *Nouveaux Essais*, pref. See also Kernius, *Dissert. in Epicuri προληψις*, &c., Goett., 1736.

Anticipation of Nature is a phrase employed by Lord Bacon to denote a hasty and illicit generalization, as opposed to a due and gradual generalization, which he called an *interpretation of Nature*.—Pref. to *Nov. Organ.*

ANTINOMY (*αντι*, against; *νομος*, law)—the opposition of law or rule to another law or rule.

"If He once willed adultery should be sinful, all His omnipotence will not allow Him to will the allowance that

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His holiest people might, as it were, by His own *antinomy* or counter statute, live unreprieved in the same fact as He Himself esteemed it, according to our common explainers."—Milton, *Doct. and Dis. of Div.*, b. ii., c. 3.

According to Kant, it means that natural contradiction which results from the law of reason, when, passing the limits of experience, we seek to know the absolute. Then we do not attain the idea of the absolute, or we overstep the limits of our faculties which reach only to phenomena. Then we may maintain by arguments equally valid, that the world is eternal and infinite, or that it had a beginning in time and is limited to space.

That above all phenomena there is a cause absolutely free, or that all things are ruled by blind laws of nature. That there is a necessarily existing Being, or that all things are phenomenal and contingent. These are the *antinomies* of the *pure reason*. The *antinomy* of the *practical reason* is, that virtue ought to be happy, but cannot be so here. This is answered by the doctrine of a future state, which is a postulate of the *practical reason*.

ANTIPATHY (*αντι παθος*, feeling against).—"There are many ancient and received traditions and observations touching the sympathy and *antipathy* of plants; for that some will thrive best growing near others, which they impute to sympathy, and some worse, which they impute to *antipathy*."—Bacon, *Nat. Hist.*, sect. 479.

According to Sylvester Rattray, M.D. (*Aditus Novus ad Occultas Sympathiæ et Antipathiæ causas inveniendas*, 12mo, Glasg., 1658,) there is antipathy and sympathy not only between plants, but also between minerals and animals.

A blind and instinctive movement, which, without any appreciable reason, makes us averse to the company or character of some persons at first sight. An involuntary dislike or aversion entertained by an animate being to some sensible object. A man may have an antipathy to particular smells or tastes, a turkey cock or bull to the colour red, a horse to the smell of raw flesh. Some are natural,

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others are acquired, as a surfeit of any food gives antipathy. Some are founded on sensation, others on sentiment.—Locke, *On Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 33, sect. 7, 8.—*V. SYMPATHY.*

A PARTE ANTE, and A PARTE POST.—These two expressions, borrowed from the scholastic philosophy, refer to eternity; of which man can only conceive as consisting of two parts; the one without limits in the past, *a parte ante*; and the other without limits in the future, *a parte post*. Both are predicable of Deity; only the latter of the human soul.—*V. ETERNITY.*

APATHY (*a*, privative; and *παθος*, passion).—The absence of passion. “What is called by the Stoics *apathy*, or dispassion; by the Sceptics indisturbance, *αταραξία*; by the Molinists, quietism; by common men, peace of conscience: seem all to mean but great tranquillity of mind.”—Sir W. Temple, *Of Gardening*.

As the passions are the springs of most of our actions, a state of apathy has come to signify a sort of moral inertia—the absence of all activity or energy. According to the Stoics apathy meant the extinction of the passions by the ascendancy of reason.

Niemeierus (Joh. Barth.), *Dissert. de Stoicorum απαθεια*, &c. 4to, Helmst., 1679.

Becnius, *Dispp.*, libb. 3, *απαθεια Sapiientis Stoici*. 4to, Copenhag., 1693.

Fischerus (John Hen.), *Diss. de Stoicis απαθειας falso suspectis*. 4to, Leips., 1716.

Quadius, *Disputatio tritum illud Stoicorum paradoxon περι της απαθειας expendens*. 4to, Sedin, 1720.

Meiners, *Melanges*, tom. 2, p. 130.

APHORISM, determinate position, from *αφοριζειν*, to bound, or limit; whence our horizon.—Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, vol. i., p. 16, edit. 1848: “In order to get the full sense of a word, we should first present to our minds the visual image that forms its primary meaning. Draw lines of different colours round the different counties of England,

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and then cut out each separately, as in the common play-maps that children take to pieces and put together, so that each district can be contemplated apart from the rest, as a whole in itself. This twofold act of circumscribing and detaching, when it is exerted by the mind on subjects of reflection and reason, is to aphorize, and the result an *aphorism*."

A precise, sententious saying—*e. g.*, "It is always safe to learn from our enemies, seldom safe to instruct even our friends."

Like Hippocrates, Boerhaave has written a book entitled *Aphorisms*, containing medical maxims, not treated argumentatively, but laid down as certain truths. In civil law *aphorisms* are also used.

The three ancient commentators upon Hippocrates, viz., Theophilus, Meletius, and Stephanus, have given the same definition of an *aphorism*, *i. e.*, "a succinct saying, comprehending a complete statement," or a saying poor in expression, but rich in sentiment. The first *aphorism* of Hippocrates is, "Life is short, and the art is long; the occasion fleeting; experience fallacious, and judgment difficult. The physician must not only be prepared to do what is right himself, but also to make the patient, the attendants, and externals, cooperate."

"The first and most ancient inquirers into truth were wont to throw their knowledge into *aphorisms*, or short, scattered, unmethodical sentences."—*Nov. Organ.*, book i., sect. 86. And the *Novum Organum* itself is written in *aphorisms*.

Heraclitus is known by his *aphorisms*, which are among the most brilliant of those

"Jewels, five words long,
That on the stretched fore-finger of all time,
Sparkle for ever."

Among the most famous are,—War is father of all things, *i. e.*, all things are evolved by antagonistic force.

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No man can bathe twice in the same stream, *i. e.*, all things are in perpetual flux.

APODEICTIC, APODEICTICAL (*απο* and *δεικνυσθαι*, to show).—"The argumentation is from a similitude, therefore not *apodictick*, or of evident demonstration."—Robinson, *Eudoxa*, p. 23.

This term was borrowed by Kant from Aristotle (*Analyt. Prior.*, lib. i., cap. 1). He made a distinction between propositions which admitted of contradiction or dialectic discussion, and such as were the basis or result of demonstration. Kant wished to introduce an analogous distinction between our judgments, and to give the name of apodeictic to such as were above all contradiction.

APOLOGUE (*απολογος*, *fabula*)—"a novel story, contrived to teach some moral truth."—Johnson.

"It would be a high relief to hear an apologue or fable well told, and with such humour as to need no sententious moral at the end to make the application."—(Shaftesbury, vol. iii., *miscell.* 4, c. 1.) It is essential to an *apologue* that the circumstances told in it should be fictitious. The difference between a *parable* and an *apologue* is, that the former being drawn from human life requires probability in the narration; whereas the *apologue* being taken from inanimate things or the inferior animals, is not confined strictly to probability. The fables of Æsop are *apologues*.

For an admirable instance of the *λογος* or *apologue*, see Coleridge's *Friend*, where the case of the seizure of the Danish fleet by the English is represented in this form.

APOLOGY (*απολογία*, a defence made in a court of justice).—

We have a work of Xenophon, entitled the *Apology of Socrates*, and another with the same title by Plato. The term was adopted by the Christian fathers, and applied to their writings in defence of Christianity, and in answer to its opponents. Tertullian addressed his *Apologetic* to the magistrates of Rome, the emperor Severus being then absent.

APOPHTHEGM (*απο φθεγγεσθαι*, *eloqui*, to speak out).—A

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short and pithy speech or saying of some celebrated man ; as that of Augustus, *Festina lente*.

“In a numerous collection of our Saviour’s *apophthegms*, there is not to be found one example of sophistry.”—Paley, *Evidences*, part ii., c. 2.

“We ask advice, but we mean approbation.”—Lacon.

The Lacedæmonians used much this mode of speaking. Plutarch has a collection entitled the *Apophthegms of Kings and Generals*, many of which are anecdotes ; and also another entitled *Laconica*.

“Of Blackmore’s (Sir Richard) attainments in the ancient tongues, it may be sufficient to say that in his prose, he has confounded an *aphorism* with an *apophthegm*.”—Macaulay, *On Addison*, p. 11.

In *Guesses at Truth* (2d series, 1848), the saying of Demosthenes, that “action was the first, second, and third essential of eloquence,” is called an *apophthegm*.

APPERCEPTION (self-consciousness).—“By *apperception* he (Leibnitz) understands that degree of perception which reflects as it were upon itself ; by which we are conscious of our own existence, and conscious of our perceptions, by which we can reflect upon the operation of our own minds, and can comprehend abstract truths.”—Reid, *Intell. Powers*, essay ii., c. 15.

“By *apperception* the Leibnitzio-Wolfians meant the act by which the mind is conscious immediately of the representative object, and through it, mediately of the remote object represented.”—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid’s Works*, note D*, sect. 1.

“Cousin maintains that the soul possesses a mode of spontaneous thought, into which volition and reflection, and therefore personality, do not enter, and which gives her an intuition of the absolute. For this he has appropriated the name *apperception*, explaining it also as a true inspiration, and holding, therefore, that inspirations come to man, not by the special volitions of God, as commonly believed, but fall to reason in its own right, thus consti-

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tuting a scientific organon of discovery.”—Macvicar, *Enquiry into Human Nature*, 8vo, Edin., 1853. Pp. 216.

“*Consciousness* denotes a state, *apperception* an act of the ego; and from this alone the superiority of the latter is apparent.”—Meiklejohn, *Translation of the Pure Reason*, note, p. 81.

APPETITE.—“The word *appetitus*, from which that of appetite is derived, is applied by the Romans and the Latinists to desires in general, whether they primarily relate to the body or not, and with obvious propriety; for the primitive signification is the seeking after whatever may conduce either to gratification or happiness. Thus Cicero observes. ‘*Motus animorum duplices sunt; alteri, cogitationis; alteri, appetitus. Cogitatio in vero exquirendo maxime versatur; appetitus impellit ad agendum.*’ By two powers of action being thus placed in contrast with each other, and the one applied to thought simply, it is obvious that the other comprehends every species of desire, whether of a mental or corporeal nature. Metaphysicians also, who have written in the Latin language, use the word *appetitus* in the same latitude.”—Cogan, *On the Passions*, vol. i., p. 15.

In modern use, *appetites* refer to corporeal wants, each of which creates its compendent desire. But desire proper refers to mental objects.

“The word *appetite*, in common language, often means hunger, and sometimes figuratively any strong desire.”—Beattie, *Mor. Science*, part i., c. 1.

As our perceptions are *external*, which are common to us with the brutes; and *internal*, which are proper to us as rational beings—so *appetite* is *sensitive* and *rational*. The sensitive appetite was distinguished into the irascible and the concupiscible.—Reid, *Active Powers*, essay iii.; Stewart, *Active and Moral Powers*, vol. i., p. 14.

Appetite and Instinct.—“Appetites have been called instinctive, because they seek their own gratification without the aid of reason, and often in spite of it. They are common to man with the brute; but they differ at least in

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one important respect from those instincts of the lower animals which are usually contrasted with human reason. The objects towards which they are directed are prized for their own sake; they are sought as *ends*, while *instinct* teaches brutes to do many things which are needed only as *means* for the attainment of some ulterior purpose. Thus *instinct* enables a spider to entrap his prey, while *appetite* only leads him to devour it when in his possession.

“*Instinct* is an impulse conceived without instruction, and prior to all experience, to perform certain acts, which are not needed for the immediate gratification of the agent, which in fact are often opposed to it, and are useful only as means for the accomplishment of some ulterior object; and this object is usually one of pre-eminent utility or necessity, either for the preservation of the animal's own life, or for the continuance of its species. The former quality separates it from intelligence, properly so called, which proceeds only by experience or instruction; and the latter is its peculiar trait as distinguished from *appetite*, which, in strictness, uses no means at all, but looks only to ends.”—Bowen, *Lowell Lect.*, 1849, p. 228.

“All the actions of man, which have been loosely considered or described as instinctive, may be referred either to the power of organic life, that is, to mechanical forces, or to the teaching of experience, or to the class of appetites. Human nature shows no trace whatever of that marvellous power which governs the bee in the construction of its cell, and guides the migrating bird to its winter home. But man is the only being who is not under its influence; every other animal, from the noblest quadruped to the humblest insect, gives frequent indications of its presence and control.”—Bowen, *Lowell Lect.*, 1849, p. 241.

APPREHENSION (*apprehendere*, to lay hold of).—“By the *apprehensive* power, we perceive the species of sensible things, present or absent, and retain them as wax doth the print of a seal.”—Burton, *Anat. of Melancholy*, p. 21.

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Here it includes not only conception or imagination, but also memory or retention.

“How can he but be moved willingly to serve God, who hath an *apprehension* of God’s merciful design to save him!”
—Barrow, *Serm.* 42.

“It may be true, perhaps, that the generality of the negro slaves are extremely dull of *apprehension* and slow of understanding.”—Porteous, *On Civilization of Slaves*.

Apprehension in Logic, is that act or condition of the mind in which it receives a notion of any object; and which is analogous to the perception of the senses. *Incomplex apprehension* regards one object, or several, without any relation being perceived between them, as a man, a card, &c. *Complex apprehension* regards several objects with such a relation, as a man on horseback, a pack of cards, &c.—Whately, *Logic*, b. ii., ch. 1, v. 1.

“*Apprehension* is the Kantian word for perception, in the largest sense in which we employ that term. It is the genus which includes under it, as species, perception proper and sensation proper.”—Meiklejohn, *Translat. of Pure Reason*, note, p. 127.

APPREHENSION and COMPREHENSION.

Apprehend and Comprehend.—“We *apprehend* many truths which we do not *comprehend*. The great mysteries of our faith, the doctrine, for instance, of the Holy Trinity—we lay hold upon it (*ad prehendō*), we hang upon it, our souls live by it; but we do not take it all in, we do not *comprehend* it; for it is a necessary attribute of God that He is incomprehensible; if He were not so He would not be God, or the being that comprehended Him would be God also. But it also belongs to the idea of God that He may be ‘apprehended,’ though not ‘comprehended’ by His reasonable creatures; He has made them to know Him, though not to know Him all, to ‘apprehend’ though not to ‘comprehend’ Him.”—Trench, *On Study of Words*, p. 110, 12mo, Lond., 1851.

A PRIORI, and A POSTERIORI.—“There are two

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general ways of *reasoning*, termed arguments *à priori* and *à posteriori*, or according to what is usually styled the *synthetic* and *analytic* method; the one lays down some previous, self-evident principles; and in the next place, descends to the several consequences that may be deduced from them; the other begins with a view of the phenomena themselves, traces them up to their original, and by developing the properties of these phenomena, arrives at the knowledge of the cause."—King, *Essay*, pref., p. 9.

By an *à priori* argument a conclusion is drawn from an antecedent fact, whether the consequence be in the order of time or in the necessary relation of cause and effect. By the argument *à posteriori* we reason from what is consequent in the order of time to what is antecedent, or from effect to cause. An individual may fall under suspicion of murder for two reasons: he may have coveted the deceased's property, or he may be found with it in his possession; the former is an *à priori*, the latter an *à posteriori* argument against him.—Aristot., *Metaphys.*, lib. v., cap. 11.
—V. DEMONSTRATION.

"Of demonstrations there are two sorts; demonstrations *à priori*, when we argue from the cause to the effect; and *à posteriori*, when we argue from the effect to the cause. Thus when we argue from the ideas we have of immensity, eternity, necessary existence, and the like, that such perfections can reside but in *one* being, and thence conclude that there can be but one supreme God, who is the cause and author of all things, and that therefore it is contradictory to this to suppose that there can be two necessary independent principles, the one the cause of all the good, and the other the cause of all the evil that is in the world; this is an argument *à priori*. Again, when the Manicheans and Paulicians, from what they observe in things and facts, from the many natural evils which they see in the world, and the many moral wickednesses which are committed by men, conclude that there must be two different causes or principles from whence each of these proceed; this is

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arguing *à posteriori*.”—Dr. John Clark, *Enquiring into Evil*, pp. 31-2.

“The term *à priori*, by the influence of Kant and his school, is now very generally employed to characterize those elements of knowledge which are not obtained *à posteriori*—are not evolved out of factitious generalizations; but which as native to, are potentially in, the mind antecedent to the act of experience, on occasion of which (as constituting its subjective condition) they are first actually elicited into consciousness. Previously to Kant the terms *à priori* and *à posteriori* were, in a sense which descended from Aristotle, properly and usually employed—the former to denote a reasoning from cause to effect—the latter a reasoning from effect to cause. The term *à priori* came, however, in modern times, to be extended to any abstract reasoning from a given notion to the conditions which such notion involved; hence, for example, the title *à priori* bestowed on the ontological and cosmological arguments for the existence of the Deity. The latter of these, in fact, starts from experience—from the observed contingency of the world, in order to construct the supposed notion on which it founds. Clarke’s cosmological demonstration called *à priori*, is therefore, so far, properly an argument *à posteriori*.”—Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid’s Works*, p. 762.

“By knowledge *à priori*,” says Kant (*Criticism of Pure Reason*, Introd., sect. 1), “we shall in the sequel understand, not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience, but such as is absolutely so of *all* experience. Opposed to this is empirical knowledge, or that which is possible only *à posteriori*, that is, through experience. Knowledge *à priori* is either pure or impure. Pure knowledge *à priori* is that with which no empirical element is mixed up. For example, the proposition, ‘Every change has a cause,’ is a proposition *à priori*, but impure because change is a conception which can only be derived from experience.”

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“We have ordinarily more consideration for the demonstration called *propter quid* or *à priori*, than for that which we call *quia* or *à posteriori*; because the former proceeds from universals to particulars, from causes to effects, while the latter proceeds in a manner wholly contrary. We must nevertheless see whether we have a right to do this; since no demonstration *à priori* can have credence, or be received, without supposing the demonstration *à posteriori*, by which it must be proved. For how is it, for example, that having to prove that *man feels*, from this proposition, every animal feels—how, I say, will you establish the truth of this position, should some one hesitate to grant it, except by making induction of the individual animals, of whom there is not one that does not feel?”—Bernier, *Abridgment of Gassendi “De l’Entendement,”* vol. vi., pp. 340-1.

“If there are any *truths* which the mind possesses, whether consciously or unconsciously, before and independent of experience, they may be called *à priori* truths, as belonging to it *prior* to all that it acquires from the world around. On the other hand, truths which are acquired by observation and experience, are called *à posteriori* truths, because they come to the mind *after* it has become acquainted with external facts. How far *à priori* truths or ideas are possible, is the great *campus philosophorum*, the great controverted question of mental philosophy.”—Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, 2d edit., pp. 68-9.

ARCHEUS—is the name given by Paracelsus to the vital principle which presides over the growth and continuation of living beings. He called it body; but an *astral body*, that is an emanation from the substance of the stars, which defends us against the external agents of destruction till the inevitable term of life arrives. The hypothesis was extended by Van Helmont to the active principle which presides not only over every body, but over every particle of organized body to which it gives its proper form.

The word is used by More (*Antidote to Atheism*, pt. i., c. 11,) as synonymous with *form*.

ARCHELOGY (*λογος περι των αρχων*) treats of principles, and should not be confounded with *Archæology* (*λογος περι των αρχαιων*) which treats of antiquities or things old.—See Alstedius (J. H.), *Scientiarum Omnium Encyclopædia*.—V. PRINCIPLE.

ARCHETYPE (*αρχη*, first or chief; and *τυπος*, form)—a model or first form.—“There were other objects of the mind, universal, eternal, immutable, which they called intelligible ideas, all originally contained in one *archetypal* mind or understanding, and from thence participated by inferior minds or souls.”—Cudworth, *Intell. Syst.*, p. 387.

“The first mind is, according to this hypothesis, an *archetypal* world which contains intelligibly all that is contained sensibly in our world.”—Bolingbroke, *Essay* iv., sect. 28.

Cornelius Agrippa, in accordance with the philosophy of Plato, gave the name of *Archetype* to God, considered as the absolute model of all being.

In the philosophy of Locke, the *archetypes* of our ideas are the things really existing out of us. “By real ideas, I mean such as have a foundation in nature; such as have a conformity with the real being and existence of things, or with their *archetypes*.”—*On Hum. Underst.*, b. ii., c. 30.

ARGUMENT (*arguere*, from *αργος*, clear, manifest—to show, reason, or prove) — is an explanation of that which is doubtful, by that which is known. “Whoever will examine any correct argument, by reducing it to its syllogistic form, will find either,—First, That the premises are nothing but a simpler and commoner statement of the truth announced in the conclusion; or, Secondly, That they are a mere analytical statement of it; or, Thirdly, That they are a synthetic (or generalized) statement, from which a particular truth may be inferred in the conclusion.”—Irons, *Final Causes*, p. 112.

The term *argument* in ordinary discourse, has several meanings.—1. It is used for the premises in contradistinction to the conclusion, *e. g.*, “the conclusion which this *argument* is intended to establish is,” &c. 2. It

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denotes what is a *course* or *series* of *arguments*, as when it is applied to an entire dissertation. 3. Sometimes a *disputation* or *two trains of argument* opposed to each other. 4. Lastly, the *various forms of stating an argument* are sometimes spoken of as different kinds of *argument*, as if the same *argument* were not capable of being stated in various ways.—Whately, *Logic*, Appendix i.

In strictly logical sense, the third operation of mind, reasoning, discussion, expressed in words, is *argument*.—Whately.

“In technical propriety *argument* cannot be used for *argumentation*, as Dr. Whately thinks, but exclusively for its middle term. In this meaning, the word (though not with uniform consistency) was employed by Cicero, Quintilian, Boethius, &c.; it was thus subsequently used by the Latin Aristotelians, from whom it passed even to the Ramists; and this is the meaning which the expression always first, and most naturally, suggests to a logician.”—Sir W. Hamilton, *Discussions*, p. 147.

ARGUMENTATION is opposed to intuition and consciousness, and used as synonymous with deduction by Dr. Price (*Review*, chap. 5).

Argumentation or reasoning is that operation of mind whereby we infer one proposition from two or more propositions premised.—Watts, *Logic*, Introd.

Argumentation must not be confounded with *reasoning*. *Reasoning* may be natural or artificial; *argumentation* is always artificial. An advocate *reasons* and *argues*; a Hottentot *reasons*, but does not *argue*. *Reasoning* is occupied with ideas and their relations, legitimate or illegitimate; *argumentation* has to do with forms and their regularity or irregularity. One *reasons* often with one's self; you cannot *argue* but with two. A thesis is set down—you attack, I defend it; you insist, I reply; you deny, I prove; you distinguish, I destroy your distinction; your objections and my replies balance or overturn one another. Such is *argumentation*. It supposes that there are two

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sides, and that both agree to the same rules.—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

ART (Latin *ars*, from Greek *αρετη*, strength or skill; or from *αρω*, *αρω*, to fit, join, or make agree).

Ars est ratio recta aliquorum operum faciendorum.—Thomas Aquinas.

Ars est habitus cum recta ratione effectivus; quia per precepta sua dirigit effectiōnem seu productionem operis externi sensibilis. Differt autem a natura, quod natura operatur in eo in quo est; ars vero nunquam operatur in eo in quo est; nisi per accidens, puta cum medicus seipsum sanat.—Derodon, *Phys.*, p. 21.

Ars est methodus aliquid juxta regulas determinatas operandi.—Bouvier.

Ars est recta ratio factibilium, atque in eo differt a prudentia, quæ est recta ratio agibilium.—Peemans, *Introd. ad Philosoph.*, p. 31.

“We speak of *art* as distinguished from *nature*; but *art* itself is natural to man. . . . If we admit that man is susceptible of improvement, and has in himself a principle of progression and a desire of perfection, it appears improper to say that he has quitted the state of his *nature*, when he has begun to proceed; or that he finds a station for which he was not intended, while, like other animals, he only follows the disposition and employs the powers that *nature* has given. The latest efforts of human invention are but a continuation of certain devices which were practised in the earliest ages of the world, and in the rudest state of mankind.”—Ferguson, *Essay on Hist. of Civ. Soc.*, pp. 10-13.

Art is defined by Lord Bacon to be “a proper disposal of the things of nature by human thought and experience, so as to make them answer the designs and uses of mankind.” It may be defined more concisely to be the adjustment of *means* to accomplish a desired *end*.—Stewart, *Works*, vol ii., p. 36, last edition.

“*Art* has in general preceded science. There were

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bleaching, and dyeing, and tanning, and artificers in copper and iron, before there was chemistry to explain the processes used. Men made wine before there was any theory of fermentation; and glass and porcelain were manufactured before the nature of alkalis and earths had been determined. The pyramids of Nubia and Egypt, the palaces and sculptured slabs of Nineveh, the Cyclopean walls of Italy and Greece, the obelisks and temples of India, the cromlechs and druidical circles of countries formerly Celtic, all preceded the sciences of mechanics and architecture. There was music before there was a science of acoustics; and painting while as yet there was no theory of colours and perspective.”—M^cCosh, *On Div. Govern.*, p. 151.

On the other hand, Cicero has said (*De Oratore*, i., 41), “Nihil est enim, quod ad artem redigi possit, nisi ille prius qui illa tenet, quorum artem instituere vult, habet illam scientiam, ut ex iis rebus, quorum ars nondum sit, artem efficere possit.”

And Mr. Harris (*Phil. Arrangements*, chap. 15) has argued—“If there were no theorems of science to guide the operations of *art*, there would be no *art*; but if there were no operations of *art*, there might still be theorems of science. Therefore science is prior to *art*.”

“The principles which *art* involves, science evolves. The truths on which *art* depends lurk in the artist’s mind undeveloped, guiding his hand, stimulating his invention, balancing his judgment, but not appearing in the form of enunciated propositions. *Art* in its earlier stages is anterior to science, it may afterwards borrow aid from it.”—Whewell, *Phil. of Induct. Sciences*, vol. ii., pp. 275-6.

If the knowledge used be merely accumulated experience, the *art* is called *empirical*; but if it be experience reasoned upon and brought under general principles, it assumes a higher character and becomes a *scientific art*.

The difference between *art* and *science* is regarded as merely verbal by Sir William Hamilton in *Edin. Rev.*, No. 115.

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On the other side, see Preface of St. Hilaire's *Translation of the Organon*, p. 12; Whewell, *Phil. of Induct. Sciences*, part ii., book ii., chap. 8.

“The distinction between *science* and *art* is, that a *science* is a body of principles and deductions, to explain the nature of some object matter. An *art* is a body of precepts with practical skill for the completion of some work. A *science* teaches us to know, an *art* to do; the former declares that something exists, with the laws and causes which belong to its existence, the latter teaches how something may be produced.”—Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, p. 16, 2d edit.

“The object of *science* is knowledge; the objects of *art* are works. In *art*, truth is a means to an end; in *science* it is the only end. Hence the practical arts are not to be classed among the sciences.”—Whewell, *Phil. of Induct. Sciences*, aph. 25.

“*Science* gives principles, *art* gives rules. *Science* is fixed, and its object is intellectual; *art* is contingent and its object sensible.”—Harris, *Dialogue on Art*.

ASCETICISM (*ασκησις*, to exercise; or *ασκησις*, exercise).—The exercise of severe virtue among the Pythagoreans and Stoics was so called. It consisted in chastity, poverty, watching, fasting, and retirement.

“The *ascetics* renounced the business and the pleasures of the age; abjured the use of wine, of flesh, and of marriage, chastised the body, mortified their affections, and embraced a life of misery, as the price of eternal happiness.”—Gibbon, *Hist.*, c. 37.

See *Zimmerman on Solitude*.

This name may be applied to every system which teaches man not to govern his wants by subordinating them to reason and the law of duty, but to stifle them entirely, or at least to resist them as much as we can; and these are not only the wants of the body, but still more those of the heart, the imagination and the mind; for society, the family, most of the sciences and arts of civilization are pro-

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scribed, sometimes as rigorously as physical pleasures. The care of the soul and the contemplation of the Deity are the only employments. *Asceticism* may be distinguished as *religious*, which is founded on the doctrine of expiation, and seeks to appease the Divine wrath by voluntary sufferings, and *philosophical*, which aims at accomplishing the destiny of the soul, developing its faculties, and freeing it from the servitude of sense.—*Dict. des Sciences Phil.*

The *principle of asceticism* is described by Bentham (Intro. to *Prin. of Mor. and Legislation*, ch. ii.) as “that principle which approves of actions in proportion as they tend to *diminish* human happiness, and conversely disapproves of them as they tend to augment it.” But this is not a fair representation of *asceticism* in any of its forms. The only true and rational *asceticism* is temperance or moderation in all things.

“The Budhists believe that it is possible, by the performance of certain ceremonies, and the observance of a prescribed course of moral action, to arrive at the possession of supernatural powers.”—Hardy, *Eastern Monachism*, p. 225.

ASSENT (*ad sentire*—to think the same—to be of the same mind or opinion).—“Subscription to articles of religion, though no more than a declaration of the subscriber’s *assent*, may properly enough be considered in connection with the subject of oaths, because it is governed by the same rule of interpretation.”—Paley, *Mor. Phil.*, b. iii., c. 22.

Assent is that act of the mind by which we accept as true a proposition, a perception, or an idea. It is a necessary part of judgment; for, if you take away from judgment, affirmation or denial, nothing remains but a simple conception without logical value, or a proposition which must be examined before it can be admitted. It is also implied in perception, which would otherwise be a mere phenomenon which the mind had not accepted as true. *Assent* is *free* when it is not the unavoidable result of evidence, *necessary*

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when I cannot withhold it without contradicting myself. The Stoics, while they admitted that most of our ideas came from without, thought that images purely sensible could not be converted into real cognitions without a spontaneous act of the mind, which is just *assent* or belief, *συγκαταθεσις*.—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*—V. BELIEF, CONSENT.

“*Assent* of the mind to truth is, in all cases, the work not of the *understanding*, but of the *reason*. Men are not convinced by syllogisms; but when they believe a principle, or wish to believe, then syllogisms are brought in to prove it.”—Sewell, *Christ. Mor.*, chap. 21.

ASSERTORY (*ad serere*, to knit or join).—“But whether each of them be according to the kinds of *oaths* divided by the schoolmen, one *assertory*, the other *promissory*, to which some add a third, *comminatory*, is to me unknown.”—Fuller, *Worthies*, Cornwall.

Judgments have also been distinguished into the *problematic*, *assertory*, which imply no necessity, and the *apodeictic*.—V. JUDGMENT, OATH.

In Logic, *assertion* is the affirmation or denial of something.—Whately, *Logic*, b. ii., ch. 2, sect. 1.

ASSOCIATION (*ad sociare*, to accompany).—“Ideas that in themselves are not all of kin, come to be so united in some men’s minds, that it is very hard to separate them; they always keep company, and the one no sooner at any time comes into the understanding but its *associate* appears with it.”—Locke, *On Hum. Understand.*, b. ii., c. 33, sect. 5.—V. SUGGESTION, TRAIN OF THOUGHT.

“If several thoughts, or ideas, or feelings, have been in the mind at the same time, afterwards, if one of these thoughts return to the mind, some, or all of the others, will frequently return with it; this is called the *association of ideas*.”—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

“By the *law of continuity*, the mind, when the chord has once been struck, *continues*, as Hume describes it, to repeat of itself the same note again and again, till it finally dies away. By *association* it falls naturally into the same

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train of consecutive ideas, to which it has been before accustomed. Imagine a glass so constructed that when the face placed before it was withdrawn, the image should still continue reflected on it for a certain time, becoming fainter and fainter until it finally disappeared. This would represent the *law of continuity*. Imagine that when a book and a man had been once placed before it together, it should be able, when the book was next brought alone, to recall the image of the man also. This would be the *law of association*. On these two laws depends the spontaneous activity of the mind."*—Sewell, *Christ. Mor.*, ch. 14.

"The law of *association* is this,—That empirical ideas which often follow each other, create a habit in the mind, whenever the one is produced, for the other always to follow."—Kant, *Anthropology*, p. 182.

"I employ the word *association* to express the effect which an object derives from ideas, or from feelings which it does not necessarily suggest, but which it uniformly recalls to the mind, in consequence of early and long continued habits."—Stewart, *Works*, vol. ii., p. 449.

"*Intelligitur per associationem idearum non quævis naturalis et necessaria earundem conjunctio, sed quæ fortuita est, aut per consuetudinem vel affectum producitur, qua ideæ, quæ nullum naturalem inter se habent nexum, ita copulantur, ut recurrente una, tota earum catena se conspiciendum intellectui præbeat.*"—Bruckerus, *De Ideis*.

Locke, *Essay*, book ii., chap. 23; Hume, *Essays*, essay iii.; Hartley, *Observat. on Man*; Reid, *Intellect. Powers*, essay iv.; Stewart, *Elements*, vol. ii., chap. 5; Brown, *Lectures*, lect. xxxiii.

"The influence of *association* upon morals opens an ample field of inquiry. It is from this principle that we explain the reformation from theft and drunkenness in servants which we sometimes see produced by a draught of spirits in which tartar emetic had been secretly

* See the use which Butler has made of these in his *Analogy*, ch. i. and ch. v.

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dissolved. The recollection of the pain and sickness excited by the emetic, naturally associates itself with the spirits, so as to render them both equally the objects of aversion. It is by calling in this principle only that we can account for the conduct of Moses in grinding the golden calf into a powder, and afterwards dissolving it (probably by means of *hepar sulphuris*), in water, and compelling the children of Israel to drink of it as a punishment for their idolatry. This mixture is bitter and nauseous in the highest degree. An inclination to idolatry, therefore, could not be felt without being associated with the remembrance of this disagreeable mixture, and of course being rejected with equal abhorrence." — *Medical Enquiries*, by Benj. Rush, M.D., vol. ii., 8vo, Philadelphia, 1793, p. 42.

ASSUMPTION (*assumere*, to take to).—"The unities of time and place arise evidently from false assumptions."—Johnson, *Proposals for, &c.*, *Shakspeare*.

Of enunciations or præmisses, that which is taken universally is called the *proposition*, that which is less universal and comes into the mind secondarily is called the *assumption*.—Trendlenburg, *Notæ in Aristot.*

Assumption, in Logic, is the minor or second proposition in a categorical syllogism.

ATHEISM (α , priv.; and *θεος*, God).—The doctrine that there is no God.

"We shall now make diligent search and inquiry, to see if we can find any other philosophers who *atheized* before Democritus and Leucippus, as also what form of *atheism* they entertained."—Cudworth, *Intell. Syst.*, p. 111.

The name *Atheist* is said to have been first applied to Diagoras of Melos (or Delos), a follower of Democritus, who explained all things by motion and matter, or the movement of material atoms. The other form of *atheism* in ancient times was that of Thales, Anaximenes and Heraclitus, who accounted for all things by the different transformations of the one element of water. Straton of

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Lampsacus rejected the purely mechanical system of Democritus, and ascribed to matter a power of organization which gave to all beings their forms and faculties. Epicurus was the cotemporary of Straton, but the follower of Democritus, on whose system he grafted the morality which is suited to it. And the materialism of Hobbes and others in modern times has, in like manner, led to *atheism*.

It is a fine observation of Plato in his *Laws*—that *atheism* is a disease of the soul before it becomes an error of the understanding.

Leclerc, *Hist. des Systemes des Anciens Athées*. In *Bibliothèque Choisie*.

“To believe nothing of a designing principle or mind, nor any cause, measure, or rule of things but chance, so that in nature neither the interest of the *whole*, nor of any *particulars*, can be said to be in the least designed, pursued or aimed at, is to be a perfect *atheist*.”—Shaftesbury, *Inquiry Concerning Virtue*, book i., part 1, sect. 2.

Hi soli sunt athei, qui mundum rectoris sapientis consilio negant in initio constitutum fuisse atque in omni tempore administrari.—Hutcheson, *Metaphys.*, pars 3, c. 1.

Atheists are confounded with *Pantheists*; such as Xenophanes among the ancients, or Spinoza and Schelling among the moderns, who, instead of denying God, absorb everything into Him.

Atheism has been distinguished from *Anti-theism*; and the former has been supposed to imply merely the non-recognition of God, while the latter asserts His non-existence. This distinction is founded on the difference between *unbelief* and *disbelief* (Chalmers, *Nat. Theol.*, i., 58), and its validity is admitted in so far as it discriminates merely between sceptical and dogmatic *atheism*.—Buchanan, *Faith in God*, vol. i., p. 396.

“The verdict of the *atheist* on the doctrine of a God, is only that it is not proven. It is not that it is disproven. He is but an *atheist*. He is not an *anti-theist*.”—(Chalmers, *ut supra*).

ATOM, ATOMISM (α , priv. ; and $\tau\epsilon\mu\upsilon\epsilon\iota\nu$, to cut, that which cannot be cut or divided is an atom).

“Now, I say, as Ecphantus and Archelaus asserted the corporeal world to be made of *atoms*, yet notwithstanding, held an incorporeal deity, distinct from the same as the first principle of activity in it, so in like manner did all other ancient *atomists* generally before Democritus join theology and incorporealism with their atomical physiology.”—Cudworth, *Intell. Syst.*, p. 26.

“Leucippus considered the basis of all bodies to consist of extremely fine particles, differing in form and nature, which he supposed to be dispersed throughout space, and to which the followers of Epicurus first gave the name of *atoms*. To these *atoms* he attributed a rectilinear motion, in consequence of which, such as are homogeneous united, whilst the lighter were dispersed throughout space.”

The doctrine of *atomism* did not take its rise in Greece, but in the East. It is found in the Indian philosophy. Kanada, the author of the system, admitted an infinite intelligence distinct from the world. But he could not believe matter to be infinitely divisible, as in this case a grain of sand would be equal to a mountain, both being infinite. Matter consists, then, of ultimate indivisible *atoms*, which are indestructible and eternal. Empedocles and Anaxagoras did not exclude mind or spirit from the universe. Leucippus and Democritus did. Epicurus added nothing to their doctrine. Lucretius gave it the graces of poetry.

In all its forms, explaining the universe by chance or necessity, it tends to materialism or atheism, although Gassendi has attempted to reconcile it with a belief in God.—Stewart, *Active Powers*, vol. ii., last edit., 369.—**V. MOLECULE.**

ATTENTION (*ad tendere*, to apply the mind to an object).

“The natural reason of this rule is plain, for two different independent acts distract the *attention* and concernment of the audience.”—Dryden, *Pref. to Troilus and Cressida*.

“When we see, hear, or think of anything, and feel a

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desire to know more of it, we keep the mind fixed upon the object; this effort of the mind, produced by the desire of knowledge, is called *attention*." — Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

Attention is the voluntary directing of the energy of the mind towards an object or an act. It has been said by Dr. Holland (*Mental Physiol.*, p. 14), that "The phrase of *direction of consciousness* might often be advantageously substituted for it." It implies Will as distinct from Intelligence and Sensibility. It is the voluntary direction of the intelligence and activity. Condillac confounded it with a sensation of which we were passively conscious, all other sensations being as if they were not. Laromiguiere regarded it as a faculty, and as the primary faculty of the understanding, which gives birth to all the rest. But we may do an act with *attention* as well as contemplate an object with *attention*. And we may attend to a feeling as well as to a cognition. According to De Tracy (*Ideologie*, c. 11), it is a state of mind rather than a faculty. It is to be acquired and improved by habit. We may learn to be attentive as we learn to walk and to write.

According to Dr. Reid, "*Attention* is a voluntary act; it requires an active exertion to begin and to continue it; and it may be continued as long as we will; but consciousness is involuntary, and of no continuance, changing with every thought."—*Essays on Intellect. Powers*, p. 60.

Attention to external things is *observation*. *Attention* to the subjects of our own consciousness is *reflection*.

Attention and *abstraction* are the same process, it has been said, viewed in different relations. They are the positive and negative poles of the same act. The one evolves the other. *Attention* is the *abstraction* of the mind from all things else, and fixing it upon one object; and *abstraction* is the fixing the mind upon one object to the exclusion of others.

Attention and Thought.—Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, vol. i., p. 4, edit. 1848.

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“By *thought* is here meant the voluntary reproduction in our minds of those states of consciousness, to which, as to his best and most authentic documents, the teacher of moral or religious truth refers us. In *attention*, we keep the mind passive; in *thought*, we rouse it into activity. In the former, we submit to an impression—we keep the mind steady, in order to receive the stamp. In the latter, we seek to imitate the artist, while we ourselves make a copy or duplicate of his work. We may learn arithmetic or the elements of geometry, by continued *attention* alone; but self-knowledge, or an insight into the laws and constitution of the human mind, and the grounds of religion and true morality, in addition to the effort of *attention*, requires the energy of *thought*.

ATTRIBUTE (*ad tribuere*, to apportion, to ascribe) is anything that can be predicated of another.

“Heaven delights

To pardon erring man; sweet mercy seems

Its darling *attribute*, which limits justice.”

Dryden, *All for Love*.[¶]

Attributes (logical), refer not to a substance or real being, but to a subject. Consequently, *attributes* of this kind may express something different from qualities, if only they do not include a pure negation. Thus, in the famous proposition of Pascal: Man is neither an angel nor a beast,—the words which hold the place of the *attribute* represent neither a quality nor a positive idea.

“*Attributes* are usually distributed under the three heads of quality, quantity, and relation.”—Mill, *Logic*, 2d edit., vol. i., p. 83.

In the schools, the definition, the genus, the proprium, and the accident, were called dialectic *attributes*; because, according to Aristotle (*Topic*, lib. i., c. 6), these were the four points of view in which any subject of philosophical discussion should be viewed.

“A predicate, the exact limits of which are not determined, cannot be used to define and determine a subject.

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It may be called an *attribute*, and conveys not the whole nature of the subject, but some one quality belonging to it. 'Metals are heavy,' 'Some snakes are venomous,' are judgments in which this kind of predicable occurs."—Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, 2d edit., p. 161.

Attributes (real or metaphysical) are always real qualities, essential and inherent, not only in the nature, but even in the substance of things. "By this word *attribute*," said Descartes (in his letter to Regius), "is meant something which is immovable and inseparable from the essence of its subject, as that which constitutes it, and which is thus opposed to *mode*." Thus unity, identity, and activity, are *attributes* of the soul; for I cannot deny them, without, at the same time, denying the existence of the soul itself. Sensibility, liberty, and intelligence, are but *faculties*. In God there is nothing but *attributes*, because, in God everything is absolute, involved in the substance and unity of the necessary being. *In Deo non proprie modos aut qualitates, sed attributa tantum dicimus esse.*—Descartes, *Princip. Philosoph.*, i., n. 56.

Attributes are belonging to the existence of the being to which they are ascribed.

Marks or *characters*, by being in some and not in others, mark or distinguish.

Qualities are an answer to *quale sit ens*.

Properties are when a being has some properties more than other beings.

Modes or modifications are when a being, remaining essentially the same, acquires or loses some marks.

In man the essential *mark* is reason—*attribute*, capacity of learning—*mode*, actual learning—*quality*, relatively to another more or less learned.—V. QUALITY, MODE.—Peemans, *Introd. ad Philosoph.*, p. 6.

AUTHENTIC—"I oppose the word *authentic* to supposititious (or apocryphal), the word *genuine* to vitiated. I call a book *authentic* which was truly the work of the person whose name it bears. I call a book *genuine*, which remains,

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in all material points, the same as when it proceeded from the author.”—Dr. Hill, *Lectures*, vol. i., p. 17, (3d edit.) Dr. Dick appears just to reverse this definition.—*Lectures*, vol. i., p. 52.

In jurisprudence, those laws or acts are called *authentic* which are promulgated by the proper public officer, and accompanied with the conditions requisite to give them faith and force.

AUTHORITY (The principle of).—“The principle of adopting the belief of others, on a matter of opinion, without reference to the particular grounds on which the belief may rest.”—Lewis, *On Authority in Matters of Opinion*, p. 6.—
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Authority (The argument from).—It is an argument for the truth of an opinion that it has been embraced by all men, in all ages, and in all nations. *Quod semper, ubique et ab omnibus*, are the marks of universality, according to Vincentius Lirinensis. “This word is sometimes employed in its primary sense, when we refer to any one’s example, testimony, or judgment; as when, *e. g.*, we speak of correcting a reading in some book on the *authority* of an ancient MS., or giving a statement of some fact on the *authority* of such and such historians, &c. In this sense the word answers pretty nearly to the Latin *auctoritas*. It is a claim to *deference*.

“Sometimes, again, it is employed as equivalent to *potestas*, power, as when we speak of the *authority* of a magistrate. This is a claim to *obedience*.”—Whately, *Logic*, appendix 1.

Una in re consensio omnium gentium lex naturæ putanda est.—Cicero, I., Tuscul.

Multum dare solemus præsumptioni omnium hominum: Apud nos veritatis argumentum est, aliquid omnibus videri.—Seneca, epist. 117.

AUTOCRASY (αυτος, self; and κρατειν, to have power).—“The divine will is absolute, it is its own reason, it is both the producer and the ground of all its acts. It moves not by

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the external impulse or inclination of objects, but determines itself by an absolute *autocracy*.”—South, vol. vii., ser. x.

“God extends his dominion even to man’s will, that great seat of freedom, that with a kind of *autocracy* and supremacy within itself, commands its own actions, laughs at all compulsion, scorns restraint, and defies the bondage of human laws or external obligations.”—South, vol. i., ser. vii.—*V. AUTONOMY.*

AUTOMATON (*αυτοματον*, that which moves of itself.)

Automatic.—“The difference between an animal and *automatic* statue consists in this, that in the animal we trace the mechanism to a certain point, and then we are stopped, either the mechanism becoming too subtle for our discernment, or something else beside the known laws of mechanism taking place; whereas, in the *automaton*, for the comparatively few motions of which it is capable, we trace the mechanism throughout.”—Paley, *Nat. Theol.*, c. 3.

“*Automatic* motions are those muscular actions which are not dependent on the mind, and which are either persistent, or take place periodically with a regular rhythm, and are dependent on *normal* causes seated in the nerves or central organs of the nervous system.” “Movements influenced simply by sensation, and not at all by the will, are *automatic*.”—Morell, *Psychology*, p. 99.

Leibnitz, tom. i., p. 156, has said, “*anima humana est spirituale quoddam automaton.*” In a note on this passage, Bilfinger is quoted as saying that *automaton* is derived from *αυτος* and *μαω* or *ματω*, to seek or desire. The soul is a being desiring of itself, whose changes are desired by itself; whereas the common interpretation of the word is self-moving. The soul, in strict propriety, may be called self-desiring, or desiring changes of itself, as having the principle of change in itself; whereas machines are improperly called self-moving, or self-desiring, or willing.

“By the compound word *αυτοματον* (*οταν αυτο ματην γηνηται*) Aristotle expresses nature effecting either more

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or less than the specific ends or purposes to which her respective operations invariably tend."—*Nat. Auseult.*, lib. ii., cap. 6; Gillies, *Analysis of Aristotle's Works*, chap. 2, note. Nature operating *κατα συμβεβηκος*, and producing effects not in her intention, is called *αυτοματον* or chance, and art operating *κατα συμβεβηκος*, and producing effects not in her intention, is called *τυχη*, fortune. Thus, chance or fortune cannot have any existence independently of intention or design.

Automatism is one of the theories as to the activity of matter.

See Stewart, *Active Powers*, vol. ii., pp. 378, 379.

AUTONOMY (*αυτο νομος*, to be a law to itself).—In the philosophy of Kant, *autonomy* is ascribed to the reason in all matters of morality. The meaning is, that reason is sovereign, and the laws which it imposes on the will are universal and absolute. Man, as possessed of reason, is his own law-giver. In this, according to Kant, consists the true character and the only possible proof of liberty. The term *heteronomy* is applied by him to those laws which are imposed upon us by nature, or the violence done to us by our passions and our wants or desires.—*V. AUTOCRASY.*

AUTOTHEISTS (*αυτος θεος*).—*Autotheistæ* qui nulla alia entia præter se agnoscunt.—Lacoudre, *Instit. Philosoph.*, tom. ii., p. 120.

AXIOM (*αξιωμα*, from *αξιος*, worthy)—a position of worth or authority.

Diogenes Laertius (*Life of Zeno*, ch. 48) explains an *axiom*, according to Chrysippus, as meaning a proposition asserting or denying something. "It has received the name of *axiom*, *αξιωμα*, because it is either maintained, *αξιωνται*, or repudiated."

"There are a sort of propositions, which, under the name of maxims and *axioms*, have passed for principles of science."—Locke, *On Hum. Understand.*, book iv., ch. 7.

"Philosophers give the name of *axioms* only to self-evident truths that are necessary, and are not limited to time and place, but must be true at all times and in all

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places.”—Reid, *Intellectual Powers*, essay ii., chap. 20 ; see also Sir William Hamilton’s edition of *Reid*, note A, sect. 5.

Mr. Stewart (*Elements*, part 2, ch. 1) contends that *axioms* are elemental truths necessary in reasoning, but not truths from which anything can be deduced.

That all *axioms* are *intuitive* and *self-evident* truths, is, according to Mr. Tatham (*Chart and Scale of Truth*, chap. 4), a fundamental mistake into which Mr. Locke (*Essay*, b. iv., chap. 7, sect. 1), and others (*Ancient Metaphysics*, vol. i., b. v., chap. 3, p. 389, and vol. ii., p. 335), have been betrayed to the great injury of science. All *axioms* though not *intuitive* may, however, be properly said to be *self-evident* ; because, in their formation, reason judges by single comparisons without the help of a third idea or middle term ; so that they are not indebted to any *other* for their evidence, but have it in themselves ; and though inductively framed, they cannot be syllogistically proved.—*Ibid.*, chap. vii., sect. 1.

This term was first applied by mathematicians to a certain number of propositions which are self-evident, and serve as the basis of all their demonstrations. Aristotle applied it to all self-evident principles, which are the grounds of all science (*Analyt. Post.*, lib. i., chap. 2). According to him they were all subordinate to the supreme condition of all demonstration, the principle of identity and contradiction. The Stoics, under the name of *axioms*, included every kind of general proposition, whether of necessary or contingent truth. In this sense the term is employed by Bacon, who, not satisfied with submitting *axioms* to the test of experience, has distinguished several kinds of *axioms*, some more general than others (*Novum Organum*, lib. i., aphor. 13, 17, 19, &c.) The Cartesians, who wished to apply the methods of geometry to philosophy, have retained the Aristotelian use of the term. Kant has consecrated it to denote those principles which are the grounds of mathematical science, and which, according to

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him, are judgments absolutely independent of experience, of immediate evidence, and which have their origin in the pure intuition of time and space.

BEAUTY.—“All the objects we call beautiful agree in two things, which seem to concur in our sense of *beauty*. First, When they are perceived, or even imagined, they produce a certain agreeable emotion or feeling in the mind; and, secondly, This agreeable emotion is accompanied with an opinion or belief of their having some perfection or excellence belonging to them.”—Reid, *Intell. Powers*, essay viii., chap. 4.

Beauty is *absolute*, *real*, and *ideal*. The *absolutely* beautiful belongs to Deity. The *really* beautiful is presented to us in the objects of nature and the actions of human life. The *ideally* beautiful is aimed at by art. Plato identified the *beautiful* with the *good*, το καλον και αγαθον. But, although the ideas of the beautiful, of the good, and of the true are related to each other, they are distinct. There may be truth and propriety, or proportion in *beauty*—and there is a *beauty* in what is good or right, and also in what is true. But still these ideas are distinct.

Dr. Hutcheson (*Inquiry Concerning Beauty, &c.*) distinguishes *beauty* into “*absolute*; or that beauty which we perceive in objects without comparison to anything external, of which the object is supposed an imitation or picture; such as that *beauty* perceived from the works of nature; and *comparative* or relative *beauty*, which we perceive in objects, commonly considered as imitations or resemblances of something else.” According to Hutcheson, the general foundation or occasion of the ideas of *beauty* is “*uniformity amidst variety*.”—*Inquiry*, sect. 2.

Berkeley in his *Alciphron*, and Hume, in many parts of his works, make utility the foundation of *beauty*. But objects which are useful are not always beautiful, and

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objects which are beautiful are not always useful. That which is useful is useful for some end ; that which is beautiful is beautiful in itself, and independent of the pleasure which it gives, or the end it may serve.

On the question whether mental or material objects first give us feelings of *beauty*, see Stewart (*Active and Moral Powers*, vol. i., p. 279), Smith (*Theory of Moral Sentiments*, part 4., chap. 1), and Alison (*Essay on Taste*).

Dr. Price, in his *Review of Principal Questions in Morals*, sect. 2, has some remarks on natural *beauty*. See also the article *Beauty* in the *Encyclopæd. Brit.*, by Lord Jeffrey. Kames, *Elements of Criticism*, vol. i., chap. 3. Burke on *The Sublime and Beautiful*. Knight's *Enquiry into Principles of Taste*. Sir Uvedale Price on *The Picturesque*, with preface by Sir T. D. Lauder. 8vo, Edin., 1842. Stewart's *Essays*, part 2. Crousaz, *Traité de Beau*. André, *Essai sur le Beau*.—V. ÆSTHETICS, IDEAL.

BEING (το ον—that which is—existence).

“First, thou madest things which should have *being* without life ; then those which should have life and *being* ; lastly, those which have *being*, life, and reason.”—Bishop Hall, *Contemplat*. The Creation.

“This (*being*), applies to everything which exists in any way, whether as *substance* or *accident*, whether *actually* or *potentially*, whether in the nature of things, or only in our notions ; for, even what we call *entia rationis*, or fictions of our minds, such as *hippo-centaur*, or *mountain of gold*, have a *being* ; even *negation* or *privation* have an existence ; nay, according to Aristotle,* we can say that *nothing* has a *being*. In short, whenever we can use the substantive verb *is*, there must be some kind of being.”—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, book i., chap. 4.

According to some (*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*, art. *Etre*), we can have no idea of *nothing* ; according to others (Smart, *Man. of Logic*, 1849, p. 130), the knowledge of

* Το μη ον, εις οτι μη ον, φημεν.—*Metaphys.*, lib. iv., c. 2.

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contraries being one, if we know what *being* is, we know what *not being* is.

Being is either *substance* or *accident*.

Substance is either *matter* or *mind*.

Accident is divided by the other categories.—V. ONTOLOGY.

BELIEF—(That which we live by, or according to, or *lief* in German *belieben*, from *lubet*, that which pleases).

“The first great instrument of changing our whole nature, is a firm *belief*, and a perfect assent to, and hearty entertainment of the promises of the gospel.”—Bp. Taylor, vol. i., ser. xi.

“*Belief*, assent, conviction, are words which I do not think admit of logical definition, because the operation of mind signified by them, is perfectly simple, and of its own kind. *Belief* must have an object. For he who believes must believe something, and that which he believes is the object of his *belief*. *Belief* is always expressed in language by a proposition wherein something is affirmed or denied. *Belief* admits of all degrees, from the slightest suspicion to the fullest assurance. There are many operations of mind of which it is an essential ingredient; as consciousness, perception, remembrance. We give the name of evidence to whatever is a ground of *belief*. What this evidence is, is more easily felt than described. The common occasions of life lead us to distinguish evidence into different kinds; such as the evidence of sense, of memory, of consciousness, of testimony, of axioms, and of reasoning. I am not able to find any common nature to which they may all be reduced. They seem to me to agree only in this, that they are all fitted by nature to produce *belief* in the human mind, some of them in the highest degree, which we call certainty, others in various degrees according to circumstances.”—Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay ii., chap. 20, and *Inquiry*, chap. 20, sect. 5.

“St. Austin accurately says, ‘We know what rests upon *reason*; we believe what rests upon *authority*.’ But reason

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itself must rest at last upon authority ; for the original data of reason do not rest upon reason, but are necessarily accepted by reason on the authority of what is beyond itself. These data are, therefore, in rigid propriety, *beliefs* or *trusts*. Thus it is, that in the last resort, we must perforce, philosophically admit, that *belief* is the primary condition of reason, and not reason the ultimate ground of *belief*. We are compelled to surrender the proud *Intellige ut credas* of Abelard, to content ourselves with the humble *Crede ut intelligas* of Anselm."—Sir William Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note A, sect. 5.—V. FEELING, KNOWLEDGE, OPINION.

See Guizot, *Meditations, &c. Quel est le vrai sens du mot Foi*, p. 135. 8vo, Paris, 1852.

To *believe* is to admit a thing as true, on grounds sufficient, *subjectively*; insufficient, *objectively*.—Kant, *Crit. de la Raison Prat.*, p. 11.

"The word *believing* has been variously and loosely employed. It is frequently used to denote states of consciousness which have already their separate and appropriate appellations. Thus it is sometimes said, "I believe in my own existence, and the existence of an external world, I believe in the facts of nature, the axioms of geometry, the affections of my own mind," as well as "I believe in the testimony of witnesses, or in the evidence of historical documents."

"Setting aside this loose application of the term, I propose to confine it, *First*, to the effect on the mind of the premises in what is termed probable reasoning, or what I have named contingent reasoning—in a word, the premises of all reasoning, but that which is demonstrative; and, *Secondly*, to the state of *holding true* when that state, far from being the effect of any premises discerned by the mind, is dissociated from all evidence."—Bailey, *Letters on Philosoph. of Hum. Mind*. 8vo, 1851, p. 75.

BENEVOLENCE (*bene volentia*, good-will).—"When our love or desire of good goes forth to others, it is termed

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good-will or *benevolence*.”—Cogan, *On the Passions*, part 7, sect. 2, chap. 3.

Bishop Butler has said (sermon i., *On Human Nature*), that “there are as real and the same kind of indications in human nature, that we were made for society and to do good to our fellow-creatures, as that we were intended to take care of our own life and health and private good.” These principles in our nature by which we are prompted to seek and to secure our own good are comprehended under the name of self-love, and those which lead us to seek the good of others are comprehended under the name of *benevolence*. The term corresponding to this among the Greeks was *φιλανθρωπία*, among the writers of the New Testament *αγάπη*, and among the Romans *humanitas*. Under these terms are comprehended all those feelings and affections which lead us to increase the happiness, and alleviate the sufferings of others, while the term self-love includes all those principles of our nature which prompt us to seek our own good. According to some philosophers, our own good is the ultimate and only proper end of human actions, and that when we do good to others it is done with a view to our own good. This is what is called the selfish philosophy, which in modern times has been maintained by Hobbes, Mandeville, Rochefoucault, and others. The other view which is stated above in the words of Butler has been strenuously defended by Cumberland, Hutcheson, Adam Smith, and Reid, throughout their writings.

BLASPHEMY (from *βλαπτω*, *lædo*, to hurt).—“*Βλασφημία* properly denotes *calumny*, *detraction*, *reproachful* or *abusive language*, against whomsoever it be vented.”—Campbell, *On the Gospels*, Prelim. Dissert. ix., part 2.

As commonly used, it means the wanton and irreverent use of language in reference to the Divine Being or to his worship and service.* This is an offence against the light of nature, and was severely condemned by ancient ethical

* Augustine said,—*Jam vulgo blasphemia non accipitur nisi mala verba de Deo dicere.*

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writers. Among the Jews, *blasphemy* was punished by death, (Levit. xxiv. 14, 16.) And by the laws of many Christian nations it has been prohibited under heavy penalties. So late as the end of the seventeenth century, a man suffered death at Edinburgh for *blasphemy*.—See Arnot, *Crim. Trials*.

Blasphemy differs from sacrilege, in that the former consists in using language, the latter in some overt act.

BODY.—"The primary ideas we have peculiar to *body*, as contradistinguished to *spirit*, are the cohesion of solid and consequently separable parts, and a power of communicating motion by impulse."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 23.

"*Body* is the external cause to which we ascribe our sensations."—Mill, *Logic*, 2d edit., vol. i., p. 74.

Monboddo (*Ancient Metaphys.*, book ii., chap. 1), distinguishes between *matter* and *body*, and calls *body* *matte-sensible*, that is, with those qualities which make it perceptible to our senses. This leaves room for understanding what is meant by a *spiritual body*, *σωμα πνευματικον*, of which we read 1 Cor. xv. 44. He also calls *body*, "*matte with form*," in contradistinction to "*first matter*," which is matter without form.

Body is distinguished as *physical*, *mathematical*, and *metaphysical*. *Physical body* is *incomplete* or *complete*. *Incomplete* as in the *material part* of a living being; thus man is said to consist of *body* and *mind*, and *life* is something different from the *bodily frame* in animals and vegetables. *Complete*, when composed of matter and form as all natural bodies are. *Mathematical body* is the threefold dimensions of length, breadth, and thickness. *Metaphysical body* is *body* as included under the predicament of *substance*, which it divides with *spirit*.—V. MATTER, MIND, SPIRIT.

BONUM, when given as one of the transcendental properties of being, means that God hath made all things in the best possible manner to answer the wisest ends, or that no thing is destitute of its essential properties, which metaphysicians

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call perfections. Perfections are distinguished into absolute and relative, the former making the nature to which they belong happy, and excluding all imperfection; the latter belonging to inferior natures, and not excluding imperfection, but affording help and relief under its effects.—Hutcheson, *Metaphys.*, pars i., cap. 3.

Bonum Morale, or what is good, relatively to man, was distinguished into *bonum jucundum*, or what is calculated to give pleasure, as music; *bonum utile*, or what is advantageous, as wealth; and *bonum honestum*, or what is right, as temperance. These may be separate or conjoined in human actions.

Bonum Summum—the chief good.—This phrase was employed by ancient ethical philosophers to denote that in the prosecution and attainment of which the progress, perfection, and happiness of human beings consist. The principal opinions concerning it are stated by Cicero in his Treatise *De Finibus*.

Tucker, *Light of Nature*, has a chapter (27 of vol. i.), entitled "Ultimate Good," which he says is the right translation of *summum bonum*.

According to Kant, "virtue is not the entire complete good as an object of desire to reasonable finite beings; for, to have this character, it should be accompanied by happiness, not as it appears to the interested eyes of our personality, which we conceive as an end of itself, but according to the impartial judgment of reason, which considers virtue in general, in the world, as an end in itself. Happiness and virtue then, together, constitute the possession of the sovereign good in an individual, but with this condition, that the happiness should be exactly *proportioned* to the morality (this constituting the value of the individual, and rendering him worthy of happiness). The sovereign good, consisting of these two elements, represents the entire or complete good, but virtue must be considered as the supreme good, because there can be no condition higher than virtue; whilst happiness, which

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is unquestionably always agreeable to its possessor, is not of itself absolutely good, but supposes as a condition, a morally good conduct."

BROCARD.—"I make use of all the *brocardics*, or rules of interpreters; that is, not only what is established regularly, in law, but what is concluded wise and reasonable by the best interpreters."—Jeremy Taylor, Preface to *Ductor Dubitantium*.

"To the Stoics and not to the Stagirite, are we to refer the first announcement of the *brocard*. *In intellectu nihil est, quod non prius fuerit in sensu.*"—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note A, p. 772.

CAPACITY —

"If heaven to men such mighty thoughts would give,
What breast but thine *capacious* to receive
The vast infusion?"—Cowley, *The Davideis*, b. 4.

"Is it for that such outward ornament
Was lavish'd on their sex, that inward gifts
Were left for haste unfinish'd, judgment scant,
Capacity not raised to apprehend,
Or value, what is best
In choice, but ofttest to affect the wrong."—

Milton, *Samson Agonistes*.

"The original power which the mind possesses of being taught, we call *natural capacity*; and this in some degree is common to all men. The superior facility of being taught, which some possess above the rest, we call *genius*. The first transition or advances from natural power, we call *proficiency*; and the end or completion of proficiency, we call *habit*. If such habit be conversant about matter purely speculative, it is then called *science*; if it descend from speculation to practice, it is then called *art*; and if such practice be conversant in regulating the passions and affections, it is then called *moral virtue*."—Harris, *Philosoph. Arrange.*, chap. 8.

"From habit, necessarily results power or *capacity* (in Greek *δυναμις*), which Aristotle has distinguished into two

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kinds. The first is the *mere capacity of becoming anything*. The second is the *power or faculty of energizing*, according to the habit when it is formed and acquired; or, in other words, after the thing is *become* and actually exists, which at first was only in the *capacity of existing*. This, Aristotle illustrates by the example of a child, who is then only a general in power (*εν δυναμει*), that is, has the power of becoming a general. But when he is grown up and has become a general, then he has the power of the second kind, that is, the power of performing the office of a general."—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, b. i., chap. 4.

"There are powers which are acquired by use, exercise, or study, which are called *habits*. There must be something in the constitution of the mind necessary to our being able to acquire *habits*, and this is commonly called *capacity*."—Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay i., chap. 1.

Dr. Reid did not recognize the distinction of power as active or passive. But *capacity* is a passive power, or natural receptivity. A faculty is a power which we are conscious we can direct towards an end. A *capacity* is rather a disposition or aptitude to receive certain modifications of our consciousness, in receiving which we are passive. But an original *capacity*, though at first passive, may be brought under the influence of will and attention, and when so exercised it corresponds to a mental power, and is no longer a pure receptivity. In sensation, we are in the first instance passive, but our *capacity* of receiving sensations may be employed in various ways under the direction of will and attention, or personal activity.

CARDINAL (The) Virtues, prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice, were so called from *cardo*, a hinge; because they were the hinges on which other virtues turned. Each one of them was a *fons et principium*, from which other virtues took their rise.

The four *cardinal* virtues are rather the necessary and essential conditions of virtue, than each individually a virtue. For no one can by itself be manifested as a virtue.

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without the other three.—Thurot, *De l'Entendement*, tom. i., page 162.

This division of the virtues is as old as moral philosophy. It is found in the teaching of Socrates as recorded by Xenophon, with this difference, that *ευσεβεια* or regard to the Deity holds the place of prudence or knowledge, which, united to virtue, forms true wisdom. Plato notices temperance, fortitude, and prudence, and in connection with or arising out of these justice, which he considered not as the single virtue of giving all their due, but as the perfection of human nature and of human society. The term justice had been employed in the same large sense by Pythagoras, and the corresponding term righteousness, is used in Scripture to signify not one virtue, but all the virtues. The four *cardinal* virtues are alluded to in the Apocrypha, *Wisdom*, viii., 7.

The theological virtues are faith, hope, and charity; which being added to the *cardinal*, make the number seven.

“Justice, temperance, fortitude, and prudence, the old heads of the family of virtues, give us a division which fails altogether; since the parts are not distinct, and the whole is not complete. The portions of morality so laid out, both over-lap one another, or are undistinguishable; and also, leave parts of the subject which do not appear in the distribution at all.”—Whewell, *Systemat. Mor.*, lect. iv.

Clodius, *De Virtutibus quas Cardinales Appellant*. 4to, Leips., 1815. Plethon, *De Quatuor Virtutibus Cardinalibus*. 8vo, Basl., 1552.

CASUISTRY is a department of ethics—“the great object of which is to lay down rules or canons for directing us *how* to act, wherever there is any room for doubt or hesitation.”—Stewart, *Active Powers*, b. iv., chap. 5, sect. 4.

To *casuistry*, as ethical or moral, belongs the decision of what are called cases of conscience—that is, cases in which we are under obligation, but cases which from the special circumstances attending give rise to doubt whether or how far the obligation may be relaxed or dissolved—such as

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the obligation to keep a promise obtained by fraud, or extorted by force.

CATALEPSY.—“The speculations of Berkeley and Boscovich on the non-existence of matter, and of Kant and others on the arbitrariness of all our notions, are interested in, for they appear to be confuted by, the intuitions of *cataleptics*. The *cataleptic* apprehends or perceives directly the objects around her; but they are the same as when realized through her senses. She notices no difference; size, form, colour, distance, are elements as real to her now as before. In respect again to the future, she sees it, but not in the sense of the annihilation of time; she foresees it; it is the future present to her; time she measures, present and future, with strange precision—strange, yet an approximation, instead of this certainty, would have been more puzzling.

“So that it appears that our notions of matter, force, and the like, and of the conditions of space and time, apart from which we can conceive nothing, are not figments to suit our human and temporary being, but elements of eternal truth.”—Mayo, *On Popular Superstitions*, p. 125. 8vo, 3d edit., Edin., 1851.

How far is the argument in the foregoing passage affected by the fact, that in sleep and in dreams we have sensations and perceptions in reference to objects which are not within the reach of the senses?

The paradox of Berkeley may be confuted in two ways:—First, by a *Reductio ad absurdum*; second, no single existence can effect any change or event, and a change or event of some kind there must be, in order to create those sensations or states of mind in which consciousness consists. There must, therefore, be something in existence foreign to ourselves, for no change, in other words, nothing which stands in the relation of cause and effect, is conceivable, but what is the result of two existences acting upon each other.

See Sir Gilbert Blane on *Muscular Motion*, p. 258, note.

CATEGORY (*κατα αγειρειν*, to bring together, or, *καταγορειν*, to accuse, to attribute).

“So again, the distribution of things into certain tribes, which we call *categories* or *predicaments*, are but cautions against the confusion of definitions and divisions.”—Bacon, *Adv. of Learning*, b. ii.

The *categories* are the highest classes to which all the objects of knowledge can be reduced, and in which they can be arranged in subordination and system. Philosophy seeks to know all things. But it is impossible to know all things individually. They are, therefore, arranged in classes, according to properties which are common to them. And when we know the definition of a class, we attain to a formal knowledge of all the individual objects of knowledge contained in that class. Every individual man we cannot know; but if we know the definition of man, we know the nature of man, of which every individual of the species participates; and in this sense we may be said to know all men. This attempt to render knowledge in some sense universal, has been made in all ages of philosophy, and has given rise to the *categories* which have appeared in various forms. They are to be found in the philosophy of Eastern nations, as a classification of things and of ideas. The *categories* of the followers of Pythagoras have been preserved by Aristotle in the first book of his *Metaphysics*. Those ascribed to Archytas are now regarded as apocryphal, and as having been fabricated about the beginning of the Christian era, to lower the reputation of Aristotle, whose *categories* are well known. They are ten in number, viz., —*ουσια*, substance; *ποσον*, quantity; *ποιον*, quality; *προς τι*, relation; *που*, place; *ποτε*, time; *κεισθαι*, situation; *εχειν*, possession, or manner of holding; *ποιειν*, action; and *πασχειν*, suffering. The Mnemonic verses which contain them, are:—

Arbor sex servos ardore refrigerat ustos
Cras rure stabo, sed tunicatus ero.*

* A humorous illustration of the categories is given by Cornelius to his pupil Martinus Scriblerus. Calling up the coachman, he asked him what he had seen at

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The *categories* of Aristotle are both logical and metaphysical, and apply to things as well as to words. Regarded logically, they are reducible to two, *substance* and *attribute*. Regarded metaphysically, they are reducible to *being* and *accident*. The Stoics reduced them to four, viz., substance, quality, manner of being, and relation. Plotinus attempted a new system. But the *categories* of Aristotle were acquiesced in till the time of Bacon, who recommended observation rather than classification. Descartes arranged all things under two great *categories*, the absolute and the relative. In the *Port Royal Logic*, seven *categories* are established. In more modern times the *categories* of Kant are well known. They are quantity, quality, relation, and modality. But they are purely subjective, and give merely a classification of the conceptions or judgments of the understanding. In the history of philosophy, the *categories* have been successively a classification universal of things, of words, of ideas, or of forms of thought. And a complete theory of classification, or a complete system of *categories* is still a desideratum.—Monboddo, *Origin of Lang.*, vol. i., p. 520, and *Ancient Metaphys.*, b. iii., chap. 1.—V. PREDICAMENT, UNIVERSAL.

Mr. Mill (*System of Logic*, I. iii., ult.), gives the following classification of all nameable things.

1. Feelings or states of consciousness.
2. The minds which experience these feelings.
3. The bodies or external objects which excite certain of these feelings, together with the power or properties whereby they excite them.
4. The successions and co-existences, the likenesses and unlikenesses, between feelings or states of consciousness.

the bear-garden? The man answered he had seen two men fight for a prize; one was a fair man, a sergeant in the Guards; the other black, a butcher; the sergeant had red breeches, the butcher blue; they fought upon a stage about four o'clock, and the sergeant wounded the butcher in the leg. Mark (quoth Cornelius) how the fellow runs through the predicaments—men (*substantia*)—two (*quantitas*)—fair and black (*qualitas*)—sergeant and butcher (*relatio*)—wounded the other (*actio et passio*)—fighting (*situs*)—stage (*ubi*)—four o'clock (*quando*)—blue and red breeches (*habitus*).

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A *categorical* proposition is one which affirms or denies a predicate of a subject, absolutely, and without any hypothesis.—Whately, *Logic*, b. ii., chap. 2, sect. 4.

A *categorical* answer is an express and pertinent reply to a question proposed.

CAUSALITY, CAUSATION, CAUSE.**CAUSE.—**

“He knew the *cause* of every maladic,
Were it of cold, or hot, or moist, or drie.”

Chaucer, *Prologue*, v. 421.

“The general idea of *cause* is, that without which another thing called the *effect*, cannot be; and it is divided by Aristotle (*Metaphys.*, lib. 5, cap. 2), into four kinds, known by the name of the *material*, the *formal*, the *efficient*, and the *final*. The first is that of which any thing is made. Thus brass or marble are the *material* causes of a statue; earth, air, fire, and water, of all natural bodies. The *formal cause* is the form, idea, archetype, or pattern of a thing; for all these words Aristotle uses to express it. Thus the idea of the artist is the *formal cause* of the statue; and of all natural substances, if we do not suppose them the work of chance, the *formal cause* are the ideas of the divine mind; and this form concurring with the matter, produces every work, whether of nature or art. The *efficient cause* is the principle of change or motion which produces the thing. In this sense the statuary is the *cause* of the statue, and the God of nature the *cause* of all the works of nature. And lastly, the *final cause* is that for the sake of which any thing is done. Thus the statuary makes the statue for pleasure or for profit; and the works of nature are all for some good end.”—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, b. i., chap. 4.

In *Metaphys.*, lib. i., cap. 3, Aristotle says we may distinguish four kinds of causes. The *first* is the *form* proper to each thing. Το τι ην ειναι. This is the *quidditas* of the schoolmen, the *causa formalis*. The *second* is the matter and the subject. Τη ύλη και το ύποκειμενον, *causa*

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materialis. The *third* is the principle of movement which produced the thing. Αρχη της κινήσεως, *causa efficiens*. The *fourth* is the reason and good of all things ; for the end of all phenomena and of all movement is good. Το όν ένεκα και ταραθον, *causa finalis*. The sufficient reason of Leibnitz, which he, like Aristotle, thought to be essentially good.

In *Metaphys.*, lib. iii., cap. 2, Aristotle says, "It is possible that one object may combine all the kinds of *causes*. Thus, in a house, the *principle of movement* is the art and the workman, the *final cause* is the work, the *matter* the earth and stones, and the *plan* is the *form*." See also *Nat. Auseult.*, lib. ii., cap. 3, quoted by Harris concerning Art. p. 24.

In addition to these four causes, Dr. Gillies (*Analysis of Aristotle's Works*, chap. ii., note, p. 100), says, "The *model* or *exemplar* was considered as a *cause* by the Pythagoreans and Platonists ; the former of whom maintained that all perceptible things were imitations of *numbers* ; and the latter, that they owed their existence to the participation of *ideas* ; but wherein either this imitation or this participation consisted, these philosophers, Aristotle observes, omitted to show."

Seneca, in *Epist.* 66 and 67, explains the common and Platonic divisions of causes ; and arraigns both, because he conceived that space, time, and motion, ought to be included.

Sir W. Hamilton (*Reid's Works*, p. 690, note), says, "The *exemplary cause* was introduced by Plato ; and was not adopted by the schoolmen as a fifth *cause* in addition to Aristotle's four."

It is noticed by Suarez and others.

According to Derodon (*De Prædicamentis*, p. 114), material and formal *causes* are *internal*, and constitute the essence of a thing ; efficient, final, and exemplary *causes* are *external*, that is, out from or of the essence of a thing. The material *cause* is that, *ex quo*, any thing is, or becomes. The formal *cause* is that, *per quod*. The efficient *cause* is

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that, *a quo*. The final *cause* is that, *propter quod*. And the exemplary *cause* is that, *ad cujus imitationem res fit*.

When the word *cause* is used without an adjective, it commonly means, active power, that which produces change, or *efficient cause*.

Suarez, Rivius, and others, define a *cause* thus:—*Causam esse principium per se influens esse in aliud*.

“A *cause* is that which, of itself, makes any thing begin to be.”—Irons, *Final Causes*, p. 74.

We conceive of a *cause* as existing and operating before the effect which is produced. But, to the production of an effect, more causes than one may be necessary. Hence it has been said by Mr. Karlake (*Aids to the Study of Logic*, vol. ii., p. 43), “The *cause* of a thing is that antecedent (or aggregate of antecedents), which is seen to have an intimate connection with the effect, viewed, if it be not itself a self-determining agent, in reference to a self-acting power, whose agency it exhibits.” And some, instead of the word *cause*, would prefer in many cases to use the word *concauses*.

“Though the antecedent is most strictly the *cause of a thing being*, as, *e. g.*, the passage of the moon between the earth and the sun is the *cause* of an eclipse, yet the effect is that which commonly presents itself to us as the *cause of our knowing it to be*. Hence, by what seems to us a strange inversion of *cause* and effect, *effect was said to be a cause*, a *causa cognoscendi*, as distinguished from a *causa essendi*, the strict *cause*.”—Karlake, *Aids to Study of Logic*, vol. ii., p. 38.

CAUSALITY and CAUSATION.

“Now, if there be no spirit, matter must of necessity move itself, where you cannot imagine any activity or *causality*, but the bare essence of the matter, from whence the motion comes.”—H. More, *Immortality of the Soul*, book i., chap. 6.

“Now, always God’s word hath a *causation* with it. He said to him, Sit, that is, he made him sit, or, as it is here

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expressed, he made him sit with a mighty power.”—Goodwin, *Works*, vol. i., part 1, p. 406.

Causality, in actu primo, is the energy or power in the *cause** by which it produces its effect; as heat in the fire. *Causality, in actu secundo*, is *causation* or the operation of the power by which the *cause* is actually producing its effect. It is, *influxus ille, a quo causa influit esse in effectum quæ distinguitur a parte rei, tam a principio, quam a termino, sive ab effectu, ad quem tendit*. “The changes of which I am conscious in the state of my own mind, and those which I perceive in the external universe, impress me with a conviction that some *cause* must have operated to produce them. There is an intuitive judgment involving the simple idea of *causation*.”—Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, i., chap. 3.

From the explanation of these terms, it appears that a cause is something which not only *precedes*, but has power to *produce* the effect. And when the effect has been produced, we say it is in consequence of the power in the cause having operated. The belief that every effect implies a cause, or that every change is produced by the operation of some power, is regarded by some as a primitive belief, and has been denominated by the phrase, the † *principle of causality*. Hume, and others, however, have contended that we have no proper idea of cause as implying power to produce, nor of any necessary connection between the operation of this power and the production of the effect. All that we see or know is mere succession, antecedent and

* The idea of the *reason* is not to be confounded with that of *causality*. It is a more elevated idea, because it applies to all orders of things, while *causality* extends only to things in time. It is true we speak sometimes of the eternal cause; but thus the idea of cause is synonymous with that of the reason. This idea of the reason expresses the relation of a being or thing to what is contained within it; in other words, the reason expresses the *rapport du contenant au contenu*, or the reason is that whose essence encloses the essence and existence of another thing. We thus arrive at the conception of all being contained in God, who is the supreme reason.—Ahrens, *Cours de Psychol.*, tom. ii.—V. REASON.

† Lord Bacon (*Nov. Organ.*, book ii., sect. 14), says, “There are some things ultimate and incausable.”

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consequent; but having seen things in this relation, we associate them together, and imagining that there is some *vinculum* or connection between them, we call the one the cause, and the other the effect. Dr. Thomas Brown adopts this view with the modification that it is in cases where the antecedence and consequence is *invariable* that we attain to the idea of cause. Experience, however, can only testify that the succession of one thing to another has, in so far as it has been observed, been *unvaried*, not that in the nature of things it is *invariable*. Mr. Locke (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 21 and 26), ascribes the origin of our idea of cause to our experience of the sensible changes which one body produces on another, as fire upon wax. Our belief in an external world rests partly on the principle of *causality*. Our sensations are referred to external objects as their causes. Yet, the idea of *power* which is involved in that of cause, he traces to the consciousness of our possessing power in ourselves. This is the view taken of the origin of our idea of cause by Dr. Reid. "In the strict philosophical sense, I take a cause to be that which has the relation to the effect which I have to my voluntary and deliberate actions; for I take this notion of a cause to be derived from the power I feel in myself to produce certain effects. In this sense we say that the Deity is the cause of the universe."—*Correspondence of Dr. Reid*, p. 77. And at p. 81 he has said, "I see not how mankind could ever have acquired the conception of a cause, or of any relation beyond a mere conjunction in time and place between it and its effects, if they were not conscious of active exertions in themselves, by which effects are produced. This seems to me to be the origin of the idea, or conception of production."

By origin, however, Dr. Reid must have meant occasion. At least he held that the principle of *causality*, or the belief that every change implies the operation of a cause, is a natural judgment, or *à priori* conviction, necessary and universal. But if the idea of a cause be empirical and grounded on experience, it may be difficult to show how a

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higher origin can be claimed for the principle of *causality*. Mr. Stewart has expressed himself in language equivalent to that of Dr. Reid. And Maine de Biran (*Nouvelles Considerat. sur le Rapport du Physique et du Moral de l'homme*, 8vo, Par., 1834, pp. 274, 290, 363, 402), thinks that the true origin of our idea of cause is to be found in the activity of the will, or in the consciousness that we are causes, or have in ourselves the power of producing change. Having found the idea of power within the sphere of consciousness, we, by a process which he calls natural induction, project this idea into the external world, and ascribe power to that which we call cause. According to Kant we have the idea of cause, and also the belief that every commencing phenomenon implies the operation of a cause. But these are merely forms of our understanding, subjective conditions of human thought. In conformity with a pre-existing law of our intelligence, we arrange phenomena according to the relation of cause and effect. But we know not whether, independently of our form of thought, there be any reality corresponding to our idea of cause, or of productive power. The view that the idea of cause is furnished by the fact of our being conscious of possessing power, meets the idealism of Kant, for what greater reality can be conceived than a fact of consciousness? But if experience of external phenomena can be accepted as the origin (or rather as the occasion) of our notion of change, and if consciousness of internal phenomena can be accepted as the origin (or rather as the occasion) of our notion of power to produce change, the idea of a necessary and universal connection between change and the power which produces it, in other words, a belief in the principle of *causality*, can only be referred to the reason, the faculty which apprehends, not what is contingent and passing, but what is permanent and absolute.

“Cousin's theory concerning the origin of idea of *causality* is, that the mind, when it perceives that the agent and the change vary in cases of personal agency (though here

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he is not very explicit), several times repeated; while the relation between them, viz., the strict idea of personal causation, never varies, but is necessary, that the mind abstracts the invariable and necessary element from the variable and contingent elements of the fact, and thus arrives at the idea of *causality*.”—*Essay on Causality*, by an Undergraduate, 1854, p. 3.

“**Causation** is not an object of sense. The only experience we can have of it, is in the consciousness we have of exerting some power in ordering our thoughts and actions. But this experience is surely too narrow a foundation for a general conclusion, that all things that have had or shall have a beginning, must have a cause. This is to be admitted as a first or self-evident principle.”—Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay vi., chap. 6.

But Locke has said (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 21, sect. 4), “The idea of the beginning of motion we have only from reflection on what passes in ourselves, where we find by experience, *that barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the mind*, we can move the parts of our bodies which were before at rest.”

See Cousin, *Œuvres Prem. Ser.*, tom. i., cours. 1817, and *Hist. de Philosoph. Mod.*, sect. 19. See also on the various theories as to the origin of our judgment of cause and effect, Sir Will. Hamilton, *Discussions*, app. 1.

CAUSES (Final, Doctrine of).—When we see means independent of each other conspiring to accomplish certain ends, we naturally conclude that the ends have been contemplated, and the means arranged by an intelligent agent; and, from the nature of the ends and of the means, we infer the character or design of the agent. Thus, from the ends answered in creation being wise and good, we infer not only the existence of an Intelligent Creator, but also that He is a Being of infinite wisdom and goodness. This is commonly called the argument from design or from *final causes*. It was used by Socrates (see Xenophon, *Memorabilia*), and found a place in the scholastic philosophy. But

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Lord Bacon has said (*De Aug. Scient.*, lib. iii., cap. 5), that the inquiry into *final causes* is sterile. And Descartes maintained that we cannot know the designs of God in creating the universe, unless he reveal them to us. But Leibnitz, in maintaining the principle of sufficient reason, upheld the doctrine of *final causes*, and thought it equally applicable in physics and in metaphysics. It is true that in physical science we should prosecute our inquiries without any preconceived opinion as to the ends to be answered, and observe the phenomena as they occur, without forcing them into the service of an hypothesis. And it is against this error that the language of Bacon was directed. But when our contemplations of nature reveal to us innumerable adjustments and arrangements working out ends that are wise and good, it is natural to conclude that they have been designed by a *cause* sovereignly wise and good. Notwithstanding the doubts as to the logical validity of this argument, which have been started by Kant, Coleridge, and others, it continues to be regarded as the most popular and impressive mode of proving the being and perfections of God. And the validity of it is implied in the universally admitted axiom of modern physiology, that there is no organ without its function. We say of some things in nature that they are useless. All we can truly say is, that we have not yet discovered their use. Every thing has an end to the attainment or accomplishment of which it continually tends. This is the form in which the doctrine of *final causes* was advocated by Aristotle. With him it was not so much an argument from design, as an argument against chance. But if things do not attain their ends by chance it must be by design. Aristotle, it is true, was satisfied that ends were answered by tendencies in nature. But whence or why these tendencies in nature, but from an Intelligent Author of nature?

“If we are to judge from the explanations of the principle given by Aristotle, the notion of a *final cause*, as

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originally conceived, did not necessarily imply design. The theological sense to which it is now commonly restricted, has been derived from the place assigned to it in the scholastic philosophy; though, indeed, the principle had been long before beautifully applied by Socrates and by the Stoics to establish the truth of a Divine Providence. Whenever, indeed, we observe the adjustment of means to an end, we seem irresistibly impelled to conclude that the whole is the effect of design. The present acceptation, therefore, of the *doctrine of final causes*, is undoubtedly a natural one. Still it is not a necessary construction of the *doctrine*. With Aristotle, accordingly, it is simply an inquiry into tendencies—an investigation of any object or phenomenon, from considering the *ἕνεκα τούτου*, the reason of it in something else which follows it, and to which it naturally leads.

His theory of *final causes* is immediately opposed to a doctrine of chance, or spontaneous coincidence; and must be regarded as the denial of that, rather than as a positive assertion of design. He expressly distinguishes, indeed, between thought and nature. He ascribes to nature the same working in order to ends, which is commonly regarded as the attribute of thought alone. He insists that there is no reason to suppose deliberation necessary in these workings of nature, since it is “as if the art of ship-building were in the timber, or just as if a person should act as his own physician.”—Hampden, *Introd. to Mor. Phil.*, lect. iv., p. 113.

“The argument from *final causes*,” says Dr. Reid (*Intell. Powers*, essay vi., chap. 6), “when reduced to a syllogism, has these two premises:—First, that design and intelligence in the *cause* may, with certainty, be inferred from marks or signs of it in the effect. This we may call the major proposition of the argument. The second, which we call the minor proposition, is, that there are in fact the clearest marks of design and wisdom in the works of nature; and the conclusion is, that the works of nature are the effects

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of a wise and intelligent *cause*. One must either assent to the conclusion, or deny one or other of the premises."

Hampden, *Introd. to Mor. Phil.*, p. 110-113; Irons, *Doctrine of Final Causes*, 8vo, Lond., 1856. The argument from design is prosecuted by Paley, in *Nat. Theology*; *Bridgewater Treatises*; *Burnett Prize Essays*, &c.

Causes (Occasional, Doctrine of).—This phrase has been employed by the Cartesians to explain the commerce or mode of communicating between mind and matter. The soul being a thinking substance, and extension being the essence of body, no intercourse can take place between them without the intervention of the First Cause. It is Deity himself, therefore, who, on the *occasion* of certain modifications in our mind, excites the corresponding movements of body; and, on the *occasion* of certain changes in our body, awakens the corresponding feelings in the mind. This theory, which is involved in the philosophy of Descartes, was fully developed by Malebranche, Regis, and Geulinx. Laforge limited the theory to involuntary movements, and thus reconciled it in some degree to experience and common sense. Malebranche's *doctrine* is commonly called the "vision of all things in God"—who is the "light of all our seeing."

According to this theory, the admirable structure of the body and its organs is useless; as a dull mass would have answered the purpose equally well.

CERTAINTY, CERTITUDE (*Certum* (from *cerno*), *proprie idem sit, quod decretum ac proinde firmum*. Vossius).

"This way of *certainty* by the knowledge of our own ideas, goes a little farther than bare imagination; and I believe it will appear that all the *certainty* of general truths a man has, lies in nothing else."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iii., chap. 4.

"*Certain*, in its primary sense, is applied (according to its etymology from *cerno*), to the state of a person's mind; denoting any one's full and complete conviction; and *generally*, though not always, implying that there is suffi-

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cient *ground* for such conviction. It was thence easily transferred metonymically to the *truths* or *events*, respecting which this conviction is rationally entertained. And uncertain (as well as the substantives and adverbs derived from these adjectives), follows the same rule. Thus we say, "It is certain, &c., meaning that *we* are sure; whereas the fact may be *uncertain* and *certain* to different individuals. From not attending to this, the words *uncertain* and *contingent* have been considered as denoting some quality in the things themselves—and *chance* has been regarded as a real agent."—Whatley, *Logic*, appendix 1.

"*Certainty* is truth brought methodically to the human intellect, that is, conducted from principle to principle, to a point which is evident in itself. It is the relation of truth to knowledge, of God to man, of ontology to psychology." Tiberghien, *Essai des Connais. Hum.*, p. 35.

"In accurate reasoning, the word *certain* ought never to be used as merely synonymous with *necessary*. Physical events we call *necessary*, because of their depending on *fixed causes*, not on *known causes*; when they depend also on *known causes*, they may be called *certain*. The variations of the weather arise from *necessary* and *fixed causes*, but they are proverbially uncertain." — Coplestone, *Remains*, 8vo, Lond., 1854, p. 98.

When we affirm, without any doubt, the existence or non-existence of a being or phenomenon, the truth or falsity of a proposition, the state in which our mind is we call *certainty*—and we say of the object of knowledge that it is evident or certain. According to the mode in which it is attained, *certainty* is *immediate* by sense and intuition, and *mediate* by reasoning and demonstration. According to the grounds on which it rests it is called *metaphysical*, when we firmly adhere to truth which cannot be otherwise. Such as the first principles of natural law, or the difference between right and wrong. *Physical*, when we adhere to truth which cannot be otherwise, according to the laws of nature, but which may be by miracle; as, fire will *certainly*

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burn—although it did not burn the Hebrew youths (Dan., chap. iii.) *Moral*, when we adhere to truth which is in accordance with the common order of things, and the common judgment of men—although it may be otherwise without a miracle.

Moral *certainty* may amount to the highest degree of *probability*, and to all practical purposes may be as influential as *certainty*. For it should be observed that *probability* and *certainty* are two states of mind, and not two modes of the reality. The reality is one and the same, but our knowledge of it may be probable or certain. *Probability* has more or less of doubt and admits of degrees. *Certainty* excludes doubt and admits neither of increase nor diminution.

Certainty supposes an object to be known, a mind to know, and the result of a communication or relation being established between them which is knowledge; and certain knowledge or *certainty* is the confidence with which the mind reposes in the information of its faculties. Self-consciousness reveals with *certainty* the different states and operations of our own minds. We cannot doubt the reality of what our senses clearly testify. The operations of memory may give us *certainty* as to the past. Reason reveals to us first truths with intuitive *certainty*. And by demonstration we ascend with *certainty* from one truth to another. For to use the words of Thomas Aquinas (*De Veritate*), "*Tunc conclusiones, pro certe, sciuntur, quando resolvuntur in principia, et ideo, quod aliquod per certitudinem sciatur, est ex lumine rationis divinitus interius indito, quo in nobis loquitur Deus, non autem ab homine exterius docente, nisi quatenus conclusiones in principia resolvit, nos docens, ex quo tamen nos certitudinem non acciperemus, nisi in nobis esset certitudo principiorum, in quæ conclusiones resolvuntur.*"

"The criterion of true knowledge is not to be looked for any where abroad without our own minds, neither in the height above, nor in the depth beneath, but only in our knowledge and conceptions themselves. For the entity of

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all theoretical truth is nothing else but clear intelligibility, and whatever is clearly conceived, is an entity and a truth; but that which is false, Divine power itself cannot make it to be clearly and distinctly understood, because falsehood is a non-entity, and a clear conception is an entity; and Omnipotence itself cannot make a non-entity to be an entity."—Cudworth, *Eternal and Immutable Mor.*, book iv., chap. 5.

"The theories of *certitude* may be reduced to three classes. The *first* places the ground of *certitude* in *reason*; the *second* in *authority*; the *third* in *evidence*; including, under that term, both the external manifestations of truth, and the internal principles or laws of thought by which we are determined in forming our judgments in regard to them."—Buchanan, *Faith in God*, vol. ii., p. 304.

"*De veritatis criterio frustra laborantur quidam: quum non alia reperienda sit præter ipsam rationis facultatem, aut menti congenitam intelligendi vim.*"—Hutcheson, *Metaphys.*, pars. i., cap. 2.

Protagoras and Epicurus in ancient times, and Hobbes and the modern sensationalists, have made sense the measure and ground of *certainty*. Descartes and his followers founded it on self-consciousness, *Cogito ergo sum*, while others have received as certain only what is homologated by human reason in general. But *certainty* is not the peculiar characteristic of knowledge furnished by any one faculty, but is the common inheritance of any or all of our intellectual faculties when legitimately exercised within their respective spheres. When so exercised we cannot but accept the result as true and certain.

But if we are thus naturally and necessarily determined to accept the knowledge furnished by our faculties, that knowledge, according to Kant, cannot be proved to be absolute, or a knowledge of things in themselves, and as they must appear to all intelligent beings, but is merely relative, or a knowledge of things as they appear to us. Now, it is true that we cannot, as Kant has expressed it,

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objectify the subjective. Without rising out of human nature to the possession of a higher, we cannot sit in judgment on the faculties of that nature. But in admitting that our knowledge is *relative*, we are merely saying it is human. It is according to the measure of a man. It is attained by human faculties, and must be relative, or bear proportion to the faculties by which it is attained. In like manner, the knowledge of angels may be called angelic, but this is not to call it uncertain. We may not know all that can be known of the objects of our knowledge, but still, what we do know, we may know with *certainty*. Human knowledge may admit of increase without being liable to be contradicted or overturned. We come to it by degrees, but the higher degree of knowledge to which we may ultimately attain, does not invalidate the lower degree of knowledge. It rests upon it and rises out of it, and the ground and encouragement of all inquiry is, that there is a truth and reality in things which our faculties are fitted to apprehend. Their testimony we rejoice to believe. Faith in their trustworthiness is spontaneous. Doubt concerning it is an afterthought. And scepticism as a creed is self-destructive. He who doubts is *certain* that he doubts. *Omnis, qui utrum sit veritas, dubitat, in se ipso habet verum, unde non dubitet.*—Augustin, *De vera Religione*.

Etiam qui negat, veritatem esse, concedit veritatem esse; si enim veritas non est, verum est, veritatem non esse. Thomas Aquin., *Sum. Theol.*; Savary, *sur la Certitude*, 8vo, Paris, 1847.—V. EVIDENCE, CRITERION.

CHANCE.—Aristotle defines *chance* to be a “cause not manifest to human reasoning.” Δοκει, μεν, αιτια η τυχη, αδηλον δε ανθρωπινη διανοια.—*Phys.*, ii., 4.

“Many things happen, besides what man intends or purposes; and also some things happen different from what is aimed at by nature. We cannot call them natural things, or from nature, neither can we say that they are from human intention. They are what we call fortuitous events, and the cause which produces them is called *chance*. But

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they have all respect to some end intended by nature or by man. So that nothing can be more true than what Aristotle says (*Phys.*, lib. ii.), that if there were no end intended, there could be no *chance*.

“A man digs a piece of ground, to sow or plant it; but, in digging, he finds a treasure. This is beside his intention, and therefore it is said to be by *chance*.”

“When a hanging wall falls upon a passenger and crushes him, the destination of nature was only, that the stones of the wall being no longer kept together by the cement, should fall to the ground, according to their natural movement; so that the crushing of the man was something beside the purpose of nature, or *παρα Φυσιν*.”—Monboddo, *Ancient. Metaphys*, book ii., chap. 20.

As to Aristotle's views of *fortune* and *chance*, see Piccolomineus, *Philosoph. de Moribus*, 1583, p. 713.

Chance is opposed to law in this sense, viz., that what happens according to law may be predicted, and counted on. But everything has its own law and its proper cause; and *chance* merely denotes that we know not the proper cause, nor the law according to which a phenomenon occurs.

An event or series of events which seems to be the result neither of a necessity inherent in the nature of things, nor of a plan conceived by intelligence, is said to happen by *chance*.

“It is not, I say, merely in a pious manner of expression, that the Scripture ascribes every event to the providence of God; but it is strictly and philosophically true in nature and reason, that there is no such thing as *chance* or accident; it being evident that these words do not signify anything that is truly an agent or the cause of any event; but they signify merely men's ignorance of the real and immediate cause.”—Clarke, vol. i., sermon xcvi.

“If a die be thrown, we say it depends upon *chance* what side may turn up; and, if we draw a prize in a lottery, we ascribe our success to *chance*. We do not, however, mean that these effects were produced by no cause,

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but only that we are ignorant of the cause that produced them.”—Arthur, *Discourses*, p. 17.

CHARITY (*αγαπη*), as one of the theological virtues, is a principle of prevailing love to God, prompting to seek his glory and the good of our fellow-men.

Sometimes it is used as synonymous with brotherly love, or that principle of benevolence which leads us to promote, in all possible ways, the happiness of others.

In a more restricted sense it means almsgiving, or relieving the wants of others by communication of our means and substance.

CHASTITY is the duty of restraining and governing the appetite of sex. It includes purity of thought, speech, and behaviour. Lascivious imaginings, and obscene conversation, as well as incontinent conduct, are contrary to the duty of *chastity*.

CHOICE.

“The necessity of continually *choosing* one of the two, either to act or to forbear acting, is not inconsistent with or an argument against liberty, but is itself the very essence of liberty.”—Clarke, *Attributes*, prop. 10.

For the principle of deliberate *choice*, Aristotle thought that the rational and irrational should concur, producing “orectic intellect,” or “dianoetic appetite,” of which he emphatically says,—“And this principle is man.”—*Catholic Philosophy*, p. 46.

Ὁ μὲν νοῦς οὐ φαίνεται κινῶν ἀνεῦ ὀρεξέως.—Aristotle.

Voluntas est quæ quid cum ratione desiderat.—Cicero.

Mr. Locke says, “The will signifies nothing but a power or ability to *prefer* or *choose*.” And in another passage he says, “The word *preferring* seems best to express the act of volition; yet it does not precisely, for though a man would *prefer* flying to walking, yet who can say he ever *wills* it?”—By Jonathan Edwards (*Essay on Freedom of Will*, sect. 1), *choice* and *volition* are completely identified. But, in popular language *choosing* or *preferring* may mean, 1, A conclusion of the understanding; as when I say—I prefer

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or choose peaches rather than plums ; *i. e.*, I reckon them a better and safer fruit.

2. A state of inclination or sensibility . as—I prefer or choose plums rather than pears ; that is, I like them better ; or,

3. A determination of will : as—I prefer or choose pears, meaning, that with the offer of other fruits, I take this.

It is only in the latter sense that *choice* and *volition* are the same.

“ *Choice* or *preference*, in the proper sense, is an act of the understanding ; but sometimes it is improperly put for *volition*, or the determination of the will in things where there is no judgment or preference ; thus, a man who owes me a shilling, lays down three or four equally good, and bids me take which I choose. I take one without any judgment or belief that there is any ground of preference ; this is merely an act of will, that is, a *volition*.”—*Correspondence of Dr. Reid*, p. 79.

CHREMATISTICS (*χρηματα*, substance) is the science of wealth, or as it is more commonly called, Political Economy, or that department of social science which treats of the resources of a country, and of the best means of increasing them, and of diffusing them most beneficially among the inhabitants, regarded as individuals, or as constituting a community.

CIVILITY or **COURTEOUSNESS** belongs to what has been called the lesser moralities. It springs from benevolence or brotherly love, and manifests itself by kindness and consideration in manner and conversation towards others. It is distinguished into *natural* and *conventional*. It is opposed to *rudeness*. Dr. Ferguson says *civility* avoids giving offence by our conversation or manner. *Politeness* seeks to please.—Knox, *Essays*, No. 95.

CLASSIFICATION (*κλησις*, *classis*, from *καλειν*, to call, a multitude called together).

“ Montesquieu observed very justly, that in their *classification* of the citizens, the great legislators of antiquity

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made the greatest display of their powers, and even soared above themselves.”—Burke, *On the French Revolution*.

“A *class* consists of several things coming under a common description.”—Whately, *Logic*, book i., sect. 3.

“The sorting of a multitude of things into parcels, for the sake of knowing them better, and remembering them more easily, is *classification*. When we attempt to classify a multitude of things, we first observe some respects in which they differ from each other; for we could not classify things that are entirely alike; as, for instance, a bushel of peas; we then separate things that are alike, and bring together things that are similar.”—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

A methodical arrangement of the divisions and sub-divisions of any *whole* is called *classification*.

Classification is the arrangement of things in genera and species.

“In every act of *classification*, two steps must be taken; certain marks are to be selected, the possession of which is to be the* title to admission into the class, and then all the objects that possess them are to be ascertained. When the marks selected are really important and connected closely with the nature and functions of the thing, the *classification* is said to be *natural*; where they are such as do not affect the nature of the objects materially, and belong in common to things the most different in their main properties, it is *artificial*.”—Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, 2d edit., p. 377.

The condition common to both modes of *classification*, is to comprehend everything and to suppose nothing. But the rules for a natural *classification* are more strict than

* *Abstraction*, *generalization*, and *definition*, precede *classification*; for if we wish to reduce to regularity the observations we have made, we must compare them, in order to unite them by their essential resemblances, and express their essence with all possible precision. We might classify a library by dividing the books into *history* and *philosophy*. History into *ancient* and *modern*; *ancient*, according to the people to whom it referred, and *modern* into *general*, *particular*, and *individual*, or *memoirs*. These divisions and subdivisions might be called a *classification*.

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for an artificial or arbitrary one. We may classify objects arbitrarily in any point of view in which we are pleased to regard them. But a natural *classification* can only proceed according to the real nature and qualities of the objects. The advantages of *classification* are to give a convenient form to our acquirements, and to enlarge our knowledge of the relations in which different objects stand to one another. A good *classification* should—1st, Rest on one principle or analogous principles. 2d, The principle or principles should be of a constant and permanent character. 3d, It should be natural, that is, even when artificial, it should not be violent or forced. 4th, It should clearly and easily apply to all the objects classified.

The principles on which *classification* rests are these :—1st, of *generalization* ; 2d, of *specification* ; and 3d, of *continuity*.—q. v.

Classification proceeds upon observed resemblances. *Generalization* rests upon the principle, that the same or similar causes will produce similar effects.

COLLIGATION OF FACTS in Induction, is a phrase employed by Dr. Whewell to denote the binding together groups of *facts* by means of some suitable conception. The conception must be capable of explanation or definition, not indeed of *adequate* definition, since we shall have to alter our description of it from time to time with the advance of knowledge, but still capable of a precise and clear explanation. Conceptions not wholly correct may serve for a time for the *colligation of facts*, and may guide us in researches which shall end in a more exact *colligation*. As soon as *facts* occur which a conception is inadequate to explain, we unite it or replace it by a new one.—Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, 2d edit., p. 353.

COMBINATION and CONNECTION of IDEAS are phrases to be found in book ii., chap. 33 of Locke's *Essay*, in which he treats of what is more commonly called *association of ideas*.—q. v.

COMBINATIONS OF IDEAS—

Combinations of Ideas.—The phrase *association of ideas* seems to have been introduced by Locke. It stands as the title to one of the chapters in his *Essay on the Human Understanding*. But in the body of the chapter he uses the phrase *combination of ideas*. These two phrases have reference to the two views which may be taken of the *train of thought* in the mind. In both, under *ideas* are comprehended all the various modes of consciousness. In treating of the association of ideas, the inquiry is as to the laws which regulate the succession or order according to which one thought follows another. But, it has been observed, that the various modes of consciousness not only succeed in some kind of order, but that they incorporate themselves with one another so as to form permanent and almost indissoluble *combinations*.

Suppose, that, in eating an apple we had made use of a fruit knife; a connection comes to be established in our minds between an apple and a fruit knife; so that when the idea of the one is present, the idea of the other also will appear; and these two ideas are said to be associated in the way of *combination*.

Or, the same kind of connection may be established between two feelings, or between a cognition and a feeling, or between a feeling and a volition,—between any two or more mental movements.

In cutting an apple, we may have wounded our finger; and, afterwards, the sight of an apple will raise a sense or feeling of the wound. Having eaten of honey, we have afterwards suffered pain; and, when honey is again presented, there will be a feeling of dislike, and a purpose to abstain from it.

The *association*, which thus takes place between different mental movements, is more than mere juxta-position of separate things. It amounts to a perfect *combination* or fusion. And, as in matter, compounds have properties which are not manifested by any of the component parts, in their separate state, so it is in mind; the result of various

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thoughts and feelings being fused into one whole, may be to produce a new principle, with properties differing from the separate influence of each individual thought and feeling. In this way, many *secondary* and *factitious* principles of action are formed.

COMMON SENSE is a phrase employed to denote that degree of intelligence, sagacity, and prudence, which is common to all men.

“There is a certain degree of *sense* which is necessary to our being subjects of law and government, capable of managing our own affairs and answerable for our conduct to others. This is called *common sense*, because it is common to all men with whom we can transact business.

“The same degree of understanding which makes a man capable of acting with common prudence in life, makes him capable of discerning what is true and what is false in matters that are self-evident, and which he distinctly apprehends.”—Reid, *Intell. Powers*.

“It is by the help of an innate power of distinction that we recognize the differences of things, as it is by a contrary power of composition that we recognize their identities. These powers, in some degree, are common to all minds; and as they are the basis of our whole knowledge (which is, of necessity, either affirmative or negative), they may be said to constitute what we call *common sense*.”—Harris, *Philosoph. Arrange.*, chap. 9.

COMMON SENSE (**The Philosophy of**) is that philosophy which accepts the testimony of our faculties as trustworthy within their respective spheres, and rests all human knowledge on certain first truths or primitive beliefs, which are the constitutive elements or fundamental forms of our rational nature, and the regulating principles of our conduct.

“As every ear not absolutely depraved is able to make some general distinctions of sound; and, in like manner, every eye, with respect to objects of vision; and as this general use of these faculties by being diffused through all

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individuals, may be called common hearing and common vision, as opposed to those more accurate energies, peculiar only to artists; so fares it with respect to the intellect. There are truths or universals of so obvious a kind, that every mind or intellect not absolutely depraved, without the least help of art, can hardly fail to recognize them. The recognition of these, or at least the ability to recognize them, is called *νοῦς κοινός* *common sense*, as being a sense common to all except lunatics and idiots.

“Further, as this power is called *κοινός νοῦς*, so the several propositions which are its proper objects, are called *προληψεις* or pre-conceptions, as being previous to all other conceptions. It is easy to gather from what has been said that those *προληψεις* must be general, as being formed by induction; as also natural, by being common to all men, and previous to all instruction—hence, therefore, their definition. A pre-conception is the natural apprehension of what is general or universal.”—Harris, *On Happiness*, page 46.

A fundamental maxim of the Stoics was, that there is nothing in the intellect which has not first been in the sense. They admitted, however, natural notions, which they called *anticipations*, and artificial notions formed in us by the understanding. They also recognized notions which all men equally receive and understand. These cannot be opposed to one another; they form what is called *common sense*.—Bouvier, *Hist. de la Philosoph.*, tom. i., p. 149. 8vo, Paris, 1844.

“A power of the mind which perceives truth, not by progressive argumentation, but by an instinctive and instantaneous impulse; derived neither from education nor from habit, but from nature; acting independently upon our will, whenever the object is presented, according to an established law; and, therefore, not improperly called a *sense*, and acting in the same manner upon all mankind; and, therefore, properly called *common sense*, the ultimate judge of truth.”—Beattie, *Essay on Truth*, p. 36-42.

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“*Common sense*,” says Mons. Jaques, (*Mem. de l'Academ., Roy. des Sciences Mor. et Pol.*, tom. i., p. 349, Paris, 1841), “is the unanimous sentiment of the whole human race, upon facts and questions which all may know and resolve—or, more precisely, it is the *ensemble* (complement) of notions and opinions common to all men of all times and places, learned or ignorant, barbarous or civilized. Spontaneity, impersonality, and universality, are the characteristics of truths of *common sense*; and hence their truth and certainty. The moral law, human liberty, the existence of God, and immortality of the soul, are truths of *common sense*.”

On the nature and validity of the *common sense* philosophy, see *Reid's Works* by Sir W. Hamilton, appendix, note A; Oswald, *Appeal to Common Sense*; Beattie, *Essay on Truth*, &c.

COMMON TERM is one which is applicable in the same sense to more than one individual object; as “river,” which may be predicated of the Thames, the Rhine, &c. *Common terms* are therefore called predicables.—Whately, *Logic*, book i., sect. 6.—*V. ABSTRACTION.*

COMPARISON is the act of carrying the mind from one object to another, in order to discover some relation subsisting between them. It is a voluntary operation of the mind, and thus differs from the perception or intuition of relations, which does not always depend upon the will. The result of comparison is knowledge, which the intellect apprehends; but the act is an exercise of attention voluntarily directing the energy of the mind to a class of objects or ideas. The theorems of mathematics are a series of judgments arrived at by comparison, or viewing different quantities and number in their relations. The result of *comparison* is a judgment.—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

COMPASSION.—*V. SYMPATHY.*

COMPLEX.—“That which consists of several *different* things, so put together as to form a whole, is called *complex*. *Complex* things are the subjects of analysis. The analysis of *complex* notions is one of the first and most important

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exercises of the understanding."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

COMPREHENSION means the act of comprehending or fully understanding any object or idea. For the sense in which it is used by the Logicians, *V. EXTENSION*.

CONCEIVING and APPREHENDING, or UNDERSTANDING.—Dr. Reid begins his essay on Conception by saying, "*Conceiving, imagining, apprehending, and understanding, having a notion of a thing, are common words used to express that operation of the understanding which the logicians call simple apprehension.*"

In reference to this it has been remarked by Mr. Mansell (*Prolegom. Log.*, p. 24), that "*conception must be distinguished as well from mere imagination, as from a mere understanding of the meaning of words.** Combinations of attributes logically impossible, may be expressed in language perfectly intelligible. There is no difficulty in understanding the meaning of the phrase *bilinear figure*, or *iron-gold*. The language is intelligible, though the object is inconceivable. On the other hand, though all conception implies imagination, yet all imagination does not imply conception. To have a conception of a horse, I must not only know the meaning of the several attributes constituting the definition of the animal, but I must also be able to combine these attributes in a *representative image*, that is, to *individualize them*. This, however, is not mere imagination, it is imagination relatively to a concept. I not only see, as it were, the image with the mind's eye, but I also think of it *as a horse*, as possessing the attributes of a given concept, and called by the name expressive of them. But mere imagination is possible without any such relation. My mind may recall a sensible impression on whose constituent features I have never reflected, and relatively to which I have never formed a concept or applied a name. Imagination would be possible in a being without any power of distinguishing or comparing his presentations ;

* These have been confounded by Aldrich, and Reid, and others.

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it is compatible with our ignorance or forgetfulness of the existence of any presentations, save the one represented by the image. Conception, in its lowest degree, implies at least a comparison and distinction of *this* from *that*. Conception proper, thus holds an intermediate place between the *intuitive* and *symbolical* knowledge of Leibnitz, being a verification of the latter by reference to the former."

"The words *conception*, *concept*, *notion*, should be limited to the thought of what cannot be represented in the imagination, as the thought suggested by a general term. The Leibnitzians call this *symbolical*, in contrast to *intuitive* knowledge. This is the sense in which *conceptio* and *conceptus* have been usually and correctly employed."—Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 360, note.

CONCEPT, A, "Is a collection of attributes, united by a sign, and representing a possible object of intuition."—Mansell, *Prolegom*, *Log.*, p. 60.

It was used, or *conceit* as synonymous with it, by the older English writers. See Baynes, *Essay on Analytic of Log. Forms*, 8vo, Edin., 1850, pp. 5, 6; Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 393.

Kant and his followers, while they reserve the word *idea* to denote the absolute products of the reason, and *intuition* to denote the particular notions which we derive from the senses, have applied the word *concept* (*begriff*) to notions which are general without being absolute. They say they are of three kinds,—1. *Pure concepts*, which borrow nothing from experience; as the notions of cause, time, and space. 2. *Empirical concepts*, which are altogether derived from experience; as the notion of colour or pleasure. 3. *Mixed concepts*, composed of elements furnished partly by experience, and partly by the pure understanding. See Schmid, *Dictionnaire pour servir aux écrits de Kant*, 12mo, Jena, 1798.

A *concept* is *clear*, when its object, as a whole, can be distinguished from any other; it is *distinct*, when its several, constituent parts can be distinguished from each other.

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The merit of first pointing out these characteristics of the logical perfection of thought is ascribed to Leibnitz. See *Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate et Ideis*.

CONCEPT, CONCEPTION (*conceptus, conceptio* = to *notio* or notion).—" *Conception* consists in a conscious act of the understanding, bringing any given object or impression into the same class with any number of other objects or impressions, by means of some character or characters common to them all. *Concipimus, id est, capimus hoc cum illo*—we take hold of both at once, we *comprehend* a thing, when we have learnt to comprise it in a known class."—Coleridge, *Church and State*, Prelimin. Rem., p. 4.

" *Conception* is the forming or bringing an image or idea into the mind by an effort of the will. It is distinguished from *sensation* and *perception*, produced by an object present to the senses; and from *imagination*, which is the joining together of ideas in new ways; it is distinguished from *memory*, by not having the feeling of past time connected with the idea."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

According to Mr. Stewart (*Elements of Philosoph. of Hum. Mind*, vol. i., chap. 3), *conception* is "that faculty, the business of which is to present us with an exact transcript of what we have felt or perceived," or that faculty, whose province it is "to enable us to form a notion of our past sensations or of the objects of sense which we have formerly perceived." But what Mr. Stewart would thus assign to the faculty of *conception* belongs to *imagination* in its reproductive function. Hence, Sir Will. Hamilton has said (*Discussions*, p. 276), "Mr. Stewart has bestowed on the reproductive imagination the term *conception*; happily, we do not think; as both in grammatical propriety and by the older and correcter usage of philosophers, this term (or rather the product of this operation, *concept*) is convertible with *general notion*, or more correctly, *notion* simply, and in this sense is admirably rendered by the Begriff (which is, *grasped up*) of the Germans."

"A *concept* or notion" is defined to be "the cognition

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or idea of the general attribute or attributes in which a plurality of objects coincide." This involves the perception of a number of objects, the comparing of them, the recognition of their points of similarity, and their subjective union by this common attribute.

See Baynes, *Essay on the Analytic of Logical Forms*, 8vo, Edin., 1853, pp. 5, 6.

CONCEPTION sometimes signifies the act of the mind in conceiving, sometimes the thing conceived, which is the object of that act.—Reid, *Works*, p. 393.

This last should be called *concept*, which was a term in use with the old English philosophers.

CONCEPTION and IMAGINATION. — "Properly and strictly to *conceive* is an act more purely intellectual than *imagining*, proceeding from a faculty superior to those of sense and fancy, or imagination, which are limited to corporeal things, and those *determined*, as all particulars must be, to this or that, place, time, manner, &c. When as that higher power in man, which we may call the *mind*, can form apprehensions of what is *not material* (viz., of spirits and the affections of bodies which fall not under sense), and also can frame *general* ideas or notions, or consider of things in a general way without attending to their particular limited circumstances, as when we think of length in a road, without observing its determinate measure."—Oldfield, *Essay on Reason*, p. 11.

"It is one thing to *imagine* and another thing to *conceive*. For do we *conceive* anything more clearly than our thought when we think? And yet it is impossible to *imagine* a thought, or to paint any image of it in the brain."—*Port Roy. Logic*, part 1, chap. 1.

"The distinction between *conception* and *imagination* is real, though it be too often overlooked and the words taken to be synonymous. I can *conceive* a thing that is impossible, but I cannot distinctly *imagine* a thing that is impossible. I can *conceive* a proposition or a demonstration, but I cannot *imagine* either. I can *conceive* under-

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standing and will, virtue and vice, and other attributes of mind, but I cannot *imagine* them. In like manner, I can distinctly *conceive* universals, but I cannot *imagine* them.”
—Reid.

Imagination has to do only with objects of sense, *conception* with objects of pure thought. The things which we *imagine* are represented by the mind as individuals, as some particular man, or some particular horse. The things of which we *conceive* are such as may be denoted by general terms, as man, horse.

“The notions” (or *conceptions*) which the “mind forms from things offered to it, are either of single objects, as of ‘this pain, that man, Westminster Abbey;’ or of many objects taken together, as ‘pain, man, abbey.’” Notions of single objects are called *intuitions*, as being such as the mind receives when it simply attends to or inspects (*intuetur*) the object. Notions formed from several objects are called *conceptions*, as being formed by the power which the mind has of taking things together (*concupere, i. e., capere hoc cum illo*).

“On inspecting two or more objects of the same class, we begin to compare them with one another, and with those which are already repositied in our memory; and we discover that they have some points of resemblance. All the houses, for example, which come in our way, however they may differ in height, length, position, convenience, duration, have some common points; they are all covered buildings, and fit for the habitation of men. By attending to these points only, and abstracting them from all the rest, we arrive at a general notion of a house, that it is a covered building fit for human habitation; and to this notion we attach a particular name, house, to remind us of the process we have gone through, and to record its results for use. The general notion so formed we call a *conception*; the common points we observed in the various objects are called *marks* or *notes*; and the process of observing them and forming one entire notion from them is

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termed *abstraction*.” — Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, p. 105.

CONCEPTION and IDEA.—By *conception* is meant the simple view we have of the objects which are presented to our mind; as when, for instance, we think of the *sun*, the *earth*, a *tree*, a *circle*, a *square*, *thought*, *being*, without forming any determinate judgment concerning them; and the form through which we consider these things is called an *idea*.”—*Port Roy. Logic*.

“The *having an idea of a thing* is, in common language, used in the same sense (as *conceiving*), chiefly, I think,” says Dr. Reid, “since Mr. Locke’s time.”

“A *conception* is something derived from observation; not so *ideas*, which meet with nothing exactly answering to them within the range of our experience. Thus *ideas* are *à priori*, *conceptions* are *à posteriori*; and it is only by means of the former that the latter are really possible. For the bare fact, taken by itself, falls short of the *conception* which may be described as the synthesis of the fact and the *idea*. Thus we have an *idea* of the universe, under which its different phenomena fall into place, and from which they take their meaning; we have an *idea* of God as creator, from which we derive the power of conceiving that the impressions produced upon our minds, through the senses, result from really existing things; we have an *idea* of the soul, which enables us to realize our own personal identity, by suggesting that a feeling, conceiving, thinking subject, exists as a substratum of every sensation, *conception*, thought.”—Chretien, *Essay on Log. Meth.*, p. 137.

“Every *conception*,” said Coleridge (*Notes on English Divines*, 12mo, 1853, vol. i., p. 27), “has its sole reality in its being referable to a thing or class of things, of which, or of the common characters of which, it is a reflection. An *idea* is a power, *δυναμις νοερα*, which constitutes its own reality, and is, in order of thought, necessarily antecedent to the things in which it is more or less adequately realized, while a *conception* is as necessarily posterior.”

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Conception is used to signify—1. The *power* or *faculty* of conceiving, as when Mr. Stewart says, “Under the article of *conception* I shall confine myself to that faculty whose province it is to enable us to form a notion of our past sensations, or of the objects of sense that we have formerly perceived.”

2. The *act* or *operation* of this power or faculty, “*Conception*,” says Sir John Stoddart (*Univ. Gram. in Encyclop. Metropol.*), “which is derived from *con* and *cipio*, expresses the *action* by which I *take up together* a portion of our sensations, as it were water, in some vessel adapted to contain a certain quantity.”

“*Conception* is the *act* by which we comprehend by means of a general notion, as distinguished both from the *perception* of a *present*, and the imagination of an *absent individual*.”—*North Brit. Rev.*, No. 27, p. 45.

3. The *result* of the operation of this power or faculty; as when Dr. Whewell says (*Pref. to the Philosoph. of the Induct. Sciences*, p. 13), “our *conceptions* are *that*, in the mind, which we denote by our general terms, as a triangle, a square number, a force.”

This last signification, however, is more correctly and conveniently given by the word *concept*, *i. e.*, *conceptum*, or *id quod conceptum est*.

CONCEPTUALISM is a doctrine in some sense intermediate between *realism* and *nominalism*, *q. v.* Have genera and species a real independent existence? The *realist* answers that they exist independently; that besides individual objects and the general notion from them in the mind there exist certain *ideas*, the pattern after which the single objects are fashioned; and that the general notion in our mind is the counterpart of the idea without it. The *nominalist* says that nothing exists but things, and names of things; and that universals are mere names, *flatus venti*. The *conceptualists* assign to universals an existence which may be called logical or psychological, that is, independent of single objects, but dependent upon the mind of the

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thinking subject, in which they are as notions or conceptions.—Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, 2d edit., p. 112.

Dr. Brown, while his views approach those of the *conceptualists*, would prefer to call himself a *relationalist*.—See *Physiol. of Hum. Mind*, p. 295.

Cousin, *Introd. Aux Ouvrages Inédits d'Abelard*, 4to, Par., 1836, p. 181.

Reid, *Intellect. Powers*, essay v., chap. 6, with Sir W. Hamilton's note, p. 412.

CONCLUSION.—When something is simply affirmed to be true, it is called a *proposition*; after it has been found to be true, by several reasons or arguments, it is called a *conclusion*. “Sloth and prodigality will bring a man to want,” this is a proposition; after all the arguments have been mentioned which prove this to be true, we say, “*therefore* sloth and prodigality will bring a man to want;” this is now the *conclusion*.—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

That proposition which is inferred from the premises of an argument is called the *conclusion*.—Whately, *Logic*, b. ii., ch. 3, sect. 1.

CONCRETE (*con-crescere*, to grow together), is opposed to *abstract*. A *concrete* notion of an object is the notion of an object as possessed of all its qualities, and such as it exists in nature. An *abstract* notion may be the notion of any particular quality viewed separately from its object. The notion of a tree as consisting of trunk, branches, and leaves, as it naturally exists, is a *concrete* notion. The notion of the trunk regarded separately, or of the leaves, or of the colour of the leaves, is an *abstract* notion.

A *concrete* notion is the notion of an object as it exists in nature, invested with all its qualities. An *abstract* notion, on the contrary, is the notion of some quality or attribute separated from the object to which it belongs, and deprived of all the specialties with which experience invests it; or it may be the notion of a substance stripped of all its qualities. In this way *concrete*

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comes to be synonymous with *particular*, and abstract with *general*.

The names of classes are *abstract*, those of individuals *concrete*; and from *concrete* adjectives are made *abstract* substantives.—*V. ABSTRACT.*

A *concrete* name is a name which stands for a thing, as this table.

An *abstract* name is a name which stands for an attribute of a thing; as, This table is square.—*Mill, Logic.*

CONDITION—(*Conditio, fere sumitur pro qualitate qua quid condi, id est fieri.*—*Vossius.* Or it may be from *con* or *co-dare, i. e.*, something given or going along with a cause).

A *condition* is that which is pre-requisite in order that something may be, and especially in order that a cause may operate. A *condition* does not operate, but, by removing some impediment, as opening the eyes to see; or by applying one's strength in conjunction with another, when two men are required to lift or carry a weight, it being a condition of their doing so that their strength be exerted at the same time. A *condition* is prior to the production of an effect; but it does not produce it. It is fire that burns; but before it burns it is a condition that there be an approximation of the fire to the fuel, or the matter that is burned. Where there is no wood the fire goeth out. The cause of burning is the element of fire, fuel is a con-cause, and the *condition* is the approximation of the one to the other. The impression on the wax is the *effect*—the seal is the *cause*; the pressure of the one substance upon the other, and the softness or fluidity of the wax are *conditions*.

“By a *condition*,” says Mr. Karlake (*Aids to Logic*, vol. ii., p. 43), “is meant something more negative, whereas a *cause* is regarded as something more positive. We seem to think of a *condition* rather as that whose absence would have prevented a thing from taking place; of a *cause*, rather as that whose presence produced it. Thus we apply, perhaps, the word *cause* rather to that between which and the result we can see a more immediate connection. If so, then

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in this way, also, every *cause* will be a *condition*, or antecedent, but not every antecedent will be a cause. The fact of a city being built of wood will be a *condition* of its being burnt down: some inflammable material having caught fire will be the cause."

A *conditional* proposition is one which asserts the dependence of one categorical proposition on another; as, If the Scriptures are not wholly false, they are entitled to respect. A *conditional* syllogism is one in which the reasoning depends on such a proposition.—Whately, *Logic*, b. ii., ch. 4, sects. 3 and 6.

CONJUGATE.—Words of the same stock or kindred, as *wise*, *to be wise*, *wisely*, are called *conjugate* or *paronymous* words.

CONNOTATIVE, A, or attributive term is one which, when applied to some object, is such as to imply in its signification some attribute belonging to that object. It *connotes*, *i. e.*, notes along with the object (or implies), something considered as inherent therein; as "The capital of France," "The founder of Rome." The founding of Rome is, by that appellation, *attributed* to the person to whom it is applied.

A term which merely *denotes* an object, without implying any attribute of that object, is called absolute or non-connotative; as Paris, Romulus. The last terms *denote* respectively the same objects as the former, but do not, like them, *connote* (*imply* in their signification) any attribute of those individuals.—Whately, *Logic*, b. ii., ch. 5., sect. 1.

CONSANGUINITY (*co-sanguis*, of the same blood) is defined to be, *vinculum personarum ab eodem stipite descendentium*, the relation of persons descended from the same stock or common ancestor. It is either *lineal* or *collateral*. *Lineal consanguinity* is that which subsists between persons of whom one is descended in a direct line from the other; as son, grandson, great grandson, &c. *Collateral* relations agree with the *lineal* in this, that they descend from the same stock or ancestor; but differ in this, that they do not descend the one from the other. John has two sons, who

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have each a numerous issue; both these issues are *linearly* descended from John, or their common ancestor; and they are *collateral* kinsmen to each other, because all descended from this common ancestor, and all have a portion of his blood in their veins, which denominates them *consanguineous*.—V. AFFINITY.

CONSCIENCE (*con-scientia*, joint or double knowledge) means knowledge of conduct in reference to the law of right and wrong.

According to some, *conscience* takes cognizance merely of our own conduct. Thus Bishop Butler has said (sermon i., *On Hum. Nature*): “The principle in man by which he approves or disapproves of his heart, temper, and actions, is *conscience*—for this is the strict sense of the word, though it is sometimes used so as to take in more.”

Dr. Rush (*Inquiry into the Influence of Physical Causes upon the Moral Faculty*, p. 3), has said: “The moral faculty exercises itself upon the actions of others. It approves, even in books, of the virtues of a Trajan, and disapproves of the vices of a Marius, while *conscience* confines its operations to our own actions.”

“The word ‘*conscience*’ does not immediately denote any moral faculty by which we approve or disapprove. *Conscience* supposes, indeed, the existence of some such faculty, and properly signifies our consciousness of having acted agreeably or contrary to its directions.”—Smith, *Theory of Mor. Sent.*, pt. 7, sect. 3.

“*Conscience* coincides exactly with the moral faculty, with this difference only, that the former refers to our own conduct alone, whereas the latter is meant to express also the power by which we approve or disapprove of the conduct of others.”—Stewart, *Active and Moral Powers*, pt. 1, ch. 2.—See also Payne, *Elements of Mor. Science*, 1845, p. 283.

By these writers *conscience* is represented as being the function of the moral faculty in reference to our own conduct, and as giving us a consciousness of self-approbation or of self-condemnation.

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By a further limitation of the term, *conscience* has been regarded by some as merely retrospective in its exercise; and by a still further limitation as only, or chiefly, punitive in its exercise, and implying the consciousness of our having acted wrong.

But of late years, and by the best writers, the term *conscience*, and the phrases moral faculty, moral judgment, faculty of moral perception, moral sense, susceptibility of moral emotion, have all been applied to that faculty, or combination of faculties, by which we have ideas of right and wrong in reference to actions, and correspondent feelings of approbation and disapprobation. This faculty, or combination of faculties, is called into exercise not merely in reference to our own conduct, but also in reference to the conduct of others. It is not only reflective but prospective in its operations. It is *antecedent* as well as *subsequent* to action in its exercise; and is occupied *de faciendo* as well as *de facto*.—See Reid, *Active Powers*, essay iii., pt. 3, ch. 8.

In short, *conscience* constitutes itself a witness of the past and of the future, and judges of actions reported as if present when they were actually done. It takes cognizance not merely of the individual man, but of human nature, and pronounces concerning actions as right or wrong not merely in reference to one person, or one time, or one place, but absolutely and universally.

With reference to their views as to the nature of *conscience* and the constitution of the moral faculty, modern philosophers may be arranged in two great schools or sects. The difference between them rests on the prominence and precedence which they assign to reason and to feeling in the exercise of the moral faculty; and their respective theories may be distinctively designated the *intellectual* theory and the *sentimental* theory. A brief view of the principal arguments in support of each may be found in Hume's *Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, sect. 5.

CONSCIOUSNESS (*con-scire, con-scientia*, joint knowledge, a

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knowledge of one thing in connection or relation with another).

Sir William Hamilton has remarked (*Discussions*, p. 110, note,) that "the Greek has no word for *consciousness*," and that "Tertullian is the only *ancient* who uses the word *conscientia* in a psychological sense, corresponding with our *consciousness*."—*Reid's Works*, p. 775.

The meaning of a word is sometimes best attained by means of the word opposed to it. *Unconsciousness*, that is, the want or absence of *consciousness*, denotes the suspension of all our faculties. *Consciousness*, then, is the state in which we are when all or any of our faculties are in exercise. It is the condition or accompaniment of every mental operation.

The Scholastic definition was, *perceptio qua mens de presenti suo statu admonetur*.

"*Consciousness* is the necessary knowledge which the mind has of its own operations. In knowing, it knows that it knows. In experiencing emotions and passions, it knows that it experiences them. In willing, or exercising acts of causality, it knows that it wills or exercises such acts. This is the common, universal, and spontaneous *consciousness*." . . . "By *consciousness* more nicely and accurately defined, we mean the power and act of self-recognition: not if you please, the mind knowing its knowledges, emotions, and volitions; but the mind knowing itself in these."—Tappan, *Doctrine of the Will by an Appeal to Consciousness*, chap. 2, sect. 1.

"Sensation, remembrance, simple apprehension, and conception, with every other actual energy or passion of the mind, is accompanied by an inward feeling or perception of that energy or passion, and that feeling or perception is *consciousness*."—*Encyclop. Brit.*, art. *Metaphysics*.

Mr. Locke has said (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., ch. 1), "It is altogether as intelligible to say that a body is extended without parts, as that anything thinks without being conscious of it, or perceiving that it does so.

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They who talk in this way, may, with as much reason, say that a man is always hungry, but that he does not always feel it; whereas hunger consists in that very sensation, as thinking consists in being conscious that one thinks!"

"We not only *feel*, but we *know* that we *feel*; we not only *act*, but we *know* that we *act*; we not only *think*, but we *know* that we *think*; to think, without knowing that we think, is as if we should not think; and the peculiar quality, the fundamental attribute of thought, is to have a *consciousness* of itself. *Consciousness* is this interior light which illuminates everything that takes place in the soul; *consciousness* is the accompaniment of all our faculties; and is, so to speak, their echo."—Cousin, *Hist. of Mod. Philosoph.*, vol. i., pp. 274-5.

On *consciousness* as the necessary form of thought, see lecture v. of the same volume.

That *consciousness* is not a particular faculty of the mind, but the universal condition of intelligence, the fundamental form of all the modes of our thinking activity, and not a special mode of that activity, is strenuously maintained by Amadee Jacques, in the *Manuel de Philosophie, Partie Psychologique*; and also by two American writers, Mr. Bowen in his *Critical Essays*, p. 131, and Mr. Tappan. This view is in accordance with the saying of Aristotle, οὐκ ἐστὶν αἰσθησις αἰσθησεως—there is not a feeling of a feeling. And that of the schoolmen—"Non sentimus, nisi sentiamus nos sentire—non intelligimus nisi intelligamus nos intelligere." "No man," said Dr. Reid, "can perceive an object without being conscious that he perceives it. No man can think without being conscious that he thinks." And as on the one hand we cannot think or feel without being conscious, so on the other hand we cannot be conscious without thinking or feeling. This would be, if possible, to be conscious of nothing, to have a *consciousness* which was no *consciousness*, or *consciousness* without an object. "Annihilate the object of any mental operation and you annihilate the operation; annihilate the

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consciousness of the object, and you annihilate the operation.”

This view of *consciousness*, as the common condition under which all our faculties are brought into operation, or of considering these faculties and their operations as so many modifications of *consciousness*, has of late been generally adopted; so much so that psychology, or the science of mind, has been denominated an inquiry into the facts of *consciousness*. All that we can truly learn of mind must be learned by attending to the various ways in which it becomes conscious. None of the phenomena of *consciousness* can be called in question. They may be more or less clear; more or less complete; but they either are or are not.

In the *Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*, art. *Conscience*, it is maintained that *consciousness* is a separate faculty, having *self*, or the *ego*, for its object.

Instead of regarding *consciousness* as the common condition or accompaniment of every mental operation, Royer Collard among the French, and Reid and Stewart among the Scotch philosophers, have been represented as holding the opinion that *consciousness* is a separate faculty, having for its objects the operations of our other faculties. “*Consciousness*,” says Dr. Reid (*Intell. Pow.*, essay i., chap. 1; see also essay vi., chap. 5), “is a word used by philosophers to signify that immediate knowledge which we have of our present thoughts and purposes, and in general, of all the present operations of our minds. Whence we may observe that *consciousness* is only of things present. To apply *consciousness* to things past, which sometimes is done, in popular discourse, is to confound *consciousness* with memory; and all such confusion of words ought to be avoided in philosophical discourse. It is likewise to be observed that *consciousness* is only of things in the mind, and not of external things. It is improper to say, ‘I am *conscious* of the table which is before me.’ I perceive it, I see it, but do not say I am *conscious* of it. As that *con-*

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sciousness by which we have a knowledge of the operations of our own minds, is a different power from that by which we perceive external objects, and as these different powers have different names in our language, and, I believe, in all languages, a philosopher ought carefully to preserve this distinction and never confound things so different in their nature." In this passage Dr. Reid speaks of *sciousness* properly so called as *that consciousness* which is distinct from the *consciousness* by which we perceive external objects—as if perception was another kind or mode of *sciousness*. Whether all his language be quite consistent with the opinion that all our faculties are just so many different modes of our becoming conscious, may be doubted. But there is no doubt that by *sciousness* he meant especially attention to the operations of our own minds, or *reflection*; while by *observation* he meant attention to external things. This language has been interpreted as favourable to the opinion that *consciousness* is a separate faculty. Yet he has not distinctly separated it from reflection except by saying that *sciousness* accompanies all the operations of mind. Now reflection does not. It is a voluntary act—an energetic attention to the facts of *sciousness*. But *sciousness* may be either spontaneous or reflective.

“This word denotes the immediate knowledge which the mind has of its sensations and thoughts, and, in general, of all its present operations.”—*Outlines of Mor. Philosoph.*, part 1, sect. 1.

Mr. Stewart, in his *Outlines*, has enumerated *sciousness* as one of our intellectual powers, co-ordinate with perception, memory, judgment, &c. But *sciousness* is not confined to the operation of the intellectual powers. It accompanies the development of the feelings and the determinations of the will. And the opinion that *sciousness* is a separate faculty is not only founded on a false analysis, but an opinion, which if prosecuted to its results would overturn the doctrine of immediate knowledge in

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perception—a doctrine which Stewart and Reid upheld as the true and only barrier against the scepticism of Hume. “Once admit that, after I have perceived an object, I need another power termed *consciousness*, by which I become cognizant of the perception, and by the medium of which the knowledge involved in perception is made clear to the thinking self, and the plea of common sense against scepticism is cut off. . . . I am conscious of *self* and of *notself*; my knowledge of both in the act of perception is equally direct and immediate. On the other hand, to make *consciousness* a peculiar faculty, by which we are simply cognizant of our own mental operations, is virtually to deny the immediacy of our knowledge of an external world.”—Morell, *Hist. of Spec. Philosoph.*, vol. ii., p. 13.

See Fearn, *Essay on Consciousness*.

CONSENT.—“Believing in the prophets and evangelists with a calm and settled faith, with that *consent* of the will, and heart, and understanding, which constitutes religious belief, I find in them the clear annunciation of the kingdom of God upon earth.”—Southey, *Progress of Society*, colloquy 2. —V. ASSENT.

Assent is the consequence of a conviction of the understanding. *Consent* arises from the state of the disposition and the will. The one accepts what is *true*; the other embraces it as true and good, and worthy of all acceptance.

CONSENT (Argument from Universal).—V. AUTHORITY.

Reid applies this argument to establish first principles.—*Intell. Powers*, essay i., chap. 2. He uses it against the views of Berkeley and Hume.—*Essay* ii., chap. 19.

Cicero (*De Officiis*, lib. i., cap. 41,) says, *Major enim pars eo fere deferri solet quo a natura deducitur*. It is used to prove the existence of the gods. *De quo autem omnium natura consentit, id verum esse necesse est. Esse igitur deos, confitendum est.* (*De Nat. Deorum*, lib. i., cap. 17,) Cotta argues against it, cap. 23. The argument is also used (*De*

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Nat. Deor., lib. ii., 2; and *Tuscul. Quest.*, lib. i., 13), when we read, *Omni autem in re, consensio omnium gentium lex naturæ putanda est.*

Bacon is against this argument in preface to *Instauratio Magna*, and also *Aphorism 77*, and in *Cogitata et Visa*.

“These things are to be regarded as *first truths*, the credit of which is not derived from other truths, but is inherent in themselves. As for *probable truths*, they are such as are admitted by *all men*, or by the *generality of men*, or by *wise men*; and among these last, either by all the wise, or by the generality of the wise, or by such of the wise as are of the highest authority.”—Aristotle, *Topic.*, i., 1.

“What seems true to *most wise men* is very probable; what most men, both wise and unwise, assent to, doth still more resemble truth; but what men generally *consent* in hath the highest probability, and approaches demonstration so near, that it may pass for ridiculous arrogance, or for intolerable obstinacy and perverseness to deny it. A man may assume what seems true to the wise, if it do not contradict the common opinion of mankind.”—Aristotle, *Topic.*, i., 8, or 10.

Multum dare solemus præsumptioni omnium hominum. Apud nos veritatis argumentum est *aliquid omnibus videri.*
—Seneca, *Epist.*, cvii. a cxvii.

CONSEQUENT.—V. ANTECEDENT, NECESSITY.

CONSILIENCE of INDUCTIONS takes place when an induction obtained from one class of facts coincides with an induction obtained from a different class. This *consilience* is a test of the truth of the theory in which it occurs.—Whewell, *Philosoph. Induct. Sciences*, aphorism 14.

Paley’s *Horæ Paulinæ*, which consists of gathering together undesigned coincidences, is an example of the *consilience* of inductions.

The law of gravitation may be proved by a *consilience* of inductions.

CONTEMPLATION.—The next faculty of the mind (*i. e.*, to

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perception), whereby it makes a further progress towards knowledge, is that which I call *retention*, or the keeping of these simple ideas which from sensation or reflection it hath received. This is done two ways; first, by keeping the idea which is brought into it for some time actually in view, which is called *contemplation*.—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 10.

When an object of sense or thought has attracted our admiration or love we dwell upon it; not so much to know it better, as to enjoy it more and longer. This is *contemplation*, and differs from reflection. The latter seeks knowledge, and our intellect is active. In the former, we think we have found the knowledge which reflection seeks, and luxuriate in the enjoyment of it. Mystics have exaggerated the benefits of *contemplation*, and have directed it exclusively to God, and to the cherishing of love to Him.

CONTINENCE (*continere*, to restrain), is the virtue which consists in governing the appetite of sex. It is most usually applied to men, as *chastity* is to women. *Chastity* may be the result of natural disposition or temperament—*continence* carries with it the idea of struggle and victory.

CONTINGENT (*con-tingere*, to touch two points).—"Perhaps the beauty of the world requireth that some agents should work without deliberation (which his lordship calls *necessary* agents), and some agents with deliberation (and those both he and I call *free* agents), and that some agents should work, and we know not how (and their effects we call *contingents*)."—Hobbes, *Liberty and Necessity*.

"When any event takes place which seems to us to have no cause, why it should happen in one way, rather than another, it is called a *contingent* event; as, for example, the falling of a leaf on a *certain spot*, or the turning up of any particular number when the dice are thrown."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

The *contingent* is that which does not exist necessarily, and which we can think as non-existing without contradiction. Everything which had a beginning, or will have an

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end, or which changes, is *contingent*. The *necessary*, on the contrary, is that of which we cannot conceive as non-existing—that which has always been, which will always be, and which does not change its manner of being.

“*Contingent* is that which does not happen constantly and regularly. Of this kind ancient philosophy has distinguished three different opinions; for either the event happens more frequently one way than another, and then it is said to be *ἔπι το πολυ*; of this kind are the regular productions of nature, and the ordinary actions of men. Or it happens more rarely, such as the birth of monsters, or other extraordinary productions of nature, and many accidents that happen to man. Or, lastly, it is betwixt the two, and happens as often the one way as the other; or, as they express it in Greek, *ὀπετερ ἐτυχη*. Of this kind are some things in nature, such as the birth of a male or female child; a good or bad day in some climates of the earth; and many things among men, such as good or bad luck at play. All these last-mentioned events are in reality as necessary as the falling of heavy bodies, &c. But as they do not happen constantly and uniformly, and as we cannot account for their happening sometimes one way and sometimes another, we say they are *contingent*.”—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, vol. i., p. 295.

The *contingent* is known empirically—the *necessary* by the reason. There are but two modes of being, the *necessary* and the *contingent*. But the *contingent* has degrees: 1. Simple facts which appear and disappear, or, in the language of the schools, accidents. 2. Qualities or properties inherent in a substance, which constitute its specific character. 3. The substance itself considered as a particular and finite existence.

A thing may be *contingent* in three ways:—

1. *Æqualiter*, when the thing or its opposite may equally be, from the determination of a free will.
2. *Ut plurimum*, as when a man is born with five digits, though sometimes with more or less.

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3. *Raro*, as when it happens seldom; *physically*, as when a tile falls on a man's head; or *voluntarily*, as when a man cleaving wood wounds the bystander.—See Chauvin, *Lexicon Philosoph.*

An event, the opposite of which is *possible*, is *contingent*.

An event, the opposite of which is *impossible*, is *necessary*.

An event is *impossible* when the opposite of it is *necessary*.

An event is *possible* when the opposite of it is *contingent*.

CONTINUITY (Law of).—“The supposition of bodies *perfectly* hard, having been shown to be inconsistent with two of the leading doctrines of Leibnitz, *that* of the constant maintenance of the same quantity of force in the universe, and *that* of the proportionality of forces to the squares of the velocities—he found himself reduced to the necessity of maintaining that all changes are produced by insensible gradations, so as to render it impossible for a body to have its state changed from motion to rest, or from rest to motion, without passing through all the intermediate states of velocity. From this assumption he argued with much ingenuity, that the existence of atoms, or of perfectly hard bodies, is impossible; because, if two of them should meet with equal and opposite motions, they would necessarily stop at once, in violation of the *law of continuity*.”—Stewart, *Dissert.*, part 2, p. 275.

“I speak,” said John Bernoulli (*Discourse on Motion*, 1727), “of that immovable and perpetual order established since the creation of the universe, which may be called the *law of continuity*, in virtue of which everything that is done, is done by degrees infinitely small. It seems to be the dictate of good sense that no change is made *per saltum*; *natura non operatur per saltum*; and nothing can pass from one extreme to another, without passing through all the intermediate degrees.”

The *law of continuity*, though originally applied to *continuity of motion*, was extended by Charles Bonnet to *continuity of being*. He held that all the various beings which compose the universe, form a scale descending downwards

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without any chasm or *saltus*, from the Deity to the simplest forms of unorganized matter. A similar view had been held by Locke and others (*Spectator*, No. 519). The researches of Cuvier have shown that it can only be held with limitations and exceptions, even when confined to the comparative anatomy of animals.—V. ASSOCIATION.

CONTRACT (*con-trahere*, to draw together).—A *contract* is an agreement or pact in which one party comes under obligation to do one thing, and the other party to do some other thing. Paley calls it a mutual promise. *Contracts* originate in the insufficiency of man to supply all his needs. One wants what another has abundance of and to spare; while that other may want something which his neighbour has. They are drawn more closely together by their individual insufficiency, and they enter into an agreement each to give what the other needs or desires.

Contracts being so necessary and important for the welfare of society, the framing and fulfilling of them have in all countries been made the object of positive law. Viewed ethically, the obligation to fulfil them is the same with that to fulfil a promise. The consideration of *contracts*, and of the various kinds and conditions of them belongs to Jurisprudence.

While all *contracts* are *pacts*, all *pacts* are not *contracts*. In the Roman law, a distinction was taken between pacts or agreements entered into without any cause or consideration antecedent, present or future, and pacts which were entered into for a cause or consideration, that is, containing a *synallagma* or bargain, or as it may be popularly expressed, a *quid pro quo*—in which one party came under obligation to give or do something, on account of something being done or given by the other party. Agreements of the latter kind were properly *contracts*, while those of the former were called *bare pacts*. A *pactum nudum*, or *bare pact*, was so called because it was not clothed with the circumstances of mutual advantage, and was not a valid agreement in the eye of the Roman law.

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Nuda pactio obligationem non facit. It is the same in the English law, in which a *contract* is defined: "An agreement of two or more persons, upon *sufficient consideration*, to do or not to do a particular thing,"—and the consideration is necessary to the validity of the *contract*.

CONTRADICTION, Principle of (*contra dicere*, to speak against).—It is usually expressed thus: A thing cannot be and not be at the same time, or a thing must either be or not be, or the same attribute cannot at the same time be affirmed and denied of the same subject.—Pierron and Zevost, *Introd. à la Metaphys. d'Aristote*, 2 tom. Paris, 1840.—V. IDENTITY.

Aristotle laid down this principle as the basis of all Logic and of all Metaphysic.

Leibnitz thought it insufficient as the basis of all truth and reasoning, and added the principle of the *sufficient reason*, *q. v.*

Kant thought this principle good only for those judgments of which the attribute is the consequence of the subject, or, as he called them, analytic judgments; as when we say, all body has extension. The idea of extension being enclosed in that of body, it is a sufficient warrant of the truth of such a judgment, that it implies no *contradiction*. But in synthetic judgments, we rest either on a belief of the reason or the testimony of experience, according as they are *à priori* or *à posteriori*.—Aristot., *Metaphys.*, lib. iii., cap. 3; lib. ix., cap. 7; lib. x., cap. 5. Kant, *Critique de la Raison Pure*.

"The principle of *sufficient reason* deals with facts, and the principle of *contradiction* with indemonstrable truths. Apparently these two principles are distinct when considered in reference to two different species of thought, yet the one is derived from the other. The necessity of a *sufficient reason* for every thing which exists, is itself a necessary or fundamental truth in all reasonings, because the negative of it cannot be conceived. Ultimately, therefore, the principle of *contradiction* is the sole and common

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root from which all scientific truth springs.”—Blakey, *Hist. of Logic*, p. 249.

“The *dictum de omni et nullo* is the same with the principle of *contradiction*. If the propositions A is B, and A is not B, could stand together, there could be no reasoning. Hence, all sceptics attacked it in various ways. Heraclitus said all things are in a perpetual flux, so that nothing is in the same state for two successive moments.* From this it would follow, that neither of two *contradictories* could be predicated with truth of any subject. Anaxagoras held that the ultimate elements could never be entirely separated; that nothing in nature was pure or simple, or excluded opposite elements, but received its denomination according to the predominance of particular ingredients. It follows that neither of two *contradictories* can be predicated absolutely of any subject. He maintained also, that whatever seems is true, an assertion similar to that of Protagoras, who taught that man is the measure of reality, which meant that opinion is the criterion of truth; and, as the same objects produce different sensations and opinions in different men, it was inferred that truth may be *self-contradictory*.”—Poste, *Trans. of Poster. Analyt.*, appendix A.

CONTRARIES.—Aristotle (*De Anima*, lib. iii., cap. 3), says—

“There seems to be one and the same error, and one and the same science, with respect to things contrary.” This, by Themistius, in his *Paraphrase*, is thus illustrated:—
“Of things contrary there is one science and one ignorance. For thus, he who knows good to be something beneficial, knows evil at the same time to be something pernicious; and he who is deceived with respect to one of these, is deceived also with respect to the other.”

“There is an essential difference between *opposite* and *contrary*. Opposite powers are always of the same kind, and tend to union either by equipoise or by a common product. Thus the + and the — poles of the magnet, thus

* To avoid the consequences of the doctrine of Heraclitus, Plato, who came from this school, maintained the existence of immutable ideas.

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positive and negative electricity, are opposites. *Sweet and sour are opposites; sweet and bitter are contraries.* The *feminine* character is *opposed* to the *masculine*; but the *effeminate* is its *contrary*."—Coleridge, *Church and State*, note, p. 18.

We should say *opposite* sides of the street; not *contrary*.

"Among the ancient philosophers, some held the principles of things to be hot and cold; others, to be moist and dry; others, to be dense and rare; others, in a more abstracted way, to be excess and defect; even and odd; friendship and strife. Among the moderns, we know the stress laid on action and re-action; attraction and repulsion; expansion and condensation; centripetal and centrifugal; to which may be added these two principles, held by many ancients as well as moderns, the principles of atoms and a void, which two stand opposed nearly as *being* and *non-being*."—Harris, *Philosoph. Arrange.*, chap. iii.

Aristotle generally enumerates four kinds of opposition, viz.: *contradiction*, ἀντιφασίς; *contrariety*, τανναντία; *relation*, τὰ πρὸς τι; *privation and habit*, στέρησις καὶ ἐξίς.

Aristotle defines *contrary*, "that which in the same genus differs most;" as in colour, white and black; in sensation, pleasure and pain; in morals, good and evil. *Contraries* never co-exist, but they may succeed in the same subject. They are of two kinds, one admitting a middle term, participating at once in the nature of the things opposed. Thus, between being absolute and nonentity, there may be contingent being. In others no middle term is possible. There are *contraries* of which the one belongs necessarily to a subject, or is a simple privation, as health and sickness; light and darkness; sight and blindness. *Contraries* which admit of no middle term are *contradictories*; and form, when united, a *contradiction*. On this rests all logic; and Aristotle wished to make virtue a middle term, between two extremes.—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

COSMOGONY (κοσμος, world; γένος, birth).—"It was a most

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ancient, and, in a manner, universally received tradition among the Pagans, that the *cosmogonia*, or generation of the world, took its first beginning from a chaos (the divine *cosmogonists* agreeing herein with the atheistic ones): this tradition having been delivered down from Orpheus and Linus (among the Greeks) by Hesiod and Homer, and others.”—Cudworth, *Intell. Syst.*, p. 248.

The different theories as to the origin of the world may be comprehended under three classes:—

1. Those which represent the world, in its present form, as having existed from eternity.—Aristotle.
2. Those which represent the *matter* but not the *form* of the world to be from eternity.—Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus.
3. Those which assign both the matter and form of the world to the direct agency of a spiritual cause.

COSMOLOGY, Rational.—V. METAPHYSICS.

CRANIOLOGY.—V. PHRENOLOGY.

CRANIOSCOPY.—V. PHRENOLOGY, ORGAN, ORGANOLOGY.

CREATION—is the act by which God produced out of nothing all things that now exist. Unless we deny altogether the existence of God, we must either believe in *creation* or accept one or other of the two hypotheses, which may be called *theological dualism* or *pantheism*. According to the former, there are two necessary and eternal beings, God and matter. According to the latter, all beings are but modes or manifestations of one eternal and necessary being. A belief in *creation* admits only the existence of one necessary and eternal being, who is at once substance and cause, intelligence and power, absolutely free and infinitely good.—God and the universe are essentially distinct.—God has self-consciousness, the universe has not and cannot have.—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

CREDULITY, or a disposition to believe what others tell us, is set down by Dr. Reid as an original principle implanted in us by the Supreme Being. And as the counterpart of this he reckons *veracity* or a propensity to speak truth

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and to use language so as to convey our real sentiments, to be also an original principle of human nature.—Reid, *Inquiry*, chap. 6, sect. 24; and also Reid, *Active Pow.*, essay iii., pt. 1, chap. 2; Stewart, *Active Pow.*, vol. ii., p. 344; Priestley, *Exam.*, p. 86; Brown, lect. lxxxiv.

CRITERION (*κριτήριον*, from the Greek verb *κρίνειν*, to judge), denotes in general, all means proper to judge. It has been distinguished into the *criterion a quo, per quod*, and *secundum quod*—or the *being* who judges, as man; the *organ* or faculty by which he judges, and the *rule* according to which he judges. Unless utter scepticism be maintained, man must be admitted capable of knowing what is true.

“With regard to the *criterion* (says Edw. Poste, M.A., *Introd.*, p. 14, to *Trans. of Poster. Analyt. of Aristotle*), or organ of truth among the ancient philosophers, some advocated a simple, and others a mixed *criterion*. The advocates of the former were divided into Sensationalists or Rationalists, as they advocated sense or reason; the advocates of the latter advocated both sense and reason. Democritus and Leucippus were Sensationalists; Parmenides and the Pythagoreans were Rationalists; Plato and Aristotle belonged to the mixed school. Among those who advocated reason as a *criterion*, there was an important difference: some advocating the common reason, as Heraclitus and Anaxagoras; others, the scientific reason, or the reason as cultivated and developed by education, as Parmenides, the Pythagoreans, Plato, and Aristotle. In the *Republic* (7, sect. 9), Plato prescribes a training calculated to prepare the reason for the perception of the higher truths. Aristotle requires education for the moral reason. The older Greeks used the word *measure*, instead of *criterion*; and Protagoras had said, that man was the measure of all truth. This Aristotle interprets to mean that sense and reason are the organs of truth (*Metaphys.*, x. 2; xi. 6), and he accepts the doctrine, if limited to these faculties in a healthy and perfect condition. These

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names, then, cannot properly be ranked among the *common sense* philosophers, where they are placed by Sir William Hamilton.

“When reason is said to be an organ of truth, we must include, besides the intuitive, the syllogistic faculty. This is the instrument of the mediate or indirect apprehension of truth, as the other of immediate. The examination of these instruments, in order to discover their capabilities and right use, is Logic. This appears to be the reason why Aristotle gave the title of *Organon* to his Logic. So Epicurus called his the *canon* or *criterion*. The controversy on the *criterion* is to be found at length in Sextus Empiricus, *Hypotopos.*, lib. ii., cap. 5-7.

Criterion is now used chiefly to denote the character which distinguishes truth from falsity. In this sense it corresponds with the ground of certitude.—V. CERTITUDE.

CUMULATIVE (The Argument).—“The proof of a Divine agency is not a conclusion which lies at the end of a chain of reasoning, of which chain each instance of contrivance is only a link, and of which, if one link fail, the whole falls; but it is an *argument* separately supplied by every separate example. An error in stating an example affects only that example. The argument is *cumulative* in the fullest sense of that term. The eye proves it without the ear, the ear without the eye. The proof in each example is complete; for when the design of the part, and the conduciveness of its structure to that design is shown, the mind may set itself at rest; no future consideration can detract anything from the force of the example”—Paley, *Nat. Theol.*, chap. 6.

CUSTOM.—“Let *custom*,” says Locke, “from the very childhood, have joined figure and shape to the idea of God, and what absurdities will that mind be liable to about the Deity.”—*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 33, 17; and book i., chap. 4, 16.

Mundus regitur opinionibus.

CUSTOM—

Custom is the queen of the world.

“Such precedents are numberless; we draw
Our right from *custom*; *custom* is a law
As high as heaven, as wide as seas or land.”

Lansdown, *Beauty and Law*.

A *custom* is not necessarily a *usage*. A *custom* is merely that which is often repeated; a *usage* must be often repeated and of long standing. Hence we may speak of a “new *custom*,” but not of a “new *usage*.” *Custom* had probably the same origin as “accost,” to come near, and thence to be habitual. The root is the Latin *costa*, the side or rib.—See Kames, *Elements of Criticism*, chap. 14. Cornwall Lewis, *On Politics*, chap. 20, sect. 9.

“An aggregate of habits, either successive or cotemporaneous, in different individuals, is denoted by the words *custom*, *usage*, or *practice*.* When many persons—either a class of society, or the inhabitants of a district, or an entire nation—agree in a certain habit, they are said to have a *custom* or usage to that effect.

“*Customs* may be of two kinds:—*First*, There may be voluntary *customs*—*customs* which are adopted spontaneously by the people, and originate from their independent choice, such as the modes of salutation, dress, eating, travelling, &c., prevalent in any country, and most of the items which constitute the manners of a people.—*Secondly*, There are the *customs* which are the result of laws—*customs* which have grown up in consequence of the action of the government upon the people. Thus, when successive judges in a court of justice have laid down certain rules of procedure, and the advocates pleading before the court have observed these rules, such is called the established *practice* of the court. The sum of the habits of the successive judges and practitioners constitute the *practice* of the court. The same may be said of a deliberative assembly, or any other body, renewed by a perpetual succession of its mem-

* A similar distinction between *mos* and *consuetudo* is made by Macrobius, *Saturn* iii., 8, commenting on Virgil, *Aeneid*, 6, 601. He quotes Varro as stating that *mos* is the unit, and *consuetudo* the resulting aggregate.

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bers. In churches the equivalent name is *rites* and *ceremonies*.”

CYNIC.—After the death of Socrates, some of his disciples, under Antisthenes, were accustomed to meet in the Cynosargos, one of the gymnasia of Athens,—and hence they were called *Cynics*. According to others, the designation comes from *κυν* or *κυνος*, a dog, because like the dog they were destitute of all modesty. Antisthenes, Diogenes, and Crates, were the first heads of the sect. Zeno, by checking and moderating their doctrines, gave birth to the sect of Stoics.

Richterius, *Dissertatio de Cynicis*, Leips., 1701; Diogenes Laertius, lib. vi., c. 103.

DÆMONIST.—“To believe the governing mind, or minds, not absolutely and necessarily good, nor confined to what is best, but capable of acting according to mere will or fancy, is to be a *Dæmonist*.”—Shaftesbury, *Inquiry concerning Virtue*, book i., pt. 1, sect. 2.

DATA (the plural of *Datum*—given or granted).—“Those facts from which an inference is drawn, are called *data*; for example, it has always been found that the inhabitants of temperate climates have excelled those of very hot or very cold climates in stature, strength, and intelligence: these facts are the *data*, from which it is inferred that excellence of body and mind depend, in some measure, upon the temperature of the climate.”—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

DEDUCTION (from *de ducere*, to draw from, to cause to come out of)—is the mental operation which consists in drawing a particular truth from a general principle antecedently known. It is opposed to *induction*, which consists in rising from particular truths to the determination of a general principle. Let it be proposed to prove that Peter is mortal; I know that Peter is a man, and this

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enables me to say that all men are mortal; from which affirmation I *deduce* that Peter is mortal.

The syllogism is the form of *deduction*. Aristotle (*Prior. Analyt.*, lib. i., cap. 1), has defined it to be “an enunciation in which certain assertions being made, by their being true, it follows necessarily, that another assertion different from the first is true also.”

Before we can *deduce* a particular truth we must be in possession of the general truth. This may be acquired *intuitively*, as every change implies a cause; or *inductively*, as the volume of gas is in the inverse ratio of the pressure.

Deduction, when it uses the former kind of truths, is demonstration or science. Truths drawn from the latter kind are contingent and relative, and admit of correction by increasing knowledge.

The principle of *deduction* is, that things which agree with the same thing agree with one another. The principle of *induction* is, that in the same circumstances, and in the same substances, from the same causes the same effects will follow.

The mathematical and metaphysical sciences are founded on *deduction*, the physical sciences rest on *induction*.

For the different views of *deduction* and *induction*, see Whewell, *Philosoph. of Induct. Sciences*, book i., chap. 6; Mill, *Logic*, book ii., chap. 5; *Quarterly Rev.*, vol. 68, art. on Whewell.

DEFINITION (*de finire*, to mark out limits).—Est definitio, earum rerum, quæ sunt ejus rei propriæ, quam definire volumus, brevis et circumscripta quædam explicatio.—Cicero, *De Orat.*, lib. i., c. 42.

“The simplest and most correct notion of a *definition* is, a proposition declaratory of the meaning of a word.”—Mill, *Logic*, 2d edit., vol. i., p. 182.

Definition signifies “laying down a boundary;” and is used in logic to signify “an expression which explains any term so as to *separate* it from everything else, as a boundary separates fields. Logicians distinguish *definitions* into *essen-*

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tial and *accidental*. An *essential* definition states what are regarded as the constituent parts of the essence of that which is to be defined; and an *accidental definition* (or description) lays down what are regarded as circumstances belonging to it, viz., properties or accidents, such as causes, effects, &c.

“*Essential definition* is divided into *physical* (natural), and *logical* (metaphysical): the *physical definition* being made by an enumeration of such parts as are *actually* separable; such as are the hull, masts, &c., of a ‘ship;’ the root, trunk, branches, bark, &c., of a ‘tree.’ The *logical definition* consists of the genus and difference, which are called by some the *metaphysical* (ideal) parts; as being not two real parts into which an *individual* object can (as in the former case), be *actually* divided, but only different views taken (notions formed) of a *class* of objects, by one mind. Thus a magnet would be defined *logically*, ‘an iron ore having attraction for iron.’”—Whately, *Logic*, b. ii., ch. 5, sect. 6.

The rules of a good definition are:—

1. That it be clearer than the thing defined. 2. That it be brief—*neque absit quidquam nec supersit*. 3. That it agree *toti definito et soli definito*; that is, that it be proper and universal.

That which is complex can be defined, not that which is simple. I can define *man*—not *being*. Individuals cannot be defined, as James and John, for they have the same essence, and are only distinguished by accidents.

Accidental or descriptive definition, may be—1. *Causal*; as when man is defined as made after the image of God, and for his glory. 2. *Accidental*; as when he is defined to be *animal bipes implume*. 3. *Genetic*; as when the means by which it is made are indicated—as, if a straight line fixed at one end be drawn round by the other end so as to return to itself, a circle will be described. Or, 4. *Per oppositum*; as when virtue is said to be the flying from vice.

“Definitions are called *nominal*, which explain merely

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the *meaning of the term*; and *real*, which explain the nature of the thing signified by that term. Logic is concerned with *nominal* definitions alone.”—Whately, *ut supra*.

“By a *real*, in contrast to a *verbal* or *nominal definition*, the logicians do not intend ‘the giving an adequate conception of the nature and essence of a thing;’ that is, of a thing considered in itself, and apart from the conceptions of it already possessed. By *verbal* definition is meant the more accurate determination of the signification of a *word*; by *real* the more accurate determination of the contents of a *notion*. The one clears up the relation of *words to notions*; the other of *notions to things*. The substitution of *notional* for *real* would, perhaps, remove the ambiguity. But if we retain the term *real*, the aim of a *verbal* definition being to specify the *thought denoted by the word*, such definition ought to be called *notional*, on the principle on which the definition of a notion is called *real*; for this definition is the exposition of what things are comprehended in a thought.”—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 691, note.

“In the sense in which *nominal* and *real* definitions were distinguished by the scholastic logicians, logic is concerned with *real*, i. e., *notional* definitions only; to explain the meaning of words belongs to dictionaries or grammars.”—Mansell, *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 189.

“There is a real distinction between definitions of names and what are erroneously called definitions of things; but it is that the latter, along with the meaning of a name, covertly asserts a matter of fact. This covert assertion is not a *definition*, but a *postulate*. The *definition* is a mere identical proposition, which gives information only about the use of language, and from which no conclusions respecting matters of fact can possibly be drawn. The accompanying *postulate*, on the other hand, affirms a fact which may lead to consequences of every degree of importance. It affirms the real existence of things, possessing the combination of attributes set forth in the definition, and

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this, if true, may be foundation sufficient to build a whole fabric of scientific truth.”—Mill, *Logic*, p. 197.

Aristotle, *Poster. Analyt.*, lib. ii. ; *Topic.*, lib. vi.

Logic of Port Royal, part 1, chap. 12, 13, 14 ; part 2, chap. 16.

Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iii., c. 3 and 4.

Leibnitz, *Nouveaux Essais*, liv. iii., cap. 3 et 4.

Reid, *Account of Aristotle's Logic*, chap. 2, sect. 4.

DEIST.—There are different kinds of *deists* noticed by Dr. Sam. Clarke, vol. ii., p. 12.

1. Those who believe in an Eternal and Intelligent Being, but deny a Providence, either conserving or governing.

2. Those who believe in God and in Providence, but deny moral distinctions and moral government.

3. Those who believe in God and his moral perfections, but deny a future state.

4. Those who believe in God and his moral government, here and hereafter, in so far as the light of nature goes ; but doubt or deny the doctrines of revelation.

Kant has distinguished between a *theist* and a *deist*—the former acknowledging a God, free and intelligent, the creator and preserver of all things ; the latter believing that the first principle of all things is an Infinite Force, which is inherent in matter, and the blind cause of all the phenomena of nature. *Deism*, in this sense, is mere materialism. But *deism* is generally employed to denote a belief in God, without implying a belief in revelation.

“That modern species of infidelity, called *deism*, or *natural religion*, as contradistinguished from *revealed*.”—Van Mildert, *Bampton Lect.*, sermon 9.

“Tindal appears to have been the first who assumed for himself, and bestowed on his coadjutors, the denomination of *Christian deists*, though it implied no less than an absolute contradiction in terms.”—Van Mildert, *Bampton Lecture*, sermon 10.

See Leland, *Answer to Deistical Writers.*—V. THEIST.

DEMIURGE (*δημιουργος*, workman, architect).—Socrates and

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Plato represented God as the architect of the universe. Plotinus confounded the *demiurge* with the soul of the world, and represented it as inferior to the supreme intelligence. The Gnostics represented it as an emanation from the supreme divinity, and having a separate existence. The difficulty of reconciling our idea of an infinite cause to the variable and contingent effects observable in the universe has given rise to the hypotheses of a *demiurge*, and of a plastic nature; but they do not alleviate the difficulty. This term is applied to God, Heb. xi. 10.

DEMONSTRATION (*demonstrare*, ἀποδείξει, from ἀποδεικνυμι, to point out, to cause to see).—In old English writers this word was used to signify the *pointing out*, the connection between a conclusion and its premises, or that of a phenomenon with its asserted cause. It now denotes a necessary consequence, and is synonymous with *proof* from first principles. To draw out a particular truth from a general truth in which it is enclosed, is *deduction*; from a necessary and universal truth to draw consequences which necessarily follow, is *demonstration*. To connect a truth with a first principle, to show that it is this principle applied or realized in a particular case, is to demonstrate. The result is science, knowledge, certainty. Those general truths arrived at by induction in the sciences of observation, are certain knowledge. But it is knowledge which is not definite or complete. It may admit of increase or modification, by new discoveries; but the knowledge which *demonstration* gives is fixed and unalterable.

A *demonstration* is a reasoning consisting of one or more arguments, by which some proposition brought into question is evidently shown to be contained in some other proposition assumed, whose truth and certainty being evident and acknowledged, the proposition in question must also be admitted as certain.

Demonstration is *direct* or *indirect*. *Direct demonstration* is *descending*—when starting from a general truth we come to a particular conclusion, which we must affirm or deny;

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or *ascending*—when starting from the subject and its attributes, we arrive by degrees at a general principle, with which we connect the proposition in question. Both these are deductive, because they connect a particular truth with a general principle. *Indirect demonstratio* is when we admit hypothetically a proposition contradictory of that which we wish to demonstrate and show that this admission leads to absurdity; that is, an impossibility or a contradiction. This is *demonstratio per impossibile*, or *reductio ad absurdum*. It should only be employed when *direct demonstration* is unattainable.

“*Demonstration* was divided by ancient writers into two kinds: one kind they called *demonstration ὄτι*; the other *demonstration διοτι*.

“The *demonstration διοτι*, or argument from cause to effect, is most commonly employed in anticipating future events. When, *e. g.*, we argue that at a certain time the tides will be unusually high, because of its being the day following the new or the full moon, it is because we know that that condition of the moon is in some way connected as a cause with an unusually high rising of the tides as its effect, and can argue, therefore, that it will produce what is called *spring tide*.

“On the other hand, the *demonstration ὄτι*, or argument from effect to cause, is more applicable, naturally, to past events, and to the explanation of the phenomena which they exhibit as effects. Thus the presence of poison in the bodies of those whose death has been unaccountably sudden, is frequently proved in this way by the phenomena which such bodies present, and which involve the presence of poison as their cause.”—Karslake, *Aids to Logic*, vol. ii., p. 46.

The theory of *demonstration* is to be found in the *Organon* of Aristotle, “since whose time,” said Kant, “Logic, as to its foundation, has gained nothing.”

DENOMINATION, External.—*V. MODE.*

DEONTOLOGY (το δεον, what is due, or binding; λογος, discourse).

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“*Deontology*, or that which is proper, has been chosen as a fitter term than any other which could be found, to represent in the field of morals, the principle of *utilitarianism*, or that which is useful.”—Bentham, *Deontology, or the Science of Morality*, vol. i., p. 34.

“The term *deontology* expresses moral science, and expresses it well, precisely because it signifies the science of duty, and contains no reference to utility.”—Whewell, *Preface to Mackintosh's Prelim. Dissert.*, p. 20.

Deontology involves the being bound or being under obligation; the very idea which it was selected to avoid, and which utility does not give.

“The ancient Pythagoreans defined virtue to be *Ἐξίς του δεοντος* (that is, the habit of duty, or of doing what is binding), the oldest definition of virtue of which we have any account, and one of the most unexceptionable which is yet to be found in any system of philosophy.”—Stewart, *Active and Mor. Powers*, vol. ii., p. 446.

And Sir W. Hamilton (*Reid's Works*, p. 540, note), has observed that ethics are well denominated *deontology*.

DESIGN.—“The atomic atheists further allege, that though there be many things in the world which serve well for uses, yet it does not at all follow that therefore they were made intentionally and *designedly* for those uses.”—Cudworth, *Intell. Syst.*, p. 670.

“What is done, neither by accident, nor simply for its own sake, but with a view to some effect that is to follow, is said to be the result of *design*. None but intelligent beings act with *design*; because it requires knowledge of the connection of causes and effects, and the power of comparing ideas, to conceive of some end or object to be produced, and to devise the means proper to produce the effect. Therefore, whenever we see a thing which not only may be applied to some use, but which is evidently made for the sake of the effect which it produces, we feel sure that it is the work of a being capable of thought.”—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

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“When we find in nature the adaptation of means to an end, we infer *design* and a designer; because the only circumstances in which we can trace the origination of adaptation, are those in which human mind is implicated.”
—*Theory of Hum. Progression*, p. 482.

“The words *design* and *wisdom* are by no means synonymous; and it is possible that a philosopher may grant that there are marks of *design* in the universe, who thinks but meanly of the *wisdom* displayed in its formation. This was the case with King Alphonso when he ventured to censure the planetary system (according to the conceptions which astronomers then entertained of it), as a contrivance which admitted of important improvements. Distinct, however, as these two inquiries are, they have often been confounded by sceptical writers, who imagined that every little criticism they were able to make on the course of events, either in the physical or moral world, furnished an argument in favour of atheism.”—Stewart, *Active and Mor. Powers*, vol. ii., p. 34.

“I cannot help remarking, on the other hand, that the same distinction between *design* and *wisdom* has been overlooked by many of the excellent writers who have employed their genius in defending and illustrating the truths of natural religion. Of those who have speculated on the subject of final causes, the greater number seem plainly to have considered every new conjecture they were able to form concerning the ends and uses of the different objects comprising the universe, and of the general laws by which its phenomena are regulated, as an additional proof that it is not the work of chance or of necessity; and to have imagined that the greater the number of such *ends* and *uses* they were able to trace, the more irresistible they rendered the evidence of *design* and intelligence. . . . The proper use of such speculations is not to refute the atheist, but to illustrate the wisdom and unity of *design* displayed in the material and moral worlds, or rather, to enlighten and exalt our own understanding, by tracing with humility and

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reverence the operations of a wisdom which is infinite and divine.”—*Ibid.*—V. CAUSE (Final).

On the argument for the being of God from the evidences of *design*, or the adaptation of means to ends in the universe, see

Xenophon, *Memorabilia of Socrates*, book i., chap. 4.

Buffier, *Treatise on First Truths*, part 2, chap. 16.

Reid, *Active Powers*, essay vi., chap. 6.

Stewart, *Active and Mor. Powers*, book iii., chap. 2.

Paley, *Nat. Theology*.

Bridgewater Treatises.

Burnett Prize Essays.

DESIRE.—According to Dr. Hutcheson (*Essay on the Passions*, sect. 1), “*desires* arise in our mind from the frame of our nature, upon apprehension of good or evil in objects, actions, or events, to obtain for ourselves or others the agreeable sensation when the object or event is good; or to prevent the uneasy sensation when it is evil.”

But, while *desires* imply intelligence, they are not the mere efflux, or product of that intelligence; and, while the objects of our *desires* are known, it is not, solely, in consequence of knowing them, that we desire them; but, rather, because we have a capacity of *desiring*. There is a tendency, on our part, towards certain ends or objects, and there is a fitness in them to give us pleasure, when they are attained. Our *desires* of such ends or objects are *natural* and *primary*. *Natural*, but not *instinctive*, for they imply intelligence; *primary*, and not *factitious*, for they result from the constitution of things, and the constitution of the human mind, antecedent to experience and education.

It has been maintained, however, that there are no original principles in our nature, carrying us towards particular objects, but that, in the course of experience, we learn what gives us pleasure or pain—what does us good or ill; that we flee from the one class of objects, and follow after the other; that, in this way, likings and dislikings—inclination and aversion spring up within us; and, that all the

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various passions and pursuits of human life are produced and prompted by sensibility to pleasure and pain, and a knowledge of what affects that sensibility; and, thus, all our *desires* may be resolved into one general *desire* of happiness or well-being.

There is room for difference of opinion as to the number of those *desires* which are original; but there is little room for doubting, that there are some which may be so designated. Every being has a nature. Every thing is what it is, by having such a nature. Man has a nature, and his nature has an end. This end is indicated by certain tendencies. He feels inclination or *desire* towards certain objects, which are suited to his faculties and fitted to improve them. The attainment of these objects gives pleasure, the absence of them is a source of uneasiness. Man seeks them by a natural and spontaneous effort. In seeking them, he comes to know them better and *desire* them more eagerly. But the intelligence which is gradually developed, and the development which it may give to the *desires*, should not lead us to overlook the fact, that the *desires* primarily existed, as inherent tendencies of our nature, aiming at their correspondent objects; spontaneously, it may be, in the first instance, but gradually gaining clearness and strength, by the aid and concurrence of our intellectual and rational powers.

DETERMINISM.—This name is applied by Sir W. Hamilton (*Reid's Works*, p. 601, note) to the doctrine of Hobbes, as contradistinguished from the ancient doctrine of *fatalism*. The principle of the *sufficient reason* is likewise called by Leibnitz the principle of the *determining reason*. In the *Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*, nothing is given under *determinism*, but a reference made to *fatalism*.* And *fatalism* is explained as the doctrine which denies liberty to man.—V. NECESSITY, FATALISM, LIBERTY.

* But in the article *Liberte*, *determinism* is applied to the doctrine that motives *invincibly determine* the will, and is opposed to liberty of indifference, which is described as the doctrine that man can determine himself without motives.

DESTINY (*destinatum*, fixed)—is the necessary and unalterable connection of events; of which the heathens made a divine power, superior to all their deities. The idea of an irresistible *destiny*, against which man strives in vain, pervades the whole of Greek tragedy.—V. FATALISM.

DIALECTICS (*διαλεκτικὴ τέχνη*). —“The Greek verb *διαλεγῆσθαι*, in its widest signification,—1. Includes the use both of reason and speech as proper to man. Hence, *dialectics* may mean Logic, as including the right use of reason and language. 2. It is also used as synonymous with the Latin word *disserere*, to discuss or dispute; hence, *dialectics* has been used to denote the Logic of probabilities, as opposed to the doctrine of demonstration and scientific induction. 3. It is also used in popular language to denote Logic properly so called. But *dialectics*, like science, is not Logic, but the subject matter of Logic. *Dialectics* is handled, anatomized, and its conditions determined by Logic; but, for all that, it is not Logic, any more than the animal kingdom is Zoology, or the vegetable kingdom is Botany.”—Poste, *Introd. to Aristotle's Poster. Analyt.*, p. 16. 12mo, London, 1850.

In the philosophy of Kant, *dialectic* means what is probable. He opposes *dialectic* arguments to *apodeictic* or demonstrative arguments.

“Xenophon tells us (*Mem.* iv., §, 11), that Socrates said, ‘That *dialectic* (*τὸ διαλεγῆσθαι*) was so called because it is an inquiry pursued by persons who take counsel together, separating the subjects considered according to their kinds (*διαλεγοντας*). He held accordingly that men should try to be well prepared for such a process, and should pursue it with diligence. By this means he thought they would become good men, fitted for responsible offices of command, and truly *dialectical*’ (*διαλεκτικωτατους*). And this is, I conceive, the answer to Mr. Grote’s interrogatory exclamation (vol. viii., p. 577). ‘Surely the etymology here given by Xenophon or Socrates of the word (*διαλεγῆσθαι*), cannot be considered as satisfactory.’ The two notions, of investigatory dialogue and distribution of notions according

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to their kinds, which are thus asserted to be connected in etymology, were, among the followers of Socrates, connected in fact; the *dialectic* dialogue was supposed to involve of course the *dialectic* division of the subject.”—Dr. Whewell, *On Plato's Notion of Dialectic*, *Trans. of Camb. Philosoph. Soc.*, vol. ix., part 4.

DIANOIOLOGY—V. NOOLOGY.

DICTUM DE OMNI ET DE NULLO—an axiom from Aristotle, which is the fundamental principle of reasoning. It may be explained to mean “whatever is predicated (*i. e.*, affirmed, or denied) universally of any class of things, may be predicated in like manner (*viz.*, affirmed, or denied) of any thing comprehended in that class.”

DIFFERENCE (*διαφορα*, *differentia*).—When two objects are compared they may have qualities which are common to both, or the one may have qualities which the other has not. The first constitutes their *resemblance*, the second their *difference*. If the qualities constituting their resemblance be *essential* qualities, and the qualities constituting their difference be merely *accidental*, the objects are only said to be *distinct*; but if the qualities constituting their difference be *essential* qualities, then the objects are *different*.* One man is *distinct* from another man, or one piece of silver from another; but a man is *different* from a horse, and gold is *different* from silver. Those accidental differences which distinguish objects whose essence is common, belong only to individuals, and are called *individual* or *numerical differences*. Those *differences*, which cause objects to have a different nature, constitute species, and are called *specific differences*. The former are passing and variable; but the latter are permanent and form the objects of science, and furnish the grounds of all *classification*, *division*, and *definition*,—*q. v.*

“*Difference* or *differentia*, in Logic, means the formal or distinguishing part of the essence of a species.” When

* Derodon, *De Universalibus*, seems to use *differentia* and *distinctio* indiscriminately.

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I say that the *differentia* of a magnet is “its attracting iron,” and that its *property* is “polarity,” these are called respectively, a *specific difference* and *property*; because magnet is (I have supposed) an *infima species* (*i. e.*, only a species). When I say that the *differentia* of iron ore is “its containing iron,” and its *property* “being attracted by the magnet,” these are called respectively, a *generic difference* and *property*, because “iron ore” is a subaltern species or genus; being both the genus of magnet, and the species of mineral.”—Whately, *Logic*, book ii., chap. 5, sect. 4.

The English word *divers* expresses *difference* only, but *diverse* expresses *difference with opposition*. The Evangelists narrate the same events in “*divers manners*,” but not in “*diverse manners*.”

Porphiry, *Introd. to Categor.*

Aristotle, *Topic.*, lib. vii., c. 1, 2.—**V. DISTINCTION.**

DILEMMA (δῖς λημμα)—is an argument consisting of two or more contradictory propositions which lead to the same conclusion—as,

The wicked either perish utterly at death, or their souls are immortal.

If they perish utterly at death, there is no hope for them.

If their souls are immortal, they will be punished for their wickedness

DISCOVERY.—V. INVENTION.

DISCURSUS.—“If the mind do not perceive intuitively the connection betwixt the prædicate and subject, as in the case of axioms, or self-evident propositions, it can do so no otherwise than by the intervention of other ideas, or by the use of middle terms, as they are called, in the language of Aristotle. And this application of the middle term, first to one of the terms of a proposition, and then to the other, is performed by that exercise of the intellect which is very properly called in Greek *διανοια*, because the intellect in this operation goes betwixt the two terms, as it were, and passes from the one to the other. In Latin, as there is not

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the same facility of composition, it is expressed by two words, *discursus mentis*, *mens* being the same thing in Latin as *Νοῦς* in Greek; and the Latin expression is rendered into English by *discourse of reasoning*, or as it is commonly called, reasoning.”—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, book v., ch. 4.

“Reasoning (or *discourse*) is the act of proceeding from certain judgments to another *founded* on them (or the result of them.)”—Whately, *Logic*, book ii., ch. 1, sect. 2.

DISTINCTION (διαιρέσις) — is wider in signification than *difference*; for all things that are *different* are also *distinct*; but all things that are *distinct* are not also *different*. One drop of water does not *specifically differ* from another; but they are *individually distinct*.

Distinction is a kind of *alietas* or otherness. Those things are said to be distinct of which one is not the other. Thus *Peter*, precisely because he is not *Paul*, is said to be distinct from *Paul*. *Union* is not opposed to *distinction*; for things may be so united that the one shall not be confounded with the other. Thus the soul is united to the body. Indeed *union* implies *distinction*; it is when two things which are mutually *distinct*, become, as it were, *one*.

Distinction is *real* and *mental*, *a parte rei* and *per intellectum*. *Real distinction* is founded in the nature of the thing, and amounts to *difference*. It is threefold:—1. Object from object—as God from man. 2. Mode from mode—as blue from black. 3. Mode from thing—as body from motion. *Mental distinction* is made by the mind—as when we distinguish between light and heat, which are naturally united, or between the length and breadth of a body. It amounts to *abstraction*.—Bossuet, *Logique*, liv. i., c. 25; Reid, *Account of Aristotle's Logic*, ch. 2, sect. 3.

DISTRIBUTION—“Is the placing particular things in the places or compartments which have already been prepared to receive them.”—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

“In *Logic*, a term is said to be *distributed* when it is

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employed in its full extent, so as to comprehend all its significates—everything to which it is applicable.—Whately, *Logic*, b. ii., ch. 3, sect. 2.

“A term is said to be ‘*distributed*,’ when an assertion is made or implied respecting *every member* of the class which the term denotes. Of every universal proposition, therefore, the subject is *distributed*; e. g., all *men* are mortal; No *rational being* is irresponsible; Whatsoever things were *written aforesime* were written for our learning. When an assertion is made or implied respecting some member or members of a class, but not necessarily respecting all, the term is said to be ‘*undistributed*,’ as, for example, the subjects of the following propositions:—Some *men* are benevolent; There are some *standing here* that shall not die; Not every one *that invokes the sacred name* shall enter into the heavenly kingdom.”—Kidd, *Principles of Reasoning*, ch. 4, sect. 3, p. 179.

DITHEISM.—“As for that fore-mentioned *ditheism*, or opinion of two gods, a good and an evil one, it is evident that its original sprung from nothing else, but from a firm persuasion of the essential goodness of Deity, &c.”—Cudworth, *Intell. System*, p. 213.—**V. DUALISM.**

DIVISION—“Is the separating things of the *same kind* into parcels; *analysis* is the separating of things that are of *different kinds*; we divide a stick by cutting it into two, or into twenty pieces; we analyze it by separating the bark, the wood, and the pith—a *division* may be made at pleasure, an *analysis* must be made according to the nature of the object.”—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

“*Division* (Logical) is the distinct enumeration of several things signified by one common name. It is so called from its being analogous to the real division of a whole into its parts.”—Whately, *Logic*, book ii., ch. 5, sect. 5.

Division is either *division proper* or *partition*. *Partition* is the distribution of some *substance* into its parts; as of the globe into Europe, Asia, Africa, and America. *Division proper* is the distribution of *genus* and *species* into what is

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under them; as when *substance* is divided into *spiritual* and *material*. The members which arise from *division* retain the name of their whole; but not those from *partition*.

“*Division* is the separation of a whole into its parts.

“But as there are *two kinds of wholes*, there are also two kinds of *division*. There is a *whole* composed of parts really distinct, called in Latin, *totum*, and whose parts are called *integral parts*. The division of this *whole* is called properly *partition*; as when we divide a *house* into its apartments, a *town* into its wards, a *kingdom* or *state* into its provinces, *man* into *body* and *soul*, the *body* into its *members*. The sole rule of their division is, to make the enumeration of particulars very exact, and that there be nothing wanting to them.

“The other *whole* is called, in Latin, *omne*, and its parts *subjected* or *inferior parts*, inasmuch as the whole is a *common term*, and its parts are the terms comprising its extension. The word *animal* is a whole of this nature, of which the inferiors, as man and beast, which are comprehended under its extension, are subjected parts. This division obtains properly the name of *division*, and there are four kinds of division which may be noticed.

“The *first* is, when we divide the *genus by its species*; every substance is body or mind, every animal is man or beast. The *second* is, when we divide the *genus by its differences*; every animal is rational or irrational, every number is even or uneven. The *third* is, when we divide a *common subject* into the *opposite accidents* of which it is susceptible, these being according to its different inferiors, or in relation to different times; as, every star is luminous by itself, or by reflection only; every body is in motion or at rest, &c. The *fourth* is, that of an *accident* into its *different subjects*, as division of *goods* into those of mind and body.”—*Port Roy. Logic*, part 2, chap. 15.

The rules of a good *division* are :—

1st. That it be adequate, *i. e.*, that the parts taken together contain the whole.

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2d. That it be distinct, so that the members do not coincide, but exclude one another.

3d. That there be nothing superfluous or redundant.

Seneca (*Epist.* 89) said, *Idem vitii habet nimia quod nulla divisio; simile confuso est quicquid usque in pulverem sectum est.*

Aristotle, *Poster. Analyt.*, lib. ii., c. 13.

Reid, *Account of Aristotle's Logic*, chap. ii., sect. 2.—

V. WHOLE.

DOGMATISM (δογμα, from δοκειν, to see or seem).—"Philosophers," said Lord Bacon, "may be divided into two classes, the *empirics* and the *dogmatists*. The empiric, like the ant, is content to amass, and then consume his provisions. The *dogmatist*, like the spider, spins webs of which the materials are extracted from his own substance, admirable for the delicacy of their workmanship, but without solidity or use. The bee keeps a middle course—she draws her matter from flowers and gardens; then, by art peculiar to her, she labours and digests it. True philosophy does something like this."

"He who is certain or presumes to say he *knows*, is, whether he be mistaken or in the right, a *dogmatist*."—Shaftesbury, *Miscell. Reflect.*, Miscell. ii., c. 2.

Kant defined *dogmatism*, "the presumption that we are able to attain a pure knowledge based on ideas, according to principles which the reason has long had in use, without any inquiry into the *manner* or into the *right* by which it has attained them."—Morell, *Elements of Psychology*, p. 236, note.

"By *dogmatism* we understand, in general, both all propounding and all receiving of tenets, merely from habit, without thought or examination, or, in other words, upon the authority of others; in short, the very opposite of critical investigation. All assertion for which no proof is offered is *dogmatical*."—Chalybæus, *Specul. Philosoph.*, p. 4.

To maintain that man cannot attain to knowledge of the

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truth, is *scepticism*. To maintain that he can do so only by renouncing his reason, which is naturally defective, and surrendering himself to an internal inspiration or superior intuition, by which he is absorbed into God, and loses all personal existence, is *mysticism*. *Dogmatism* is to maintain that knowledge may be attained by the right use of our faculties, each within its proper sphere, and employed in a right method. This is the natural creed of the human race. Scepticism and mysticism are after thoughts.

Dogmatism, or faith in the results of the due exercise of our faculties, is to be commended. But *dogmatism* in the method of prosecuting our inquiries is to be condemned. Instead of laying down *dogmatically* truths which are not proven, we should proceed rather by observation and doubt. The scholastic philosophers did much harm by their *dogmatic method*. It is not to be mistaken for the *synthetic method*. There can be no *synthesis* without a preceding *analysis*. But they started from positions which had not been proved, and deduced consequences which were of no value.—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

DOUBT (*dubitare, duitare, i. e., in duo itare, to go two ways*).—Man knows some things, and is ignorant of many things, while he is in *doubt* as to other things. *Doubt* is that state of mind in which we hesitate as to two contradictory conclusions—having no preponderance of evidence in favour of either. Philosophical *doubt* has been distinguished as *provisional* or *definitive*. *Definitive doubt* is *scepticism*. *Provisional, or methodical doubt* is a voluntary suspending of our judgment for a time, in order to come to a more clear and sure conclusion. This was first given as a rule in philosophical method by Descartes, who tells us that he began by doubting everything, discharging his mind of all preconceived ideas, and admitting none as clear and true till he had subjected them to a rigorous examination.

“*Doubt* is some degree of belief, along with the consciousness of ignorance, in regard to a proposition. Absolute *disbelief* implies knowledge: it is the knowledge that such

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or such a thing is not true. If the mind admits a proposition without any desire for knowledge concerning it, this is *credulity*. If it is open to receive the proposition, but feels ignorance concerning it, this is *doubt*. In proportion as knowledge increases, *doubt* diminishes, and belief or disbelief strengthens."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.—V. CERTAINTY, SCEPTICISM.

DREAMING—The phenomena of sleep and *dreaming*, are treated by almost all writers on psychology. *Dreams* very often take their rise and character from something in the preceding state of body or mind. "Through the multitude of business cometh a *dream*," said Solomon; and Aristotle regarded dreams as the vibrations of our waking feelings.—*Ethic.*, lib. i., cap. 13.

According to these views, *dreams*, instead of being prospective or prophetic, are retrospective and resultant. The former opinion, however, has prevailed in all ages and among all nations; and hence, *oneiromancy* or prophesying by *dreams*, that is, interpreting them as presages of coming events.

DUALISM, DUALITY.—"Pythagoras talked, it is said, of an immaterial unity, and a material *duality*, by which he pretended to signify, perhaps, the first principles of all things, the efficient and material causes."—Bolingbroke, *Hum. Reason*, essay ii.

Dualism is the doctrine that the universe was created and is preserved by the concurrence of two principles, equally necessary, eternal, and independent.

Mythological dualism was held by Zoroaster and the Magi, who maintained the existence of a good principle and an evil principle; and thus explained the mixed state of things which prevails. It would appear, however, according to Zoroaster, that both Ormuzd and Ahrimanes were subordinate to Akerenes, or the Supreme Deity; and that it was only a sect of the Magi who held the doctrine of *dualism* in its naked form. Their views were revived in the second century by the Gnostics, and in the third cen-

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ture were supported by Manes, whose followers were called Manichæans.

Many of the ancient philosophers regarded the universe as constituted by two principles, the one active, the other passive, the one mind, the other matter, the one soul, the other body. But the supposition of two infinities, or of two first causes, is self-contradictory, and is now abandoned.

The term *dualism* also finds a place in the theory of *perception*,—*q. v.*

DURATION.—"After some thought has entirely disappeared from the mind it will often return, joined with the belief that it has been in the mind before; this is called *memory*. Memory and the consciousness of succession give us the notion signified by the word *duration*."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 15.

According to Kant, *duration* or time, and also space, are necessary forms of the human mind, which cannot think of bodies but as existing in space, nor of events but as occurring in time.—*V. TIME.*

DUTY.—That which we *ought* to do—that which we are under *obligation* to do. In seeing a thing to be right we see at the same time that it is our *duty* to do it. There is a complete synthesis between *rectitude* and *obligation*. Price has used *oughtness* as synonymous with *rightness*.—*V. OBLIGATION.*

Duty and *right* are relative terms. If it be the *duty* of one party to do some thing, it is the *right* of some other party to expect or exact the doing of it.—*V. RIGHT, RECTITUDE.*

See Wordsworth, *Ode to Duty*.

DYNAMISM—the doctrine of Leibnitz, that all substance involves *force*.—*V. MATTER.*

ECLECTICISM (*ἐκλεγειν*, to select, to choose out).—The Alexandrian philosophers, or Neo-platonicians, who arose at Alexandria about the time of Pertinax and Severus, and continued to flourish to the end of the reign of Justinian,

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professed to gather and unite into one body, what was true in all systems of philosophy. To their method of philosophizing, the name *eclecticism* was first applied. Clemens Alexandrinus (*Stromm.*, lib. i., p. 288) said, "By philosophy I mean neither the Stoic, nor the Platonic, nor the Epicurean, nor the Aristotelian; but whatever things have been properly said by each of these sects, inculcating justice and devout knowledge,—*this whole selection I call philosophy.*" Diogenes Laertius tells us (1, sect. 21), that Potamos of Alexandria introduced *ἐκλεκτικὴν ἄνοιαν*. But the method had been adopted by Plato and Aristotle before, and has been followed by many in all ages of philosophy. Leibnitz said that truth was more widely diffused than was commonly thought; but it was often burdened and weakened, mutilated and corrupted by additions which spoiled it and made it less useful. In the philosophy of the ancients, or those who had gone before, he thought there was *perennis quædam philosophia*—if it could only be disentangled from error and disinterred from the rubbish which overwhelmed it. In modern times the great advocate of *eclecticism* is Mons. Cousin. But its legitimacy as a mode of philosophizing has been challenged.

"I follow the liberty of the old Christians, who did not pin their faith to any sect of philosophers, not that they agreed with those who say that nothing can be known; than which nothing is more foolish; but that they thought that there was no sect which had seen the whole of the truth, and none which had not seen some part of the truth. They therefore aimed at collecting the truth which was diffused among individual philosophers, and among sects, into one body: and they thought that this result would be nothing else but the true Christian religion."—Grotius, *De Jure Belli, &c., Prolegomena*, sec. 42.

"The sense in which this term is used by Clemens" (of Alexandria), says Mr. Maurice (*Mor. and Metaphys. Phil.*, p. 53), "is obvious enough. He did not care for Plato, Aristotle, Pythagoras, as such; far less did he care for the

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opinions and conflicts of the schools which bore their names ; he found in each hints of precious truths of which he desired to avail himself ; he would gather the flowers without asking in what garden they grew, the prickles he would leave for those who had a fancy for them. *Eclecticism*, in this sense, seemed only like another name for catholic wisdom. A man, conscious that everything in nature and in art was given for his learning, had a right to suck honey wherever it was to be found ; he would find sweetness in it if it was hanging wild on trees and shrubs, he could admire the elaborate architecture of the cells in which it was stored. The Author of all good to man had scattered the gifts, had imparted the skill ; to receive them thankfully was an act of homage to Him. But once lose the feeling of *devotion* and *gratitude*, which belonged so remarkably to Clemens—once let it be fancied that the philosopher was not a mere receiver of treasures which had been provided for him, but an ingenious chemist and compounder of various naturally unsociable ingredients, and the eclectic doctrine would lead to more self-conceit, would be more unreal and heartless than any one of the sectarian elements out of which it was fashioned. It would want the belief and conviction which dwell, with whatever unsuitable companions, even in the narrowest theory. Many of the most vital characteristics of the original dogmas would be effaced under pretence of taking off their rough edges and fitting them into each other. In general the superficialities and formalities of each creed would be preserved in the new system ; its original and essential characteristics sacrificed.”

“ In philosophy Cicero was never more than an *Eclectic*, that is, in point of fact, no philosopher at all. For the very essence of the philosophical mind lies in this, that it is constrained by an irresistible impulse to ascend to primary, necessary principles, and cannot halt until it reaches the living, streaming sources of truth ; whereas the *eclectic* will stop short where he likes, at any maxim to which he chooses to ascribe the authority of a principle. The philosophical

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mind must be systematic, ever seeking to behold all things in their connection, as parts or members of a great organic whole, and impregnating them all with the electric spirit of order; while the *eclectic* is content if he can string together a number of generalizations. A philosopher incorporates and animates; an *eclectic* heaps and ties up. The philosopher combines multiplicity into unity; the *eclectic* leaves unity straggling about in multiplicity. The former opens the arteries of truth, the latter its veins. Cicero's legal habits peer out from under his philosophical cloak, in his constant appeal to precedent, his ready deference to authority. For in law, as in other things, the practitioner does not go beyond maxims, that is, secondary or tertiary principles, taking his stand upon the mounds which his predecessors have erected."—Second Series of *Guesses at Truth*, edition 1848, p. 238.

See Cousin, *Fragmens Philosophiques*, 8vo, Paris, 1826.

Jouffroy, *Melanges Philosophiques*, 8vo, Paris, 1833.

Damiron, *Essai sur l'Histoire de la Philosophie au dix-neuvieme siecle*, 2 tom., 8vo, Paris, 1834.

ECONOMICS (*ὄικος νομος*—the law of the house).—Treatises under this title were written by Xenophon, Aristotle, and Cicero. They seem to have treated of the best means of managing and increasing the comfort and resources of a household. Only fragments of them remain. But in modern times justice or social duty has been distinguished by Henry More into *ethical*, *economical*, and *political*. And *economics* has been employed to denote those duties which spring from the relations which exist in a family or household. These are the duties—

1. Of husband and wife.
2. Of parent and child.
3. Of master and servant.

ECSTASY (*ἐκστασις*, standing out)—a transport of the soul by which it seems as if out of the body.

This word does not occur in philosophy before the time of Philo and the Alexandrians. Plotinus and Porphyry

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pretended to have *ecstasies* in which they were united to God. Among Christian writers, Bonaventura (*Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*), Gerson (*Theologia Mystica*), and Francis de Sales, recommend those contemplations which may lead to *ecstasy*. But there is danger of their leading to delusion, and to confound the visions of a heated imagination with higher and nearer views of spiritual things.

Baader, *Traité sur l'Extase*, 1817.

EDUCATION (*educere*, to draw out)—means the development of the bodily and mental powers. The human being is born and lives amidst scenes and circumstances which have a tendency to call forth and strengthen his powers of body and mind. And this may be called the *education* of nature. But by *education* is generally meant the using those means of development which one man or one generation of men may employ in favour of another. These means are chiefly *instruction*, or the communication of knowledge to enlighten and strengthen the mind, and *discipline*, or the formation of manners and habits. Instruction and discipline may be physical or moral, that is, may refer to the body or to the mind. Both, when employed in all their extent, go to make up *education*, which is the aid given to assist the development, and advance the progress of the human being, as an individual, and as a member of a family, of a community, and a race.

“The business of *education* is to *educere* or bring out that which is within, not merely or mainly to *instruct* or impose a form from without. Only we are not framed to be self-sufficient, but to derive our nourishment, intellectual and spiritual, as well as bodily, from without, through the ministrations of others; and hence *instruction* must ever be a chief element of *education*. Hence too we obtain a criterion to determine what sort of *instruction* is right and beneficial—that which ministers to *education*, which tends to bring out, to nourish and cultivate the faculties of the mind, not that which merely piles a mass of information upon them. Moreover, since nature, if left to herself, is

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ever prone to run wild, and since there are hurtful and pernicious elements around us, as well as nourishing and salutary, pruning and sheltering, correcting and protecting are also among the principal offices of *education*.”—Second Series. *Guesses at Truth*, 1848, p. 145.

Milton, *On Education*. Locke, *On Education*.

Guizot, *Meditations*, 8vo, Paris, 1852.

Conseils d'un Pere sur l'Education.

EFFECT.—That which is produced by the operation of a cause.—*V. CAUSE*.

EGO (I).—“Supposing it proved that my thoughts and my consciousness must have a *subject*, and consequently that I exist, how do I know that all that train and succession of thoughts which I remember belong to one subject, and that the *I* of this moment is the very individual *I* of yesterday, and of time past?”—Reid, *Inquiry*, introd., sect. 3.

Sir William Hamilton's note upon this passage is as follows:—“In English, we cannot say the *I* and the *not I*, so happily as the French *le moi* and *le non-moi*, or even the German *das Ich* and *das nicht Ich*. The ambiguity arising from identity of sound between the *I* and the *eye*, would itself preclude the ordinary employment of the former. The *ego* and the *non-ego* are the best terms we can use; and as the expressions are scientific, it is perhaps no loss that their technical precision is guarded by their *non-vernacularity*.”

In another note (*Reid's Works*, note B, sect. 1, p. 806,) he has added:—“The *ego* as the subject of thought and knowledge, is now commonly styled by philosophers the *subject*; and *subjective* is a familiar expression for what pertains to the mind or thinking principle. In contrast and correlation to these, the terms *object* and *objective* are, in like manner, now in general use to denote the *non-ego*, its affections and properties, and in general, the *really existent* as opposed to the *ideally known*.”

EGOISM, EGOIST.—“Those Cartesians who in the progress of their doubts ended in absolute *egoism*.”

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“A few bold thinkers, distinguished by the name of *egoists*, had pushed their scepticism to such a length as to doubt of everything but their own existence. According to *these*, the proposition *Cogito, ergo sum*, is the only truth which can be regarded as absolutely certain.”—Stewart, *Dissert.*, part 2, p. 161, and p. 175.

Dr. Reid says (*Intell. Powers*, essay ii., chap. 8), that some of Descartes' disciples who doubted of everything but their own existence, and the existence of the operations and ideas of their own mind, remained at this stage of his system and got the name of *egoists*. But Sir William Hamilton, in a note on the passage, says “He is doubtful about the existence of this supposed sect of *egoists*.”

The first sense and aspect of *egoism* may seem to be selfishness. But this is contradicted by the following epitaph.

In the churchyard of Homersfield (St. Mary, Southelmham), Suffolk, was the gravestone of Robert Crytoft, who died Nov. 17th, 1810, aged ninety, bearing the following epitaph:—

“MYSELF.

“As I walk'd by myself, I talk'd to myself,
And thus myself said to me,
Look to thyself, and take care of thyself,
For nobody cares for thee.

“So I turned to myself and I answered myself,
In the self-same reverie,
Look to myself, or look not to myself,
The self-same thing will it be.”

ELECTION (*eligere*, to choose)—is an elicit act of will, by which, after deliberation of several means to an end proposed by the understanding, the will elects one rather than any other. *Volition* has reference to the end, *election* is of the means. According to others, no distinction should be taken between *election* and *volition*; as to will an end is the same act as to choose the means. But an end may be accomplished by different means—of one or other of which there is *election*.

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Aristotle (*Ethics*, book iii., chap. 3, 4) says "moral preference, *προάρεσις*, then, relates to those things only which may be accomplished by our own exertions; it is appetite or affection, combined with and modified by reason; and, conversant not about *ends*, but about the best *means* by which they may be attained. *Volition*, on the contrary, is conversant only about *ends*; which consist, according to some, in real, and according to others in seeming good."

ELEMENT (*στοιχείον*).—The Stoic definition of an *element* is, "that out of which, as their first principle, things generated are made, and into which, as their last remains, they are resolved."—Diog. Laert., vii., 176.

"The word *element* designates the case in which one thing is the primitive matter which constitutes another thing."—Arist., *Metaphys.*, lib. x., c. 1.

"We call that elementary which in a composition cannot be divided into heterogeneous parts—thus the *elements* of sound constitute sound, and the last parts into which you divide it—parts which you cannot divide into other sounds of a different kind. The last parts into which bodies can be divided—parts which cannot be divided into parts of a different kind, are the *elements* of bodies. The *elements* of every being are its constitutive principle."—Arist., *Metaphys.*, lib. v., c. 3.

"*Elements* are *τα ἐνυπαρχόντα αίτια*—the inherent or in-existing causes, such as matter and form. There are other causes, such as the tribe of *efficient causes*, which cannot be called *elements*, because they make no part of the substances which they generate or produce. Thus the statuary is no part of his statue; the painter of his picture. Hence it appears that all *elements* are causes, but not all causes *elements*."—Harris, *Philosoph. Arrange.*, chap. 5, note. And in the chap. he says, "In form and matter we place the *elements* of natural substance."

Materia prima, or matter without form, was an *element* ready to receive form. This seems to be the use of the word as retained in the communion service. Bread and

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wine are *elements* ready to receive the form of the body and blood of Christ. "Like the *elements* of the material world, the bases of the sacred natures into which they were transformed."—Hampden, *On Scholastic Philosophy*, lect. vii.—See Doublado's *Letters*.

"The *elementes* be those originall thynges unmyxt and uncompounde, of whose temperance and myxture all other thynges having corporal substance be compact; of them be foure, that is to say, earth, water, ayre, and fyre."—Sir T. Elyot, *Castel of Health*, b. i.

Element is applied analogically to many things; as to letters, the *elements* of words; to words, the *elements* of speech; and in general to the principles or first truths or rules of any science or art.

ELICIT (*elicere*, to draw out)—is applied to acts of will which are produced directly by the will itself, and are contained within it; as *velle aut nolle*. An *elicit* act of will is either election or volition—the latter having reference to ends, and the former to means.

ELIMINATION, in mathematics, is the process of causing a function to disappear from an equation, the solution of which would be embarrassed by its presence there. In other writings the correct signification is, "the extrusion of that which is superfluous or irrelevant." Thus, in *Edin. Rev.*, April, 1833, Sir W. Hamilton says:—"The preparatory step of the discussion was, therefore, an *elimination* of those less precise and appropriate significations, which, as they would at best only afford a remote genus and difference, were wholly incompetent for the purpose of a definition."

It is frequently used in the sense of eliciting, but incorrectly.

EMANATION (*e-manare*, to flow from).—According to several systems of philosophy and religion which have prevailed in the East, all the beings of which the universe is composed, whether body or spirit, have proceeded from, and are parts of, the divine being or substance. This doctrine of *emana-*

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tion is to be found in the systems of Zoroaster, the Gnostics, and Neo-platonicians. It differs little, if at all, from Pantheism.

EMINENTLY.—V. VIRTUAL.

EMOTION (*emovere*, to move out)—is often used as synonymous with feeling. Strictly taken, it means “a state of feeling which, while it does not spring directly from an affection of body, manifests its existence and character by some sensible effect upon the body.”

An *emotion* differs from a *sensation*, by its not originating in a state of body; and from a *cognition*, by its being pleasurable or painful.

Emotions, like other states of feeling, imply knowledge. Something beautiful or deformed, sublime or ridiculous, is known and contemplated; and, on the contemplation, springs up the appropriate feeling, followed by the characteristic expression of countenance, or attitude, or manner.

In themselves considered, *emotions** can scarcely be called springs of action. They tend, rather, while they last, to fix attention on the objects or occurrences which have excited them. In many instances, however, *emotions* are succeeded by desires to obtain possession of the objects which awaken them, or to remove ourselves from the presence of such objects. When an *emotion* is thus succeeded by some degree of desire, it forms, according to Lord Kames, a *passion*, and becomes, according to its nature, a powerful and permanent spring of action.

Emotions, then, are awakened through the medium of the intellect, and are varied and modified by the conception we form of the objects to which they refer.

Emotions manifest their existence and character by sensible effects upon the body.

Emotions, in themselves, and by themselves, lead to

* “The feelings of beauty, grandeur, and whatever else is comprehended under the name of taste, *do not lead to action*, but terminate in delightful contemplation, which constitutes the essential distinction between them and the moral sentiments, to which, in some points of view, they may doubtless be likened.”—Mackintosh, *Dissert.*, p. 238.

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quiescence and contemplation, rather than activity. But they combine with springs of action, and give to them a character and a colouring. What is said to be done from surprise or shame, has its proper spring—the surprise or shame being concomitant.—See Dr. Chalmers, *Sketches of Mental and Moral Phil.*, p. 88.

EMPIRIC, EMPIRICISM.—Among the Greek physicians those who founded their practice on experience called themselves *empirics* (ἐμπειρικοί); those who relied on theory, *methodists* (μεθοδικοί); and those who held a middle course, *dogmatists* (δογματικοί). The term *empiricism* became naturalized in England when the writings of Galen and other opponents of the *empirics* were in repute, and hence it was applied generally to any ignorant pretender to knowledge. It is now used to denote that kind of knowledge which is the result of experience. Aristotle applies the terms *historical* and *empirical* in the same sense. *Historical* knowledge is the knowledge that a thing is. *Philosophical* knowledge is the knowledge of its cause, or why it is. The Germans laugh at our phrase *philosophical transactions*, and say, “Socrates brought down philosophy from the clouds—but the English have brought her down to the dunghill.”

Empiricism allows nothing to be true nor certain but what is given by experience, and rejects all knowledge *à priori*.

In antiquity the Ionian school may be said to have been sensualist or *empirical*. The saying of Heraclitus that nothing is, but that all things are beginning to be, or are in a continual flux, amounts to a denial of the persistence of substance. Democritus and the atomists, if they admitted the substance of atoms, denied the fundamental laws of the human mind. And the teaching of Protagoras, that sense is knowledge, and man the measure of all things, made all science individual and relative. The influence of Plato and Aristotle re-established the foundation of true philosophy, and *empiricism* was regarded as scepticism.

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In the middle ages *empiricism* was found only among the physicians and alchemists, and was not the badge of any school of philosophy.

Empiricism, as applied to the philosophy of Locke, means that he traces all knowledge to experience, ἐμπειρία. Experience, according to him, included sensation and reflection. The French philosophers, Condillac and others, rejected reflection as a distinct source of knowledge; and their doctrine, to distinguish it from that of Locke, is called *sensualism*. *Ideology* gives nothing to the mind but sensations remembered or generalized, which it calls ideas. But Reid and the common sense philosophers, as well as Cousin and the rationalist philosophers, hold that the mind has primary beliefs, or universal and necessary ideas, which are the ground of all experience and knowledge.—V. EXPERIENCE.

Empirical or *experimental* “is an epithet used by Madame de Staël and other writers on German philosophy, to distinguish what they call the philosophy of sensation, from that of Plato and of Leibnitz. It is, accordingly, generally, if not always, employed by them in an unfavourable sense. In this country, on the contrary, the *experimental* or *inductive* philosophy of the human mind denotes those speculations concerning mind, which, rejecting all hypothetical theories, rest solely on phenomena for which we have the evidence of consciousness. It is applied to the philosophy of Reid, and to all that is truly valuable in the metaphysical works of Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume.”—Stewart, *Dissert.*, pt. 2, p. 146, note.

EMULATION (ἀμιλλὰ, contest, whence the Latin *æmulus*, and thence *emulation*)—is the desire of superiority. It is one of those primitive desires which manifest themselves in very early years. It prompts, when properly directed and regulated, to the most strenuous and persevering exertion. Its influence in the carrying forward of education is most important.

END.—*Ends* are of two kinds, according to Aristotle (*Eth.*,

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lib. i., cap. 1), ἐνεργεῖαι, operations, ἔργα, productions. An ἐνεργεῖα is the *end*, when the object of a man's acting is the pleasure or advantage in being so employed, as in music, dancing, contemplation, &c., which produce nothing, generally speaking, beyond the pleasure which the act affords. An ἔργον is something which is produced beyond the operation or energy; thus, the shoe is the ἔργον produced by the ἐνεργεῖα of shoe-making.—Paul, *Analysis of Arist.*, p. 2.

This corresponds to Adam Smith's distinction of labour as productive or unproductive, according as it gives or does not give a material product.

An *end* is that for the sake of which an action is done. Hence it has been said to be, *principium in intentione et terminus in executione*.

When one *end* has been gained, it may be the means of gaining some other *end*. Hence it is that *ends* have been distinguished, as *supreme* and *ultimate*, or *subordinate* and *intermediate*. That which is sought for its own sake, is the *supreme* and *ultimate end* of those actions which are done with a view to it. That which is sought for the sake of some other end, is a *subordinate* and *intermediate* end.

Ends are ultimate, are distinguished into the *end simpliciter ultimus*, and *ends* which are ultimate *secundum quid*. An *end* which is the last that is successively aimed at, in a series of actions, is called ultimate *secundum quid*. But that which is aimed at, exclusively for its own sake, and is never regarded as a means to any other *end*, is an ultimate end, simply and absolutely.

See Edwards, *Dissertation concerning the End for which God created the World*.

Cicero, *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum*.

ENS is either *ens reale* or *ens rationis*.

Ens Rationis.—That which has no existence but in the idea which the mind forms of it; as a golden mountain.

Ens Reale, in philosophical language, is taken *late et stricte*, and means anything that exists or may exist; and is distin-

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guished as *ens potentiale*, or that which may exist, and *ens actuale*, or that which does exist. It is sometimes taken as the concrete of *essentia*, and signifies what has essence and may exist—as a rose in winter. Sometimes as the principle of *esse*, and then it signifies what actually exists. *Ens* without intellect is *res*, a thing.

ENTELECHY (ἐντελεχεια, from ἐντελες, perfect, ἔχειν, to have, and τέλος, an end, in Latin *perfectihabia*).—"In one of the books of the Pythagoreans, viz., *Ocellus Lucanus*, περι του παντος, the word συντελεια is used in the same sense. Hence it has been thought that this was borrowed from the Pythagoreans."—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, b. i., ch. 3, p. 16.—Note.

Cicero (*Tuscul. Quæst.*, lib. i., quæst. 1) interprets it to mean *quandam quasi continuatam motionem et perennem*.

Melancthon (*Opera*, tom. xiii., pp. 12-14, edit. 1846) gives two interpretations of *Endelechy*, as he writes it. He says that ἐνδελχες signifies *continuus*, and ἐνδελχεια *continuitas*. According to him, Aristotle used it as synonymous with ἐνεργεια. Hence Cicero translated it by continuous movement or agitation. Argyropolis blames Cicero for this, and explains it as meaning "interior perfection," as if it were το ἐντος τελειουν. But Melancthon thinks Cicero's explanation in accordance with the philosophy of Aristotle.

According to Leibnitz, *entelecheia* is derived apparently from the Greek word which signifies *perfect*, and therefore the celebrated Hermoläus Barbarus expressed it in Latin, word for word, by *perfectihabia*, for act is the accomplishment of power; and he needed not to have consulted the devil, as he did, they say, to tell him this much.—Leibnitz, *Theodicee*, partie i., sect. 87.

"You may give the name of *entelechies* to all simple substances or created monads, for they have in them a certain perfection (ἔχουσι το ἐντελες), they have a sufficiency (ἀνταρκεια) which makes them the source of their internal actions, and so to say incorporeal automatons."

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—*Monadologie*, sect. 18. He calls a monad an autarchic automaton, or first *entelechy*—having life and force in itself

“*Entelechy* is the opposite to *potentiality*, yet would be ill translated by that which we often oppose to *potentiality*, *actuality*. 'Εἶδος expresses the substance of each thing viewed in repose—its form or constitution; ἐνεργεῖαι sit substance, considered as active and generative; ἐντελεχία seems to be the synthesis or harmony of these two ideas. The *effectio* of Cicero, therefore, represents the most important side of it, but not the whole.”—Maurice, *Mor. and Metaphys. Phil.*, note, p. 191.

Ἐντελεχία ce qui a en soi sa fin, qui par consequent ne releve que de soi meme, et constitue une unite indivisible.—Cousin, note to *Translat. of Aristotle's Metaphysics*, book xii., p. 212.

“L'*Entelechie* est opposee a la simple puissance, comme la forme a la matiere, l'etre au possible. C'est elle qui, par la vertu de la fin, constitue l'essence meme des choses, et imprime le mouvement a la matiere aveugle; et c'est en ce sens qu' Aristote a pu donner de l'ame cette celebre definition, qu'elle est l'entelechie ou forme premiere de tout corps naturel qui possede la vie en puissance.”—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

Aristotle defines the soul of man to be an *entelechy*; a definition of which Dr. Reid said he could make no sense.—**V. SOUL.**

ENTHUSIASM (ὁ θεος ἐν ἡμῖν)—“is almost a synonym of genius; the moral life in the intellectual light, the will in the reason; and without it, says Seneca, nothing truly great was ever achieved.”—Coleridge, *Notes on Eng. Div.*, vol. i., p. 338.

The word occurs both in Plato and Aristotle. According to its composition it should signify “divine inspiration.” But it is applied in general to any extraordinary excitement or exaltation of mind. The raptures of the poet, the deep meditations of the philosopher, the heroism of the warrior, the devotedness of the martyr, and the ardour of the patriot,

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are so many different phases of *enthusiasm*. “According to Plutarch, there be five kinds of *enthusiasm*:—*Divinatory*, *Bacchical* (or corybantical), *Poetical* (under which he comprehends musical also), *Martial* and *Erotical*, or *Amatorie*.” A *Treatise concerning enthusiasm* by Meric Casaubon, D.D., chap. 1. See also *Natural Hist. of Enthusiasm*, by Isaac Taylor; Madame de Staël, *Germany*; Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iv., chap. 19.

ENTHYMEME (ἐν θυμῷ, in the mind)—is an irregular syllogism in which one of the premisses is not expressed, but kept in mind; as every animal is a substance, therefore every man is a substance, in which the premiss, “man is an animal,” is suppressed. The famous expression of Descartes, *Cogito ergo sum*, is, as to form, an *enthymeme*. It was not put, however, as a proof of existence, but as meaning that the fact of existing is enclosed in the consciousness of thinking.

ENTITY (*entitas*)—in the scholastic philosophy was synonymous with essence or form.

To all individuals of a species there is something in common—a nature which transiently invests all, but belongs exclusively to none. This essence, taken by itself and viewed apart from any individual, was what the scholastics called an *entity*. Animals had their *entity*, which was called *animality*. Men had their *entity*, which was called *humanity*. It denoted the common nature of the individuals of a species or genus. It was the idea or model according to which we conceived of them. The question whether there was a reality corresponding to this idea, divided philosophers into *nominalists* and *realists*,—*q. v.*

It is used to denote any thing that exists, as an object of sense or of thought.—*V. ENS.*

ENUNCIATION, in Logic, included the doctrine of propositions.

EQUANIMITY.—*V. MAGNANIMITY.*

EQUITY (ἐπιεικεία, or το ἴσον, as distinguished from το νομιμον)—is described by Aristotle (*Ethics*, book v., chap.

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10), as that kind of justice which corrects the irregularities or rigours of strict legal justice. All written laws must necessarily speak in general terms, and must leave particular cases to the discretion of the parties. An *equitable* man will not press the letter of the law in his own favour, when, by doing so, he may do injustice to his neighbour. The ancients, in measuring rusticated building, in which the stones alternately projected and receded, used a leaden rule. *Equity*, like this leaden rule, bends to the specialities of every case, when the iron rule of legal justice cannot do so.

“*Equity* contemplates the mass of rights growing out of the law of nature; and justice contemplates the mass of rights growing out of the law of society. *Equity* treats of our dues as equals; justice treats of our dues as fellow-subjects. The purpose of *equity* is respect for humanity; the purpose of justice is respect for property. *Equity* withstands oppression; justice withstands injury.”
—Taylor, *Synonyms*.—V. JUSTICE.

EQUIVOCAL words have different significations, as *bull*, the animal, the Pope's letter, a blunder. *Gallus*, in Latin, a cock, or a Frenchman. *Canis*, a dog, or the dog-star. They originate in the multiplicity of things and the poverty of language.

Words signifying different things may be used,—

First, By accident; or, second, With intention. 1st. It has happened, that *sandwich* is the name of a peer—of a town—of a cluster of islands, and of a slice of bread and meat. 2d. There are four ways in which a word may come to be used equivocally with knowledge or intention:—

1. On account of the resemblance of the things signified, as when a statue or picture is called a man.
2. On account of proportion, as when a point is called a principle in respect to a line, and unity a principle in respect to number.
3. On account of common derivation—thus, a *medical*

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man, a *medical* book, a *medical* instrument, are all derived from *medicine*.

4. On account of common reduction or reference—thus, a *healthful* medicine, *healthful* pulse, *healthful* herb, all referring to human *health*.

Some of these are intermediate between *equivocal* and *analogous* terms, particularly No. 4.

An *Equivocal* noun, in Logic, has more than one signification, each of its significations being *equally* applicable to several objects, as *bull*, the animal, the Pope's letter, a blunder. "Strictly speaking, there is hardly a word in any language which may not be regarded as in this sense *equivocal*; but the title is usually applied only in any case when a word is *employed equivocally*; e. g., when the middle term is used in different senses in the two premises, or where a proposition is liable to be understood in different senses, according to the various meaning of one of its terms."—Whately, *Logic*, b. iii., sect. 10.

EQUIVOCATION (*æque vocare*, to use one word in different senses).—"How absolute the knave is! We must speak by the card, or *equivocation* will undo us."—*Hamlet*, act v. scene 1.

In morals, to *equivocate* is to offend against the truth by using language of double meaning, in one sense, with the intention of its being understood in another—or in either sense according to circumstances. The ancient oracles gave responses of ambiguous meaning. *Aio, te, Æacide, Romanos posse vincere*—may mean either; "I say that thou, O descendant of Æacus, canst conquer the Romans;" or, "I say that the Romans can conquer thee, O descendant of Æacus." *Latronem Petrum occidisse*, may mean, "a robber slew Peter;" or, "Peter slew a robber."

There may be *equivocation* in sound as well as in sense. It is told that the queen of George III. asked one of the dignitaries of the church, if ladies might *knot* on Sunday? His reply was, ladies may *not*; which, in so far as sound goes, is *equivocal*.

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“Eyes saw Peter to-day,” sounds the same as “I saw Peter to-day.”—*V. RESERVATION.*

ERROR.—Knowledge being to be had only of visible certain truth, *error* is not a fault of our knowledge, but a mistake of our judgment, giving assent to that which is not true.—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. iv., c. 20.

“The true,” said Bossuet, after Augustine, “is that which is, the false is that which is not.” To *err* is to fail of attaining to the true, which we do when we think that to be which is not—or think that not to be which is. *Error* is not in things themselves, but in the mind of him who *errs*, or judges not according to the truth.

Our faculties, when employed within their proper sphere, are fitted to give us the knowledge of truth. We *err* by a wrong use of them. The causes of *error* are partly in the objects of knowledge, and partly in ourselves. As it is only the true and real which exists, it is only the true and real which can reveal itself. But it may not reveal itself fully—and man, mistaking a part for the whole, or partial evidence for complete evidence, falls into *error*. Hence it is, that in all *error* there is some truth. To discover the relation which this partial truth bears to the whole truth, is to discover the origin of the *error*.

The causes in ourselves which lead to *error*, arise from wrong views of our faculties, and of the conditions under which they operate. Indolence, precipitation, passion, custom, authority, and education, may also contribute to lead us into *error*.—*V. FALSITY.*

Bacon, *Novum Organum*, lib. i.

Malebranche, *Recherche de la Verite*.

Descartes, *On Method*.

Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. vi., c. 20.

ESOTERIC and EXOTERIC (ἐσωθεν, within; ἐξω, without).

—“The philosophy of the Pythagoreans, like that of the other sects, was divided into the *exoteric* and the *esoteric*; the open, taught to all; and the secret, taught to a select number.”—Warburton, *Div. Leg.*, book ii., note bb.

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According to Origen, Aulus Gellius, Porphyry, and Jamblichus, the distinction of *esoteric* and *exoteric* among the Pythagoreans was applied to the disciples—according to the degree of initiation to which they had attained, being fully admitted into the society, or being merely postulants.—Ritter, *Hist. de Philosophie*, tom. i., p. 298, of French translation.

Plato is said to have had doctrines which he taught publicly to all—and other doctrines which he taught only to a few, in secret. There is no allusion to such a distinction of doctrines in the writings of Plato. Aristotle (*Phys.*, lib. iv., c. 2), speaks of opinions of Plato which were not written. But it does not follow that these were secret—"Ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ἀγραφοῖς δόγμασιν. They may have been oral.

Aristotle himself frequently speaks of some of his writings as *exoteric*; and others as *acroamatic*, or *esoteric*. The former treat of the same subjects as the latter, but in a popular and elementary way; while the *esoteric* are more scientific in their form and matter.

Ravaisson, *Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote*, tom i., c. 1.

Tucker, *Light of Nature Pursued*, vol. ii., chap. 2.—

V. ACROAMATIC.

ESSENCE (*essentia*, from *essens*, the old participle of *esse*, to be—introduced into the Latin tongue by Cicero).

"Sicut ab eo quod est *sapere*, vocatur *sapientia*; sic ab eo quod est *esse*, vocatur *essentia*."—August., *De Civit.*, lib. xii., c. 11.

"Totum illud per quod res est, et est id quod est."—Chauvin, *Lexicon Philosoph.*

"Essence may be taken for the very being of any thing, whereby it is what it is."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iii., chap. 3, sect. 15.

"The *essence* of things is made up of that common nature wherein it is founded, and of that distinctive nature by which it is formed. This latter is commonly understood when we speak of the formality or *formalis ratio* (the formal con-

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sideration) of things ; and it is looked upon as being more peculiarly the *essence* of things, though 'tis certain that a triangle is as truly made up in part of figure, its common nature, as of the three lines and angles, which are distinctive and peculiar to it.

“The *essence* of a thing most properly and strictly is, what does first and fundamentally constitute that thing, and that only is strictly essential which is either the whole or some part of the constituent *essence* ; as in man to be a living creature, or to be capable of religion ; his being capable of celestial happiness, may be called essential in the way of consequence, or consecutively, not constitutively.”—Oldfield, *Essay on Reason*, p. 184.

“Whatever makes a thing to be what it is, is properly called its *essence*. Self-consciousness, therefore, is the *essence* of the mind, because it is in virtue of self-consciousness that the mind is the mind—the man himself.”—Ferrier, *Instit. of Metaphys.*, p. 245.

“All those properties or qualities, without which a thing could not exist, or without which it would be entirely altered, make up what is called the *essence* of a thing. Three lines joining are the *essence* of a triangle ; if one is removed, what remains is no longer a triangle.”—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

The essential attributes, *faciunt esse entia*, cause things to be what they are.

The Greeks had but one word for *essence* and substance. viz., *ούσια*. The word *ύποστασις* was latterly introduced. By Aristotle *ούσια* was applied—1. To the *form*, or those qualities which constitute the specific nature of every being, 2. To the *matter*, in which those qualities manifest themselves to us—the substratum or subject (*ύποκειμενον*). 3. To the concrete or individual being (*συνόλον*), constituted by the union of the two preceding.

In the scholastic philosophy a distinction began to be established between *essence* and *substance*. *Substance* was applied to the abstract notion of matter—the undetermined

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subject or substratum of all possible forms, το ὑποκειμενον. *Essence* to the qualities expressed in the definition of a thing, or those ideas which represent the genus and species. Descartes defined *substance* as “that which exists so that it needs nothing but itself to exist”—(*Princip. Philosoph.*, 4 pars, sect. 1)—a definition applicable to deity only. *Essence* he stripped of its logical signification, and made it the foundation of all those qualities and modes which we perceive in matter. Among the attributes of every substance there is one only which deserves the name of *essence*, and on which the others depend as modifications—as extension, in matter, and thought, in mind. He thus identified *essence* and *substance*. But extension supposes something extended, and thought something that thinks. With Leibnitz *essence* and *substance* were the same, viz., force or power.

Essence is analogically applied to things having no real existence; and then it retains its logical sense and expresses the qualities or ideas which should enter into the definition; as when we speak of the essence of an equilateral triangle being three equal sides and three equal angles. This is the only sense in which Kant recognizes the word. In popular language *essence* is used to denote the nature of a thing.

ETERNITY is a negative idea expressed by a positive term. It supposes a present existence, and denies a beginning or an end of that existence. Hence the schoolmen spoke of *eternity*, *a parte ante*, and *a parte post*. The *Scotists* maintained that *eternity* is made up of successive parts, which drop, so to speak, one from another. The *Thomists* held that it is simple duration, excluding the past and the future. Plato said, time is the moving shadow of *eternity*. The common symbol of *eternity* is a circle. It may be doubted how far it is competent to the human mind to compass in thought the idea of absolute beginning, or the idea of absolute ending.

On man's conception of *eternity*, see an *Examination of Mr. Maurice's Theory of a Fixed State out of Time*. By Mr. Mansell.

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“ What is *eternity*? can aught
 Paint its duration to the thought?
 Tell all the sand the ocean laves,
 Tell all its changes, all its waves,
 Or, tell with more laborious pains,
 The drops its mighty mass contains;
 Be this astonishing account
 Augmented with the full amount
 Of all the drops that clouds have shed,
 Where'er their wat'ry fleeces spread,
 Through all time's long protracted tour,
 From Adam to the present hour;—
 Still short the sum, nor can it vie
 With the more numerous years that lie
 Embosomed in *eternity*.
 Attend, O man, with awe divine,
 For this *eternity* is thine.”—Gibbons.

ETERNITY (OF GOD).—The Eternal is that which is above all variation. The Eternal is not time infinite, duration without limits. The Eternal is above and without time and duration; it is the condition of time itself. God is eternal by his infinite essence, absolute, always the same, identical, immovable; He is eternal in the fundamental properties which constitute the ground of his essence. He is by his *eternity*, the source of all those *laws*, eternal, immutable, necessary, which govern all the domains of existence, the world physical and spiritual. *Eternity* is the *reason* even of *necessity*. For we call that necessary which cannot be but in one manner, which admits no alternative, and permits no choice, which is immovable. The Being eternal and immovable is also the Being necessary. God cannot not be, or be other than he is in his eternal nature. All his essence, all his attributes are necessarily given in his being and by his being. God is all which can be in his eternal nature, in the absolute organism of his existence, by one single power immovable and necessary; he is absolute power, he is the Being in regard to which there is neither present, nor past, nor future.—Tiberghien, *Essai de Connaiss. Hum.*, p. 741.

Deus non est duratio vel spatium, sed durat et adest. This scholium of Sir Isaac Newton contains the germ of Dr.

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Clarke's *Demonstration of the Being of God*. Time and space are qualities, and imply a substance. The ideas of time and space necessarily force themselves upon our minds. We cannot think of them as not existing. And as we think of them as infinite, they are the infinite qualities of an infinite substance, that is, of God, necessarily existing.

ETHICS "extend to the investigation of those principles by which *moral* men are governed; they explore the nature and excellence of virtue, the nature of *moral* obligation, on what it is founded, and what are the proper motives of practice; *morality* in the more common acceptation, though not exclusively, relates to the practical and obligatory part of *ethics*. *Ethics* principally regard the theory of morals."—Cogan, *Ethic. Treat. on Passions*, introd.

Aristotle (*Eth.*, lib. 2), says that $\eta\theta\epsilon\varsigma$, which signifies moral virtue, is derived from $\epsilon\theta\theta\epsilon\varsigma$, custom; since it is by repeated acts that virtue, which is a moral habit, is acquired. Cicero (*De Fato*, cap. 1), says, *Quia pertinet ad mores, quod $\eta\theta\epsilon\varsigma$ illi vocant, nos eam partem philosophiæ, De moribus, appellare solemus: sed decet augentem linguam Latinam nominare Moralem*. *Ethics* is thus made synonymous with *morals* or *moral philosophy*, q. v.

Ethics taken in its widest signification, as including the moral sciences or natural jurisprudence, may be divided into:—

1. Moral Philosophy, or the science of the relations, rights, and duties, by which men are under obligation towards God, themselves, and their fellow-creatures.

2. The Law of Nations, or the science of those laws by which all nations, as constituting the universal society of the human race, are bound in their mutual relations to one another.

3. Public or Political Law, or the science of the relations between the different ranks in society.

4. Civil Law, or the science of those laws, rights, and duties, by which individuals in civil society are bound,—as commercial, criminal, judicial, Roman or modern.

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5. History, Profane, Civil, and Political.—Peemans, *Introd. ad Philosoph.*, p. 96.

ETHNOGRAPHY (ἔθνος γραφία), and **ETHNOLOGY** bear the same relation almost to one another as *geology* and *geography*. While *ethnography* contents herself with the mere description and classification of the races of man, *ethnology*, or the science of races, “investigates the mental and physical differences of mankind, and the organic laws upon which they depend; seeks to deduce from these investigations principles of human guidance, in all the important relations of social and national existence.”

Ethnological Journal, June 1, 1848.

Edin. Rev., Oct., 1844.

ETHOLOGY (ἠθος, or ἔθος, and λογος)—is a word coming to be used in philosophy. Sir William Hamilton has said that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is the best *ethology* extant, meaning that it contains the best account of the passions and feelings of the human heart, and of the means of awakening and interesting them so as to produce persuasion or action.

EUDEMONISM (εὐδαιμονία, happiness)—is a term applied by German philosophers to that system of morality which places the foundation of virtue in the production of happiness.—Whewell, *Pref. to Mackintosh's Dissert.*, p. 20.

This name, or rather *Hedonism*, may be applied to the system of Chrysippus and Epicurus.

EVIDENCE (*e-videre*, to see, to make see).—“Evidence signifies that which demonstrates, makes clear, or ascertains the truth of the very fact or point in issue, either on the one side or the other.”—Blackstone, *Comment.*, b. iii., c. 23.

Evidence is the ground or reason of knowledge. It is the light by which the mind apprehends things presented to it. *Fulgur quidam mentis assensum rapiens.*

In an act of knowledge there is the object or thing known, and the subject or person knowing. Between the faculties of the person knowing and the qualities of the thing known, there is some proportion or relation. The qualities mani-

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fest themselves to the faculties, and the result is knowledge; or the thing is made evident—that is, it not only exists, but is revealed as existing.

There are as many kinds or sources of evidence as there are powers or faculties by which we attain to truth and reality. Sense, consciousness, and memory are sources of *evidence*. Reason, as giving necessary and universal truth, and reasoning, by which we ascend from the particular to the general, or by which we descend from the general to the particular, are so many sources of *evidence*. And the testimony of others as to things which have not come under the cognizance of our own faculties, may also furnish *evidence*, or a ground of knowledge.

“The demonstrations of algebra possess equal *certainty* with those of geometry, but cannot lay claim to the same *evidence*. *Certainty* is positive; *evidence*, relative; the former, strictly taken, insusceptible of more or less, the latter capable of existing in many different degrees.”—Coleridge, *Notes on English Divines*, vol. i., p. 33.

Evidence is of different degrees. The *evidence* of sense and consciousness as to matters of fact, and the *evidence* of reason as to first truths or truths demonstrated by means of them, is of the highest degree, and begets certainty or knowledge properly so called. When things do not fully manifest themselves to our faculties, or when our faculties do not clearly nor fully apprehend them, but when we, notwithstanding, form some judgment concerning them, the *evidence* is probable. And when there is merely the possibility of the object of our apprehension existing as it is apprehended by us, we have not knowledge or opinion, even, but may rather be said to be in doubt.

Evidence of sense and consciousness, and also of the truths of reason, is such as to give knowledge without any effort upon our parts. But in reasoning, although the result may be equally clear and certain, we do not attain it without attention and intellectual effort. We are not, on this account, to think that we make or give the *evidence*

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to what is true. Truth and reality exist independently of us.

Many things are most *certain* which are not *evident*, not only in matters of faith but of sense; as the motion transmitted from one body to another.

The rules as to the various kinds and degrees of *evidence* can only be found in writers on the several departments of inquiry to which that *evidence* belongs. On *evidence* in general, see Glassford, *Essay on the Principles of Evidence*, part 1, 8vo, Edin., 1820.

Smedley, *Moral Evidence*, 8vo, Lond., 1850.

EVIL is the negation or contrary of good.—“That which hath in it a fitness to promote its own preservation or well-being, is called good. And, on the contrary, that which is apt to hinder it, is called *evil*.”—Wilkins, *Nat. Relig.*, book i.

“Every man calleth that which *pleaseth*, and is delightful to himself, good; and that *evil* which *displeaseth* him.”—Hobbes, *Hum. Nat.*, chap 7.

Pleasure is *fit* for, or *agreeable* to, the nature of a sensible being, or a *natural good*; pain is *unfit*, or is a *natural evil*.

“The voluntary *application* of this natural good and *evil* to any *rational* being, or the production of it by a rational being, is *moral good and evil*.”—King, *Essay on Origin of Evil*, translated by Law, chap. 1, sect. 3, notes, p. 38, fifth edit.

“*Metaphysical evil* consists simply in imperfection, *physical evil* in suffering, and *moral evil* in sin.”—Leibnitz, *On Goodness of God*, part 1, sect. 21.

“*Evil* does not proceed from a *principle of evil*. *Cold* does not proceed from a *principle of coldness*, nor *darkness* from a *principle of darkness*. *Evil* is mere privation.”—part 2, sect. 153.

“*Evil* does not exist in itself as a substance; there is not an element of *evil*; nothing is *evil* considered in itself, but it may be vitiated in its relations with other things. *Evil*, then, expresses the *false relations* (*faux rapports*), in which

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*several things good in themselves may be placed, in the physical or moral world. Whence it follows, that evil is neither a principle, in the sense of dualism, since all things are good in so far as they manifest the divine essence in the world, nor a simple negation, in the sense of pantheism, since evil exists effectively and really in the false relations, or in the false combinations established among things. These false relations from which evil results, denote evidently an individual being, a finite being, who, at the same time that he is capable of ascending to absolute unity and harmony, in which things find themselves in their true relations, can also, in so far as finite, embrace things in their isolation, in their particularity, and establish between them relations contrary to the general harmony of beings. Evil, then, has its origin in the individuality, in the finiteness of beings who are not sufficient for themselves, and who can, in virtue of their spontaneity and liberty, break the absolute relations which exist among things. Spontaneity and liberty are not imperfect in themselves, but they may become so, by the bad use made of them, and may be the cause of imperfections and evils without number. And, as individuality is an eternal principle, it is also an eternal cause of evil; the evil is given with the finite nature of beings and endures with it—if not in reality at least in possibility, in all states and conditions in which individual beings can be found. Evil is an eternal element of the life of finite beings, and as such, it is also necessary and independent of the Divine will.”—Tiberghien, *Essai des Connais. Hum.*, p. 736.*

“The Being infinite and absolute, who is self-sufficient, independent, in possession of all the conditions to accomplish good and to embrace all things in their just relations, is not capable of evil or error. But as individual beings have the reason of their existence in God, evil also has its last reason in the being of all reality. . . . The divine nature gave the possibility of evil, in giving individual and finite beings who transfer it into reality. That which is

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possible in finite beings, by reason of their eternal and divine origin, they render real, effective in time, by the use of their spontaneity. *Evil* may be said to exist in God, not in act, but in power. He does not will it as such, but admits it as the possible result of the nature of finite beings who have their eternal cause in himself; in other words, he *permits evil*.

“*Evil* has also its origin in human nature in so far as it is finite, but it may be avoided and combated by that part of his nature which is the expression of the infinite and absolute. *Evil* is the occasion for man to show what is divine in him, by rising above the finite and contingent events of this life, and striving to be perfect as his Father in heaven is perfect.”—*Ibid*, p. 758.

A power to do good, is *ex necessitate rei*, a power to do evil.

“Almighty power itself cannot create an intelligent moral agent, and place it beyond all liability to sin. If it could not sin, there would be no merit, no virtue in its obedience. That is to say, it would not be a moral agent at all, but a machine merely. The power to do wrong, as well as to do right, is included in the very idea of a moral and accountable agent, and no such agent can possibly exist without being invested with such a power.”—Bledsoe, *Theodicy*, p. 195, and p. 353.

Dr. Young (*Mystery*, p. 203) says,—“The abuse of moral power, in other words, the rebellion of the created will, *must* have been impreventible, else it had been prevented. All that was possible to be done must have been done; but to prevent the abuse of moral power, that is, to necessitate the created will, was an impossibility.” And in a note he says, this is the view of Julius Müller.

“Moral *evil* is an *evil* that has its origin in a will. An *evil* common to all, must have a ground common to all. But the actual existence of moral *evil*, we are bound in conscience to admit; and that there is an *evil* common to all is a fact; and this *evil* must therefore have a common

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ground. Now, this *evil* ground cannot originate in the Divine will; it must therefore be referred to the will of man.”—Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, pp. 158, 174.

The question concerning the *origin of evil* has been answered by—1. The doctrine of pre-existence, or that the *evils* we are here suffering are the punishments or expiations of moral delinquencies in a former state of existence. 2. The doctrine of the Manicheans which supposes two co-eternal and independent agencies, the one the author of good, and the other of *evil*. 3. The doctrine of optimism, or, that *evil* is part of a system conducted by Almighty power, under the direction of infinite wisdom and goodness.—Stewart, *Active and Mor. Powers*, b. iii., c. 3, sect. 1.

On the origin of *evil*, its nature, extent, uses, &c., see Plato, Cicero, and Seneca, Malebranche and Fenelon, Clarke and Leibnitz, Bledsoe, *Theodicy*; Young, *Mystery*.

EXISTENCE (*ex sistere*, to stand out).—“The metaphysicians look upon *existence* as the formal and actual part of a being.”—H. More, *Antid. agt. Atheism*, app., c. 44.

It has been called the *actus entitativus*, or that by which anything has its essence actually constituted in the nature of things.

Essence pertains to the question *Quid est?*

Existence pertains to the question *An est?*

Essence formal, combined with *essence substantial*, gives *existence*; for *existence* is *essence* clothed with form.—Tiberghien, *Essai des Connaiss. Hum.*, p. 739, note.

Existence is the actuality of *essence*. It is the act by which the *essences* of things are actually in *rerum natura*—beyond their causes. Before things are produced by their causes, they are said to be in the objective power of their causes; but when produced they are beyond their causes, and are actually in *rerum natura*—as maggots before they are warmed into life by heat of the sun.

“*Existentia* est unio realis, sive actualis conjunctio partium sive attributorum quibus ens constat. . . . *Existentia* dicitur quasi rei *extra* causas et nihilum *sistentia*.”

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—Peemans, *Introd. ad Philosoph.*, 12mo, Lovan., 1840, p. 45.

Existence and Essence.—Incaute sibi finxerunt quidam, “*Essentias quasdam easque eternas, fuisse sine existentia;*” siquando autem subnascatur Res istiusmodi ideæ similis, tunc censent existentiam essentiæ supervenientém, veram rem efficere, sive ens reale. Atque hinc, essentiam et existentiam dixerunt essendi principia, sive entis constitutiva. Quicquid vero *essentiam* habet veram, eodem tempore habet *existentiam*, eodem sensu quo habet *essentiam*, aut quo est ens, aut aliquid.”—Hutcheson, *Metaphys.*, p. 4.

“*Essence*, in relation to God, must involve a *necessary existence*; for we cannot in any measure duly conceive *what he is*, without conceiving *that he is*, and, indeed, *cannot but be*. The name he takes to himself is I am (or I will be). This is the contraction of that larger name, I am what I am (or I will be what I will be), which may seem closely to conjoin God’s unquestionable *necessary existence* with his unsearchable, boundless *essence*.”—Oldfield, *Essay on Reason*, p. 48.

See art. *Existence*, in *French Encyclopædia*, by Mons. Turgot.

EXOTERIC.—V. ESOTERIC.

EXPEDIENCY (Doctrine of).—Paley has said, “Whatever is expedient is right.”—*V. UTILITY (Doctrine of)*.

EXPERIENCE (ἐμπειρία, *experientia*).—Aristotle limited *experience* to the results of sensation and perception. “Ἐκ μὲν ὄντων αἰσθησεως γινεται μνημη, ἔκ δὲ μνημης πολλακις του αυτου γινομενης ἐμπειρια.—*Analyt. Poster.*, ii., 19.

Wolf used *experience* as co-extensive with the contents of consciousness, to include all of which the mind is conscious, as agent or patient, all that it does from within, as well as all that it suffers from without. “Experiri dicimur, quicquid ad perceptiones nostras attentè cognoscimus. *Solem lucere*, cognoscimus ad ea attentè, quæ visu percipimus. Similiter ad nosmet ipsos attentè cognoscimus, nos non posse assensum præbere contradictoriis, v. g. non posse sumere

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tanquam verum, quod simul pluat et non pluat.”—*Philosoph. Rat.*, sect. 664.

“*Experience*, in its strict sense, applies to what has occurred within a person’s own knowledge. *Experience*, in this sense, of course, relates to the *past* alone. Thus it is that a man knows by *experience* what sufferings he has undergone in some disease; or what height the tide reached at a certain time and place. More frequently the word is used to denote that judgment which is derived from *experience in the primary sense*, by reasoning from that in combination with other data. Thus a man may assert, on the ground of *experience*, that he was cured of a disorder by such a medicine—that that medicine is generally beneficial in that disorder; that the tide may always be expected, under such circumstances, to rise to such a height. Strictly speaking, none of these can be known *by experience*, but are conclusions *from experience*. It is in this sense only that *experience* can be applied to the *future*, or, which comes to the same thing, to any *general fact*; as, *e. g.*, when it is said that we know *by experience* that water exposed to a certain temperature will freeze.”—Whately, *Logic*, app. i.

Mr. Locke (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 1), has assigned *experience* as the only and universal source of human knowledge. “Whence hath the mind all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from *experience*; in that, all our knowledge is founded, and from that ultimately derives itself. Our observation, employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understanding with all the materials of thinking. These are the fountains of knowledge from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring—that is, sensation and reflection.”

In opposition to this view, according to which all human knowledge is *à posteriori*, or the result of *experience*, it is contended that man has knowledge *à priori*—knowledge

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which *experience* neither does nor can give, and knowledge without which there could be no *experience*—inasmuch as all the generalizations of *experience* proceed and rest upon it.

“*No accumulation of experiments whatever can bring a general law home to the mind of man; because if we rest upon experiments, our conclusion can never logically pass beyond the bounds of our premises; we can never infer more than we have proved; and all the past, which we have not seen, and the future, which we cannot see, is still left open, in which new experiences may arise to overturn the present theory. And yet the child will believe at once upon a single* experiment. Why? Because a hand divine has implanted in him the tendency to generalize thus rapidly. Because he does it by an instinct, of which he can give no account, except that he is so formed by his maker.*”—Sewell, *Christ. Mor.*, chap. 24.

“We may have seen one circle, and investigated its properties, but why, when our individual *experience* is so circumscribed, do we assume the same relations of all? Simply because the understanding has the conviction intuitively that similar objects will have similar properties; it does not acquire this idea by sensation or custom; the mind develops it by its own intrinsic force—it is a law of our faculties, ultimate and universal, from which all reasoning proceeds.”—Dr. Mill, *Essays*, p. 337.

Experience, more especially in physical philosophy, is either active or passive, that is, it is constituted by observation and experiment.

“*Observationes fiunt spectando id quod natura per seipsam sponte exhibet. Experimenta fiunt ponendo naturam in eas circumstantias, in quibus debeat agere, et nobis ostendere id quod quærimus.*”—Boscovich, Note to Stay's Poem, *De Sytemate*.

These are more fully explained and characterized in the

* As having been once burnt by fire.

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following passage from Sir John Herschel, *On the Study of Nat. Phil.*, *Lardner's Cyclop.*, No. xiv., p. 67 :—

“The great, and indeed the only ultimate source of our knowledge of nature and its laws is *experience*; by which we mean not the *experience* of one man only, or of one generation, but the accumulated *experience* of all mankind in all ages, registered in books, or recorded by tradition. But *experience* may be acquired in two ways: either, first, by noticing facts as they occur, without any attempt to influence the frequency of their occurrence, or to vary the circumstances under which they occur; this is *observation*: or secondly, by putting in action causes and agents over which we have control, and purposely varying their combinations, and noticing what effects take place; this is *experiment*. To these two sources we must look as the fountains of all natural science. It is not intended, however, by thus distinguishing *observation* from *experiment*, to place them in any kind of contrast. Essentially they are much alike, and differ rather in degree than in kind; so that, perhaps, the terms *passive* and *active observation* might better express their distinction; but it is, nevertheless, highly important to mark the different states of mind in inquiries carried on by their respective aids, as well as their different effects in promoting the progress of science. In the former, we sit still and listen to a tale, told us, perhaps obscurely, piecemeal, and at long intervals of time, with our attention more or less awake. It is only by after ruminating that we gather its full import; and often, when the opportunity is gone by, we have to regret that our attention was not more particularly directed to some point which, at the time, appeared of little moment, but of which we at length appreciate the importance. In the latter, on the other hand, we cross-examine our witness, and by comparing one part of his evidence with the other, while he is yet before us, and reasoning upon it in his presence, are enabled to put pointed and searching questions, the answer to which may at once enable us to make up our minds.

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Accordingly it has been found invariably, that in those departments of physics, where the phenomena are beyond our control, or into which experimental inquiry, from other causes, has not been carried, the progress of knowledge has been slow, uncertain, and irregular; while in such as admit of experiment, and in which mankind have agreed to its adoption, it has been rapid, sure, and steady.”

—V. ANALOGY.

Experimentum Crucis.—A crucial or decisive experiment in attempting to interpret the laws of nature: so called, by Bacon, from the crosses or way-posts used to point out roads, because they determine at once between two or more possible conclusions.

Bacon (*Nov. Organ.*, book ii., sect. 36) says, “Crucial instances are of this kind; when in inquiry into any nature the intellect is put into a sort of equilibrium, so that it is uncertain to which of two, or sometimes more natures, the cause of the nature inquired into ought to be attributed or assigned, on account of the frequent and ordinary concurrence of more natures than one; the *instances of the cross* show that the union of the one nature with the nature sought for is faithful and indissoluble; while that of the other is varied and separable; whence the question is limited, and that first nature received as the cause, and the other sent off and rejected.”

Sir G. Blane (*Med. Logic*, p. 30), notices that in chemistry a single experiment is conclusive, and the epithet *experimentum crucis* applied; because the crucible derives its name from the figure of the cross being stamped upon it.

A and B, two different causes, may produce a certain number of similar effects; find some effect which the one produces and the other does not, and this will point out, as the direction-post (*crux*), at a point where two highways meet, which of these causes may have been in operation in any particular instance. Thus, many of the symptoms of the Oriental plague are common to other diseases; but when the observer discovers the peculiar bubo or boil of the

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complaint, he has an *instantia crucis* which directs him immediately to its discovery.

Playfair, *Works*, vol. ii., p. 108.

Edin. Review, vol. xxxvi.

“If, in a variety of cases presenting a general resemblance, whenever a certain circumstance is present, a certain effect follows, there is a strong probability that one is dependent on the other; but if you can also find a case where the circumstance is absent from the combination, and the effect also disappears, your conclusion has all the evidence in its favour of which it is susceptible. When a decisive trial can be made by leaving out, in this manner, the cause of which we wish to trace the effect, or by insulating any substances so as to exclude all agents but those we wish to operate, or in any other way, such a decisive trial receives the title of *experimentum crucis*. One of the most interesting on record is that of Dr. Franklin, by which he established the identity of lightning and the electricity of our common machines.”—S. Bailey, *Discourses*, Lond., 1852, p. 169.

EXTENSION (*ex-tendere*, to stretch from).—“The notions acquired by the sense of touch, and by the movement of the body, compared with what is learnt by the eye, make up the idea expressed by the word *extension*.”—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

Extension is that property of matter by which it occupies space; it relates to the qualities of length, breadth, and thickness, without which no substance can exist; but has no respect to the size or shape of a body. Solidity is an essential quality of matter as well as *extension*. And it is from the resistance of a solid body, as the occasion, that we get the idea of *externality*,—*q. v.*

According to the Cartesians, *extension* was the essence of matter. “Sola igitur extensio corporis naturam constituit, quum illa *omni solum semperque* conveniat, adeo ut nihil in corpore *prius percipere* possumus.”—Le Grand, *Institut. Philosoph.*, pars. iv., p. 152.

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Hobbes' views are given, *Philosoph. Prima*, pars. ii., cap. 8, sect. 1.

Locke's views are given, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. ii., chap. 13, see also chap. 15.

Reid, *Inquiry*, chap. 5, sect. 5 and 6, *Intell. Powers*, essay ii., chap. 19.

Extension (Logical), when predicated as belonging to a general term, means the number of objects included under it, and *comprehension* means the common characters belonging to such objects.

"I call the *comprehension* of an idea, those attributes which it involves in itself, and which cannot be taken away from it without destroying it; as the *comprehension* of the idea triangle includes *extension*, figure, three lines, three angles, and the equality of these three angles to two right angles, &c.

"I call the *extension* of an idea those subjects to which that idea applies, which are also called the inferiors of a general term, which, in relation to them, is called superior, as the idea of triangle in general extends to all the different sorts of triangles."—*Port Roy. Logic*, part 1, chap. 6.

We cannot detach any properties from a notion without extending the list of objects to which it is applied. Thus, if we abstract from a rose its essential qualities, attending only to those which it connotes as a plant, we *extend* its application, before limited to flowers with red petals, to the oak, fir, &c. But as we narrow the sphere of a notion, the qualities which it *comprehends* proportionally increase. If we restrict the term body to animal, we include life and sensation—if to man, it *comprehends* reason.

EXTERNALITY or OUTNESS.—"Pressure or resistance necessarily supposes *externality* in the thing which presses or resists."—Adam Smith, *On the Senses*.

"Distance or *outness* is neither immediately of itself perceived by sight, nor yet apprehended or judged of by lines and angles, but is only *suggested* to our thoughts," &c.—Berkeley, *Principles of Knowledge*, part 1, sect. 43.—V.

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FABLE.—V. APOLOGUE.

FACT.—"Whatever really exists, whether necessarily or relatively, may be called a *fact*. A statement concerning a number of *facts*, is called a doctrine (when it is considered *absolutely* as a truth), and a law (when it is considered *relatively* to an intelligence ordaining or receiving it.)"—Irons, *On Final Causes*, p. 48.

"By a matter of *fact*, I understand any thing of which we obtain a conviction from our internal consciousness, or any individual event or phenomenon which is the object of sensation."—Lewis, *Essay on Influence of Authority*, pp. 1-4.

It is thus opposed to matter of *inference*. Thus, the destructiveness of cholera is *matter of fact*, the mode of its propagation is *matter of inference*. *Matter of fact* also denotes what is certain, as opposed to *matter of doubt*. The existence of God is *matter of fact*, though ascertained by reasoning.

"The distinction of *fact* and *theory*, is only relative. Events and phenomena considered as particulars which may be colligated by induction, are *facts*; considered as generalities already obtained by colligation of other *facts*, they are *theories*. The same event or phenomenon is a *fact* or a *theory*, according as it is considered as standing on one side or the other of the inductive bracket."—Whewell, *Philosoph. Induct. Sciences*, aphorism 23.

"Theories which are true, are *facts*."—Whewell, *On Induction*, p. 23.—V. OPINION.

FACTITIOUS (*factitare*, to practise)—is applied to what is the result of use or art, in distinction to what is the product of nature. Mineral waters made in imitation of the natural springs are called *factitious*.

Cupiditas aliorum existimationis non est *factitia* sed nobis congenita; deprehenditur enim et in infantibus qui, etiam ante reflectionis usum, molestia afficiuntur, quum parvi a ceteris penduntur.—N. Lacoudre, *Institut. Philosoph.*, tom. iii., p. 21.

"It is enough that we have moral ideas, however ob-

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tained; whether by original constitution of our nature, or *factitiously*, makes no difference.”—Hampden, *Introd. to Mor. Philosoph.*, p. 13.

“To Mr. Locke, the writings of Hobbes suggested much of the sophistry displayed in the first book of his essay on the *factitious* nature of our moral principles.”—Stewart, *Prelimin. Dissert.*, p. 64.

FACTULTY.—Facultates sunt aut quibus *facilius* fit, aut sine quibus omnino confici non potest.—Cicero, *De Invent.*, lib. ii., 40.

Facultas est quælibet vis activa, seu virtus, seu potestas. Solet etiam vocari *potentia*, verum tunc intelligenda est potentia activa, seu habilitas ad agendum.—Chauvin, *Lexicon Philosoph.*

“The word *faculty* is most properly applied to those powers of the mind which are original and natural, and which make part of the constitution of the mind.”—Reid, *Intell. Powers*, essay i., chap. 1.

A *faculty* is the natural power by which phenomena are produced by a person that is an agent, who can direct and concentrate the power which he possesses.—Jouffroy, *Melanges*, Bruxell, 1834, p. 249.

Bodies have the *property* of being put in motion, or being melted. The magnet has an attractive *power*. Plants have a medical *virtue*. But instead of blind and fatal activity, let the being who has power be conscious of it, and be able to exercise and regulate it; this is what is meant by *faculty*. It implies intelligence and freedom. It is personality which gives the character of *faculties* to those natural powers which belong to us.—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

“The *faculties* of the mind and its *powers*,” says Dr. Reid, “are often used as synonymous expressions. But,” continues he, “as most synonyms have some minute distinction that deserves notice, I apprehend that the word *faculty* is most properly applied to those powers of the mind which are original and natural, and which make part

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of the constitution of the mind. There are other powers which are acquired by use, exercise, or study, which are not called *faculties*, but habits. There must be something in the constitution of the mind necessary to our being able to acquire *habits*, and this is commonly called *capacity*."

Such are the distinct meanings which Dr. Reid would assign to these words; and these meanings are in accordance both with their philosophical and more familiar use. The distinction between *power* and *faculty* is, that *faculty* is more properly applied to what is natural and original, in opposition or contrast to what is acquired. We say the *faculty* of judging, but the *power* of habit. But, as all our faculties are powers, we can apply the latter term equally to what is original and to what is acquired. And we can say, with equal propriety, the *power* of judging and the *power* of habit. The acquiring of habits is peculiar to man: at least the inferior animals do so to a very limited extent. There must, therefore, be something in the constitution of the human mind upon which the acquiring of habits depends. This, says Dr. Reid, is called a *capacity*. The capacity is natural, the habit is acquired. Dr. Reid did not recognize the distinction between active and passive power. But a capacity is a passive power. The term is applied to those manifestations of mind in which it is generally regarded as passive, or as affected or acted on by something external to itself. Thus, we say a man is *capable* of gratitude, or love, or grief, or joy. We speak also of the *capacity* of acquiring knowledge. Now, in these forms of expression, the mind is considered as the passive recipient of certain affections or impressions coming upon it. Taking into account the distinction of powers as active and passive, "these terms," says Sir Will. Hamilton (*Reid's Works*, p. 221), "stand in the following relations. Powers are *active* and *passive*, *natural* and *acquired*. Powers natural and active are called *faculties*. Powers natural and passive, *capacities* or *receptivities*. Powers acquired are *habits*, and habit is used both in an active and passive sense. The

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power, again, of acquiring a habit is called a disposition.' This is quite in accordance with the explanations of Dr. Reid, only that instead of disposition he employs the term capacity, to denote that on which the acquiring of habits is founded. Disposition is employed by Dr. Reid to denote one of the active principles of our nature.

One great end and aim of philosophy is to reduce facts and phenomena to general heads and laws. The philosophy of mind, therefore, endeavours to arrange and classify the operations of mind according to the general circumstances under which they are observed. Thus we find that the mind frequently exerts itself in acquiring a knowledge of the objects around it by means of the bodily senses. These operations vary according to the sense employed, and according to the object presented. But in smelling, tasting, and touching, and in all its operations by means of the senses, the mind comes to the knowledge of some object different from itself. This general fact is denoted by the term perception; and we say that the mind, as manifested in these operations, has the *power* or *faculty* of perception. The knowledge which the mind thus acquires can be recalled or reproduced, and this is an operation which the mind delights to perform, both from the pleasure which it feels in reviving objects of former knowledge, and the benefit which results from reflecting upon them. But the recalling or reproducing objects of former knowledge is an act altogether different from the act of originally obtaining it. It implies the possession of a peculiar power to perform it. And hence we ascribe to the mind a power of recollection or a *faculty* of memory. A perception is quite distinct from a recollection. In the one we acquire knowledge which is new to us—in the other we reproduce knowledge which we already possess.

In the operations of recollection or memory it is often necessary that the mind exert itself to exclude some objects which present themselves, and to introduce others which do not at first appear. In such cases the mind does

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so by an act of resolving or determining, by a volition. Now, a volition is altogether different from a cognition. To know is one thing, to will is quite another thing. Hence it is that we assign these different acts to different powers, and say that the mind has a power of understanding, and also a power of willing. The power of understanding may exert itself in different ways, and although the end and result of all its operations be knowledge, the different ways in which knowledge is acquired or improved may be assigned, as we have seen they are, to different powers or *faculties*—but these are all considered as powers of understanding. In like manner the power of willing or determining may be exerted under different conditions, and, for the sake of distinctness, these may be denoted by different terms; but still they are all included in one class, and called powers of the will.

Before the will is exerted we are in a state of pleasure or pain, and the act of will has for its end to continue that state or to terminate it. The pleasures and the pains of which we are susceptible are numerous and varied, but the power or capacity of being affected by them is denoted by the term sensibility or feeling. And we are said not only to have powers of understanding and will, but powers of sensibility.

When we speak, therefore, of a power or *faculty* of the mind, we mean that certain operations of mind have been observed, and classified according to the conditions and circumstances under which they manifest themselves, and that distinct names have been given to these classes of phenomena, to mark what is peculiar in the act or operation, and consequently in the power or *faculty* to which they are referred. But when we thus classify the operations of the mind, and assign them to different powers, we are not to suppose that we divide the mind into different compartments, of which each has a different energy. The energy is the same in one and all of the operations. It is the same mind acting according to different conditions and laws.

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The energy is one and indivisible. It is only the manifestations of it that we arrange and classify.

This is well put by the famous Alcuin, who was the friend and adviser of Charlemagne, in the following passage, which is translated from his work *De Ratione Animæ*:—
 “The soul bears divers names according to the nature of its operations; inasmuch as it lives and makes live, it is the soul (*anima*); inasmuch as it contemplates, it is the spirit (*spiritus*); inasmuch as it feels, it is sentiment (*sensus*); since it reflects, it is thought (*animus*); as it comprehends, intelligence (*mens*); inasmuch as it discerns, reason (*ratio*); as it consents, will (*voluntas*); as it recollects, memory (*memoria*). But these things are not divided in substance as in name, for all this is the soul, and one soul only.”

Faculties of the Mind.—The faculties of the human mind were formerly distinguished as gnostic or cognitive, and orectic or appetent. They have also been regarded as belonging to the understanding or to the will, and have been designated as intellectual or active. A threefold classification of them is now generally adopted, and they are reduced to the heads of intellect or cognition, of sensitivity or feeling, and of activity or will. Under each of these heads, again, it is common to speak of several subordinate *faculties*.

“This way of speaking of *faculties* has misled many into a confused notion of so many distinct agents in us, which had their several provinces and authorities, and did command, obey, and perform several actions, as so many distinct beings: which has been no small occasion of wrangling, obscurity, and uncertainty, in questions relating to them.”
 —Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 21, sect. 17, 20.

Dr. Brown, instead of ascribing so many distinct *faculties* to the mind, which is one, would speak of it as in different *states*, or under different *affections*.—Lecture xvi.

“Les divers facultés que l'on considere dans l'ame, ne sont point des choses distinctes reellement, mais le meme

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etre différemment considéré.” — Arnaud, *Des Vrais et des Fausses Idées*, ch. 27.

“Quoique nous donnions a ces facultés des noms différents, par rapport a leur diverses operations, cela ne nous oblige pas a les regarder comme des choses différentes, car l’entendement n’est autre chose que l’ame, en tant qu’elle retient et se ressouvient ; la volonté n’est autre chose que l’ame, en tant qu’elle veut et qu’elle choisit. . . . De sorte qu’on peut entendre que toutes ces facultés ne sont, au fond, que le meme ame, qui recoit divers noms, a cause de ses différentes operations.”—Bossuet, *Connaissance de Dieu*, ch. 1, art. 20.

“*Man is sometimes in a predominant state of intelligence, sometimes in a predominant state of feeling, and sometimes in a predominant state of action and determination. To call these, however, separate faculties, is altogether beside the mark. No act of intelligence can be performed without the will, no act of determination without the intellect, and no act either of the one or the other without some amount of feeling being mingled in the process. Thus, whilst they each have their own distinctive characteristics, yet there is a perfect unity at the root.*”—Morell, *Psychology*, p. 61.

“I feel that there is no more reason for believing my mind to be made up of distinct entities, or attributes, or *faculties*, than that my foot is made up of walking and running. My mind, I firmly believe, thinks, and wills, and remembers, just as simply as my body walks, and runs, and rests.”—Irons, *Final Causes*, p. 93.

“It would be well if, instead of speaking of ‘the powers (or *faculties*) of the mind’ (which causes misunderstanding), we adhered to the designation of the several ‘operations of one mind ;’ which most psychologists recommend, but in the sequel forget.”—Feuchtersleben, *Medical Psychol.*, 8vo, 1847, p. 120.

“The judgment is often spoken of as if it were a distinct power or *faculty* of the soul, differing from the imagination, the memory, &c., as the heart differs from the

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lungs, or the brain from the stomach. All that ought to be understood by these modes of expression is, that the mind sometimes compares objects or notions; sometimes joins together images; sometimes has the feeling of past time with an idea now present, &c.”—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

“Notwithstanding we divide the soul into several powers and *faculties*, there is no such division in the soul itself, since it is the whole soul that remembers, understands, wills, or imagines. Our manner of considering the memory, understanding, will, imagination, and the like *faculties*, is for the better enabling us to express ourselves in such abstracted subjects of speculation, not that there is any such division in the soul itself.”—*Spectator*, No. 600.

“The expression, ‘man perceives, and remembers, and imagines, and reasons,’ denotes all that is conveyed by the longer phrase, ‘the mind of man has the *faculties* of perception, and memory, and imagination, and reasoning.’”—S. Bailey, *Letters on Philosoph. of Hum. Mind*, p. 13.

“Herbart rejects the whole theory of mental inherent *faculties* as chimerical, and has, in consequence, aimed some severe blows at the psychology of Kant. But, in fact, it is only the rational psychology which Kant exploded, which is open to this attack. It may be that in mental, as in physical mechanics, we know force only from its effects; but the consciousness of distinct effects will thus form the real basis of psychology. The *faculties* may then be retained as a convenient method of classification, provided the language is properly explained; and no more is attributed to them than is warranted by consciousness. The same consciousness which tells me that seeing is distinct from hearing, tells me also that volition is distinct from both; and to speak of the faculty of will does not necessarily imply more than the consciousness of a distinct class of mental phenomena.”—Mansell, *Prolegem. Log.*, p. 34, note.

FALSE, FALSITY.—The *false*, in one sense, applies to things; and there is *falsity* either when things really are

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not, or when it is impossible they can be; as when it is said that the proportion of the diagonal to the side of a square is commensurable, or that you sit—the one is absolutely *false*, the other accidentally—for in the one case and the other the fact affirmed is not.

The *false* is also predicated of things which really exist, but which appear other than they are, or what they are not; a portrait, or a dream. They have a kind of reality, but they really are not what they represent. Thus, we say that things are *false*, either because they do not absolutely exist, or because they are but appearances and not realities.—Arist., *Metaphys.*, lib. v., cap. 30.

Falsity is opposed to verity or *truth*.—*q. v.*

To transcendental truth, or *truth of being*, the opposite is *nonentity** rather than *falsity*. A thing that really is, is what it is. A thing that is not is a *nonentity*. *Falsity*, then, is twofold—*objective* and *formal*. *Objective falsity* is when a thing resembles a thing which it really is not, or when a sign or proposition seems to represent or enunciate what it does not. *Formal falsity* belongs to the intellect when it fails to discover *objective falsity*, and judges according to appearances rather than the reality and truth of things. *Formal falsity* is error; which is opposed to logical truth. To moral truth, the opposite is falsehood or lying.

FANCY (*φαντασία*).—"Imagination or *phantasy*, in its most extensive meaning, is the faculty *representative* of the phenomena both of the internal and external worlds."—Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note B, sect. 1.

"In the soul
Are many lesser faculties, that serve
Reason as chief; among them *fancy* next
Her office holds: of all external things
Which the five watchful senses represent
She forms imaginations, airy shapes."

Milton, *Paradise Lost*, book v.

* Aristotle says (*Metaphys.*, lib. ix., cap. 10), "Being is above all true—nonentity false."

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“Where *fantasy*, near handmaid to the mind,
Sits and beholds, and doth discern them all;
Compounds in one things different in their kind,
Compares the black and white, the great and small.”
Sir John Davies, *Immortality*.

“When nature rests,
Oft in her absence mimic *fancy* wakes
To imitate her, but, misjoining shapes,
Wild work produces oft, but most in dreams.”

“Tell me where is *fancy* bred,
Or in the heart, or in the head?
How begot, how nourished?

Merch. of Venice, act iii., scene 2.

“Break, *Phantsie*, from thy cave of cloud,
And wave thy purple wings,
Now all thy figures are allowed,
And various shapes of things.
Create of airy forms a stream;
It must have blood and naught of phlegm;
And though it be a waking dream,
Yet let it like an odour rise
To all the senses here,
And fall like sleep upon their eyes,
Or music on their ear.”—Ben Jonson.

“How various soever the pictures of *fancy*, the materials, according to some, are all derived from sense; so that the maxim—*Nihil est in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensu*—though not true of the intellect, holds with regard to the *phantasy*.”—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, b. ii., ch. 7.

Addison said (*Spectator*, No. 411), that he used the words *imagination* and *fancy* indiscriminately.

Mr. Stewart said (*Philosoph. Hum. Mind*, chap. v.), “It is obvious that a creative imagination, when a person possesses it so habitually that it may be regarded as forming one characteristic of his genius, implies a power of summoning up at pleasure a particular class of ideas; and of ideas related to each other in a particular manner; which power can be the result only of certain habits of association, which the individual has acquired. It is to this power of the mind which is evidently a particular turn of thought, and not one of the common principles of our nature,” that Mr. Stewart would appropriate the name

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fancy. “The office of this power is to collect materials for the imagination; and therefore, the latter power presupposes the former, while the former does not necessarily suppose the latter. A man whose habits of association present to him, for illustrating or embellishing a subject, a number of resembling or analogous ideas, we call a man of *fancy*; but for an effort of imagination, various other powers are necessary, particularly the powers of taste and judgment; without which, we can hope to produce nothing that will be a source of pleasure to others. It is the power of *fancy* which supplies the poet with metaphorical language, and with all the analogies which are the foundation of his allusions; but it is the power of imagination that creates the complex scenes he describes, and the fictitious characters he delineates. To *fancy* we apply the epithets of rich or luxuriant; to imagination, those of beautiful or sublime.”

Fancy was called by Coleridge “the aggregative and associative power.” But Wordsworth says, “To aggregate and to associate, to evoke and to combine, belong as well to *imagination* as to *fancy*. But *fancy* does not require that the materials which she makes use of should be susceptible of change in their constitution from her touch; and, where they admit of modification, it is enough for her purpose if it be slight, limited, and evanescent. Directly the reverse of these are the desires and demands of the *imagination*. She recoils from every thing but the plastic, the pliant, and the indefinite.”—Wordsworth, *Preface to Works*, vol. i., 12mo. Lond., 1836.—V. IMAGINATION.

FATALISM, FATE.—“*Fatum* is derived from *fari*; that is, to pronounce, to decree; and in its right sense, it signifies the decree of Providence.”—Leibnitz, *Fifth Paper to Dr. Clarke*. “*Fate* derived from the Latin *fari*, to speak, must denote the *word spoken* by some intelligent being who has power to make his words good.”—Tucker, *Light of Nature*, vol. ii., part 2, chap. 26.

Among all nations it has been common to speak of *fate*

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or destiny as a power superior to gods and men—swaying all things irresistibly. This may be called the *fate* of poets and *mythologists*. *Philosophical fate* is the sum of the laws of the universe, the product of eternal intelligence, and the blind properties of matter. *Theological fate* represents Deity as above the laws of nature, and ordaining all things according to his will—the expression of that will being the law.

Leibnitz (*Fifth Paper to Dr. Samuel Clarke*) says:—
 “There is a *Fatum Mahometanum*, a *Fatum Stoicum*, and a *Fatum Christianum*. The Turkish *fate* will have an effect to happen, even though its cause should be avoided; as if there was an *absolute necessity*. The Stoical *fate* will have a man to be quiet, because he must have patience whether he will or not, since 'tis impossible to resist the course of things. But 'tis agreed that there is *Fatum Christianum*, a *certain destiny* of every thing, regulated by the fore-knowledge and providence of God.”

“Fatalists that hold the necessity of all human actions and events, may be reduced to these three heads—First, such as, asserting the Deity, suppose it irrespectively to decree and determine all things, and thereby make all actions necessary to us; which kind of *fate*, though philosophers and other ancient writers have not been altogether silent of it, yet it has been principally maintained by some neoteric Christians, contrary to the sense of the ancient church. Secondly, such as suppose a Deity that, acting wisely, but necessarily, did contrive the general frame of things in the world; from whence, by a series of causes, doth unavoidably result whatsoever is so done in it: which *fate* is a concatenation of causes, all in themselves necessary, and is that which was asserted by the ancient Stoics, Zeno, and Chrysippus, whom the Jewish Essenes seemed to follow. And lastly, such as hold the material necessity of all things without a Deity; which *fate* Epicurus calls *την των Φυσικων ἐμαρμενην*, the *fate* of the naturalists, that is, indeed, the atheists, the assertors whereof may be called

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also the democritical *fatalists*.”—Cudworth, *Intell. Syst.* book i., chap. 1.

Cicero, *De Fato*.

Plutarchus, *De Fato*.

Grotius, *Philosophorum Sententiæ De Fato*.

FEAR is one of the passions. It arises on the conception or contemplation of something evil coming upon us.

FEELING.—“This word has two meanings. *First*, it signifies the perceptions we have of eternal objects, by the sense of touch. When we speak of *feeling* a body to be hard or soft, or rough or smooth, hot or cold, to *feel* these things is to perceive them by touch. They are external things, and that act of the mind by which we *feel* them is easily distinguished from the objects felt. *Secondly*, the word *feeling* is used to signify the same thing as *sensation*; and in this sense, it has no object; the *feeling* and the thing felt are one and the same.

“Perhaps betwixt *feeling*, taken in this last sense, and *sensation*, there may be this small difference, that *sensation* is most commonly used to signify those *feelings* which we have by our external senses and bodily appetites, and all our bodily pains and pleasures. But there are *feelings* of a nobler nature accompanying our affections, our moral judgments, and our determinations in matters of taste, to which the word *sensation* is less properly applied.”*—Reid, *Intell. Powers*, essay i., chap. 1.

“*Feeling*, beside denoting one of the external senses, is a general term, signifying that internal act by which we are made conscious of our pleasures and our pains; for it is not limited, as *sensation* is, to any one sort. Thus, *feeling* being the genus of which *sensation* is a species, their meaning is the same when applied to pleasure and pain felt at the organ of sense; and accordingly we say indifferently, ‘I feel pleasure from heat, and pain from cold;’ or, ‘I

* The French use of *sensation*—as when we say such an occurrence excited a great *sensation*, that is, *feeling* of surprise, or indignation, or satisfaction, is becoming more common.

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have a sensation of pleasure from heat and of pain from cold.' But the meaning of *feeling*, as is said, is much more extensive. It is proper to say, I feel pleasure in a sumptuous building, in love, in friendship; and pain in losing a child, in revenge, in envy; sensation is not properly applied to any of these.

"The term *feeling* is frequently used in a less proper sense, to signify what we feel or are conscious of; and in that sense it is a general term for all our passions and emotions, and for all our other pleasures and pains."—Kames, *Elements of Criticism*, appendix.

"Pressing my hand with force against the table, I *feel* pain and I *feel* the table to be hard. The pain is a sensation of the mind, and there is nothing that resembles it in the table. The hardness is in the table, nor is there anything resembling it in the mind. *Feeling* is applied to both, but in a different sense; being a word common to the act of sensation, and to that of perceiving by the sense of touch."—Reid, *Intell. Powers*, essay ii., chap. 16.

All sensations are *feelings*; but all *feelings* are not sensations. Sensations are those *feelings* which arise immediately and solely from a state or affection of the bodily organism. But we have *feelings* which are connected not with our animal, but with our intellectual, and rational, and moral nature; such as *feelings* of the sublime and beautiful, of esteem and gratitude, of approbation and disapprobation. Those higher *feelings* it has been proposed to call sentiments.

From its most restricted sense of the perceiving by the sense of touch, *feeling* has been extended to signify immediate perceiving or knowing in general. It is applied in this sense to the immediate knowledge which we have of first truths or the principles of common sense. "By external or internal perception, I apprehend a phenomenon of mind or matter as existing; I therefore affirm it to be. Now, if asked how I know, or am assured, that what I apprehend as a mode of mind, may not, in reality, be a

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mode of mind; I can only say, using the simplest language, 'I know it to be true, because I *feel*, and cannot but *feel*,' or 'because I *believe*, and cannot but *believe*,' it so to be. And if further interrogated how I know, or am assured that I thus *feel* or thus *believe*, I can make no better answer than, in the one case, 'because I *believe* that I *feel*;' in the other, 'because I *feel* that I *believe*.' It thus appears, that when pushed to our last resort, we must retire either upon *feeling* or *belief*, or upon both indifferently. And, accordingly, among philosophers, we find that a great many employ one or other of these terms by which to indicate the nature of the ultimate ground to which our cognitions are reducible; while some employ both, even though they may award a preference to one. . . . In this application of it we must discharge that signification of the word by which we denote the phenomena of pain and pleasure."—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note A, sect. 5.—V. BELIEF.

FETICHISM is supposed to have been the first form of the theological philosophy; and is described as consisting in the ascription of life and intelligence essentially analogous to our own, to every existing object, of whatever kind, whether organic or inorganic, natural or artificial.—(Comte, *Philosoph. Positive*, i., 3.) The Portuguese call the objects worshipped by the negroes of Africa *fetisso*—bewitched or possessed by fairies. Such are the *grisgris* of Africa, the *manitous* and the *ockis* of America, and the *burkhans* of Siberia—good and evil genii inhabiting the objects of nature which they worship. The priests of this worship are called *griots* in Africa, *jongleurs* or *jugglers* in America, and *chamanes* in Central Asia.

FITNESS and UNFITNESS—"most frequently denote the congruity or incongruity, aptitude or inaptitude, of any means to accomplish an end. But when applied to actions, they generally signify the same with *right* and *wrong*; nor is it often hard to determine in which of these senses these words are to be understood. It is worth observing that *fitness* in the former sense is equally undefinable with *fitness*

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in the latter ; or, that it is as impossible to express in any other than synonymous words, what we mean when we say of certain objects, ‘ that they have a *fitness* to one another ; or are *fit* to answer certain purposes,’ as when we say, ‘ reverencing the Deity is *fit*, or beneficence is *fit* to be practised.’ In the first of these instances, none can avoid owning the absurdity of making an arbitrary sense the source of the idea of *fitness*, and of concluding that it signifies nothing real in objects, and that no one thing can be properly the *means* of another. In both cases the term *fit* signifies a simple perception of the understanding.”—Price, *Review*, chap. 6.

According to Dr. Samuel Clarke, virtue consists in acting in conformity to the nature and *fitness* of things. In this theory the term *fitness* does not mean the adaptation of an action, as a means towards some end designed by the agent ; but a congruity, proportion, or suitableness between an action and the relations, in which, as a moral being, the agent stands. Dr. Clarke has been misunderstood on this point by Dr. Brown (lect. lxxvi.) and others. See Wardlaw, *Christ. Ethics*, note E.

FORCE is any energy or power which has a tendency to move a body at rest, or to affect or stop the progress of a body already in motion. This is sometimes termed *active force*, in contradistinction to that which merely resists or retards the motion of a body, but is itself apparently *inactive*. But according to Leibnitz, by whom the term *force* was introduced into modern philosophy, no substance is altogether passive. *Force*, or a continual tendency to activity, was originally communicated by the Creator to all substances, whether material or spiritual. Every *force* is a *substance*, and every *substance* is a *force*. The two notions are inseparable ; for you cannot think of action without a being, nor of a being without activity. A substance entirely passive is a contradictory idea. See Leibnitz, *De primæ Philosophiæ emendatione, et de notione substantiæ*.—
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In like manner Boscovich maintained that the ultimate particles of matter are indivisible and unextended points, endowed with the *forces* of attraction and repulsion.—*Dissertationes duæ de viribus vivis*, 4to, 1745. See also Stewart, *Philosophical Essays*, essay ii., chap. 1.

According to the dynamic theory of Kant, and the atomic theory of Leucippus, the phenomena of matter were explained by attraction and repulsion.

“*La force, proprement dite, c'est ce qui regit les actes, sans régler les volontés.*” If this definition of *force*, which is given by Mons. Comte, be adopted, it would make a distinction between *force* and *power*. Power extends to *volitions* as well as to *operations*, to mind as well as matter.

“We talk of mechanical *forces*. Where are they? Apart from will, what have we but weights? All motion and power in mechanism result from the power of man. Lever, pulley, wedge, and wheel, are all helpless as dust till the human spirit gives them power. The huge things that spin, and hammer, and run for us, are but artificial limbs,—outlying physical instruments, whereby the spirit within us does heavy work, never meant for the gentle frame which everywhere attends it.”—*Crystal Palace*, an essay, p. xx., reprinted from *Quarterly Review*. 1855.

FORM—“is that of which matter is the receptacle,” says Lord Monboddo (*Ancient Metaphys.*, book ii., chap. 2). A trumpet may be said to consist of two parts; the *matter* or brass of which it is made, and the *form* which the maker gives to it. The latter is essential, but not the former; since although the matter were silver, it would still be a trumpet; but without the *form*, it would not. Now, although there can be no *form* without matter, yet as it is the *form* which makes the thing what it is, the word *form* came to signify essence or nature. “*Form* is the essence of the thing, from which result not only its figure and shape, but all its other qualities.”—Monboddo, *ut supra*.

Matter void of *form*, but ready to receive it, was called,

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in metaphysics, *materia prima*, or elementary; in allusion to which Butler has made Hudibras say, that he

Professed
He had first matter seen undressed,
And found it naked and alone,
Before one rag of *form* was on.

Form was defined by Aristotle λογος της ουσιας, and as ουσια signifies, equally, substance and essence, hence came the question whether *form* should be called substantial or essential; the Peripatetics espousing the former epithet, and the Cartesians the latter.

According to the Peripatetics, in any natural composite body, there were—1. The matter. 2. Quantity, which followed the matter. 3. The substantial *form*. 4. The qualities which followed the *form*. According to others, there were only,—1. Matter. 2. Essential *form*; as *quantity* is identified with *matter*, and *qualities* with *matter* or *form*, or the compound of them.

According to the Peripatetics, *form* was a subtle substance, penetrating *matter*, and the cause of all acts of the compound; in conformity with the saying, *formæ est agere, materiæ vero pati*. According to others, *form* is the union of material parts, as atoms, or elements, &c., to which some added a certain motion and position of the parts.—Derodon, *Phys.*, pars prima, pp. 11, 12.

He who gives *form* to matter, must, before he do so, have in his mind some idea of the particular *form* which he is about to give. And hence the word *form* is used to signify an idea.

Idea and Law are the same thing, seen from opposite points. "That which contemplated *objectively* (that is, as existing externally to the mind), we call a law; the same contemplated *subjectively* (that is, as existing in a subject or mind), is an idea. Hence Plato often names ideas laws; and Lord Bacon, the British Plato (?), describes the laws of the material universe as ideas in nature. Quod in natura naturata *lex*, in natura naturante *idea* dicitur."—Coleridge,

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Church and State, p. 12. And in *Nov. Organ.*, ii., 17, Bacon says: "When we speak of *forms*, we understand nothing more than the *laws* and *modes* of action which regulate and constitute any simple nature, such as heat, light, weight, in all kinds of matter susceptible of them; so that the *form* of heat, or the *form* of light, and the *law* of heat, and the *law* of light, are the same thing." Again he says: "Since the *form* of a thing is the very thing itself, and the thing no otherwise differs from the *form*, than as the apparent differs from the existent, the outward from the inward, or that which is considered in relation to man from that which is considered in relation to the universe, it follows clearly that no nature can be taken for the true *form*, unless it ever decreases when the nature itself decreases, and in like manner is always increased when the nature is increased."—*Nov. Organ.*, 2, 13.

As the word *form* denotes the *law*, so it may also denote the class of cases brought together and united by the law. "Thus to speak of the *form* of animals might mean, first, the law or definition of animal in general; second, the part of any given animal by which it comes under the law, and is what it is; and last, the class of animals in general formed by the law."—Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, p. 33, 2d edit.

"The sense attached at the present day to the words *form* and *matter*, is somewhat different from, though closely related to, these. The *form* is what the mind impresses upon its perceptions of objects, which are the *matter*; *form* therefore means *mode of viewing* objects that are presented to the mind. When the attention is directed to any object, we do not see the object itself, but contemplate it in the light of our own prior conceptions. A rich man, for example, is regarded by the poor and ignorant under the *form* of a very fortunate person, able to purchase luxuries which are above their own reach; by the religious mind under the *form* of a person with more than ordinary temptations to contend with; by the political economist, under that

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of an example of the unequal distribution of wealth; by the tradesman, under that of one whose patronage is valuable. Now, the object is really the same to all these observers; the same rich man has been represented under all these different *forms*. And the reason that the observers are able to find many in one, is that they connect him severally with their own prior conceptions. The *form*, then, in this view, is *mode of knowing*; and the *matter* is the *perception*, or *object* we have to know."—*Ibid*, p. 34.

Sir W. Hamilton calls the theory of *substantial forms*, "the theory of qualities viewed as entities conjoined with, and not as mere dispositions or modifications of matter."—*Reid's Works*, p. 827, note.

Aristotle, *Metaphys.*, lib. 7 et 8.

Michelet, *Examen Critique de la Metaphysique d'Aristote*, 8vo, Paris, 1836, p. 164 et p. 287.

Ravaisson, *Essai sur la Metaphysique d'Aristote*, 8vo, Paris, 1837, tom. i., p. 149.—*V. LAW*.

FORMALLY.—V. REALLY, VIRTUALLY.

FORTITUDE is one of the virtues called *cardinal*. It may display itself *actively* by *resolution* or *constancy*, which consists in adhering to duty in the face of danger and difficulty which cannot be avoided, or by *intrepidity* or *courage*, which consists in maintaining firmness and presence of mind in the midst of perils from which there may be escape. The displays of *fortitude passively* considered may be comprehended under the term *patience*, including humility, meekness, submission, resignation, &c.

FREE WILL.—V. LIBERTY, NECESSITY, WILL.

FRIENDSHIP is the mutual affection cherished by two persons of congenial minds. It springs from the social nature of man, and rests on the esteem which each entertains for the good qualities of the other. The resemblance in disposition and character between friends may sometimes be the occasion of their contracting friendship; but it may also be the effect of imitation and frequent and familiar intercourse. And the interchange of kind offices

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which takes place between friends is not the cause of their friendship, but its natural result. Familiarities founded on views of interest or pleasure are not to be dignified by the name of friendship.

Dr. Brown (lect. lxxxix.) has classified the duties of *friendship* as they regard the *commencement* of it, the *continuance* of it, and its *close*.

In the *choice* of a friend there is room for discretion and prudence: The cultivation of *friendship* calls for confidence, kindness, and encouragement. Should it become necessary, from a change of circumstances, or from a neglect or violation of its duties, to break off *friendship*, it should be done not abruptly, but gradually, and more in sorrow than in anger. Should *friendship* last till it be dissolved by the death of one of the parties, then it becomes the duty of the survivor to cherish the memory of his departed friend, to defend his character, and to continue to imitate his excellences.

See the various questions connected with *friendship* treated by Aristotle, in *Ethics*, books viii. and ix., and by Cicero, in his treatise *De Amicitia*.

GENERALIZATION.—"The mind makes its utmost endeavours to *generalize* its ideas, begins early with such as are most familiar, comes in time to those that are less so, and is never at rest till it has found means of conceiving, as well as it can, its ideas collectively, and of signifying them in that manner to others."—Bolingbroke, *Essay on Hum. Knowl.*, s. 5.

"*Generalization* is the act of comprehending, under a common name, several objects agreeing in some point which we abstract from each of them, and which that common name serves to indicate."

"When we are contemplating several individuals which *resemble* each other in some *part* of their nature, we can (by attending to *that part alone*, and not to those points

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wherein they differ) assign them *one common name*, which will express or stand for them merely as far as they all agree; and which, of course, will be applicable to all or any of them (which process is called *generalization*); and each of these names is called a *common term*, from its belonging to them *all alike*; or a *predicable*, because it may be predicated affirmatively of them or any of them.”—Whately, *Logic*, b. ii., ch. 5, sect. 3.

“On sensation,” says Aristotle (*Poster. Analyt.*, chap. 16), “ensues memory; and on many memories of the same fact experience; for many similar memories are one experience: on experience, or the whole unchanging universal that has settled in the mind, the all penetrating one beside the many, ensues the beginning of art and science; of art, if the end is production, of science, if the end is truth.” Experience can only give truths which are particular, but science aims at truths which are general. Now these general truths are involved in particular cases or instances; and the mental process by which we disengage the general from the particular and look on it separately from any individual case, is the process of *generalization*, while the general truths derived from particular observations constitute science.

Generalization is of two kinds—*classification* and *generalization* properly so called.

When we observe facts accompanied by diverse circumstances, and reduce these circumstances to such as are essential and common, we obtain a law.

When we observe individual objects and arrange them according to their common characters, we obtain a class. When the characters selected are such as belong essentially to the nature of the objects, the class corresponds with the law. When the character selected is not natural the *classification* is artificial. If we were to class animals into white and red, we would have a *classification* which had no reference to the laws of their nature. But if we classify them as vertebrate or invertebrate, we have a *classification*

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founded on their organization. Artificial *classification* is of no value in science, it is a mere aid to the memory. Natural *classification* is the foundation of all science. This is sometimes called *generalization*. It is more properly *classification*.—V. CLASSIFICATION.

The law of gravitation is exemplified in the fall of a single stone to the ground. But many stones and other heavy bodies must have been observed to fall before the fact was generalized, and the law stated. And in this process of *generalizing* there is involved a principle which experience does not furnish. Experience, how extensive soever it may be, can only give the particular, yet from the particular we rise to the general, and affirm not only that all heavy bodies which have been observed, but that all heavy bodies whether they have been observed or not, gravitate. In this is implied a belief that there is order in nature, that under the same circumstances the same substances will present the same phenomena. This is a principle furnished by reason, the process founded on it embodies elements furnished by experience.—V. INDUCTION.

The results of *generalization* are general notions expressed by general terms. Objects are classed according to certain properties which they have in common, into genera and species. Hence arose the question which caused centuries of acrimonious discussion. Have genera and species a real, independent existence, or are they only to be found in the mind?—V. REALISM, NOMINALISM, CONCEPTUALISM.—Reid, *Intell. Powers*, essay v., chap. 6; Stewart, *Philosoph. Hum. Mind*, chap. 4.

“*General* ideas or *general* notions are of two kinds, essentially different from each other; those which are *general* merely from the vagueness and imperfection of our information; and those which have been methodically *generalized*, in consequence of an abstraction founded on the careful study of particulars.”—Stewart, *Philosoph. of Hum. Mind*, part ii., ch. 2, sect. 4.

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The principle of *generalization* is, that beings howsoever different agree or are homogeneous in some respect.

GENERAL TERMS.—V. TERMS.

GENIUS (from *geno*, the old form of the verb *gigno*, to produce).

This word was in ancient times applied to the tutelary God or spirit appointed to watch over every individual from his birth to his death. As the character and capacities of men were supposed to vary according to the higher or lower nature of their *genius*, the word came to signify the natural powers and abilities of men, and more particularly their natural inclination or disposition. But the peculiar and restricted use of the term is to denote that high degree of mental power which produces or invents. “*Genius*,” says Dr. Blair (*Lectures on Rhetoric*, lect. iii.), “always imports something inventive or creative.” “It produces,” says another, “what has never been accomplished, and which all in all ages are constrained to admire. Its chief elements are the reason and the imagination, which are alone inventive and productive. According as one or other predominates, *genius* becomes scientific or artistic. In the former case, it seizes at once those hidden affinities which otherwise do not reveal themselves, except to the most patient and vigorous application; and as it were intuitively recognizing in phenomena the unalterable and eternal, it produces truth. In the latter, seeking to exhibit its own ideas in due and appropriate forms, it realizes the infinite under finite types, and so creates the beautiful.”

To possess the powers of common sense in a more eminent degree, so as to be able to perceive identity in things widely different, and diversity in things nearly the same; this it is that constitutes what we call *genius*, that power divine, which through every sort of discipline renders the difference so conspicuous between one learner and another.”—Harris, *Philosoph. Arrange.*, chap. 9.

“Nature gives men a bias to their respective pursuits,

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and that strong propensity, I suppose, is what we mean by *genius*.”—*Couper*.

Dryden has said,—

“What the child admired,
The youth *endeavoured*, and the man *acquired*.”

He read Polybius, with a notion of his historic exactness, before he was ten years old. Pope, at twelve, feasted his eyes in the picture galleries of Spenser. Murillo filled the margin of his schoolbooks with drawings. Le Brun, in the beginning of childhood, drew with a piece of charcoal on the walls of the house.—*Pleasures, &c., of Literature*, 12mo, Lond., 1851, pp. 27, 28.

Sharp, *Dissertation on Genius*. Lond., 1755.

Duff, *Essays on Original Genius*. Lond., 1767.

Gerard, *Essay on Genius*. Lond., 1774.

Lælius and Hortensia, or Thoughts on the Nature and Objects of Taste and Genius. Edin., 1782.

Beattie, *Dissertations. Of Imagination*, chap. 3, 4to, Lond., 1783.

GENUINE.—V. AUTHENTIC.

GENUS is “a predicable which is considered as the material part of the species of which it is affirmed.”—Whately, *Logic*, b. ii., ch. 5, sect 3. It is either *summum* or *subalternum*, that is, having no *genus* above it, as *being*, or having another *genus* above it, as *quadruped*; *proximum* or *remotum*, when nothing intervenes between it and the species, as *animal* in respect of man, or when something intervenes, as *animal* in respect of a crow, for between it and crow, *brute* and *bird* intervene. A *genus physicum* is part of the species, as *animal* in respect of man, who has an animal body and a rational soul. A *genus metaphysicum* is identified adequately with the species and distinguished from it extrinsically, as *animal* in respect of brute, *colour* in respect of blackness in ink. Logically the *genus* contains the species; whereas metaphysically the species contains the *genus*; e. g., we divide logically the *genus man* into European, Asiatic, &c., but each of the species, European, &c.,

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contains the idea of man, together with the characteristic difference.

In modern classification, *genus* signifies “a distinct but subordinate group, which gives its name as a prefix to that of all the species of which it is composed.”

GOD, in Anglo-Saxon, means good.

One of the names of the Supreme Being. The corresponding terms in Latin (*Deus*) and in Greek ($\Theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$) were applied to natures superior to the human nature. With us, *God* always refers to the Supreme Being.

That department of knowledge which treats of the being, perfections, and government of *God*, is theology, *q. v.*

“The true and genuine idea of *God* in general, is this—a perfect conscious understanding being (or mind) existing of itself from eternity, and the cause of all other things.”—Cudworth, *Intell. Syst.*, b. i., ch. 4, sect. 4.

“The true and proper idea of *God*, in its most contracted form, is this—a being absolutely perfect; for this is that alone to which necessary existence is essential, and of which it is demonstrable.”—*Ibid*, sect. 8.

“I define *God* thus—an essence or being, fully and absolutely perfect. I say fully and absolutely perfect, in contradistinction to such perfection as is not full and absolute, but the perfection of this or that species or kind of finite beings, suppose a lion, horse, or tree. But to be fully and absolutely perfect, is to be, at least, as perfect as the apprehension of a man can conceive without a contradiction.”—H. More, *Antidote against Atheism*, ch. 2.

GOOD (The Chief).—An inquiry into the chief good, or the *summum bonum*, is an inquiry into what constitutes the perfection of human nature and the happiness of the human condition. This has been the aim of all religion and philosophy. The answers given to the question have been many. Varro enumerated 288; August., *De Civit.*, lib. 19, cap. 1. But they may easily be reduced to a few. The ends aimed at by human action, how various soever they may seem, may all be reduced to three, viz., pleasure, in-

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terest, and duty. What conduces to these ends we call *good*, and seek after; what is contrary to these ends we call *evil*, and shun. But the highest of these ends is duty, and *the chief good* of man lies in the discharge of duty. By doing so he perfects his nature, and may at the same time enjoy the highest happiness.

“Semita certe

Tranquillæ per virtutem patet unica vitæ.”

Juvenal, lib. iv., sat. 10.

Cicero, *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum*.

L'Abbe Anselme, *Sur le Souverain bien des anciens*, *Mem. d. l'Acad. des Inscript., et Belles Lettres*, 1 ser., tom. 5.—Jouffroy, *Miscell.*—V. BONUM (SUMMUM).

GRAMMAR (Universal).—This word *grammar* comes to us from the Greeks, who included under *τεχνη γραμματιστικη* the art of writing and reading letters. But “*grammar*,” says B. Johnson (the *English Grammar*, c. 1), “is the art of true and well speaking a language; the writing is but an accident.” Language is the expression of thought—thought is the operation of mind, and hence language may be studied as a help to psychology.—Reid, *Intell. Powers*, essay i., chap. 5.

Thought assumes the form of ideas or of judgments, that is, the object of thought is either simply apprehended or conceived of, or something is affirmed concerning it. Ideas are expressed in words, judgments by propositions; so that as ideas are the elements of judgments, words are the elements of propositions.

Every judgment involves the idea of a *substance*, of which some *quality* is affirmed or denied—so that language must have the *substantive* or noun, the adjective or *quality*, and the *verb* connecting or disconnecting.

If the objects of our thoughts existed or were contemplated singly, these parts of speech would be sufficient. But the relations between objects and the connection between propositions, render other parts of speech necessary.

It is because we have ideas that are general, and ideas

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that are individual, that we have also *nouns common* and *proper*; and it is because we have ideas of unity and plurality, that we have *numbers, singular, dual, and plural. Tenses* and *moods* arise from dividing duration, and viewing things as conditional or positive. Even the order or construction of language is to be traced to the calm or impassioned state of mind from which it proceeds.

In confirmation of the connection thus indicated between *grammar* and *psychology*, it may be noticed that those who have done much for the one have also improved the other. Plato has given his views of language in the *Cratylus*, and Aristotle, in his *Interpretation* and *Analytics*, has laid the foundations of general *grammar*. And so in later times the most successful cultivators of mental philosophy have also been attentive to the theory of language.

In Greek, the same word (*λόγος*) means reason and language. And in Latin, reasoning is called *discursus*—a meaning which is made English by our great poet when he speaks of “large discourse of reason.” In all this the connection between the powers of the mind and language is recognized.

Montémont, *Grammaire General ou Philosophie des Langues*, 12 tom., 8vo, Paris, 1845.

Beattie, *Dissertations, Theory of Language*, part 2. 4to, Lond., 1783.

Monboddo, *On the Origin and Progress of Language*, 3 vols.

GRANDEUR.—“The emotion raised by *grand* objects is awful, solemn, and serious.”

“Of all objects of contemplation, the Supreme Being is the most *grand*. . . . The emotion which this grandest of all objects raises in the mind is what we call devotion—a serious *recollected* temper, which inspires magnanimity, and disposes to the most heroic acts of virtue.

“The emotion produced by other objects which may be called *grand*, though, in an inferior degree, is, in its nature and in its effects, similar to that of devotion. It disposes to seriousness, elevates the mind above its usual state to a

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kind of enthusiasm, and inspires magnanimity, and a contempt of what is mean. . . .

“To me *grandeur* in objects seems nothing else but such a degree of excellence, in one kind or another, as merits our admiration.”—Reid, *Intell. Powers*, essay viii., chap. 3.

—V. SUBLIMITY, BEAUTY, ÆSTHETICS.

GRATITUDE is one of the affections which have been designated benevolent. It implies a sense of kindness done or intended, and a desire to return it. It is sometimes also characterized as a moral affection, because the party cherishing it has the idea that he who did or intended kindness to him has done right and deserves a return; just as the party who has received an injury has not merely a sense or feeling of the wrong done, but a sense of injustice in the doing of it, and the feeling or conviction that he who did it deserves punishment.

See Chalmers, *Sketches of Mental and Moral Philosophy*, chap. viii.

Shaftesbury, *Moralists*, pt. 3, lect. ii.

GYMNOSOPHIST (*γυμνος*, naked; *σοφός*, wise).—“Among the Indians, be certain philosophers, whom they call *gymnosophists*, who from sun rising to the setting thereof are able to endure all the day long, looking full against the sun, without winking or once moving their eyes.”—Holland, *Pliny*, b. vii., c. 2.

The Brahmins, although their religion and philosophy were but little known to the ancients, are alluded to by Cicero. *Tuscul.*, lib. v., cap. 27; Arrian, *Exped. Alexand.*, lib. vii., cap. 1.

Colebrooke and others in modern times have explained the Indian philosophy.

HABIT (*ἕξις*, *habitus*).—*Habit*, or state, is a constitution, frame, or disposition of parts, by which everything is fitted to act or suffer in a certain way.—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, chap. 4. By Aristotle *ἕξις* is defined (*Metaphys.*,

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lib. 5, cap. 20) to be, in one sense, the same with *διαθεσις*, or disposition. His commentators make a distinction, and say *ἔξις* is more permanent. There is the same distinction in English between *habit* and *disposition*.

Habits have been distinguished into natural and supernatural, or acquired and infused. Natural *habits* are those acquired by custom or repetition. Supernatural *habits* are such as are infused at once. They correspond to gifts or graces, and the consideration of them belongs to theology.

Acquired *habits* are distinguished into intellectual and moral. From *habit* results power or virtue, and the intellectual *habits* or virtues are intellect, wisdom, prudence, science, and art. "These may be subservient to quite contrary purposes, and those who have them may exercise them spontaneously and agreeably in producing directly contrary effects. But the moral virtues, like the different *habits* of the body, are determined by their nature to one specific operation. Thus, a man in health acts and moves in a manner conformable to his healthy state of body, and never otherwise, when his motions are natural and voluntary; and in the same manner the habits of justice or temperance uniformly determine those adorned by them to act justly and temperately."—Aristotle, *Ethic.*, lib. v., cap. 1.

Habits have been distinguished as active or passive. The determinations of the will, efforts of attention, and the use of our bodily organs, give birth to active *habits*; the acts of the memory and the affections of the sensibility, to passive *habits*.

Aristotle (*Ethic.*, lib. iii.) proves that our habits are voluntary, as being created by a series of voluntary actions. "But, it may be asked, does it depend merely on our own will to correct and reform our bad *habits*? It certainly does not; neither does it depend on the will of a patient, who has despised the advice of a physician, to recover that health which has been lost by profligacy. When we have thrown a stone we cannot restrain its flight; but it depended entirely on ourselves whether we should throw it or not."

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Actions, according to Aristotle, are voluntary throughout: *habits* only as to their beginnings.

Thurot (*De l'Entendement*, tom. i., p. 138) calls "*habit* the memory of the organs, or that which gives memory to the organs."

Maine de Biran, *L'Influence de l'Habitude*.

Dutrochet, *Theorie de l'Habitude*.

M. F. Ravaisson, *De l'Habitude*.

Butler, *Analogy*, part 1, ch. 5.

Reid, *Active Powers*, essay iii., pt. 1, ch. 3.

Reid, *Intellectual Powers*, essay iv., ch. 4.—V. CUSTOM.

Habit and Custom.

"That opinion of Aristotle* seems to me to savour of narrowness and carelessness of view, when he asserts that *habit* has no power over such actions as are natural; taking as an illustration that, if a stone be thrown a thousand times into the air, it acquires not the slightest tendency to ascend of its own accord; moreover, that we see and hear no better by often seeing and hearing. For though this may hold in some cases, where nature is absolute, yet it is far otherwise in those cases where nature, with a certain degree of latitude, admits of intension and remission. He might surely have observed that a glove a little too tight is rendered looser by often putting it on the hand; that a staff, by use and time, is bent quite in the opposite of its natural shape, and continues for a while in that state; that the voice, by exercise, is rendered stronger and more distinct; that custom enables us to endure cold and heat; and several other things of the same kind. And these two latter instances are more analogous to the subject than those adduced by him. Nevertheless, the more truth there is in the remark that virtues and vices consist in *habit*, the more he should have endeavoured to lay down rules whereby

* "None of these things, which are what they are by nature, can be altered by being accustomed. Thus a stone, which by nature is carried downward, can never be accustomed to mount upward, no, not though any one should ten thousand times attempt it, by throwing the stone upward. The same may be said of accustoming fire to move downward."—*Ethic.*, lib. ii., c. 1.

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habits of this kind might be acquired or got rid of; for several precepts can be given for the wise regulation of the exercises of the mind as well as of the body. We shall enumerate a few of them.

“The first is, that we should, from the very commencement, be on our guard against tasks of too difficult or too easy a nature; for, if too great a burden be imposed, in the diffident temper you will check the buoyancy of hope, in the self-confident temper you will excite an opinion whereby it will promise itself more than it can accomplish, the consequence of which will be sloth. But in both dispositions it will happen that the trial will not answer the expectation, a circumstance which always depresses and confounds the mind. But if the tasks be of too trivial a kind there will be a serious loss on the total progress.

“The second is, that in order to the exercise of any faculty for the acquirement of *habit*, two particular times should be carefully observed: the one when the mind is best disposed, the other, when worst disposed to the matter; so that, by the former, we may make most progress on our way; by the latter we may, by laborious effort, wear out the knots and obstructions of the mind, by which means the intermediate times shall pass on easily and smoothly.

“The third precept is that of which Aristotle makes incidental mention:—‘That we should, with all our strength (yet not running into a faulty excess), struggle to the opposite of that to which we are by nature most inclined;’ as when we row against the current, or bend into an opposite direction a crooked staff, in order to straighten it.

“The fourth precept depends on a general law, of undoubted truth, namely, that the mind is led on to anything more successfully and agreeably, if that at which we aim be not the chief object in the agent’s design, but is accomplished, as it were, by doing something else; since the bias of our nature is such, that it usually dislikes constraint and rigorous authority. There are several other rules which may be given with advantage on the government of *habit*;

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for *habit*, if wisely and skilfully formed, becomes truly a second nature (as the common saying is); but unskilfully and unmethodically directed, it will be, as it were, the ape of nature, which imitates nothing to the life, but only clumsily and awkwardly."

Bacon, *On the Advancement of Learning*, book vii., translated in Moffet's *Selections*, Dubl., 1847.

HAPPINESS—"is not, I think, the most appropriate term for a state, the perfection of which consists in the exclusion of all hap, that is, chance.

"Felicity in its proper sense, is but another word for fortunateness, or happiness; and I can see no advantage in the improper use of words, when proper terms are to be found, but on the contrary, much mischief."—Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, vol. i., pp. 31-2.

The Greeks called the sum total of the pleasure which is allotted or happens to a man *εὐτυχία*, that is, good hap; or, more religiously, *εὐδαιμονία*, that is, favourable providence.—*Ibid.*

To live well and to act well is synonymous with being happy.—Aristotle, *Ethic.*, lib. i., c. 4.

Happiness is never desired but for its own sake only. Honour, pleasure, intelligence, and every virtue are desirable on their own account, but they are also desirable as means towards *happiness*. But *happiness* is never desired as a means, because it is complete and all-sufficient in itself.

"*Happiness* is the object of human action in its most general form, as including all other objects, and approved by reason. As pleasure is the aim of mere desire, and interest the aim of prudence, so *happiness* is the aim of wisdom. *Happiness* is conceived as necessarily an *ultimate* object of action. To be happy, includes or supersedes all other gratifications. If we are happy, we do not miss that which we have not; if we are not happy, we want something more, whatever we have. The desire of *happiness* is the supreme desire. All other desires of pleasure, wealth, power, fame, are included in this, and are subor-

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dinate to it. We may make other objects our ultimate objects; but we can do so only by identifying them with this. *Happiness* is our being's end and aim.

“Since *happiness* is necessarily the supreme object of our desires, and duty the supreme rule of our actions, there can be no harmony in our being, except our *happiness* coincide with our duty. That which we contemplate as the ultimate and universal object of desire, must be identical with that which we contemplate as the ultimate and supreme guide of our intentions. As moral beings, our *happiness* must be found in our moral progress, and in the consequences of our moral progress we must be happy by being virtuous.”
—Whewell, *Morality*, Nos. 544, 545.

See Aristotle, *Ethic.*, lib. i.

Harris, *Dialogue on Happiness*.—V. GOOD (Chief).

HARMONY (Pre-established).—When an impression is made on a bodily organ by an external object, the mind becomes percipient. When a volition is framed by the will, the bodily organs are ready to execute it. How is this brought about? The doctrine of a *pre-established harmony* has reference to this question, and may be thus stated.

Before creating the mind and the body of man, God had a perfect knowledge of all possible minds and of all possible bodies. Among this infinite variety of minds and bodies, it was impossible but that there should come together a mind the sequence of whose ideas and volitions should correspond with the movements of some body: for, in an infinite number of possible minds and possible bodies, every combination or union was possible. Let us, then, suppose a mind, the order and succession of whose modifications corresponded with the series of movements to take place in some body, God would unite the two and make of them a living soul, a man. Here, then, is the most perfect harmony between the two parts of which man is composed. There is no commerce nor communication, no action and reaction. The mind is an independent force, which passes from one volition or perception to another, in conformity

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with its own nature ; and would have done so although the body had not existed. The body, in like manner, by virtue of its own inherent force, and by the single impression of external objects, goes through a series of movements ; and would have done so although it had not been united to a rational soul. But the movements of the body and the modifications of the mind correspond to each other. In short, the mind is a spiritual automaton, and the body is a material automaton. Like two pieces of clock-work, they are so regulated as to mark the same time ; but the spring which moves the one is not the spring which moves the other ; yet they go exactly together. The harmony between them existed before the mind was united to the body. Hence this is called the doctrine of *pre-established harmony*.

It may be called *correspondence* or *parallelism*, but not *harmony* between mind and body—for there is no unity superior to both, and containing both, which is the cause of their mutual penetration. In decomposing human personality into two substances,* from eternity abandoned each to its proper impulse, which acknowledges no superior law in man to direct and control them, liberty is destroyed.—Tiberghien, *Essai des Connais. Hum.*, p. 394.

The doctrine of *pre-established harmony* differs from that of occasional causes “only in this respect, that by the former the accordance of the mental and the bodily phenomena was supposed to be pre-arranged, once for all, by the Divine Power, while by the latter their *harmony* was supposed to be brought about by His constant interposition.”—**V. CAUSES (Occasional).**

This doctrine was first advocated by Leibnitz in his *Theodicée* and *Monadologie*.

Wolfius, *Psychologia Rationalis*, sect. 614-15-17, &c.

HARMONY (of the Spheres).—The ancient philosophers supposed that the regular movements of the heavenly bodies throughout space formed a kind of *harmony*, which they called the *harmony of the spheres*.

* Soul and body, however, constitute one *suppositum* or person.

HATRED.—*V.* LOVE.

HEDONISM (ἡδονή, pleasure)—is the doctrine that the chief good of man lies in the pursuit of pleasure. This was the doctrine of Aristippus and the Cyrenaic school.

HERMETIC PHILOSOPHY.—A system of mystical philosophy ascribed to Hermes Trismegistus or Mercury, and contained in a book or books ascribed to him.—Plato, *Phyllus*.

Hor., ode 10, lib. i. Hesiod, *Theog.*, v. q. 37.

Lenglet du Fresnoy, *Hist. de la Philosoph. Hermetique*, 3 tom., 12mo, Paris, 1742.

HYLOZOISM (ὕλη, matter; and ζῶή, life).—The doctrine that life and matter are inseparable. This doctrine has been held under different forms. Straton of Lampsacus held that the ultimate particles of matter were each and all of them possessed of life. The Stoics, on the other hand, while they did not accord activity or life to every distinct particle of matter, held that the universe, as a whole, was a being animated by a principle which gave to it motion, form, and life. This doctrine appeared among the followers of Plotinus, who held that the soul of the universe animated the least particle of matter. Spinoza asserted that all things were alive in different degrees. *Omnia quamvis diversis gradibus animata tamen sunt.*

Under all these forms of the doctrine there is a confounding of life with force. Matter, according to Leibnitz and Boscovich, and others, is always endowed with force. Even the *vis inertiae* ascribed to it is a force. Attraction and repulsion, and chemical affinity, all indicate activity in matter; but life is a force always connected with organization, which much of matter wants. Spontaneous motion, growth, nutrition, separation of parts, generation, are phenomena which indicate the presence of life; which is obviously not co-extensive with matter.

HYPOSTASIS.—*V.* SUBSISTENTIA.

HYPOTHESIS (ὑπόθεσις, *suppositio*, supposition).—In Logic Aristotle gave the name *θέσις* to every proposition which, without being an axiom, served as the basis of

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demonstration, and did not require to be demonstrated itself. He distinguished two kinds of thesis, the one which expressed the essence of a thing, and the other which expressed its existence or non-existence. The first is the *ὀρισμὸς* or definition—the second, the *ὑπόθεσις*. “What is capable of proof, but assumed without proof, if believed by the learner, is, relatively to the learner, though not absolutely, an *hypothesis*; if the learner has no belief or a disbelief, it is a petition or postulate.”—*Poster. Analyt.*, lib. ii., cap. 10.

When a phenomenon that is new to us cannot be explained by any known cause, we are uneasy and try to reconcile it to unity by assigning it *ad interim* to some cause which may appear to explain it. Before framing an *hypothesis*, we must see *first* that the phenomenon really exists. Prove ghosts before explaining them. Put the question *an sit?* before *cur sit?* *Second*, that the phenomenon cannot be explained by any known cause. When the necessity of an *hypothesis* has been admitted, a good *hypothesis*—*First*, should contain nothing contradictory between its own constituent parts or other established truths. The Wernerians suppose water once to have held in solution bodies which it cannot now dissolve. The Huttonians ascribe no effect to fire but what it can now produce. *Second*, it should fully explain the phenomenon. The Copernican system is more satisfactory than that of Tycho Brahe. *Third*, it should simply explain the phenomenon, that is, should not depend upon any other *hypothesis* to help it out. The Copernican system is more simple. It needs only gravitation to carry it out—that of Tycho Brahe depends on several things.

This word is not used by Aristotle in the sense which is now assigned to it. With him, *ὑπόθεσις* is a proposition, the truth of which is affirmed, and which serves as the basis of science; a basis not arbitrary, but legitimate, not imaginary, but real. *Hypothesis* and definition are the two phases under which the *θέσις* presents itself. The thesis is

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the principle proper to each particular science.—*Aristotle's Metaphysics*, by Pierron and Zevost, tom. i., p. 200, note.

By *hypothesis* is now understood the supposing of something, the existence of which is not proved, as a cause to explain phenomena which have been observed. It thus differs in signification from theory, which explains phenomena by causes which are known to exist and to operate. "*Hypothesis*," says Dr. Gregory (*Lectures on Duties and Qualifications of a Physician*), "is commonly confounded with theory; but a *hypothesis* properly means the supposition of a principle, of whose existence there is no proof from experience, but which may be rendered more or less probable by facts which are neither numerous enough nor adequate to infer its existence."

"In some instances," says Boscovich (*De Solis ac Lunæ Defectibus*, Lond., 1776, pp. 211, 212), "observations and experiments at once reveal to us all we know. In other cases, we avail ourselves of the aid of *hypothesis*; by which word, however, is to be understood, not fictions altogether arbitrary, but suppositions conformable to experience or analogy." "This," says Dr. Brown, "is the right use of *hypothesis*—not to supersede, but to direct investigation—not as telling us what we are to believe, but as pointing out to us what we are to ascertain." And it has been said (*Pursuit of Knowledge*, vol. ii., p. 255, weekly vol., No. 31), that "the history of all discoveries that have been arrived at, by what can with any propriety be called philosophical investigation and induction, attests the necessity of the experimenter proceeding in the institution and management of his experiments upon a previous idea of the truth to be evolved. This previous idea is what is properly called an *hypothesis*, which means something placed under as a foundation or platform on which to institute and carry on the process of investigation."

Different opinions have been held as to the use of *hypotheses* in philosophy. The sum of the matter seems to be, that *hypotheses* are admissible and may be useful as a means

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of stimulating, extending, and directing inquiry. But they ought not to be hastily framed, nor fondly upheld in the absence of support from facts. They are not to be set up as barriers or stopping places in the path of knowledge, but as way-posts to guide us in the road of observation, and to cheer us with the prospect of speedily arriving at a resting place—at another stage in our journey towards truth. They are to be given only as provisional explanations of the phenomena, and are to be cheerfully abandoned the moment that a more full and satisfactory explanation presents itself.—Reid, *Intell. Powers*, essay i., chap. 3.

I.—V. EGO, SUBJECT.

IDEA (*ἰδέα*, *ἔδος*, *forma*, *species*, image).—"Plato agreed with the rest of the ancient philosophers in this—that all things consist of matter and form; and that the matter of which all things were made, existed from eternity, without form; but he likewise believed that there are eternal forms of all possible things which exist, without matter; and to those eternal and immaterial forms he gave the name of ideas.

"In the Platonic sense, then, *ideas* were the patterns according to which the Deity fashioned the phenomenal or ectypal world."—Sir William Hamilton.

The word is used in this sense by Milton when he says,—

"God saw his works were good,
Answering his fair *idea*."

And by Spenser in the following passage :—

"What time this world's great workmaister did cast,
To make all things such as we now behold,
It seems that He before his eyes had plast
A goodly patterne, to whose perfect mould
He fashioned them as comely as he could,
That now so fair and seemly they appear,
As naught may be amended anywhere.
That wondrous patterne, wheresoe'er it be,
Whether in earth, laid up in secret store,
Or else in heaven, that no man may it see
With sinful eyes, for fear it to deflore,
Is perfect beauty."

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We are accustomed to say that an artificer contemplating the *idea* of anything, as of a chair or bed, makes a chair or bed. But he does not make the *idea* of them. "These forms of things," said Cicero (*Orat.*, c. 3), "Plato called *ideas*, and denied that they were born, but were always contained in reason and intelligence."—Heusde, *Init. Philosoph. Platon.*, tom. ii., pars, 3.

"*Idea* is a bodiless substance, which of itself hath no subsistence, but giveth form and figure to shapeless matter, and becometh the cause that bringeth them into show and evidence. Socrates and Plato supposed that these be substances separate and distinct from matter, howbeit subsisting in the thoughts and imagination of God, that is to say, of mind and understanding. Aristotle admitteth verily these forms and *ideas*, howbeit not separate from matter, as being patterns of all that God hath made. The Stoics, such at least as were of the school of Zeno, have delivered that our thoughts and conceits are the *ideas*."—Plutarch, *Opinions of Philosophers*, ch. 10, fol. 666 of the translation by Holland.

"*Ideæ* sunt principales formæ quædam, vel rationes rerum stabiles, atque incommutabiles, quæ ipsæ formatae non sunt, ac per hoc æternæ ac semper eodem modo sese habentes, quæ in divina intelligentia continentur: et cum ipsæ neque oriantur, neque intereant; secundum eas tamen formari dicitur, quicquid oriri et interire potest, et omne quod oritur et interit."—Augustine, lib. lxxxiii., 99, 46.

"Tu cuncta superno

Ducis ab exemplo, pulchrum pulcherimus ipse

Mundum mente gerens, similique imagine formans."—

Boeth., *De Consol.*, 9.

Tiberghien (*Essai des Connaiss. Hum.*, p. 207), has said,—“Seneca considered *ideas*, according to Plato, as the *eternal exemplars* of things, Cicero as their *form*, Diogenes Laertius as their *cause* and *principle*, Aristotle as *substances*; and in the middle ages and in our day they are *general notions*, in opposition to particular or individual notions. The *ideas* of Plato embrace all

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these meanings. The terms which he employs are ἰδέα and εἶδος to designate the Divine image, the ideal model or type (τύπος) of all things and beings. He also calls them παραδείγματα, αἰτίαι, ἀρχαί, to denote that these eternal exemplars are the principle and cause of the existence and development of all that is in nature. They are also the thoughts of God (νόηματα), who has produced all things according to the type of these *ideas*. And the terms ἐναδεις, μοναδεις, indicate the affinity between the theory of Plato and the numbers of Pythagoras."

In another passage (*Essai des Connais. Hum.*, pp. 33, 34) 'the same author has said, that, "according to the Platonic sense, adopted by Kant and Cousin, *ideas* are as it were the essence and matter of our intelligence. They are not as such, a product or result of intelligence, they are its primitive elements, and at the same time the immediate object of its activity. . . . They are the primary anticipations which the mind brings to all its cognitions, the principles and laws by reason of which it conceives of beings and things. The mind does not create *ideas*, it creates by means of *ideas*. . . . There are two great classes of *ideas*—1. Those which are related in some sense to experience; as the principles of mathematics, notions of figure, magnitude, extension, number, time, and space. 2. Those which are completely independent of all sensible representation, as the *ideas* of good and evil, just and unjust, true or false, fair or deformed."—p. 208.—V.

NOTION.

According to Plato, *ideas* were the only objects of science or true knowledge. Things created being in a state of continual flux, there can be no real knowledge with respect to them. But the divine *ideas* being eternal and unchangeable, are objects of science properly so called. According to Aristotle and the Peripatetics, knowledge, instead of originating or consisting in the contemplation of the eternal *ideas*, types, or forms, according to which all things were created, originated, and consisted in the con-

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templation of the things created, and in the thoughts and the operations of mind to which that contemplation gives rise. But as external things cannot themselves be in the mind, they are made known to it by means of *species*, *images*, or *phantasms* (*q. v.*); so that, in perception, we are not directly cognizant of the object, but only of a representation of it. In like manner, in imagination, memory, and the operations of intellect, what is directly present to the mind is not the real object of thought, but a representation of it.

Instead of employing the various terms *image*, *species*, *phantasm*, &c., of the Peripatetic philosophy, Descartes adopted the term *idea*, which till his time had been all but exclusively employed in its Platonic sense.

By Descartes and subsequent philosophers the term *idea* was employed to signify all our mental representations, all the notions which the mind frames of things. And this, in contradistinction to the Platonic, may be called the modern use of the word. Mr. Locke, for example, who uses the word *idea* so frequently, as to think it necessary to make an apology for doing so, says—"It is the term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding, when a man thinks: I have used it to express whatever is meant by *phantasm*, *notion*, *species*, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking."

Against this modern use of the word *idea*, more especially in reference to the doctrine of *perception* (*q. v.*), Dr. Reid most vehemently protested.—"Modern philosophers," said he (*Intell. Powers*, essay i., ch. 1), "as well as the Peripatetics and Epicureans of old, have conceived that external objects cannot be the immediate objects of our thoughts; that there must be some image of them in the mind itself, in which, as in a mirror, they are seen. And the name *idea*, in the philosophical sense of it, is given to those internal and immediate objects of our thoughts. The external thing is the remote or mediate object; but the *idea*, or image of that object in the mind, is the immediate

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object, without which we would have no perception, no remembrance, no conception of the mediate object.

“When, therefore, in common language, we speak of *having an idea* of anything, we mean no more by that expression than thinking of it. The vulgar allow that this expression implies a mind that thinks, an act of that mind which we call thinking, and an object about which we think. But besides these three, the philosopher conceives that there is a fourth; to wit, the *idea* which is the immediate object. The *idea* is in the mind itself, and can have no existence but in a mind that thinks; but the remote or mediate object may be something external, as the sun or moon; it may be something past or future; it may be something which never existed. This is the philosophical meaning of the word *idea*; and we may observe that this meaning of the word is built upon a philosophical opinion; for if philosophers had not believed that there are such immediate objects of all our thoughts in the mind, they would never have used the word *idea* to express them.

“I shall only add that, although I may have occasion to use the word *idea* in this philosophical sense in explaining the opinions of others, I shall have no occasion to use it in expressing my own, because I believe *ideas*, taken in this sense, to be a mere fiction of philosophers. And in the popular meaning of the word, there is the less occasion to use it, because the English words *thought*, *notion*, *apprehension*, answer the purpose as well as the Greek word *idea*; with this advantage, that they are less ambiguous.”

Now it may be doubted whether in this passage Dr. Reid has correctly understood and explained the meaning of the word *idea* as employed by all modern philosophers. from the time of Descartes.

Dr. Reid takes *idea* to mean something interposed between the mind and the object of its thought—a *tertium quid*, or a *quartum quid*, an independent entity different from the mind and from the object thought of. Now this has been the opinion both of ancient and modern philoso-

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phers ; but it is not the opinion of all. There are many, especially among modern philosophers, who, by the *idea of a thing*, mean the thing itself in the mind as an object of thought. Even when the object thought of is represented to the mind, the representation is a modification of the mind itself, and the act of representing and the act of knowing the object thought of, are one and the same ; the representation and cognition are indivisible. But Dr. Reid does not admit that any of our knowledge is representative. He had such a horror of the doctrine of *ideas*, as meaning something interposed between the mind and the objects of its knowledge, that he calls all our knowledge immediate. Thus he speaks of an immediate knowledge of things past, and of an immediate knowledge of things future. Now all knowledge is present knowledge, that is, it is only knowledge when we have it. But all knowledge is not immediate knowledge. Things that are past are not actually present to the mind when we remember them. Things that are future are not actually present when we anticipate them, for they have as yet no actual existence. But the mind frames to itself a representation of these things as they have been, or as they will be, and in thus representing them has knowledge of them. This knowledge, however, cannot be called immediate. In memory there is the faculty, and there is the object of the faculty or the thing remembered. But the object or the thing remembered is not actually present to the faculty. It is reproduced or represented, and in representing the object to the faculty we have knowledge of it as a past reality. Memory, therefore, may be called a representative faculty. Now, in perception, where the object of the faculty is also present, it may not be necessary for the mind to frame to itself any representation or image of the external reality. The faculty and its object are in direct contact, and the knowledge or perception is the immediate result. This is the doctrine of Dr. Reid, and if he had acknowledged the distinction, he might have called per-

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ception a presentative faculty, as memory is a representative faculty.* According to other philosophers, however, there is a representation even in perception. The external reality is not in the mind. The mind merely frames to itself a representation or image of what the external reality is, and in this way has knowledge of it. But this representation or image is not something interposed or different from the mind and the external object. It is a modification of the mind itself. It is the external object in the mind as an object of thought. It is the *idea* of the external reality. This is a theory of perception which Dr. Reid did not clearly distinguish; but it is at variance with his own, and, if he had distinctly apprehended it, he would have condemned it. In like manner he would have condemned the use of the word *idea* to denote a representative image, even although that representation was held to be merely a modification of mind. But this is the sense in which the term *idea* is used by Descartes, and other philosophers, in reference to the doctrine of perception. In a general sense it means anything present to the mind, whether really or representatively, as an object of thought.†

Ideas, regarded according to the nature and diversity of their objects, are *sensible*, *intellectual*, or *moral*; according to the essential characters of these objects, they are *necessary* and *absolute*, or *contingent* and *relative*; according to the aspect in which they represent things, they are *simple* or *compound*, *abstract* or *concrete*, *individual* or *general*, *partitive* or *collective*; according to their origin or formation, they are *adventitious*, *factitious*, or *innate*; according to their quality or fidelity, they are *true* or *false*, *real* or

* See *Reid's Works*, edited by Sir Will. Hamilton; Note B, Of Presentative and Representative Knowledge; and Note C, Of the Various Theories of External Perception.

† Dr. Currie once, upon being bored by a foolish blue, to tell her the precise meaning of the word *idea* (which she said she had been reading about in some metaphysical work, but could not understand), answered, at last, angrily, "*Idea*, madam, is the feminine of *idiot*, and means a female fool."—Moore, *Diary*, vol. iv., p. 38.

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imaginary, clear or obscure, distinct or confused, complete or incomplete, adequate or inadequate.

As to the origin of our *ideas*, the opinions of metaphysicians may be divided into three classes. 1. Those who deny the senses to be anything more than instruments conveying objects to the mind, perception being active, (Plato and others). 2. Those who attribute all our *ideas* to sense, (Hobbes, Gassendi, Condillac, the ancient Sophists). 3. Those who admit that the earliest notions proceed from the senses, yet maintain that they are not adequate to produce the whole knowledge possessed by the human understanding, (Aristotle, Locke).—Dr. Mill, *Essays*, 314, 321.—

V. INNATE.

See Trendlenburg, *De Ideis Platonis*.

Richter, *De Ideis Platonis*.

Sir William Hamilton, *Discussions on Philosophy*.

Reid's Works, edited by Sir William Hamilton.

Dugald Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, appendix ii.

Adam Smith, *Essays on Philosoph. Subjects*, p. 119, note.

IDEAL.—"Though ideas are widely separated from sensible reality, there is something, if possible, still more widely separated, and that is the *ideal*. A few examples will enable you to comprehend the difference between *ideas* and the *ideal*: Perfection is an *idea*; humanity in all its perfection is an *ideal*; human virtue and wisdom in all their purity are *ideas*; the wisdom of the Stoics is an *ideal*. The *ideal*, then, is the intellectual existence of a thing which has no other characters than those determined by the *idea* itself. The *idea*, thus individualized, so to speak, serves as the rule of our actions; it is a model, which we may approach in a greater or lesser degree, but from which we are nevertheless infinitely distant. We compare, for example, our conduct with the dictates of the monitor, that exists within us. We all judge and correct ourselves with reference to this *ideal*, without the power of ever attaining to its perfection. These ideas, though destitute of any objective reality, cannot be regarded as purely

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chimerical. They furnish a unit of measure to the reason, which requires a conception of what is perfect in each kind, in order to appreciate and measure the various degrees of imperfection. But would you realize the *ideal* in experience as the hero of a romance? It is impossible, and is, besides, a senseless and useless enterprise; for the imperfection of our nature, which ever belies the perfection of the idea, renders all illusion impossible, and makes the good itself, as contemplated in the idea, resemble a fiction.” —Henderson, *The Philosophy of Kant*, p. 119.

“We call attention” says Cousin (*On the Beautiful*), “to two words which continually recur in this discussion—they are, on the one hand, *nature* or *experience*; on the other, *ideal*. Experience is individual or collective; but the collective is resolved into the individual; the *ideal* is opposed to the individual and to collectiveness: it appears as an original conception of the mind. Nature or experience gives me the occasion for conceiving the *ideal*, but the *ideal* is something entirely different from experience or nature; so that, if we apply it to natural, or even to artificial figures, they cannot fill up the condition of the *ideal* conception, and we are obliged to *imagine* them exact. The word *ideal* corresponds to an absolute and independent idea, and not to a collective one.”

“By *ideal* I understand the idea, not in *concreto* but in *individuo*, as an individual thing, *determinable* or *determined* by the idea alone. What I have termed an *ideal*, was in Plato’s philosophy an *idea of the divine mind*—an individual object present to its pure intuition, the most perfect of every kind of possible beings, and the archetype of all phenomenal existences.” —Meiklejohn, *Translation of Kant’s Criticism of Pure Reason*, p. 351.

“I should dread to disfigure the *beautiful ideal* of the memories of illustrious persons with incongruous features, and to sully the imaginative purity of classical works with gross and trivial recollections.”—Wordsworth, *Letter on Burns*.

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When the word *ideal* is used as a noun and qualified by the adjective *beau*, its sense is critical or æsthetic, and has reference to the fine arts, especially to statuary and painting. “The common notion of the *ideal* as exemplified more especially in the painting of the last century, degrades it into a mere abstraction. It was assumed that to raise an object into an *ideal*, you must get rid of everything individual about it. Whereas the true *ideal* is the individual freed from everything that is not individual in it, with all its parts pervaded, and animated, and harmonized by the spirit of life which flows from the centre.”—*Guesses at Truth*, second series, p. 218.

The *ideal* is to be attained by selecting and assembling in one whole the beauties and perfections which are usually seen in different individuals, excluding everything defective or unseemly, so as to form a type or model of the species. Thus, the Apollo Belvedere is the *ideal* of the beauty and proportion of the human frame; the Farnese Hercules is the type of manly strength. The *ideal* can only be attained by following nature. There must be no elements nor combinations but such as nature exhibits; but the elements of beauty and perfection must be disengaged from individuals, and embodied in one faultless whole. This is the empirical account of the *ideal*.

According to Cicero (*Orator.*, c. 2, 3), there is nothing of any kind so fair that there may not be a fairer conceived by the mind. “We can conceive of statues more perfect than those of Phidias. Nor did that artist, when he made the statue of Jupiter or Minerva, contemplate any one individual from which to take a likeness; but there was in his mind a form of beauty, gazing on which he guided his hand and skill in imitation of it.” In the philosophy of Plato this form was called *παράδειγμα*. Seneca (*Epist.*, lviii., sect. 15-18) takes the distinction between *ἰδέα* and *εἶδος*, thus:—when a painter paints a likeness, the original is his *ἰδέα*—the likeness is the *εἶδος* or image. The *εἶδος* is in the work—the *ἰδέα* is out of the work and before the

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work. This distinction is commended by Heusde (*Init. Philosoph. Platon.*, vol. 2, pars 3, p. 105). And he refers to Cicero (*De Invent.*, ii., 1), who states that Zeuxis had five of the most beautiful women of Crotona, as models, from which to make up his picture of a perfect beauty, as illustrating the Platonic sense of *παράδειγμα* or the *ideal*. According to this view, the *beau ideal* is a type of hypothetical perfection contemplated by the mind, but which may never have been realized, how nearly soever it may have been approached in the shape of an actual specimen.

IDEALISM is the doctrine that in external perceptions the objects immediately known are ideas. It has been held under various forms.—See Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note C; Berkeley, *Works*; Sir W. Drummond, *Academic Questions*; Reid, *Inquiry*.

Some of the phases of modern *idealism* among the Germans, may be seen in the following passage from Lewes, *Biograph. Hist. of Philosoph.*, vol. iv., p. 209:—"I see a tree. The common psychologists tell me that there are three things implied in this one fact of vision, viz.: a tree, an image of that tree, and a mind which apprehends that image. Fichte tells me that it is I alone who exist. The tree and the image of it are one thing, and that is a modification of my mind. This is *subjective idealism*. Schelling tells me that both the tree and my *ego* (or self), are existences equally real or ideal; but they are nothing less than manifestations of the absolute, the infinite, or unconditioned. This is *objective idealism*. But Hegel tells me that all these explanations are false. The only thing really existing (in this one fact of vision) is the idea, the relation. The *ego* and the tree are but two terms of the relation, and owe their reality to it. This is *absolute idealism*. According to this there is neither mind nor matter, heaven nor earth, God nor man.—V. **NIHILISM**. The only real existences are certain ideas or relations. Everything else that has name or being derives its name and being from its constituting one or other of the two related terms, subject and

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object; but the only thing that is true or real is the identity of their contradiction, that is, the relation itself."

The doctrine opposed to *idealism* is *realism*, *q. v.* See also PERCEPTION.

IDEALIST.—"In England, the word *idealist* is most commonly restricted to such as (with Berkeley) reject the existence of a material world. Of late its meaning has been sometimes extended (particularly since the publication of Reid) to all those who retain the theory of Descartes and Locke, concerning the immediate objects of our perceptions and thoughts, whether they admit or reject the consequences deduced from this theory by the Berkeleian. In the present state of the science, it would contribute much to the distinctness of our reasonings were it to be used in this last sense exclusively."—Stewart, *Dissert.*, part ii., 166, note.

IDENTICAL PROPOSITION.—"It is Locke, I believe, who introduced, or at least gave currency to the expression *identical proposition*, in philosophic language. It signifies a judgment, a proposition, in which an idea is affirmed by itself, or in which we affirm of a thing what we already know of it."—Cousin, *Hist. of Mod. Philosoph.*, lect. xxiv. Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iv., chap. 8, sect. 3.

A proposition is called *identical* whenever the attribute is contained in the subject, so that the subject cannot be conceived as not containing the attribute. Thus, when you say body is solid, I say that you make an *identical proposition*, because it is impossible to have the idea of body without that of solidity.

IDENTISM or IDENTITY (*idem*, the same)—or the doctrine of absolute *identity*, teaches that the two elements of thought, objective and subjective, are absolutely one; that matter and mind are opposite poles of the same infinite substance; and that creation and the Creator are one. This is the philosophy of Schelling. It coincides ultimately with *Pantheism*, *q. v.*

"If the doctrine of *identity* means anything, it means

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that thought and being are essentially one; that the process of *thinking* is virtually the same as the process of *creating*: that in constructing the universe by logical deduction, we do virtually the same thing as Deity accomplished in developing himself in all the forms and regions of creation: that every man's reason, therefore, is really God; in fine, that Deity is the whole sum of consciousness immanent in the world."—Morell, *Hist. of Philosoph.*, vol. ii., p. 127.

IDENTITY means sameness. *Unity* is opposed to division, *identity* to distinction. A thing is *one* when it is not divided into others. A thing is the *same* when it is not distinguishable from others, whether it be divided from them or not. *Unity* denies the divisibleness of a thing in itself. *Identity* denies the divisibleness of a thing from itself, or from that with which it is said to be the same. It is unity with persistence and continuity; unity perceived even in plurality; in multiplicity and succession, in diversity and change. It is the essential characteristic of all substance or being, that it is one and endures.

Unorganized matter may be said to have *identity* in the persistence of the parts or molecules of which it consists. Organized bodies have *identity* so long as organization and life remain. An oak, which from a small plant becomes a great tree, is still the same tree.—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., ch. 27, sect. 3.

IDENTITY (Personal).—"What is called *personal identity*, is our being the same persons from the commencement to the end of life; while the matter of the body, the dispositions, habits, and thoughts of the mind, are continually changing. We feel and know that we are the same. This notion or persuasion of *personal identity* results from memory. If a man loses all recollection of his early life, he continues, nevertheless, actually the same person."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

Dr. Brown (lecture xi.) changes the phrase *personal identity* into *mental identity*. Locke says (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., ch. 27)—"To find wherein *personal*

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identity consists we must consider what person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places."

This looks like confining *personal identity* to the mind. But Leibnitz (in his *Theodicée*, p. 172) called it a "metaphysical communication by which soul and body make up one *suppositum*, which we call a person." In a *Review of the Doctrine of Personal Identity*, p. 73, 8vo, London, 1827, it has been proposed to define it as "the continuation of the same organization of animal life in a human creature possessing an intelligent mind, that is, one endowed with the ordinary faculties of reason and memory, without reference to the original formation or constitution of that mind, whether it be material or immaterial, or whether it survives or perishes with the body. Or, more shortly, it may be said *personal identity* consists in the same thinking intelligent substance united to the same human body. By the same human body, however, is not meant of the same particles of matter, but of the same human structure and form."—V. PERSONALITY.

Locke makes *personal identity* consist in consciousness. "Consciousness is inseparable from thinking; and since it is so, and is *that* which makes every one to be what he calls *self*, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking beings, in *this alone consists personal identity*, *i. e.*, the sameness of a rational being. And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the *identity* of that person."—*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., ch. 27.

But it has been remarked that "Consciousness, without any regard to a sameness of the thinking intelligent substance, cannot constitute *personal identity*. For, then, a disordered imagination might make *one man* become *two*, or even *twenty persons*, whose actions he should imagine himself to have performed. And if a man forgets and loses all consciousness of having done certain actions, he will then

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not be the same person who did them.”—Whitehead, *On Materialism*, p. 79.

Consciousness merely ascertains or indicates *personal identity*, but does not constitute it. Consciousness presupposes *personal identity* as knowledge presupposes truth.

See Butler, *Dissertation on Personal Identity*.

Reid, *Intellect. Powers*, essay iii., ch. 6, with note.

Stewart, *Philosoph. of Hum. Mind*, part ii., ch. 1, sect. 2.

IDENTITY (Principle of).—It is usually expressed thus—a thing is what it is, and not another. So that it amounts to the same as the principle of *contradiction*, *q. v.* In Logic it is expressed thus—conceptions which agree can be in thought united, or affirmed of the same subject at the same time.

IDEOLOGY or IDEALOGY.—The analysis of the human mind by Destutt de Tracy, published about the end of last century, was entitled “*Elemens d’Idealogie*,” and the word has come to be applied to the philosophy of the sensational school, or the followers of Condillac—as Cabanis, Garat, and Volney. Of this school, De Tracy is the metaphysician; Cabanis (*Rapports du Physique et de Moral de l’Homme*) is the physiologist; and Volney (*Catechism du Citoyen Francais*) is the moralist. The followers of this school were leading members of the *Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques*, and also took an active share in political assemblies. Their doctrines and movements were contrary to the views of Napoleon, who showed his dislike by suppressing the *Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques*. But the members of the school kept up their doctrines and their meetings, and it was on the motion of De Tracy that the Senate decreed the abdication of the emperor in 1814.—Damiron, *Hist. de Philosoph. en France au 19 siecle*.

“For Locke and his whole school, the study of the understanding is the study of ideas; hence the recent and celebrated expression *ideology*, to designate the science of the human understanding. The source of this expression is in the *Essay on the Hum. Understanding*, and the ideological

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school is the natural offspring of Locke.”—Cousin, *Hist. of Mod. Philosoph.*, lect. 16.

“By a double blunder in philosophy and Greek, *ideologie* (for *idealogie*), a word which could only *properly* suggest an *à priori* scheme, deducing our knowledge from the intellect, has in France become the name peculiarly distinctive of that philosophy of mind which exclusively derives our knowledge from sensation.”—Sir W. Hamilton, *Edin. Rev.*, Octr., 1830, p. 182.

“Destutt de Tracy has distinguished Condillac by the title of *the father of ideology*.”—Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, essay iii.

IDIOSYNCRASY (*ἰδιος*, *proprius*, and *συν κρᾶσις*, *com-mixtio*)—means a peculiar temperament of mind or of body. “The soul in its first and pure nature hath no *idiosyncrasies*, that is, hath no *proper natural inclinations*, which are not competent to others of the same kind and condition.” Glanville, *Pre-existence of Souls*, c. 10. It is seen, however, that different persons of the same kind and condition may soon manifest different inclinations—which if not natural are partly so, and are traced to some peculiarity in their *temperament*, as well as to the effect of circumstances.

Sir Thomas Brown (*Vulgar Errors*, book iii., chap. 28), asks, “Whether quails from any *idiosyncrasy* or peculiarity of constitution do invariably feed upon hellebore, or rather sometimes but medically use the same?” In like manner some men are violently affected by honey and coffee, which have no such effects on others. This is bodily *idiosyncrasy*. *Sympathy*, and *antipathy*, *q. v.*, when peculiar, may be traced to *idiosyncrasy*.

Mr. Stewart in the conclusion of part second of his *Philosoph. of Hum. Mind*, says he uses temperament as synonymous with *idiosyncrasy*.—V. TEMPERAMENT.

IDOL (*εἰδωλον*, from *εἶδος*, an image).—Something set up in place of the true and the real. Hence Lord Bacon (*De Augment. Scient.*, lib. iv., cap. 5) calls those false appearances by which men are led into error, *idols*. “I do find, therefore, in this enchanted glass four *idols*, or false appear-

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ances, of several distinct sorts, every sort comprehending many subdivisions: the first sort I call *idols* of the nation or tribe; the second, *idols* of the den or cave; the third, *idols* of the forum; and the fourth, *idols* of the theatre.”—*De Interpretatione Naturæ*, sect. 39.

Reid, *Intell. Powers*, essay vi., chap. 8.—V. PREJUDICE.

IGNORANCE, in morals and jurisprudence, may respect the law or the action, and is distinguished into *ignorantia juris*, and *ignorantia facti*.

In respect of the action, *ignorance* is called *efficacious* or *concomitant*, according as the removal* of it would, or would not, prevent the action from being done. In respect of the agent, *ignorance* is said to be *vincible* or *invincible*, according as it can, or cannot, be removed, by the use of accessible means of knowledge.

Vincible ignorance is distinguished into *affected* or *wilful*; by which the means of knowing are perversely rejected; and *supine* or *crass*; by which the means of knowing are indolently or stupidly neglected.

Ignorance is said to be *invincible* in two ways—in *itself*, and also in *its cause*; as when a man knows not what he does, through disease of body or of mind. *In itself*, but not in *its cause*; as when a man knows not what he does, through intoxication or passion.

ILLATION (*illatum*, from *inferre*, to bring in)—or “*inference* consists in nothing but the perception of the connection there is between the *ideas* in each step of the deduction, whereby the mind comes to see either the certain agreement or disagreement of any two *ideas*, as in demonstration, in which it arrives at knowledge; or their probable connection on which it withholds its assent, as in opinion.”—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. iv., c. 17.—V. INFERENCE, INDUCTION.

* Aristotle (*Ethic.*, lib. iii., cap. 1) takes a difference between an action done through *ignorance* (δὲξ ἄγνοιας), and an action done *ignorantly* (ἄγνοῶν). In the former case the ignorance is the direct cause of the action, in the latter case it is an accident or concomitant.

IMAGINATION.—"Nihil aliud est *imaginari* quam rei corporeæ figuram seu imaginem contemplari."—Descartes, *Medit. Secunda*.

Mr. Addison says (*Spectator*, No. 411), "The pleasures of *imagination* are such as arise from visible objects, since it is the sense of sight that furnishes the *imagination* with its ideas." Dr. Reid says:—" *Imagination*, in its proper sense, signifies a lively conception of objects of sight. It is distinguished from conception as a part, from a whole." But a much wider signification has been given to the word by others.

" *Imagination* or *phantasy*, in its most extensive meaning, is the faculty *representative* of the phenomena, both of the external and internal worlds."—Sir William Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note B, sect. 1.

"By *imagination* we mean, in a comprehensive sense, that operation of the mind by which it (1) *receives*, (2) *retains*, (3) *recals*, and (4) *combines*, according to higher laws the ideal *images* furnished to it by the cænesthesia and by the senses; for all these acts are manifestly links of one chain. At the first step, we usually call this operation,* the faculty of conception; at the second, memory; at the third, reproductive fancy, and at the fourth, productive fancy."—Feuchtersleben, *Med. Psychol.*, p. 120. 8vo, 1847.

"In the language of modern philosophy, the word *imagination* seems to denote—first, the power of apprehending or conceiving ideas, simply as they are in themselves, without any view to their reality; secondly, the power of combining into new forms or assemblages, those thoughts, ideas, or notions, which we have derived from experience or from information. These two powers, though distinguishable, are not essentially different."—Beattie, *Dissert., Of Imagination*, chap. 1.

" *Imagination*, as *reproductive*, stores the mind with ideal

* "It would be well, if, instead of speaking of the *powers of the mind* (which causes a misunderstanding), we adhered to the designation of the several *operations of one mind*; which most psychologists recommend, but in the sequel forget."

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images, constructed through the medium of attention and memory, out of our immediate perceptions. These images when laid up in the mind, form *types* with which we can compare any new phenomena we meet with, and which help us to begin the important work of reducing our experience to some appreciable degree of unity.

“To understand the nature of *productive* or *creative imagination*, we must suppose the reproductive process to be already in full operation, that is, we must suppose a number of ideas to be already formed and stored up within the mind. . . . They may now be combined together so as to form new images, which, though composed of the elements given in the original representations, yet are *now* purely mental creations of our own. Thus I may have an image of a rock in my mind, and another image of a diamond. I combine these two together and create the purely ideal representation of a diamond rock.”—Morell, *Psychol.*, pp. 175, 176. 8vo, Lond., 1853.

IMAGINATION and FANCY.—“A man has *imagination* in proportion as he can distinctly copy in idea the impressions of sense; it is the faculty which *images* within the mind the phenomena of sensation. A man has *fancy* in proportion as he can call up, connect, or associate at pleasure, these internal images (*Φανταζεσθαι*, is to cause to appear) so as to complete ideal representations of absent objects. *Imagination* is the power of depicting, and *fancy*, of evoking or combining. The *imagination* is formed by patient observation; the *fancy*, by a voluntary activity in shifting the scenery of the mind. The more accurate the *imagination*, the more safely may a painter, or a poet, undertake a delineation or description, without the presence of the objects to be characterized. The more versatile the *fancy*, the more original and striking will be the decorations produced.”—Taylor, *Synonyms*.

Wordsworth (Preface to his *Works*, vol. i., 12mo, Lond., 1836) finds fault with the foregoing discrimination, and says, “It is not easy to find how *imagination* thus ex-

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plained, differs from distinct remembrance of images; or *fancy*, from quick and vivid recollection of them: each is nothing more than a mode of memory." According to Wordsworth, "*imagination*, in the sense of the poet, has no reference to images that are merely a faithful copy, existing in the mind, of absent external objects; but is a word of higher import, denoting operations of the mind upon these objects, and processes of creation or composition governed by fixed laws."

"It is the divine attribute of the *imagination*, that it is irrepressible, unconfined; that when the real world is shut out, it can create a world for itself, and with a necromantic power, can conjure up glorious shapes and forms, and brilliant visions to make solitude populous, and irradiate the gloom of the dungeon."—W. Irving, *Sketch Book*.

"And as *imagination* bodies forth
The form of things unknown, the poet's pen
Turns them to shapes, and gives to nothing
A local habitation and a name.

To *imagine* in this high and true sense of the word, is to realize the ideal, to make intelligible truths descend into the forms of sensible nature, to represent the invisible by the visible, the infinite by the finite. In this view of it, *imagination* may be regarded as the *differentia* of man—the distinctive mark which separates him *a grege mutorum*. That the inferior animals have memory, and what has been called *passive imagination*, is proved by the fact that they dream—and that in this state the sensuous impressions made on them during their waking hours, are reproduced. But they show no trace of that higher faculty or function which transcends the sphere of sense, and which out of elements supplied by things seen and temporal, can create new objects, the contemplation of which lifts us to the infinite and the unseen, and gives us thoughts which wander through eternity. High art is highly metaphysical, and whether it be in poetry or music, in painting or in sculpture, the triumph of the artist lies not in presenting us

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with an exact transcript of things that may be seen, or heard, or handled in the world around us, but in carrying us across the gulf which separates the phenomenal from the real, and placing us in the presence of the truly *beautiful*, and surrounding us with an atmosphere more pure than that which the sun enlightens.

IMAGINATION and CONCEPTION.—"The business of *conception*," says Mr. Stewart (*Philosoph. of Hum. Mind*, chap. 3), "is to present us with an exact transcript of what we have felt or perceived. But we have, moreover, a power of modifying our *conceptions*, by combining the parts of different ones together, so as to form new wholes of our own creation. I shall employ the word *imagination* to express this power, and I apprehend that this is the proper sense of the word; if *imagination* be the power which gives birth to the productions of the poet and the painter. This is not a simple faculty of the mind. It presupposes abstraction to separate from each other qualities and circumstances which have been perceived in conjunction; and also judgment and taste to direct us in forming the combinations." And he adds (chap. 6), "The operations of *imagination* are by no means confined to the materials which *conception* furnishes, but may be equally employed about all the subjects of our knowledge."—*V. CONCEPTION, FANCY.*

See Hunt, *Imagination and Fancy*.

Wordsworth, *Preface to Lyrical Ballads*.

Edin. Review for April, 1842, article on Moore's *Poems*.

Akenside, *Pleasures of Imagination*.

IMITATION (Latin, *imitor*, *quasi mimitor*, from the Greek *μιμουμαι*, the initial *μ* omitted, *Vossius*).—"is a facultie to expresse livelie and perfitelie that example, which ye go about to folow."—Ascham, *The Schulemaster*, b. ii.

As a social and improveable being, man has been endowed with a propensity to do as he sees others do. This propensity manifests itself in the first instance spontaneously or instinctively. Children try to follow the gestures and movements of others, before their muscles are ready to

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obey, and imitate sounds which they hear, before their voice is able to do so. Mr. Stewart has made a distinction (*Philosoph. of Hum. Mind*, vol. iii., chap. 2) between the *propensity* and the *power of imitation*. Both are peculiarly strong and lively in children, and answer the most important purposes. But the propensity to imitate what others do and the manner of doing it continues throughout life, and requires to be carefully watched and properly directed.

And man not only imitates his fellow-creatures, but tries to copy nature in all her departments. In the fine arts he imitates the forms which strike and please him. And the germ of some of the highest discoveries in science has been found in attempts to copy the movements and processes of nature.—Reid, *Act. Powers*, essay iii., part 1, chap. 2.

IMMANENT (from *in manere*, to remain in)—means that which does not pass out of a certain subject or certain limits. “Logicians distinguish two kinds of operations of the mind; the first kind produces no effect without the mind, the last does. The first they call *immanent* acts; the second *transitive*. All intellectual operations belong to the first class; they produce no effect upon any external object.”—Reid, *Intell. Powers*, essay ii., chap. 14.

“Even some voluntary acts, as attention, deliberation, purpose, are also *immanent*.” — *Correspondence of Dr. Reid*, p. 81.

“Conceiving, as well as projecting or resolving, are what the schoolmen called *immanent* acts of the mind, which produce nothing beyond themselves. But painting is a *transitive* act, which produces an effect distinct from the operation, and this effect is the picture.”—Reid, *Intell. Powers*, essay iv., chap. 1.

The logical sense assigned to this word by Kant, is somewhat different. According to him we make an *immanent* and valid use of the forms of the understanding, and conceive of the matter, furnished by the senses, accord-

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ing to our notions, of time and space. But when we try to lift ourselves above experience and phenomena, and to conceive of things as they are in themselves, we are making a *transcendent* and illegitimate use of our faculties.

With moralists an *immanent* act is one which has no effect on anything out of the agent. Sensation is an *immanent* act of the senses—cognition of the intellect. A *transient* act produces an effect or result out of, and beyond the agent; as the act of writing, or of building.

Theologians say, God the Father generated the Son by an *immanent* act, but he created the world by a *transient* act.

The doctrine of Spinoza (*Ethic.*, pars, 1, pref. 18) is, Deus est omnium rerum causa *immanens*, non vero *transiens*,—that is, all that exists, exists in God; and there is no difference in substance between the universe and God.

Acts of the will are distinguished as *elicit* and *imperate*,—*q. v.*

“ We are deceived, when, judging the infinite essence by our narrow selves, we ascribe *intellections, volitions, decrees, purposes*, and such like *immanent actions* to that nature which hath nothing in common with us, as being infinitely above us.”—Glanville, *Vanity of Dogmatising*, edit. 1661, p. 101.

IMMATERIALISM is the doctrine of Bishop Berkeley, that there is no material substance, and that all being may be reduced to mind, and ideas in a mind.

Swift, in a letter to Lord Carteret, of date 3d September, 1724, speaking of Berkeley, says, “ Going to England very young, about thirteen years ago, he became founder of a sect there, called the *immaterialists*, by the force of a very curious book upon that subject.”

“ In the early part of his own life, he (Dr. Reid) informs us that he was actually a convert to the scheme of *immaterialism*; a scheme which he probably considered as of a perfectly inoffensive tendency, so long as he conceived the existence of the material world to be the only point in dispute.” This passage is quoted by Richardson in his

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Dict. as occurring in Stewart's *Philosoph. of Hum. Mind*, c. 1, s. 3. Dr. Reid's acknowledging that he once believed the doctrine of ideas is in *Intell. Powers*, essay ii., chap. 10.

A work published a few years ago in defence of Berkeley's doctrine, was entitled *Immaterialism*; and a prize offered to any one who would refute the reasoning of it.

IMMATERIALITY is predicated of mind, to denote that as a substance it is different from *matter*. *Spirituality* is the positive expression of the same idea. *Simplicity* is also used in the same sense. *Matter* is made up of parts into which it can be resolved. *Mind* is simple and has no parts, and so cannot be dissolved. The materiality of the soul was maintained by Tertullian, Arnobius, and others, during the three first centuries. At the end of the fourth, the *immateriality* of the soul was professed by Augustin, Nemesius, and Mamertius Claudienus.—Guizot, *Hist. of Civilizat.*, vol. i., p. 394.

IMMORTALITY (OF THE SOUL)—is one of the doctrines of natural religion. At death the body dies, and is dissolved into its elements. The soul being distinct from the body, is not affected by the dissolution of the body. How long, or in what state it may survive after the death of the body, is not intimated by the term *immortality*. But the arguments to prove that the soul survives the body, all go to favour the belief that it will live for ever.

See Plato, *Phædon*; Porteous, *Sermons*; Sherlock, *On the Immortality of the Soul*; Watson, *Intimations of a Future State*; Bakewell, *Evidence of a Future State*; Autenrieth, *On Man, and his Hope of Immortality*, Tubingen, 1815.

IMMUTABILITY is the absence or impossibility of change. It is applied to the Supreme Being to denote that there can be no inconstancy in his character or government. It was argued for by the heathens. See Bishop Wilkins, *Natural Religion*.

IMPENETRABILITY is one of the primary qualities of matter, in virtue of which the same portion of space cannot at the same time be occupied by more than one portion of

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matter. It is extension, or the quality of occupying space. A nail driven into a board does not *penetrate* the wood ; it merely separates and displaces the particles. Things are *penetrable*, when two or more can exist in the same space—as two angels ; *impenetrable*, when not—as two stones.

IMPERATE.—V. ELICIT.

IMPERATIVE (CATEGORICAL, THE)—is the phrase employed by Kant, to denote that the moral law is absolute and obligatory. The practical reason speaks to us in the *categorical imperative*,—that is, in seeing an action to be right, we see, at the same time, that we ought to do it. And this sense of obligation springs from no view of the consequences of the action, as likely to be beneficial, but is a primitive and absolute idea of the reason ; involving, according to Kant, the power to obey, or not to obey. We are under obligation, therefore we are free. Moral obligation implies freedom.

IMPOSSIBLE (THE)—or that which cannot be, has been distinguished as the *metaphysically* or absolutely *impossible*, or that which implies a contradiction, as to make a square circle, or two straight lines to enclose a space ; *the physically impossible*—the miraculous, or that which cannot be brought about by merely physical causes, or in accordance with the laws of nature, as the death of the soul ; and *the ethically impossible*, or that which cannot be done without going against the dictates of right reason, or the enactments of law, or the feelings of propriety. That which is *morally impossible*, is that against the occurrence of which there is the highest probable evidence—as that the dice should turn up the same number a hundred successive times.—Whately, *Logic*, append. i.

“It may be as *really impossible* for a person in his senses, and without any motive urging him to it, to drink poison, as it is for him to prevent the effects of it after drinking it ; but who sees not these impossibilities to be totally different in their foundation and meaning ? or what good reason can there be against calling the one a *moral* and the other a *natural* impossibility ?”—Price, *Review*, chap. 10, p. 431.

IMPRESSION (*in premere*, to press in, or on)—is the term employed to denote the change on the nervous system arising from a communication between an external object and a bodily organ. It is obviously borrowed from the effect which one piece of matter which is hard has, if pressed upon another piece of matter which is softer; as the seal leaving its impression or configuration upon the wax. It is not intended, however, to convey any affirmation as to the nature of the change which is effected in the nervous system, or as to the nature of sensation; and still less to confound this preliminary change with the sensation itself. The term *impression*, is also applied to the effects produced upon the higher sensibility, or our sentiments. Thus, we speak of moral *impressions*, religious *impressions*, *impressions* of sublimity and beauty.

Hume divided all modifications of mind into *impressions* and *ideas*. Ideas were *impressions* when first received; and became *ideas* when remembered and reflected on. See Reid, *Intell. Powers*, essay i., chap. 1.

“Mr. Stewart (*Philosoph. of Hum. Mind*, vol. iii., addenda to vol. i., p. 43), seems to think that the word *impression* was first introduced as a *technical* term, into the philosophy of mind, by Hume. This is not altogether correct; for, besides the instances which Mr. Stewart himself adduces, of the illustration attempted, of the phenomena of memory from the analogy of an *impress* and a *trace*, words corresponding to *impression* were among the ancients familiarly applied to the processes of external perception, imagination, &c., in the Atomistic, the Platonic, the Aristotelian, and the Stoical philosophies; while, among modern psychologists (as Descartes and Gassendi), the term was likewise in common use.”—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 294, note.

Dr. Reid (*Intell. Powers*, essay ii.), distinguishes the *impressions* made on the organs of sense into *mediate* and *immediate*. The *impressions* made on the sense of touch are *immediate*, the external body and the organ being in contact. The *impressions* made on the ear by sounding

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bodies are *mediate*, requiring the air and the vibrations of the air to give the sensation of hearing, It may be questioned whether this distinction is well or deeply founded. See Dr. Young, *Intell. Philosoph.*, p. 71. Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 104.

IMPULSE and IMPULSIVE (*in-pellere*, to drive on)—are used in contradistinction to *reason* and *rational*, to denote the influence of appetite and passion as differing from the authority of reason and conscience. "It may happen, that when appetite draws one way, it may be opposed, not by any appetite or passion, but by some cool principle of action, which has authority without any *impulsive* force.—Reid, *Act. Powers*, essay iii., pt. 2, chap. 1.

"Passion often gives a violent *impulse* to the will, and makes a man do what he knows he shall repent as long as he lives."—*Ibid*, chap. 6.

INCLINATION (*in-clinare*, to lean towards)—is a form or degree of natural desire. It is synonymous with propensity or with the *penchant* of the French. It is more allied to affection than to appetite. "It does not appear that in things so intimately connected with the happiness of life, as marriage and the choice of an employment, parents have any right to force the *inclinations* of their children."—Beattie, *Mor. Science*, vol. ii., part 2.—*V. DISPOSITION, TENDENCY.*

INDEFINITE (*in* or *non-definitum*, that which is not limited)—means that, the limits of which are not determined, or at least not so determined as to be apprehended by us. The *definite* is that of which the form and limits are determined and apprehended by us. That of which we know not the limits comes to be regarded as having none; and hence *indefinite* has been confounded with the *infinite*. But they ought to be carefully distinguished. The *infinite* is absolute; it is that of which we not only know not the limits, but which has and can have no limit. The *indefinite* is that of which there is no limit fixed. You can suppose it enlarged or diminished, but still it is finite.—*V. INFINITE.*

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Leibnitz, *Discours de la Conformité de la Foi et de la Raison*, sect. 70.

Descartes, *Princip. Philosoph.* 1 pars, c. 26 et 27.

INDIFFERENCE (Liberty of)—is that state of mind in which the will is not influenced or moved to choose or to refuse an object, but is equally ready to do either. It is also called liberty of contrariety. It should rather be called liberty of indetermination, or that state in which the mind is when it has not determined to do one of two or more things.—*V. LIBERTY, WILL.*

INDIFFERENT.—An action in morals is said to be *indifferent*, that is, neither right nor wrong, when, *considered in itself* or *in specie*, it is neither contrary nor conformable to any moral law or rule; as, to bow the head. Such an action becomes right or wrong, when the end for which it is done, or the circumstances in which it is done are considered. It is then regarded in *individuo*; as, to bow the head, in token of respect, or in a temple, in token of adoration.

INDIFFERENTISM or IDENTISM, *q. v.*, is sometimes employed to denote the philosophy of Schelling, according to which there is no difference between the real and the ideal, or the idea and the reality, or rather that the idea is the reality.

INDIVIDUAL, INDIVIDUALISM, INDIVIDUALITY, INDIVIDUATION (from *in* or *non* and *dividere*, to divide), **Individual** was defined by Porphyry—*Id cujus proprietates alteri simul convenire non possunt.*

“An object which is, in the strict and primary sense, one, and cannot be logically divided, is called *individual*.”
—Whately, *Logic*, b. ii., ch. 5, sect. 5.

An *individual* is not absolutely indivisible, but that which cannot be divided without losing its name and distinctive qualities, that which cannot be parted into several other things of the same nature as the *individual* whole. A stone or a piece of metal may be separated into parts, each of which shall continue to have the same qualities as the

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whole. But a plant or an animal when separated into parts loses its *individuality*; which is not retained by any of the parts. We do not ascribe *individuality* to brute matter. But what is that which distinguishes one organized being, or one living being, or one thinking being from all others? This is the question so much agitated by the schoolmen, concerning the principle of *individuation*. In their barbarous Latin it was called *Hæcceietas*, that is, that in virtue of which we say *this* and not *that*; or *Ecceietas*, that of which we say, lo! here, and not anywhere else. Peter, as an *individual*, possesses many properties which are *quid-dative*, or common to him with others, such as *substantialitas*, *corporeietas*, *animalitas*, *humanitas*. But he has also a reality, which may be called *Petreibetas* or *Peterness*, which marks all the others with a difference, and constitutes him Peter. It is the *Hæcceietas* which constitutes the principle of *individuation*. It was divided into the *extrinsic* and *intrinsic*.

The number of properties which constituted an *individuum extrinsecum*, are enumerated in the following versicle:—

*Forma, figura, locus, tempus, cum nomine, sanguis,
Patria, sunt septem, quæ non habet unum et alter.*

You may call Socrates a philosopher, bald, big-bellied, the son of Sophroniscus, an Athenian, the husband of Xantippe, &c., any one of which properties might belong to another man; but the congeries of all these is not to be found but in Socrates.

The *intrinsic* principle of *individuation*, was the ultimate reality of the being—*ipsa rei entitas*. In physical substances, the *intrinsic principle of individuation* is *ipsa materia et forma cum unione*.

Hutcheson has said (*Metaphys.*, pars 1, chap. iii.), “Si quæretur de causa cur res sit una, aut de Individuationis principio in re ipsa; non aliud assignandum, quam ipsa rei natura existens. Quæcunque enim causa rem quam-

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libet fecerat aut creaverat, eam unam etiam fecerat, aut individuum, quo sensu volunt Metaphysici.”

Leibnitz has a dissertation, *De principio Individuationis*, which has been thought to favour nominalism. Yet he maintained that *individual* substances have a real positive existence, independent of any thinking subject.

Individuality, like personal identity, belongs properly to intelligent and responsible beings. Consciousness reveals it to us that no being can be put in our place, nor confounded with us, nor we with others. We are one and indivisible.

“*Individuality* is scarcely to be found among the inferior animals. When it is, it has been acquired or taught. *Individuality* is not *individualism*. The latter refers everything to self, and sees nothing but self in all things. *Individuality* consists only in willing to be self, in order to be something.”—Vinet, *Essais de Philosophie*, Mor. Par., 1847, p. 142.

But in the *Elements of Individualism*, by William Maccall, 8vo, Lond., 1847, the word *individualism* is used in the sense assigned above to *individuality*.

INDUCTION (Method or Process of) (ἐπαγωγή, *inductio*).—

“It has been said that Aristotle attributed the *discovery* of *induction* to Socrates, deriving the word ἐπαγωγή from the Socratic accumulation of instances serving as antecedents to establish the requisite conclusion.”—Devey, *Logic*, p. 151, note.

“*Inductio* est argumentum quo ex plurium singularium recensione aliquid universale concluditur.”—Le Grand, *Instit. Philosoph.*, p. 57, edit. 1675.

Inductio est argumentum quo probatur quid verum esse de quopiam generali, ex eo quod verum sit de particularibus omnibus, saltem de tot ut sit credibile.—Wallis, *Instit. Log.*, p. 198, 4th edit.

Induction is a kind of argument which infers, respecting a whole class, what has been ascertained respecting one or more individuals of that class.—Whately, *Logic*, book ii., chap. 5, sect. 5.

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“When from the observation of a number of individual instances, we ascend to a general proposition, or when, by combining a number of general propositions, we conclude from them another proposition still more general, the process which is substantially the same in both instances, is called *induction*. . . . When the conclusion is more general than the largest of the premisses, the argument is called *induction*; when less general or equally general, it is *ratiocination*.”—Mill, *Logic*, 2d edit., vol. i., pp. 223, 224.

“*Induction* is that operation of mind by which we infer that what we know to be true in a particular case or cases, will be true in all cases which resemble the former in certain assignable respects. In other words, *induction* is the process by which we conclude that what is true of certain individuals of a class, is true of the whole class, or that what is true at certain times will be true under similar circumstances at all times.”—Mill, *Logic*, iii., ii., i.

“*Induction* is usually defined to be the process of drawing a general rule from a sufficient number of particular cases; *deduction* is the converse process of proving that some property belongs to the particular case from the consideration that it belongs to the whole class in which the case is found. That all bodies tend to fall towards the earth is a truth which we have obtained from examining a number of bodies coming under our notice, by *induction*; if from this general principle we argue that the stone we throw from our hand will show the same tendency, we adopt the *deductive* method. . . . More exactly, we may define the *inductive* method as the process of discovering laws and rules from facts, and causes from effects; and the *deductive*, as the method of deriving facts from laws and effects from their causes.”—Thomson, *Outline of the Laws of Thought*, 2d edit., pp. 321, 323.

In the process of *induction*, Bacon recommends the construction of — 1. *Tabulæ præsentivæ*, that is, we should extend observation and enumerate the circumstances in which a phenomenon has taken place, so as to separate the

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accidental from the essential. 2. *Tabulæ absentiæ*, that is, cases in which the phenomenon has not taken place, and thus ascend from the particular to the general conditions under which it occurs. 3. *Tabulæ comparationis*, that is, comparative tables in which the determining causes are ascertained and compared, and perhaps reduced to a higher cause or law.

According to Sir William Hamilton (*Discussions on Philosophy, &c.*, p. 156), "*Induction* has been employed to designate three very different operations—1. The objective process of investigating particular facts, as preparatory to *induction*, which is not a process of reasoning of any kind. 2. A material illation of a universal from a singular, as warranted either by the general analogy of nature, or the special presumptions afforded by the object matter of any real science. 3. A formal illation of a universal from the individual, as legitimated solely by the laws of thought, and abstracted from the conditions of any 'particular matter.' The second of these is the *inductive* method of Bacon, which proceeds by way of rejections and conclusions, so as to arrive at those axioms or general laws from which we infer by way of synthesis other particulars unknown to us, and perhaps placed beyond reach of direct examination. Aristotle's definition coincides with the third, and '*induction* is an inference drawn from all the particulars' (*Prior Analyt.*, ii., c. 23). The second and third have been confounded. But the second is not a logical process at all, since the conclusion is not necessarily inferrible from the premiss, for the *some* of the antecedent does not necessarily legitimate the *all* of the conclusion, notwithstanding that the procedure may be warranted by the material problem of the science or the fundamental principles of the human understanding. The third alone is properly an *induction* of Logic; for Logic does not consider things, but the general forms of thought under which the mind conceives them; and the logical inference is not determined by any relation of causality between the pre-

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miss and the conclusion, but by the subjective relation of reason and consequence as involved in the thought."

On the difference between *induction* as known and practised by Aristotle and as recommended by Lord Bacon, see Stewart, *Philosoph. of Hum. Mind*, part 2, chap. iv., sect. 2.

INDUCTION (Principle of).—By the principle of *induction* is meant the ground or warrant on which we conclude that what has happened in certain cases, which have been observed, will also happen in other cases, which have not been observed. This principle is involved in the words of the wise man, Eccles. i. 9. "The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be: and that which is done is that which shall be done." In nature there is nothing insulated. All things exist in consequence of a sufficient reason, all events occur according to the efficacy of proper causes. In the language of Newton, *Effectuum naturalium ejusdem generis eadem sunt causæ*. The same causes produce the same effects. The principle of *induction* is an application of the principle of causality. Phenomena have their proper causes and these causes operate according to a fixed law. This law has been expressed by saying, substance is persistent. Our belief in the established order of nature is a primitive judgment, according to Dr. Reid and others, and the ground of all the knowledge we derive from experience. According to others this belief is a result or inference derived from experience. On the different views as to this point compare Mill's *Logic*, vol. ii., chap. 5, with Whewell's *Philosophy of Inductive Sciences*, book i., ch. 6. Also, the *Quarterly Review*, vol. 68.

On the subject of *induction* in general, see

Reid, *Intell. Powers*, essay vi., ch. 5.

Reid, *Inquiry*, chap. vi., sect. 24.

Stewart, *Philosoph. of Hum. Mind*, vol. i., ch. iv., sect. 5.

Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, p. 74.

Royer Collard, *Œuvres de Reid*. Par Mons. Jouffroy, tom. iv., p. 277.

INERTIA.—That property of matter by which it would always continue in the same state of rest or motion in which it was put, unless changed by some external force. Resistance to change of state. The quantity of matter in a body is determined by its quantity of *inertia*; and this is estimated by the quantity of force required to put it in motion at a given rate. Kepler conceiving the disposition of a body to maintain its state of motion as indicating an exertion of power, prefixed the word *vis* to *inertia*. Leibnitz maintained that matter manifests force in maintaining its state of rest.

“The *vis insita*, or innate force of matter, is a power of resisting by which every body, as much as in it lies, endeavours to persevere in its present state, whether it be of rest or of moving uniformly forward in a straight line. This force is ever proportional to the body whose force it is; and differs nothing from the inactivity of the mass but in our manner of conceiving it. A body, from the inactivity of matter, is not without difficulty put out of its state of rest or motion. Upon which account this *vis insita* may, by a most significant name, be called *vis inertiae*, or force of inactivity.”—Newton, *Princip.*, defin. 3.

IN ESSE; IN POSSE.—Things that are not, but which may be, are said to be *in posse*; things actually existing are said to be *in esse*.

INFERENCE (*in ferre*, to bear, or bring in)—is of the same derivation as *illation* and *induction*, *q. v.*

“To infer is nothing but by virtue of one proposition laid down as true, to *draw in* another as true; *i. e.*, to see or suppose such a connection of the two ideas of the *inferred* proposition.”—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. iv., c. 17.

“An *inference* is a proposition which is perceived to be true, because of its connection with some known fact. There are many things and events which are always found together; or which constantly follow each other: therefore, when we observe one of these things or events, we *infer* that the other also exists, or has existed, or will soon

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take place. If we see the prints of human feet on the sands of an unknown coast, we *infer* that the country is inhabited; if these prints appear to be fresh, and also below the level of high water, we *infer* that the inhabitants are at no great distance; if the prints are those of naked feet, we *infer* that these inhabitants are savages; or if they are the prints of shoes, we *infer* that they are, in some degree, civilized.”—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

INFERENCE and PROOF.—“Reasoning comprehends *inferring* and *proving*; which are not two different things, but the same thing regarded in *two different points of view*; like the road from London to York, and the road from York to London. He who *infers*, *proves*; and he who *proves*, *infers*; but the word *infer* fixes the mind *first* on the *premiss* and then on the *conclusion*; the word *prove*, on the contrary, leads the mind *from* the conclusion to the premiss. Hence, the substantives derived from these words respectively, are often used to express that which, on each occasion, is *last* in the mind; *inference* being often used to signify the *conclusion* (*i. e.*, proposition *inferred*,) and *proof*, the premiss. To *infer*, is the business of the *philosopher*; to *prove*, of the *advocate*.”—Whately, *Logic*, b. iv., ch. 3, sect. 1.

Proving is the assigning a reason (or argument) for the support of a *given* proposition; *inferring* is the deduction of a conclusion from *given* premisses.”—Whately, *ibid*.

“When the grounds for believing anything are slight, we term the mental act or state induced a *conjecture*; when they are strong, we term it an *inference* or *conclusion*. Increase the evidence for a conjecture, it becomes a conclusion; diminish the evidence for a conclusion, it passes into a conjecture.”—S. Bailey, *Theory of Reasoning*, pp. 31, 32, 8vo, Lond., 1851.—V. FACT.

INFINITE (*in* or *non finitum*, unlimited or rather limitless). —In geometry, *infinite* is applied to quantity which is greater than any assignable magnitude. But strictly speaking it means that which is not only without determinate

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bounds, but which cannot possibly admit of bound or limit.

“The *infinite* expresses the entire absence of all limitation, and is applicable to the one *infinite* being in all his attributes. The *absolute* expresses perfect independence, both in being and in action. The *unconditioned* indicates entire freedom from every necessary relation. The whole three unite in expressing the entire absence of all restriction. But let this be particularly observed, they do not imply that the one *infinite* being cannot exist in a *necessary relation*, that is, if He exist in relation, that relation cannot be a necessary condition of his existence.”—Calderwood, *Philosoph. of the Infinite*, p. 37.—V. ABSOLUTE, UNCONDITIONED.

As to our idea of the *infinite* there are two opposite opinions.

According to some, the idea is purely negative, and springs up when we contemplate the ocean or the sky, or some object of vast extent to which we can assign no limits. Or, if the idea has anything positive in it, that is furnished by the imagination, which goes on enlarging the finite without limit.

On the other hand it is said that the enlarging of the finite can never furnish the idea of the *infinite*, but only of the indefinite. The indefinite is merely the confused apprehension of what may or may not exist. But the idea of the *infinite* is the idea of an objective reality, and is implied as a necessary condition of every other idea. We cannot think of body but as existing in space, nor of an event but as occurring in time; and space and duration are necessarily thought of as *infinite*.

But have we or can we have knowledge of the *infinite*? Boethius (*In Præd.*, p. 113, edit. Bas.) is quoted as saying, “*Infinitorum nulla cognitio est; infinita namque animo comprehendendi nequeunt; quod autem ratione mentis circumdari non potest, nullius scientiæ fine concluditur: quare infinitorum scientia nulla est.*”

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On the other hand, Cudworth has said (*Intell. System*, p. 449),—"Since *infinite* is the same with *absolutely perfect*, we having a notion or idea of the latter must needs have of the former."

But while we cannot *comprehend* the *infinite* we may *apprehend* it in contrast or relation with the finite. And this is what the common sense of men leads them to rest satisfied with, and without attempting the metaphysical difficulty of reconciling the existence of the *infinite* with that of the *finite* to admit the existence of both.

"Truth is bigger than our minds, and we are not the same with it, but have a lower participation only of the intellectual nature, and are rather apprehenders than comprehenders thereof. This is indeed one badge of our creaturely state, that we have not a perfectly comprehensive knowledge, or such as is adequate and commensurate to the essence of things."—Cudworth.

Ancillon, *Essai sur l'Idée et le Sentiment de l'Infini*.

Cousin, *Cours de Philosoph.*, et *Hist. de la Philosoph.*

Sir W. Hamilton, *Discussions on Philosophy*, &c.

There is a *Dissertatio de Finito et Infinito*, appended to the *Dissertatio de principiis Justi et Decori*, 12mo, Amst., 1651. See also Descartes, *Meditations*.

INFLUX (Physical) (*in fluere*, to flow in)—is one of the theories as to our perception of external objects.—"The advocates of this scheme maintained that real things are the efficient causes of our perceptions, the word *efficient* being employed to signify that the things by means of some positive power or inherent virtue which they possess, were competent to transmit to the mind a knowledge of themselves. . . . External objects were supposed to operate on the nervous system by the transmission of some kind of influence, the nervous system was supposed to carry on the process by the transmission of certain images or representations, and thus our knowledge of external things was supposed to be brought about. The representations alone came before the mind; the things by which

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they were caused remained occult and unknown.”—Ferrier, *Instit. of Metaphys.*, p. 472.—V. CAUSES, (OCCASIONAL.)

INJURY (*in-juria*, from *in* and *jus*, neglect or violation of right)—in morals and jurisprudence is the intentional doing of wrong. We may bring *harm* or *evil* upon others without intending it. But *injury* implies intention and awakens a sense of injustice and indignation, when it is done. It is on this difference in the meaning of *harm* and *injury* that Bishop Butler finds the distinction of resentment into *sudden* and *deliberate*.—Butler, *Sermons* viii. and 9.

INNATE (IDEAS). — Ideas, as to their origin, have been distinguished into *adventitious*, or such as we receive from the objects of external nature, as the idea or notion of a mountain, or a tree; *factitious*, or such as we frame out of ideas already acquired, as of a golden mountain, or of a tree with golden fruit; and *innate*, or such as are inborn and belong to the mind from its birth, as the idea of God or of immortality. Cicero, in various passages of his treatise *De Natura Deorum*, speaks of the idea of God and of immortality as being *inserted*, or *engraven*, or *inborn* in the mind. “*Intelligi necesse est, esse deos, quoniam insitas eorum, vel potius innatas cognitiones habemus.*”—Lib. i., sect. 17. In like manner, Origen (*Adv. Celsum*, lib. i., cap. 4) has said, “That men would not be guilty if they did not carry in their mind common notions of morality, *innate* and written in divine letters.” It was in this form that Locke (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book i.) attacked and refuted the doctrine of *innate ideas*. It has been questioned, however, whether the doctrine, as represented by Locke, was really held by the ancient philosophers. And Dr. Hutcheson (*Oratio Inauguralis, De Naturali hominum Societate*) has the following passage:—“*Omnes autem ideas, apprehensiones, et judicia, quæ de rebus, duce naturæ formamus, quocumque demum tempore hoc fiat, sive quæ naturæ nostræ viribus quibuscunque,* necessario fere, atque*

* We have here, in 1730, the two marks of *necessity* and *universality* which subsequently were so much insisted on by Kant and others as characterizing all our *à priori* cognitions.

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universaliter recipiuntur, innata, quantum memini, dixerunt antiqui." Among modern philosophers it would be difficult to name any who held the doctrine in the form in which it has been attacked by Locke. In calling some of our ideas *innate* they seem merely to have used this word as synonymous with *natural*, and applied it, as Hutcheson thinks the ancients did, to certain ideas which men, as human or rational beings, *necessarily* and *universally* entertain.—See NATURAL as distinguished from INNATE.

"There are three senses in which an idea may be supposed to be *innate*; one, if it be something originally super-added to our mental constitution, either as an idea in the first instance fully developed; or as one undeveloped, but having the power of self-development: another, if the idea is a subjective condition of any other ideas, which we receive independently of the previous acquisition of this idea, and is thus proved to be in some way embodied in or interwoven with the powers by which the mind receives those ideas: a third, if, without being a subjective condition of other ideas, there be any faculty or faculties of mind, the exercise of which would suffice, independently of any knowledge acquired from without, spontaneously to produce the idea. In the first case, the idea is given us at our first creation, without its bearing any special relation to our other faculties; in the second case, it is given us as a form, either of thought generally or of some particular species of thought, and is therefore embodied in mental powers by which we are enabled to receive the thought; in the third case, it is, as in the second, interwoven in the original constitution of some mental power or powers; not, however, as in the preceding case, simply as a prerequisite to their exercise, but by their being so formed as by exercise spontaneously to produce the idea."—Dr. Alliot, *Psychology and Theology*, p. 93, 12mo, Lond. 1855.

The first of these three is the form in which the doctrine

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of innate ideas is commonly understood. This doctrine was at one time thought essential to support the principles of natural religion and morality. But Locke saw that these principles were safe from the attacks of the sceptic, although a belief in God and immortality and a sense of the difference between right and wrong were not implanted or inserted in the mind ; if it could be shown that men *necessarily* and *universally* came to them by the ordinary use of their faculties. He took a distinction between an *innate law* and a *law of nature* (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book i., ch. 3) ; and while he did not admit that there was a law “imprinted on our minds in their very original,” contended “that there is a law knowable by the light of nature.” In like manner, Bishop Law said (King’s *Essay on Origin of Evil*, p. 79, note), “It will really come to the same thing with regard to the usual attributes of God, and the nature of virtue and vice, whether the Deity has *implanted* these instincts and affections in us, or has framed and disposed us in such a manner—has given us such powers and placed us in such circumstances, that we must *necessarily* acquire them.”—V. NATURE (LAW OF.)

“Though it appears not that we have any innate ideas or formed notions or principles laid in by nature, antecedently to the exercise of our senses and understandings ; yet it must be granted, that we were born with the natural faculty, whereby we actually discern the agreement or disagreement of some notions, so soon as we have the notions themselves ; as, that we can or do think, that therefore we ourselves are ; that one and two make three, that gold is not silver, nor ice formally water ; that the whole is greater than its part, &c., and if we should set ourselves to do it, we cannot deliberately and seriously doubt of its being so. This we may call intuitive knowledge, or natural certainty wrought into our very make and constitution.”—Oldfield, *Essay on Reason*, p. 5, 8vo, Lond., 1707.

“Some writers have imagined, that no conclusions can be drawn from the state of the passions for or against the

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Divine Benevolence, because they are not *innate* but acquired. This is frivolous. If we are so framed and placed in such circumstances, that all these various passions must be acquired; it is just the same thing as if they had been planted in us originally.”—Balguy, *Divine Benevolence*, p. 100, note.

“Ni nos idées, ni nos sentiments, ne sent *innés*, mais ils sont *naturels*, fondés sur la constitution de notre esprit et de notre ame, et sur nos rapports avec tout ce qui nous environne.” *Œuvres de Turgot*, tom. iv., p. 308; quoted by Cousin, *Œuvres*, 1 serie, tom. iv., p. 202.

The doctrine of *innate ideas* is handled by Locke in his *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book i., and by most authors who treat of intellectual philosophy.—See also Ellis, *Knowledge of Divine Things*, pp. 59–86. Sherlock, *On the Immortality of the Soul*, chap. 2.

INSTINCT (ἐν or ἐντοσ and στικζειν, *intus pungere*) — signifies an internal stimulus.

In its widest signification, it has been applied to plants as well as to animals; and may be defined to be “the power or energy by which all organized forms are preserved in the individual, or continued in the species.” It is more common, however, to consider *instinct* as belonging to animals. And in this view of it Dr. Reid (*Active Powers*, essay iii., part 1, chap. 2) has said:—“By *instinct* I mean a natural blind impulse to certain actions without having any end in view, without deliberation, and very often without any conception of what we do.” An *instinct* says Paley (*Nat. Theol.*, chap. 18), “is a propensity prior to experience and independent of instruction.”

“An *instinct*,” says Dr. Whately (*Tract on Instinct*, p. 21), “is a blind tendency to some mode of action independent of any consideration on the part of the agent, of the end to which the action leads.”

There are two classes of actions, which, in the inferior animals, have been referred to *instinct* as their spring. 1. Those which have reference to the preservation of indivi-

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duals—as the seeking and discerning the food which is convenient for them, and the using their natural organs of locomotion, and their natural means of defence and attack.

2. Those which have reference to the continuation of the species—as the bringing forth and bringing up of their young.

The theories which have been proposed to explain the *instinctive* operations of the inferior animals may be arranged in three classes.

I. According to the *physical* theories, the operations of *instinct* are all provided for in the structure and organization of the inferior animals, and do not imply any mind or soul. The principle of life may be developed—

1. By *the mechanical play of bodily organs*. See Descartes, *Epistles*; Polignac, *Anti-Lucretius*, book vi.; Norris, *Essay towards the Theory of an Ideal World*, part 2, ch. 2.

2. By *Irritability*: Badham, *Insect Life*; Mason Good, *Book of Nature*, vol. ii., p. 132; Virey, *De la Physiologie dans ses rapports avec la Philosophie*, p. 394.

3. By *Sensation*: Bushnan, *Philosophy of Instinct and Reason*, p. 178; Barlow, *Connection between Physiology and Intellectual Philosophy*; Kirby, *Bridgewater Treatise*, vol. ii., p. 255.

II. According to the *psychical* theories, the instinctive actions of the inferior animals are the results of mental powers or faculties possessed by them, analogous to those of understanding in man.

1. Mr. Coleridge calls *instinct* “the power of selecting and adapting means to a proximate end.” But he thinks “that when *instinct* adapts itself, as it sometimes does, to *varying* circumstances, there is manifested by the inferior animals, an instinctive intelligence, which is not different in kind from understanding, or the faculty which judges according to sense in man.”—*Aids to Reflection*, vol. i., p. 193, 6th edit.; Green, *Vital Dynamics*, app. F., p. 88, or Coleridge's *Works*, vol. ii., app. B., p. 5.

2. Dr. Darwin contends (*Zoonomia*, vol. i., 4to, pp. 256-7),

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that what have been called the instinctive actions of the inferior animals are to be referred to experience and reasoning, as well as those of our own species; “though their reasoning is from fewer ideas, is busied about fewer objects, and is exerted with less energy.”

3. Mr. Smellie (*Philosophy of Nat. Hist.*, vol. i., 4to, p. 155), instead of regarding the instinctive actions of the inferior animals as the results of reasoning, regards the power of reasoning as itself an *instinct*. He holds that “all animals are, in some measure, rational beings; and that the dignity and superiority of the human intellect are necessary results of the great variety of *instincts* which nature has been pleased to confer on the species.”—p. 159.

III. According to the theories which may be called *hyperpsychical*, the phenomena of *instinct* are the results of an intelligence, different from the human, which emanates upon the inferior animals from the supreme spirit or some subordinate spirit.

This doctrine is wrapped up in the ancient fable, that the gods, when pursued by the Titans, fled into Egypt, and took refuge under the form of animals of different kinds.

Father Bougeant, in a work entitled, *A Philosophical Amusement on the Language of Beasts*, contends that the bodies of the inferior animals are inhabited by fallen and reprobate spirits.

Mr. French (*Zoological Journal*, No. 1) holds that the actions of the inferior animals are produced by good and evil spirits; the former being the cause of the *benevolent*, and the latter of the *ferocious* instincts.

Others have referred the operations of *instinct* to the direct agency of the Creator on the inferior animals.—See Newton, *Optics*, book iii., xx., query subjoined; *Spectator*, No. 120; Hancock, *Essay on Instinct*.

Dr. Reid has maintained (*Active Powers*, essay iii., pt. 1, chap. 2) that in the human being many actions, such as sucking and swallowing, are done by *instinct*; while Dr.

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Priestley (*Examinat. of Reid, &c.*, p. 70) regards them as automatic or acquired. And the interpretation of natural signs and other acts which Dr. Reid considers to be instinctive, Dr. Priestley refers to association and experience.

INTELLECT (*inter-legere*, to choose between, to perceive a difference).—*Intellect*, *sensitivity*, and *will*, are the three heads under which the powers and capacities of the human mind are now generally arranged. In this use of it, the term *intellect* includes all those powers by which we acquire, retain, and extend our knowledge, as perception, memory, imagination, judgment, &c. “It is by those powers and faculties which compose that part of his nature commonly called his *intellect* or *understanding* that man acquires his knowledge of external objects; that he investigates truth in the sciences; that he combines means in order to attain the ends he has in view; and that he imparts to his fellow-creatures the acquisitions he has made.”—Stewart, *Active and Moral Powers*, introd.

The *intellectual* powers are commonly distinguished from the *moral* powers; inasmuch as it is admitted that the moral powers partake partly of the *intellect* and partly of the *sensitivity*, and imply not only *knowledge* but *feeling*.

And when the moral powers are designated active, it is not meant to assert that in exercising the intellectual powers the mind is altogether passive, but only to intimate that while the function of the intellectual powers is to give knowledge, the function of the active and moral powers is to prompt and regulate actions.

Lord Monboddo (*Ancient Metaphysics*, book ii., chap. 7) reduces the gnostic powers to two, *viz.*—*sense* and *intellect*. Under *sense* he includes the phantasy and also the comparing faculty, and that by which we apprehend ideas, either single or in combination. This he considers to be partly rational, and shared by us with the brutes. But *intellect* or *νοῦς*, he considers peculiar to man—it is the faculty by which we generalize and have ideas altogether independent of sense. He quotes Hierocles on the golden verses of Pytha-

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goras (p. 160, edit. Needham), as representing the λογος or ψυχη λογικη, as holding a middle place betwixt the irrational or lowest part of our nature and intellect, which is the highest.

“The term *intellect* is derived from a verb (*intelligere*), which signifies to *understand*: but the term itself is usually so applied as to imply a faculty which recognizes principles explicitly as well as implicitly; and abstract as well as applied; and therefore agrees with the reason rather than the understanding; and the same extent of signification belongs to the adjective *intellectual*.”—Whewell, *Elements of Morality*, introd. 12.

Intellect and Intellection.—“The mind of man is, by its native faculty, able to discern universal propositions, in the same manner as the sense does particular ones—that is, as the truth of these propositions—Socrates exists, An eagle flies, Bucephalus runs, is immediately perceived and judged of by the sense; so these contradictory propositions cannot be both true; What begins to exist has its rise from another; Action argues that a thing exists (or as it is vulgarly expressed, a thing that is not, acts not), and such-like propositions, which the mind directly contemplates and finds to be true by its native force, without any previous notion or applied reasoning; which method of attaining truth is by a peculiar name styled *intellection*, and the faculty of attaining it the *intellect*.”—Barrow, *Mathemat. Lectures*, 1734, p. 72.

Intellect and Intelligence.—“By Aristotle, νοησις is used to denote—

“1. Our higher faculties of thought and knowledge.

“2. The faculty, habit, or place of principles, that is of self-evident and self-evidencing notions and judgments.

“The schoolmen, following Boethius, translated it by *intellectus* and *intelligentia*; and some of them appropriated the former of these terms to its first or general signification, the latter to its second or special.”—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note A, sect. 5.

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Intellect and *intelligence* are commonly used as synonymous. But Trusler has said, "It seems to me that *intellectus* ought to describe *art* or *power*, and *intelligentia* ought to describe *use* or *habit* of the understanding; such being the tendency of the inflections in which the words terminate. In this case *intellect* or understanding power is a gift of nature; and *intelligence*, or understanding habit, an accumulation of time. So discriminated, *intellect* is inspired, *intelligence* is acquired. The Supreme *Intellect*, when we are speaking of the Wisdom, the Supreme *Intelligence* when we are speaking of the Knowledge of God. Every man is endowed with understanding; but it requires reading to become a man of *intelligence*." — V. REASON, UNDERSTANDING.

Intellectus Patiens and Intellectus Agens.—Aristotle distinguished between the *intellectus patiens* and the *intellectus agens*. The former, perishing with the body (*De Anima*, cap. 5), by means of the senses, imagination and memory, furnished the matter of knowledge; the latter, separable from the body and eternal, gave that knowledge form. Under the impressions of the senses the mind is passive; but while external things rapidly pass, imagination does not allow them altogether to escape, but the knowledge of them is retained by the memory. But this knowledge, being the knowledge of singulars, cannot give universal notions, but merely generalized ones. The *intellectus agens*, however, proceeding upon the information furnished by the senses, actually evolves the idea which the *intellectus patiens* potentially possessed. His illustration is,—as light makes colours existing potentially, actually to be, so the *intellectus agens* converts into actuality, and brings, as it were, to a new life, whatever was discovered or collected by the *intellectus patiens*. As the senses receive the forms of things expressed in matter, the *intellect* comprehends the universal form, which, free from the changes of matter, is really prior to it and underlies the production of it as cause. The common illustration of Aristotle is that the senses per-

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ceive the form of things as it is *το σιμων* or a height, the *intellect* has knowledge of it as resembling *τω κοιλω*, a hollow, out of which the height was produced.

Aristotle has often been said to reduce all knowledge to experience. But although he maintained that we could not shut our eyes and frame laws and causes for all things, yet he maintained, while he appealed to experience, that the *intellect* was the ultimate judge of what is true.

See Herman Rasso, *Aristotelis de Notionis Definitione Doctrina*. Berol., 1843.

According to Thomas Aquinas (*Adv. Gentes*, lib. iii., cap. 41.) "*Intellectus noster nihil intelligit sine phantasmate.*" But he distinguished between the *intellect passive* and the *intellect active*; the one receiving impressions from the senses, and the other reasoning on them. Sense knows the individual, *intellect* the universal. You see a triangle, but you rise to the idea of triangularity. It is this power of generalizing which specializes man and makes him what he is, *intelligent*.

INTENT or INTENTION (*in-tendere*, to tend to)—in morals and in law, means that act of the mind by which we contemplate and design the accomplishment of some end. It is followed by the adoption and use of suitable means. But this is more directly indicated by the word *purpose*. "He had long harboured the *intention* of taking away the life of his enemy, and for this *purpose* he provided himself with weapons." *Purpose* is a step nearer action than *intention*. But both in law and in morals, *intention*, according as it is right or wrong, good or bad, affects the nature or character of the action following. According to the doctrine of the Church of Rome, *intention* may altogether change the nature of an action. Killing may be no murder, if done with the *intention* of freeing the church from a persecutor, and society from a tyrant. And if a priest administers any of the sacraments without the *intention* of exercising his priestly functions, these sacraments may be rendered void.—V. ELECTION.

INTENTION (Logical).

Quoth he, whatever others deem ye,
 I understand your metonymy,*
 Your words of second-hand *intention*,
 When things by wrongful names you mention.

Butler, *Hudibras*, part ii., canto 3, l. 587.

Intention, with logicians, has the same meaning as *notion*; as it is by *notions* the mind tends towards or attends to objects. — V. NOTION.

Intention (First and Second).

“Nouns of the *first intention* are those which are imposed upon things as such, that conception alone intervening, by which the mind is carried immediately to the thing itself. Such are *man* and *stone*. But nouns of the *second intention* are those which are imposed upon things not in virtue of what they are in themselves, but in virtue of their being subject to the *intention* which the mind makes concerning them; as when we say that man is a *species*, and animal a *genus*.”—Aquinas, *Opuscula*, xlii., art. 12, ad init.

“*Intentio nihil aliud est quam quædam ratio intelligendi rem ut est in pluribus, seu quædam cogitatio rei; sicut universale nihil aliud est quam quædam ratio intelligendi rem ut est in pluribus, et genus nihil aliud est quam quædam ratio intelligendi rem ut est in pluribus differentibus specie; et sic de aliis. Logica igitur est de secundis intentionibus, non in abstracto, sed in concreto, ut concernunt rem primo intellectam.*”

Raoul le Breton, *Super Libb. Poster. Analyt.* He was a Thomist.

See *Tractatio de Secundis Intentionibus secundum doctrinam Scoti*. By Sarnanus, 4to, Ursellis, 1622.

A *first intention* may be defined “a conception of a thing or things formed by the mind from materials existing without itself.”

A *second intention* is “a conception of another concep-

* “The transference of words from the primary to a secondary meaning, is what grammarians call metonymy. Thus a *door* signifies both an opening in the wall (more strictly called the door-way) and a board which closes it; which are things neither similar nor analogous.”—Whately, *Logic*, b. iii., sect. 10.

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tion or conceptions formed by the mind from materials existing in itself." Thus the conceptions "*man, animal, whiteness,*" &c., are framed from marks presented by natural objects. "The conceptions, *genus, species, accident,* &c., are formed from the first *intentions* themselves viewed in certain relations to each other."—Mansell, *Note to Aldrich*. 1849, pp. 16-17.

See *Review of Whately's Logic*, No. cxv., *Edin. Review*.

"The *first intention* of a term is a certain vague and general signification of it, as opposed to one more *precise and limited*, which it bears in some particular art, science, or system, and which is called its *second intention*. Thus among farmers, in some parts of the world, *beast* is applied particularly and especially to the ox kind; and *bird*, in the language of many sportsmen, is in like manner appropriated to the partridge: the common and general acceptation of each of these words, is the *first intention*, the other is its *second intention*.

"The doctrine that logic is concerned only with the *forms* of thought was expressed by the old logicians when they said that it treated of '*second intentions applied to first.*' A *first intention* being an image or idea, or copy in the mind of something objective, or conceived of as objective: of something really existing or supposed to be really existing: while a *second intention* is an idea or image or copy in the mind of a *mode* or *form* of thought. In other words it has to do not with *things*, but with our way of thinking of things."—Karlsruhe, *Aids to Study of Logic*, book i., 8vo, Oxf., 1851, p. 11.

INTUITION (from *intueri*, to behold).—"Sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other; and this, I think, we may call *intuitive* knowledge. For in this the mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives the truth as the eye doth the light, only by being directed towards it. Thus, the mind perceives that white is not black, that a circle is not a triangle, that three

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are more than two, and equal to one and two.”—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. iv., ch. 2.

“What we know or comprehend as soon as we perceive or attend to it, we are said to know by *intuition*: things which we know by *intuition*, cannot be made more certain by arguments, than they are at first. We know by *intuition* that all the parts of a thing together are equal to the whole of it. Axioms are propositions known by *intuition*.”—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

In the philosophy of Kant, *intuition* is almost synonymous with external perception;—with this exception, that it applies both to the objects perceived and the absolute conditions under which they are perceived. Hence there are *pure intuitions*, answering to notions of time and space, and *empirical intuitions*, answering to the representations of sensible objects. Kant denied the existence of purely intellectual *intuitions*. On the other hand, he held an intellectual *intuition* by which reality revealed itself to the reason. Schelling also maintains an intellectual *intuition* by which the mind seizes the absolute in its identity. This approaches the sense of *intuition* in theology; from which it passed into philosophy, viz., a supernatural beholding of God awarded by grace to some chosen spirits in this life, and to the souls of believers after death.

On the difference between knowledge as *intuitive*, *immediate*, or *presentative*, and as *mediate*, or *representative*,—See Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note B.

Intuition.—“Besides its original and proper meaning (as a visual perception), it has been employed to denote a kind of *apprehension* and a kind of *judgment*. Under the former head it has been used to denote, 1. A perception of the actual and present, in opposition to the *abstractive* knowledge which we have of the possible in imagination, and of the past in memory. 2. An immediate apprehension of a thing in itself, in contrast to a representative, vicarious or mediate, apprehension of it, in or through something else. (Hence by Fichte, Schelling, and others, *intuition* is

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employed to designate the *cognition* as opposed to the *conception* of the absolute.) 3. The knowledge, which we can adequately represent in imagination, in contradistinction to the 'symbolical' knowledge which we cannot image, but only think or conceive, through and under a sign or word. (Hence, probably, Kant's application of the term to the forms of the sensibility, the imaginations of Time and Space, in contrast to the forms or categories of the Understanding). 4. Perception proper (the objective), in contrast to sensation proper (the subjective), in our sensitive consciousness. 5. The simple apprehension of a notion, in contradistinction to the complex apprehension of the terms of a proposition.

"Under the latter head it has only a single signification, viz. :—To denote the immediate affirmation by the intellect, that the predicate does or does not pertain to the subject, in what are called self-evident propositions."—Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note A, sect. 5, p. 759.

"*Intuition* has been applied by Dr. Beattie and others, not only to the power by which we perceive the truth of the axioms of geometry, but to that by which we recognize the authority of the fundamental laws of belief, when we hear them enunciated in language. My only objection to this use of the word is, that it is a departure from common practice; according to which, if I be not mistaken, the proper objects of *intuition* are propositions analogous to the axioms prefixed to Euclid's *Elements*. In some other respects, this innovation might perhaps be regarded as an improvement on the very limited and imperfect vocabulary of which we are able to avail ourselves in our present discussions." — Stewart, *Philosoph. of Hum. Mind*, part 2, chap. 1, sect. 2.

"*Intuition* is used in the extent of the German *Anschauung*, to include all the products of the perceptive (external or internal) and imaginative faculties; every act of consciousness, in short, of which the immediate object is an *individual*, thing, state, or act of mind, presented under the condition

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of distinct existence in space or time.”—Mansell, *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 9.

“*Intuition* is properly attributed and should be carefully restricted, to those instinctive faculties and impulses, external and internal, which act instantaneously and irresistibly, which were given by nature as the first inlets of all knowledge, and which we have called the *Primary Principles*, whilst self-evidence may be justly and properly attributed to axioms, or the *Secondary Principles* of truth.”—Tatham, *Chart and Scale of Truth*, ch. vii., lect. 1.

INVENTION (*in-venire*, to come in)—is the creation or construction of something which has not before existed. Discovery is the making manifest something which hitherto has been unknown. We *discover* what is hidden. We *come at* new objects. Galileo *invented* the telescope. Harvey *discovered* the circulation of the blood.

“We speak of the *invention* of printing, the *discovery* of America. Shift these words, and speak, for instance, of the *invention* of America, you feel at once how unsuitable the language is. And why? Because Columbus did not make that to be which before him had not been. America was there before he revealed it to European eyes; but that which before was, he showed to be; he withdrew the veil which hitherto had concealed it, he *discovered* it.”—Trench, *On Words*.

Newton *discovered* the law of gravitation, but Watt *invented* the steam engine. We speak with a true distinction, of the *inventions* of Art, the *discoveries* of Science.

In Locke and his contemporaries, to say nothing of the older writers, to *invent* is currently used for to *discover*. Thus Bacon says, “Logic does not pretend to invent science, or the axioms of sciences, but passes it over with a *cuique in sua arte credendum*.”—*Adv. of Learning*.

The object of *invention* is to produce something which had no existence before; that of *discovery* to bring to light something which did exist, but which was concealed from common observation. Thus we say, Otto Guericke *invented*

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the air pump ; Sanctorius *invented* the thermometer ; Newton and Gregory *invented* the reflecting telescope ; Galileo *discovered* the solar spots, and Harvey *discovered* the circulation of the blood. It appears, therefore, that improvements in the arts are properly called *Inventions* ; and that facts brought to light by means of observation, are properly called *Discoveries*.—Stewart, *Philosoph. of Hum. Mind*, ch. 5.

JUDGMENT.—“ A judgment is a combination of two concepts, related to one or more common objects of possible intuition.”
—Mansell, *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 60.

Our judgments, according to Aristotle, are either *problematical*, *assertive*, or *demonstrable* ; or in other words, the results of *opinion*, of *belief*, or of *science*.

“ The *problematical judgment* is neither subjectively nor objectively true, that is, it is neither held with entire certainty by the thinking subject, nor can we show that it truly represents the object about which we judge. It is a mere opinion. It may, however, be the expression of our presentiment of certainty ; and what was held as mere opinion before proof, may afterwards be proved to demonstration. Great discoveries are problems at first, and the examination of them leads to a conviction of their truth, as it has done to the abandonment of many false opinions. In other subjects, we cannot, from the nature of the case, advance beyond mere opinion. Whenever we judge about variable things, as the future actions of men, the best course of conduct for ourselves under doubtful circumstances, historical facts about which there is conflicting testimony, we can but form a *problematical judgment*, and must admit the possibility of error at the moment of making our decision.

“ The *assertive judgment* is one of which we are fully persuaded ourselves, but cannot give grounds for our belief that shall compel men in general to coincide with us. It is therefore *subjectively*, but not *objectively*, certain. It commends itself to our moral nature, and in so far as

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other men are of the same disposition, they will accept it likewise.

“The *demonstrative judgment* is both *subjectively* and *objectively* true. It may either be certain in itself, as a mathematical axiom is, or capable of proof by means of other judgments, as the theories of mathematics and the laws of physical science.”—Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, pp. 304-6.

Port Royal definition:—“*Judgment* is that operation of the mind through which, joining different ideas together, it affirms or denies the one or the other; as when, for instance, having the ideas of the earth and roundness, it affirms or denies that the earth is round.”

The old definition of *judgment* was, “It is an act of the mind, whereby one thing is affirmed or denied of another.”

When expressed in words a *judgment* is called a proposition. According to Mr. Locke, *judgment* implies the comparison of two or more ideas. But Dr. Reid says he applies the word *judgment* to every determination of the mind concerning what is true or false, and shows that many of these determinations are simple and primitive beliefs (not the result of comparing two or more ideas), accompanying the exercise of all our faculties, *judgments* of nature, the spontaneous product of intelligence.—*Intell. Powers*, essay vi., ch. 1.

Chap. 4.—“One of the most important distinctions of our *judgments* is, that some of them are intuitive, others grounded on argument.”

In his *Inquiry*, ch. ii., sect. 4, he shows that *judgment* and belief, so far from arising from the comparison of ideas, in some cases precede even simple apprehension.

Judgments, Analytic, Synthetic, and Tautologous. —

“Some *judgments* are merely explanatory of their subject, having for their predicate a conception which it fairly implies, to all who know and can define its nature. They are called *analytic judgments* because they *unfold* the meaning of the subject, without determining anything new

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concerning it. If we say that 'all triangles have three sides,' the *judgment* is *analytic*; because having three sides is always implied in a right notion of a triangle. Such *judgments*, as declaring the nature or essence of the subject, have been called 'essential propositions.'

"*Judgments* of another class attribute to the subject something not directly implied in it and thus increase our knowledge. They are called *synthetic*, from *placing together* two notions not hitherto associated. 'All bodies possess power of attraction' is a *synthetic judgment*, because we can think of bodies without thinking of attraction as one of their immediate primary attributes.

"We must distinguish between *analytic* and *tautologous judgments*. Whilst the *analytic* display the meaning of the subject and put the same *matter* in a new *form*, the *tautologous* only repeat the subject, and give us the same matter in the same form, as 'Whatever is, is.' 'A spirit is a spirit.'

"It is a misnomer to call *analytic judgments* identical propositions.—Mill, *Logic*, b. i., chap. 6. 'Every man is a living creature' would not be an identical proposition unless 'living creature' denoted the same as 'man;' whereas it is far more extensive. Locke understands by identical propositions only such as are tautologous (b. iv., ch. 8, 3)."—Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, pp. 194-5.

JURISPRUDENCE (*Juris-prudentia*, the science of rights).—

Some refer the Latin word *jus* to *jussum*, the supine of the verb *jubeo*, to order or enact. Others refer it to *justum*, that which is just and right. But as right is, or ought to be, the foundation of positive law, a thing is *jussum*, *quia justum est*—made law because it was antecedently just and right.

Jurisprudence is the science of rights in accordance with positive law. It is distinguished into universal and particular. "The former relates to the science of law in general, and investigates the principles which are common to all positive systems of law, apart from the local, partial,

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and accidental circumstances and peculiarities by which these systems respectively are distinguished from one another. Particular *jurisprudence* treats of the laws of particular states; which laws are, or at least profess to be, the rules and principles of universal *jurisprudence* itself, specifically developed and applied.”

There is a close connection between *jurisprudence* and *morality*, so close that it is difficult to determine precisely the respective limits of each. Both rest upon the great law of right and wrong as made known by the light of nature. But while *morality* enjoins obedience to that law in all its extent, *jurisprudence* exacts obedience to it only in so far as the law of nature has been recognized in the law of nations or the positive institutions of society. *Morality* is, therefore, more extensive than *jurisprudence*. *Morality* has equal reference to the whole of human duty. *Jurisprudence* has special reference to social duty. All social duty as enjoined by the light of nature—whether included under justice or benevolence—belongs to *morality*. *Jurisprudence* treats chiefly or almost exclusively of duties of justice, which have been made the subject of positive law; which duties of benevolence cannot well be. The rules of *morality* as such, are enforced merely by the law within; but in so far as they have been adopted by *jurisprudence*, they can be enforced by external law. The *moralist* appeals to our sense of duty, the *jurist* to a sense of authority or law. “As the sense of duty is the sense of moral necessity simply, and excluding the sense of physical (or external) compulsion, so the sense of law is the sense of the same necessity, in combination with the notion of physical (or external) compulsion in aid of its requirements.”—Foster, *Elements of Jurisprudence*, p. 39.

The difference between *morality* and *jurisprudence* as to extent of range, may be illustrated by the difference of signification between the word *right*, when used as an adjective, and when used as a substantive. *Morality* contemplates all that is *right* in action and in disposition.

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Jurisprudence contemplates only that which one man has a *right* to from another. "The adjective *right*," says Dr. Whewell (*Elements of Morality*, No. 84), "has a much wider signification than the substantive *right*. Everything is *right* which is conformable to the supreme rule of human action; but that only is a *right* which, being conformable to the supreme rule, is realized in society, and vested in a particular person. Hence the two words may often be properly opposed. We may say, that, a poor man has *no right* to relief; but it *is right* he should have it. A rich man has *a right* to destroy the harvest of his fields; but to do so would not *be right*." So that the sphere of *morality* is wider than that of *jurisprudence*,—the former embracing all that is *right*, the latter only particular *rights* realized or vested in particular persons.

Morality and *jurisprudence* differ also in the immediate ground of obligation. *Morality* enjoins us to do what is *right*, because it is right. *Jurisprudence* enjoins us to give to others their *right*, with ultimate reference, no doubt, to the truth made known to us by the light of nature, that we are morally bound to do so; but, appealing more directly to the fact, that our doing so can be demanded by our neighbour, and that his demand will be enforced by the authority of positive law. And this difference between the immediate ground of obligation in matters of *morality* and matters of *jurisprudence*, gives rise to a difference of meaning in the use of some words which are generally employed as synonymous. For example, if regard be had to the difference between *morality* and *jurisprudence*, *duty* is a word of wider signification than *obligation*; just as *right*, the adjective, is of wider signification than *right*, the substantive. It is my *duty* to do what is *right*. I am under *obligation* to give another man his *right*. A similar shade of difference in meaning may be noticed in reference to the words *ought* and *obliged*. I *ought* to do my duty; I am *obliged* to give a man his *right*. I am not *obliged* to relieve a distressed person, but I *ought* to do so.

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These distinctions are sometimes explained by saying, that what is enjoined by *jurisprudence* is of *perfect obligation*, and what is enjoined only by *morality* is of *imperfect obligation*,—that is, that we may or may not do what our conscience dictates, but that we can be compelled to do what positive law demands. But these phrases of perfect and imperfect obligation are objectionable in so far as they tend to represent the obligations of *morality* as inferior to those of *jurisprudence*—the dictates of conscience as of less authority than the enactments of law—whereas the latter rest upon the former, and the law of nations derives its binding force from the law of nature.

Grotius, *De Jure Belli et Pais*.

Puffendorff, *De Officio Homini et Civis*.

Leibnitz, *Jurisprudentia*.

Montesquieu, *Spirit of Laws*.

Burlamaqui, *Principles of Natural Law*.

Rutherford, *Institutes of Natural Law*.

Mackintosh, *Discourse of the Law of Nature and of Nations*.

Lerminier, *Sur le Droit*.

JUSTICE (*δικαιοσύνη*, *justitia*)—is one of the four cardinal virtues. It consists, according to Cicero (*De Finibus*, lib. v., cap. 23), *in suo cuique tribuendo*, in according to every one his right. By the Pythagoreans, and also by Plato, it was regarded as including all human virtue or duty. And Cicero has also used it in this sense when he said, *Pietas est justitia ergo Deos*. The word righteousness is used in our translation of the Scripture in a like extensive signification. As opposed to equity, *justice* (*το νομικόν*) means doing merely what positive law requires, while equity (*το ἴσον*) means doing what is fair and right in the circumstances of every particular case. *Justice* is not founded in law, as Hobbes and others hold, but in our idea of what is right. And laws are just or unjust in so far as they do or do not conform to that idea.

“To say that there is nothing just nor unjust but what is

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commanded or prohibited by positive laws," remarks Montesquieu (*Spirit of Laws*, book i., chap. 1), "is like saying that the radii of a circle were not equal till you had drawn the circumference."

Justice may be distinguished as ethical, economical, and political. The first consists in doing *justice* between man and man as men; the second, in doing *justice* between the members of a family or household; and the third, in doing *justice* between the members of a community or commonwealth. These distinctions are taken by More in his *Enchiridion Ethicum*, and are adopted by Grove in his *Moral Philosophy*.

Plato's *Republic* contains a delineation of *justice*.—Arist., *Ethic.*, lib. v.; Cicero, *De Finibus*.

Horace gives the idea of a just or good man.—*Epist.*, lib. i., 16, 40.—V. RIGHT, DUTY, EQUITY.

KNOWLEDGE (*γνῶσις*, *cognitio*).

. . . . "Learning dwells
In heads replete with thoughts of other men,
Knowledge in minds attentive to their own."

"*Knowledges* (or cognitions)—in common use with Bacon and our English philosophers, till after the time of Locke, ought not to be discarded. It is, however, unnoticed by any English lexicographer."—Sir William Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note A, sect. 5, p. 763.

"*Knowledge* is the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas. Where this perception is, there is *knowledge*; and where it is not, then, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of *knowledge*."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iv., chap. 1. And in chap. 14, he says, "The mind has two faculties conversant about truth and falsehood. *First*, *knowledge*, whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly satisfied of the agreement or disagreement of any ideas. *Secondly*, *judg-*

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ment, which is the putting ideas together, or separating them from one another in the mind, when their certain agreement or disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so." *Knowledge* is here opposed to opinion. But judgment is the faculty by which we attain to certainty, as well as opinion. "And," says Dr. Reid (*Intell. Powers*, essay iv., chap. 3), "I know no authority, besides that of Mr. Locke, for calling *knowledge* a faculty, any more than for calling opinion a faculty."

"*Knowledge* implies three things;—1st, *Firm Belief*; 2d, Of what is *true*; 3d, On sufficient grounds. If any one, *e. g.*, is in *doubt* respecting one of Euclid's demonstrations, he cannot be said to *know* the proposition proved by it; if, again, he is fully *convinced* of anything that is not *true*, he is mistaken in supposing himself to know it; lastly, if two persons are each *fully confident*; one, that the moon is inhabited; and the other, that it is not (though one of these opinions must be true), neither of them could properly be said to *know* the truth, since he cannot have sufficient *proof* of it."—Whately, *Logic*, book iv., chap. 2, sect. 2, note.

Knowledge supposes three terms: a *being* who knows, an *object* known, and a *relation* determined between the knowing being and the known object. This relation properly constitutes *knowledge*.

But this relation may not be exact, in conformity with the nature of things; *knowledge* is not *truth*. *Knowledge* is a subjective conception—a relative state of the human mind; it resides in the relation, essentially ideal, of our thought and its object. *Truth*, on the contrary, is the reality itself, the reality ontological and absolute, considered in their absolute relations with intelligence, and independent of our personal conceptions. *Truth* has its source in God; *knowledge* proceeds from man. *Knowledge* is true and perfect from the moment that our conception is really conformable to that which is—from the moment that our thought has seized the reality. And, in this view,

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truth may be defined to be the conformity of our thought with the nature of its object.

But truth is not yet *certitude*. It may exist in itself without being acquired by the human mind, without existing actually for us. It does not become certain to us till we have acquired it by the employment of method. *Certitude* is thus truth brought methodically to the human intelligence,—that is, conducted from principle to principle, to a point which is evident of itself. If such a point exist, it is plain that we can attain to all the truths which attach themselves to it directly or indirectly; and that we may have of these truths, howsoever remote, a *certainty* as complete as that of the point of departure.

Certitude, then, in its last analysis, is *the relation of truth to knowledge*, the relation of man to God, of ontology to psychology. When the human intelligence, making its spring, has seized divine truth, in identifying itself with the reality, it ought then, in order to finish its work, to return upon itself, to individualize the truth in us; and from this individualization results the *certitude* which becomes, in some sort, personal, as *knowledge*; all the while preserving the impersonal nature of *truth*.

Certitude then reposes upon two points of support, the one *subjective*, man or the human consciousness, the other *objective* and absolute, the Supreme Being. God and consciousness are the two arbiters of *certitude*.—Tiberghien, *Essai des Connaiss. Hum.*, p. 34.

“The schoolmen divided all human knowledge into two species, *cognitio intuitiva*, and *cognitio abstractiva*. By intuitive knowledge they signified that which we gain by an immediate presentation of the *real individual object*; by abstractive, that which we gain and hold through the medium of a general term; the one being, in modern language, a *perception*, the other a *concept*.”—Morell, *Psychology*, p. 158.

Knowledge as Immediate and Presentative or Intuitive—
and as **Mediate and Representative or Remote.**

“A thing is known *immediately* or *proximately*, when

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we cognize it *in itself*; *mediately* or *remotely*, when we cognize it *in or through something numerically different from itself*. Immediate cognition, thus the knowledge of a thing in itself, involves the *fact* of its existence; mediate cognition, thus the knowledge of a thing in or through something not itself, involves only the *possibility* of its existence.

“An immediate cognition, inasmuch as the thing known is *itself presented* to observation, may be called a *presentative*; and inasmuch as the thing presented is, as it were, *viewed by the mind face to face*, may be called an *intuitive* cognition. A mediate cognition, inasmuch as the thing known is *held up or mirrored to the mind in a vicarious representation*, may be called a *representative* cognition.

“A thing known is called an *object* of knowledge.

“In a *presentative* or immediate cognition there is *one sole object*; the thing (immediately) known and the thing existing being one and the same. In a *representative* or mediate cognition there may be discriminated *two objects*; the thing (immediately) known and the thing existing being numerically different.

“A thing known *in itself* is the (sole) *presentative* or *intuitive object* of knowledge, or the (sole) object of a *presentative* or *intuitive knowledge*. A thing known *in and through something else* is the *primary, mediate, remote, real, existent, or represented object* of (mediate) knowledge—*objectum quod*; and a thing *through which something else is known* is the *secondary, immediate, proximate, ideal, vicarious, or representative object* of (mediate) knowledge—*objectum quo* or *per quod*. The former may likewise be styled—*objectum entitativum*.”—Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note B, sect. 1.

Knowledge in respect of the mode in which it is obtained is *intuitive* or *discursive*. *Intuitive* when things are seen in themselves by the mind, or when objects are so clearly exhibited that there is no need of reasoning to perceive them—as, a whole is greater than any of its parts. *Discursive* when objects are perceived by means of reasoning, as, the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right

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angles. In respect of its strength *knowledge* is *certain* or *probable*. If we attend to the degrees or ends of knowledge, it is either *science*, or *art*, or *experience*, or *opinion*, or *belief*,—*q. v.*

“*Knowledge* is not a couch whereon to rest a searching and reckless spirit, or a terrace for a wandering and variable mind to walk up and down with a fair prospect, or a tower of state for a proud mind to raise itself upon, or a fort or commanding ground for strife and contention, or a shop for profit or sale; but a rich store-house for the glory of the Creator, and the relief of man’s estate.”—Bacon.

V. CERTAINTY, TRUTH, WISDOM.

LANGUAGE is *natural* or *artificial*. *Natural language* expresses itself by features of the countenance, tones of the voice, and gestures and attitudes of the body.—See Reid, *Inquiry*, ch. 4, sect. 2. *Artificial language* expresses itself by words or signs which are conventionally understood.—V. SIGNS.

LAUGHTER is the act of expressing our sense of the ridiculous. This act, or rather the sense of the ridiculous which prompts it, has been thought peculiar to man, as that which distinguishes him from the inferior animals.*—Dr. Hutcheson, *Essay on Laughter*; Dr. Beattie, *Essay on Laughter and Ludicrous Composition*; Akenside, *Pleasures of Imaginat.*, book iii., *Spectator*, Nos. 47 and 249.

LAW comes from the Anglo-Saxon verb signifying “to lay down.”

“All things that are have some operation not violent or casual. That which doth assign unto each thing the kind, that which doth moderate the force and power, that which doth appoint the form and measure of working, the same we term a *law*.”—Hooker, *Eccles. Pol.*, book i., sect. 2.

* The ludicrous pranks of the puppy and the kitten make this doubtful; and Montaigne said he was not sure whether his favourite cat might not sometimes be laughing as much *at* him as *with* him.

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“*Laws* in their most extended signification are the necessary relations arising from the nature of things; and, in this sense, all beings have their laws, the Deity has his laws, the material world has its laws, superior intelligences have their laws, the beasts have their laws, and man has his laws.”—Montesquieu, *Spirit of Laws*, book i., ch. 1.

Thus understood, the word comprehends the *laws* of the physical, metaphysical, and moral universe. Its primary signification was that of a command or a prohibition, addressed by one having authority to those who had power to do or not to do. There are in this sense *laws* of society, *laws* of morality, and *laws* of religion—each resting upon their proper authority. But the word has been transferred into the whole philosophy of being and knowing. And when a fact frequently observed recurs invariably under the same circumstances, we compare it to an act which has been prescribed, to an order which has been established—and say it recurs according to a *law*. On the analogy between political *laws* or *laws* proper, and those which are called metaphorically *laws* of nature, see Lindley, *Introduction to Jurisprudence*, app., p. 1.

Austin, *Province of Jurisprudence Determined*, p. 186.

Law and Cause.

The word *law* expresses the constant and regular order according to which an energy or agent operates. It may thus be distinguished from *cause*—the latter denoting *efficiency*, the former denoting the mode according to which efficiency is developed. “It is a perversion of language,” says Paley (*Nat. Theol.*, ch. 1), “to assign any *law*, as the efficient, operative cause of anything. A *law* pre-supposes an agent; this is only the mode, according to which an agent proceeds; it implies a power; for it is the order according to which that power acts. Without this agent, without this power, which are both distinct from itself, the *law* does nothing, is nothing.” To the same purpose Dr. Reid has said, “The *laws* of nature are the rules according to which effects are produced; but there must be a

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cause which operates according to these rules. The rules of navigation never steered a ship, nor the *law* of gravity never moved a planet.”

“Those who go about to attribute the origination of mankind (or any other effect) to a bare order or *law* of nature, as the primitive effector thereof, speak that which is perfectly irrational and unintelligible; for although a *law* or rule is the method and order by which an intelligent being may act, yet a *law*, or rule, or order, is a dead, unactive, uneffective, thing of itself, without an agent that useth it, and exerciseth it as his rule and method of action. What would a *law* signify in a kingdom or state, unless there were some person or society of men that did exercise and execute, and judge, and determine, and act by it, or according to it?”—Hales, *Prim. Origin.*, chap. 7, sect. 4.

To maintain that the world is governed by *laws*, without ascending to the superior reason of these *laws*—not to recognize that every *law* implies a legislator and executor, an agent to put it in force, is to stop half-way; it is to hypostatise these *laws*, to make beings of them, and to imagine fabulous divinities in ignoring the only God who is the source of all *laws*, and who governs by them all that lives in the universe.—See Tiberghien, *Essai des Connaiss. Hum.*, p. 743

“A *law* supposes an agent and a power; for it is the mode, according to which the agent proceeds, the order according to which the power acts. Without the presence of such an agent, of such a power, conscious of the relations on which the *law* depends, producing the effects which the *law* prescribes, the *law* can have no efficacy, no existence. Hence we infer, that the intelligence by which the *law* is ordained, the power by which it is put into action, must be present at all times and in all places, where the effects of the *law* occur; that thus the knowledge and the agency of the Divine Being pervade every portion of the universe, producing all action and passion, all permanence and change. The *laws* of matter are the *laws*

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which he, in his wisdom, prescribes to his own acts; his universal presence is the necessary condition of any course of events; his universal agency, the only organ of any efficient force."—Whewell, *Astronomy*, p. 361.

Law, Physical, Mental, Moral, Political.

Laws may acquire different names from the difference in the agents or energies which operate according to them. A stone when thrown up into the air rises to a height proportional to the force with which it is thrown, and then falls to the ground by its own gravity. This takes place according to *physical laws*, or what are commonly called *laws of nature*.

"Those principles and faculties are the general *laws* of our constitution, and hold the same place in the philosophy of mind that the general *laws* we investigate in physics hold in that branch of science." — Stewart, *Philosoph. of Hum. Mind.*, part 1, introd. When an impression has been made upon a bodily organ a state of sensation follows in the mind. And when a state of sensation has been long continued or often repeated it comes to be less sensibly felt. These are *mental laws*. We have a faculty of memory by which the objects of former consciousness are recalled; and this faculty operates according to the *laws* of association.

Moral laws are derived from the nature and will of God, and the character and condition of man, and may be understood and adopted by man, as a being endowed with intelligence and will, to be the rules by which to regulate his actions. It is right to speak the truth. Gratitude should be cherished. These things are in accordance with the nature and condition of man, and with the will of God—that is, they are in accordance with the *moral law* of conscience and of revelation.

Political laws are prohibitions or injunctions promulgated by those having authority to do so, and may be obeyed or disobeyed; but the disobedience of them implies punishment.

"The *intent* or *purpose* of a law is wholly different from

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the *motives* or *grounds* of the law. The former is its practical end or effect; the latter, the pre-existing circumstances which suggested and caused its enactment.* For example, the existence of a famine in a country, may tend to the enactment of a poor law. In this case the famine is the motive or ground of the *law*; and the relief of the poor its intent or purpose. The one is its positive cause, the latter its desired effect."—Lewis, *Method of Observat. in Politics*, ch. 12, sect. 6.

In reference to the moral *law*, Hobbes and his followers have overlooked the difference between a *law* and the *principle* of the *law*. An action is not right merely in consequence of a *law* declaring it to be so. But the declaration of the *law* proceeds upon the antecedent rightness of the action.

Law and Form,—"though correlative terms, must not, in strict accuracy, be used as synonymous. The former is used properly with reference to an operation; the latter with reference to its product. *Conceiving, judging, reasoning*, are subject to certain *laws*; *concepts, judgments, syllogisms*, exhibit certain *forms*."—Mansell, *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 240.

LEMMA (from λαμβανειν, *sumere*, to take for granted, to assume).—This term is used to denote a preliminary proposition, which, while it has no direct relation to the point to be proved, yet serves to pave the way for the proof. In Logic, a premiss taken for granted is sometimes called a *lemma*. To prove some proposition in mechanics, some of the propositions in geometry may be taken as *lemmata*.

LIBERTARIAN.—"I believe he (Dr. Crombie, that is) may claim the merit of adding the word *Libertarian* to the

* Suarez (*De Legibus*, iii., 20, sect. 2) says, "Sine dubio in animo legislatoris hæc duo distincta sunt, scilicet voluntas sen intentio ejus, secundum quam vult præcipere, et ratio, ob quam movetur."

The *ratio legis* and the *mens legis* are distinguished by Grotius (*J. B. et P.*, ii., 16, sect. 8) with Barbeyrac's notes; and by Puffendorff (*v.*, 12, sect. 10). The *purpose* of a *law* and its *motive* have often been confounded under the general term *ratio legis*.—See Savigny, *System des Rechts*, vol. i., pp. 216-224.

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English language, as Priestley added that of *Necessarian*."
—*Correspondence of Dr. Reid*, p. 88.

Both words have reference to the questions concerning liberty and necessity, in moral agency.

LIBERTY of the WILL or LIBERTY of a MORAL AGENT.

“The idea of *liberty* is the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other.”—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. ii., ch. 21, sect. 8.

“By the *liberty* of a moral agent, I understand a power over the determinations of his own will. If, in any action, he had power to will what he did, or not to will it, in that action he is free. But if, in every voluntary action, the determination of his will be the necessary consequence of something involuntary in the state of his mind, or of something in his external circumstances, he is not free; he has not what I call the *liberty* of a moral agent, but is subject to necessity.”—Reid, *Active Powers*, essay iv., ch. 1.

It has been common to distinguish *liberty* into *freedom from co-action*, and *freedom from necessity*.

Freedom from co-action implies, on the one hand, the absence of all impediment or restraint, and, on the other hand, the absence of all compulsion or violence. If we are prevented from doing what is in our power, when we desire and will to do it, or, if we are compelled to do it, when we desire and will not to do it, we are not free from *co-action*. This general explanation of freedom agrees equally with *bodily freedom*, *mental freedom*, and *moral freedom*. Indeed, although it is common to make a distinction between these, there is no difference, except what is denoted by the different epithets introduced. We have *bodily freedom*, when our body is not subjected to restraint or compulsion—*mental freedom*, when no impediment or violence prevents us from duly exercising our powers of mind—and *moral freedom*, when our moral principles and feelings are allowed

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to operate within the sphere which has been assigned to them. Now it is with freedom regarded as moral that we have here to do—it is with freedom as the attribute of a being who possesses a moral nature, and who exerts the active power which belongs to him, in the light of reason, and under a sense of responsibility. Liberty of this kind is called *freedom from necessity*.

Freedom from necessity is also called *liberty of election*, or power to choose, and implies freedom from anything invincibly determining a moral agent. It has been distinguished into *liberty of contrariety*, or the power of determining to do either of two actions which are contrary, as right or wrong, good or evil; and *liberty of contradiction*, or the power of determining to do either of two actions which are contradictory, as to walk or to sit still, to walk in one direction or in another.

Freedom from necessity is sometimes also called *liberty of indifference*, because, before he makes his election, the agent has not determined in favour of one action more than another. *Liberty of indifference*, however, does not mean, as some would have it, liberty of equilibrium, or that the agent has no more inclination towards one action or one mode of action than towards another; for although he may have motives prompting more urgently to one action or course of action, he still has *liberty of election*, if he has the power of determining in favour of another action or another course of action. Still less can the phrase *liberty of indifference* be understood as denoting a power to determine in opposition to all motives, or in absence of any motive. A being with *liberty of indifference* in the former of these senses would not be a reasonable being; and an action done without a motive is an action done without an end in view, that is, without intention or design, and, in that respect, could not be called a moral action, though done by a moral agent.

Liberty of will may be viewed, 1st, in respect of the *object*, and 2d, in respect of the *action*. In both respects it may be *liberty of*, 1st, *contrariety*, or 2d, of *contradiction*.

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Liberty of contrariety in respect of the object is when the will is indifferent to any object and to its opposite or contrary—as when a man is free, for the sake of health, to take hot water or cold water. *Liberty of contradiction* is when the will is indifferent to any object, and to its opposite or contradictory—as walking and not walking.

In respect of the act of will, there is *liberty of contrariety* when the will is indifferent as to contrary actions concerning the same particular object,—as to choose or reject some particular good. There is *liberty of contradiction* when the will is free not to contrary action, but to act or not to act, that is, to will or not to will, to exercise or suspend volition.

Liberty has also been distinguished into, 1st, *liberty of specification*, and 2d, *liberty of exercise*. The former may be said to coincide with *liberty of contrariety*, and the latter with *liberty of contradiction*.—Baronius, *Metaphys.*, p. 96.

LIFE belongs to organized bodies, that is, animals and vegetables. Birth and development, decay and death, are peculiar to living bodies. Is there a vital principle, distinct on the one hand from matter and its forces, and on the other, from mind and its energies? According to Descartes, Borelli, Boerhäave, and others, the phenomena of living bodies may be explained by the mechanical and chemical forces belonging to matter. According to Bichat, there is nothing in common—but rather an antagonism—between the forces of dead matter and the phenomena of life, which he defines to be “the sum of functions which resist death.” Bichat and his followers are called *Organicists*. Barthez and others hold that there is a vital principle distinct from the organization of living bodies, which directs all their acts and functions which are only vital, that is, without feeling or thought. Their doctrine is *Vitalism*. The older doctrine of Stahl was called *Animism*, according to which the soul, or *anima mundi*, presides not only over the functions of the sensibility and thought, but over all the functions and actions of the living economy.

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Are *life* and *sensibility* two things essentially distinct, or two things essentially united?

Irritability and *Excitability* are terms applied to the sensibility which vegetables manifest to external influences, such as light, heat, &c. Bichat ascribed the functions of absorption, secretion, circulation, &c., which are not accompanied with feeling, to what he called *organic sensibility*.

The characteristics of the several kingdoms of nature given by Linnæus are the following:—*Lapides crescunt: vegetabilia crescunt et vivunt; animalia crescunt vivunt et sentiunt.*

The theories of life and its connection with the phenomena of mind are thus classified by Morell, *Psychology*, p. 77, note:—

1. The *chemical* theory. This was represented by Sylvius in the seventeenth century, who reduced all the phenomena of vital action and organization to *chemical processes*.
2. The *mechanical* theory. This falls to the time when Harvey discovered the circulation of the blood, and Boerhåave represented the human frame as one great hydraulic machine.
3. The *dynamical* theory. Here we have the phenomena of mind and of life drawn closely together. The writings of Stahl especially show this point of view. He regarded the whole man as being the product of certain *organic powers*, which evolve all the various manifestations of human life, from the lowest physical processes to the highest intellectual.
4. The theory of *irritation*. This we find more especially amongst the French physiologists, such as Bichat, Majendie, and others, who regard life as being the product of a mere organism, acted on by physical stimuli from the world without.
5. The theory of *evolution*. Schultz and others of the German writers of the same school, regard life as a regular *evolution*, created by opposing powers in the universe of existence, from the lowest forms of the vital functions to the highest spheres of thought and activity. To these speculators nature is not a fixed reality, but a *relation*. It is perpetual movement, an unceasing *becoming*,

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a passing from death to life, and from life to death. And just as physical life consists in the tension of the lower powers of nature, so does mental life consist in that of its higher powers. 6. The theory of the *Divine ideal*. Here, Carus, prompted by Schelling's philosophy, has seized the *ideal* side of nature, as well as the *real*, and united them together in his theory of the genesis of the soul, and thus connected the whole dynamics of nature with their *Divine original*.

Plato, *Timæus*.

Aristotle, *De Anima*, lib. ii., cap. 10.

Descartes, *Œuvres*, par Cousin, tom. iv.

Barthez, Bichat, Cabanis, and Berard.

Coleridge, Posthumous Essay: *Hints towards the Formation of a more Comprehensive Theory of Life—a plagiarism from a work of Schelling's, in which Life is defined to be "the Principle of Individuation."*

LOGIC (λογική, λόγος, reason, reasoning, language).—The word *logica* was early used in Latin; while ἡ λογική and το λογικον were late in coming into use in Greek. Aristotle did not use either of them. His writings which treat of the syllogism and of demonstration were entitled *Analytics* (*q. v.*) The name *organon* was not given to the collected series of his writings upon *logic* till after the invention of printing. The reason of the name is that *logic* was regarded as not so much a science in itself as the *instrument* of all science. The Epicureans called it κανονική, the rule by which true and false are to be tried. Plato, in the *Phædrus*, has called it a *part* (μερος), and in the *Parmenides* the organ (ὄργανον) of philosophy.—See Trendlenburg, *Elementa Log. Aristot.*, 8vo, Basil. 1842, pp. 48-49. An old division of philosophy was into *logic*, *ethics*, and *physics*. But excluding physics, philosophy may be regarded as consisting of four parts—viz., *psychology*, *logic*, *ethics*, and *metaphysics* properly so called.

“When we attend to the procedure of the human intellect we soon perceive that it is subject to certain supreme laws

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which are independent of the variable matter of our ideas, and which, posited in their abstract generality, express the absolute and fixed rules not only of the human intellect, but of all thought, whatever be the subject which frames it or the object which it concerns. To determine those universal laws of thought in general, in order that the human mind in particular may find in all its researches a means of control and an infallible criterion of the legitimacy of its procedure, is the object of *logic*. At the beginning of the first analytics, Aristotle has laid it down that ‘the object of *logic* is demonstration.’

“*Logic* is the science of the laws of thought as thought—that is, of the necessary conditions to which thought, considered in itself, is subject.”—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 698, note.

“‘*Logic* is the science of the laws of thought.’ It is a science rather than an art. As the science of the necessary laws of thought it is pure. It only gives those principles which constitute thought; and pre-supposes the operation of those principles by which we gain the materials for thinking. And it is the science of the *form* or *formal laws* of thinking, and not of the *matter*.”—Thomson, *Outline of the Laws of Thought*.—V. INTENTION, NOTION.

Others define *logic* to be the science of the laws of reasoning. Dr. Whately has said, “*Logic* in its most extensive application, is the science as well as the art of reasoning. So far as it institutes an analysis of the process of the mind in reasoning, it is strictly a *science*; while so far as it investigates the principles on which argumentation is conducted, and furnishes rules to secure the mind from error in its deductions, it may be called the *art* of reasoning.”

Kirwan had said (*Logic*, vol. i., p. 1), “*Logic* is both a science and an art; it is a *science* inasmuch as, by analyzing the elements, principles, and structure of arguments, it teaches us how to discover their truth or detect their fallacies, and point out the sources of such errors. It is an *art*, inasmuch as it teaches us how to arrange arguments in

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such manner that their truth may be most readily perceived or their falsehood detected." Sir William Hamilton thinks that Dr. Whately had this passage in view when he constructed his own definition; but he adds, "Not a single reason has been alleged to induce us to waver in our belief, that the *laws of thought*, and not the *laws of reasoning*, constitute the adequate object of the science."—*Discussions*, pp. 131-4.

According to the significations attached to the terms art and science, and according to the point of view in which it is regarded, *logic* may be called a science or an art, or both, that is, a scientific art.

Thought may manifest itself in framing concepts, or judgments, or reasonings; and *logic* treats of these under three corresponding heads. Method, which is the scientific arrangement of thoughts, is frequently added as a fourth head. But to some it appears that method belongs more properly to psychology than to *logic*. Barthelemy St. Hilaire, who takes this view, has said (*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*, art. *Logique*), "In *logic* considered as a science there are necessarily four essential parts, which proceed from the simple to the compound, and in the following order, which cannot be changed: 1, A theory of the elements of a proposition; 2, A theory of propositions; 3, A general theory of reasoning formed of propositions connected with one another according to certain laws; and, lastly, A theory of that special and supreme kind of reasoning which is called demonstration, and gives assurance to the mind of man of the forms of truth, if it be not truth itself."

LOVE and HATRED are the two generic or mother passions or affections of mind, from which all the others take their rise. The former is awakened by the contemplation of something which is regarded as good; and the latter by the contemplation of something which is regarded as evil. Hence springs a desire to seek the one, and a desire to shun the other; and desire under its various forms and

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modifications may be found as an element in all the manifestations of the sensitivity.

MACROCOSM and MICROCOSM (*μακρός*, large, *μικρός*, small, and *κόσμος*, world).

“As for Paracelsus, certainly he is injurious to man, if (as some eminent chemists expound him) he calls a man a *microcosm*, because his body is really made up of all the several kinds of creatures the *macrocosm* or greater world consists of, and so is but a model or epitome of the universe.”—Boyle, *Works*, vol. ii., p. 54.

Many ancient philosophers regarded the world as an animal, consisting like man of a soul and a body. This opinion, exaggerated by the mystics, became the theory of the *macrocosm* and the *microcosm*, according to which man was an epitome of creation, and the universe was man on a grand scale. The same principles and powers which were perceived in the one were attributed to the other, and while man was believed to have a supernatural power over the laws of the universe, the phenomena of the universe had an influence on the actions and destiny of man. Hence arose Alchemy and Astrology, which were united in the Hermetic medicine. Such views are fundamentally pantheistic, leading to the belief that there is only one substance, manifesting itself in the universe by an infinite variety, and centred in man as in an epitome. Van Helmont, Paracelsus, Robert Fludd, and others held some of these views.

Dr. Reid has said (*Active Powers*, essay iii., part 1, chap. 1), “Man has, not without reason, been called an epitome of the universe. His body, by which his mind is greatly affected, being a part of the material system, is subject to all the laws of inanimate matter. During some part of his existence, his state is very like that of a vegetable. He rises, by imperceptible degrees, to the animal, and, at last, to the rational life, and has the principles that belong to all.”

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“Man is not only a *microcosm*, in the structure of his body, but in the system, too, of his impulses, including all of them within him, from the basest to the most sublime.”

—Harris, *Philosoph. Arrange.*, cap. 17.

“Man is a living synthesis of the universe.”—Tiberghien.

Mons. Cousin (*Introd. aux Œuvres Inédites d'Abelard*, p. 127,) has given an analysis of a MS. work by Bernard de Chartres, entitled *Megacosmus et Microcosmus*.

MAGNANIMITY and EQUANIMITY (greatness of mind and evenness of mind)—are two words which were much used by Cicero and other ancient ethical writers.

Magnanimity was described as lifting us above the good and evil of this life—so that while the former was not necessary to our happiness, the latter could not make us miserable. The favourite example of *magnanimity* among the Romans was Fabius Maximus, who, amidst the provocation of the enemy and the impatience of his countrymen, delayed to give battle till he saw how he could do so successfully.

Equanimity supposes change of state or fortune, and means the preservation of an even mind in the midst of vicissitude — neither elated unduly by prosperity nor depressed unduly by adversity. *Equanimity* springs from *Magnanimity*. Indeed both these words denote frames or states of mind from which special acts of virtue spring—rather than any particular virtue. They correspond to the active and passive *fortitude* of modern moralists.

MANICHEISM (so called from Manes, a Persian philosopher, who flourished about the beginning of the third century)—is the doctrine that there are two eternal principles or powers, the one good and the other evil, to which the happiness and misery of all beings may be traced. It has been questioned whether this doctrine was ever maintained to the extent of denying the Divine unity, or that the system of things had not an ultimate tendency to good. It is said that the Persians, before Manes, maintained dualism so as to give the supremacy to the good principle. And that Manes maintained both to be equally eternal and absolute.

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The doctrine of *manicheism* was ingrafted upon Christianity about the middle of the third century. The Cathari or Albigenses who appeared in the twelfth century are said also to have held the doctrine of *dualism* or *ditheism*.—*q. v.*

To refute it we have only to say that if the two opposing principles were equal, they would neutralize each other— if they were unequal, the stronger would prevail, so that there would be nothing but evil or nothing but good in the world ; which is contrary to fact.

Matter, *Hist. Critiq. du Gnosticisme*, 3 tom., Paris, 1843.

Beausobre, *Hist. du Manicheisme*.

MATERIALISM.—“The *materialists* maintain that man consists of one uniform substance, the object of the senses ; and that perception, with its modes, is the result, necessary or otherwise, of the organization of the brain.”—Belsham, *Moral Philosophy*, chap. xi., sect. 1. The doctrine opposed to this is *spiritualism*, or the doctrine that there is a spirit in man, and that he has a soul as well as a body. In like manner, he who maintains that there is but one substance (*unisubstancisme*), and that that substance is matter, is a *materialist*. And he who holds that above and beyond the material frame of the universe there is a spirit sustaining and directing it is a *spiritualist*. The philosopher who admits that there is a spirit in man, and a spirit in the universe, is a perfect *spiritualist*. He who denies spirit in man or in the universe is a perfect *materialist*. But some have been inconsistent enough to admit a spirit in man and deny the existence of God, while others have admitted the existence of God and denied the soul of man to be spiritual.—*V. IMMATERIALITY.*

Baxter and Drew have both written on the immateriality of the soul. Belsham and Priestley have defended *materialism* without denying the existence of God.

Priestley, *Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit*.

Priestley, *Three Dissertations on the Doctrine of Materialism and Philosophical Necessity*.

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Price, *Letters on Materialism and Philosophical Necessity*.

MATTER, as opposed to *mind* or *spirit* (*q. v.*), is that which occupies space, and with which we become acquainted by means of our bodily senses or organs. Everything of which we have any knowledge is either *matter* or *mind*, *i. e.*, *spirit*. *Mind* is that which knows and thinks. *Matter* is that which makes itself known by means of the bodily senses.

“The first form which *matter* assumes is extension, or length, breadth, and thickness—it then becomes *body*. If body were infinite there could be no *figure*, which is body bounded. But body is not physical body, unless it partake of or is constituted of one or more of the elements, fire, air, earth, or water.”—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, b. ii., c. 2.

According to Descartes the essence of *mind* is *thought*, and the essence of *matter* is *extension*. He said, Give me extension and motion, and I shall make the world. Leibnitz said the essence of all being, whether *mind* or *matter*, is *force*. *Matter* is an assemblage of simple forces or monads. His system of physics may be called *dynamical*, in opposition to that of Newton, which may be called *mechanical*; because Leibnitz held that the monads possessed a vital or living energy. We may explain the phenomena of *matter* by the movements of ether, by gravity and electricity; but the ultimate reason of all movement is a force primitively communicated at creation, a force which is everywhere, but which while it is present in all bodies is differently limited; and this force, this virtue or power of action is inherent in all substances material and spiritual. Created substances received from the creative substance not only the faculty to act, but also to exercise their activity each after its own manner. See Leibnitz, *De Primæ Philosophiæ Emendatione et de Notione Substantiæ*, or *Nouveau Systeme de la Nature et de la Communication des Substances*, in the *Journal des Savans*, 1695. On the various hypotheses to explain the activity of *matter*, see Stewart,

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Outlines, part 2, ch. 2, sect. 1, and *Active and Mor. Powers*, last edit., vol. ii., note A.

The properties which have been predicated as essential to *matter* are impenetrability, extension, divisibility, inertia, weight. To the senses it manifests colour, sound, smell, taste, heat, and motion; and by observation it is discovered to possess elasticity, electricity, magnetism, &c.

Metaphysicians have distinguished the qualities of *matter* into primary and secondary, and have said that our knowledge of the former, as of impenetrability and extension, is clear and absolute—while our knowledge of the latter, as of sound and smell, is obscure and relative. This distinction taken by Descartes, adopted by Locke and also by Reid and Stewart, was rejected by Kant, according to whom, indeed, all our knowledge is relative. And others who do not doubt the objective reality of *matter*, hold that our knowledge of all its qualities is the same in kind. See the distinctions precisely stated and strenuously upheld by Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note D; and ingeniously controverted by Mons. Emile Saisset, in *Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*, art. *Matiere*.

Matter and Form.

Matter as opposed to *form* (*q. v.*) is that elementary constituent in composite substances, which appertains in common to them all without distinguishing them from one another. Everything generated or made, whether by nature or art, is generated or made out of something else; and this something else is called its *subject* or *matter*. Such is iron to the boat, such is timber to the boat. *Matter* void of *form* was called *ὑλη πρωτη*, or, *prima materia*—(*ὑλη*, means wood.—*V. HYLOZOISM*). *Form* when united to *matter* makes it determinate and constitutes *body* (*q. v.*)

“The term *matter* is usually applied to whatever is given to the artist, and consequently, as given, does not come within the province of the art itself to supply. The *form* is that which is given in and through the proper operation of the art. In sculpture, the *matter* is the marble in its

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rough state as given to the sculptor; the *form* is that which the sculptor in the exercise of his art communicates to it. The distinction between *matter* and *form* in any mental operation is analogous to this. The former includes all that is given *to*, the latter all that is given *by*, the operation. In the division of notions, for example, the generic notion is that given to be divided; the addition of the difference in the art of division constitutes the species. And accordingly, Genus is frequently designated by Logicians the *material*, Difference, the *formal* part of the species."—Mansell, *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 226.

Harris, *Philosoph. Arrange.*, chap. iv.

Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, book ii., chap. 1.

Reid, *Intell. Powers*, essay ii., ch. 19.

MAXIM (*maxima propositio*, a proposition of the greatest weight)—is used by Boethius as synonymous with *axiom*, or a self-evident truth.—Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note A, sect. 5. It is used in the same way by Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iv., chap. 7. "There are a sort of propositions, which, under the name of *maxims* and *axioms*, have passed for principles of science." "By Kant, *maxim* was employed to designate a subjective principle, theoretical or practical, *i. e.*, one not of objective validity, being exclusively relative to some interest of the subject. *Maxim* and *regulative principle* are, in the critical philosophy, opposed to law and constitutive principle."

In Morals, we have Rochefoucauld's *Maxims*.

In Theology, Fenelon wrote *Maxims of the Saints*, and Rollin made a collection of *Maxims* drawn from holy writ.

MEMORY (from *memini*, preterite of the obsolete form *meneo* or *meno*, from the Greek μένειν, *manere*, to stay or remain. From the contracted form μένω comes μνημη, the memory, in which things remain).—"The great Keeper or Master of the Rolls of the soul, a power that can make amends for the speed of time, in causing him to leave behind him those things which else he would so carry away as if they had not been."—Bishop Hall, *Righteous Mammon*.

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Consciousness testifies that when a thought has once been present to the mind, it may again become present to it, with the additional consciousness that it has formerly been present to it. When this takes place we are said to *remember*, and the faculty of which *remembrance* is the act is *memory*.

Memory implies,—1. A mode of consciousness experienced. 2. The retaining or remaining of that mode of consciousness so that it may subsequently be revived without the presence of its object. 3. The actual revival of that mode of consciousness; and 4. The recognizing that mode of consciousness as having formerly been experienced.

“The word *memory* is not employed uniformly in the same precise sense; but it always expresses some modification of that faculty, which enables us to treasure up, and preserve for future use, the knowledge we acquire; a faculty which is obviously the great foundation of all intellectual improvement, and without which no advantage could be derived from the most enlarged experience. This faculty implies two things; a capacity of retaining knowledge, and a power of recalling it to our thoughts when we have occasion to apply it to use. The word *memory* is sometimes employed to express the capacity, and sometimes the power. When we speak of a *retentive memory*, we use it in the former sense; when of a *ready memory*, in the latter.”—Stewart, *Philosoph. of Hum. Mind*, ch. 6.

Memory has, and must have, an object; for he that remembers must remember something, and that which he remembers is the object of memory. It is neither a decaying sense, as Hobbes would make it, nor a transformed sensation, as Condillac would have it to be; but a distinct and original faculty, the phenomena of which cannot be included under those of any other power. The objects of *memory* may be things external to us, or internal states and modes of consciousness; and we may remember what we have seen, touched, or tasted; or we may remember a

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feeling of joy or sorrow which we formerly experienced, or a resolution or purpose which we previously formed.

Hobbes would confine *memory* to objects of sense. He says (*Human Nature*, ch. 3, sect. 6), "By the senses, which are numbered according to the organs to be five, we take notice of the objects without us, and that notice is our conception thereof: but we take notice also, some way or other, of our conception, for when the conception of the same thing cometh again, we take notice that it is again, that is to say, that we have had the same conception before, which is as much as to imagine a thing past, which is impossible to the sense which is only of things present; this, therefore, may be accounted a sixth sense, but internal; not external as the rest, and is commonly called *remembrance*."

Mr. Stewart holds that *memory* involves "a power of recognizing, as former objects of attention, the thoughts that from time to time occur to us: a power which is not implied in that law of our nature which is called the association of ideas." But the distinction thus taken between *memory* and *association* is not very consistent with a further distinction which he takes between the *memory of things* and the *memory of events*. (*Philosoph. of Hum. Mind*, chap. 6). "In the former case, thoughts which have been previously in the mind, may recur to us without suggesting the idea of the past, or of any modification of time whatever; as when I repeat over a poem which I have got by heart, or when I think of the features of an absent friend. In this last instance, indeed, philosophers distinguish the act of the mind by the name of *conception*; but in ordinary discourse, and frequently even in philosophical writing, it is considered as an exertion of *memory*. In these and similar cases, it is obvious that the operations of this faculty do not necessarily involve the idea of the past. The case is different with respect to the *memory of events*. When I think of these, I not only recall to the mind the former objects of its thoughts, but I refer the event to a particular point of time; so that, of every such act of *memory*, the idea of the past is a neces-

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sary concomitant." Mr. Stewart therefore supposes "that the remembrance of a past *event* is not a simple act of the mind; but that the mind first forms a conception of the event, and then judges from circumstances, of the period of time to which it is to be referred." But the remembrance of a *thing* is not a simple act of the mind, any more than the remembrance of an *event*. The truth seems to be that *things* and *events* recur to the mind equally unclothed or unconnected with the notion of pastness. (See Young, *Intellect. Philosoph.*, lect. xvi.) And it is not till they are recognized as objects of former consciousness that they can be said to be remembered. But the recognition is the act of the judging faculty. Thoughts which have formerly been present to the mind may again become present to it without being recognized. Nay, they may be entertained for a time as new thoughts, but it is not till they have been recognized as objects of former consciousness that they can be regarded as remembered thoughts,* so that an act of *memory*, whether of things or events, is by no means a simple act of the mind. Indeed, it may be doubted whether in any mental operation we can detect any single faculty acting independently of others. What we mean by calling them distinct faculties is, that each has a separate or peculiar function; not that that function is exercised independently of other faculties.—See FACULTY.

Mr. Locke (book ii., chap. 10.) treats of *retention*. "The next faculty of the mind (after perception), whereby it makes a further progress towards knowledge, is that which I call *retention*, or the keeping of those simple ideas, which from sensation or reflection it hath received. This is done two ways: first, by keeping the idea which is brought into it for some time actually in view; which is called *contemplation*. The other way of *retention*, is the power to revive again in our minds those ideas which, after imprinting,

* Aristotle (*De Memoria et Reminiscentia*, cap. 1.) has said that *memory* is always accompanied with the notion of time, and that only those animals that have the notion of time have *memory*.

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have disappeared, or have been as it were laid aside out of sight; and thus we do, when we conceive heat or light, yellow or sweet,—the object being removed. This is *memory*, which is as it were the store-house of our ideas.”—V.

RETENTION.

The circumstances which have a tendency to facilitate or insure the retention or the recurrence of anything by the *memory*, are chiefly—*Vividness*, *Repetition*, and *Attention*. When an object affects us in a pleasant or in a disagreeable manner—when it is frequently or familiarly observed—or when it is examined with attention and interest, it is more easily and surely remembered.

“The things which are best preserved by the *memory*,” said Lord Herbert (*De Veritate*, p. 156), “are the things which *please* or *terrify*—which are *great* or *new*—to which much *attention* has been paid—or which have been oft *repeated*,—which are *apt* to the circumstances—or which have many things *related* to them.”

The qualities of a good *memory* are, susceptibility, retentiveness, and readiness.

The common saying that *memory* and judgment are not often found in the same individual, in a high degree, must be received with qualification.

Memory in all its manifestations is very much influenced and guided by what have been called the laws of *association*.—q. v.

In its first manifestations, *memory* operates spontaneously, and thoughts are allowed to come and go through the mind without direction or control. But it comes subsequently to be exercised with intention and will; some thoughts being sought and invited, and others being shunned and as far as possible excluded. *Spontaneous memory* is *remembrance*. *Intentional memory* is *recollection* or *reminiscence*.

The former in Greek is *Μνήμη* and the latter *Αναμνησις*. In both forms, but especially in the latter, we are sensible of the influence which *association* has in regulating the exercise of this faculty.

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By *memory*, we not only retain and recall former knowledge, but we also acquire new knowledge. It is by means of *memory* that we have the notion of continued existence or duration; and also the persuasion of our personal identity, amidst all the changes of our bodily frame, and all the alterations of our temper and habits.

Memory, in its spontaneous or passive manifestation, is common to man with the inferior animals. But Aristotle denied that they are capable of *recollection or reminiscence*, which is a kind of reasoning by which we ascend from a present consciousness to a former, and from that to a more remote, till the whole facts of some case are brought again back to us. And Dr. Reid has remarked that the inferior animals do not measure time nor possess any distinct knowledge of intervals of time. In man *memory* is the condition of all experience, and consequently of all progress.

Memory in its exercise is very dependent upon bodily organs, particularly the brain. In persons under fever, or in danger of drowning, the brain is preternaturally excited; and in such cases it has been observed that *memory* becomes more remote and far-reaching in its exercise than under ordinary and healthy circumstances. Several authentic cases of this kind are on record. (See Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria; Confessions of an English Opium Eater*; and the *Autobiography of Sir John Barrow*, p. 398). And hence the question has been suggested, whether thought be not absolutely imperishable—or whether every object of former consciousness may not, under peculiar circumstances, be liable to be recalled?

On *Memory*, see Aristotle, *De Memoria et Reminiscentia*.
Beattie, *Dissertations*.

Reid, *Intell. Powers*, essay iii.

Stewart, *Philosoph. of Hum. Mind*, ch. 6.

MEMORIA TECHNICA, or MNEMONICS.—These terms are applied to artificial methods which have been devised to assist the memory. They all rest on the association of ideas. The relations by which ideas are most easily and

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firmly associated are those of contiguity in place and resemblance. On these two relations the principal methods of assisting the memory have been founded. The methods of *localization* or local memory associate the object which it is wished to remember with some place or building, all the parts of which are well known. The methods of *resemblance* or *symbolization*, establish some resemblance either between the things or the words which it is wished to remember, and some object more familiar to the mind. Rhythm and rhyme giving aid to the memory, technical verses have been framed for that purpose in various departments of study.

The topical or local memory has been traced back to Simonides, who lived in the sixth century, B.C. Cicero (*De Oratore*, ii., 86) describes a local memory or gives a Topology. Quintilian (xi., 2) and Pliny the naturalist (vii., 24) also describe this art.

In modern times, may be mentioned Grey, *Memoria Technica*, 1730; and Feinagle, *New Art of Memory*, 1812.

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.—The adjective *mental* comes to us from the Latin *mens*, or from the Greek μένος, or these may be referred to the German *meinen*, to mean, to mark. If the adjective *mental* be regarded as coming from the Latin *mens*, then *mental philosophy* will be the philosophy of the human mind, and will correspond with psychology. If the adjective *mental* be regarded as coming from the German *meinen*, to mean or to mark, then the phrase *mental philosophy* may be restricted to the philosophy of the mind in its intellectual energies, or those faculties by which it marks or *knows*, as distinguished from those faculties by which it *feels* and *wills*. It would appear that it is often used in this restricted signification to denote the philosophy of the intellect, or of the intellectual powers as contradistinguished from the active powers, exclusive of the phenomena of the sensitivity and the will.

See Chalmers, *Sketches of Moral and Mental Philosophy*, chap. 1.

MERIT (*meritum*, from *μέρος*, a part or portion, of labour or reward)—means good desert; having done something worthy of praise or reward.

Fear not the anger of the wise to raise
Those best can bear reproof, who *merit* praise.

Pope, *Essay on Criticism*.

In seeing a thing to be right, we see at the same time that we ought to do it; and when we have done it we experience a feeling of conscious satisfaction or self-approbation. We thus come by the idea of *merit* or good desert. The approbation of our own mind is an indication that God approves of our conduct; and the religious sentiment strengthens the moral one. We have the same sentiments towards others. When we see another do what is right we applaud him. When we see him do what is right in the midst of temptation and difficulty, we say he has much *merit*. Such conduct appears to be deserving of reward. Virtue and happiness ought to go together. We are satisfied that under the government of God they will do so.

The idea of *merit* then is a primary and natural idea to the mind of man. It is not an after thought to praise the doing of what is right from seeing that it is beneficial, but a spontaneous sentiment indissolubly connected with our idea of what is right, a sentiment guaranteed as to its truthfulness by the structure of the human mind and the character of God.

See Price, *Review of the Principal Questions in Morals*.

Theological writers make a distinction between *merit of congruity* and *merit of condignity*. Only Popish writers admit *merit* in the latter sense.—V. VIRTUE.

METAPHOR.—"A *metaphor* is the transferring of a word from its usual meaning to an analogous meaning, and then the employing it agreeably to such transfer." Arist., *Poet.*, cap. 21. For example: the usual meaning of evening is the conclusion of the day. But age too is a conclusion, the conclusion of human life. Now there being an analogy in all conclusions, we arrange in order the

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two we have alleged, and say, that “as evening is to the day, so is age to human life.” Hence by an easy permutation (which furnishes at once two *metaphors*) we say alternately, that “evening is the age of the day,” and that “age is the evening of life.”—Harris, *Philosoph. Arrange.*, p. 441.

“Sweet is primarily and properly applied to tastes; secondarily and improperly (*i. e.*, by analogy) to sounds.

When the secondary meaning of a word is founded on some *fanciful* analogy, and especially when it is introduced for ornament's sake, we call this a *metaphor*, as when we speak of a ship's *ploughing* the deep; the turning up of the surface being essential indeed to the plough, but accidental only to the ship.”—Whately, *Logic*, b. iii., sect. 10.—*V. ANALOGY.*

METAPHYSICS.—This word is commonly said to have originated in the fact that Tyrannion or Andronicus, the collectors and conservers of the works of Aristotle, inscribed upon a portion of them the words Τα μετα τα φυσικα. But a late French critic, Mons. Ravaisson (*Essai sur la Metaphysique*, tom. i., p. 40), says he has found earlier traces of this phrase, and thinks it probable that, although not employed by Aristotle himself, it was applied to this portion of his writings by some of his immediate disciples. Whether the phrase was intended merely to indicate that this portion should *stand*, or that it should be *studied* after the physics, in the collected works of Aristotle, are the two views which have been taken. In point of fact, this portion does usually stand after the physics. But, in the order of science or study, Aristotle said, that after physics should come mathematics. And Derodon (*Proem. Metaphys.*) has given reasons why *metaphysics* should be studied after logic and before physics and other parts of philosophy. But the truth is that the preposition *μετα* means *along with* as well as *after*, and might even be translated *above*. In Latin *metaphysica* is synonymous with *supernaturalia*. And in English Shake-

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speare has used *metaphysical* as synonymous with *supernatural*.

. . . Fate and *metaphysical* aid doth seem
To have thee crowned.

Macbeth, Act i., scene 3.

In common usage *hyperphysical*, or that which is above and beyond nature, is the meaning attached to *metaphysical*. And Aristotle has said (*Metaphys.*, lib. iii., cap. 3) that there is a science above physics. "Ἔστι γὰρ ἔπι τοῦ φυσικοῦ τι ἄνωτερον. But if *μετα* be interpreted, as it may, to mean *along with*, then *metaphysics* or metaphysical philosophy will be that philosophy which we should take *along with* us into physics, and into every other philosophy—that knowledge of causes and principles which we should carry with us into every department of inquiry. Aristotle called it the governing philosophy, which gives laws to all, but receives laws from none (*Metaphys.*, lib. i., cap. 2). Lord Bacon has limited its sphere, when he says, "The one part (of philosophy) which is *physics* enquireth and handleth the *material* and *efficient* causes; and the other which is *metaphysic* handleth the *formal* and *final* cause."—(*Advancement of Learning*, book ii.)* But all causes are considered by Aristotle in his writings which have been entitled *metaphysics*. The inquiry into causes was called by him the first philosophy—science of truth, science of being. It has for its object—not those things which are seen and temporal—phenomenal and passing, but things not seen and eternal, things supersensuous and stable. It investigates the first

* In another passage, however, Bacon admits the advantage if not the validity of a higher *metaphysic* than this. "Because the distributions and partitions of knowledge are not like several lines that meet in one angle, and so touch but in a point, but are like branches of a tree that meet in a stem, which hath a dimension and quantity of entireness and continuance, before it come to discontinue and break itself into arms and boughs; therefore, it is good to erect and constitute one universal science by the name of '*philosophia prima*,' primitive or summary philosophy, as the main and common way, before we come where the ways part and divide themselves; which science, whether I should report deficient or no, I stand doubtful." Except in so far as it proceeded by observation rather than by speculation *à priori*, even this science would have been but lightly esteemed by Bacon.

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principles of nature and of thought, the ultimate causes of existence and of knowledge. It considers things in their essence, independently of the particular properties or determined modes which make a difference between one thing and another. In short, it is ontology or the science of being as being—"Επιστημη του ὄντος ἢ ὄντος (*Metaphys.*, lib. iv.), that is, not the science of any particular being or beings, such as animals or vegetables, lines or numbers, but the science of being in its general and common attributes. There is a science of matter and there is a science of mind. But *Metaphysics* is the science of being as common to both. Aristotle spoke of it as φιλοσοφία πρώτη, first or universal philosophy, and called it θειοτατη και τιμιωτατη, the most honourable and divine science (*Metaphys.*, lib. i., cap. 1, and lib. vi., cap. 1).

"The subject of *Metaphysics* is the *whole* of things. This cannot be otherways known than in its principles and causes. Now these must necessarily be what is *most general* in nature; for it is from *generals* that *particulars* are derived, which cannot exist without the *generals*; whereas the *generals* may exist without the *particulars*. Thus, the species, *man*, cannot exist without the genus, *animal*; but *animal* may be without *man*. And this holds universally of all genuses and specieses. The subject therefore of *metaphysics*, is what is principal in nature, and first, if not in priority of time, in dignity and excellence, and in order likewise, as being the causes of everything in the universe. Leaving, therefore, particular subjects, and their several properties, to particular sciences, this universal science compares these subjects together; considers wherein they differ and wherein they agree: and that which they have in common, but belongs not, in particular to any one science, is the proper object of *metaphysics*."—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, book iii., chap. 4.

Metaphysics is the knowledge of the one and the real in opposition to the many and the apparent (Arist., *Metaphys.*, lib. iii., c. 2). *Matter*, as perceived by the senses,

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is a combination of distinct and heterogeneous qualities, discernible, some by sight, some by smell, &c. What is the *thing itself*, the subject and owner of these several qualities, and yet not identical with any one of them? What is it by virtue of which those several attributes constitute or belong to one and the same thing? *Mind*, presents to consciousness so many distinct states and operations and feelings. What is the nature of that one mind, of which all these are so many modifications? The inquiry may be carried higher still. Can we attain to any single conception of *being* in general, to which both *mind* and *matter* are subordinate, and from which the essence of both may be deduced?—Wolf, *Philosoph. Ration. Disc. Prelim.*, sect. 73.

Mansell, *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 277.

Metaphysics was formerly distinguished into *general* and *special*. The former was called *ontology*—(*q. v.*), or the science of being in general, whether infinite or finite, spiritual or material; and explained therefore the most universal notions and attributes common to all beings—such as entity, nonentity, essence, existence, unity, identity, diversity, &c. This is *metaphysics* properly so called. *Special metaphysics* was sometimes called *Pneumatology*—(*q. v.*), and included—1. *Natural Theology* or *Theodicy*. 2. *Rational Cosmology*, or the science of the origin and order of the world; and 3. *Rational Psychology*, which treated of the nature, faculties, and destiny of the human mind.

The three objects of *special metaphysics*, viz., God, the world, and the human mind, correspond to Kant's three ideas of the pure reason. According to him, a systematic exposition of those notions and truths, the knowledge of which is altogether independent of experience, constitutes the *science of metaphysics*.

“Time was,” says Kant (preface to the first edition of the *Criticism of Pure Reason*), “when *metaphysics* was the *queen* of all the sciences; and if we take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high im-

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portance of her object matter, this title of honour. Now, it is the fashion of the time to heap contempt and scorn upon her; and the matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like Hecuba—

Modo, maxima rerum,
Tot generis, natisque potens,
Nunc trahor exul, inops.

According to D'Alembert (*Melanges*, tom. iv., p. 143), the aim of *metaphysics* is to examine the generation of our ideas and to show that they all come from *sensations*. This is the *ideology* of Condillae and De Tracy.

Mr. Stewart (*Dissert.*, part 2, p. 475) has said that "*Metaphysics* was a word formerly appropriated to the ontology and pneumatology of the schools, but now understood as equally applicable to all those inquiries which have for their object, to trace the various branches of human knowledge to their first principles in the constitution of the human mind." And in the preface to the *Dissert.*, he has said that by *metaphysics* he understands "the inductive philosophy of the human mind." In this sense the word is now popularly employed to denote, not the *rational psychology* of the schools, but *psychology*, or the philosophy of the human mind prosecuted according to the inductive method. In consequence of the subtle and insoluble questions prosecuted by the schoolmen, under the head of *metaphysics*, the word and the inquiries which it includes have been exposed to ridicule.*

* The word *mètaphysics* was handled by Rev. Sydney Smith (*Elementary Sketches of Moral Philosophy*, chap. 1, p. 3,) with as much caution as if it had been a hand-grenade.

"There is a word," he exclaimed, when lecturing with his deep, sonorous, warning voice, "of dire sound and horrible import, which I would fain have kept concealed if I possibly could, but as this is not feasible, I shall even meet the danger at once, and get out of it as well as I can. The word to which I allude is that very tremendous one of '*metaphysics*,' which in a lecture on moral philosophy, seems likely to produce as much alarm as the cry of 'fire' in a crowded playhouse; when Belvidera is left to cry by herself, and every one saves himself in the best manner he can. I must beg of my audience, however, to sit quiet, and in the meantime to make use of the language which the manager would probably adopt on such an

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But there is and must be a *science of being*, otherwise there is and can be no *science of knowing*.

“If by *metaphysics* we mean those truths of the pure reason which always transcend, and not seldom appear to contradict the understanding, or (in the words of the great apostle) spiritual verities which can only be spiritually discerned, and this is the true and legitimate meaning of *metaphysics*, *μετα τα φυσικα*, then I affirm, that this very controversy between the Arminians and the Calvinists (as to grace), in which both are partially right in what they affirm, and both wholly wrong in what they deny, is a proof that without *metaphysics* there can be no light of faith.”—Coleridge, *Notes on Eng. Div.*, vol. i., p. 340.

In French the word *metaphysique* is used as synonymous with *philosophie*, to denote the first principles, or an inquiry into the first principles of any science. *La Metaphysique du Droit*, *La Metaphysique du Moral*, &c. It is the same in German.

METEMPSYCHOSIS (*μετα*, beyond, *ἔμψυχω*, I animate)—is the transmigration or passage of the soul from one body to another. “We read in Plato, that from the opinion of *metempsychosis*, or transmigration of the souls of men into the bodies of beasts most suitable unto their human condition, after his death, Orpheus the musician became a swan.”—Browne, *Vulgar Errors*, b. iii., c. 27.

This doctrine implies a belief in the pre-existence and immortality of the soul. And, according to Herodotus (lib. ii., sect. 123), the Egyptians were the first to espouse both doctrines. They believed that the soul at death entered into some animal created at the moment; and that

occasion: I can assure ladies and gentlemen, there is not the smallest degree of danger.”

The blacksmith of Glamis' description of *metaphysics* was—“Twa folk disputin' thegither; he that's listenin' disna ken what he that's speakin' means, and he that's speakin' disna ken what he means himsel”—that's *metaphysics*.”

Another said, “God forbid that I should say a word against *metaphysics*, only if a man should try to see down his own throat with a lighted candle in his hand, let him take care lest he set his head on fire.”

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after having inhabited the forms of all animals on earth, in the water, or in the air, it returned at the end of three thousand years into a human body, to begin anew a similar course of transmigration. (Among the inhabitants of India the transmigration of the soul was more nearly allied to the doctrine of *emanation*,—*q. v.*) The common opinion is, that the doctrine of transmigration passed from Egypt into Greece. But before any communication between the two countries, it had a place in the Orphic mysteries. Pythagoras may have given more precision to the doctrine. It was adopted by Plato and his followers, and was secretly taught among the early Christians, according to one of St. Jerome's letters. The doctrine, when believed, should lead to abstaining from flesh, fish, or fowl, and this, accordingly, was one of the fundamental injunctions in the religion of Brahma, and in the philosophy of Pythagoras.

METHOD (*μέθοδος, μετα* and *ὁδός*)—means the way or path by which we proceed to the attainment of some object or aim. In its widest acceptance, it denotes the means employed to obtain some end. Every art and every handicraft has its *method*. Cicero translates *μέθοδος* by *via*, and couples it with *ars*. (*Brutus*, c. 12. Compare *De Finibus*, ii., 1, and also *De Orat.*, i., 19).

Scientific or philosophical *method* is the march which the mind follows in ascertaining or communicating truth. It is the putting of our thoughts in a certain order with a view to improve our knowledge or to convey it to others.

Method may be called, in general, *the art of disposing well a series of many thoughts, either for the discovering truth when we are ignorant of it, or for proving it to others when it is already known*. Thus there are two kinds of *method*, one for discovering truth, which is called *analysis*, or the *method of resolution*, and which may also be called the *method of invention*; and the other for explaining it to others when we have found it, which is called *synthesis*, or the *method of composition*, and which may also be called the *method of doctrine*.—*Port Roy. Logic*, part 4, ch. 2.

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“*Method*, which is usually described as the fourth part of Logic, is rather a complete practical Logic. It is rather a power or spirit of the intellect, pervading all that it does, than its tangible product.”—Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, sect. 119.

Every department of Philosophy has its own proper *method*; but there is a universal *method* or science of *method*. This was called by Plato, dialectic; and represented as leading to the true and the real. (*Repub.*, lib. vii.) It has been said that the word μέθοδος, as it occurs in Aristotle's *Ethics*, should be translated “system,” rather than “method.”—(Paul, *Analysis of Aristotle's Ethics*, p. 1.) But the construction of a system implies *method*. And no one was more thoroughly aware of the importance of a right *method* than Aristotle. He has said (*Metaphys.*, lib. ii.), “that we ought to see well what demonstration (or proof) suits each particular subject; for it would be absurd to mix together the research of science and that of *method*: two things, the acquisition of which offers great difficulty.” The Deductive *method* of philosophy came at once finished from his hand. And the Inductive *method* was more extensively and successfully followed out by him than has been generally thought.

James Acontius, or Concio, as he is sometimes called, was born at Trent, and came to England in 1567. He published a work, *De Methodo*, of which Mons. Degerando (*Hist. Compar. des Systemes de Philosophie*, part 2, tom. ii., p. 3) has given an analysis. According to him, all knowledge deduced from a process of reasoning pre-supposes some primitive truths, founded in the nature of man, and admitted as soon as announced; and the great aim of *method* should be to bring these primitive truths to light, that by their light we may have more light. Truths obtained by the senses, and by repeated experience, become at length positive and certain knowledge.

Descartes has a discourse on *Method*. He has reduced it to four general rules.

I. To admit nothing as true of which we have not a clear

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and distinct idea. We have a clear and distinct idea of our own existence. And in proportion as our idea of anything else approaches to, or recedes from, the clearness of this idea, it ought to be received or rejected.

II. To divide every object inquired into as much as possible into its parts. Nothing is more simple than the ego, or self-consciousness. In proportion as the object of inquiry is simplified, the evidence comes to be nearer that of self-consciousness.

III. To ascend from simple ideas or cognitions to those that are more complex. The real is often complex: and to arrive at the knowledge of it as a reality, we must by synthesis reunite the parts which were previously separated.

IV. By careful and repeated enumeration to see that all the parts are reunited. For the synthesis will be deceitful and incomplete if it do not reunite the whole, and thus give the reality.

This *method* begins with provisory doubt, proceeds by analysis and synthesis, and ends by accepting evidence in proportion as it resembles the evidence of self-consciousness.

These rules are useful in all departments of philosophy. But different sciences have different *methods* suited to their objects and to the end in view.

In prosecuting science with the view of extending our knowledge of it, or the limits of it, we are said to follow the *method* of investigation or inquiry, and our procedure will be chiefly in the way of *analysis*. But in communicating what is already known, we follow the *method* of exposition or doctrine, and our procedure will be chiefly in the way of *synthesis*.

In some sciences the principles or laws are given, and the object of the science is to discover the possible application of them. In these sciences the *method* is deductive, as in geometry. In other sciences, the facts or phenomena are given, and the object of science is to discover the principles or laws. In these sciences the proper *method* is inductive, proceeding by observation or experiment, as in psychology

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and physics. The *method* opposed to this, and which was long followed, was the constructive *method*; which, instead of discovering causes by induction, imagined or assigned them *à priori*, or *ex hypothesi*, and afterwards tried to verify them. This *method* is seductive and bold, but dangerous and insecure, and should be resorted to with great caution.

—*V. HYPOTHESIS.*

The use of *method*, both in obtaining and applying knowledge for ourselves, and in conveying and communicating it to others, is great and obvious. “*Currenti extra viam, quo habilior sit et velocior, eo majorem contingere aberrationem.*” —*Nov. Org.*, i., 61. “Une bonne methode donne a l’esprit une telle puissance qu’elle peut en quelque sorte remplacer le talent. C’est un levier qui donne a l’homme faible, qui l’employe, une force que ne savait posseder l’homme le plus fort qui serait privé d’un semblable meyen.”—Comte, *Traite de l’Legislation*, lib. i., c. 1. La Place has said,—“La connaissance de la methode qui a guidé l’homme de genie, n’est pas moins utile au progres de la science, et meme a sa propre gloire, que ses decouvertes.”

“Marshal thy notions into a handsome *method*. One will carry twice as much weight, trussed and packed up in bundles, than when it lies untoward, flapping and hanging about his shoulders.”—*Pleasures of Literature*, 12mo, Lond., 1851, p. 104.

See Descartes, *On Method*.

Coleridge, *On Method*, Introd. to *Encyclop. Metropol.*

Coleridge, *Friend*, vol. iii.—*V. SYSTEM.*

METONYMY.—*V. INTENTION.*

MICROCOSM.—*V. MACROCOSM.*

MIND is that which moves, body is that which is moved.—

Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, book ii., chap. 3. See his remarks on the definition of Plato and Aristotle, chap. 4.

“By *mind* we mean something which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do; something stored with ideas of its intended works, agreeably to which ideas those works are fashioned.”—Harris, *Hermes*, p. 227.

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“*Mind*, that which perceives, feels, thinks, and wills.”—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

“Among metaphysicians, *mind* is becoming a generic, and *soul* an individual designation. *Mind* is opposed to matter; soul to body. *Mind* is soul without regard to personality; soul is the appropriate *mind* of the being under notice. Etymologically, *mind* is the principle of volition, and *soul* the principle of animation. “I *mean* to go” was originally “I *mind* to go.” *Soul*, at first identical with *self*, is from *sellan*, to say, the faculty of speech being its characteristic.

Dumb, and without a soul, beside such beauty
He has no *mind* to marry.—Taylor, *Synonyms*.

—V. SOUL.

MNEMONICS.—V. MEMORIA TECHNICA.

MODALITY is the term employed to denote the most general points of view under which the different objects of thought present themselves to our mind. Now all that we think of we think of as *possible*, or *contingent*, or *impossible*, or *necessary*. The *possible* is that which may equally be or not be, which is not yet, but which may be; the *contingent* is that which already is, but which might not have been; the *necessary* is that which always is; and the *impossible* is that which never is. These are the *modalities* of being, which necessarily find a place in thought, and in the expression of it in judgments and in propositions. Hence arise the four *modal propositions* which Aristotle has defined and opposed (Περί ἐρμηνείας, c. 12-14.) He did not use the term *modality*, but it is to be found among his commentators and the scholastic philosophers. In the philosophy of Kant, our judgments are reduced under the four heads of quantity, quality, relation, and *modality*. In reference to *modality* they are either problematic, or assertory, or apodeictical. And hence the category of *modality* includes possibility and impossibility, existence and non-existence, necessity or contingency. But existence and non-existence should have no place, the contingent and the necessary are not different from being.—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

MODE.—"The manner in which a thing exists is called a *mode* or affection; shape and colour are *modes* of matter, memory and joy are *modes* of mind."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

"*Modes*, I call such complex ideas, which, however compounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as dependencies on, or affections of substances."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. ii., chap. 12, sec. 4.

"There are some *modes* which may be called *internal*, because they are conceived to be in the substance, as round, square; and others which may be called *external*, because they are taken from something which is not in the substance, as loved, seen, desired, which are names taken from the action of another; and this is what is called in the schools an *external denomination*."—Port Roy. *Logic*, part 1, chap. 2.

"*Modes* or *modifications of mind*, in the Cartesian school, mean merely what some recent philosophers express by *states of mind*; and include both the *active* and *passive* phenomena of the conscious subject. The terms were used by Descartes as well as by his disciples."—Sir William Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 295, note.

Mode is the manner in which a substance exists; thus wax may be round or square, solid or fluid. *Modes* are secondary or subsidiary, as they could not be without substance, which exists by itself. Substances are not confined to any *mode*, but must exist in some. *Modes* are all variable conditions, and though some one is necessary to every substance, the particular ones are all accidental. *Modification* is properly the bringing of a thing into a *mode*, but is sometimes used to denote the *mode* of existence itself. *State* is a nearly synonymous but a more extended term than *mode*.

A *mode* is a variable and determinate affection of a substance, a quality which it may have or not without affecting its essence or existence. A body may be at rest or in motion, a mind may affirm or deny, without ceasing to be. They are not *accidents* because they arise directly from

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the nature of the substance which experiences them. Nor should they be called *phenomena* which may have or not have their cause in the object which exhibits them. But *modes* arise from the nature of the substance affected by them. It is true that one substance *modifies* another, and in this view *modes* may sometimes be the effect of causes out of the substance in which they appear. They are then called *modifications*. Fire melts wax, the liquidity of wax in this view is a *modification*.

All beings which constitute the universe modify one another; but a soul endowed with liberty is the only being that modifies itself, or which can be altogether and in the same *mode*, cause and substance, active and passive.—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

That quality which distinguishes one genus, one species, or even one individual, from another, is termed a *modification*; then the same particular that is termed a *property* or *quality*, when considered as belonging to an individual, or a class of individuals, is termed a *modification* when considered as distinguishing the individual or the class from another; a black skin and soft curled hair, are properties of a negro; the same circumstances considered as marks that distinguish a negro from a man of a different species, are denominated *modifications*.”—Kames, *Elements of Criticism*, app.

MOLECULE (*molecula*, a little mass)—is the smallest portion of matter cognizable by any of our senses. It is something real, and thus differs from *atom*, which is not *perceived* but *conceived*. It is the smallest portion of matter which we can reach by our means of dividing, while *atom* is the last possible term of all division. When *molecules* are of simple homogeneous elements, as of gold or silver, they are called *integral*—when they are of compound or heterogeneous elements, as salts and acids, they are called *constituent*.

MONAD, MONADOLOGY, (μόνας, unity, one).—According to Leibnitz, the elementary particles of matter are vital forces not acting mechanically, but from an internal prin-

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iple. They are incorporeal or spiritual atoms, inaccessible to all change from without, but subject to internal movement. This hypothesis he explains in a treatise entitled *Monadologie*. He thought inert matter insufficient to explain the phenomena of body, and had recourse to the *entelechies* of Aristotle, or the *substantial forms* of the scholastic philosophy, conceiving of them as primitive forces, constituting the substance of matter, atoms of substance but not of matter, real and absolute unities, metaphysical points, full of vitality, *exact* as mathematical points, and *real* as physical points. These substantial unities which constitute matter are of a nature inferior to spirit and soul, but they are imperishable, although they may undergo *transformation*.

“*Monadologie* rests upon this axiom—Every substance is at the same time a cause, and every substance being a cause, has therefore in itself the principle of its own development: such is the *monad*; it is a simple force. Each *monad* has relation to all others; it corresponds with the plan of the universe; it is the universe abridged; it is, as Leibnitz says, a living mirror which reflects the entire universe under its own point of view. But every *monad* being simple, there is no immediate action of one *monad* upon another; there is, however, a natural relation of their respective development, which makes their apparent communication; this natural relation, this harmony which has its reason in the wisdom of the supreme director is *pre-established harmony*.”
—Cousin, *Hist. Mod. Philosoph.*, vol. ii., p. 86.

Mr. Stewart (*Dissert.*, part 2, note 1, p. 219) has said,—“After studying, with all possible diligence, what Leibnitz has said of his *monads* in different parts of his works, I find myself quite incompetent to annex any precise idea to the word as he has employed it.” The most intelligible passage which he quotes is the following. (Tom. ii., p. 50.) “A *monad* is not a *material* but a *formal* atom, it being impossible for a thing to be at once material, and possessed of a real unity and indivisibility. It is necessary, therefore, to revive the obsolete doctrine of *substantial forms* (the essence

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of which consists in *force*), separating it, however, from the various abuses to which it is liable.”

MONOGAMY (μόνος γάμος, one marriage)—is the doctrine that one man should have only one wife. It has also been interpreted to mean that a man should not marry more than once.—*V. POLYGAMY.*

MONOTHEISM (μόνος θεός, one God)—is the belief in one God only.

“The general propensity to the worship of idols was totally subdued, and the Jews became *monotheists*, in the strictest sense of the term.”—Cogan, *Discourse on Jewish Dispensation.*, c. 2, s. 7.

V. THEISM, POLYTHEISM.

MORAL (*moralis, mos, manner*)—is used in several senses in philosophy.

In reasoning, the word *moral* is opposed to *demonstrative*, and means *probable*. Sometimes it is opposed to *material*, and in this sense it means *mental* or that the object to which it is applied belongs to *mind* and not to *matter*. Thus we speak of *moral science* as distinguished from *physical science*.

It is also opposed to *intellectual* and to what is *aesthetic*. Thus we distinguish between a *moral habit* and an *intellectual habit*, between that which is *morally becoming* and that which pleases the powers of *taste*.

Moral is opposed to *positive*. “*Moral precepts* are precepts, the reasons of which we see; *positive precepts* are precepts, the reasons of which we do not see. *Moral duties* arise out of the nature of the case itself prior to external command; *positive duties* do not arise out of the nature of the case, but from external command; nor would they be duties at all, were it not for such command received from him whose creatures and subjects we are.”—Butler, *Analogy*, part 2, ch. 1.

“A *positive* precept concerns a thing that is right because commanded; a *moral* precept respects a thing commanded because it is right. A Jew, for instance, was bound both to honour his parents, and also to worship at Jerusalem;

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but the former was *commanded* because it was right, and the latter was right *because* it was commanded."—Whately, *Lessons on Morals*.

MORAL FACULTY.—V. CONSCIENCE.

MORALITY.—"To lay down, in their universal form, the laws according to which the conduct of a free agent ought to be regulated, and to apply them to the different situations of human life, is the end of *morality*."

"*A body of moral truths, definitely expressed, and arranged according to their rational connection,*" is the definition of a "system of *morality*" by Dr. Whewell, *On Systematic Morality*, lect. i.

"The doctrine which treats of actions as right or wrong is *morality*."—Whewell, *Morality*, sect. 76.

"There are in the world two classes of objects, persons and things. And these are mutually related to each other. There are relations between persons and persons, and between things and things. And the peculiar distinctions of *moral* actions, *moral* characters, *moral* principles, *moral* habits, as contrasted with the intellect and other parts of man's nature, lies in this, *that they always imply a relation between two persons, not between two things.*"—Sewell, *Christ. Morals*, p. 339.

"*Morality* commences with, and begins in, the sacred distinction between thing and person. On this distinction all law, human and divine, is grounded."—Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, vol. i., p. 265.

"What the duties of *morality* are, the apostle instructs the believer in full, comprising them under the two heads of negative and positive; negative, to keep himself pure from the world; and positive, beneficence from loving-kindness, that is, love of his fellow-men (his kind) as himself. Last and highest come the spiritual, comprising all the truths, acts, and duties, that have an especial reference to the timeless, the permanent, the eternal, to the sincere love of the true as truth, of the good as good, and of God as both in one. It comprehends the whole ascent from upright-

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ness (morality, virtue, inward rectitude) to godlikeness, with all the acts, exercises, and disciplines of mind, will, and affections, that are requisite or conducive to the great design of our redemption from the form of the evil one, and of our second creation or birth in the divine image.

“It may be an additional aid to reflection, to distinguish the three kinds severally, according to the faculty to which each corresponds, the part of our human nature which is more particularly its organ. Thus, the prudential corresponds to the sense and the understanding; the moral, to the heart and the conscience; the spiritual, to the will and the reason, that is, to the finite will reduced to harmony with, and in subordination to, the reason, as a ray from that true light which is both reason and will, universal reason and will absolute.”

How nearly this scriptural division coincides with the Platonic, see PRUDENCE.—Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, vol. i., pp. 22, 23.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY is the science of human duty. The knowledge of human duty implies a knowledge of human nature. To understand what man ought to do, it is necessary to know what man is. Not that the moral philosopher, before entering upon those inquiries which peculiarly belong to him, must go over the science of human nature in all its extent. But it is necessary to examine those elements of human nature which have a direct bearing upon human conduct. A full course of *moral philosophy* should consist, therefore, of two parts—the first, containing an analysis and illustration of those powers and principles by which man is prompted to act, and by the possession of which, he is capable of acting under a sense of duty; the second, containing an arrangement and exposition of the duties incumbent upon him as the possessor of an active and moral nature. As exhibiting the facts and phenomena presented by an examination of the active and moral nature of man, the first part may be characterized as *psychological*; and as laying down the

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duties arising from the various relations in which man, as a moral agent, has been placed, the second part may be designated as *deontological*.—V. ETHICS.

MORAL SENSE.—V. SENSE REFLEX.

MOTION (*κίνησις*)—is the continued change of place of a body, or of any *parts* of a body; for in the cases of a globe turning on its axis and of a wheel revolving on a pivot, the parts of these bodies change their places, while the bodies themselves remain stationary.

Motion is either *physical*, that is, obvious to the senses, or *not physical*, that is, knowable by the rational faculty.

Aristotle has noticed several kinds of *physical* motion. Change of place, as when a body moves from one place to another, remaining the same. Alteration or aliation, as when a body from being round, becomes square. Augmentation or diminution, as when a body becomes larger or smaller. All these are changes from one attribute to another, while the substance remains the same.

But body only moves because it is moved. And Aristotle traced all *motion* to impulses in the nature of things, rising from the spontaneous impulse of life, appetite, and desire, up to the intelligent contemplation of what is good.

As Heraclitus held that all things are continually changing, so Parmenides and Zeno denied the possibility of motion. The best reply to their subtle sophisms, was that given by Diogenes the Cynic, who walked into the presence of Zeno in refutation of them.

The notion of movement or *motion*, like that of extension, is acquired in connection with the exercise of the senses of sight and touch.

MOTIVE.—"The deliberate preference by which we are moved to act, and not the object for the sake of which we act is the principle of action; and desire and reason, which is for the sake of something, is the origin of deliberate preference."—Aristotle, *Ethic.*, lib. vi., cap. 2.

Kant distinguishes between the subjective principle of appetite which he calls the mobile or spring (*die Trieb-*

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feder), and the objective principle of the will, which he calls motive or determining reason (*beweggrund*); hence the difference between *subjective ends* to which we are pushed by natural disposition, and *objective ends*, which are common to us with all beings endowed with reason.—Willm, *Hist. de la Philosoph. Allemande*, tom. i., p. 357.

This seems to be the difference expressed in French between *mobile* and *motif*.

“A motive is an object so operating upon the mind as to produce either desire or aversion.”—Lord Kames, *Essay on Liberty and Necessity*.

“By *motive*,” said Edwards (*Inquiry*, part i., sect. 2), “I mean the whole of that which moves, excites, or invites, the mind to volition, whether that be one thing singly, or many things conjunctly. Many particular things may concur and unite their strength to induce the mind; and when it is so, all together are, as it were, one complex *motive*. . . . Whatever is a *motive*, in this sense, must be something that is *extant in the view or apprehension of the understanding, or perceiving faculty*. Nothing can induce or invite the mind to will or act anything, any further than it is perceived, or is in some way or other in the mind’s view; for what is wholly unperceived, and perfectly out of the mind’s view, cannot affect the mind at all.”

Hence it has been common to distinguish *motives* as *external* or *objective*, and as *internal* or *subjective*. Regarded *objectively*, *motives* are those external objects or circumstances, which, when contemplated, give rise to views or feelings which prompt or influence the will. Regarded *subjectively*, *motives* are those internal views or feelings which arise on the contemplation of external objects or circumstances. In common language, the term *motive* is applied indifferently to the external object, and to the state of mind, to which the apprehension or contemplation of it may give rise. The explanation of Edwards includes both. Dr. Reid said, that he “understood a *motive*, when applied to a human being, to be that for the sake of which

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he acts, and therefore that what he never was conscious of, can no more be a *motive* to determine his will, than it can be an argument to determine his judgment.”* (*Correspondence prefixed to his Works*, p. 87). In his *Essays on the Active Powers* (essay iv., chap. 4), he said, “Everything that can be called a *motive* is addressed either to the animal or to the rational part of our nature.” Here the word *motive* is applied *objectively* to those external things, which, when contemplated, affect our intelligence or our sensitivity. But, in the very next sentence, he has said, “*motives* of the former kind are common to us with the brutes.” Here the word *motive* is applied *subjectively* to those internal principles of our nature, such as appetite, desire, passion, &c., which are excited by the contemplation of external objects, adapted and addressed to them.

But, in order to a more precise use of the term *motive*, let it be noted, that, in regard to it, there are three things clearly distinguishable, although it may not be common, nor easy, always to speak of them distinctively. These are, the external object, the internal principle, and the state or affection of mind resulting from the one being addressed to the other. For example, bread or food of any kind, is the external object, which is adapted to an internal principle which is called appetite, and hunger or the desire of food is the internal feeling, which is excited or allayed, as the circumstances may be, by the presentment of the external object to the internal principle. In popular language, the term *motive* might be applied to any one of these three; and, it might be said, that the *motive* for such an action was *bread*, or *appetite*, or *hunger*. But, strictly speaking, the feeling of hunger was the *motive*; it was that, in the preceding state of mind, which disposed or inclined the agent to act in one way rather than in any other. The

* “This is Aristotle’s definition (*το ἕνεκα οὗ*) of *end* or *final cause*; and as a synonym for end or final cause the term *motive* had been long exclusively employed.”—Sir Will. Hamilton.

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same may be said of *motives* of every kind. In every case there may be observed the external object, the internal principle, and the resultant state or affection of mind; and the term *motive* may be applied, separately and successively, to any one of them; but speaking strictly, it should be applied to the terminating state or affection of mind which arises from a principle of human nature having been addressed by an object adapted to it; because, it is this state or affection of mind which prompts to action. The *motive* of an agent, in some particular action, may be said to have been *injury*, or *resentment*, or *anger*—meaning by the first of these words, the wrongous behaviour of another; by the second, the principle in human nature affected by such behaviour; and by the third, the resultant state of mind in the agent. When it is said that a man acted *prudently*, it may intimate, that his conduct was in accordance with the rules of propriety and prudence; or, that he adopted it, after careful consideration and forethought, or, from a sense of the benefit and advantage to be derived from it. In like manner, when it is said that a man acted *conscientiously*, it may mean, that the particular action was regarded not as a matter of interest, but of duty, or, that his moral faculty approved of it as right, or, that he felt himself under a sense of obligation to do it. In all these cases, the term *motive* is strictly applicable to the terminating state or affection of mind, which immediately precedes the volition or determination to act.

To the question, therefore, whether *motive* means something in the mind or out of it, it is replied, that what moves the will is something in the preceding state of mind. The state of mind may have reference to something out of the mind. But what is out of the mind must be apprehended or contemplated—must be brought within the view of the mind, before it can in any way affect it. It is only in a secondary or remote sense, therefore, that external objects or circumstances can be called *motives*, or be said to move the will. *Motives* are, strictly speaking, *sub-*

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jective—as they are internal states or affections of mind in the agent.

And *motives* may be called *subjective*, not only in contradistinction to the external objects and circumstances which may be the occasion of them, but also in regard to the different effect which the same objects and circumstances may have, not only upon different individuals, but even upon the same individuals, at different times.

A man of slow and narrow intellect is unable to perceive the value or importance of an object when presented to him, or the propriety and advantage of a course of conduct that may be pointed out to him, so clearly or so quickly as a man of large and vigorous intellect. The consequence will be, that with the same *motives* (*objectively* considered) presented to them, the one may remain indifferent and indolent in reference to the advantage held out, while the other will at once apprehend and pursue it. A man of cold and dull affections will contemplate a spectacle of pain or want, without feeling any desire or making any exertion to relieve it; while he whose sensibilities are more acute and lively, will instantly be moved to the most active and generous efforts. An injury done to one man will rouse him at once to a phrenzy of indignation, which will prompt him to the most extravagant measures of retaliation or revenge; while, in another man, it will only give rise to a moderate feeling of resentment. An action which will be contemplated with horror by a man of a tender conscience, will be done without compunction by him whose moral sense has not been sufficiently exercised to discern between good and evil. In short, anything external to the mind will be modified in its effect, according to the constitution and training of the different minds within the view of which it may be brought.

And not only may the same objects differently affect different minds, but also the same minds, at different times, or under different circumstances. He who is suffering the pain of hunger may be tempted to steal, in order to satisfy

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his hunger ; but he who has bread enough and to spare, is under no such temptation. A sum of money which might be sufficient to bribe one man, would be no trial to the honesty of another. Under the impulse of any violent passion, considerations of prudence and propriety have not the same weight as in calmer moments. The young are not so cautious, in circumstances of danger and difficulty, as those who have attained to greater age and experience. Objects appear to us in very different colours, in health and in sickness, in prosperity and in adversity, in society and in solitude, in prospect and in possession.

It would thus appear, that *motives* are in their nature *subjective*, in their influence *individual*, and in their issue *variable*.

MYSTICISM and MYSTERY have been derived from *μυσειν*, to shut up ; hence *μύστης*, one who shuts up.

“ The epithet sublime is strongly and happily descriptive of the feelings inspired by the genius of Plato, by the lofty *mysticism* of his philosophy, and even by the remote origin of the theological fables which are said to have descended to him from Orpheus.”—Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, ii., chap. 5.

Mysticism in philosophy is the belief that God may be known face to face, without anything intermediate. It is a yielding to the sentiment awakened by the idea of the infinite, and a running up of all knowledge and all duty to the contemplation and love of Him.—Cousin, *Hist. de la Philosoph. Mod.*, 1st series, tom. ii., leçon 9, 10.

Mysticism despairs of the regular process of science ; it believes that we may attain directly, without the aid of the senses or reason, and by an immediate intuition, the real and absolute principle of all truth, God. It finds God either in nature, and hence a *physical* and *naturalistic mysticism* ; or in the soul, and hence a *moral* and *metaphysical mysticism*. It has also its historical views ; and in history it considers especially that which represents *mysticism* in full, and under its most regular form, that is reli-

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gious; and it is not to the letter of religions, but to their spirit, that it clings; hence an *allegorical* and *symbolical* mysticism. Van Helmont, Ames, and Pordage, are *naturalistic mystics*; Poiret is *moral*, and Bourignon and Fenelon are *Divine mystics*. Swedenborg's *mysticism* includes them all.

The Germans have two words for *mysticism*; *mystik* and *mysticismus*. The former they use in a favourable, the latter in an unfavourable sense. Just as we say *piety* and *pietism*, or *rationality* and *rationalism*; keeping the first of each pair for use, the second for abuse.—Vaughan, *Hours with the Mystics*, vol. i., p. 23.

Cousin, *Hist. of Mod. Philosoph.*, vol. ii., pp. 94-7.

Schmidt (Car.), *Essai sur les Mystiques du quatorzieme siecle*. Strasburg, 1836.

MYTH and MYTHOLOGY (*μυθος*, a fable; *λεγειν*, to tell).

—“I use this term (*myth*) as synonymous with ‘invention,’ having no historical basis.”—Pococke, *India in Greece*, p. 2, note.

The early history and the early religion of all nations are full of fables. Hence it is that *myths* have been divided into the *traditional* and the *theological*, or the *historical* and the *religious*.*

A *myth* is a narrative framed for the purpose of expressing some general truth, a law of nature, a moral phenomenon, or a religious idea, the different phases of which correspond to the turn of the narrative. An *allegory* agrees with it in expressing some general idea, but differs from it in this,—that in the *allegory* the *idea* was developed before the *form*, which was invented and adapted to it. The *allegory* is a reflective and artificial process, the *myth* springs up spontaneously and by a kind of inspiration. A *symbol* is a silent *myth*, which impresses the truths which it con-

* Among the early nations, every truth a little remote from common apprehension, was embodied in their religious creed; so that this second class would contain *myths* concerning Deity, morals, physics, astronomy, and metaphysics. These last are properly called *philosophemes*.

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veys not by successive stages, but at once (*συν βαλλειν*) throws together significant images of some truth.

Plato has introduced the *myth* into some of his writings in a subordinate way, as in the *Gorgias*, the *Republic*, and the *Timæus*.

Huttner, *De Mythis Platonis*, 4to, Leipsic, 1788.

Bacon, *On the Wisdom of the Ancients*.

Muller, *Mythology*. Translated by Leitch, 1844.

On the philosophic value of *myths*, see Cousin, *Cours*, 1828; 1 and 15 leçons, and the Argument of his Translation of *Plato*.

Some good remarks on the difference between the *parable*, the *fable*, the *myth*, &c., will be found in Trench, introduction to his work *On the Parables*.

On the different views taken of Greek *mythology*, see Creuzer and Godfrey Hermann.

See an *Essay on Comparative Mythology*, in the *Oxford Essays* for 1856.

NATURAL, as distinguished from **Supernatural** or **Miraculous**.

—“The only distinct meaning of the word *natural* is *stated*, *fixed*, or *settled*; since what is *natural* as much requires and presupposes an intelligent agent to render it so, that is, to effect it continually or at stated times, as what is supernatural or miraculous does to effect it for once.”—Butler, *Analogy*, part 1, chap. 1.

Natural, as distinguished from **Innate** or **Instinctive**.

“There is a great deal of difference,” said Mr. Locke (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book i., ch. 3), “between an *innate law*, and a *law of Nature*; between something imprinted on our minds in their very original, and something that we being ignorant of, may attain to the knowledge of by the use and application of our *natural* faculties. And I think they equally forsake the truth who, running into contrary extremes, either affirm an *innate law*, or deny that there is a law knowable by the *light of nature*, without the help of positive revelation.”

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“Of the various powers and faculties we possess, there are some which nature seems both to have planted and reared, so as to have left nothing to human industry. Such are the powers which we have in common with the brutes, and which are necessary to the preservation of the individual, or to the continuance of the kind. There are other powers, of which nature hath only planted the seeds in our minds, but hath left the rearing of them to human culture.* It is by the proper culture of these that we are capable of all those improvements in intellectuals, in taste, and in morals, which exalt and dignify human nature; while on the other hand, the neglect or perversion of them makes its degeneracy and corruption.”—Reid, *Inquiry*, ch. 1, sect. 2.

“Whatever ideas, whatever principles we are *necessarily* led to acquire by the circumstances in which we are placed, and by the exercise of those faculties which are essential to our preservation, are to be considered as parts of human nature, no less than those which are implanted in the mind at its first formation.”—Stewart, *Active and Moral Powers*, vol. i., p. 351.

“Acquired perceptions and sentiments may be termed *natural*, as much as those which are commonly so called, if they are as rarely found wanting.”—Mackintosh, *Prelimin. Dissert.*, p. 67.

NATURALISM is the name given to those systems of the philosophy of *nature* which explain the phenomena by a blind force acting necessarily. This doctrine is to be found in Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, and was held by Leucippus and Epicurus. The *Systeme de la Nature* of D’Holbach, the *Traité de la Nature* of Robinet, and the *Philosophie de la Nature* of Delisle de Sales, also contain it.

Naturalism in the fine arts is opposed to *idealism*. Of Albert Durer it is said that “he united to the brilliant delicacies of Flemish *naturalism* the most elevated and varied of Italian *idealism*.”—Labarte, *Handbook of the Middle Ages*.

* Yet Dr. Reid, when speaking of *natural* rights (*Active Powers*, essay v., ch. 5) uses *innate* as synonymous with *natural*.

NATURE (*natum, nascor*, to be born, to be).—According to its derivation, *nature* should mean that which is produced or born; but it also means that which produces or causes to be born. The word has been used with various shades of meaning, but they may all be brought under two heads, *Natura Naturans*, and *Natura Naturata*.

I. *Natura Naturans*.—*a.* The Author of *nature*, the uncreated Being who gave birth to everything that is. *b.* The plastic *nature* or energy subordinate to that of the Deity, by which all things are conserved and directed to their ends and uses. *c.* The course of *nature*, or the established order according to which the universe is regulated.

Alii *naturam* censent esse vim quandam sine Ratione, cientem motus in corporibus necessarios; alii autem vim participem ordinis, tanquam via progredientem.—Cicero, *De Nat. Deorum*, lib. ii.

II. *Natura Naturata*.—*a.* 1. The works of *nature*, both mind and matter. 2. The visible or material creation, as distinct from God and the soul, which are the objects of *natural science*.

“The term *nature* is used sometimes in a wider, sometimes in a narrower extension. When employed in its most extensive meaning, it embraces the two worlds of mind and matter. When employed in its more restricted signification, it is a synonym for the latter only, and is then used in contradistinction to the former. In the Greek philosophy, the word φύσις was general in its meaning; and the great branch of philosophy, styled ‘*physical* or *physiological*,’ included under it not only the sciences of matter, but also those of mind. With us, the term *nature* is more vaguely extensive than the terms *physics*, *physical*, *physiology*, *physiological*, or even than the adjective, *natural*; whereas in the philosophy of Germany, *natur* and its correlatives, whether of Greek or Latin derivation, are, in general, expressive of the world of matter in contrast to the world of intelligence.”—Sir William Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 216, note.

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b. *Nature* as opposed to *art*, all physical causes, all the forces which belong to physical beings, organic or inorganic. *c.* The *nature* or essence of any particular being or class of beings, that which makes it what it is.

Aristotle (*Metaphys.*, lib. v., cap. 4), after noticing various significations of $\varphi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$, says, "*Nature*, properly so called, is the essence of beings, which have in themselves and by themselves the principle of their movement." And he says (*In Physic. Auseult.*), "Things which exist naturally, have all in themselves the principle of motion or rest; some that of motion in space, others that of growth and decay; and others that of change. On the contrary, a litter, a dress, all that is the product of art, carries no principle of change in itself; and it is because these things are of stone, or earth, or a mixture of elements; it is this accidental cause which is for them the principle of motion or rest. *Nature* is thus a principle, a cause which impresses motion and rest, a cause inherent in the essence of the object, not a cause accidental."

"*Nature*, then (according to the opinion of Aristotle), is the beginning of motion and rest, in that thing wherein it is properly and principally, not by accident; for all things to be seen (which are done neither by fortune nor by necessity, and are not divine, nor have any such efficient cause), are called *natural*, as having a proper and peculiar *nature* of their own."—Holland, *Plutarch*, p. 659.

"The word *nature* has been used in two senses,—viz., actively and passively; energetic (= *forma formans*), and material (= *forma formata*). In the first it signifies the inward principle of whatever is requisite for the reality of a thing as *existent*; while the *essence*, or essential property, signifies the inner principle of all that appertains to the *possibility* of a thing. Hence, in accurate language, we say the essence of a mathematical circle or geometrical figure, not the *nature*, because in the conception of forms, purely geometrical, there is no expression or implication of their real existence. In the second or material sense of

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the word *nature*, we mean by it the sum total of all things, as far as they are objects of our senses, and consequently of possible experience—the aggregate of phenomena, whether existing for our outer senses, or for our inner sense. The doctrine concerning *nature*, would therefore (the word physiology being both ambiguous in itself, and already otherwise appropriated) be more properly entitled phenomenology, distinguished into its two grand divisions, somatology* and psychology.”—Coleridge, *Friend*, p. 410.

NATURE (Course or Power of).—“There is no such thing as what men commonly call the *course of nature*, or the *power of nature*. The *course of nature*, truly and properly speaking, is nothing else but the *will of God* producing certain effects in a continued, regular, constant, and uniform manner; which course or manner of acting, being in every movement perfectly *arbitrary*, is as easy to be *altered* at any time as to be *preserved*. And if (as seems most probable), this continual acting upon matter be performed by the subserviency of created intelligences appointed to that purpose by the Supreme Creator, then it is easy for any of them, and as much within their natural power (by the permission of God), to *alter* the course of *nature* at any time, or in any respect, as it is to *preserve* or *continue* it.”—Clarke, *Evidences of Nat. and Revealed Religion*, p. 300, 4th edit.

“*Nature*,” said Dr. Reid (*Active Powers*, essay i., ch. 5), “is the name we give to the efficient cause of innumerable effects which fall daily under observation. But if it be asked what *nature* is? whether the first universal cause † or a subordinate one? whether one or many? whether intelligent or unintelligent?—upon these points we find various conjectures and theories, but no solid ground upon which we can rest. And I apprehend the wisest men are

* Both these are included in the title of a work which appeared more than thirty years ago,—viz., *Somatopsychonologia*.

† *Natura est principium et causa efficiens omnium rerum naturalium, quo sensu a veteribus philosophis cum Deo confundebatur.*—Cicero, *De Nat. Dea.*, lib. i., c. 8, and lib. ii., c. 22, 32.

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they who are sensible that they know nothing of the matter.”

The Hon. Robert Boyle wrote an *Enquiry into the vulgarly received notion of Nature*, in which he attempted to show the absurdity of interposing any subordinate energy between the Creator and His works, 12mo, Lond., 1785.

Nature or Force (Plastic) (*πλασσο, formare*)—was the name given by ancient physiologists to a power to which they attributed the formation of the germs and tissues of organized and living beings. In opposition to the doctrine of Democritus, who explained all the phenomena of *nature* by means of matter and motion, and in opposition to the doctrine of Strato, who taught that matter was the only substance, but in itself a living and active force, Cudworth maintained that there is a *plastic nature*, a spiritual energy intermediate between the Creator and His works, by which the phenomena of *nature* are produced. To ascribe these phenomena to the immediate agency of Deity would be, he thought, to make the course of *nature* miraculous; and he could not suppose the agency of the Deity to be exerted directly and yet monstrosities and defects to be found in the works of *nature*. How far the facts warrant such an hypothesis, or how far such an hypothesis explains the facts, may be doubted. But the hypothesis is not much different from that of the *anima mundi*, or soul of matter, which had the countenance of Pythagoras and Plato, as well as of the school of Alexandria, and later philosophers.

—V. ANIMA MUNDI.

Nature (Philosophy of).—The philosophy of *nature* includes all the attempts which have been made to account for the origin and on-goings of the physical universe. Some of these have been noticed under *Matter, q. v.* And for an account of the various *philosophies of nature*, see T. H. Martin, *Philosoph. Spiritualiste de la Nature*, 2 tom., Paris, 1849; J. B. Stallo, A.M., *General Principles of Philosoph. of Nature*, Lond., 1848.

NATURE (Law of).—By the *law of Nature* is meant that law

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of justice and benevolence which is written on the heart of every man, and which teaches him to do to others as he would wish that they should do unto him. It was long called the *law of nature and of nations*, because it is natural to men of all nations. But by the phrase *law of nations* is now meant international law, and by the *law of nature*, natural law. It is not meant by the phrase that there is a regular system or code of laws made known by the light of nature in which all men everywhere acquiesce, but that there are certain great principles universally acknowledged, and in accordance with which men feel themselves bound to regulate their conduct.

“Why seek the law or rule in the world? What would you answer when it is alleged to be within you, if you would only listen to it? You are like a dishonest debtor who asks for the bill against him when he has it himself. *Quod petis intus habes*. All the tables of the law—the two tables of Moses, the twelve tables of the Romans, and all the good laws in the world, are but copies and extracts, which will be produced in judgment against thee who hidest the original and pretendest not to know what it is, stifling as much as possible that light which shines within thee, but which would never have been without and humanly published but that that which was within, all celestial and divine, had been contemned and forgotten.”—Charron, *De la Sagesse*, liv. 2, chap. 3, No. 4.

According to Grotius, “*Jus naturale est dictatum rectæ rationis, indicans, actui alicui, ex ejus convenientia, vel disconvenientia cum ipsa natura rationali, inesse moralem turpitudinem, aut necessitatem moralem; et consequentur ab authore naturæ, ipso Deo, talem actum aut vetari aut præcipi.*”

“*Jus gentium* is used to denote, not international law, but positive or instituted law, so far as it is common to all nations. When the Romans spoke of international law, they termed it *Jus Feciale*, the law of heralds, or international envoys.”—Whewell, *Morality*, No. 1139.

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Selden, *De Jure Naturali*, lib. 1, c. 3.

Grotius, *De Jure Belli et Pacis, Prolegom.*, sect. 5-6, lib. 1, cap. 1, sect. 10.

Puffendorff, *De Officio Hominis et Civis*, lib. 3, c. 3.

Sanderson, *De Oblig. Conscientiæ*, Prælect. Quarta, sect. 20-24.

Culverwell, *Discourse of the Light of Nature*.

NATURE (Human).—As to the different senses in which *nature* may be understood, and the proper meaning of the maxim, follow *nature*,—see Butler, *Three Sermons on Hum. Nature*.

NECESSITY (*ne* and *cesso*, that which cannot cease).—"I have one thing to observe of the several kinds of *necessity*. that the idea of some sort of firm connection runs through them all: and that is the proper general import of the name *necessity*. Connection of mental or verbal propositions, or of their respective parts, makes up the idea of *logical necessity*,—connection of end and means makes up the idea of *moral necessity*,—connection of causes and effects is *physical necessity*, and connection of existence and essence is *metaphysical necessity*."—Waterland, *Works*, vol. iv., p. 432.

Logical necessity is that which, according to the terms of the proposition, cannot but be. Thus it is necessary that man be a rational animal, because these are the terms in which he is defined.

Moral necessity is that without which the effect cannot well be, although absolutely speaking it may. A man who is lame is under a *moral necessity* to use some help, but absolutely he may not.

"The phrase *moral necessity* is used variously; sometimes it is used for *necessity* of moral obligation. So we say, a man is under *necessity*, when he is under bonds of duty and conscience from which he cannot be discharged. Sometimes by *moral necessity* is meant that sure connection of things that is a foundation for infallible certainty. In this sense *moral necessity* signifies much the same as that high degree of probability, which is ordinarily sufficient to satisfy man-

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kind in their conduct and behaviour in the world. Sometimes by *moral necessity* is meant that *necessity* of connection and consequence which arises from such moral causes as the strength of inclination or motives, and the connection which there is in many cases between them, and such certain volitions and actions. It is in this sense that I use the phrase *moral necessity* in the following discourse.”—Edwards, *Works*, vol. i., p. 116.

“By *natural* (or *physical*) *necessity*, as applied to men, I mean such *necessity* as men are under through the force of natural causes. Thus men placed in certain circumstances, are the subjects of particular sensations by *necessity*; they feel pain when their bodies are wounded; they see the objects placed before them in a clear light, when their eyes are opened: so they assent to the truths of certain propositions as soon as the terms are understood; as that two and two make four, that black is not white, that two parallel lines can never cross one another; so by a *natural* (a *physical*) *necessity* men’s bodies move downwards when there is nothing to support them.”—Edwards, *Works*, vol. i., p. 146.

Necessity is characteristic of *ideas* and of *actions*. A necessary *idea* is one the contrary of which cannot be entertained by the human mind; as every change implies a cause. *Necessity* and *universality* are the marks of certain ideas which are native to the human mind, and not derived from experience. A necessary *action* is one the contrary of which is impossible. *Necessity* is opposed to freedom, or to free-will.—V. LIBERTY.

“There are two schemes of *necessity*,—the necessitation by *efficient*—the necessitation by *final* causes. The former is brute or blind fate; the latter rational determinism. Though their practical results be the same, they ought to be carefully distinguished.”—Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid’s Works*, p. 87, note.

Physical necessity is when a thing is necessary according to physical causes, as, an eclipse of the sun is necessary when the moon is interposed, or a stone when not upheld

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necessarily falls to the ground. *Metaphysical necessity* is when the contrary cannot be conceded, as that a whole is greater than a part.

Leibnitz in his Fifth Paper to Dr. Clarke, p. 157, distinguishes between—

1. *Hypothetical necessity*, as opposed to absolute *necessity*, as that which the supposition or hypothesis of God's foresight and preordination lays upon future contingents.

2. *Logical, metaphysical or mathematical necessity*, which takes place because the opposite implies a contradiction, and

3. *Moral necessity*, whereby a wise being chooses the best, and every mind follows the strongest inclination.

Dr. Clarke replies, p. 287, "*Necessity*, in philosophical questions, always signifies *absolute necessity*. *Hypothetical necessity* and *moral necessity* are only figurative ways of speaking, and in philosophical strictness of truth, are no *necessity* at all. The question is not, whether a thing *must* be, when it is *supposed* that it *is*, or that it is *to be* (which is *hypothetical necessity*). Neither is it the question whether it be true, that a *good* being, continuing to be good, cannot do evil; or a wise being, continuing to be wise, cannot act *unwisely*; or a *veracious* person, continuing to be *veracious*, cannot tell a lie (which is *moral necessity*). But the true and only question in philosophy concerning liberty, is, whether the *immediate physical cause*, or *principle of action* be indeed in him whom we call the agent; or whether it be some other *reason*, which is the *real cause* by operating upon the agent, and making him to be not indeed an *agent*, but a mere *patient*."

The scholastic philosophers have denominated one species of *necessity*—*necessitas consequentiæ*, and another *necessitas consequentis*. The former is an *ideal* or *formal necessity*; the inevitable dependence of one *thought* upon another, by reason of our intelligent nature. The latter is a *real* or *material necessity*; the inevitable dependence of one *thing* upon another because of its own nature. The former is a

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logical *necessity*, common to all legitimate *consequence*, whatever be the material modality of its objects. The latter is an extra-logical *necessity*, over and above the syllogistic inference, and wholly dependent upon the modality of the *consequent*. This ancient distinction modern philosophers have not only overlooked but confounded. See contrasted the doctrines of the Aphrodisian, and of Mr. Dugald Stewart, in *Dissertations upon Reid*, p. 701, note.—Sir William Hamilton, *Discussions*, p. 144.

NEGATION (*negare*, to deny)—is the absence of that which does not naturally belong to the thing we are speaking of, or which has no right, obligation, or necessity, to be present with it; as when we say—A stone is inanimate, or blind, or deaf, that is, has no life, nor sight, nor hearing; or when we say — A carpenter or fisherman is unlearned; these are mere *negations*.—Watts, *Logic*, part i., chap. 2, sect. 6.

In simple apprehension there is no affirmation or denial, so that, strictly speaking, there are no negative ideas, notions, or conceptions. In truth, some that are so called represent the most positive realities; as infinity, immensity, immortality, &c. But in some ideas, as in that of blindness, deafness, insensibility, there is, as it were, a taking away of something from the object of which these ideas are entertained. But this is privation (*στέρησις*) rather than *negation* (*ἀποφασίς*). And in general it may be said that *negation* implies some anterior conception of the object of which the *negation* is made. Absolute *negation* is impossible. We have no idea of nothing. It is but a word.—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

NIHILISM (*nihil*, *nihilum*, nothing)—is scepticism carried to the denial of all existence.

“The sum total,” says Fichté, “is this. There is absolutely nothing permanent either without me or within me, but only an unceasing change. I know absolutely nothing of any existence, not even of my own. I myself know nothing, and am nothing. Images (*Bilder*) there are;

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they constitute all that apparently exists, and what they know of themselves is after the manner of images; images that pass and vanish without there being aught to witness their transition; that consist in fact of the images of images, without significance and without an aim. I myself am one of these images; nay, I am not even thus much, but only a confused image of images. All reality is converted into a marvellous dream without a life to dream of, and without a mind to dream; into a dream made up only of a dream itself. Perception is a dream; thought, the source of all the existence and all the reality which I imagine to myself of *my* existence, of my power, of my destination—is the dream of that dream.”—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 129, note. *Bestimmung des Menschen P108*

In like manner, Mr. Hume resolved the phenomena of consciousness into impressions and ideas. And as according to Berkeley, sensitive impressions were no proof of external realities, so according to Hume, ideas do not prove the existence of mind—so that there is neither matter nor mind, for anything that we can prove.

NIHILUM or NOTHING—“is that of which everything can truly be denied, and *nothing* can be truly affirmed. So that the idea of *nothing* (if I may so speak) is absolutely the negation of all ideas. The idea, therefore, either of a finite or infinite *nothing*, is a contradiction in terms.”—Clarke, *Answer to 7th Letter*, note.

Nothing, taken *positively*, is what does not but may exist, as a river of milk—taken *negatively*, it is that which does not and cannot exist, as a square circle, a mountain without a valley. *Nothing* positively is *ens potentiale*. *Nothing* negatively is *non ens*.

NOMINALISM (*nomen*, a name)—is the doctrine that general notions, such as the notion of a tree, have no realities corresponding to them, and have no existence but as names or words. The doctrine directly opposed to it is *realism*. To the intermediate doctrine of *conceptualism*, *nominalism* is closely allied. It may be called the envelope of *concep-*

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tualism, while *conceptualism* is the letter or substance or *nominalism*. "If *nominalism* sets out from *conceptualism*, *conceptualism* should terminate in *nominalism*," says Mons. Cousin, *Introduction Aux Ouvrages Inédits d'Abailaird*, 4to, Paris, 1836, p. 181.

Universalia ante rem, is the watchword of the *Realists*; *Universalia in re*, of the *Conceptualists*; *Universalia post rem*, of the *Nominalists*. The *Nominalists* were called *Terminists* about the time of the Reformation.—Ballantyne, *Exam. of Hum. Mind*, chap. 3, sect. 4.

NOOGONIE (*νους*, mind; *γενος*, birth, or generation).—"Leibnitz has intellectualized sensations, Locke has sensualized notions, in that system which I might call a *noogonie*, in place of admitting two different sources of our representations, which are objectively valid only in their connection."—Kant, *Crit. de la Raison Pure*, pp. 326, 327.

NOOLOGY (*νους*, mind; *λογος*, discourse)—is a term proposed by Mons. Paffe (*Sur la Sensibilité*, p. 30), to denote the science of intellectual facts, or the facts of intellect; and *pathology* (*psychological*), to denote the science of the *phenomenes affectifs*, or feeling, or sensibility.

The use of the term is noticed by Sir W. Hamilton, (*Reid's Works*, note A, sect. 5, p. 770) as the title given to *Treatises on the doctrine of First Principles*, by Calovius, in 1651; Mejerus, in 1662; Wagnerus, in 1670; and Zeidlerus, in 1680—and he has said, "The correlatives *noetic* and *dianoetic* would afford the best philosophical designations, the former for an intuitive principle, or truth at first hand; the latter for a demonstrative proposition, or truth at second hand. *Noology* or *noological*, *dianoiology* and *dianoiological*, would be also technical terms of much convenience in various departments of philosophy."

Mons. Ampere proposed to designate the sciences which treat of the human mind *Les sciences Noologiques*.

"If, instead of considering the *objects* of our knowledge, we consider its *origin*, it may be said that it is either derived from experience alone, or from reason alone;

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hence empirical philosophers and those which Kant calls *noologists*: at their head are Aristotle and Plato among the ancients, and Locke and Leibnitz among the moderns.”

—Henderson, *Philosoph. of Kant*, p. 172.

NOTION (*noscere*, to know).—Bolingbroke says (essay i., *On Human Knowledge*, sect. 2), “ I distinguish here between *ideas* and *notions*, for it seems to me, that, as we compound simple into complex ideas, so the composition we make of simple and complex ideas may be called, more properly, and with less confusion and ambiguity, *notions*.”

Mr. Locke says (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., ch. 22), “ The mind being once furnished with simple ideas, it can put them together in several compositions, and so make variety of complex *ideas*, without examining whether they exist so together in nature, and hence I think it is that these *ideas* are called *notions*, as they had their original and constant existence more in the thoughts of men than in the reality of things.”

“ The distinction of *ideas*, strictly so called, and *notions*, is one of the most common and important in the philosophy of mind. Nor do we owe it, as has been asserted, to Berkeley. It was virtually taken by Descartes and the Cartesians, in their discrimination of ideas of imagination, and ideas of intelligence; it was in terms vindicated against Locke, by Serjeant, Stillingfleet, Norris, Z. Mayne, Bishop Brown, and others. Bonnet signaled it; and under the contrast of *Anschauungen* and *Begriffe*, it has long been an established and classical discrimination with the philosophers of Germany. Nay, Reid himself suggests it in the distinction he requires between *imagination* and *conception*,—a distinction which he unfortunately did not carry out, and which Mr. Stewart still more unhappily perverted. The terms *notion* and *conception* (or more correctly *concept* in this sense), should be reserved to express what we comprehend but cannot picture in *imagination*,—such as a relation, a general term, &c. The word *idea*, as one prostituted to all meanings, it were better to discard. As for

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the representations of imagination or phantasy, I would employ the term *image* or *phantasm*, it being distinctly understood that these terms are applied to denote the *representations* not of our visible perceptions merely, as the term taken literally would indicate, but of our sensible perceptions in general.”—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 291, note.

Notion is more general in its signification than *idea*. *Idea* is merely a *conception*, or at most a *necessary* and *universal* conception. *Notion* implies all this and more,—a judgment or series of judgments, and a certain degree of knowledge of the object. Thus we speak of having no *notion* or knowledge of a thing, and of having some *notion* or knowledge. It began to be used by Descartes in his *Regulæ ad Directionem Ingenii*, and soon came into current use among French philosophers. It enables us to steer clear of the *ideas* of Plato, of the *species* of the scholastics, and of the *images* of the empirical school. Hence Dr. Reid tells us that he used it in preference.—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

Des Maistre (*Soirees de St. Petersbourg*, p. 164), uses the French word *notion* as synonymous with pure idea, or innate idea, underived from sense.

Chalybæus, in a Letter to Mr. Eddersheim (the translator of his work), says, “In English as in French, the word *idea*, *idée*, is applied, without distinction, to a representation, to a *notion*, in short to every mental conception; while in German, in scientific language, a very careful distinction is made between sensuous “*vorstellung*” (representation), abstract “*verstandesbegriff*” (intellectual notion), and “*ideen*,” (ideas) of reason.

Notions or *concepts* are *clear* and *distinct*, or *obscure* and *indistinct*. “A concept is said to be *clear* when the degree of consciousness is such as enables us to distinguish it as a whole from others, and *obscure* when the degree of consciousness is insufficient to accomplish this. A concept is said to be *distinct* when the amount of consciousness is such

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as enables us to discriminate from each other the several characters or constituent parts of which the concept is the sum, and *indistinct* or *confused* when the amount of consciousness requisite for this is wanting." In the darkness of night there is no perception of objects, this is *obscurity*. As light dawns we begin to see objects, this is *indistinctness*. As morning advances we make a distinction between trees and houses, and fields, and rivers, as wholes differing from one another, this is *clearness*. At length when day approaches noon, we see the parts which make up the wholes, and have a *distinct* view of everything before us.

We have a *clear notion* of colours, smells, and tastes; for we can discriminate red from white, bitter from sweet. But we have not a *distinct notion* of them, for we are not acquainted with the qualities which form the difference; neither can we describe them to such as cannot see, smell, and taste. We have a *clear notion* of a triangle when we discriminate it from other figures. We have a *distinct notion* of it when we think of it as a portion of space bounded by three straight lines, as a figure whose three angles taken together are equal to two right angles.

First Notions and Second Notions.

The distinction (which we owe to the Arabians) of *first* and *second notions* (*notiones, conceptus, intentiones, intellecta prima et secunda*) is a highly philosophical determination.* . . . A *first notion* is the concept of a thing as it exists of itself, and independent of any operation of thought; as man, John, animal, &c. A *second notion* is the concept, not of an object as it is in reality, but of the *mode under which it is thought by the mind*; as individual, species, genus, &c. The former is the *concept of a thing, real, immediate, direct*: the latter the *concept of a concept, formal, mediate, reflex*."—Sir William Hamilton, *Discussions*, p. 137.

"Notions are of two kinds; they either have regard to

* The Americans call a cargo of fashionable goods, trinkets, &c., being "laden with notions," and on being hailed by our ships, a fellow (without an idea perhaps in his head) will answer through a speaking trumpet that he is "laden with notions."
—Moore, *Diary*, p. 249.

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things as they are, as horse, ship, tree, and are called *first notions*; or to things as they are *understood*, as *notions* of genus, species, attribute, subject, and in this respect are called *second notions*, which, however, are based upon the first, and cannot be conceived without them. Now logic is not so much employed upon first *notions* of things as upon second; that is, it is not occupied so much with things as they exist in nature, but with the way in which the mind conceives them. A logician has nothing to do with ascertaining whether a horse, or a ship, or a tree exists, but whether one of these things can be regarded as a genus or species, whether it can be called a subject or an attribute, whether from the conjunction of many second *notions* a proposition, a definition, or a syllogism can be formed. The *first intention* of every word is its real meaning; the *second intention*, its logical value according to the function of thought to which it belongs.*—Thomson, *Outline of the Laws of Thought*, 2d ed., pp. 39, 40.

Notions, Intuitive and Symbolical.

Leibnitz was the first to employ *intuitive* and *intuition* to denote our direct ostensive cognitions of an individual object either in sense or imagination, and in opposition to our indirect and *symbolical* cognitions acquired through the use of signs or language in the understanding.

“When our *notion* of any object or objects consists of a clear insight into all its attributes, or at least the essential ones, he would call it *intuitive*. But where the *notion* is complex and its properties numerous, we do not commonly realize all that it conveys; the powers of thinking would be needlessly retarded by such a review. We think more compendiously by putting a symbol in the place of all the properties of our *notion*, and this naturally is the term by

* “See Buhle (Aristot., 1, p. 432), whose words I have followed. See also Cracanthorp (*Logic. Proem.*), and Sir W. Hamilton (*Edin. Rev.*, No. 115, p. 210). There is no authority whatever for Aldrich’s view, which makes second intention mean, apparently, ‘a term defined for scientific use;’ though with the tenacious vitality of error it still lingers in some quarters, after wounds that should have been mortal.”

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which we are accustomed to convey the *notion* to others. A name, then, employed in thought is called a *symbolical cognition*; and the names we employ in speech are not always symbols to another of what is explicitly understood by us, but quite as often are symbols both to speaker and hearer, the full and exact meaning of which neither of them stop to unfold, any more than they regularly reflect that every sovereign which passes through their hands is equivalent to 240 pence. Such words as the State, Happiness, Liberty, Creation, are too pregnant with meaning for us to suppose that we realize their full sense every time we read or pronounce them. If we attend to the working of our minds, we shall find that each word may be used, and in its proper place and sense, though perhaps few or none of its attributes are present to us at the moment. A very simple *notion* is always *intuitive*; we cannot make our *notion* of brown or red simpler than it is by any symbol. On the other hand a highly complex notion, like those named above, is seldom fully realized—seldom other than *symbolical*.”—Thomson, *Outline of the Laws of Thought*, p. 47.

NOTIONES COMMUNES, also called *prænotiones*, *anticipations*, *communes notitiæ*, *πρῶτη ψεῖς*, *κοινὰ ἔννοιαι*—*first truths*, *natural judgments*, *principles of common sense*, are phrases employed to denote certain *notions* or cognitions which are native to the human mind, which are intuitively discerned, being clear and manifest in their own light, and needing no proof, but forming the ground of proof and evidence as to other truths.—V. ANTICIPATION, TRUTHS (FIRST).

NOUMENON, in the philosophy of Kant (an object as conceived by the understanding, or thought of by the reason, *νοῦς*), is opposed to *phenomenon* (an object such as we represent it to ourselves by the impression which it makes on our senses). *Noumenon* is an object in itself, not relatively to us. But we have, according to Kant, no such knowledge of things in themselves. For besides the impressions which things make on us, there is nothing in us but the forms of the sensibility and the categories of the understanding, according to which, and not according

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to the nature of things in themselves, it may be, are our conceptions of them.

Things sensible considered as in themselves and not as they appear to us, Kant calls *negative noumena*; and reserves the designation of *positive noumena*, to intelligibles properly so called, which are the objects of an intuition purely intellectual.—Willm, *Hist. de la Philosoph. Allemande*, tom. i., p. 200.

The two kinds of *noumena* taken together are opposed to *phenomena*, and form the *intelligible* world. This world we admit as possible, but unknown. Kantism thus trends towards scepticism.

“The word *phenomenon* has no meaning except as opposed to something intelligible—to a *noumenon*, as Kant says. Now, either we understand by the latter word a thing which cannot be the object of a sensuous intuition, without determining the mode in which it is perceived, and in this case we take it in a *negative* sense; or we understand it as the object of a real intuition, though not a sensuous one, an intellectual one, and then we take it in a *positive* sense. Which of these two is the truth? It cannot unquestionably be affirmed *à priori* that the only possible manner of perception is sensuous intuition, and it implies no contradiction to suppose that an object may be known to us otherwise than by the senses. But, says Kant, this is only a possibility. To justify us in affirming that there really is any other mode of perception than sensuous intuition, any intellectual intuition, it must come within the range of our knowledge; and in fact we have no idea of any such faculty. We, therefore, cannot adopt the word *noumenon* in any positive sense; it expresses but an indeterminate object, not of an intuition, but of a conception—in other words a hypothesis of the understanding.”
—Henderson, *Philosophy of Kant*, p. 76.

NOVELTY (*novus*, new)—“is not merely a sensation in the mind of him to whom the thing is new; it is a real relation which the thing has to his knowledge at that time. But we are so constituted, that what is new to us commonly

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gives pleasure upon that account, if it be not in itself disagreeable. It rouses our attention, and occasions an agreeable exertion of our faculties. . . . Curiosity is a capital principle in the human constitution, and its food must be what is in some respect new. . . .

Into this part of the human constitution, I think, we may resolve the pleasure we have from *novelty* in objects.”—Reid, *Intell. Powers*, essay viii., chap. 2.

Any new or strange object, whether in nature or in art, when contemplated gives rise to feelings of a pleasing kind, the consideration of which belongs to *Æsthetics*—or that department of philosophy which treats of the Powers of Taste.

NUMBER was held by Pythagoras to be the ultimate principle of being. His views were adopted to a certain extent by Plato, and attacked by Aristotle. In the Middle Ages, *numbers* and the proportions subsisting between them, were employed in the systems of the alchemists and cabalists. But in proportion as the true spirit of philosophy prevailed, *numbers* were banished from metaphysics, and the consideration of them was allotted to a separate science—arithmetic and algebra.

OATH.—An *oath* is a solemn appeal to God, as the author of all that is true and right, and a solemn promise to speak the truth and to do what is right; renouncing the divine favour and imprecating the divine vengeance, should we fail to do so. *Oaths* have been distinguished as—1. The *assertory*, or *oath* of evidence, and 2. The *promissory*, or *oath* of office—the former referring to the past, and the latter to the future. But both refer to the future, inasmuch as both are confirmatory of a promise to give true evidence or to do faithful service.—V. AFFIRMATION.

OBJECTIVE (*objicere*, to throw against)—is now used to describe the absolute independent state of a thing; but by the elder metaphysicians it was applied to the aspect of things as *objects* of sense or understanding. So Berkeley, “Natural phenomena are only natural appearances. They

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are, therefore, such as we see and perceive them. Their *real* and *objective* natures are, therefore, one and the same." *Siris*, sect. 292, where *real* and *objective* are expressly distinguished. The modern nomenclature appears to me very inconvenient."—Fitzgerald, *Notes to Aristotle*, p. 191.

With Aristotle "υποκειμενον signified the *subject* of a proposition, and also substance. The Latins translated it *subjectum*. In Greek object is αντικειμενον, translated *oppositum*. In the Middle Ages *subject* meant *substance*, and has this sense in Descartes and Spinoza; sometimes also in Reid. *Subjective* is used by Will. Occam to denote that which exists independent of mind, *objective* that which the mind feigned. This shows what is meant by *realitas objectiva* in Descartes (*Med.* 3). Kant and Fichte have inverted the meanings: *subject* is the mind which knows—*object* that which is known. *Subjective* the varying conditions of the knowing mind—*objective* that which is in the constant nature of the thing known.—Trendlenburg, *Notes to Aristotle's Logic*.

By *objective reality* Descartes meant the reality of the object in so far as represented by the idea or thought of it—by *formal*, or *actual reality* the reality of the object as conform to our idea of it. Thus the sun was *objectively* in our thought or idea of it—*actually* or *formally* in the heavens. He had also a third form of reality which he called *eminent*—that is an existence superior at once to the *idea* and the *object*, and which contained in *posse* what both these had in *esse*.—*Response aux Seconde Objection*.

"In philosophical language, it were to be wished that the word *subject* should be reserved for the *subject of inhesion*—the *materia in qua*; and the term *object* exclusively applied to the *subject of operation*—the *materia circa quam*. If this be not done, the grand distinction of *subjective* and *objective*, in philosophy, is confounded. But if the employment of *subject* for *object* is to be deprecated, the employment of *object* for purpose or final cause (in the French and English languages) is to be absolutely condemned, as a recent and irrational confusion of notions which

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should be carefully distinguished.”—Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 97, note, and App., note B.—V. SUBJECT.

OBLIGATION (*ob-ligare*, to bind)—is legal or moral.

“*Obligation*, as used in moral inquiry, is derived from the doctrine of justification in the scholastic ages. In consequence of original sin man comes into the world a *debtor* to Divine justice. He is under an *obligation* to punishment, on account of his *deficiency* from that form of original justice in which he rendered to God all that service of love which the great goodness of God demanded. Hence our terms *due* and *duty*, to express right conduct.”—Hamptden, *Bampton Lect.*, vi., p. 296.

Obligation (Moral)—has been distinguished as *internal* and *external*; according as the reason for acting arises in the mind of the agent, or from the will of another.

In seeing a thing to be right we are under *obligation* to do it. This is *internal obligation*, or that reason for acting which arises in the mind of the agent, along with the perception of the rightness of the action. It is also called *rational obligation*. Dr. Adams (*Sermon on the Nature and Obligation of Virtue*) has said, “*Right* implies duty in its idea. To perceive that an action is *right*, is to see a reason for doing it in the action itself, abstracted from all other considerations whatever. Now, this perception, this acknowledged rectitude in the action, is the very *essence of obligation*; that which commands the approbation of choice, and *binds the conscience* of every rational being.” And Mr. Stewart (*Active and Moral Powers*, vol. ii., p. 294) has said, “The very notion of virtue implies the notion of *obligation*.”

External obligation is a reason for acting which arises from the will of another, having authority to impose a law. It is also called *authoritative obligation*. Bishop Warburton (*Div. Legat.*, book i., sect. 4) has contended that all *obligation* necessarily implies an *obliger* different from the party obliged; and moral *obligation*, being the *obligation* of a free agent, implies a law; and a law implies a lawgiver.

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The will of God, therefore, is the true ground of all *obligation*, strictly and properly so called. The perception of the difference between right and wrong can be said to oblige only as an indication of the will of God.

There is no incompatibility between these two grounds of obligation.—See Whewell, *Sermons on the Foundation of Morals*, pp. 26-76. And Dr. Chalmers, *Bridgewater Treatise*, vol. i., p. 78.

By some philosophers, however, this stream of living waters has been parted. They have grounded *obligation* altogether on the will of God, and have overlooked or made light of the *obligation* which arises from our perception of rectitude. Language to this effect has been ascribed to Mr. Locke. (*Life by Lord King*, vol. ii., p. 129.) And both Warburton and Horseley, as well as Paley and his followers, have given too much, if not an exclusive, prominence to the rewards and punishments of a future life, as prompting to the practice of virtue. But, although God, in accommodation to the weakness of our nature and the perils of our condition, has condescended to quicken us, in the discharge of our duty, by appealing to our hopes and fears, both in regard to the life that now is and that which is to come, it does not follow that self-love, or a concern for our own happiness, should be the only, or even the chief, spring of our obedience. On the contrary, obedience to the divine will may spring from veneration and love to the divine character, arising from the most thorough conviction of the rectitude, wisdom, and goodness of the divine arrangements. And that this, more than a regard to the rewards of everlasting life, is the proper spring of virtuous conduct, is as plain as it is important to remark. To do what is right, even for the sake of everlasting life, is evidently acting from a motive far inferior, in purity and power, to love and veneration for the character and commands of Him who is just and good, in a sense and to an extent to which our most elevated conceptions are inadequate. That which should bind us to the throne of the

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Eternal is not the iron chain of selfishness, but the golden links of a love to all that is right; and our aspirations to the realms of bliss should be breathings after the prevalence of universal purity, rather than desires of our own individual happiness. Self and its little circle is too narrow to hold the heart of man, when it is touched with a sense of its true dignity, and enlightened with the knowledge of its lofty destination. It swells with generous admiration of all that is right and good; and expands with a love which refuses to acknowledge any limits but the limits of life and the capacities of enjoyment. In the nature and will of Him from whom all being and all happiness proceed, it acknowledges the only proper object of its adoration and submission; and in surrendering itself to His authority is purified from all the dross of selfishness, and cheered by the light of a calm and unquenchable love to all that is right and good.

See Sanderson, *De Juramenti Obligatione*, prælec. i., sect. 11.

Sanderson, *De Obligatione Conscientiæ*, prælec. v.

Whewell, *Morality*, book i., chap. 4, pp. 84-89.

King, *Essay on Evil*, Prelim. Dissertat., sect. 2.—V.

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OBSERVATION.—"The difference between *experiment* and *observation*, consists merely in the comparative rapidity with which they accomplish their discoveries; or rather in the comparative command we possess over them, as instruments for the investigation of truth."—Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, Prelim. Diss., chap. 2.

Mr. Stewart (*Philosoph. Hum. Mind*, vol. i., p. 106, note) has said that according to Dr. Reid, "Attention to external things is *observation*, and attention to the subjects of our own consciousness is reflection. Yet Dr. Reid (*Intell. Powers*, essay vi., chap. 1) has said that "reflection in its proper and common meaning, is equally applicable to objects of sense and to objects of consciousness—and has censured Locke for restricting it to that reflection which is employed

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about the operations of our minds. In like manner we may *observe* the operations of our own minds as well as external phenomena. *Observation* is better characterized by Sir John Herschell as passive experience.—V. EXPERIENCE.

It is the great instrument of discovery in mind and matter. According to some (*Edin. Rev.*, vol. iii., p. 269), *experiment* can be applied to matter, but only *observation* to mind. But to a certain extent the study of mind admits experiment.—See Hampden, *Introd. to Mor. Phil.*, sect. ii., p. 51; and Mr. Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, Prelim. Dissert., chap. 2.

“Instead of contrasting *observation* and *experiment*, we should contrast spontaneous and experimental phenomena as alike subjects of *observation*. Facts furnished by artificial contrivances require to be *observed* just in the same way as those which are presented by nature without our interference; and yet philosophers are nearly unanimous in confining *observation* to the latter phenomena, and speaking of it as of something which ceases where experiment begins; while in simple truth, the business of experiment is to extend the sphere of *observation*, and not to take up a subject where *observation* lays it down.”—S. Bailey, *Theory of Reasoning*, pp. 114-15, 8vo, Lond., 1851.

All men are apt to notice likenesses in the facts that come before them, and to group similar facts together. The faculty by which such similarities are apprehended is called *observation*; the act of grouping them together under a general statement, as when we say, “All seeds grow—all bodies fall,” has been described as *generalization*.—V. GENERALIZATION.

According to M. Comte (*Cours de Philosoph. Positive*, tom. ii., p. 19), there are three modes of *observation*:—
1. *Observation*, properly so called, or the direct examination of the phenomenon as it presents itself naturally.
2. *Experiment*, or the contemplation of the phenomenon, so modified more or less by artificial circumstances introduced intentionally by ourselves, with a view to its more

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complete investigation. 3. *Comparison*, or the successive consideration of a series of analogous cases, in which the phenomenon becomes more and more simple. The third head (as to which see tom. iii., p. 343) seems not so much a species of *observation*, as a mode of arranging *observations*, with a view to a proper investigation of the phenomena.—Lewis, *Methods of Observat. in Politics*, chap. 5, note.

According to Humboldt (*Cosmos*, vol. ii., p. 212) there are three stages of the investigation of nature—*passive observation*, *active observation*, and *experiment*.

The difference between active and passive *observation* is marked in Bacon (*Nov. Org.*, 1, Aphor. 100). The former is when, *Experientia lege certa procedit, seriatim et continenter*.

“This word *experimental* has the defect of not appearing to comprehend the knowledge which flows from *observation*, as well as that which is obtained by *experiment*. The German word *empirical* is applied to all the information which experience affords; but it is in our language degraded by another application. I therefore must use *experimental* in a larger sense than its etymology warrants.”—Sir J. Mackintosh, *On Bacon and Locke, Works*, vol. i., p. 333.

Experiential has been proposed as equivalent to *empirical*.
—V. EXPERIENCE.

OCCASION.—Cicero (1. *De Inventione*) says:—*Occasio est pars temporis, habens in se alicujus rei idoneam faciendi opportunitatem.* (*De Offic.*, lib. i.) *Tempus autem actionis opportunum*, Græce, *ἔνκαιρία*; Latine, *appellatur occasio*. The watchman falling asleep gives *occasion* to thieves to break into the house and steal.

“There is much difference between an *occasion* and a proper *cause*: these two are heedfully to be distinguished. Critical and exact historians, as Polybius and Tacitus, distinguish betwixt the *ἀρχή* and the *αἰτία*, the beginning *occasions* and the real causes, of a war.”—Flavell, *Discourse of the Occasions, Causes, Nature, Rise, Growth, and Remedies of Mental Errors*, 20. *Observat.*

OCCASIONAL CAUSES (Doctrine of).—V. CAUSE.

OCCULT QUALITIES.—V. QUALITY.

ONEIROMANCY.—V. DREAMING.

ONTOLOGY (*ὄν ὄντος* and *λογος*, the science of being).—

“*Ontology* is a discourse of being in general, and the various or most universal modes or affections, as well as the several kinds or divisions of it. The word *being* here includes not only whatsoever actually is, but whatsoever can be.”—Watts, *On Ontology*, c. 1.—See also Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, book v., c. 1.

Ontology is the same as metaphysics. Neither the one name nor the other was used by Aristotle. He called the science now designated by them *philosophia prima*, and defined it as *ἐπιστημη του ὄντος ἢ ὄντος*—*Scientia Entis Quantenus Entis*, that is, the science of the essence of things; the science of the attributes and conditions of being in general, not of being in any given circumstances, not as physical or mathematical, but as being. The name *ontology* seems to have been first made current in philosophy by Wolf. He divided metaphysics into four parts—*ontology*, psychology, rational cosmology, and theology. It was chiefly occupied with abstract inquiries into possibility, necessity, and contingency, substance, accident, cause, &c., without reference to the laws of our intellect by which we are constrained to believe in them. Kant denied that we had any knowledge of substance or cause as really existing. But there is a science of principles and causes, of the principles of being and knowing. In this view of it, *ontology* corresponds with metaphysics,—*q. v.*

“*Ontology* may be treated of in two different methods, according as its exponent is a believer in *το ὄν*, or in *τα ὄντα*, in one or in many fundamental principles of things. In the former, all objects whatever are regarded as phenomenal modifications of one and the same substance, or as self-determined effects of one and the same cause. The necessary result of this method is to reduce all metaphysical philosophy to a Rational Theology, the one Substance or Cause, being identified with the Absolute or the Deity.

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According to the latter method, which professes to treat of different classes of beings independently, metaphysics will contain three co-ordinate branches of inquiry, Rational Cosmology, Rational Psychology, and Rational Theology. The first aims at a knowledge of the real essence, as distinguished from the phenomena of the material world; the second discusses the nature and origin, as distinguished from the faculties and affections of the human soul and of other finite spirits; the third aspires to comprehend God himself, as cognizable *à priori* in his essential nature, apart from the indirect and relative indications furnished by his works, as in Nat. Theology, or by his word, as in Revealed Religion.

“These three objects of metaphysical inquiry, God, the World, the Mind, correspond to Kant’s three ideas of the Pure Reason; and the object of his Critique is to show that in relation to all these, the attainment of a system of speculative philosophy is impossible.”—Mansell, *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 277.

“The science of *ontology* comprehends investigations of every real existence, either beyond the sphere of the present world, or in any other way incapable of being the direct object of consciousness, which can be deduced immediately from the possession of certain feelings or principles and faculties of the human soul.”—Archer Butler, *Lectures on Ancient Philosophy*.

OPERATIONS (of the Mind).—“By the *operations of the mind*,”* says Dr. Reid (*Intellect. Powers*, essay i., chap 1), “we understand every mode of thinking of which we are conscious.

“It deserves our notice, that the various modes of thinking have always and in all languages, as far as we know, been called by the name of *operations of the mind*, or by names of the same import. To body, we ascribe various properties, but not *operations*, properly so called: it is ex-

* *Operation*, *act*, and *energy*, are nearly convertible terms; and are opposed to *faculty*, as the *actual* to the *potential*.—Sir Will. Hamilton.

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tended, divisible, moveable, inert; it continues in any state in which it is put; every change of its state is the effect of some force impressed upon it, and is exactly proportional to the force impressed, and in the precise direction of that force. These are the general properties of matter, and these are not *operations*; on the contrary, they all imply its being a dead, inactive thing, which moves only as it is moved, and acts only by being acted upon. But the mind is, from its very nature, a living and active being. Everything we know of it implies life and active energy; and the reason why all its modes of thinking are called *operations*, is that in all, or in most of them, it is not merely passive as body is, but is really and properly active.”
—V. STATES OF MIND.

OPINION (*ᾠω*, I think, hence *ᾠνωα*, *opinion*).—“The essential idea of *opinion* seems to be that it is a matter about which doubt can reasonably exist, as to which two persons can without absurdity think differently. . . . Any proposition, the contrary of which can be maintained with probability, is matter of opinion.”—Lewis, *Essay on Opinion*, p. i., iv.

According to the last of these definitions, matter of *opinion* is opposed not to matter of *fact*, but to matter of *certainty*. Thus, the death of Charles I. is a *fact*—his authorship of *Icon Basilike*, an *opinion*. It is also used, however, to denote knowledge acquired by inference, as opposed to that acquired by perception. Thus, that the moon gives light, is matter of *fact*; that it is inhabited or uninhabited, is matter of *opinion*.

It has been proposed (*Edin. Rev.*, April 1850, p. 511) to discard from philosophical use these ambiguous expressions, and to divide knowledge, according to its sources, into matter of *perception* and matter of *inference*; and, as a cross division as to our conviction, into matter of *certainty* and matter of *doubt*.

Holding for true, or the subjective validity of a judgment in relation to conviction (which is, at the same time, ob-

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jectively valid), has the three following degrees:—*opinion*, *belief*, and *knowledge*. *Opinion* is a consciously insufficient judgment, subjectively as well as objectively. *Belief* is subjectively sufficient, but is recognized as being objectively insufficient. *Knowledge* is both subjectively and objectively sufficient. Subjective sufficiency is termed *conviction* (for myself); objective sufficiency is termed *certainly* (for all).—Meiklejohn, *Translat. of Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 498.—V. BELIEF, KNOWLEDGE, CERTAINTY, FACT.

OPPOSED, OPPOSITION (το ἄντικειμενον, that which lies over against).—Aristotle has said (*In Categor.*, 9), that “one thing may be opposed to another in four ways; by relation, by contrariety, or as privation is to possession, affirmation to negation. Thus, there is the *opposition* of relation between the double and the half; of contrariety between good and evil; blindness and seeing are *opposed* in the way of privation and possession; the propositions he sits, and he does not sit, in the way of negation and affirmation.”—V. CONTRARY, PRIVATION.

OPTIMISM (*optimum*, the superlative of *bonum*, good)—is the doctrine, that the universe, being the work of an infinitely perfect being, is the best that could be created.

This doctrine under various forms appeared in all the great philosophical schools of antiquity. During the Middle Ages it was advocated by St. Anselm and St. Thomas. In times comparatively modern, it was embraced by Descartes and Malebranche. But the doctrine has been developed in its highest form by Leibnitz.

According to him, God being infinitely perfect, could neither will nor produce evil. And as a less good compared with a greater is evil, the creation of God must not only be good, but the best that could possibly be. Before creation, all beings and all possible conditions of things were present to the divine mind in idea, and composed an infinite number of worlds, from among which infinite wisdom chose the best. Creation was the giving existence to

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the most perfect state of things which had been ideally contemplated by the Divine Mind.

The *optimism* of Leibnitz has been misunderstood and misrepresented by Voltaire and others. But the doctrine which Leibnitz advocated is not that the present state of things is the best possible in reference to individuals, nor to classes of beings, nor even to this world as a whole, but in reference to all worlds, or to the universe as a whole—and not even to the universe in its present state, but in reference to that indefinite progress of which it may contain the germs.—Leibnitz, *Essais de Theodicée*.

Malebranche, *Entretiens Metaphysiques*.

According to Mr. Stewart (*Active and Mor. Pow.*, b. iii., ch. 3, sect. 1), under the title of *optimists*, are comprehended, those who admit and those who deny the freedom of human actions and the accountableness of man as a moral agent.

ORDER means rank, *series* means succession; hence there is in *order* something of voluntary arrangement, and in *series* something of unconscious catenation. The *order* of a procession. The *series* of ages. A *series* of figures in uniform—soldiers in *order* of battle.—Taylor, *Synonyms*.

Order is the intelligent arrangement of means to accomplish an end, the harmonious relation established between the parts for the good of the whole. The primitive belief that there is *order* in nature, is the ground of all experience. In this belief we confidently anticipate that the same causes, operating in the same circumstances, will produce the same effects. This may be resolved into a higher belief in the wisdom of an infinitely perfect being, who orders all things.

Order has been regarded as the higher idea into which moral rectitude may be resolved. Every being has an end to answer, and every being attains its perfection in accomplishing that end. But while other beings tend blindly towards it, man knows the end of his being, and the place he holds in the scheme of the universe, and can freely and

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intelligently endeavour to realize that universal *order* of which he is an element or constituent. In doing so he does what is right.

Such is the theory of Malebranche, and more recently of Jouffroy. In like manner, science, in all its discoveries, tends to the discovery of universal *order*. And art, in its highest attainments, is only realizing the truth of nature; so that the true, the beautiful, and the good, ultimately resolve themselves into the idea of *order*.

The following just strictures upon the delusion which finds a worthier object of admiration in the extraordinary than in the ordinary operations of nature, are made by Seneca (*Natur. Quæst.*, vii., 1):—

“Sol spectatorem, nisi quum deficit non habet. Nemo observat lunam nisi laborantem. Tunc urbes conclamant, tunc pro se quisque superstitione vana trepidat. Quanto illa majora sunt, quod sol totidem, ut ita dicam, gradus, quot dies habet, et annum circuitu suo claudit: quod a solstitio ad minuendos dies vertitur, quod a solstitio statum inclinatur, et dat spatium noctibus; quod sidera abscondit; quod terras, quum tanto major sit illis, non urit, sed calorem suum intensionibus et remissionibus temperando fovet; quod lunam nunquam implet, nisi adversam sibi, nec obscurat. Hæc tamen non annotamus, quamdiu *ordo* servatur. Si quid turbatum est, aut præter consuetudinem emicuit, spectamus, interrogamus, ostendimus. Adeo naturale est magis nova, quam magna, mirari.”

ORGAN.—An *organ* is a part of the body fitted to perform a particular action, which, or rather the performance of which action is denominated its function.

“By the term *organ*,” says Gall (vol. i., p. 228), “I mean the material condition which renders possible the manifestation of a faculty. The muscles and the bones are the material condition of movement, but are not the faculty which causes movement; the whole organization of the eye is the material condition of sight, but it is not the faculty of seeing. By the term ‘*organ* of the soul,’ I mean a

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material condition which renders possible the manifestation of a moral quality, or an intellectual faculty. I say that man in this life thinks and wills by means of the brain ; but if one concludes that the brain is the thing that thinks and wills, it is as if one should say that the muscles are the faculty of moving ; that the *organ* of sight and the faculty of seeing are the same thing. In each case it would be to confound the *faculty* with the *organ*, and the *organ* with the *faculty*.”

“ An *organ* of sense is an instrument composed of a peculiar arrangement of organized matter, by which it is adapted to receive from specific agents definite impressions. Between the agent that produces and the *organ* that receives the impressions, the adaptation is such, that the result of their mutual action is, in the first place, the production of sensation ; and, in the second place, of pleasure.”—Dr. Southwood Smith.

According to phrenological writers, particular parts of the brain are fitted to serve as instruments for particular faculties of the mind. This is *organology*. It is farther maintained, that the figure and extent of these parts of the brain can be discerned externally. This is *organoscopy*. Some who believe in the former, do not believe in the latter.

ORGANON or **ORGANUM** is the name often applied to a collection of Aristotle's treatises on logic ; because, by the Peripatetics, logic was regarded as the instrument of science rather than a science or part of science in itself. In the sixth century, Ammonius and Simplicius arranged the works of Aristotle in classes, one of which they called *logical* or *organical*. But it was not till the fifteenth century that the name *Organum* came into common use (Bartholemy St. Hilaire, *De la Logique d'Aristote*, tom. i., p. 19). Bacon gave the name of *Novum Organum* to the second part of his *Instauratio Magna*. And the German philosopher, Lambert, in 1763, published a logical work under the title, *Das Neue Organon*.

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Poste, in his translation of the *Posterior Analytics*, gives a sketch of the *Organum* of Aristotle, which he divides into four parts,—viz., *General Logic*, the *Logic of Deduction*, the *Logic of Induction*, and the *Logic of Opinion*; the third, indeed, not sufficiently articulated and disengaged from the fourth, and hence the necessity of a *Novum Organum*.

“The *Organon* of Aristotle, and the *Organon* of Bacon, stand in relation, but the relation of contrariety; the one considers the laws under which the subject thinks, the other the laws under which the object is to be known. To compare them together, is therefore to compare together qualities of different species. Each proposes a different end; both, in different ways, are useful; and both ought to be assiduously studied.”—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 712, note.

ORIGINATE, ORIGATION.—These words and their conjugates are coming to be used in the question concerning liberty and necessity. Does man *originate* his own actions? Is man a principle of *origination*? are forms of expression equivalent to the question, Is man a free agent?

“To deny all *originating* power of the will, must be to place the primordial and necessary causes of all things in the Divine nature. . . . Whether as a matter of fact an *originating* power reside *in man*, may be matter of inquiry; but to maintain it to be an impossibility, is to deny the possibility of creation.”—Thompson, *Christ. Theism*, book i., chap. 6. See also, Cairns, *On Moral Freedom*.

OUGHTNESS.—V. DUTY.

OUTNESS.—“The word *outness*, which has been of late revived by some of Kant's admirers in this country, was long ago used by Berkeley in his *Principles of Human Knowledge* (sect. 43); and at a still earlier period of his life, in his *Essay towards a New Theory of Vision* (sect. 46). I mention this as I have more than once heard the term spoken of as a fortunate innovation.”—Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, part 1, essay 2.—**V. EXTERNALITY.**

PACT.—V. CONTRACT, PROMISE.

PANTHEISM (*παν θεος*, all is God, or God is all).—"It supposes God and nature, or God and the whole universe, to be one and the same substance—one universal being; insomuch that men's souls are only modifications of the Divine substance."—Waterland, *Works*, vol. viii., p. 81.

Pantheistæ qui contendunt unicam esse substantiam cujus partes sunt omnia entia quæ existunt.—Lacoudre, *Instit. Philosoph.*, tom. ii., p. 120.

Pantheism, when explained to mean the absorption of the infinite in the finite—of God in nature—is atheism; and the doctrine of Spinoza has been so regarded by many. When explained to mean the absorption of nature in God—of the finite in the infinite—it amounts to an exaggeration of theism. But *pantheism*, strictly speaking, is the doctrine of the necessary and eternal co-existence of the finite and the infinite—of the absolute consubstantiality of God and nature—considered as two different but inseparable aspects of universal existence; and the confutation of it is to be found in the consciousness which every one has of his personality and responsibility, which *pantheism* destroys.

PARABLE (*παραβολη*, from *παραβαλλειν*, to put forth one thing before or beside another)—has been defined to be a "fictitious but probable narrative taken from the affairs of ordinary life to illustrate some higher and less known truth." "It differs from the *Fable*, moving, as it does, in a spiritual world, and never transgressing the actual order of things natural; from the *Myth*, there being in the latter an unconscious blending of the deeper meaning with the outward symbol, the two remaining separate, and separable in the *parable*; from the *Proverb*, inasmuch as it is longer carried out, and not merely accidentally and occasionally, but necessarily figurative; from the *Allegory*, comparing, as it does, one thing *with* another, at the same time preserving them apart as an inner and an outer, not transferring, as does the *Allegory*, the properties, and qualities, and relations of one *to* the other."—Trench, *On the Parables*.

PARADOX (*παραδοξα*, beyond, or contrary to appearance) —is a proposition which seems not to be true, but which turns out to be true; so that to deny it would be to maintain an absurdity. Cicero wrote "*Paradoxa*," and the Hon. Robert Boyle published, in 1666, *Hydrostatical Paradoxes*, made out by new experiments.

PARCIMONY (Law of) (*parcimonia*, sparingness).—"That substances are not to be multiplied without necessity;" in other words, "that a plurality of principles are not to be assumed, when the phænomena can possibly be explained by one." This regulative principle may be called the law or maxim of *parcimony*.—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 751, note A.

Entia non sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatem. Frustra fit per plura quod fieri potest per pauciora. These are expressions of this principle.

PARONYMOUS.—V. CONJUGATE.

PART (*μερος*, *pars*, part, or portion).—"Part, in one sense, is applied to anything divisible in quantity. For that which you take from a quantity, in so far as it is quantity, is a *part* of that quantity. Thus two is a *part* of three. In another sense, you only give the name of *part* to what is an exact measure of quantity; so that, in one point of view, two will be a *part* of three, in another not. That into which you can divide a genus, animal, for example, otherwise than by quantity, is still a *part* of the genus. In this sense species are *parts* of the genus. *Part* is also applied to that into which an object can be divided, whether matter or form. Iron is *part* of a globe, or cube of iron; it is the matter which receives the form. An angle is also a *part*. Lastly, the elements of the definition of every particular being are *parts* of the whole; so that, in this point of view, the genus may be considered as *part* of the species; in another, on the contrary, the species is *part* of the genus."—Aristotle, *Metaphys.*, lib. v., cap. 25.

"Of things which exist by *parts*, there are three kinds. The first is of *things*, the *parts* of which are not *co-existent*,

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but *successive*; such as *time* or *motion*, no two parts of which can exist together.

“The next kind of things consisting of *parts*, is such where *parts* are *co-existent and contiguous*. Things of this kind are said to be *extended*; for *extension* is nothing else but *co-existence and junction of parts*.

“The third kind of things existing by *parts* is, when the *parts* are co-existent, yet not contiguous or joined, but separate and disjoined. Of this kind is *number*, the *parts* of which are separated by *nature*, and only united by the operation of the mind.”—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, book ii., chap. 13.

PASSION (*passio*, παθη, πασχειν, to suffer)—is the contrary of action. “A passive state is the state of a thing while it is operated upon by some cause. Every thing and every being but God, is liable to be in this state. He is pure energy—always active, but never acted upon; while everything else is liable to suffer change.”—See Harris, *Dialogue concerning Happiness*, p. 86, note, for the meaning of *Passion*.

PASSIONS (The).—This phrase is sometimes employed in a wide sense to denote all the states or manifestations of the sensibility—every form and degree of feeling. In a more restricted psychological sense, it is confined to those states of the sensibility which are turbulent, and weaken our power of self-command. This is also the popular use of the phrase, in which *passion* is opposed to reason.

Plato arranged the *passions* in two classes,—the concupiscible and irascible, ἐπιθυμια and θυμος; the former springing from the body and perishing with it, the latter connected with the rational and immortal part of our nature, and stimulating to the pursuit of good and the avoiding of excess and evil.

Aristotle included all our active principles under one general designation of *orectic*, and distinguishing them into the appetite irascible, the appetite concupiscible, which

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had their origin in the body; and the appetite rational (*βούλησις*), which is the will, under the guidance of reason.

Descartes and Malebranche have each given a theory and classification of the *passions*; also, Dr. Isaac Watts, Dr. Cogan, and Dr. Hutcheson.

PERCEPTION (*capere*, to take or lay hold, *per*, by means of,—that is, to apprehend by means of the organs of sense).

Descartes (*Princip. Philosoph.*, pars 1, sect. 32), says, “*Omnes modi cogitandi, quos in nobis experimur, ad duos generales referri possunt: quorum unus est perceptio, sive operatio intellectus; alius vero, volitio, sive operatio voluntatis. Nam sentire, imaginari, et pure intelligere, sunt tantum diversi modi percipiendi; ut et cupere, aversari, affirmare, negare, dubitare, sunt diversi modi volendi.*”

Locke (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 6), says, “The two principal actions of the mind are these two: *perception* or *thinking*, and *volition* or *willing*. The power of thinking is called the *understanding*, and the power of volition the *will*; and these two powers or abilities of the mind, are called faculties.”

Dr. Reid thought that “*perception* is most properly applied to the evidence which we have of external objects by our senses.” He says (*Intell. Powers*, essay i., chap. 1), “The *perception* of external objects by our senses, is an operation of the mind of a peculiar nature, and ought to have a name appropriated to it. It has so in all languages. And, in English, I know no word more proper to express this act of the mind than *perception*. Seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching or feeling, are words that express the operations proper to each sense; *perceiving* expresses that which is common to them all.”

The restriction thus imposed upon the word by Reid, is to be found in the philosophy of Kant; and, as convenient, has been generally acquiesced in.

In note D* to *Reid's Works*, p. 876, Sir Will. Hamilton notices the following meanings of *perception*, as applied to different faculties, acts, and objects:—

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1. *Perceptio*, in its primary philosophical signification, as in the mouths of Cicero and Quintilian, is vaguely equivalent to comprehensiou, notion, cognition in general.

2. An apprehension, a becoming aware of, consciousness. *Perception*, the Cartesians really identified with *idea*, and allowed them only a logical distinction; the same representative act being called *idea*, inasmuch as we regard it as a representation; and *perception*, inasmuch as we regard it as a consciousness of such representation.

3. *Perception* is limited to the apprehension of sense alone. This limitation was first formally imposed by Reid, and thereafter by Kant.

4. A still more restricted meaning, through the authority of Reid, is *perception* (proper), in contrast to *sensation* (proper).

He defines sensitive *perception*, or *perception* simply, as that act of consciousness whereby we apprehend in our body.

a. Certain special affections, whereof, as an *animated* organism, it is contingently susceptible; and

b. Those *general relations of extension*, under which, as a *material* organism, it necessarily exists.

Of these *perceptions*, the former, which is thus conversant about a *subject-object*, is *sensation proper*; the latter, which is thus conversant about an *object-object*, is *perception proper*.

PERCEPTIONS (Obscure)—or latent modifications of mind.

Every moment the light reflected from innumerable objects, smells and sounds of every kind, and contact of different bodies are affecting us. But we pay no heed to them. These are what Leibnitz (*Avant Propos de ses Nouv. Essais*) calls *obscure perceptions*—and what Thurot (*De l'Entendement, &c.*, tom. i., p. 11) proposes to call *impressions*. But this word is already appropriated to the changes produced by communication between an external object and a bodily organ.

The sum of these *obscure perceptions* and latent feelings,

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which never come clearly into the field of consciousness, is what makes us at any time well or ill at ease. And as the amount in general is agreeable it forms the charm which attaches us to life—even when our more defined *perceptions* and feelings are painful.

The following account of Leibnitz's philosophy as to (*obscure*) *perceptions* is translated from Tiberghien, *Essai des Connaiss. Hum.*, p. 566.

“We have *perceptions* and ideas, sense, and reason.

“*Perceptions* are the internal representation of what passes without. They are either clear or confused. But both have this in common that they cannot attain to absolute truth, but have always reference to facts and things contingent. They are also closely connected with one another by the *law of continuity*, which does not allow nature to proceed *per saltum*, so that we can acquire a clear *perception* without passing through the lower degrees of *perception*.

“*Clear perceptions* are accompanied with consciousness, and engrave themselves on the memory. But howsoever distinct, they cannot engender certainty, because the external world in which they are placed, is all tied together, and every thing has its reason in all other things. *Perception* always involves what is infinite; it cannot be exhaustively analyzed. All that we can do as to what is infinite is to know distinctly that it is. It belongs only to the Supreme Reason, whom nothing escapes, to *comprehend* what is infinite, all the reasons and all the consequences of things.

“*Confused or insensible perceptions* are without consciousness or memory. It is difficult enough to seize them in themselves, but they must be, because the mind always thinks. A substance cannot be without action, a body without movement, a mind without thought. There are a thousand marks which make us judge that there is, every moment, in us an infinity of *perceptions*; but the habit in which we are of perceiving them, by depriving them of the

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attraction of novelty, turns away our attention and prevents them from fixing themselves in our memory. How could we form a *clear perception* without the *insensible perceptions* which constitute it? To hear the noise of the sea, for example, it is necessary that we hear the parts which compose the whole, that is, the noise of each wave, though each of these little noises does not make itself known but in the confused assemblage of all the others together with it. A hundred thousand nothings cannot make anything. And sleep, on the other hand, is never so sound that we have not some feeble and confused feeling; one would not be wakened by the greatest noise in the world, if one had not some *perception* of its commencement, which is small.

“It is important to remark how Leibnitz attaches the greatest questions of philosophy to these *insensible perceptions*, in so far as they imply the *law of continuity*. It is by means of these we can say that the present ‘is full of the past and big with the future,’ and that in the least of substances may be read the whole consequences of the things of the universe. They often determine us without our knowing it, and they deceive the vulgar by the appearance of an indifference of equilibrium. They supply the action of substances upon one another, and explain the pre-established harmony of soul and body. It is in virtue of these insensible variations that no two things can ever be perfectly alike (the principle of *indiscernibles*), and that their difference is always more than numerical, which destroys the doctrine of the tablets of the mind being empty, of a soul without thought, a substance without action, a vacuum in space, and the atoms of matter. There is another consequence—that souls, being simple substances, are always united to a body, and that there is no soul entirely separated from one. This dogma resolves all the difficulties as to the immortality of souls, the difference of their states being never anything but that of more or less perfect, which renders their state past or future as explicable as their present. It also supplies the means of

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recovering memory, by the periodic developments which may one day arrive."

PERFECT, PERFECTION (*per-facere, perfectum*, made out, complete).—To be *perfect* is to want nothing. *Perfection* is *relative* or *absolute*. A being possessed of all the qualities belonging to its species in the highest degree may be called *perfect* in a *relative sense*. But *absolute perfection* can only be ascribed to the Supreme Being. We have the idea of a Being infinitely *perfect*—and from this Descartes reasoned that such a being really exists.

The *perfections* of God are those qualities which he has communicated to his rational creatures, and which are in Him in an infinitely *perfect* degree. They have been distinguished as *natural* and *moral*—the former belonging to Deity as the great first cause—such as independent and necessary existence—the latter as manifested in the creation and government of the universe—such as goodness, justice, &c. But they are all natural in the sense of being essential. It has been proposed to call the former *attributes*, and the latter *perfections*. But this distinctive use of the terms has not prevailed; indeed it is not well-founded. In God there are nothing but *attributes*—because in him everything is absolute and involved in the substance and unity of a perfect being.

PERFECTIBILITY (**The Doctrine of**)—is—that men as individuals, and as communities have not attained to that happiness and development of which their nature and condition are capable, but that they are in a continual progress to a state of perfection, even in this life. That men as a race are capable of progress and improvement is a fact attested by experience and history. But that this improvement may be carried into his whole nature—and to an indefinite extent—that all the evils which affect the body or the mind may be removed—cannot be maintained. Bacon had faith in the intellectual progress of man when he entitled his work "Of the Advancement of Learning." Pascal has articulately expressed this faith in a preface

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to his "Treatise of a Vacuum." "Not only individual men advance from day to day in knowledge, but men as a race make continual progress in proportion as the world grows older, because the same thing happens in a succession of men as in the different periods of the life of an individual; so that the succession of men during a course of so many ages, ought to be considered as the same man always living and always learning. From this may be seen the injustice of the reverence paid to antiquity in philosophy: for as old age is the period of life most distant from infancy, who does not see that the old age of the universal man is not to be sought for in the period nearest his birth, but in that most remote from it." Malebranche (*Search after Truth*, book ii., part 2, chap. 4) expressed a similar opinion; and the saying of a great modern reformer is well known—"If you talk of the wisdom of the ancients—we are the ancients." It cannot be denied that in arts and sciences, and the accommodations of social life, and the extension of social freedom, the administration of justice, the abolition of slavery, and many other respects, men have improved, and are improving, and may long continue to improve. But human nature has limits beyond which it cannot be carried. Its life here cannot be indefinitely prolonged—its liability to pain cannot be removed—its reason cannot be made superior to error, and all the arrangements for its happiness are liable to go wrong.

Leibnitz, in accordance with his doctrine that the universe is composed of monads essentially active, thought it possible that the human race might reach a perfection of which we cannot well conceive. Charles Bonnet advocated the doctrine of a *palingenesia*, or transformation of all things into a better state. In the last century the great advocates of social progress are Fontenelle, and Turgot, and Condorcet, in France; Lessing, Kant, and Schiller, in Germany; Price and Priestley, in England. Owen's views are also well known.—Mercier, *De la Perfectibilite Humaine*, 8vo, Paris, 1842.

PERIPATETIC (*περιπατητικός*, *ambulator*, from *περιπατεῖν*, to walk about)—is applied to Aristotle and his followers, who seem to have carried on their philosophical discussions while walking about in the halls or promenades of the Lyceum.

PERSON, PERSONALITY.—*Persona*, in Latin, meant the mask worn by an actor on the stage, within which the sounds of the voice were concentrated, and through which (*personuit*) he made himself heard by the immense audience. From being applied to the mask it came next to be applied to the actor, then to the character acted, then to any assumed character, and lastly, to any one having any character or station. Martinius gives as its composition—*per se una*, an individual. “Person,” says Locke (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 27), “stands for a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it: it being impossible for any one to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive.” “We attribute *personality*,” says Mons. Ahrens (*Cours de Psychologie*, tom. ii., p. 272), “to every being which exists, not solely for others, but which is in the relation of unity with itself in existing, or for itself. Thus we refuse *personality* to a mineral or a stone, because these things exist for others, but not for themselves. An animal, on the contrary, which exists for itself, and stands in relation to itself, possesses a degree of *personality*. But man exists for himself in all his essence, in a manner more intimate and more extensive; that which he is, he is for himself, he has consciousness of it. But God alone exists for himself in a manner infinite and absolute. God is entirely in relation to himself; for there are no beings out of him to whom he could have relation. His whole essence is for himself, and this relation is altogether internal: and it is this intimate and entire relation of God to himself in all his essence, which constitutes the divine *personality*.”

“The seat of intellect,” says Paley, “is a *person*.”

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A being intelligent and free, every spiritual and moral agent, every cause which is in possession of responsibility and consciousness, is a *person*. In this sense, God considered as a creating cause, distinct from the universe, is a *person*.

Personality is that character or quality in virtue of which any being deserves to be called a *person*. The divine *personality* has been disputed. Human *personality* after death has been disputed. Reason has been called *impersonal*.

“The intimate relation of God, as Being, to all His attributes and to all His essence, constitutes the divine *personality*, which for God is His entire being. God only exists for Himself in a manner infinite and absolute. God has relation entirely to Himself; for there is no being out of Him, to which He can have relation. His whole essence is for Himself, and this relation is altogether internal. The divine consciousness or divine *personality* embraces all that is in God, all of which He is the reason.

“All is present to God, and He is present to all things.”
—Tiberghien, *Essai des Connaiss. Hum.*, p. 140.

According to Boethius, *Persona est rationalis naturæ individua substantia*.

“Whatever derives its powers of motion from without, from some other being, is a *thing*. Whatever possesses a spontaneous action within itself, is a *person*, or, as Aristotle (*Nicom. Eth.*, lib. iii.) defines it, an ἀρχὴ πρᾶξεως.”—Sewell, *Christ. Mor.*, p. 152.

“*Personality* is individuality existing in itself, but with a nature as its ground.”—Coleridge, *Notes on Eng. Div.*, vol. i., p. 43.

“If the substance be unintelligent in which the quality exists, we call it a thing or substance, but if it be intelligent, we call it a *person*, meaning by the word *person* to distinguish a thing or substance that is intelligent, from a thing or substance that is *not* intelligent. By the word *person*, we therefore mean a thing or substance that is intelligent, or a conscious being; including in the word, the

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idea both of the substance and its properties together.”—Henry Taylor, *Apology of Ben Mordecai*, letter i., p. 85.

“A subsisting substance or *suppositum* endued with reason as man is, that is, capable of religion, is a *person*.”—Oldfield, *Essay on Reason*, p. 319.

“*Person*, as applied to Deity, expresses the definite and certain truth that God is a living being, and not a dead material energy. Whether spoken of the Creator or the creature, the word may signify either the unknown but abiding substance of the attributes by which he is known to us; or the unity of these attributes considered in themselves.”—R. A. Thompson, *Christian Theism*, book ii., chap. 7.—*V. IDENTITY PERSONAL, REASON, SUBSISTENTIA.*

Personality, in jurisprudence, denotes the capacity of rights and obligations which belong to an intelligent will.—Jouffroy, *Droit. Nat.*, p. 19.

PETITIO PRINCIPII (το εν αρχη αιτεισθαι και λαμβανειν, or begging the question)—is one of the seven paralogisms or false reasonings which Aristotle refutes in the fifth chapter of his *Sophistical Refutations*. It consists in assuming or taking for granted in some way the point which is really in dispute. Now, in all reasoning, that which is employed as proof should be more clear and better known than that which it is employed to prove. To infer the actual occurrence of eclipses, recorded in Chinese annals, from an assumption of the authenticity of these annals, is an example of *petitio principii*.

PHANTASM.—*V. IDEA, PERCEPTION.*

PHENOMENOLOGY.—*V. NATURE.*

PHENOMENON (Φαινουμενον, from Φαινομαι, to appear)—is that which has appeared. It is generally applied to some sensible appearance, some occurrence in the course of nature. But in mental philosophy it is applied to the various and changing states of mind. “How pitiful and ridiculous are the grounds upon which such men pretend to account for the very lowest and commonest *phenomena* of nature, without recurring to a God and Providence!”—South, vol. iv., serm. ix.

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“Among the various *phenomena* which the human mind presents to our view, there is none more calculated to excite our curiosity and our wonder, than the communication which is carried on between the sentient, thinking, and active principle within us, and the material objects with which we are surrounded.”—Stewart, *Philosoph. of Hum. Mind*, c. 1, sect. 1.

In the philosophy of Kant, *phenomenon* means an object such as we represent it to ourselves or conceive of it, in opposition to *noumenon*, or a thing as it is in itself.

The definition of *phenomenon* is, “that which can be known only along with something else.”—Ferrier, *Instit. of Metaphys.*, p. 319.—V. NOUMENON.

PHILANTHROPY (*Φιλανθρωπία*, from *Φιλειν*, to love, and *ἄνθρωπος*, a man)—is a love of mankind. “They thought themselves not much concerned to acquire that God-like excellency, a *philanthropy* and love to all mankind.”—Bp. Taylor, vol. iii., serm. i.

This state or affection of mind does not differ essentially from charity or brotherly love. Both spring from benevolence or a desire for the well-being of others. When our benevolence is purified and directed by the doctrines and precepts of religion, it becomes charity or brotherly love. When sustained by large and sound views of human nature and the human condition, it seeks to mitigate social evils and increase and multiply social comforts, it takes the name of *philanthropy*. But there is no incompatibility between the two. It is only when *philanthropy* proceeds on false views of human nature and wrong views of human happiness, that it can be at variance with true charity or brotherly love.

Philanthropy or a vague desire and speculation as to improving the condition of the whole human race is sometimes opposed to nationality or patriotism. But true charity or benevolence, while it begins with loving and benefiting those nearest to us by various relations, will expand according to the means and opportunities afforded

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of doing good. And while we are duly attentive to the stronger claims of intimate connection, as the waves on the bosom of the waters spread wider and wider, so we are to extend our regards beyond the distinctions of friendship, of family, and of society, and grasp in one benevolent embrace the universe of human beings. God hath made of one blood all nations of men that dwell upon the face of the earth; and, although the sympathies of friendship and the charities of patriotism demand a more early and warm acknowledgment, we are never to forget those great and general relations which bind together the kindreds of mankind—who are all children of one common parent, heirs of the same frail nature, and sharers in the same unbounded goodness:—

“ Friends, parents, neighbours, first it will embrace,
Our country next, and next all human race.
Wide and more wide, the o’erflowing of the mind,
Takes every creature in of every kind.
Earth smiles around, in boundless beauty dressed,
And heaven reflects its image in her breast.”—Pope.

PHILOSOPHY ($\Phi\iota\lambda\omega\sigma\phi\iota\alpha$, $\Phi\iota\lambda\iota\alpha$, $\sigma\phi\iota\alpha$, the love of wisdom).

—The origin of the word is traced back to Pythagoras, who did not call himself $\sigma\phi\omega\varsigma$ like the wise men of Greece, but merely declared himself to be a lover of wisdom, $\Phi\iota\lambda\omega\varsigma$ $\sigma\phi\iota\alpha\varsigma$. *Philosophy* is not so much the love of wisdom, as the love of wisdom may be said to be its spring. The desire of knowledge is natural to man. Ignorance is painful; knowledge is agreeable. Surrounded with ever changing phenomena, he seeks to know their causes and tries to bring their multiplicity to something like unity, and to reduce their variety to law and rule. When so employed he is prosecuting *philosophy*. It was defined by Cicero (*De Officiis*, lib. ii., c. 2). *Rerum divinarum et humanarum,* causarumque quibus hæ res continentur, scientia*. But what man can attain or aspire to such

* According to Lord Monboddo (*Ancient Metaphys.*, b. i., ch. 5), the Romans had only the word *sapientia* for philosophy, till about the time of Cicero, when they adopted the Greek word *philosophia*.

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knowledge, or even to the knowledge of one of the several departments into which *philosophy* may be divided. "In *philosophy*," says Lord Bacon (*Of the Advancement of Learning*, book ii.), "the contemplations of man do either penetrate unto God, or are circumferred to nature, or are reflected or reverted upon himself. Out of which several inquiries there do arise three knowledges, *Divine philosophy*, *natural philosophy*, and *human philosophy*, or humanity." Now the object-matter of *philosophy* may be distinguished as God, or nature, or man. But, underlying all our inquiries into any of these departments, there is a *first philosophy*, which seeks to ascertain the grounds or principles of knowledge, and the causes of all things. Hence *philosophy* has been defined to be the science of causes and principles. It is the investigation of those principles on which all knowledge and all being ultimately rest. It is the exercise of reason to solve the most elevated problems which the human mind can conceive. How do we know? and what do we know? It examines the grounds of human certitude, and verifies the trustworthiness of human knowledge. It inquires into the causes of all beings, and ascertains the nature of all existences by reducing them to unity. It is not peculiar to any department, but common to all departments of knowledge. Or if each department of knowledge may be said to have its *philosophy*, it is because it rests upon that knowledge of principles and causes which is common to them all. Man first examines phenomena, but he is not satisfied till he has reduced them to their causes, and when he has done so he asks to determine the value of the knowledge to which he has attained. This is *philosophy* properly so called,—the mother and governing science—the science of sciences.

"It is the proper business of *philosophy* to show in many things, which have difference, what is their common character; and in many things which have a common character through what it is they differ."—Philoponus, *Com. MS.*, quoted in Harris, *Hermes*, p. 222, note.

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“*Philosophy* is the science of the connecting principles of nature.”—Adam Smith, *Hist. of Astronomy*.

“‘*Philosophy* is the science of first principles,’ that, namely, which investigates the *primary grounds*, and determines the *fundamental certainty*, of human knowledge generally.”—Morell, *Philosoph. Tendencies of the Age*. 8vo, Lond., 1848, p. 13.

Peemans, *Introd. ad Philosoph.*, 12mo, Levan., 1840, sect. 107, proposes the following definition:—“*Philosophia est scientia rerum per causas primas, recto rationis usu comparata.*”

By this definition it is distinguished from other kinds of knowledge. 1. From simple *intelligence*, which is *intuitive*, while *philosophical* knowledge is *discursive*. 2. From *natural sciences*, which do not always reach to *first causes*. 3. From *arts*, which do not proceed by causes or principles, but by rule. 4. From *faith* or *belief*, which rests not on evidence, but authority. 5. From *opinion*, which is not certain knowledge. And from the common love of knowledge and truth, which does not prosecute and acquire it *scientifically*.

PHRENOLOGY (*φρην*, mind; *λογος*, discourse).—This word ought to mean Psychology, or mental philosophy, but has been appropriated by Craniologists, on account of the light which their observations of the convolutions of the brain and corresponding elevations of the skull are supposed to throw on the nature and province of our different faculties. According to Dr. Gall, the founder of Craniology, “its end is to determine the functions of the brain in general, and of its different parts in particular, and to prove that you may recognize different dispositions and inclinations by the protuberances and depressions to be found on the cranium. The cranium being exactly moulded upon the mass of brain, every portion of its surface will present dimensions and developments according to the corresponding portion of the brain. But individuals in whom such or such a portion of the cranium is largely developed, have been observed by

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phrenologists to be remarkable for such or such a faculty, talent, or virtue, or vice; and the conclusion is, that the portion of brain corresponding to that development of the cranium is the seat of that faculty, or virtue, or vice—is its *special organ*.”—See writings of Gall, Spurzheim, and Combe.

“If it be true that the multitudinous cerebral fibres act always in the same specific fasciculi, or in the same combination of specific fasciculi, in order to produce the same faculty in the same process of ratiocination, then *phrenology* is so far true; and if the action of these fasciculi has the effect of elongating them, so as to produce pressure on the corresponding internal surface of the cranium, and if the bony case make a corresponding concession of space to the elongation of these specific fasciculi, then *cranioscopy* is true also; but there are so many arbitrary assumptions in arriving at such a result, that a vastly greater mass of evidence must be brought forward before phrenologists and cranioscopists have a right to claim general assent to their doctrine.”—Wigan, on *Duality of Mind*, p. 162.

The British Association, established several years ago, refused to admit *phrenology* as a *section* of their society.

PHYSIOGNOMY (*Φυσις*, nature; *γνωμων*, an index, from *γινωσκω*, I know)—is defined by Lavater to be the “art of discovering the *interior* of man from his *exterior*.” In common language, it signifies the judging of disposition and character by the features of the face. In the Middle Ages, *physiognomy* meant the knowledge of the *internal* properties of any corporeal existence from *external* appearances.

They found i' the *physiognomies*
Of the planets, all men's destinies.—*Hudibras*.

It does not appear that among the ancients *physiognomy* was extended beyond *man*, or at least beyond animated nature. Aristotle has formally treated of it. And all men in the ordinary business of life seem to be influenced by the belief that the disposition and character may in some

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measure be indicated by the form of the body, and especially by the features of the face. See Lavater, Spurzheim. J. Cross, *Attempt to establish Physiognomy upon Scientific Principles*, Glasg., 1817.

PHYSIOLOGY and **PHYSICS** were formerly used as synonymous. The *former* now denotes the laws of *organized* bodies, the *latter* of *unorganized*. The former is distinguished into *animal* and *vegetable*. Both imply the *necessity* of nature as opposed to *liberty* of intelligence, and neither can be appropriately applied to mind. Dr. Brown, however, entitled the first part of one of his works, the *Physiology* of mind.—V. PSYCHOLOGY.

Physiology determines the matter and the form of living beings. It describes their structure and operations, and then ascends from phenomena to laws; from the knowledge of organs and their actions it concludes their function and their end or purpose; and from among the various manifestations it seeks to seize that mysterious principle which animates the matter of their organization, which maintains the nearly constant form of the compound by the continual renewal of the component molecules, and which at death, leaving this matter, surrenders it to the common laws, from the empire of which it was for a season withdrawn.

. . . The facts which belong to it are such as we can touch and see—matter and its modifications.—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

PICTURESQUE—“properly means what is done in the style and with the spirit of a painter, and it was thus, if I am not much mistaken, that the word was commonly employed when it was first adopted in England. . . . But it has been frequently employed to denote those combinations or groups or attitudes of objects that are fitted for the purposes of the painter.”—Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, part 1, chap. 5.

“*Picturesque* is a word applied to every object, and every kind of scenery, which has been or might be represented with good effect in painting—just as the word

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beautiful, when we speak of visible nature, is applied to every object and every kind of scenery that in any way give pleasure to the eye—and these seem to be the significations of both words, taken in their most extended and popular sense.”—Sir Uvedale Price, *On the Picturesque*, c. 3.

“The two qualities of *roughness* and of *sudden variation*, joined to that of *irregularity*, are the most efficient causes of the *picturesque*.”*—*Ibid*.

“*Beauty* and *picturesqueness* are founded on opposite qualities; the one on smoothness, the other on roughness; the one on grandeur, the other on sudden variation; the one on ideas of youth and freshness, the other on those of age and even of decay.”—Chap. 4.

PNEUMATICS is now applied to physical science, and means that department of it which treats of the mechanical properties of air and other elastic fluids. It was formerly used as synonymous with *pneumatology*.

PNEUMATOLOGY (*πνευμα*, *spirit*; *λογος*, *discourse*).—The branch of philosophy which treats of the nature and operations of mind, has by some, been called *pneumatology*. Philosophy gives ground for belief in the existence of our own mind and of the Supreme mind, but furnishes no evidence for the existence of orders of minds intermediate. Popular opinion is in favour of the belief. But philosophy has sometimes admitted and sometimes rejected it. It has found a place, however, in all religions. There may thus be said to be a *religious pneumatology*, and a *philosophical pneumatology*. In *religious pneumatology*, in the East, there is the doctrine of two antagonist and equal spirits of good and evil. In the doctrines of Christianity there is acknowledged the existence of spirits intermediate between God and man, some of whom have fallen into a state of evil, while others have kept their first estate.

* “A *picturesque* object may be defined as that which, from the greater facilities which it possesses for readily and more effectually enabling an artist to display his art, is, as it were, a provocation to painting.”—Sir Thos. L. Dick, Note to above chap.

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Philosophy in its early stages is partly religious. Socrates had communication with a demon or spirit. Plato did not discountenance the doctrine, and the Neo-Platonicians of Alexandria carried *pneumatology* to a great length, and adopted the cabalistic traditions of the Jews. In the scholastic ages, the belief in return from the dead, apparitions and spirits, was universal. And Jacob Boehm, in Saxony, Emanuel Swedenborg, in Sweden, and in France, Martinez Pasqualis and his disciple St. Martin, have all given accounts of orders of spiritual beings who held communication with the living. And in the present day a belief in *spirit rapping* is prevalent in America.

Bp. Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge*, sect. 81, and throughout, admits the existence of orders of spirits.

Considered as the science of mind or spirit, *pneumatology* consisted of three parts treating of the Divine mind, Theology—the angelic mind, Angelology, and the human mind. This last is now called Psychology, “a term to which no competent objection can be made, and which affords us, what the various clumsy periphrases in use do not, a convenient adjective—*psychological*.”—Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 219, note.

POLLICITATION.—V. PROMISE.

POLYGAMY (*πολυς*, many; *γαμος*, marriage)—means a plurality of wives or husbands. It has prevailed under various forms in all ages of the world. It can be shown, however, to be contrary to the light of nature; and has been condemned and punished by the laws of many nations. About the middle of the sixteenth century, Bernardus Ochinus, general of the order of Capuchins, and afterwards a Protestant, published Dialogues in favour of *polygamy*, to which Theodore Beza wrote a reply. In 1682, a work entitled *Polygamia Triumphatrix* appeared under the name of Theophilus Aletheus. The true name of the author was Lyserus, a native of Saxony. In 1780, Martin Madan published *Thelyphthora*, or a *Treatise on Female Ruin*, in which he defended *polygamy*, on the part of the male.

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See some sensible remarks on this subject in Paley's *Moral and Political Philosophy*.

POLYTHEISM ($\pi\omicron\lambda\upsilon\varsigma$, many; $\theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$, god).—"To believe no one supreme designing principle or mind, but rather two, three, or more (though in their nature good) is to be a *polytheist*."—*Shaftesbury*, b. i., pt. 1, sect. 2.

Three forms of *polytheism* may be distinguished. 1. *Idolatry*, or the worship of idols and false gods, which prevailed in Greece and Rome. 2. *Sabaism*, or the worship of the stars and of fire, which prevailed in Arabia and in Chaldea. 3. *Fetichism*, or the worship of anything that strikes the imagination and gives the notion of great power, which prevails in Africa and among savage nations in general.

POSITIVISM.—"One man affirms that to him the principle of all certitude is the *testimony of the senses*; this is *positivism*."—Morell, *Philosoph. Tenden.*, p. 15.

Of late years the name *positivism* has been appropriated to the peculiar principles advocated by M. Auguste Comte, in his *Cours de Philosophie Positive*. This philosophy is thus described by an admirer (G. H. Lewes, *Comte's Philosoph. of Sciences*, 1853, sect. 1):—"This is the mission of *positivism*, to generalize science, and to systematize sociality; in other words, it aims at creating a philosophy of the sciences, as a basis for a new social faith. A social doctrine is the *aim* of *positivism*, a scientific doctrine the *means*; just as in a man, intelligence is the minister and interpreter of life.

"The leading conception of M. Comte is:—There are but three phases of intellectual evolution—the *theological* (supernatural), the *metaphysical*, and the *positive*. In the *supernatural* phase, the mind seeks *causes*, unusual phenomena are interpreted as the signs of the pleasure or displeasure of some god. In the *metaphysical* phase, the supernatural agents are set aside for abstract forces inherent in substances. In the *positive* phase, the mind restricts itself to the discovery of the *laws* of phenomena."

POSSIBLE (*potis-esse, posse*, to be able).—That which may or can be. "'Tis *possible* to infinite power to endue a creature with the power of beginning motion."—Clarke, *On Attributes*, prep. 10.

Possibilitas est consensio inter se, seu non repugnantia partium vel attributorum quibus res seu ens constituitur.

A thing is said to be *possible* when though not actually in existence all the conditions necessary for realizing its existence are given. Thus we say it is *possible* that a plant or animal may be born, because there are in nature causes by which this may be brought about. But as every thing which is born dies, we say it is impossible that a plant or animal should live for ever. A thing is *possible*, when there is no contradiction between the idea or conception of it and the realization of it; and a thing is *impossible* when the conception of its realization or existence implies absurdity or contradiction.

We apply the terms *possible* and *impossible* both to beings and events, chiefly on the ground of experience. In proportion as our knowledge of the laws of nature increases, we say it is *possible* that such things may be produced; and in proportion as our knowledge of human nature is enlarged, we say it is *possible* that such events may happen. But it is safer to say what is *possible* than what is *impossible*, because our knowledge of causes is increasing.

There are three ways in which what is *possible* may be brought about; *supernaturally*, *naturally*, and *morally*. The resurrection of the dead is *supernaturally possible*, since it can only be realized by the power of God. The burning of wood is *naturally* or *physically possible*, because fire has the power to do so. It is *morally possible* that he who has often done wrong should yet in some particular instance do right. These epithets apply to the causes by which the *possible* existence or event is realized.

"*Possible* relates sometimes to *contingency*, sometimes to *power* or *liberty*, and these senses are frequently confounded. In the first sense we say, *e. g.*, 'It is *possible* this patient may recover,' not meaning that it depends on his *choice*, but

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that *we* are *not sure* whether the event will not be such. In the other sense it is '*possible*' to the best man to violate every rule of morality; since if it were out of his *power* to act so if he chose it, there would be no moral goodness in the case, though we are quite sure that such never *will* be his choice."—Whately, *Logic*, appendix i.

POSTULATE (ἀίτημα, *postulatum*, that which is asked or assumed in order to prove something else).—"According to some, the difference between axioms and *postulates* is analogous to that between theorems and problems; the former expressing truths which are self-evident, and from which other propositions may be deduced; the latter operations which may be easily performed, and by the help of which more difficult constructions may be effected."—Stewart, *Philosoph. Hum. Mind*, vol. ii., chap. 2, sect. 3, From Wallis.

Aristotle says (*Poster. Analyt.*, lib. i., cap. 10, sect. 5, 6), "The axiom being a necessary truth and necessarily believed, is distinct from hypothesis, and from petition or *postulate*. What is capable of proof, but assumed without proof, if believed by the learner, is relatively to the learner, though not absolutely, an *hypothesis*; if the learner has no belief or a disbelief, it is a *petition*; and this is the difference. *Petition* is an assumption opposed to the belief of the learner, or, still wider, a demonstrable preposition assumed without demonstration."

There is a difference between a *postulate* and an *hypothesis*. When you lay down something which may be, although you have not proved it, and which is admitted by the learner or the disputant, you make an hypothesis. The *postulate* not being assented to, may be contested during the discussion, and is only established by its conformity with all other ideas on the subject.

In the philosophy of Kant, a *postulate* is neither an *hypothesis* nor a *corollary*, but a proposition of the same binding certainty, or whose certainty is incorporated with that of another, so that you must reject that other, all

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evident as it is in self, or admit at the same time what it necessarily supposes.

1. I am under obligation, therefore I am free.

2. Practical reason tends necessarily to the sovereign good which supposes an absolute conformity with the moral law; such conformity is holiness; a perfection which man can only attain by an indefinite continuity of effort and of progress. This progress supposes continuity of existence, personal and identical, therefore the soul is immortal, or the sovereign good is a chimera.

3. On the other hand, the sovereign good supposes *felicity*, but this results from the conformity of things with a will, and has for its condition, obedience to the moral law; there must then be a harmony possible between morality and felicity, and this necessarily supposes a cause of the universe distinct from nature,—an intelligent cause, who is at the same time the Author of the moral law, and guarantee of this harmony of virtue and happiness, from which results the sovereign good; then *God exists*, and is himself the primitive sovereign good, the source of all good. Kant's *postulates* of the practical reason are thus freedom, immortality, and God.—Willm, *Hist. de la Philosoph. Allemande*, tom. i, p. 420.

POWER (*potis esse*, to be able, in Greek δυναμις;—says Mr. Locke (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. ii., ch. 21), “may be considered as twofold, viz., as able to make, or able to receive, any change: the one may be called active, and the other passive power.” Dr. Reid, in reference to this distinction, says (*Active Powers*, essay i., chap. 3), “Whereas he distinguishes *power* into active and passive, I conceive *passive power* to be no *power* at all. He means by it the possibility of being changed. To call this *power*, seems to be a misapplication of the word. I do not remember to have met with the phrase *passive power* in any other good author. Mr. Locke seems to have been unlucky in inventing it; and it deserves not to be retained in our language.” “This paragraph,” says Sir W. Hamilton (*Reid's Works*, p.

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519, note), "is erroneous in almost all its statements." The distinction between *power* as active and passive, is clearly taken by Aristotle. But he says that in one point of view they are but one *power* (*Metaphys.*, lib. v., cap. 12), while in another they are two (*Metaphys.*, lib. ix., cap. 1). He also distinguishes *powers* into rational and irrational—into those which we have by nature, and those which we acquire by repetition of acts. These distinctions have been generally admitted by subsequent philosophers. Dr. Reid, however, only used the word *power* to signify *active power*. That we have the idea of *power*, and how we come by it, he shows in opposition to Hume (*Active Powers*, essay i., chap. 2, 4).

According to Mr. Hume, we have no proper notion of *power*. It is a mere relation which the mind conceives to exist between one thing going before, and another thing coming after. All that we observe is merely antecedent and consequent. Neither sensation nor reflection furnishes us with any idea of *power* or efficacy in the antecedent to produce the consequent. The views of Dr. Brown are somewhat similar. It is when the succession is constant—when the antecedent is uniformly followed by the consequent, that we call the one cause, and the other effect; but we have no ground for believing that there is any other relation between them or any virtue in the one to originate or produce the other, that is, that we have no proper idea of *power*. Now that our idea of *power* cannot be explained by the philosophy which derives all our ideas from sensation and reflection is true. *Power* is not an object of sense. All that we observe is succession. But when we see one thing invariably succeeded by another, we not only connect the one as effect and the other as cause, and view them under that relation, but we frame the idea of *power*, and conclude that there is a virtue, an efficacy, a force, in the one thing to originate or produce the other; and that the connection between them is not only uniform and unvaried, but universal and necessary. This is the common idea of

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power, and that there is such an idea framed and entertained by the human mind cannot be denied. The legitimacy and validity of the idea can be fully vindicated.

“Our inquiries into the laws of nature carry us no farther than to ascertain what events are uniformly consequent, the one to the other.

“We know of no *power* but that which belongs to *mind*. It is an old definition of mind and matter. Agreeable to this explanation of *power*, mind is that which *moves*; matter is that which is *moved*.”—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

“In the strict sense, *power* and agency are attributes of mind only; and I think that mind only can be a *cause* in the strict sense. This *power*, indeed, may be where it is not exerted, and so may be without agency or causation: but there can be no agency or causation without *power* to act and to produce the effect. As far as I can judge, to everything we call a cause we ascribe *power* to produce the effect. In intelligent causes, the *power* may be without being exerted; so I have *power* to run when I sit still or walk. But in inanimate causes we conceive no *power* but what is exerted, and, therefore, measure the *power* of the cause by the effect which it actually produces. The *power* of an acid to dissolve iron is measured by what it actually dissolves. We get the notion of *active power*, as well as of cause and effect, as I think, from what we feel in ourselves. We feel in ourselves a *power* to move our limbs, and to produce certain effects when we choose. Hence we get the notion of *power*, *agency*, and *causation*, in the strict and philosophical sense: and this I take to be our first notion of these three things.”—Dr. Reid, *Correspondence*, pp. 77, 78.

“The liability of a thing to be influenced by a cause is called *passive power*, or more properly susceptibility; while the efficacy of the cause is called *active power*. Heat has the *power* of melting wax; and in the language of some, ice has the *power* of being melted.”—Day, *On the Will*, p. 33.

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Aristotle, *Metaphys.*, lib. viii., cap. 1.

Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 21.

Hobbes, *Opera*, tom. i., p. 113, edit. by Molesworth.

“The word *power* is used in two senses. In one, it refers to the capacity or potentiality residing in a substance, and is the name of an energy, or of energy, which may be put forth by *that* in which it inheres. Thus various things are said to ‘have’ various powers. But, in its second meaning, this word refers to that unity of both substance and accident which constitutes being or reality, and is the name of something, or of anything which asserts positive being. All such things are ‘powers.’ Thus of the soul, it is properly said when the body is yielding up the ghost,

‘A *power* is passing from the earth.’—*Bibliotheca Sacra*, No. 50, p. 391.


It is usual to speak of a *power* of resistance in matter; and of a *power* of endurance in mind. Both these are *passive power*. *Active power* is the principle of action, whether immanent or transient. *Passive power* is the principle of bearing or receiving.

PRÆDICATE, PRÆDICABLE, and PRÆDICAMENT, are all derived from *prædicare*, to affirm. A *prædicate* is that which is actually affirmed of any one, as wisdom of Peter. A *prædicable* is that which may be affirmed of many, as sun may be affirmed of other suns besides that of our system. A *prædicament* is a series, order, or arrangement of *prædicates* and *prædicables* in some summum genus, as substance, or quality.

Prædicables.—“Whatever term can be affirmed of several things, must express either their *whole essence*, which is called the *species*; or a *part* of their essence (viz., either the *material* part, which is called the *genus*, or the *formal* and distinguishing part, which is called *differentia*, or in common discourse, *characteristic*), or something joined to the essence; whether *necessarily* (*i. e.*, to the *whole* species, or in other words *universally*, to every individual of it), which is called a *property*; or *contingently* (*i. e.*, to *some* individuals only of the species), which is an *accident*.

PRÆDICATE—

Every Prædicable expresses either



Prædicables.—"Genus, species, differentia, proprium, accidens, might, with more propriety perhaps, have been called the *five classes of predicates*; but use has determined them to be called the *five predicables*."—Reid, *Account of Aristotle's Logic*.

Prædicament.—These most comprehensive signs of things (the categories) are called in Latin the *prædicaments*, because they can be said or *prædicated* in the same sense of all other terms, as well as of all the objects denoted by them, whereas no other term can be correctly said of them, because no other is employed to express the full extent of their meaning."—Gillies, *Analysis of Aristotle*, c. 2.

Prædicare.—What is affirmed or denied is called the *prædicare*; and that of which it is affirmed or denied is called the *subject*.—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, vol. v., p. 152.—
V. ATTRIBUTE, CATEGORY, UNIVERSAL.

Præ-prædicamenta and Post-prædicamenta.—"The Greek Logicians divided their speculations on this subject into three sections, calling the first section τὸ πρὸ τῶν κατηγοριῶν; the second, τὸ πρὸς αὐτῶν κατηγοριῶν; the third, τὸ μετὰ τὰς κατηγορίας.—Ammon. in *Prædic.*, p. 146. The Latins, adhering to the same division, coin new names: *ante-prædicamenta*, or *præ-prædicamenta*, *prædicamenta* and *post-prædicamenta*."—Sanderson, pp. 22, 51, 55, ed. Oxon., 1672.

PREJUDICE (*præ-judicare*, to judge before inquiry).—A *prejudice* is a pre-judging, that is forming or adopting an opinion concerning anything, before the grounds of it have been fairly or fully considered. The opinion may be true

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or false, but in so far as the grounds of it have not been examined, it is erroneous or without proper evidence. "In most cases *prejudices* are opinions which, on some account, men are pleased with, independently of any conviction of their truth; and which, therefore, they are afraid to examine, lest they should find them to be false. *Prejudices*, then, are unreasonable judgments, formed or held under the influence of some other motive than the love of truth. They may therefore be classed according to the nature of the *motives* from which they result. These motives are either, 1, Pleasurable, innocent, and social; or, 2, They are malignant."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

Dr. Reid (*Intell. Powers*, essay vi., chap. 8) has treated of *prejudices* or the causes of error, according to the classification given of them by Lord Bacon, under the name of *idols* (*v. IDOL*). Mr. Locke has treated of the causes of error (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iv., chap. 20). And some excellent observations on the *prejudices* peculiar to men of study, may be seen in Malebranche, *Search after Truth*, book ii., part 2.

PREMISS (*propositiones præmissæ*, propositions which go before the conclusion, and from which it is inferred.)—A regular syllogism consists of two *premisses* and a conclusion. The two *premisses* are sometimes called the *antecedent*, and the conclusion the *consequent*.

PRESCIENCE (*præ-scire*, to know before it happens).—"The *prescience* of God is so vast and exceeding the comprehension of our thoughts, that all that can be safely said of it is this, that this knowledge is most exquisite and perfect, accurately representing the natures, powers, and properties of the thing it does fore-know."—More, *Immortality of Soul*, b. ii., c. 4.

The *prescience* of God may be argued from the perfection of his nature. It is difficult or rather impossible for us to conceive of it, because we have no analogous faculty. Our obscure and inferential knowledge of what is future, is not

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to be likened to his clear and direct* beholding of all things. Many attempts have been made to reconcile the *prescience* of God with the liberty of man. Each truth must rest upon its own proper evidence.—St. Augustin, *On the Spirit and the Letter*; Bossuet, *Traité du Libre Arbitre*; Leibnitz, *Theodicée*; Fenelon, *Existence de Dieu*.

PRIMARY (*primus*, first)—is opposed to *secondary*. “Those qualities, or properties, without which we cannot even imagine a thing to exist, are called *primary* qualities. Extension and solidity are called *primary* qualities of matter—colour, taste, smell, are called *secondary* qualities of matter.”—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

Descartes.

Locke.

Reid.

Stewart, *Phil. Essays*, ii., chap. 2.

Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note D.

PRINCIPIA ESSENDI or **PRINCIPLES OF BEING** are distinguished into the *principle of origination* and the *principle of dependence*.

The only proper *principle of origination* is God, who gives essence and existence to all beings.

The *principle of dependence* is distinguished into that of *causality* and that of *inherence*, or *effective dependence*, as the effect depends upon its cause, and *subjective dependence*, as the quality inheres or depends on its subject or substance.

PRINCIPLE (*principium*, ἀρχή, a beginning).—“A principle is that which being derived from nothing, can hold of nothing. ‘Principio autem nulla est origo,’ said Cicero, ‘nam

* When the late Sir James Mackintosh was visiting the school for the deaf and dumb at Paris, then under the care of the Abbé Sicard, he is said to have addressed this question in writing, to one of the pupils,—“Doth God reason?” The pupil for a short time appeared to be distressed and confused, but presently wrote on his slate, the following answer:—“To reason is to hesitate, to doubt, to inquire, it is the highest attribute of a *limited* intelligence. God sees all things, fore-sees all things, knows all things; therefore God doth not reason.”—Gurney, on *Habit and Discipline*, p. 138.

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ex principio oriuntur omnia: ipsum autem nulla ex re; nec enim id esset principium quod gigneretur aliunde.'"—Sir Will. Drummond, *Acad. Quest.*, p. 5.

Aristotle (*Metaphys.*, lib. v., cap. 1) has noticed several meanings of ἀρχη, which is translated *principle*, and has added—"What is common to all *principles* is that they are the *primary source from which anything is, becomes, or is known.*"

The word is applied equally to thought and to being; and hence *principles* have been divided into those of being and those of knowledge, or *principia essendi* and *principia cognoscendi*, or according to the language of German philosophers, *principles formal* and *principles real*. *Principia essendi* may also be *principia cognoscendi*, for the fact that things exist is the ground or reason of their being known. But the converse does not hold; for the existence of things is in no way dependent upon our knowledge of them.

Ancient philosophy was almost exclusively occupied with *principles of being*, investigating the origin and elements of all things, while, on the other hand, modern philosophy has been chiefly devoted to *principles of knowledge*, ascertaining the laws and elements of thought, and determining their validity in reference to the knowledge which they give.

PRINCIPLES OF KNOWLEDGE are those truths by means of which other truths are known. They have been distinguished into *simple* and *complex*, that is, they may be found in the form of ideas, as substance, cause—or in the form of propositions, as in the affirmation, that every change implies the operation of a cause, or in the negation, that qualities do not exist without a substance. *Complex principles* have been arranged in three classes, viz., hypotheses, definitions, and axioms. Hypotheses and definitions have been called *θετικα*, that is, conventional principles or truths assumed or agreed on for the purpose of disputation or teaching, and are confined to the department of knowledge to which they peculiarly belong. Axioms are *principles* true in themselves and extending to all departments of knowledge.

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These were called *φυσικα* or *ἐμφυτα*, and are such as the mind of man naturally and at once accepts as true. They correspond with the first truths, primitive beliefs, or principles of common sense of the Scottish philosophy.—V. COMMON SENSE, AXIOM.

“The word *principle*,” says Mr. Stewart (*Philosoph. Hum. Mind*, vol. i., chap. 1, sect. 2), “in its proper acceptation, seems to me to denote an assumption (whether resting on fact or on hypothesis), upon which, as a *datum*, a train of reasoning proceeds; and for the falsity or incorrectness of which no logical rigour in the subsequent process can compensate. Thus the gravity and the elasticity of the air are *principles of reasoning*, in our speculations about the barometer. The equality of the angles of incidence and reflection; the proportionality of the sines of incidence and refraction; are *principles of reasoning* in catoptrics and in dioptrics. In a sense perfectly analogous to this, the *definitions* of geometry (all of which are merely *hypothetical*) are the first *principles of reasoning* in the subsequent demonstration, and the basis on which the whole fabric of the science rests.”

Lord Herbert, *De Veritate*.

Buffier, *Treatise of First Truths*.

Reid, *Intell. Powers*, essay vi.

Principles as **Express** or as **Operative** correspond to principles of *knowing* and of *being*. An *express principle* asserts a proposition; as, truth is to be spoken. An *operative principle* prompts to action or produces change, as when a man takes food to satisfy hunger. An *express principle* asserts an original *law* and is *regulative*. An *operative principle* is an original *element* and is *constitutive*.

PRINCIPLES OF ACTION may either mean those *express principles* which regulate or ought to regulate human action, or those *operating* or *motive principles* which prompt human action. The latter, which is the common application or phrase, is its psychological meaning.

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When applied to human action psychologically, the word *principle* is used in the sense of the *principle of dependence*; and to denote that the action depends upon the agent for its being produced. It may signify the dependence of *causality*, that is, that the action depends for its production on the agent, as its efficient cause; or it may signify the dependence of *inherence*, that is, that the action depends for its production on some power or energy which inheres in the agent as its subject. Hence it has been said that a *principle of action* is twofold—the *principium quod*, and the *principium quo*. Thus, man as an active being, is the *principium quod* or efficient cause of an action being produced; his will, or the power by which he determines to act, is the *principium quo*.

But the will itself is stimulated or moved to exert itself; and in this view may be regarded as the *principium quod*, while that which moves or stimulates it, may be regarded as the *principium quo*. Before we act, we deliberate, that is, we contemplate the action in its nature and consequences; we then resolve or determine to do it or not to do it, and the performance or omission follows. Volition, then, or an exercise of will is the immediate antecedent of action. But the will is called into exercise by certain influences which are brought to bear upon it. Some object of sense or of thought is contemplated. We are affected with pleasure or pain. Feelings of complacency or displacency, of liking or disliking, of satisfaction or disgust, are awakened. Sentiments of approbation or disapprobation are experienced. We pronounce some things to be good, and others to be evil, and feel corresponding inclination or aversion; and under the influence of these states and affections of mind, the will is moved to activity. The forms which these feelings of pleasure or pain, of inclination or tendency, to or from an object, may assume, are many and various; arising partly from the nature of the objects contemplated, and partly from the original constitution and acquired habits of the mind contemplating. But they

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are all denominated, in a general way, *principles of action*.

PRIVATION (*στέρησις*, *privatio*).—“A *privation* is the absence of what does naturally belong to the thing we are speaking of, or which ought to be present with it; as when a man or a horse is deaf, or blind, or dead, or if a physician or a divine be unlearned, these are called *privations*.”—Watts, *Logic*, part 1, c. 2.

Aristotle (*Metaphys.*, lib. v., cap. 22) says:—“There is *privation* when a being wants some quality which is not natural to it—as when we say a plant wants eyes, or when the quality is natural to the being—as when we say a man is blind. There is also *privation* when a being has not yet attained to a quality which belongs to its nature—as when we say a puppy does not see.

The principles of all natural bodies are matter and form. “To these Aristotle has added a third which he calls *στέρησις* or *privation*, an addition that he has thought proper to make to the Pythagorean and Platonic philosophy, in order to give his system the appearance of novelty; but without any necessity, as I apprehend; for it is not a cause, as he himself admits, such as *matter* and *form*, but is only that without which the first *matter* could not receive the impression of any *form*; for it must be clear of every *form*, which is what he calls *privation*, before it can admit of any.

“Now, this is necessarily implied in the notion of *matter*; for as it has the *capacity* of all *form*, so it has the *privation* of all *form*. In this way, Aristotle himself has explained the nature of matter (*Physic*, lib. i., cap. 8). And Plato, in the *Timæus*, has very much insisted upon this quality of matter as absolutely necessary, in order to fit it to receive all forms; and he illustrates his meaning by a comparison:—Those, says he, who make unguents or perfumes, prepare the liquid so, to which they are to give the perfume, that it may have no odour of its own. And, in like manner, those who take off an impression of anything upon any soft matter, clear that matter of every other impression, making

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it as smooth as possible, in order that it may better receive the figure or image intended. In like manner, he says, *matter*, in order to receive the specieses of all things, must in itself have the species of nothing.”—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, book ii., chap. 2. Hence *privation* was defined—*Negatio formæ in subjecto apto ad habendam talem formam.*

According to Plato, *privation*, in the sense of limitation, imperfection, is the inherent condition of all finite existence, and the necessary cause of evil.—Leibnitz, after Augustin, Aquinas, and others, held similar views (*Causa Dei*, sect. 69, 72). *Essais Sur la Bonté de Dieu*, 1, partie, sect. 29, 31; 3, partie, sect. 378.

PROBABLE (*probabilis*, proveable).—That which does not admit of demonstration and does not involve absurdity or contradiction, is *probable* or admits of proof. “As demonstration is the showing the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, by the intervention of one or more proofs, which have a constant, immutable, and visible connection one with another; so *probability* is nothing but the appearance of such an agreement or disagreement, by the intervention of proofs, whose connection is not constant and immutable, or at least is not perceived to be so, but is, or appears for the most part to be so, and is enough to induce the mind to judge the proposition to be true or false, rather than the contrary. . . . The entertainment the mind gives this sort of propositions, is called belief, assent, or opinion, which is admitting or receiving any proposition for true, upon arguments or proofs that are found to persuade us to receive it as true, without certain knowledge that it is so. And herein lies the difference between *probability* and *certainty*, faith and knowledge, that in all the parts of knowledge there is intuition; each immediate idea, each step, has its visible and certain connection; in belief, not so. That which makes us believe, is something extraneous to the thing I believe; something not evidently joined on both sides to, and so not manifestly showing the agreement or disagreement of those ideas that are under consideration.

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“The grounds of probability are first, the conformity of anything with our own knowledge, observation, and experience. Second, the testimony of others, touching their observation and experience.” — Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iv., chap. 15.

Reid, *Intell. Powers*, essay vii., chap. 3.

“The word *probable*,” says Mr. Stewart (*Philosoph. of Hum. Mind*, part 2, chap. 2, sect. 4), “does not imply any *deficiency* in the proof, but only marks the particular nature of that proof, as contradistinguished from another species of evidence. It is opposed not to what is *certain*, but to what admits of being demonstrated after the *manner of the mathematicians*. This differs widely from the meaning annexed to the same word in popular discourse; according to which, whatever event is said to be *probable*, is understood to be expected with some degree of doubt. . . . But although, in philosophical language, the epithet *probable* be applied to events which are acknowledged to be *certain*, it is also applied to events which are called *probable* by the vulgar. The philosophical meaning of the word, therefore, is more *comprehensive* than the popular; the former denoting that particular *species* of evidence of which contingent truths admit; the latter being confined to such *degrees* of this evidence as fall short of the highest. These different degrees of *probability* the philosopher considers as a *series*, beginning with bare possibility, and terminating in that apprehended *infallibility*, with which the phrase *moral certainty* is synonymous. To this last term of the *series*, the word *probable* is, in its ordinary acceptation, plainly inapplicable.”

PROBLEM (προβλημα, from προβαλλειν, *proponere*, to throw down, to put in question).—Any point attended with doubt or difficulty, any proposition which may be attacked or defended by probable arguments, may be called a *problem*. Every department of inquiry has questions, the answers to which are problematical. So that, according to the branch of knowledge to which they belong, *problems* may be called

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Physical, Metaphysical, Logical, Moral, Mathematical, Historical, Literary, &c. In his *Topic*. (lib. i., cap. 9), Aristotle distinguishes three classes,—the *moral, or practical* which may influence our conduct; as, whether pleasure is the chief good: the *speculative or scientific*, which merely add to our knowledge; as, whether the world is eternal: and the *auxiliary*, or those questions which we seek to solve with a view to other questions.

PROGRESS.—V. PERFECTIBILITY.

PROMISE and POLLICITATION. *Promittimus rogati—pollicemur ultro.*—A *pollicitation* is a spontaneous expression of our intention to do something in favour of another. It does not necessarily imply the presence of the party in reference to whom it is made; and it does not confer upon him a right to exact its performance. But in so far as it has become known to him, and has awakened expectations of its being performed, we may be brought under a moral obligation to perform it, especially if its performance is seen to be highly beneficial to him, and in no way prejudicial to ourselves.

A *promise* is made in consequence of a request preferred to us. It implies the presence of the party preferring the request, or of some one for him, and confers upon him a perfect moral right to have it fulfilled, and brings us under a moral obligation to fulfil it. In order to constitute a *promise*, three things are necessary. 1. The voluntary consent or intention of the promiser. 2. The expression or outward signification of that intention. 3. The acceptance of the *promise* by the party to whom it is made.

A *promise* implies two parties at least—the *promiser* and the *promisee*. A *pact* implies two or more. In this it agrees with a *contract*,—*q. v.*

It is a dictate of the law of nature, that *promises* should be fulfilled,—not because it is expedient to do so, but because it is right to do so.

The various questions concerning the parties competent to give a valid *promise*, the interpretation of the terms in

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which it may be given, and the cases in which the obligation to fulfil it may be relaxed or dissolved, belong to what may be called the *Casuistry of Ethics*, and *Natural Jurisprudence*.—V. CONTRACT.

PROOF.—"To conform our language more to common use, we ought to divide arguments into demonstrations, *proofs*, and probabilities. By *proofs*, meaning such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition."—Hume, *On the Understanding*, sect. 6, note. Whately says that proving may be defined "the assigning of a reason or argument for the support of a *given* proposition," and *inferring* "the deduction of a conclusion from given premises. In the one case our *conclusion* is *given*, and we have to *seek* for *arguments*; in the other our *premises* are *given*, and we have to *seek* for a conclusion. *Proving* may be compared to the act of *putting away* any article into the proper receptacle of goods of that description, *inferring* to that of *bringing out* the article when needed."—See EVIDENCE, INFERENCE.

PROPERTY may be distinguished from *quality* or *attribute*, and also from *faculty*.

Qualities are primary or secondary, essential or non-essential. The former are called *attributes*, and the latter *properties*. Extension is the attribute of matter, taste and smell are *properties* of body.

Faculty implies understanding and will, and so is applicable only to mind. We speak of the *properties* of bodies, but not of their *faculties*. Of mind we may say will is a faculty or *property*; so that while all faculties are *properties*, all *properties* are not faculties.

PROPOSITION.—A judgment of the mind expressed in words is a *proposition*.

"A *proposition*, according to Aristotle, is a speech wherein one thing is affirmed or denied of another. Hence it is easy to distinguish the thing affirmed or denied, which is called the *predicate*, from the thing of which it is affirmed or denied, which is called the *subject*; and these two are

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called the *terms* of the *proposition*. Hence, likewise, it appears that *propositions* are either *affirmative* or *negative*; and this is called their *quality*.

“When the subject of a *proposition* is a general term, the predicate is affirmed or denied either of the whole, or of a part. Hence *propositions* are distinguished into *universal* and *particular*. ‘All men are mortal,’ is an universal *proposition*. ‘Some men are learned,’ is a particular; and this is called the *quantity* of a *proposition*.”—Reid, *Account of Aristotle’s Logic*, chap. 2, sect. 6.

As to *relation*—*Propositions* are distinguished as *categorical*, *hypothetical*, and *figurative*, according as the relation between the *predicate* and the *subject* is that of phenomenon to substance, or of effect to cause, or that of reciprocal action between the two terms.

In reference to *modality*,—as viewed with regard to the validity of the connection between subject and predicate, according as it is barely *possible*, or *contingent*, or *necessary*, *propositions* have been so called; or by Kant *problematic*, *assertory*, and *apodeictic*.

“*Propositions* are divided according to their *matter* into *true* and *false*.”—Port Roy. *Log.*, part 2, chap. 3.

As to *matter*, *propositions* have also been distinguished into *contingent* and *necessary*, according as the terms agree in part and disagree in part, or agree essentially and invariably.—V. JUDGMENT.

PROPRIETY (το πρεπον, that which is fit or congruous to the agent and the relations in which he is placed).—This, according to some, is that which characterizes an action as right, and an agent as virtuous “According to Plato, to Aristotle, and to Zeno, virtue consists in the *propriety* of conduct, or in the suitability of the affection from which we act, to the object which excites it.”

Adam Smith (*Theory of Moral Sentiments*, part 7, lect. ii., chap. 1) treats of those systems which make virtue consist in *propriety*.

PROPRIUM (The) or Property is a predicable which denotes

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something essentially conjoined to the essence of the species.—Whately, *Logic*, book ii., chap. 5, sect. 3.

Proprium is applied,—1. To what belongs to some one but not to all, as to be a philosopher in respect of man. 2. To what belongs to a species, but not to it only, as blackness in respect of a crow. 3. To what belongs to all of the species, and to that only, but not always, as to grow hoary in respect of man. 4. To what belongs to species, to all of it, to it only, and always, as laughter in respect of man. This last is truly the *proprium*. *Quod speciei toti, soli et semper convenit.*—Derodon, *Log.*, p. 37.

“There is a *proprium* which belongs to the *whole* species, but not to the *sole* species, as sleeping belongs to man. There is a *proprium* which belongs to the *sole* species, but not to the *whole* species, as to be a magistrate. There is a *proprium* which belongs to the whole species, and to the sole species, but not *always*, as laughing; and there is a *proprium* which *always* belongs to it, as to be risible, that is, to have the faculty of laughing. Can one forbear laughing when he represents to himself these poor things, uttered with a mouth made venerable by a long beard, or repeated by a trembling and respectful disciple?”—Crousaz, *Art of Thinking*, part 1, sect. 3, chap. 5.

PROVERB.—“Not to detain the reader with any long discourse concerning the nature, definition, and use of *proverbs*, my notion of a *proverb* in brief is this; a short sentence or phrase in common use, containing some trope, figure, homonymy, rhyme, or other novelty of expression.”—Ray, *Preface to Proverbs*.

The Editor of the fourth edition of Ray's *Proverbs* says, “A *Proverb* is usually defined, an instructive sentence, or common and pithy saying, in which more is generally designed than expressed; famous for its peculiarity and elegance, and therefore adopted by the learned as well as the vulgar, by which it is distinguished from counterfeits, which want such authority.”

Proverbs embody the current and practical philosophy of

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an age or nation. Collections of them have been made from the earliest times. The book of Scripture called the *Proverbs* of Solomon, contains more than one collection. They have always been common in the East. Burckhardt made a collection of Arabian *proverbs*, which was published at London in 1830. Seiler published at Augsburg, in 1816, *The Wisdom of the Streets*, or, the *Meaning and Use of German Proverbs*. Ray's *Proverbs*, Allan Ramsay's *Proverbs*, Henderson's *Proverbs*, have been published among ourselves.

PRUDENCE (*prudentia*, contracted for *prævidentia*, foresight or forethought)—is one of the virtues which were called cardinal by the ancient ethical writers. It may be described as the habit of acting at all times with deliberation and forethought. It is equally removed from rashness on the one hand, and timidity or irresolution on the other. It consists in choosing the best ends, and prosecuting them by the most suitable means. It is not only a virtue in itself, but necessary to give lustre to all the other virtues.

“The rules of *prudence* in general, like the laws of the stone tables, are for the most part prohibitive. *Thou shalt not* is their characteristic formula: and it is an especial part of Christian *prudence* that it should be so. Nor would it be difficult to bring under this head all the social obligations that arise out of the relations of the present life, which the sensual understanding (το σρονημα της σαρκος, Rom. viii. 6) is of itself able to discover, and the performance of which, under favourable circumstances, the merest worldly self-interest, without love or faith, is sufficient to enforce; but which Christian *prudence* enlivens by a higher principle and renders symbolic and sacramental (Ephes. v. 32).”

“*Morality* may be compared to the consonant; *prudence* to the vowel. The former cannot be uttered (reduced to practice) but by means of the latter.

“The Platonic division of the duties of morality commences with the prudential or the habit of act and purpose

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proceeding from enlightened self-interest (*qui animi imperio, corporis servitio, rerum auxilio, in proprium sui commodum et sibi providus utitur, hunc esse prudentem statuimus*) ascends to the moral, that is, to the purifying and remedial virtues; and seeks its summit in the imitation of the divine nature. In this last division, answering to that which we have called the spiritual, Plato includes all those inward acts and aspirations, waitings, and watchings, which have a growth in godlikeness for their immediate purpose, and the union of the human soul with the supreme good as their ultimate object." — Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, vol. i., pp. 13, 21, 22.—V. MORALITY.

PSYCHISM (from $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$, soul)—is the word chosen by Mons. Quesne (*Lettres sur le Psychisme*, 8vo, Paris, 1852) to denote the doctrine that there is a fluid, diffused throughout all nature, animating equally all living and organized beings, and that the difference which appears in their actions comes of their particular organization. The fluid is general, the organization is individual.

This opinion differs from that of Pythagoras, who held that the soul of a man passed individually into the body of a brute. He (Mons. Quesne) holds that while the body dies the soul does not: the organization perishes, but not psychal or psychical fluid.

PSYCHOLOGY ($\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$, the soul; $\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma$, discourse).—The name may be new, but the study is old. It is recommended in the saying ascribed to Socrates—Know thyself. The recommendation is renewed in the *Cogito ergo sum* of Descartes; and in the writings of Malebranche, Arnauld, Leibnitz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, psychological inquiries held a prominent place. Still further prominence was given to them by the followers of Kant and Reid, and *psychology*, instead of being partially treated as an introduction to Logic, to Ethics, and to Metaphysics, which all rest on it, is now treated as a separate department of science. It is that knowledge of the mind and its faculties which we derive from a careful examination of the facts of conscious-

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ness. Life and the functions of our organized body belong to *physiology*; and, although there is a close connection between soul and body, and mutual action and reaction between them, that is no reason why the two departments of inquiry should be confounded, unless to those who think the soul to be the product or result of bodily organization. Broussais said, he could not understand those philosophers who shut their eyes and their ears in order to hear themselves think. But if the capacity of thinking be anterior to, and independent of, sense and bodily organs, then the soul which thinks and its faculties or power of thinking deserve a separate consideration.—V. MEMOIRE, par Mons. Jouffroy, *De la Legitimite et de la Distinction de la Psychologie et de la Physiologie* (published in his *Nouveaux Melanges*, and also in the 11th vol. of *Memoires de l'Acad. des Sciences Morales et Politiques*).

Mr. Stewart (Prelim. Diss. to *Philosoph. Essays*, p. 24) objects to the use of the term *psychology*, though it is sanctioned by Dr. Campbell and Dr. Beattie, as implying a hypothesis concerning the *nature* or *essence* of the sentient or thinking principle, altogether unconnected with our conclusions concerning its phenomena and general laws. The hypothesis implied is that the sentient or thinking principle is different in its nature or essence from matter. But this hypothesis is not altogether unconnected with its phenomena. On the contrary, it is on a difference of the phenomena which they present that we ground the distinction between mind and matter. It is true that the reality of the distinction may be disputed. There are philosophers who maintain that there is but one substance—call it either matter or mind. And the question when pushed to this extremity cannot be solved by the human intellect. God only knows whether the two substances which we call matter and mind have not something which is common to both. But the phenomena which they exhibit are so different as to lead us to infer a difference in the cause. And all that is implied in using the term

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psychology is, that the phenomena of the sentient or thinking principle are different from the phenomena of matter. And, notwithstanding the objection of Mr. Stewart, the term is now current, especially on the continent—to denote the science of the human mind as manifested by consciousness.

Dr. Priestley at one time maintained the materiality of mind, and at another the spirituality of matter. The apostle speaks of a spiritual body. A body which is spirit sounds to us contradictory.

Coleridge, in his *Treatise upon Method*, employs the word *psychological*, and apologizes for using an *insolens verbum*. “Goclenius is remarkable as the author of a work, the title of which is $\psi\upsilon\chi\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\alpha$ (Marburg, 1590). This I think the first appearance of *psychology*, under its own name in modern philosophy. Goclenius had, as a pupil, Otto Casmann, who wrote *Psychologia Anthropologica, sive animæ humanæ doctrina* (Hanau, 1594).”—Cousin, *Hist. of Mod. Philosoph.*, translated by Wright, sect. 10.

Psychology has been divided into two parts—1. The *empirical*, having for its object the phenomena of consciousness and the faculties by which they are produced. 2. The *rational*, having for its object the nature or substance of the soul, its spirituality, immutability, &c.

Rational psychology, which had been chiefly prosecuted before his day, was assailed by Kant, who maintained that apart from experience we can know nothing of the soul. But even admitting that *psychology* rests chiefly on observation and experience, we cannot well separate between phenomena and their cause, nor consider the cause apart from the phenomena. There are, however, three things to which the psychologist may successively attend. 1. To the phenomena of consciousness. 2. To the faculties to which they may be referred. 3. To the Ego, that is, the soul or mind in its unity, individuality, and personality. These three things are inseparable; and the consideration of

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them belongs to *psychology*. Subsidiary to it are inquiries concerning the mutual action and reaction of soul and body, the effect of organization, temperament, age, health, disease, country, climate, &c.

Nemesius, *De Natura Hominis*.

Buchanan (David), *Historia Animæ Humanæ*.

Casmannus, *Psychologia*.

Carus, *History of Psychology*, 8vo, Leipsig, 1808, in German.

PSYCHOPANNYCHISM (ψυχῆ, soul; and παν, all; νυξ, night—the sleep of the soul)—is the doctrine, to which Luther, among divines, and Formey, among philosophers, were inclined—that at death the soul falls asleep and does not awake till the resurrection of the body.

PYRRHONISM.—V. ACADEMICS, SCEPTICISM.

QUADRIVIUM.—V. TRIVIUM.

QUALITY (ποιος, ποιότης, *qualis, qualitas*, suchness)—is the difference which distinguishes substances. “Thus man is an animal who has such a quality—he is a biped; a horse is a quadruped. The circle is a figure which has a *quality*: it has no angles.”—Arist., *Metaphys.*, lib. v., cap. 14.

“There may be substances devoid of *quantity*, such as the intellective and immaterial; but that there should be substances devoid of *quality*, is a thing hardly credible, because they could not then be characterized and distinguished from one another.”—Harris, *Philosoph. Arrange.*, chap. 8.

“Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call *idea*; and the power to produce any idea in our mind I call the *quality* of the subject wherein that power is.”—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 8, sect. 8.

“We understand by a *quality* that which truly constitutes the nature of a thing—what it is—what belongs to it per-

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manently, as an individual, or in common with others like it—not that which passes, which vanishes, and answers to no lasting judgment. A body falls: it is a fact, an accident: it is heavy, that is a *quality*. Every fact, every accident, every phenomenon, supposes a *quality* by which it is produced, or by which it is undergone: and reciprocally every *quality* of things which we know by experience manifests itself by certain modes or certain phenomena; for it is precisely in this way that things discover themselves to us.”—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

Descartes (*Princip. Philosoph.*, par prima, sect. 56) says, —Et hic quidem per *modos* plane idem intelligimus, quod alibi per *attributa* vel *qualitates*. Sed cum consideramus substantiam ab illis affici, vel variari, vocamus *modos*; cum ab ista variatione talem posse denominare, vocamus *qualitates*; ac denique, cum generalius spectamus tantum ea substantiæ inesse, vocamus *attributa*. Ideoque in Deo non proprie *modos* aut *qualitates* sed *attributa* tantum esse dicimus, quia nulla in eo variatio est intelligenda. Et etiam in rebus creatis, ea quæ nunquam in iis diverso modo se habent, ut existentia et duratio in re existente et durante, non *qualitates* aut *modi*, sed *attributa* dici debent.”

“As *qualities* help to distinguish not only one soul from another soul, and one body from another body, but (in a more general way) every soul from every body, it follows that *qualities*, by having this common reference to both, are naturally divided into *corporeal* and *incorporeal*.”—Harris, *Philosoph. Arrange.*, chap. 8.

Hutcheson also (*Metaphys.*, part 1, cap. 5) reduces all *qualities* to two genera. Thought,—proper to mind. Motion,—proper to matter.

Qualities are distinguished as *essential*, or such as are inseparable from the substance—as thought from mind, or extension from matter; and *non-essential*, or such as we can separate in conception from the substance—as passionateness or mildness from mind, or heat or cold from matter.

“With respect to all kinds of *qualities*, there is one thing

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to be observed, that some degree of permanence is always requisite; else they are not so properly *qualities* as incidental affections. Thus we call not a man passionate, because he has occasionally been angered, but because he is prone to frequent anger; nor do we say a man is of a pallid or a ruddy complexion, because he is red by immediate exercise or pale by sudden fear, but when that paleness or redness may be called constitutional."—Harris, *Philosoph. Arrange.*, chap. 8.

On the question, historical and critical, as to the distinction of the *qualities* of matter as primary or secondary, see *Reid's Works*, by Sir W. Hamilton, note D.

"Another division of *qualities* is into *natural* and *acquired*. Thus in the mind, docility may be called a natural *quality*; science an acquired one: in the human body, beauty may be called a natural *quality*; gentility (good carriage) an acquired one. This distinction descends even to bodies inanimate. To transmit objects of vision is a *quality* natural to crystal; but to enlarge them while transmitted, is a character adventitious. Even the same *quality* may be *natural* in one substance, as attraction in the magnet; and *acquired* in another, as the same attraction in the magnetic bar."—Harris, *Philosoph. Arrange.*, chap. 8.

Quality (Occult).—"It was usual with the Peripatetics, when the cause of any phenomenon was demanded, to have recourse to their *faculties* or *occult qualities*, and to say, for instance, that bread nourished by its nutritive *faculty* (*quality*); and senna purged by its purgative."—Hume, *Dial. on Nat. Relig.*, part 4.

"Were I to make a division of the *qualities* of bodies as they appear to our senses, I would divide them first into those that are *manifest*, and those that are *occult*. The *manifest qualities* are those which Mr. Locke calls *primary*; such as Extension, Figure, Divisibility, Motion, Hardness, Softness, Fluidity. The nature of these is manifest even to sense; and the business of the philosopher with regard to them is not to find out their nature, which is well known,

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but to discover the effects produced by their various combinations; and, with regard to those of them which are not essential to matter, to discover their causes as far as he is able.

“The second class consists of *occult qualities*, which may be subdivided into various kinds; as *first*, the secondary *qualities*; *secondly*, the disorders we feel in our own bodies; and *thirdly*, all the *qualities* which we call powers of bodies, whether mechanical, chemical, medical, animal, or vegetable: or if there be any other powers not comprehended under these heads. Of all these the existence is manifest to sense, but the nature is *occult*; and here the philosopher has an ample field.”—Reid, *Intell. Powers*, essay ii., ch. 18.

QUANTITY (*ποσος*, *quantum*, how much)—is defined by mathematicians to be “that which admits of more or less.”

“Mathematics contain properly the *doctrine of measure*; and the object of this science is commonly said to be *quantity*; therefore, *quantity* ought to be defined, *what may be measured*. Those who have defined *quantity* to be *whatever is capable of more or less*, have given too wide a notion of it, which, it is apprehended, has led some persons to apply mathematical reasoning to subjects that do not admit of it. Pain and pleasure admit of various degrees, but who can pretend to measure them.”—Reid, *Essay on Quantity*.

“According to the common definition, *quantity* is that which is susceptible of augmentation or diminution. But many things susceptible of augmentation or diminution, and that even in a continuous manner, are not *quantities*. A sensation, painful or pleasing, augments or diminishes, and runs through different phases of intensity. But there is nothing in common between a sensation and *quantity*.”—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

According to Aristotle (*Metaphys.*, lib. v., cap. 13), by *quantity* we understand what is divisible into constitutive elements, of which one or other, or each, has unity and of its own nature a proper existence. *Plurality is quantity* which can be counted; *magnitude* can be measured. You

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call that *plurality* which can be divided into parts not continuous; *magnitude*, that which can be divided into parts continuous. Continuous magnitude in one sense is *length*, in another *breadth*, and in a third *depth*. Plurality finite is *number*; finite length is a *line*. Determinate breadth is a *plane*, determinate depth, a *body*. Finally, things are *quantities* in themselves, others accidentally.

Of things which are *quantities* in themselves, some are so by their essence; as, for example, a line, for *quantity* enters into the definition of a line; others are but modes or states of *quantity*; as much or little, long and short, &c. . . . *Quantity*, taken accidentally, means white, musician, in so far as they are found in beings having *quantity*. Motion and time are called *quantities* in another sense. We say they are *quantities*, that they are continuous, because of the divisibility of the beings of which they are the modifications—divisibility, not of the being in motion, but of the being to which motion is applied. It is because this being has *quantity*, that there is also *quantity* in the movement; and time is but one *quantity*, because it has only one movement.

“There are some *quantities* which may be called *proper*, and others *improper*. . . . That *properly* is *quantity* which is *measured by its own kind*; or which, of its own nature, is capable of being doubled or tripled, without taking in any *quantity* of a different kind as a measure of it. *Improper quantity* is that which *cannot be measured by its own kind*; but to which we assign a measure by the means of some proper *quantity*, that is related to it. Thus velocity of motion, when we consider it by itself, cannot be measured.” We measure it by the space passed in a given time.—Reid, *Essay on Quantity*.

“The reason why *quantity*, whether continuous or discrete, though it be but an *accident* or *property* of substance, is a subject of science, is, that each kind of it furnishes a standard or measure for itself. Thus *extension*, which is *quan-*

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tity continuous, can be measured by any part of itself; and, in like manner, *number*, which is *quantity* discrete, can be measured by *number* or by *unit*; whereas *qualities*, such as *hot and cold, black and white, hard and soft, &c.*, have no common measure, and therefore cannot be scientifically compared together; for which reason, as Aristotle has observed in the chap. of his *Categories* concerning quality, it is only of *quantity* that we say, That it is equal or unequal, whereas, to qualities we can only apply the terms more or less. For the same reason, he might have said, there can be no *ratios* or proportions of qualities; for we cannot say of them, as we can say of quantities, that the one is a *half* or a *third* of the other.”—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, book ii., chap. 26, note.

Quantity (Discrete and Continuous).—“In magnitude and multitude we behold the two primary, the two grand and comprehensive species, into which the *genus* of *quantity* is divided; magnitude, from its union, being called *quantity continuous*; multitude, from its separation, *quantity discrete*. Of the *continuous* kind is every solid; also the bound of every solid, that is, a superficies; and the bound of every superficies, that is, a line; to which may be added those two concomitants of every body, namely, time and place. Of the *discrete* kind are fleets and armies, herds, flocks, the syllables of sounds articulate, &c.”—Harris, *Philosoph. Arrange.*, chap. 9.

“Discrete *quantity* is that of which the parts have no continuity, as in number. The number, *e. g.*, of inches in a foot rule, is the same whether the solid inches remain continuous, or are cut asunder and flung about the world; but they do not constitute a foot length (which is a continuous *quantity*), unless they are so joined together that the bounding lines of one coincide with those of another. Of *continuous* quantities there are two kinds; one, of which the parts are co-existent, as in extension; another, in which the parts are successive, as in duration. Discrete and continuous quantities are sometimes called *multitude* and *magni-*

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tude.—Fitzgerald, *Notes to Aristotle's Ethics*, 8vo, Dublin, 1850, p. 151.—See Aristotle in *Categor.*, c. 6.

According to Derodon (*Phys.*, pars 1, cap. 5), *quantity* is either—1. *Permanent*, when its parts are together; or 2. *Successive*, when they exist some after others. Time and motion are *quantity successive*. *Permanent quantity* is—1. *Continuous*, as a *line* which is length—*superficies*, which is length and breadth, and *mathematical body*, which is length, breadth, and depth; 2. *Discrete*, as *number* and *speech*.

Hutcheson notices magnitude, time, and number, as three genera of *quantity*.—*Metaphys.*, part 1, cap. 5.

Quantity is called *discrete* when the parts are not connected, as number; *continuous*, when they are connected, and then it is either *successive*, as time, motion; or *permanent*, which is what is otherwise called space or extension, in length, breadth, and depth; length alone constitutes lines; length and breadth, surfaces; and the three together, solids.—*Port Roy. Logic*, part 1, ch. 2.

QUIDDITY or QUIDITY (*quiditas*, from *quid*, what).—This term was employed in scholastic philosophy as equivalent to the $\tau\omicron\ \tau\iota\ \acute{\eta}\nu\ \xi\iota\nu\alpha\iota$ of Aristotle, and denotes what was subsequently called the *substantial form*. It is the answer to the question, What is it? *quid est?* It is that which distinguishes a thing from other things, and makes it what it is and not another. It is synonymous with essence, and comprehends both the substance and qualities. For qualities belong to substance, and by qualities substance manifests itself. It is the known essence of a thing; or the complement of all that makes us conceive of anything as we conceive of it, as different from any or every other thing.

QUIETISM (*quies*, rest)—“is the doctrine that the highest character of virtue consists in the perpetual contemplation and love of supreme excellence.”—Sumner, *Records of Creation*, vol. ii., p. 239.

The two following propositions from Fenelon's *Maxims of the Saints*, were condemned by Innocent XII. in 1699.

QUIETISM—

1. There is attainable in this life a state of perfection in which the expectation of reward, and the fear of punishment have no place. 2. Souls may be so inflamed with love to God, and so resigned to his will, that if they believed that God had condemned them to eternal pain, they would absolutely sacrifice their salvation.

Madame Guyon thought she had learned a method by which souls might be carried to such a state of perfection that a continual act of contemplation and love might be substituted for all other acts of religion.

A controversy was carried on by Fenelon and Bossuet on the subject. See a dissertation by M. Bonnel, *De la Controverse de Bossuet et Fenelon, sur le Quietisme*. 8vo, Macon, 1850.

Upham, *Life of Madame Guyon*.

RACE—V. SPECIES.

RATIO.—When two subjects admit of comparison with reference to some quality which they possess in common, and which may be measured, this measure is their *ratio*, or the rate in which the one exceeds the other. With this term is connected that of *proportion*, which denotes the *portions*, or parts of one magnitude which are contained in another. In mathematics, the term *ratio* is used for *proportion*; thus, instead of the *proportion* which one thing bears to another, we say, the *ratio* which one bears to the other, meaning its comparative magnitude.

In the following passage *ratio* is used for *reason* or *cause*. "In this consists the *ratio* and essential ground of the gospel doctrine."—Waterland, *Works*, vol. ix., serm. 1.—

V. REASON.

RATIOCINATION.—"The conjunction of images with affirmations and negations, which make up propositions, and the conjunction of propositions one to another, and illation of conclusions upon them, is *ratiocination* or discourse.

"Some consecutions are so intimately and evidently con-

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nexed to, or found in, the premises, that the conclusion is attained *quasi per saltum*, and without anything of *ratiocinative* process, and as the eye sees its objects immediately and without any previous discourse.”—Hale, *Origin. of Mankind*, pp. 50, 51.

“The schoolmen make a third act of the mind which they call *ratiocination*, and we may style it the generation of a judgment from others actually in our understanding.”—Tucker, *Light of Nature*, vol. i., part 1, c. 11, sect. 13.

“When from a general proposition, by combining it with other propositions, we infer a proposition of the same degree of generality with itself, or a less general proposition, or a proposition merely individual, the process is *ratiocination* (or syllogism).”—Mill, *Log.*, 2d edit., vol. i., p. 223.—V. REASONING.

RATIONALE.—“The chairs of theology and philosophy (during the scholastic ages), were the oracular seats, from which the doctrines of Aristotle were expounded, as the *rationale* of theological and moral truth.”—Hampden, *On Scholastic Philosophy*, lect. i., p. 9.

“There cannot be a body of rules without a *rationale*, and this *rationale* constitutes the science. There were poets before there were rules of poetical composition; but before Aristotle, or Horace, or Boileau, or Pope could write their arts of poetry and criticism, they had considered the reasons on which their precepts rested, they had conceived in their own minds a theory of the art. In like manner there were navigators before there was an art of navigation; but before the art of navigation could teach the methods of finding the ship’s place by observations of the heavenly bodies, the science of astronomy must have explained the system of the world.”—Sir G. Cornewall Lewis, *Method of Observat. in Politics*, chap. 19, sect. 2.

Anthony Sparrow, bishop of Exeter, is the author of a work entitled, *A Rationale upon the Book of Common Prayer*. 12mo, Lond., 1668.—V. SCIENCE, ART.

RATIONALISM, in philosophy, is opposed to *sensualism*, *sensuism*, or *sensism*, according to all which, all our knowledge is derived from sense. It is also opposed to *empiricism*, which refers all our knowledge to sensation, and reflection, or experience. According to *rationalism*, reason furnishes certain elements, without which, experience is not possible. The philosophy of Condillac is of the former kind,—that of Roger Collard of the latter. The philosophy of Locke and Reid have been contrasted in the same manner, but not quite correctly.—V. SENSISM, SENSUISM, SENSUALISM.

Rationalism, in religion, as opposed to *supernaturalism*, means the adoption of reason as our sufficient and only guide, exclusive of tradition and revelation. Spinoza, in his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, tried to explain all that is supernatural in religion by reason. And Strauss and others in modern Germany have carried this line of speculation much farther.

RATIONALISTS.—"The *empirical* philosophers are like pismires; they only lay up and use their store. The *rationalists* are like the spiders; they spin all out of their own bowels. But give me a philosopher, who, like the bee, hath a middle faculty, gathering from abroad, but digesting that which is gathered by his own virtue."—Bacon, *Apophtegms*.

REAL (The).—"There is no arguing from ideal to *real* existence, unless it could first be shown, that such ideas must have their objective *realities*, and cannot be accounted for, as they pass within, except it be by supposing such and such *real* existences, *ad extra*, to answer them."—Waterland, *Works*, vol. iv., p. 435.

The term *real* always imports the existent. It is used—

1. As denoting the *existent*, as opposed to the *non-existent*, *something*, as opposed to *nothing*.

2. As opposed to the *nominal* or *verbal*, the *thing* to the *name*.

3. As synonymous with *actual*, and thus opposed—1. To *potential*, and 2. To *possible*, existence.

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4. As denoting the *absolute* in opposition to the *phenomenal*, things in themselves in opposition to things as they appear to us, relatively to our faculties.

5. As indicating a subsistence in nature in opposition to a representation in thought, *ens reale* as opposed to *ens rationis*.

6. As opposed to *logical* or *rational*, a thing which in itself or *really*, *re*, is one, may logically, *ratione*, be considered as diverse or plural, and *vice versa*.—Sir William Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note B.—V. VIRTUAL.

REALISM, as opposed to *idealism*, is the doctrine that in perception there is an immediate or intuitive cognition of the external object, while according to *idealism* our knowledge of an external world is mediate and representative, *i. e.*, by means of *ideas*.—V. IDEA and IDEALISM.—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note C.

Edin. Rev., vol. lii., pp. 175-181.

Realism, as opposed to *nominalism*, is the doctrine that *genus* and *species* are *real things*, existing independently of our conceptions and expressions; and that as in the case of singular terms, there is some real individual corresponding to each, so, in common terms also, there is something corresponding to each; which is the object of our thoughts, when we employ the term."—Whately, *Logic*, book iv., ch. 5, sect. 1.

Cousin has said that the Middle Age is but a development of a phrase of Porphyry; which has been thus translated by Boethius—*Mox de generibus et speciebus illud quidem sive subsistant, sive in solis nudis intellectibus posita sint, sive subsistantia corporalia sint an incorporalia, et utrum separata a sensibilibus an in sensibilibus posita et citra hæc consistentia, dicere recusabo*.—V. CONCEPTUALISM, NOMINALISM.

REASON (*Ratio, ratus*, from *reor*, I think).—"The word *reason* in the English language has different significations: sometimes it is taken for true and clear principles, sometimes for clear and fair deductions from these principles

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and sometimes for the cause, and particularly the final cause. But the consideration I shall have of it here is in a signification different from all these; and that is, as it stands for a faculty in man, that faculty whereby man is supposed to be distinguished from beasts,* and wherein it is evident he much surpasses them.”—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iv., chap. 17.

“All the operations of the mind when it thinks of the qualities of things separately from the things to which they belong; or when it forms general notions, and employs general terms; or when it judges of the agreement or disagreement of different things; or when it draws inferences; are comprehended under the term *reason*. *Reason* seems chiefly to consist in the power to keep such or such thoughts in the mind; and to change them at pleasure; instead of their flowing through the mind as in dreams; also in the power to see the difference between one thought and another, and so compare, separate, or join them together afresh. Though animals seem to have some little power to perform these operations, man has so much more of it, that he alone is said to be endowed with *reason*.”—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

“This word is used to signify—1. All the intellectual powers collectively. 2. Those intellectual powers exclusively in which man differs from brutes. 3. The faculty of carrying on the operation of *reasoning*. 4. The premiss or premisses of an argument, especially the minor premiss; and it is from *reason* in this sense that the word *reasoning* is derived. 5. A cause, as when we say that the *reason* of an eclipse of the sun is,† that the moon is interposed between it and the earth.”—Whately, *Logic*, appendix i.

* La Raison, dans sa definition la plus simple, est la faculte de comprendre, qui'l ne faut pas a confondre avec la faculte de connaitre. En effet les animaux connaissent, ils ne paraissent pas comprendre, et c'est là qui les distingue de l'homme.—Jouffroy, *Droit. Nat.*, tom. i., p. 38.

† The idea of the *reason* is higher than that of cause. The ground or *reason* of all existence, actual or possible, is the existence of God. Had He not existed, nothing could ever have existed. But God is the cause only of such things as He has created in time; while he is the ground or *reason* of everything possible.

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“In common and popular discourse, *reason* denotes that power by which we distinguish truth from falsehood, and right from wrong; and by which we are enabled to combine means for the attainment of particular ends.”—Stewart, *Philosoph. of Hum. Mind*, vol. ii., chap. 1.

“*Reason* is used sometimes to express the whole of those powers which elevate man above the brutes, and constitute his rational nature, more especially, perhaps, his intellectual powers; sometimes to express the power of deduction or argumentation.”—Stewart, *Outlines*, part 2, c. 1, sect. 6.

Considering it as a word denoting a faculty or complement of faculties, Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note A, sect. 5, says, “*Reason* has been employed to denote

“1. Our intelligent nature in general, as distinguished from the lower cognitive faculties, as sense, imagination, and memory; and in contrast to the feelings and desires, including—1. Conception; 2. Judgment; 3. Reasoning; 4. Intelligence; *vous*.

“2. The right and regular use of our rational faculties.

“3. The dianoetic and noetic functions of *reason*, as by Reid, *Intell. Powers*, essay vi., chap. 2.

“4. The dianoetic function or ratiocination, as by Reid in his *Inquiry*, introd., sect. 3, chap. 2, sect. 5 and 7.

“5. The noetic function or common sense. And by Kant and others opposed to the understanding as comprehending the other functions of thought.”

Reason (Spontaneity of).—“I call *spontaneity of reason*, the development of *reason* anterior to reflection, the power which *reason* has to seize at first upon truth, to comprehend it and to admit it, without demanding and rendering to itself an account of it.”—Cousin, *Hist. of Mod. Philosoph.*, vol. i., p. 113.

Reason and Understanding.—“Pure *reason* or *intuition* holds a similar relation to the *understanding* that perception holds to sensation. As sensation reveals only *subjective* facts, while perception involves a direct intuition of the objective world around us; so with regard to higher

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truths and laws, the *understanding* furnishes *merely* the subjective forms, in which they may be logically stated, while *intuition* brings us face to face with the actual matter, or reality of truth itself."—Morell, *Philosoph. of Relig.*, p. 19.

"The faculty of thought manifests itself both as *understanding* and *reason*. By the *understanding* we inquire after and investigate the grounds, causes, and conditions of our representations, feelings, and desires, and of those objects standing in immediate connection with them; by *reason* we inquire after *ultimate* grounds, causes, and conditions. By the *understanding* we evolve rules for the regulation of our desiring faculty; by *reason* we subordinate these rules to a higher law, to a law which determines the unconditioned form, the highest end of acting. Through the power of thought, therefore, our knowledge, both theoretical and practical, is comprehended in unity, connection, and in being.."—Tenneman, *Grundriss*, sect. 41.

"By the *understanding*, I mean the faculty of thinking and forming *judgments* on the notices furnished by the sense, according to certain rules existing in itself, which rules constitute its distinct nature. By the pure *reason*, I mean the power by which we become possessed of principles (the eternal verities of Plato and Descartes) and of ideas (*n. b.*, not images) as the ideas of a point, a line, a circle, in mathematics; and of justice, holiness, free-will, &c., in morals. Hence in works of pure science, the definitions of necessity precede the reasoning; in other works they more aptly form the conclusion."—Coleridge, *Friend*, pp. 150, 151.

"The definition and proper character of man — that, namely, which should contradistinguish him from other animals, is to be taken from his *reason* rather than his *understanding*; in regard that in other creatures there may be something of *understanding*, but there is nothing of *reason*."—Harrington, quoted in *Aids to Reflection*, vol i., p. 162.

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In the philosophy of Kant the *understanding* is distinguished from the *reason*—

1. By the sphere of their action. The sphere of the *understanding* is coincident with the *sensible* world and cannot transcend it; but the *reason* ascends to the supersensuous.

2. By the *objects* and results of their exercise. The *understanding* deals with *conceptions*, the *reason* with *ideas*. The knowledge obtained by the *understanding* is particular and contingent, the product of the *reason* is necessary and universal knowledge or truth.

Criticism of Pure Reason, see English transl., pp. 7, 20, 57, 268, 7, 277, *Prolegomena*, sect. 59. See also Morell, *Philosophy of Relig.*, chap. 2; and *Philosoph. Tendencies*, p. 71.

Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*.

“The faculty which combines the simple perceptions, and so gives the knowledge of the complex objects, has been called the *understanding*. It is an energy of the mind as intelligent. It is an ultimate fact of knowledge, that the mind is conscious of itself as unity, of the world as diversity. The outward world is seen as diverse through the various sensations, but is bound in certain relations—those of space—which are independent of the perceiving subject. The mind requires a cause external to itself, of the constant representation of unity in diversity, no less than of the representation of different qualities. The *reason*, therefore, in virtue of its causal principle refers these relations to the object. Precisely as the intelligence refers the single perception to an external cause, so it refers the combination of perceptions to one object. The *understanding* is thus the same faculty with the *reason*, but in certain particular applications.”—R. A. Thompson, *Christian Theism*, book i., chap. 3.

“The assertion of a faculty of the mind by which it apprehends truth, which faculty is higher than the discursive *reason*, as the truth apprehended by it is higher than mere

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demonstrative truth, agrees with the doctrine taught and insisted on by the late Samuel Taylor Coleridge. And so far as he was the means of inculcating this doctrine, which is the doctrine of Plato, and I might add, of Aristotle, and of many other philosophers, let him have due honour. But in his desire to impress the doctrine upon men's minds, he combined it with several other tenets, which will not bear examination. He held that the two faculties by which these two kinds of truth are apprehended, and which our philosophical writers call the *intuitive reason*, and the *discursive reason*, may be called, and ought to be called respectively, the *reason* and the *understanding*; and that the second of these is of the nature of the *instinct* of animals, so as to be something intermediate between *reason* and *instinct*. These opinions, I may venture to say, are altogether erroneous. The *intuitive reason* and the *discursive reason* are not, by any English writers, called the *reason* and the *understanding*; and accordingly, Coleridge has had to alter all the passages, viz., those taken from Leighton, Harrington, and Bacon, from which his exposition proceeds. The *understanding* is so far from being especially the discursive or reasoning faculty, that it is, in universal usage, and by our best writers, *opposed* to the discursive or reasoning faculty. Thus this is expressly declared by Sir John Davies in his poem 'On the Immortality of the Soul.' He says of the soul:—

'When she *rates* things, and moves from ground to ground,
The name of *reason* (*ratio*) she acquires from this;
But when by *reason* she the truth hath found,
And standeth fixt, she *understanding* is.'

"Instead of the *reason* being fixed, and the *understanding* discursive, as Mr. Coleridge says, the *reason* is distinctively discursive; that is, it obtains conclusions by running from one point to another. This is what is meant by *discursus*; or, taking the full term, *discursus rationis*, *discourse of reason*. *Understanding* is fixed, that is, it dwells upon one view of a subject, and not upon the steps by which that

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view is obtained. The verb to *reason*, implies the substantive, the *reason*, though it is not co-extensive with it; for, as I have said, there is the intuitive *reason* as well as the discursive *reason*. But it is by the faculty of *reason* that we are capable of reasoning; though undoubtedly the practice or the pretence of reasoning may be carried so far as to seem at variance with *reason* in the more familiar sense of the term; as is the case also in French. Moliere's *Crisale* says (in the *Femmes Savantes*)—

‘Raisonner est l'emploi de toute ma maison
Et le raisonnement en bannit la *Raison*.’

“If Mr. Coleridge's assertion were true, that the *understanding* is the discursive and the *reason* the fixed faculty, we should be justified in saying that *the understanding is the faculty by which we reason, and the reason is the faculty by which we understand*. But this is not so. . . .

“Mr. Coleridge's object in his speculations is nearly the same as Plato's, viz., to declare that there is a truth of a higher kind than can be obtained by mere reasoning; and also to claim, as portions of this higher truth, certain fundamental doctrines of morality. Among these, Mr. Coleridge places the authority of conscience, and Plato, the supreme good. Mr. Coleridge also holds, as Plato held, that the *reason* of man in its highest and most comprehensive form, is a portion of a supreme and universal *reason*; and leads to truth, not in virtue of its special attributes in each person, but by its own nature.

“The view thus given of that higher kind of knowledge which Plato and Aristotle place above ordinary science, as being the knowledge of and faculty of learning first principles, will enable us to explain some expressions which might otherwise be misunderstood. Socrates, in the concluding part of the Sixth Book of the *Republic*, says, that this kind of knowledge is ‘that of which the *reason* (λογος) takes hold,* in virtue of its power of reasoning.’ Here we

* τη του διαλεγισθαι δυναμει.

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are plainly not to understand that we arrive at first principles by *reasoning*; for the very opposite is true, and is here taught, viz., that first principles are not what we *reason to*, but what we *reason from*. The meaning of this passage plainly is, that first principles are those of which the *reason* takes hold in *virtue of its power of reasoning*; they are the conditions which must exist in order to make any reasoning possible; they are the propositions which the *reason* must involve implicitly, in order that we may reason explicitly; they are the intuitive roots of the dialectical power.

“Plato’s views may be thus exhibited:—

	Intelligible World, νοητων.		Visible World, ορατων.	
Object, ..	Ideas. ιδεαι.	Conceptions. διανοια.	Things. ζωα . τ. λ.	Images. εικονες.
Process, ..	Intuition. νοησις.	Demonstration. επιστημη.	Belief. τιστις.	Conjecture. ειρασις.
Faculties, .	Intuitive Reason. νους.	Discursive Reason λογος.	Sensation. αισθησις.	

From a paper by Dr. Whewell, *On the Intellectual Powers according to Plato*, in the *Cambridge Philosoph. Trans.*, 1855.—V. UNDERSTANDING.

Reason (Impersonal).—*Reason*, according to Cousin and other French philosophers, is the faculty by which we have knowledge of the infinite and the absolute, and is *impersonal*.

“Licet enim intellectus meus sit individuus et separatus ab intellectu tuo, tamen secundum quod est individuus non habet universale in ipso, et ideo non individuatur id quod est in intellectu . . . Sic igitur universale ut universale est ubique et semper idem omnino et idem in animabus omnium, non recipiens individuationem ab anima.”

These words are quoted from Averrhöes, by Mons. Haureau, in his *Examen de la Philosoph. Scolastique*, tom. i., p. 69,

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who exclaims, “Voilà la these de l’intelligence ou de la *raison impersonnelle!*” But the truth is, that the root and germ of this doctrine may be found in the doctrine of Plato, that human *reason* is a ray of the divine *reason*.

“He, the great Father! kindled at one flame
The world as rational—one spirit pour’d
From spirit’s awful fountain, poured himself
Through all their souls, but not in equal stream :
Profuse or frugal of the inspiring God,
As his wise plan demanded; and when past
Their various trials in their common spheres
(If they continue rational as made)
Resqrbs them all into himself again,
His throne their centre, and his smile their crown.”—YOUNG.

“In truth,” observes Fenelon, “my *reason* is in myself, for it is necessary that I should continually turn inward upon myself in order to find it; but the higher *reason* which corrects me when I need it, and which I consult, is not my own, it does not specially make a part of myself. Thus, that which may seem most our own, and to be the foundation of our being, I mean our *reason*, is that which we are to believe most borrowed. We receive at every moment a *reason* superior to our own, just as we breathe an air which is not ourselves. There is an internal school, where man receives what he can neither acquire outwardly for himself, nor learn of other men who live by alms like himself.”—*Existence of God*, chap. iv., sect. 3.

“While we reflect on our own idea of *reason*, we know that our souls are not it, but only partake of it; and that we have it *κατα μεθεξιν*, and not *κατα ουσιν*. Neither can it be called a faculty, but far rather a light, which we enjoy, but the source of which is not in ourselves, nor rightly by any individual to be denominated *mine*.”—John Smith, *Posthumous Tracts*, 1660.

See Coleridge, *Liter. Rem.*, vol. iii., p. 464.

“*Reason* is impersonal in its nature,” says Cousin (*Exposit. of Eclecticism*, translated by Ripley, p. 69), “it is not we who make it. It is so far from being individual, that its peculiar characteristics are the opposite of indivi-

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duality, viz., universality and necessity; since it is to *reason* that we owe the knowledge of universal and necessary truths, of principles which we all obey and cannot but obey." "It descends from God and approaches man; it makes its appearance in the consciousness as a guest who brings intelligence of an unknown world, of which it at once presents the idea and awakens the want. If *reason* were personal it would have no value, no authority beyond the limits of the individual subject. *Reason* is a revelation, a necessary and universal revelation which is wanting to no man, and which enlightens every man on his coming into the world. *Reason* is the necessary mediator between God and man, the *λογος* of Pythagoras and Plato, the Word made flesh, which serves as the interpreter of God, and the teacher of man, divine and human at the same time. It is not, indeed, the absolute God in his majestic individuality, but his manifestation in spirit and in truth; it is not the Being of beings, but it is the revealed God of the human race."—Ibid, p. 79.

"*Reason* or intelligence is not individual, is not ours, is not even human; it is absolute, it is divine. What is personal to us is our free and voluntary activity; what is not free and not voluntary is adventitious to man, and does not constitute an integrant part of his individuality. Intelligence is conversant with truth; truth as necessary and universal is not the creature of my volition; and *reason*, which, as the subject of truth is also universal and necessary, is consequently impersonal. We see, therefore, by a light which is not ours; and *reason* is a revelation of God in man. The ideas of which we are conscious belong not to us, but to absolute intelligence."—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Discussions*, &c., 8vo, Lond., 1852, p. 8, giving the views of Cousin.

This doctrine of the impersonal *reason* is regarded by Bouillier (*Theorie de la Raison Impersonnelle*, 8vo, Paris, 1846) and others as the true ground of all certainty. Admit the personality of *reason* and man becomes the

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measure of all things—truth is individual. But the truths of *reason* are universal. No one, says Malebranche, can feel the pain which I feel; but any one or every one may contemplate the truth which I know. The scepticism of Kant as to the relative nature of knowledge is thus demolished.

Reason (Determining or Sufficient).—“There are two great principles of reasoning: the one is the *principle of contradiction*, which means that of two contradictory propositions, the one is true, the other false: the other is the principle of *raison determinante*, which is, that nothing happens without a cause, or at least a *reason* determining, that is, something which may serve to render a *reason à priori*, why that thing is as it is rather than otherwise.”—Leibnitz, *Theodicée*, partie 1, sect. 44.

“Nothing is done without a *sufficient reason*, that is, nothing happens without its being possible to him who knew things sufficiently to render a *reason* which is sufficient to determine why it is so, and not otherwise.”—Leibnitz, *Principes de la Nat. et de la Grace*, sect. 7.—V. SUFFICIENT REASON.

REASONING,—“in one of its acceptations, means syllogising, or the mode of inference which may be called concluding from generals to particulars. In another of its senses, to reason is simply to infer any assertion, from assertions already admitted: and in this sense induction is as much entitled to be called *reasoning* as the demonstrations of geometry. Writers on Logic have generally preferred the former acceptation of the term; the latter and more extensive signification is that in which I mean to use it.”—Mill, *Logic*, 2d edit., vol. i., p. 3.

“*Reasoning* is that operation of the mind through which it forms one judgment from many others; as when, for instance, having judged that true virtue ought to be referred to God, and that the virtue of the heathens was not referred to him, we thence conclude that the virtue of the heathens was not true virtue.”—*Port Roy. Logic*.

“Some appear to include under the title of *reasoning*

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every case in which a person believes one thing in consequence of his believing another thing, however far he may be from having any grounds to warrant the inference: and they accordingly include those processes which take place in the minds of infants and of brutes; which are apt to *associate* with the appearance of an object before them the remembered impression of something that formerly accompanied it. Such a process is attended to in the familiar proverbs that ‘a burnt child dreads the fire;’ or as it is expressed in another form ‘the scalded cat fears cold water;’ or again in the Hebrew proverb, ‘he who has been bitten by a serpent is afraid of a rope.’ Most logical writers, however, have confined the name of *reasoning* to *valid* argument; which cannot exist without a universal premiss, implied, if not expressed.”—Whately, *Logic*, (Introd. 4).

Mr. Stewart says that to adapt means to a proximate end is to *reason*.

RECTITUDE.—“*Rectitude* of conduct is intended to express the term *κατορθωσις*, which Cicero translates *recta effectio*: *κατορθωμα* he translates *rectum factum*, *De Fin.*, lib. iii., cap. 4. Now the definition of *κατορθωμα* was *νομου προσταγμα*, ‘A thing commanded by law’ (that is, by the law of nature, the universal law). Antoninus, speaking of the *reasoning* faculty, how, without looking farther, it rests contented in its own energies, adds, ‘for which reason are all actions of this species called *rectitudes* (*κατορθωσεις*, *κατα ορθος*, right onwards), as denoting the directness of their progression right onwards.”—Harris, *Dialogue on Happiness*, p. 73, note.

“Goodness in actions is like unto *straightness*; wherefore that which is done well we term *right*, for as the *straight* way is most acceptable to him that travelleth, because by it he cometh soonest to his journey’s end: so in action, that which doth lye the evenest between us and the end we desire, must needs be the fittest for our use.”—Hooker, *Eccles. Pol.*, b. i., s. 8.

If a term is to be selected to denote that, in action and

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in disposition, of which the Moral Faculty approves, perhaps the most precise and appropriate is *rectitude* or *rightness*. Dr. Adams has remarked, (*Sermon on the Nature and Obligation of Virtue*), "The man who acts *virtuously* is said to act *rightly*. This appears more proper than to say that he acts *according to truth*; and more clear and distinct than to say that he acts *according to the nature and reason of things*; the meaning of which will, in all cases, be found to be only this—that he acts according to what reason, in the present circumstances of the agent, and the relation he stands in to the objects before him, pronounces to be right." In like manner, Dr. Reid has said (*Active Powers*, essay v., chap. 5), "Prudence is a virtue, benevolence is a virtue; but the essence and formal nature of virtue must lie in something that is common to all these, and to every other virtue. And this, I conceive, can be nothing else but the *Rectitude of such conduct and Turpitude of the contrary*, which is discerned by a good man. And so far only he is virtuous as he pursues the former and avoids the latter." *Rectitude*, then, is that, in action and in disposition, of which the moral faculty approves. The contrary of what is *right* is *wrong*. *Rightness* and *wrongness*, then, are the characteristics of action and disposition, as contemplated by the moralist. So that the *foundation of morals*, the ground upon which moral distinctions are taken, is in the essential difference between what is *right* and what is *wrong*.

But what is *rectitude* or *rightness* as the characteristic of an action? According to Price and others, this term denotes a simple and primitive idea, and cannot be explained. It might as well be asked, what is *truth*, as the characteristic of a proposition? It is a capacity of our rational nature to see and acknowledge truth; but we cannot explain what truth is. We call it the conformity of our thoughts with the reality of things. But it may be doubted how far this explanation makes the nature of truth more intelligible. In like manner, some explain *rectitude* by saying, that it consists in a congruity between

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an action and the relations of the agent. It is the idea we form of an action, when it is, in every way, conformable to the relations of the agent and the circumstances in which he is placed. On contemplating such an action, we approve of it, and feel that if we were placed in such circumstances, and in such relations, we should be under an obligation to perform it. Now, the circumstances and relations in which man is placed arise from his nature and from the nature of things in general: And hence it has been said, that *rectitude is founded in the nature and fitness of things*; that is, an action is right when it is fit or suitable to all the relations and circumstances of the agent; and of this fitness conscience or reason is the judge. Conscience or reason does not constitute the relations; these must arise from the nature of man and the nature of things; but conscience or reason judges and determines as to the conformity of actions to those relations; and those relations arising necessarily from the very nature of things, the conformity with them which constitutes *rectitude, is said to be eternal and immutable.*—V. RIGHT.

REFLECTION (*re-flectere*, to bend back).—"By *reflection* I would be understood to mean that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them: by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding. Those two, viz.,—external material things, as the objects of *sensation*; and the operations of our own minds within, as the objects of *reflection*, are to me the only originals from whence all our ideas take their beginnings. The term operations here I use in a large sense, as comprehending not barely the actions of the mind about its ideas, but some sort of passions arising sometimes from them, such as in the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 1.

"When we make our own thoughts and passions, and the various operations of our minds, the objects of our attention, either while they are present, or when they are

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recent and fresh in our memory, this act of the mind is called *reflection*.”—Reid, *Intell. Powers*, essay i., chap. 2, Also chap. 5, and essay vi.

Reid gives a more extensive (but less proper) signification to *reflection*.—*Intell. Powers*, essay iii., chap. 5. Also essay vi., chap. 1.

Attention is the energy of the mind directed towards things present. *Reflection* has to do with things past and the ideas of them. *Attention* may employ the organs of the body. *Reflection* is purely a mental operation. It is not a simple act. In *reflection* we may analyze and compound, abstract and generalize. These operations of mind so arranged as to gain some end constitute a method. And a method is just the act of *reflecting* or properly employing the energies of the mind on the objects of its knowledge.

“*Reflection* creates nothing,—can create nothing; everything exists previous to *reflection* in the consciousness, but everything pre-exists there in confusion and obscurity; it is the work of *reflection* in adding itself to consciousness, to illuminate that which was obscure, to develop that which was enveloped. *Reflection* is for consciousness what the microscope and the telescope are for the natural sight: neither of these instruments makes or changes the objects; but in examining them on every side, in penetrating to their centre, these instruments illuminate them, and discover to us their characters and their laws.”—Cousin, *Hist. of Mod. Phil.*, vol. i., p. 275.—V. OBSERVATION.

REFLEX SENSES—V. SENSE and IDEA.


RELATION (*re-ferre, relatum*, to bear back).—“When the mind so considers one thing that it does as it were bring it to and set it by another, and carries its view from one to the other, this is, as the words import, *relation* and *respect*; and the denominations given to positive things, intimating that respect, and serving as marks to lead the thoughts beyond the subject itself denominated, to something distinct from it, are what we call *relatives*; and the

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things so brought together, *related*. Thus, when the mind considers Caius as such a positive being, it takes nothing into that idea but what really exists in Caius; *v. g.*, when I consider him as a man, I have nothing in my mind but the complex idea of the species man. So, likewise, when I say Caius is a white man, I have nothing but the bare consideration of a man who hath that white colour. But when I give Caius the name husband, I intimate some other person; and when I give him the name whiter, I intimate some other thing; in both cases my thought is led to something beyond Caius, and there are two things brought into consideration."—Locke, *Essay on Human Understand.*, book ii., chap. 25. The two things thus brought into consideration are called *relatives* or *correlates*, as father and son, husband and wife.

"In all *relation* there must be a subject whence it commences, as *snow*; another where it terminates, as a *swan*; the *relation* itself, *similitude*; and lastly, the source of that *relation*, *whiteness*; the swan is related to the snow by both of them being *white*."—Harris, *Philosoph. Arrange.*, chap. 10.

This is called predicamental *relation*, and forms one of the categories ($\pi\rho\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\iota$) of Aristotle.

"Any sort of connection which is perceived or imagined between two or more things; or any comparison which is made by the mind, is a *relation*. When we look at these two lines  we do not merely think of them separately, as *this* straight line, and *that* straight line; but they are immediately connected together by a comparison which takes place in the mind as soon as they meet the eye. We perceive that these two lines are alike; they are both straight; and we call the notion that is formed by the comparison, the *relation* of *sameness*. We may then think of them as the same in length; this comparison gives us the notion which we call the *relation* of *equality*. We think of them again as equally distant from each other, from end to end, and then we say they are *parallel* lines;

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this word *parallel* represents nothing existing in the lines themselves, but only the notion formed by measuring the distance between them. All these notions spring up in the mind from the comparison of the two objects; they belong entirely to the *mind*, and do not exist in the things themselves."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

Although *relations* are not real entities, but merely mental modes of viewing things, let it be observed that our ideas of *relation* are not vague nor arbitrary, but are determined by the known qualities of the related objects. We cannot at will see *relations* for which there is no foundation in the nature of the related objects. Of all *relations*, the *relations* of number are the clearest and most accurately appreciated.

"Another way," says Dr. Reid (*Intell. Powers*, essay vi., chap. 2), in which we get the notion of *relations* (which seems not to have occurred to Mr. Locke), is when, by attention to one of the related objects, we perceive or judge that it must, from its nature, have a certain *relation* to something else, which before, perhaps, we never thought of; and thus our attention to one of the related objects produces the notion of a correlate and of a certain *relation* between them. Thus, when I attend to colour, figure, weight, I cannot help judging these to be qualities which cannot exist without a substance; that is, something which is coloured, figured, heavy. If I had not perceived such things to be qualities, I should never have had any notion of their subject, or of their *relation* to it. By attending to the operations of thinking, memory, reasoning, we perceive or judge that there must be something which thinks, remembers, and reasons, which we call the mind. When we attend to any change that happens in nature, judgment informs us that there must be a cause of this change which had power to produce it; and thus we get the notions of cause and effect, and of the *relation* between them. When we attend to body, we perceive that it cannot exist without space; hence we get the notion of space (which is neither

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an object of sense nor of consciousness), and of the *relation* which bodies have to a certain portion of unlimited space, as their place."—See also Reid, *Inquiry*, chap. 1, sect. 7. Buffier calls *relation*, in this view, *Occasio quam præbet objectum cogitandi de alio*.—V. SUGGESTION.

RELATIVE is opposed to *absolute*, *q. v.*

A thing is called *relative* when the conception of it implies the conception of some other thing to which it has reference. A master implies a servant. A thing is called *absolute* when the conception of it does not imply the conception of any other thing to which it is referred, as substance, man.

An *absolute* term is that which can be applied to a thing without implying comparison with any other thing; as whiteness may be predicated of one body without comparing it with any other body.

A *relative* term is that which is applied in consequence of the collation of two or more things; as equality, which implies that one body has been compared to another in quantity.

RELIGION (*re-lego, re-ligo, re-eligo*).—This word according to Cicero (*De Nat. Deorum*, ii., 28) is derived from, or rather compounded of, *re-legere*, to read over again, to reflect upon or to study the sacred books in which *religion* is delivered. According to Lactantius (*Div. Instit.*, 4) it comes from *re-ligare*, to bind back—because *religion* is that which furnishes the true ground of obligation. St. Augustine (*De Vera Relig.*, c. 55) gives the same derivation of the word. But he gives another origin of it (*De Civit. Dei*, lib. x., c. 3), where he says, “Deum, qui fons est nostræ beatitudinis, et omnis desiderii nostri finis, eligentes, immo potius *religentes*, amiseramus enim negligentes; hunc, inquam, *religentes*, unde et *religio* dicta est, ad eum dilectione tendamus, ut perveniendo quiescamus.”

Muller, Professor of Theology at Bale, published a *Dissertation* on this word in 1834.

Religion is distinguished into natural and revealed, or

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that knowledge of God and of our duty which is derived from the light of nature or reason—and that knowledge of God and our duty which comes to us from positive revelation.

The epithet natural (or physical) has been objected to as applied to *religion*, inasmuch as all knowledge of God is super-sensuous.—*V. THEOLOGY.*

In all forms of *religion* there is one part, which may be called the doctrine or dogma, which is to be received by faith; and the *cultus*, or worship, which is the outward expression or mode of manifesting the religious sentiment.

REMEMBRANCE, REMINISCENCE, RECOLLECTION

(*re-colligere*, to gather together again; *rursus menisci*, or *re-minisci*, to remember).—"The perception which actually accompanies, and is annexed to any impression on the body, made by an external object, furnishes the mind with a distinct idea, which we call sensation; which is, as it were, the actual entrance of any idea into the understanding by the senses. The same idea, when it again recurs without the operation of the like object on the external sensory, is *remembrance*; if it be sought after by the mind, and with pain and endeavour found, and brought again into view, it is *recollection*; if it be held there long under attentive consideration, it is *contemplation*."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 19.

"In other cases, the various particulars which compose our stock of knowledge are *recalled* in consequence of an effort of our will. This latter operation, too, is often called by the same name (memory), but is more properly distinguished by the word *recollection*."—Stewart, *Philosoph. of Hum. Mind*, chap. 6, sect. 1.

"*Reminiscence* is the act of recovering, and *recollection* the act of combining *remembrances*. Those eminences to which we attach the subordinate parts of an object come first into *reminiscence*; when the intervening portions present themselves in order, the *recollection* is complete."—Taylor, *Synonyms*.

REMINISCENCE (*reminisci*, to remember).—Memory is knowledge of some former consciousness. *Reminiscence* is the act by which we endeavour to recall and reunite former states of consciousness. It is a kind of reasoning by which we ascend from a present consciousness to a former, and from that to a more remote, till the whole facts of some case are brought again back to us. It is peculiar to man, while memory, as spontaneous, is shared by the brutes. “When we have a *reminiscence*,” said Aristotle (*De Mem. et Reminiscencia*, c. 2), “we reason to the effect that we formerly experienced some impression of such or such a kind, and the mind makes a search after it. But an effort of this kind is not possible, except to animals who are endowed with will; and to will is a kind of reasoning or syllogism.”

“There is yet another kind of discussion, beginning with the appetite to recover something lost, proceeding from the present backward, from thought of the place where we miss at, to the thought of the place from whence we came last; and from the thought of that to the thought of a place before, till we have in our mind some place, wherein we had the thing we miss: and this is called *reminiscence*.”

—Hobbes, *Hum. Nat.*, chap. 4.—V. CONTEMPLATION, MEMORY, RETENTION.

Reminiscence according to Plato.

“Plato imagined, after more ancient philosophers, that every man is born with a certain *reminiscence*, and that when we seem to be taught we are only put in mind of what we knew in a former state.”—Bolingbroke, essay ii., *Presumption of Philosophers*.

The term employed by Plato was *ἀνάμνησις*, which may be translated “knowing up.” He did not apply it to every kind or degree of knowledge, but to that spontaneous movement of the mind by which it ascended from mere opinion (*δόξα*) to science (*ἐπιστήμη*). On such occasions the appearances of truth and beauty suggested or evolved the ideas of the true and the beautiful; which seemed to belong to the soul and to have been formerly known.

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There was a stirring up or calling into act what was in the soul potentially. That they had been known in that former state of existence which Plato, in a myth, represented the soul to have enjoyed, and were now merely recalled or remembered, is the view commonly given (Cicero, *Tuscul.*, i., 24). But what Plato meant more specially to intimate by the use of this word was, that all science or certainty is intuitive, and belongs to the reason which gives knowledge in the last and highest degree. Conjecture (*ἕκαστα*), belief (*πιστις*), which, when conjoined, give opinion (*δόξα*), and reasoning (*διάνοια*), which are the other degrees of knowledge, according to Plato, being unable to give ground for science or certainty.—Heusde, *Init. Philosoph. Platon.*, 8vo, 1827, tom. i., pp. 33, 34.

Olympiodorus in a MS. Commentary on the *Phædo* of Plato, quoted by Harris (*Hermes*, p. 232) says:—"Inasmuch as the soul, by containing the principles of all beings, is a sort of omniform representation or exemplar; when it is roused by objects of sense it recollects those principles which it contains within, and brings them forth."

"Plato, it is believed, proposed his theory of *reminiscence* as a sort of allegory, signifying the power which the mind has to draw from itself, on occasion of perceptions, universal ideas, and the manner in which it rises to them resembling the manner in which is awakened all at once within us the remembrance of what we have dreamed."—*Manuel de Philosophie*, 8vo, Paris, 1846, p. 139.

It was in the same sense that Socrates called himself a midwife of the mind. He assisted in bringing to the birth truths with which the mind was big and in labour. He unfolded what was infolded.

Boethius, *De Consolat.*, says, the mind by teaching is only excited to know. And Aquinas, *De Magistro*, says, "Omnis disciplina fit ex pre-existenti cognitione. . . . Ex homine docente certitudinem scientiæ non acciperemus, nisi inesset nobis certitudo principiorum."

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According to Mons. Chastel (*Les Rationalistes et les Traditionalistes*, 12mo, Paris, 1850, p. 150), Thomas Aquinas in his Treatise, *De Magistro*, maintains the following points:—

1. To the acquisition of science you must admit as pre-existent in us the knowledge of general principles, evident of themselves, and all those notions which the mind frames immediately to itself, by the aid of the first sensations; for all teaching supposes in him who learns some anterior knowledge.

2. But these first truths, conditions pre-requisite for all teaching, these general principles, these principles which are native and not taught, are known to us by that light of reason which God hath put in us, as the image of that uncreated truth which is reflected in our mind. They are given to us by nature as the germ of all the cognitions to which we ultimately attain.

There are certain notions of which it is impossible for a man to be ignorant.

3. It is from these principles, known in advance, that he who teaches should set out with us, to teach us other truths connected with these. His teaching consists in showing us this connection. Properly speaking, it is the knowledge of these principles and not teaching which gives us secondary knowledge, although teaching is the mediate cause. It would be impossible for us to learn of a man the knowledge which he wishes to teach us, if there were not in us beforehand those principles to which he connects his knowledge; and all the certainty of that knowledge comes to us from the certainty of those principles, and ultimately from God who has given us the light of reason to know them.

4. Thus the knowledge of first principles is not from teaching, although teaching may give secondary truths connected with them.

5. But these secondary truths we receive or reject according to their conformity with the truth that is in us.

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6. Of these secondary truths which teaching gives, there are many which the mind may discover by its own force, as there are many diseases which cure themselves.

Augustine also has a treatise, *De Magistro*, in which, from a different point of view, he comes to conclusions substantially the same. "The certainty of science comes to us from God who hath given to us the light of reason. For it is by this light that we know principles, and it is from principles that we derive the certainty of science. And yet it is true, in a certain sense, that man produces in us knowledge. The pupil, if interrogated before teaching, could answer as to those principles by aid of which all teaching proceeds; but he could not answer upon those things which are taught, which are the consequences of those principles. So that he does not learn principles but only the consequences of them."

D'Alembert, as quoted by Mr. Stewart (vol. ii., p. 23), says, "It should seem that everything we learn from a good metaphysical book is only a sort of *reminiscence* of what the mind previously knew."

On the *Reminiscence* of Plato, see Piccolomineus, *Philosoph. De Moribus*, Francof., 1583, p. 450.

RESERVATION or RESTRICTION (as it is called by casuists)—has reference to the duty of speaking what is true; and is distinguished as *real* and *mental*.

Real Restriction takes place when the words used are not true if strictly interpreted, but there is no deviation from truth if the circumstances be considered. One man asks another, Have you dined? and the answer given is, No. The party giving this answer has dined, times without number. But his answer is restricted by the circumstances to *to-day*; and in that sense is true.

Mental Restriction or Reservation consists in saying so far what is true, and to be believed, but adding mentally some qualification which makes it not to be true. A debtor asked by his creditor for payment of his debt says,—“I will certainly pay you to-morrow”—adding to himself—“in

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part,"—whereas the words audibly uttered referred to the whole amount.

There was published in 12mo, Lond., 1851, *A Treatise of Equivocation*, from a MS. in the Bodleian Library, written about 1600. It was referred to in the trials on the Gunpowder Plot.

The following occurs at p. 17 :—"A farmer hath come to sell corn. He selleth all that he can sell, because he reserveth the rest for his own necessary use. Then cometh one and desireth to buy corn. He may truly say, and swear (if it be needful) that he hath none ; for the circumstance of the person interpreteth the meaning to be that he hath none to sell."—This is *Reservation* or *Restriction*, rather than *Equivocation*.

At p. 29 :—"If I be asked whether such a one be in my house, who is there indeed, I may answer in Latin, ' *Non est hic*,' meaning he doth not *eat* in my house."—This is *Equivocation*.—*q. v.*

RETENTION (*re-tenere*, to keep hold of).

"The power of reproduction (into consciousness) supposes a power of *retention* (out of consciousness). To this conservative power I confine exclusively the term Memory."—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 912.

"There seems good reason for confining the appellation of memory to the simple power of *retention*, which undoubtedly must be considered as an original aptitude of mind, irresolvable into any other. The power of recalling the preserved impressions seems on the other hand rightly held to be only a modified exercise of the suggestive or reproductive faculty."—Dr. Tulloch, *Theism*, p. 206.—*V. MEMORY.*

RIGHT.—" *Right* and *duty* are things very different, and have even a kind of opposition ; yet they are so related that the one cannot even be conceived without the other ; and he that understands the one must understand the other. They have the same relation which credit has to debt. As all credit supposes an equivalent debt, so all *right* supposes a corresponding *duty*. There can be no credit in one party

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without an equivalent debt in another party ; and there can be no *right* in one party, without a corresponding *duty* in another party. The sum of credit shows the sum of debt ; and the sum of men's *rights* shows, in like manner, the sum of their *duty* to one another.

“The word *right* has a very different meaning, according as it is applied to actions or to persons. A *right* action (*rectum*) is an action agreeable to our duty. But when we speak of the *rights of men* (*jus*), the word has a very different, and a more artificial meaning. It is a term of art in law, and signifies all that a man may lawfully do, all that he may lawfully possess and use, and all that he may lawfully claim of any other person.

“We can be at no loss to perceive the *duties* corresponding to the several kinds of *rights*. What I have a *right* to do, it is the *duty* of all men not to hinder me from doing. What is my property or real *right*, no man ought to take from me ; or to molest me in the use and enjoyment of it. And what I have a *right* to demand of any man, it is his *duty* to perform. Between the *right* on the one hand, and the *duty* on the other, there is not only a necessary connection, but, in reality, they are only different expressions of the same meaning ; just as it is the same thing to say, I am your debtor, and to say, you are my creditor ; or as it is the same thing to say I am your father, and to say, you are my son.”

“As there is a strict notion of justice, in which it is distinguished from humanity and charity, so there is a more extensive signification of it, in which it includes those virtues. The ancient moralists, both Greek and Roman, under the cardinal virtue of Justice, included Beneficence ; and in this extensive sense, it is often used in common language. The like may be said of *right*, which in a sense not uncommon, is extended to every proper claim of humanity and charity, as well as to the claims of strict justice. But, as it is proper to distinguish these two kinds of claims by different names, writers in natural jurisprudence have given

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the name of *perfect rights* to the claims of strict justice, and that of *imperfect rights* to the claims of charity and humanity. Thus all the duties of humanity have imperfect *rights* corresponding to them, as those of strict justice have perfect *rights*.”—Reid, *Active Powers*, essay v., chap. 3.

“84. The adjective *right* has a much wider signification than the substantive *right*. Everything is *right* which is conformable to the supreme rule of human action; but that only is a *right* which, being conformable to the supreme rule, is realized in society and vested in a particular person. Hence the two words may often be properly opposed. We may say that a poor man has no *right* to relief, but it is *right* he should have it. A rich man has a *right* to destroy the harvest of his fields, but to do so would not be *right*.

“85. To a *right*, on one side, corresponds an *obligation* on the other. If a man has a *right* to my horse, I have an *obligation* to let him have it. If a man has a *right* to the fruit of a certain tree, all other persons are under an *obligation* to abstain from appropriating it. Men are *obliged* to respect each others' rights.

“86. My *obligation* is to give another man his *right*; my *duty* is to do what is *right*. Hence duty is a wider term than obligation; just as *right*, the adjective, is wider than *right* the substantive.

“88. Duty has no correlative, as obligation has the correlative *right*. What it is our duty to do, we must do, because it is *right*, not because any one can demand it of us. We may, however, speak of those who are particularly benefited by the discharge of our duties, as having a *moral claim* upon us. A distressed man has a moral claim to be relieved, in cases in which it is our duty to relieve him.

“89. The distinctions just explained are sometimes expressed by using the terms *perfect obligation* and *imperfect obligation*, for *obligation* and *duty* respectively: and the terms *perfect right* and *imperfect right* for *right* and *moral claim* respectively. But these phrases have the inconvenience of making it seem as if our duties arose from the

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rights of others; and as if duties were only legal obligations, with an inferior degree of binding force.”—Whewell, *Elements of Morality*, book i.—V. JURISPRUDENCE, RECTITUDE.

RULE.—“Rectitude is a *law*, as well as a *rule* to us; it not only *directs*, but *binds* all, as far as it is perceived.”—Price, *Rev. of Morals*, chap. 6.

A *rule* prescribes means to attain some end. But the end may not be one which all men are to aim at; and the *rule* may not be followed by all. A *law* enjoins something to be done, and is binding upon all to whom it is made known.

“A *rule*, in its proper signification, is an instrument, by means of which we draw the shortest line from one point to another, which for this very reason is called a straight line.

“In a figurative and moral sense, a *rule* imports nothing else but a principle or maxim, which furnishes man with a sure and concise method of attaining to the end he proposes.” Burlamaqui, *Principles of Nat. Law*, part 1, chap. 5.

SABAISM (from סבא, signifying a host, or from *tsaba*, in Syriac, to adore; or from *Saba* the son of Cush, and grandson of Seth)—means the worship of the stars, or host of heaven, which prevailed from an early period in the East, especially in Syria, Arabia, Chaldea, and Persia. The Sabæans are not mentioned by the Greek or Roman writers, and by the Arabian authors they are called Nabatheans, as if descendants from Nebaioth, son of Ishmael. Their doctrines are expounded by Moses Maimonides in the third part of his work, *De More Nevochim*. There was a popular and a philosophic creed with them. According to the former the stars were worshipped; and the sun, as supreme God, ruled over heaven and earth, and the other heavenly bodies were but the ministers of his will. According to the philosophic creed, the stars consisted of matter and mind. God is not

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the matter of the universe, but the spirit which animates it. But both are eternal, and will eternally exist, for the one cannot pass into, or absorb the other.

Pocock, *Specimen Hist. Arab.*, 4to, Oxf., 1649, p. 138.

Hyde, *Veterum Persarum Historia*, 8vo, Oxf., 1766.

Spencer, *De Legibus Hebræorum*, 2 vols., fol., Camb., 1727.

SAME, in its primary sense, denotes *identity*.—*q. v.*

In a secondary sense it denotes great *similarity*, and in popular usage admits of degrees, as when we speak of two things being *nearly the same*. To this ambiguity, Whately refers much of the error of *realism*; of Plato's theory of *ideas*; of the personification and deification in poetical, mythology, &c.—Whately, *Logic*, app. i.

SANCTION (*sancire*, to ratify or confirm).—"I shall declare the *sanction* of this law of nature, viz., those rewards which God hath ordained for the observation of it, and those punishments He hath appointed for its breach or transgression."—Tyrell, *On the Law of Nature*, p. 125.

The consequences which naturally attend virtue and vice are the *sanction* of duty, or of doing what is right, as they are intended to encourage us to the discharge of it, and to deter us from the breach or neglect of it. And these natural consequences of virtue and vice are also a declaration, on the part of God, that He is in favour of the one and against the other, and are intimations, that His love of the one and His hatred of the other may be more fully manifested hereafter. By Locke, Paley, and Bentham, the term *sanction*, or enforcement of obedience is applied to reward as well as to punishment. But Mr. Austin (*Province of Jurisprud. Determined*, p. 10) confines it to the latter, perhaps, because human laws only punish, and do not reward.

SAVAGE and BARBAROUS.—Ferguson (*Essay on Hist. of Civ. Soc.*, part 2, sect. 2) states that the history of mankind, in their rudest state, may be considered under two heads, viz., that of the *savage*, who is not yet acquainted with property, and that of the *barbarian*, to whom it is,

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although not ascertained by laws, a principal object of care and desire.

The distinction here made between the *savage* and the *barbarous* states of society, resolves itself into the absence or presence of political government; for without political government, property cannot exist. The distinction is an important one; and it would be convenient to apply the term *savage* to communities which are permanently in a state of anarchy, which ordinarily exist without government, and to apply the term *barbarous* to communities which, though in a rude state as regards the arts of life, are nevertheless subject to a government. In this sense, the N. American Indians would be in a *savage*, while the Arab tribes, and most of the Asiatic nations, would be in a *barbarous* state. Montesquieu's distinction between *savages* and *barbarians* (*Esprit des Lois*, xviii., 11), is different in form, but in substance it is founded on the same principle. Hugh Murray (*Enquiries respecting the Character of Nations, and the Progress of Society*, Edin., 1808) lays it down (p. 230) that the *savage* form of society is without government.

According to many ancient and modern philosophers, the *savage* state was the primitive state of the human race. But others, especially Bonald and De Maistre, have maintained that the nations now found in a *savage* state have accidentally degenerated from the primitive state, which was a state of knowledge and civilization.

SCEPTICISM (σκέπτειν, to look, to seek)—is used as synonymous with *doubt*.—*q. v.* But doubt may be removed by evidence, and give way to conviction or belief. The characteristic of *scepticism* is to come to no conclusion for or against—ἐποχῆ, holding off, and consequent tranquillity—ἀταραξία. Absolute objective certainty being unattainable, *scepticism* holds that in the contradictions of the reason, truth is as much on one side as on the other—ὄνδεν μαλλον. It was first taught by Pyrrho, who flourished in Greece about 340, B.C. Hence it is sometimes called

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Pyrrhonism. The word is generally used in a bad sense, as equivalent to infidelity or unbelief. But in the following passages it means, more correctly, the absence of determination.

“We shall not ourselves venture, to determine anything, in so great a point; but *sceptically* leave it undecided.”—Cudworth, *Intellect. Syst.*, p. 806.

“That all his arguments (Bp. Berkeley’s) are, in reality, merely *sceptical*, appears from this; that they admit of no answer and produce no conviction. Their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement, and irresolution, and confusion, which is the result of *scepticism*.”—Hume, *Essays*, note, p. 369, 4to edit.

Scepticism is opposed to dogmatism.—*q. v.*

“The writings of the best authors among the ancients being full and solid, tempt and carry me which way almost they will. He that I am reading seems always to have the most force; and I find that every one in turn has reason, though they contradict one another.”

This is said by Montaigne, book ii., chap. 12, in the true spirit of *scepticism*.

Lord Byron said,—

“I doubt if doubt itself be doubting.”

Glanvil (Joseph) has a work which he entitled, *Scepsis Scientifica, or the Folly of Dogmatizing*.

Stäudlin wrote the *History and Spirit of Scepticism*, 2 vols., Leipsic, 1794-5.

Sanchez (Fr.) or Sanctius wrote a *Tractatus de Multum nobili et prima universali scientia, quod nihil scitur*, 4to, Lyons, 1581. Crousaz has *Examen du Pyrrhonism Ancien et Moderne*.

SCHOLASTIC.—*Scholasticus*, as a Latin word, was first used by Petronius. Quintilian subsequently applied it to the rhetoricians in his day: and we read in Jerome, that Serapion, having acquired great fame, received as a title

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of honour the surname *Scolasticus*. When the schools of the Middle Ages were opened, it was applied to those charged with the education of youth.

“We see the original sense of the word *scholastic*,” says Dr. Hampden (*Bampton Lect.*, i., p. 7), “in the following passage:—*Omnes enim in scriptis suis causas tantum egerunt suas; et propriis magis laudibus quam aliorum utilitatibus consulentes, non id facere adnisi sunt ut salubres et salutiferi, sed ut scholastici ac disertissimi haberentur.*”—Salvianus, *De Gubernat. Dei, Præfat.*

Scholastic Philosophy.—This phrase denotes a period rather than a system of philosophy. It is the philosophy that was taught in the schools during the Middle Ages. The Middle Ages extend from the commencement of the ninth to the sixteenth century. What has been called the Classic Age of the *scholastic philosophy*, includes the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. It begins when the metaphysics of Aristotle were introduced into France by Latin translations, and terminates with the Council of Florence and the taking of Constantinople. The only philosophy that was taught during that period, was taught by the clergy; and was therefore very much mixed up with theology. The only way of teaching was by lectures or dictates; and hence the phrase, *legere in philosophia*. There was no one system uniformly taught; but different and conflicting opinions were held and promulgated by different doctors. The method was that of interpretation. Grammar was taught by prælections on *Donatus* and *Priscian*, and rhetoric, by prælections on some parts of *Cicero* or *Boethius*. But Logic shared most of their attention, and was taught by prælections on such of the works of Aristotle as were best known. The *Timæus* of Plato also occupied much of their attention; and they laboured to reconcile the doctrines of the one philosopher with those of the other.

Mr. Morell says (*Philosoph. of Religion*, p. 369), “It has been usual to divide the whole *scholastic* periods into three

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eras.*—1. That which was marked by the absolute subordination of philosophy to theology, that is, authority. 2. That which is marked by the friendly alliance of philosophy with dogmatic theology. 3. The commencement of a separation between the two, or the dawn of the entire independence of philosophy.

The first years of *scholastic philosophy* were marked by *authority*. In the ninth century, Joannes Scotus Erigena attempted to assert the claims of reason. Two hundred years after, the first era was brought to a close by Abelard. The second is marked by Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and Duns Scotus. Raymond Lully, Roger Bacon, followed by Occam and the Nominalists, represent the third and declining era.

The taking of Constantinople by the Turks, the invention of printing, and the progress of the Reformation, put an end to the *scholastic philosophy*. Philosophy was no longer confined to the schools and to prælections. The press became a most extensive lecturer, and many embraced the opportunities offered of extending knowledge.

In addition to general histories of philosophy, see

Rousselot, *Etudes sur la Philosophie dans le Moyen Age*, 3 tom., 8vo, Paris, 1840-2.

Haureau, *De la Philosophie Scholastique*, 2 tom., 8vo, Paris, 1850.

Cousin, *Fragmens Philosophiques*, tom. iii., Paris, 1840.

SCIENCE (*scientia*, ἴστω or εἶστω, an old verb, signifying to cleave)—means knowledge emphatically so called, that is, knowledge of principles and causes.

“*Science* (ἐπίστημη) has its name from bringing us (ἐπιστασίῳ) to some stop and boundary of things, taking us away from the unbounded nature and mutability of particulars; for it is conversant about subjects that are general and invariable.” This etymology given by Blemmides, and

* Tenneman makes four periods of *scholastic philosophy*, according to the prevalence of Realism or Nominalism.

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long before him adopted by the Peripatetics, came originally from Plato, as may be seen in his *Cratylus*.

“*Absolute science* as distinct from the sophists’ *accidental science*, is, according to the common conception, knowledge of the necessity and reason of a law. . . . It is certain there is such a thing as demonstrative knowledge: demonstration means scientific proof; and the possession of scientific proof is *science*.” *Poster. Analyt.*, lib. i., cap. 2. And in *Ethic.*, lib. vi., cap. 3, Aristotle says—“In matters of *opinion* we are liable to be deceived; not so in matters of *science*. The former relates to things variable in their nature, of whose very existence we may doubt, unless when they are actually perceived; the latter is conversant about things unalterable, necessary and eternal, incapable of being generated, exempt from corruption; the knowledge of which admits not of degrees between total ignorance and absolute certainty.”

“*Οτι scientiæ fundamentum est, διότι fastigium.*”—Trendelenburg, *Elementa Log. Arist.*, p. 76.

“Sir Will. Hamilton, in his *Lectures on Logic*, defined *science* as a ‘complement of cognitions, having in point of form the character of logical perfection, and in point of matter, the character of real truth.’”—Dove, *Political Science*, p. 76.

Science is knowledge certain and evident in itself, or by the principle from which it is deduced, or with which it is certainly connected. It is *subjective* as existing in a mind—*objective*, as embodied in truths—*speculative*, as resting in attainment of truths, as in physical *science*—*practical*, as leading to do something, as in ethical *science*.

Science, art, and empiricism, are defined by Sopater, *On Hermogenes*, apud Rhet. Gr., vol. v., pp. 3-5, ed. Walz, as follows:—

Science consists in an infallible and unchanging knowledge of phenomena.

Art is a system formed from observation and directed to a useful end.

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Empiricism is an unreasoning and instinctive imitation of previous practice.

Art is of three kinds—theoretic, practical, and mixed.

“No art, however, is purely theoretic or contemplative. The examples given are of *science*, not art. It is a part of grammatical *science* to say that all words with a certain termination have a certain accent. When this is converted into a rule, it becomes part of an art.”—Lewis, *On Methods of Observat. in Politics*, chap. 19, sect. 2.

“In *science*, *scimus ut sciamus*; in art, *scimus ut producamus*. And, therefore, *science* and art may be said to be investigations of truth:* but one, *science*, inquires for the sake of knowledge; the other, art, for the sake of production:† and hence *science* is more concerned with the higher truths, art with the lower: and *science* never is engaged as art is in productive application.‡ And the most perfect state of *science*, therefore, will be the most high and accurate inquiry; the perfection of art will be the most apt and efficient system of rules: Art always throwing itself into the form of rules.”§—Karslake, *Aids to Logic*, b. i., p. 24.—V.

ART, DEMONSTRATION.

SCIENTIA (Media).—“According to Molina, the objects of the divine knowledge are the *possible*, the *actual*, and the *conditional*. The knowledge of the *possible* is *simple intelligence*; of the *actual*, *scientia visionis*; and of the *conditional*, *scientia media*, intermediate between that of *intelligence* and *vision*. An example of *scientia media* is that of David asking the oracle if the inhabitants of the city of Keilah, in which he meant to take refuge, would deliver it up to Saul if he laid siege to it. The answer was in the affirmative, whereupon David took a different course.”—Leibnitz, *Sur la Bonté de Dieu*, partie 1, sect. 40.

In *La Cause de Dieu*, &c., sec. 17, Leibnitz has said,

* This is, speaking logically, “the Genus,” of the two.

† These are their *differentia*, or distinctive characteristics.

‡ These are their specific properties.

§ This distinction of Science and Art is given in Aristotle.—See *Poster. Analyt.*, i., 194, ii., 13.

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“*scientia media* might rather be understood to mean the science not only of future conditionals but universally of all future contingents. Then science of *simple intelligence* would be restricted to the knowledge of truths possible and necessary; *scientia visionis* to that of truths contingent and actual. *Scientia media* would thus have it in common with the first that it concerned truths *possible*; and with the second, that it applied to truths *contingent*.”

—See Reid, *Active Powers*, essay iv., chap. 11.

SCIOLIST (*sciolus*, one who thinks he knows much and knows but little).—“Some have the hap to be termed learned men, though they have gathered up but the scraps of knowledge here and there, though they be but smatterers and mere *sciolists*.”—Howell, *Letters*, b. 3, let. 8.

SCIOMACHY (*σκιὰ*, a shadow; and *μάχη*, a fight).—“But pray, countryman, to avoid this *sciomachy*, or imaginary combat with words, let me know, sir, what you mean by the name of tyrant.”—Cowley, *On the Government of Oliver Cromwell*.

SELFISHNESS—“consists not in the indulging of this or that particular propensity, but in disregarding for the sake of *any* kind of personal gratification or advantage, the rights or the feelings of other men. It is, therefore, a *negative* quality; that is, it consists in *not* considering what is due to one’s neighbours, through a deficiency of justice or benevolence. And *selfishness*, accordingly, will show itself in as many different shapes as there are different dispositions in men.

“You may see these differences even in very young children. One *selfish* child, who is greedy, will seek to keep all the cakes and sweetmeats to himself; another, who is idle, will not care what trouble he causes to others, so he can save his own; another, who is vain, will seek to obtain the credit which is due to others; one who is covetous, will seek to gain at another’s expense, &c. In short, each person ‘has a *self* of his own.’ And, consequently, though you may be of a character very unlike that of some *selfish* person, you may yet be, in your own way, quite as *selfish*

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as he. And it is possible to be *selfish* in the highest degree, without being at all too much actuated by self-love, but unduly neglectful of others when your own gratification, of whatever kind, is concerned.”—Whately, *Lessons on Morals*, p. 143.

SELF-LOVE—is sometimes used in a general sense to denote all those principles of our nature which prompt us to seek our own good, just as those principles which lead us to seek the good of others are all comprehended under the name of benevolence. All our desires tend towards the attainment of some good or the averting of some evil—having reference either to ourselves or others, and may therefore be brought under the two heads of benevolence and *self-love*.

But besides this general sense of the word to denote all those desires which have a regard to our own gratification or good, *self-love* is more strictly used to signify “the desire for our own welfare, as such.” In this sense, “it is quite distinct from all our other desires and propensities,” says Dr. Whately (*Lessons on Morals*, p. 142), “though it may often tend in the same direction with some of them. One person, for instance, may drink some water because he is *thirsty*; and another may, without thirst, drink—suppose from a mineral spring, because he believes it will be *good for his health*. This latter is impelled by *self-love*, but not the other.

“So again, one person may pursue some course of study, in order to qualify himself for some *profession* by which he may advance in life, and another, from having a *taste* for that study, and a desire for that branch of knowledge. This latter, though he may perhaps be, in fact, promoting his own welfare, is not acting from *self-love*. For as the object of thirst is not happiness, but drink, so the object of curiosity is not happiness, but knowledge. And so of the rest.”

Self-love may, like any other of our tendencies, be cherished and indulged to excess, or it may be ill-directed. But within due bounds it is allowable and right, and by no

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means incompatible with benevolence, or a desire to promote the happiness of others. And Dr. Hutcheson, who maintains that kind affection is what constitutes an agent virtuous, has said, that he who cherishes kind affection towards all, may also love himself; may love himself as a part of the whole system of rational and sentient beings; may promote his own happiness in preference to that of another who is not more deserving of his love; and may be innocently solicitous about himself, while he is wisely benevolent towards all.—*Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil*, sect. 3.

The error of Hobbes, and the school of philosophers who maintained that in doing good to others our ultimate aim is to do good to ourselves, lay in supposing that there is any antagonism between *benevolence* and *self-love*. So long as *self-love* does not degenerate into *selfishness*, it is quite compatible with true benevolence.

In opposition to the views of Hobbes and the selfish school of philosophers, see

Butler, *Sermons, On Hum. Nat., On Compassion, &c.*

Turnbull, *Nature and Origin of Laws*, vol. ii., p. 258.

Hume, *On General Principles of Morals*, sect. 2.

Hutcheson, *Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil*, sect. 2.

Hazlitt, *Essay on Principles of Hum. Action*, p. 239.

Mackintosh, *View of Ethical Philosophy*, p. 192.

SEMATOLOGY (*σημα*, a sign; and *λογος*, discourse)—the doctrine of *signs*.—*q. v.*

SENSATION.—"The earliest sign by which the Ego becomes perceptible is *corporeal sensation*.

"Without this general innate *sensation* we should not possess the certainty that our body is *our* body; for it is as much an *object* for the other senses as anything else that we can see, hear, taste, or feel. This original general innate *sensation* is necessary to the existence of all other particular sensations, and may exist independently of the nervous system. *Polypi*, animals of the simplest structure,

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without a nervous system distinct from the rest of the organic mass, show traces of innate *sensation*. The light by means of which we see, acts not only on the visual nerves, but also on the fluids of the eye, and the *sensations* of sight partly depend on the structure of the eye. *This sensibility*, therefore, appears to be a necessary attribute of animated organic matter itself.

“All the perceptions of sense are rooted in the general *sensation*. The child must be conscious of his senses before he applies them. This *sensation*, however, is very obscure; even pain is not clearly felt by it at the place where it exists. Equally obscure is the notion which it entertains of an object. Though Brach, therefore, is right in ascribing something objective, even to the general *sensation*, since conditions cannot communicate themselves, without communicating (though ever so obscurely) something of that which produces the condition—nay, strictly speaking, as even in the idea ‘subject,’ that of an ‘object’ is involved, yet it is advisable to abide by the distinction founded by Kant, according to which, by innate *sensation*, we *especially* perceive our own personality (subject), and by the senses we *specially* perceive objects, and thus in the ascending line, Feeling, Taste, Smell, Hearing, and Sight.

“The next step from this obscure original innate *sensation* is particular *sensation* through the medium of the nervous system, which, in its more profound, and yet more obscure sphere, produces common *sensation* (CÆNESTHESIS), and in a higher manifestation, the perceptions of the senses. *Cænesthesis*, or common feeling, is referred to the ganglionic nerves. It may be called subjective, inasmuch as the body itself gives the excitement to the nerve concerned.* By the Cænesthesis, states of our body are revealed to us which have their seat in the sphere of the vegetative life. These states are—

* However subjective this sensation is, there is always in it the indication of an object, as Brach shows; hence illustrating the instinct of animals. Presentiment, too, chiefly belongs to this system.

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“1. *General*:—corporeal heaviness and buoyancy, atony, toniety.

“2. *Special*:—hunger, thirst, sexual instinct, &c.

“The *sensations* of pain, titillation, itching, &c., which are generally cited here, belong, in their more common acceptation to the general corporeal feeling; in their more local limitation, with distinct perception of the object exciting, to the sense of Touch; but when they arise from the nervous system allotted to the vegetative sphere of the body, they certainly belong to the Cœnesthesis in the more limited sense of the word.

“To this class belongs especially the anxiety arising from impediment in respiration, and from nausea.

“In the analysis of the psycho-physical processes proceeding outwards from *sensation* to perception, we encounter after the organs of the Cœnesthesis, the organs of sense.”—Feuchtersleben, *Med. Psychology*, 1847, p. 83.

Sensation and Perception.—“A conscious presentation, if it refers exclusively to the subject, as a modification of our own being, is = *sensation*. The same if it refers to an object, is = *perception*.”—Coleridge, *Church and State*;—quoted by Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, p. 104.

Rousseau distinguished *sensations* as *affectives*, or giving pleasure or pain; and *representatives*, or giving knowledge of objects external.

Paffe (*Sur la Sensibilité*) distinguishes the element *affectif* and the element *instructif*.

In like manner Dr. Reid regards *sensation* not only as a state of feeling, but a *sign* of that which occasions it.

Bozelli (*De l'Union de la Philosoph. avec la Morale*) calls *sensations*, in so far as they are representative, in their *philosophical* form, in so far as they give pleasure or pain, in their *moral* form or character.

“To *sensation*, I owe all the certainty I have of my existence as a sentient being, to *perception*, a certainty not less absolute, that there are other beings besides me.”—Thurot, *De l'Entendement*, &c., tom. i., p. 43.

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Sensation properly expresses *that change in the state of the mind*, which is produced by an impression upon an organ of sense (of which change we can conceive the mind to be conscious, without any knowledge of external objects): *perception*, on the other hand, expresses the knowledge or the *intimations* we obtain, by means of our *sensations*, concerning the qualities of matter; and consequently involves, in every instance, the notion of *externality* or *outness*, which it is necessary to exclude in order to seize the precise import of the word *sensation*.

Sensation has been employed to denote—

1. The process of sensitive apprehension, both in its subjective and its objective relations; like the Greek *æsthesis*.

2. It was limited first in the Cartesian school, and thereafter in that of Reid to the subjective phasis of our sensitive cognitions.—Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note D.*

“*Sensation* proper, is not purely a passive state, but implies a certain amount of mental activity. It may be described, on the psychological side, as resulting directly from the attention which the mind gives to the affections of its own organism. This description may at first sight appear to be at variance with the facts of the case, inasmuch as every severe affection of the body produces pain, quite independently of any knowledge we may possess of the cause or of any operation of the will being directed towards it. Facts, however, rightly analyzed, show us, that if the attention of the mind be absorbed in other things, no impulse, though it amount to the laceration of the nerves, can produce in us the slightest feeling. Extreme enthusiasm, or powerful emotion of any kind, can make us altogether insensible even to physical injury. For this reason it is that the soldier on the field of battle is often wounded during the heat of the combat, without discovering it till exhausted by loss of blood. Numerous facts of a similar kind prove demonstrably, that a certain application and exercise of mind, on one side, is as necessary to

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the existence of *sensation*, as the occurrence of physical impulse, on the other.”—Morell, *Psychology*, p. 107.

Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, note F (it is G in last edit.)
See also

Stewart, *Outlines*, sect. 14.

Reid, *Essays, Intell. Powers*, essay i., chap. 1.

Morell, *Philosoph. of Religion*, p. 7.

SENSE, in psychology, is employed ambiguously—1. For the faculty of sensitive apprehension. 2. For its act. 3. For its organ.

Sense and Idea.—In the following passage from Shaftesbury (*Moralists*, part 3, sect. 2), *sense* is used as equivalent to *idea*. “Nothing surely is more strongly imprinted on our minds, or more closely interwoven with our souls than the *idea* or *sense* of order and proportion.

In like manner Dr. Hutcheson has said, “There is a natural and immediate *determination* to approve certain affections and actions consequent upon them; or a natural *sense* of immediate excellence in them, not referred to any other quality perceivable by our *senses* or by reasoning.” We speak of a *determination* of blood to the head. This is a *physical* determination or tendency. Now, there may be a mental tendency, and this, in Dr. Hutcheson’s philosophy, is called *determination* or *sense*. He defined a *sense* in this application of it ‘a determination to receive *ideas*, independent of our will,’ and he enumerates several such tendencies or determinations which he calls *reflex senses*.

SENSES (REFLEX).—Dr. Hutcheson seems to have been in some measure sensible of the inadequacy of Mr. Locke’s account of the origin of our ideas, and maintained, that in addition to those which we have by means of sensation and reflection, we also acquire ideas by means of certain powers of perception, which he called internal and *reflex senses*. According to his psychology, our powers of perception may be called *direct* or *antecedent*, and *consequent* or *reflex*. We hear a sound, or see colour, by means of senses which

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operate directly on their objects ; and do not suppose any antecedent perception. But we perceive the harmony of sound, and the beauty of colour, by means of faculties which operate reflexly, or in consequence of some preceding perception. And the moral sense was regarded by him as a faculty of this kind. Reflection, from which, according to Mr. Locke, we derive the simple ideas of the passions and affections of mind, was considered by Hutcheson, as an *internal* sense or faculty, operating *directly*. But that faculty by which we perceive the beauty or deformity, the virtue or vice, of these passions and affections, was called by Hutcheson, a *reflex, internal* sense.—*Illustrations of the Moral Sense*, sect. 1 ; *Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil*, sect. 1 ; *Mor. Phil.*, book i., chap. 4, sect. 4, and also sect. 5.

SENSIBILITY or **SENSITIVITY** (το αἰσθητικόν)—is now used as a general term to denote the capacity of feeling, as distinguished from intellect and will. It includes sensations both external and internal, whether derived from contemplating outward and material objects, or relations and ideas, desires, affections, passions. It also includes the sentiments of the sublime and beautiful, the moral sentiment and the religious sentiment ; and in short, every modification of feeling of which we are susceptible. By the ancient philosophers the *sensibility* under the name of appetite was confounded with the will. The Scotch philosophers have analyzed the various forms of the *sensibility* under the name of active principles : but they have not gathered them under one head, and have sometimes treated of them in connection with things very different.

SENSIBLES, COMMON and **PROPER** (*sensile* or *sensibile*, that which is capable of affecting some sense ; that which is the object of sense).

Aristotle distinguished *sensibles*, into *common* and *proper* (*De Anima*, lib. ii., c. 2 ; lib. iii., c. 1. *De Sensu et Sensibili*, c. 1). The *common*, those perceived by all or by a plurality of senses, were magnitude, figure, motion, rest,

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number. To these five, some of the schoolmen (but out of Aristotle) added place, distance, position, and continuity.—Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 124, note. Aristotle admitted, however (*De Anima*, lib. iii., chaps. 1, 4), that the *common sensibles* are not properly objects of sense; but merely con-comitants or con-sequents of the perception of the *proper sensibles*. This is noticed by Hutcheson (*Mor. Philosoph.*, book i., chap. 1), commended by Price (*Review*, p. 56, first edit.), by Mr. Stewart (*Philosoph. Essays*, pp. 31, 46, 551, 4to), and by Royer Collard (*Œuvres de Reid*, tom. iii., p. 431).

“*Sensibile commune* dicitur quod vel percipitur pluribus sensibus, vel ad quod cognoscendum, ab intellectu vel imaginatione desumitur *occasio*, ex variis sensibus; ut sunt figura, motus, ubicatio, duratio, magnitudo, distantia, numerus, &c.”—Compton Carleton, *Philosoph. Univ. De Anima*, diss. 16, lect. ii., sect. 1.

The *proper sensibles* are those objects of sense which are peculiar to one sense; as colour to the eye, sound to the ear, taste to the palate, and touch to the body.

SENSISM, SENSUALISM, or SENSUISM—is the doctrine that all our knowledge is derived originally from sense.

It is not the same as *empiricism*, though sometimes confounded with it. *Empiricism* rests exclusively on experience, and rejects all ideas which are *à priori*. But all experience is not that of sense. *Empiricism* admits facts and nothing but facts, but all facts which have been observed. *Sensism* gives the single fact of sensation as sufficient to explain all mental phenomena. Locke is *empirical*, Condillac is *sensual*.

Sensuism, “in the emphatic language of Fichte, is called ‘the dirt-philosophy.’”—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Discussions*, p. 38, see also p. 2.—V. EMPIRICISM, IDEOLOGY.

SENSORIUM (*ἀισθητήριον*)—is the organ by which, or place in which, the sensations of the several senses are reduced to the unity of consciousness. According to Aristotle it was in all warm blooded animals the heart, and therefore so

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in man. According to modern philosophers the central organ is the brain, the pineal gland according to Descartes, the ventricles, or the *corpus callosum* according to others.

Sensorium signifies not so properly the *organ* as the *place* of sensation. The eye, the ear, &c., are organs; but they are not *sensoria*. Sir Isaac Newton does not say that space is a *sensorium*; but that it is (by way of comparison), so to say, the *sensorium*, &c.—Clarke, *Second Reply to Leibnitz*.

Leibnitz adopted and defended (*Answer to the Second Reply of Clarke*) the explanation of Rudolphus Goclenius, who, in his *Lexicon Philosophicum*, under *Sensitorium*, says, “Barbarum scholasticorum, qui interdum sunt Simiæ Græcorum. Hi dicunt Ἀίσθητηριον. Ex quo illi fecerunt *sensorium* pro *sensorio*, id est, organum sensationis.”

SENSUS COMMUNIS (κοινὴ αἴσθησις).—This latter phrase was employed by Aristotle and the Peripatetics “to denote the faculty in which the various reports of the several senses are reduced to the unity of a common apperception.”—Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 756, note.

This faculty had an organ which was called *Sensorium Commune*.—*q. v.*

Mr. Stewart (note D, to part 2 of *Philosoph. of Hum. Mind*) says:—The *sensus communis* of the schoolmen denotes the power whereby the mind is enabled to *represent* to itself any absent object of perception, or any sensation which it has formerly experienced. Its *seat* was supposed to be that part of the brain (hence called the *sensorium*, or *sensorium commune*) where the nerves from all the organs of perception terminate. Of the peculiar function allotted to it in the scale of our intellectual faculties, the following account is given by Hobbes:—“Some say the senses receive the species of things and deliver them to the common sense; and the common sense delivers them over to the fancy; and the fancy to the memory; and the memory to the judgment—like handing of things from one to another, with many words making nothing understood.”—*Of Man*, part 1, chap. 2.

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Mr. Stewart says the *sensus communis* is perfectly synonymous with the word conception, as defined in the first vol. of his work, that is, the power by which we represent an object of sense, whether present or absent. But it is doubtful whether *sensus communis* was applied by the schoolmen to the re-production of absent objects of sense.

SENTIMENT implies an idea (or judgment), because the will is not moved nor the sensibility affected without knowing. But an idea or judgment does not infer feeling or *sentiment*. —Buffier, *Log.* ii., art. 9.

“The word *sentiment*, in the English language, never, as I conceive, signifies mere feeling, but *judgment accompanied with feeling*.* It was wont to signify opinion or judgment of any kind, but, of late, is appropriated to signify an opinion or judgment, that strikes, and produces some agreeable or uneasy emotion. So we speak of *sentiments* of respect, of esteem, of gratitude; but I never heard the pain of the gout, or any other severe feeling, called a sentiment.” —Reid, *Act. Powers*, essay v., chap. 7.

“Mr. Hume sometimes employs (after the manner of the French metaphysicians) *sentiment* as synonymous with *feeling*; a use of the word quite unprecedented in our tongue.” —Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, last ed., note E.

“There are two sensibilities — the one turned towards nature and transmitting the impressions received from it, the other hid in the depths of our organization and receiving the impression of all that passes in the soul. Have we discovered truth—we experience a *sentiment*. Have we done a good deed—we experience a *sentiment*. A *sentiment* is but the echo of reason, but is sometimes better heard than reason itself. *Sentiment*, which accompanies the intelligence in all its movements, has, like the intelligence, a spontaneous and a reflective movement. By itself it is a source of emotion, not of knowledge. Knowledge or judgment is invari-

* “This is too unqualified an assertion. The term *sentiment* is in English applied to the *higher feelings*.”—Sir William Hamilton.

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able, whatever be our health or spirits. *Sentiment* varies with health and spirits. I always judge the Apollo Belvidere to be beautiful, but I do not always feel the *sentiment* of his beauty. A bright or gloomy day, sadness or serenity of mind, affect my *sentiments*, but not my judgment.

“Mysticism would suppress reason and expand *sentiment*.”—See Cousin, *Œuvres*, tom. ii., p. 96.

Those pleasures and pains which spring up in connection with a modification of our organism or the perceptions of the senses, are called *sensations*. But the state of our mind, the exercise of thought, conceptions purely intellectual, are the occasion to us of high enjoyment or lively suffering; for these pleasures and pains of a different kind is reserved the name of *sentiments*.—*Manuel de Philosophie*, 8vo, Paris, 1846, p. 142.

“The word *sentiment*, agreeably to the use made of it by our best English writers, expresses, in my opinion, very happily those complex determinations of the mind which result from the co-operation of our rational powers and our moral feelings. We do not speak of a man’s *sentiments* concerning a mechanical contrivance, or a physical hypothesis, or concerning any speculative question whatever, by which the feelings are not liable to be roused or the heart affected.

“This account of the meaning of the word corresponds, I think, exactly with the use made of it by Mr. Smith in the title of his *Theory (of Moral Sentiments)*.”—Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, note D.

Sentiment and Opinion.—Dr. Beattie (*Essay on Truth*, pt. 2, chap. i., sec. 1) has said, “that the true and the old English sense of the word *sentiment*, is a formed *opinion*, notion or principle.” Dr. Reid, in his *Essays on the Intell. Powers*, speaks of the *sentiments* of Mr. Locke concerning perception; and of the *sentiments* of Arnauld, Berkeley, and Hume concerning ideas.

The title of chap. 7, essay ii., of Reid on *Intell. Powers*, is *Sentiments of Philosophers, &c.*, on which Sir W. Hamilton’s note, p. 269, is, “*Sentiment*, as here and elsewhere employed

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by Reid, in the meaning of *opinion* (*sententia*), is not to be imitated.”

“By means of our sensations we feel, by means of our ideas we think: now a *sentiment* (from *sentire*) is properly a judgment concerning sensations, and an *opinion* (from *opinari*) is a judgment concerning ideas: our *sentiments* appreciate external, and our *opinions* internal, phenomena. On questions of feeling, taste, observation, or report, we define our *sentiments*. On questions of science, argument, or metaphysical abstraction, we define our *opinions*. The *sentiments* of the heart. The *opinions* of the mind. It is my *sentiment* that the wine of Burgundy is the best in the world. It is my *opinion* that the religion of Jesus Christ is the best in the world. There is more of instinct in *sentiment*, and more of definition in *opinion*. The admiration of a work of art which results from first impressions, is classed with our *sentiments*; and when we have accounted to ourselves for the approbation, it is classed with our *opinions*.”—Taylor, *Synonyms*.

SIGN (*signare*, to mark).—The definition of a sign is “that which represents anything to the cognitive faculty.” We have knowledge by sense and by intellect, and a *sign* may be addressed to either or to both—as smoke, which to the eye and to the intellect indicates or signifies fire, so that a *sign* has a twofold relation—to the thing signified and to the cognitive faculty.

“*Signs* are either to represent or resemble things, or only to intimate and suggest them to the mind. And our ideas being the *signs* of what is intended or supposed therein, are in such sort and so far right, as they do either represent or resemble the object of thought, or as they do at least intimate it to the mind, by virtue of some natural connection or proper appointment.”—Oldfield, *Essay on Reason*, p. 184.

Signs are divided into *natural* and *conventional*. A *natural sign* has the power of signifying from its own nature, so that at all times, in all places, and with all people it signifies the same thing, as smoke is the sign of fire. A

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conventional sign has not the power of signifying in its own nature, but supposes the knowledge and remembrance of what is signified in him to whom it is addressed, as three balls are the conventionally understood *sign* of a pawn-broker's shop.

In his philosophy Dr. Reid makes great use of the doctrine of *natural signs*. He arranges them in three classes,—

1. Those whose connection with the thing signified is established by nature, but discovered only by experience, as natural *causes* are *signs* of their *effects*; and hence philosophy is called an interpretation of nature.
2. Those wherein the connection between the *sign* and thing signified is not only established by nature, but discovered to us by a natural principle without reasoning or experience. Of this class are the *natural signs* of human thoughts, purposes, and desires, such as modulations of the voice, gestures of the body, and features of the face, which may be called natural language, in opposition to that which is spoken or written.
3. A third class of *natural signs* comprehends those which, though we never before had any notion or conception of the thing signified, do suggest it and at once give us a conception and create a belief of it. In this way consciousness, in all its modifications, gives the conception and belief of a being who thinks—*Cogito ergo sum*.

“As the first class of *natural signs* is the foundation of true philosophy, so the second is the foundation of the fine arts or of taste, and the last is the foundation of common sense.”—Reid, *Inquiry*, chap. 5, sec. 3.

The doctrine or science of *signs* has been called *Sematology*. And as the *signs* which the mind makes use of in order to obtain and to communicate knowledge are words: the proper and skilful use of words is in different ways the object of—1. *Grammar*; 2. *Logic*; and 3. *Rhetoric*.—Smart, *Sematology*, 8vo, Lond., 1839.

See Berkeley, *Minute Phil.*, dial. iv., sect. 7, 11, 12. *New Theory of Vision*, sect. 144, 147. *Theory of Vision Vindicated*, sect. 38-43.

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Hutcheson, *Synopsis Metaphys.*, part 2, chap. 1. *Mor. Philosoph.*, b. i., ch. 1, p. 5.

De Gerando, *Des Signes et de l'Art de Penser*.

Adam Smith, *On the Formation of Language*.

SINGULAR TERM (A) is one which stands for one individual, as James, John.

SOCIALISM.—In the various forms under which society has existed, private property, individual industry and enterprise, and the rights of marriage and of the family, have been recognized. Of late years several schemes of social arrangement have been proposed, in which one or all of these principles have been abandoned or modified. These schemes may be comprehended under the general term of *socialism*. The motto of them all is *solidarité*.

Communism demands a community of goods or property. *Fourierism* or *Phalansterism* would deliver men over to the guidance of their passions and instincts, and destroy all domestic and moral discipline. *Saint Simonism* or *Humanitarianism* holds that human nature has three great functions, that of the priesthood, science, and industry. Each of these is represented in a College, above which is the father or head, spiritual and temporal, whose will is the supreme and living law of the society. Its religion is pantheism, its morality materialism or epicurism, and its politics despotism.—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

SOCIETY (Desire of).—"God having designed man for a sociable creature, made him not only with an inclination, and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind, but furnished him also with language, which was to be the great instrument and common tie of *society*."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iii., chap. 1.

That the *desire of society* is natural to man, is argued by Plato in the Second Book of his *Republic*. It is also hinted at in his dialogue entitled *Protagoras*. The argument is unfolded by Harris in his *Dialogue concerning Happiness*, sect. 12. Aristotle has said at the beginning of his

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Politics,—"The tendency to the social state is in all men by nature." The argument in favour of *society* from our being possessed of speech, is insisted on by him, *Politic.*, lib. i., cap. 2. Also by Cicero, *De Legibus*, lib. i., cap. 9; *De Officiis*, lib. i., cap. 16; *De Nat. Deorum*, lib. ii., cap. 59.

In modern times, Hobbes argued that man is naturally an enemy to his fellow-men, and that *society* is a device to defend men from the evils which they would bring on one another. Hutcheson wrote his inaugural oration when admitted Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow, in opposition to Hobbes, *De Naturali Hominum Socialitate*, 4to, Glasg., Typis Academ., 1730.

Man is a *social animal*, according to Seneca (*De Clem.*, i., 3). Lactantius says that he is a social animal by nature (*Div. Inst.*, vi., 10), in which he follows Cicero (*De Offic.*, i., 14). "Mankind have always wandered or settled, agreed or quarrelled, in troops and companies.—Ferguson, *Essay on Hist. of Civ. Soc.*, p. 26. See also Lord Kames, *Hist. of Man*, book ii., sketch 1; Filangieri, *Scienza della Legislazione*, lib. i., c. 1. "La nature de l'homme le porte a vivre en société. Quelle qu'on soit la cause, le fait se manifeste en toute occasion. Partout ou l'on a rencontré des hommes, ils vivaient en troupes, en herdes, en corps de nation. Peut-etre est ce afin d'unir leur forces pour leur surete commune; peut-etre afin de pourvoir plus aisément a leur besoins; toujours il est vrai qu'il est dans la nature de l'homme de se reunir en société, comme font les abeilles et plusieurs especès d'animaux; on remarque des traits communs dans toutes ces reunions d'hommes, en quelque parti du monde qu'ils habitent."—Say, *Cours d'Econ. Polit.*, tom. vi. Compare Comte, *ibid*, tom. iv., p. 54.

This *gregarious propensity* is different from the *political capacity*, which has been laid down as the characteristic of man.

Society (Political, Capacity of).—Command and obedience, which are essential to government, are peculiar to man-

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kind. Man is singular in commanding not only the inferior animals, but his own species. Hence men alone form a *political community*. It has been laid down by Aristotle and others, that this difference is owing to the exclusive possession of reason and speech by man, and to his power of discriminating between justice and injustice (*Polit.*, i., 2). Animals, says Cicero, are unfitted for *political society*, as being “rationis et orationis expertes.” *De Offic.*, i., 16. Separat hæc nos a grege mutorum. *Juvenal*, xv., 142-158.

SOMATOLOGY.—V. NATURE.

SOPHISM, SOPHISTER, SOPHISTICAL (Σοφίσμα, from σοφία, wisdom).—“They were called *sophisters*, as who would say, Counterfeit wise men.”—North, *Plutarch*, p. 96.

“For lyke wyse as though a *Sophyster* woulde with a fonde argumente, prove unto a symple soule, that two egges were three, because that ther is one, and that ther be twayne, and one and twayne make three; yt symple unlearned man, though he lacke learnyng to soyle hys fonde argument, hath yet wit ynough to laugh thereat, and to eat the two egges himself, and byd the *Sophyster* tak and eat the thyrd.”—Sir T. More, *Works*, p. 475.

“*Sophism* is a false argument. This word is not usually applied to *mere errors* in reasoning; but only to those erroneous reasonings of the fallacy of which the person who maintained them is, in some degree, conscious; and which he endeavours to conceal from examination by subtilty and by some ambiguity, or other unfairness in the use of words.”—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

According to Aristotle, the *sophism* is a *sylogismus contentiosus*, a syllogism framed not for enouncing or proving the truth, but for disputation. It is constructed so as to seem to warrant the conclusion but does not, and is faulty either in form or argument.—Trendlenburg, *Lineamenta Log. Aristot.*, sect. 33, 8vo, Berol., 1842.

See Reid, *Account of Aristotle's Log.*, chap. v., sect. 3.

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On the difference of meaning between φιλοσοφος and σοφιστης, see Sheppard, *Characters of Theophrastus*, 8vo, Lond., 1852, p. 81, and p. 269. See also Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, vol. viii., pp. 434-486, and the *Cambridge Journal of Philosophy*, No. 2.

SORITIES (from σωρός, a heap)—is an argument composed of an indeterminate number of propositions, so arranged that the predicate of the first becomes the subject of the second, the predicate of the second the subject of the third, and so on till you come to a conclusion which unites the subject of the first with the predicate of the last.

SOUL (ψυχή, anima, soul).

This word had formerly a wider signification than now. In the Second Book of his Treatise Περὶ ψυχης, Aristotle has given two definitions of it. In the first of these he calls it "the Entelechy or first form of an organized body which has potential life." The word Ἐντελεχεια, which Dr. Reid begged to be excused from translating, because he did not know the meaning of it, is compounded of ἔντελες, perfect; ἔχειν, to have; and τέλος, an end. Its use was revived by Leibnitz, who designated by it that which possesses in itself the principle of its own activity, and tends towards its end. According to his philosophy, the universe is made up of monads or forces, each active in itself, and tending by its activity to accomplish its proper end. In the philosophy of Aristotle, the word Entelechy or first form had a similar meaning, and denoted that which in virtue of an end constituted the essence of things, and gave movement to matter. When the *soul* then is called the entelechy of an organized body having potential life, the meaning is, that it is that force or power by which life develops itself in bodies destined to receive it.

Aristotle distinguished several forms of *soul*, viz., the *nutritive* or vegetative soul, by which plants and animals had growth and reproduction. The *sensitive*, which was the cause of sensation and feeling. The *motive*, of locomotion. The *appetitive*, which was the source of desire and will; and the

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rational or *reasonable*, which was the seat of reason or intellect. These powers or energies of *soul* exist all in some beings; some of them only in other beings; and in some beings only one of them. That is to say, man possesses all; brutes possess some; plants one only. In the scholastic philosophy, desire and locomotion were not regarded as simple powers or energies—and only the *nutritive* or *vegetative soul*, the *sensitive* or *animal*, and the *rational* or *human* were recognized.

In the system of Plato, three forms or energies of *soul* were assigned to man. The *rational*, which had its seat in the head and survived the dissolution of the body—the *irascible*, which had its seat in the heart and was the spring of activity and movement, and the *appetitive* or *concupiscible*, which was the source of the grosser passions and physical instincts, and which died with the bodily organs with which it was united. A similar distinction between the forms or energies of the *soul* has been ascribed to Pythagoras, and traces of it are to be found in several of the philosophical systems of the East.

Among modern philosophers in Germany, a distinction is taken between $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ (Seele) and $\pi\nu\epsilon\tilde{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$ (Geist), or *soul* and *spirit*. According to G. H. Schubert, professor at Munich, and a follower of Schelling, the *soul* is the inferior part of our intellectual nature—that which shows itself in the phenomena of dreaming and which is connected with the state of the brain. The *spirit* is that part of our nature which tends to the purely rational, the lofty, and divine. The doctrine of the *natural* and the *spiritual* man, which we find in the writings of St. Paul, may, it has been thought, have formed the basis upon which this mental dualism has been founded. Indeed it has been maintained that the dualism of the thinking principle is distinctly indicated by the apostle when he says of the Word of God that it is able to “divide asunder *soul* and *spirit*.” The words in the original are $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ and $\pi\nu\epsilon\tilde{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$, and it is contended that by the former is meant

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the *sentient* or *animal soul*, and by the latter the higher or *rational soul*. A similar distinction has been traced in the language of the Old Testament Scriptures, where one word is employed to denote the life that is common to man with the inferior animals, נִשְׁמָה, and another word, רוּחַ, to denote that inspiration of the Almighty which giveth him understanding, and makes of him a *rational soul*. It may be doubted, however, whether this distinction is uniformly observed, either in the Scriptures of the Old or of the New Testament. And it may be better for us instead of attempting to define the soul *à priori* by its essence, to define it rather *à posteriori* by its operations. This also has been done by Aristotle, in a definition which has been generally adopted. He says, “The *soul* is that by which we live, feel, or perceive [will], move, and understand.” This is a full enumeration of all the energies which Aristotle assigned to the *soul*, and they are all manifested by the soul as it exists in man. Two of them, however, the energies of growth and motion, are usually treated of by the physiologist, rather than by the psychologist. At the same time, life and movement are not properties of matter; and therefore they were enumerated by Aristotle as the properties of *soul*—the *soul nutritive*, τὸ θρεπτικόν, and the *soul motive*, τὸ κινεῖν or τὸ κινητικόν. “The animating form of a natural body is neither its organization, nor its figure, nor any other of those inferior forms which make up the system of its visible qualities; but it is the power which, not being that organization, nor that figure nor those qualities, is yet able to produce, to preserve, and to employ them.”—Harris, *Philosoph. Arrange.*, p. 279. This is what is now called the principle of life, and the consideration of it belongs to the physiologist—for, although in the human being life and soul are united, it is thought they may still be separate entities. In like manner some philosophers have contended that all movement implies the existence of a *soul*, and hence it is that the various phenomena of nature have been referred to an *anima mundi*,

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or *soul* of the universe. A modern philosopher of great name (Jouffroy, in his *Cours Professé a la Faculté des Lettres* in 1837), enumerated among the energies of the human *soul* a special faculty of locomotion, and the power of originating movement or change is ascribed to it when we call it active. Still, life and locomotion are not usually treated of as belonging to the *soul*, but rather as belonging to the bodies in which they are manifested. Hence it is that Dr. Reid, in his definition of the human *soul*, does not enumerate the special energies by which we live and move, but calls it that by which we think. "By the mind of a man," says he (*Intell. Powers*, essay i., chap. 1), "we understand that in him which thinks, remembers, reasons, wills. . . . We are conscious that we think, and that we have a variety of thoughts of different kinds—such as seeing, hearing, remembering, deliberating, resolving, loving, hating, and many other kinds of thought—all which we are taught by nature to attribute to one internal principle; and *this principle of thought we call the mind or soul of man.*"* It will be observed that Dr. Reid uses the word *soul* as synonymous with *mind*. And, perhaps, no very clear nor important distinction can be taken between them. The plainest and most common distinction taken in the use of these words is, that in speaking of the *mind* of man we refer more to the various powers which it possesses, or the various operations which it performs; and in speaking of the *soul* of man we refer rather to the nature and destiny of the human being. Thus we say the *immortality* of the *soul*,

* Dr. Reid's is the psychological definition. But the *soul* is something different from the *ego*,—from any of its faculties, and from the sum of them all. Some have placed its essence in thought, as the Cartesians—in sensation, as Locke and Condillac—or in the will or activity, like Maine de Biran. A cause distinguished from its acts, distinguished from its modes or different degrees of activity, is what we call a force. The soul then is a force, one and identical. It is, as defined by Plato (*De Leg.*, lib. 10), a self-moving force. Understanding this to mean bodily or local motion, Aristotle has argued against this definition.—*De Anima*, lib. i., cap. 3. But Plato, probably, meant self-active to be the epithet characteristic of the mind or *soul*.—*κίνησις ἑαυτὴν κινουσα.*

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and the *powers* of the *mind*.* A difference of meaning is more observable in our language between the terms *spirit* and *mind* than between *soul* and *mind*. Both the latter terms may be and are applied indifferently to the mental principle as living and moving in connection with a bodily organism. But the term *spirit* properly denotes a being without a body. A being that never had a body is a *pure spirit*. A human soul when it has left the body is a *disembodied spirit*. Body is animated matter. *Mind* or *soul* is incorporated *spirit*.

Into these verbal criticisms, however, it is not necessary to enter very minutely, because in psychological inquiries the term *mind* is commonly employed to denote that by which we feel, know, will, and reason—or in one word the principle of thought. We know this inward principle as manifested through a system of bodily organization with which it is united, and by which it is in many ways affected. But “we are taught by nature,” says Dr. Reid, or it is a primitive belief, that the thinking principle is something different from the bodily organism, and when we wish to signalize its peculiar nature and destiny, we call it *soul* or *spirit*.

Spirit, Mind, and Soul.—“The *first* denoting the animating faculty, the breath of intelligence, the inspiring principle, the spring of energy and the prompter of exertion; the *second* is the recording power, the preserver of impressions, the storer of deductions, the nurse of knowledge, and the parent of thought; the *last* is the disembodied, ethereal, self-conscious being, concentrating in itself all the purest and most refined of human excellences, every generous affection, every benevolent disposition, every intellectual attainment, every ennobling virtue, and every

* Mind and the Latin *mens* were probably both from a root which is now lost in Europe, but is preserved in the Sanscrit *mena*, to know. The Greek *νοος* or *νους*, from the verb *νοειν*, is of similar origin and import. *Mind* is more limited than *soul*. *Soul*, besides the rational principle, includes the living principle, and may be applied to animals and vegetables. Voluntary motion should not be denied to *mind*, as is very generally done.

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exalting aspiration.”—*The Purpose of Existence*, 12mo, 1850, p. 79.

“*Animus, Anima, πνευμα* and *ψυχή* are participles. *Anima* est ab *Animus*. *Animus* vero est a Græco *Ανεμος*, quod dici volunt quasi *Αεμος*, ab *Αω* sive *Αεμι*, quod est *πνεω*; et Latinis a *Spirando*, *Spiritus*. Immo et *ψυχή* est *ψυχω* quod *Hesychius* exponit *πνεω*.”—*Vossius*—quoted from *Horne Tooke* in *Stewart's Philosoph. Essays*—essay v.

Indulsit mundi communis conditor illis

Tantum *animas*; nobis *Animum* quoque.—*Juv. Sat.*, 9, v. 134.

Anima, which is common to man and brutes, is that by which we live, move, and are invigorated; whilst *Animus* is that which is peculiar to mankind, and by which we reason.

The triple division of man into *νους, ψυχή, σωμα*, occurs frequently in ancient authors. *Plato, Timæus*, *Aristotle, Pol.* 1. The Hellenist Jews seemed to have used the term *πνευμα* to denote what the Greeks called *νους*, with an allusion to *Gen. ii. 7*. *Josephus' Ant. Jud.*, i., c. 2. Thence in the New Test. we have 1 *Thess. v. 23, πνευμα, ψυχή, σωμα*.—*Heb. iv. 12*, and *Grotius' Note on Matthew*, xxvi. 41.—*Fitzgerald's Notes on Aristotle's Ethics*, p. 197.

Ψυχή, soul, when considered separately, signifies the principle of life; *Νους*, mind, the principle of intelligence. Or, according to *Plutarch*, *soul* is the cause and beginning of motion, and *mind* of order and harmony with respect to motion. Together they signify an intelligent soul (*εννους ψυχή*) which is sometimes called a rational soul (*ψυχή λογικη*). Hence, when the nature of the soul is not in question, the word *ψυχή* is used to express both. Thus in the *Phædo* the soul (*ψυχή*) is said sometimes to use the body for the examination of things; at which times, according to *Plato*, it forms confused and imperfect notions of things, and is involved in error. But, when it examines things by itself, it arrives at what is pure and always existing, and immortal, and uniform, and is free from error. Here the highest operations of *νους* “mind” are indisputably attri-

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buted to ψυχή, "soul." Aristotle describing ψυχή (*De Anima*, lib. i., cap. 1), says that during anger, confidence, desire, &c., it participates with the body; but that the act of understanding belongs peculiarly to itself.—Morgan, *On Trinity of Plato*, p. 54.

SOUL OF THE WORLD.—ANIMA MUNDI, q. v.

SPACE (*Spatium*).—"Space, taken in the most general sense, comprehends whatever is extended, and may be measured by the three dimensions, *length*, *breadth*, and *depth*. In this sense it is the same with *extension*. Now, *space*, in this large signification, is either occupied by *body*, or it is not. If it be not, but is void of all matter, and contains nothing, then it is *space* in the strictest signification of the word, and as it is commonly used in English philosophical language, being the same with what is called a *vacuum*."—Monboddo, *Ancient Met.*, b. iv., ch. 2.

Mr. Locke has attempted to show that we acquire the idea of *space* by sensation, especially by the senses of touch and sight—book ii., ch. 4. But according to Dr. Reid, "*space* is not so properly an object of sense as a *necessary* concomitant of the objects of sight and touch."—*Intell. Powers*, essay ii., ch. 19. It is when we see or touch body that we get the idea of *space*; but the idea is not furnished by sense—it is a conception, *à priori*, of the reason. Experience furnishes the occasion, but the mind rises to the conception by its native energy. This view has been supported by Cousin, *Cours d'Histoire de la Philosophie au xviii.*, Sicele, 2 tom., 17 leçon; and by Royer Collard, in Jouffroy's *Œuvres du Reid*, tom. iii., fragmen 4, p. 424; tom. iv., fragmen 9, p. 338.

"In the philosophy of Kant *space* and time are mere forms of the sensibility. By means of the external sense we represent to ourselves everything as in *space*; and by the internal sense all is represented in the relationship of time."—Analysis of Kant's *Critic. of Pure Reason*, 8vo, Lond., 1844, p. 9.

According to Kant, *space* is a subjective condition of the

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sensibility, the form of all external phenomena; and as the sensibility is necessarily anterior in the subject to all real intuition, it follows that the form of all these phenomena is in the mind *à priori*. There can, then, be no question about *space* or extension but in a human or subjective point of view. It may well be said of all things, in so far as they appear existing without us, that they are enclosed in *space*; but not that *space* encloses things absolutely, seen or not seen, and by any subject whatsoever. The idea of *space* has no objective validity, it is real only relatively to phenomena, to things, in so far as they appear out of us; it is purely ideal in so far as things are taken in themselves, and considered independently of the forms of the sensibility.—Willm, *Hist. de la Philosoph. Allemande*, tom. i., p. 142.

“According to Leibnitz, *space* is nothing but the order of things co-existing, as time is the order of things successive—and he maintained, ‘that, supposing the whole system of the visible world to be moved out of the place which it presently occupies, into some other portion of *space*, beyond the limits of this universe, still it would be in the same *space*, provided the order and arrangement of the bodies, with respect to one another, was continued the same.’ Now, it is true, that bodies placed in any kind of order, must necessarily be in *space*; but the order in which bodies are placed, and the *space* in which they are placed, must necessarily be distinct.”—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphysics*, book iv., chap. 1. *Letters of Clarke and Leibnitz*.

“1. *Space* is not pure nothing, for nothing has no capacity; but *space* has the capacity of receiving body.

“2. It is not an *ens rationis*, for it was occupied by heaven and earth before the birth of man.

“3. It is not an accident inhering in a subject, *i. e.*, body, for body changes its place, but *space* is not moved with it.

“4. It is not the superficies of one body surrounding another, because superficies is an accident; and as superficies is a quantity it should occupy *space*; but *space* can-

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not occupy *space*. Besides, the remotest heaven occupies *space*, and has no superficies surrounding it.

“ 5. It is not the relation or order with reference to certain fixed points, as east, west, north, and south. For if the whole world were round, bodies would change place and not their order, or they may change their order and not their place, if the sky, with the fixed points, were moved by itself.

“ 6. and 7. It is not body, nor spirit.

“ 8. It may be said with probability that *space* cannot be distinguished from the divine immensity, and therefore from God. It is infinite and eternal, which God only is. He is the place of all being, for no being is out of Him. And although different beings are in different places externally, they are all virtually in the divine immensity.”—Derodon, *Physic.*, pars. 1, ch. 6.

Bardili argued for the reality of time and *space* from the fact that the inferior animals perceive or have notions of them. Yet their minds, if they can be said to have minds, are not subject to the forms or laws of the human mind.

But if *space* be something to the mind, which has the idea of it, and to the bodies which exist in it, what is it? “Perhaps,” says Dr. Reid (*ut supra*), “we may apply to it what the Peripatetics said of their first matter, that whatever it is, it is potentially only, not actually.” This, accordingly, is the view taken of it by a great admirer of the Peripatetic philosophy. “*Space*,” says Lord Monboddo (*Ancient Metaphys.*, book iv., chap. 2), “is but a *relative*; and it is relative to *body*, and to *body* only, and this in three respects, *first*, as to its capacity of receiving *body*; *secondly*, as to its connecting or limiting *body*; and *lastly*, as to its being the distance between *bodies* that are separated. . . . *Place* is *space* occupied by *body*. It is different from *body* as that which contains is different from that which is contained. . . . *Space*, then, is *place*, δυναμις, or *potentially*; and when it is filled with *body*, then it is *place actually*, or ενεργεια.”

Space, as containing all things, was by Philo and others

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identified with the Infinite. And the text (Acts xvii. 28) which says that “in God we live, and move, and have our being,” was interpreted to mean that *space* is an affection or property of the Deity. Sir Isaac Newton maintained that God by existing constitutes time and *space*. “Non est duratio vel spatium sed durat et adest, et existendo semper et ubique, spatium et durationem constituit.” Clarke maintained that *space* is an attribute or property of the Infinite Deity. Reid and Stewart, as well as Cousin and Royer Collard, while they regard *space* as something real and more than a relation, have not positively said what it is.

As *space* is a necessary conception of the human mind, as it is conceived of as infinite, and as an infinite quality, Dr. Clarke thought that from these views we may argue the existence of an infinite substance, to which this quality belongs.—See his *Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, with Butler's *Letters* to him and the *Answers*.

Stewart, *Active and Moral Powers*.

Pownall, *Intellectual Physics*.

Brougham, *Nat. Theology*.

SPECIES (from the old verb, *specio*, to see)—is a word of different signification, in different departments of philosophy.

In *Logic*, *species* was defined to be, “Id quod prædicatur de pluribus *numero* differentibus, in quæstione quid est?” And *genus* was defined to be, “Id quod predicatur de pluribus differentibus *specie*, in quæstione quid est?” According to Derodon (*Log.*, p. 293), the adequate definition of genus is, “Res similes eodem nomine substantivo donatæ, et identificatæ cum omnibus inferioribus diverso nomine substantivo donatis, et proprietate quadam incommunicabili distinctis.” And of *species*, “Res similes eodem nomine substantivo donatæ, et identificatæ cum omnibus inferioribus diverso nomine substantivo donatis, et omnes proprietates ita similes habentibus, ut quodlibet possit habere attributa aliorum, nullum tamen habeat actu idem sed tantum simile.”

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In the process of *classification* (*q. v.*), the first step is the formation of a *species*. A *species* is a group of individuals agreeing in some common character, and designated by a common name. When two or more *species* are brought together in the same way they are called a *genus*.

“In Logic, *genus* and *species* are relative terms; a conception is called in relation to its superior, *species*—to its inferior, *genus*. The *summum genus* is the last result of the abstracting process, the *genus* which can never in turn be a *species*. The *infima species* is the *species* which cannot become a *genus*; which can only contain individuals, and not other *species*. But there can only be one absolute *summum genus*, whether we call it ‘thing,’ ‘substance,’ or ‘essence.’ And we can scarcely ever ascertain the *infima species*, because even in a handful of individuals, we cannot say with certainty that there are no distinctions on which a farther subdivision into smaller classes might be founded.”
—Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, second edition, sect. 27.

In *Mathematics*, the term *species* was used in its primitive sense of *appearance*; and when the form of a figure was given, it was said to be given in *species*.

Algebra, in which letters are used for numbers, was called, at one time, the *specious notation*.

In *Mineralogy*, *species* is determined by perfect identity of composition; the form goes for nothing.

In the *organized kingdoms* of nature, on the contrary, *species* is founded on identity of form and structure, both external and internal. The principal characteristic of *species* in animals and vegetables, is the power to produce beings like themselves, who are also productive. A *species* may be modified by external influences; and thus give rise to races or varieties; but it never abandons its own proper character to assume another.

In *Natural History*, *species* includes only the following conditions; viz., separate origin and distinctness of race,

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evinced by a constant transmission of some characteristic peculiarity of organization.—Dr. Prichard.

“*Species*,” according to Dr. Morton (author of *Crania Americana*), “is a primordial organic form.” See a description of *species* in Lyell’s *Geology*, chap. 37.

“By maintaining the unity of the human *species* (says A. v. Humboldt, *Cosmos*, vol. i., p. 355, Engl. trans.), we at the same time repel the cheerless assumption of superior and inferior races of men.” “This eminent writer appears in the passage quoted, to exaggerate the extent of uniformity implied in a common *species*. It is unquestionable that mankind form one *species* in the sense of the natural historian; but it does not follow from this fact that there are no essential hereditary differences, both physical and mental, between different varieties and races of men. The analogy of animal *species* would make it probable that such essential differences do exist; for we see that, although all horses, dogs, oxen, sheep, &c., form respectively one *species*, yet each *species* contains varieties or races, which possess certain properties in different degrees,—which are more or less large, active, gentle, intelligent, hardy, and the like. If we are guided by the analogy of animal *species*, it is as probable that an Englishman should be more intelligent than a negro, as that a greyhound should be more fleet than a mastiff, or an Arabian horse than a Shetland pony.”
—Sir G. Cornwall Lewis, *On Politics*, chap. 27, sect. 10.

Species in Perception.

In explaining the process of external perception, or how we come to the knowledge of things out of and distant from us, it was maintained that these objects send forth *species* or *images* of themselves which, making an impression on the bodily organs, next imprinted themselves on the mind and issued in knowledge.

The *species* considered as the vicarious representative of the object, was called *intentional*. And as it affected both the intellect and the sense, was distinguished as *sensible* and *intelligible*.

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Species, as *sensible*, was distinguished as *species impressa*, as making an impression upon the sense—and *species expressa*, in consequence of the sense or imagination from the impression elaborating another *species* of the object.

Species, as *intelligible*, was also distinguished into *species impressa* and *species expressa*. The *species intelligibilis* was called *impressa*, as it determined the faculty to the apprehension of this object, rather than of that. And it was called *expressa*, as in consequence of the operation of the faculty, knowledge of the object was attained to.

According to some, the *species* as intelligible were congenite, and according to others they were elaborated by the intellect in the presence of the phantasms.

The process of perception is thus described by Tellez (*Summa Philosoph. Aristot.*, Paris, 1644, p. 47).

Socrates by his figure, &c., makes an impression upon the eye, and vision follows—then a *species* is impressed upon the phantasy, *phantasma impressum*; the phantasy gives the *phantasma expressum*, the *intellectus agens* purifies and spiritualizes it, so that it is received by the *intellectus patiens*, and the knowledge of the object is elicited.

“The philosophy schools teach that for the cause of vision, the thing seen sendeth forth on every side a visible *species* (in English), a visible show, apparition, or aspect, or a being seen, the receiving of which into the eye is seeing. . . . Nay, for the cause of understanding also the thing understood sendeth forth an *intelligible species*, that is, an intelligible being seen, which, coming into the understanding, makes it understood.”—Hobbes, *Of Man*, part 1, chap. 1.

For the various forms under which the doctrine of *species* has been held, see Reid, *Intell. Powers*, essay ii., chap. 8, with notes by Sir W. Hamilton, and note D.

The doctrine was not universally received during the Middle Ages.

“Scholasticism had maintained that between the exterior bodies, placed before us, and the mind of man, there are images which belong to the exterior bodies, and make more

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or less a part of them, as the *εἰδωλα* of Democritus, images or sensible forms which represent external objects by the conformity which they have with them. So the mind was supposed to be able to know spiritual beings only through the medium of intelligible *species*. Occam destroyed these chimeras, and maintained that there is nothing real but spiritual or material beings, and the mind of man, which directly conceives them. Gabriel Biel, a pupil of Occam (born at Spire, and died 1495), exhibited with much sagacity and clearness the theory of his master. Occam renewed, without knowing it, the warfare of Arcesilaus against the Stoics; and he is in modern Europe the forerunner of Reid and of the Scotch school."—Cousin, *Hist. of Mod. Phil.*, vol. ii., p. 26.

Mons. Haureau (*Examinat. de Philosoph. Scolast.*, tom. i., p. 416) says of Durandus de St. Pourcain that he not only rejected *intelligible species*, but that he would not admit *sensible species*. To feel, to think, said he, are simple acts which result from the commerce of mind with an external object; and this commerce takes place directly without anything intermediate.

SPECIFICATION (The Principle of) is—that beings the most like or homogeneous, disagree or are heterogeneous in some respect.

SPECULATION (*speculare*, to regard attentively). — “To *speculate* is, from premisses given or assumed, but considered unquestionable, as the constituted point of observation, to look abroad upon the whole field of intellectual vision, and thence to decide upon the true form and dimension of all which meets the view.”—Marsh, *Prelim. Essay to Aids to Reflection*, p. 13.

It is that part of philosophy which is neither practical nor experimental. The *speculative* part of philosophy is metaphysics. The *speculative* part of mathematics is that which has no application to the arts.

SPIRITUALISM (*spiritus*, spirit) — is not any particular system of philosophy, but the doctrine, whether grounded

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on reason, sentiment, or faith, that there are substances or beings which are not cognizable by the senses, and which do not reveal themselves to us by any of the qualities of matter, and which we therefore call immaterial or *spiritual*. *Materialism* denies this. But *spiritualism* does not deny the existence of matter, and, placing itself above materialism, admits both body and spirit. Hence it is called dualism as opposed to the denial of the existence of matter. The idealism of Berkeley and Malebranche may be said to reduce material existences to mere phenomena of the mind. Mysticism, whether religious or philosophical, ends with resolving mind and matter into the Divine substance. Mysticism and idealism tend to pantheism, materialism to atheism. *Spiritualism*, grounded upon consciousness, preserves equally, God, the human person, and external nature, without confounding them and without isolating the one from the other.—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

SPONTANEITY.—Leibnitz (*Opera*, tom. i., p. 459) explains “*spontaneity* to mean the true and real dependence of our actions on ourselves.” Heineccius calls it “the faculty of directing one’s aim to a certain end.”—Turnbull, *Trans.*, vol. i., p. 35.

SPONTANEOUS is opposed to *Reflective*. Those operations of mind which are continually going on without any effort or intention on our part are *spontaneous*. When we exercise a volition, and make an effort of attention to direct our mental energy in any particular way, or towards any particular object, we are said to *reflect*, or to *observe*.

STANDARD OF VIRTUE.—*Standard* is that by which other things are rated or valued. “Labour alone, therefore, never varying in its own value, is alone the ultimate and real *standard* by which commodities can at all times and places be estimated and compared.”—Smith, *Wealth of Nat.*, b. i., c. 5.

A *standard* is something set up by which to measure the quantity or quality of some other thing. Now Rectitude is the foundation of Virtue. The *standard* of Virtue is some law or rule by which Rectitude can be measured. To the

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law of God, and to the testimony of an enlightened conscience, if they agree not, it is because there is no truth nor rightness in them. Now the will of God, as declared by the constitution and course of nature, or as revealed by His word, is a *standard* by which we may measure the amount of Rectitude, in action or disposition. According as they agree, in a greater or less degree, with the indications of the divine will, in the same proportion are they right, or in accordance with Rectitude. The *standard* of Virtue, then, is the will of God, as declared in His Word, or some law or rule deduced from the constitution of nature and the course of Providence. The Foundation of Virtue is the ground or reason on which the law or rule rests.—V. CRITERION.

STATE (States of Mind).—“The reason why madness, idiotism, &c., are called *states** of mind, while its acts and operations are not, is because mankind have always conceived the mind to be passive in the former and active in the latter.”—Reid’s *Correspondence*, p. 85.

Such were the views of Dr. Reid. But since his day, a change has passed over the language of Scottish Psychology. No change of phraseology, because no change of doctrine, is to be found in the writings of Mr. Stewart. But in those of Dr. Brown the difference is manifest. Instead of speaking of the mind as *operating*, or as *acting*, or as *energizing*, he delights rather to speak of it as exhibiting phenomena, and as passing through, or existing in, different *states*. This phraseology has been by many accepted and applauded. It is thought that by adopting it, we neither affirm nor deny the activity of the mind, and thus proceed to consider its manifestations, unembarrassed by any questions as to the way in which these manifestations are brought about. But it may be doubted if this phraseology leaves the question as to the activity of the mind entire and untouched.

If Dr. Brown had not challenged the common opinion, he

* “The term *state* has, more especially of late years, and principally by Necessitarian philosophers, been applied to all modifications of mind indifferently.”—Sir Will. Hamilton.

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would not, probably, have disturbed the language that was previously in common use; although it must be admitted that he was by no means averse to novel phrases. At all events, the tendency of his philosophy is to represent the mind in all its manifestations as passive—the mere recipient of changes, made upon it from without. Indeed, his system of philosophy, which is sensational in its principles, may be said to take the bones and sinews out of the mind, and to leave only a soft and yielding mass, to be magnetized by the palmistry of matter. That the mind in some of its manifestations is passive, rather than active, is admitted; and in reference to these, there can be no objection to speak of it as existing in certain *states*, or passing into these *states*. But in adopting to some extent this phraseology, we must not let go the testimony which is given in favour of the activity of mind, by the use and structure of language. Language is not the invention of philosophers. It is the natural expression of the human mind, and the exponent of those views which are natural to it. Now, the phrase *operations of mind*, being in common use, indicates a common opinion that mind is naturally active. That opinion may be erroneous, and it is open to philosophers to show if they can, that it is so. But the observation of Dr. Reid is, that “until it is proved that the mind is not active in thinking, but merely passive, the common language with regard to its operations ought to be used, and ought not to give place to a phraseology invented by philosophers, which implies its being merely passive.”

And in another place (*Intell. Powers*, essay i., chap. 1), he says, “There may be distinctions that have a real foundation, and which may be necessary in philosophy, which are not made in common language, because not necessary in the common business of life. But I believe no instance will be found of a distinction made in all languages, which has not a just foundation in nature.”

If any change of phraseology were expedient, the phrase “*manifestations of mind*” would touch less upon the ques-

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tion of its activity. But in the language of Dr. Reid—“The mind is from its very nature, a living and active being. Everything we know of it implies life and active energy; and the reason why all its modes of thinking are called its operations, is, that in all or in most of them, it is not merely passive, as body is, but is really and properly active. In all ages, and in all languages, ancient and modern, the various modes of thinking have been expressed by words of active signification, such as seeing, hearing, reasoning, willing, and the like. It seems, therefore, to be the natural judgment of mankind, that the mind is active in its various ways of thinking; and for this reason they are called its operations, and are expressed by active verbs. It may be made a question, what regard is to be paid to this natural judgment? May it not be a vulgar error? Philosophers who think so, have, no doubt, a right to be heard. But until it is proved that the mind is not active in thinking, but merely passive, the common language with regard to its operations ought to be used, and ought not to give place to a phraseology invented by philosophers, which implies its being merely passive.”

One proof of the mind being active in some of its operations is, that these operations are accompanied with effort, and followed by languor. In attention, we are conscious of effort; and the result of long continued attention is languor and exhaustion. This could not be the case if the mind was altogether passive—the mere recipient of impressions made—of ideas introduced.—V. OPERATIONS OF MIND.

STATISTICS.—“The observation, registration, and arrangement of those facts in politics which admit of being reduced to a numerical expression has been, of late years, made the subject of a distinct science, and comprehended under the designation of *Statistics*. Both the name and the separate treatment of the subject were due to Achenwall,* who died

* Godefroy Achenwall was born at Elbingen, in Prussia, in 1719, studied at Jena, Halle, and Leipsic, established himself at Marbourg in 1746, and in 1748, where he soon afterwards obtained a chair. He was distinguished as Professor of History and Statistics. But he also published several works on the Law of Nature and of Nations.

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in 1772. Upon the nature and province of the science of *statistics*, see the Introduction to the *Journal of the London Statistical Society*, vol. i., 1839. This science, it is there remarked, does not discuss causes, nor reason upon probable effects; it seeks only to collect, arrange, and compare, that class of facts which *alone* (?) can form the basis of correct conclusions with respect to social and political government. . . . Its peculiarity is, that it proceeds wholly by the accumulation and comparison of facts, and does not admit of any kind of speculation. . . . The statist commonly prefers to employ figures and tabular exhibitions.”—Sir G. C. Lewis, *Method of Observat. in Politics*, chap. 5, sect. 10.

STOICS (from *στοῖζ*, a porch).—“From the *Tusculan Questions*,” says Bentham, “I learnt that pain is no evil. Virtue is of itself sufficient to confer happiness on any man who is disposed to possess it on these terms. . . .

“This was the sort of trash which a set of men used to amuse themselves with talking, while parading backwards and forwards in colonnades, called porches: that is to say, the *Stoics*, so called from *στοῖζ*, the Greek name for a porch. In regard to these, the general notion has been, that compared with our cotemporaries in the same ranks, they were, generally speaking, a good sort of men; and assuredly, in all times, good sort of men, talking all their lives long nonsense, in an endless variety of shapes, never have been wanting; but that, from talking nonsense in this or any other shape, they or their successors have, in any way or degree, been the better, this is what does not follow.”—*Deontol.*, vol. i., p. 302.

Their philosophy of mind may be judged of by the motto assigned to them—*Nihil est in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensu*. Yet, along with this, they held that the mind had the power of framing general ideas, but these were derived from experience. Zeno compared the hand open to Sensation; half closed upon some object to Judgment; fully closed upon it to *φαντασία καταλήπτικη*, comprehensive Judgment,

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or Synthesis of Judgment. And when the one hand grasped the other, to enable it to hold more firmly, this was universal and definitive synthesis or science. In physics they said all things were made of Cause and Matter. In morals their maxim was "to live agreeably to nature." Mind ought to govern matter. And the great struggle of life was, to lift the soul above the body, and the evils incident to it. Their two great rules were *ανεχου* and *απεχου*—*sustine, abstine.*—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

Heinsius (Dan.), *Philosoph. Stoica*, 4to, Leyd., 1627.

Lipsius (Justus), *Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosoph.*, 4to, Antw., 1664.

Gataker (Thomas), *Dissertatio de Disciplina Stoica*, prefixed to his edition of *Antoninus*, 4to, Camb., 1643.

SUBJECT, OBJECT, SUBJECTIVE, OBJECTIVE.—

"We frequently meet," says Dr. Reid, "with a distinction between things *in the mind* and things *external* to the mind. The powers, faculties, and operations of the mind, are things in the mind. Everything is said to be in the mind, of which the mind is the *subject*. . . . Excepting the mind itself and things in the mind, all other things are said to be external."

By the term *subject* Dr. Reid meant substance, that to which powers belong or in which qualities reside or inhere. The distinction therefore which he takes between things in the mind and things external to the mind, is equivalent to that which is expressed among continental writers by the *ego* and the *non ego*, or *self* and *not self*. The mind and things in the mind constitute the *ego*. "All other things," says Dr. Reid, "are said to be external." They constitute the *non ego*. Aristotle expressed this distinction by the phrases *τα ημιν*, things in us—and *τα Φυσει*, things in nature.

In connection with these modes of expression, it may be proper to notice the correlative terms *subject* and *object*, which are frequently employed in mental science.

"In the philosophy of mind, *subjective* denotes what is to be referred to the thinking subject, the *ego*; *objective*,

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what belongs to the object of thought, the *non ego*.”—Sir W. Hamilton, *Discussions*, 8vo, Lond., 1852, p. 5, note.

“The *subject* is properly, *id in quo*; the *object*, *id circa quod*. Hence, in psychological language, the *subject* absolutely, is the mind that knows or thinks, *i. e.*, the mind considered as the *subject* of knowledge or thought—the *object*, that which is known or thought about. The adjectives *subjective* and *objective* are convenient, if not indispensable expressions.”—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 221, note.

In note B to *Reid's Works*, p. 108, Sir Will. Hamilton explains how these terms should have come into common use in Mental Philosophy.

“All knowledge is a relation, a relation between that which knows (in scholastic language, the *subject* in which knowledge inheres) and that which is known (in scholastic language, the *object* about which knowledge is conversant), and the contents of every act of knowledge are made up of elements, and regulated by laws, proceeding partly from its *object* and partly from its *subject*. Now, philosophy proper is principally and primarily the *science of knowledge*—its first and most important problem being to determine, What can we know? that is, what are the conditions of our knowing, whether these lie in the nature of the *object*, or in the nature of the *subject* of knowledge.

“But philosophy being the science of knowledge; and the science of knowledge supposing, in its most fundamental and thorough going analysis, the distinction of the *subject* and *object* of knowledge; it is evident that to philosophy the *subject of knowledge* would be by pre-eminence the *subject*, and the *object of knowledge*, the *object*. It was therefore natural that the *object* and *objective*, the *subject* and *subjective*, should be employed by philosophers as simple terms, compendiously to denote the grand discrimination, about which philosophy was constantly employed, and which no others could be found so precisely and promptly to express.”

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For a disquisition on *subject*, see Tappan, *Logic*, sect. 4.
— V. OBJECTIVE.

SUBJECTIVISM is the doctrine of Kant, that all human knowledge is merely relative; or rather that we cannot prove it to be absolute. According to him, we cannot *objectify the subjective*; that is, we cannot prove that what appears true to us must appear true to all intelligent beings; or that with different faculties what now appears true to us might not appear true. But to call our knowledge relative is merely calling it human or proportioned to the faculties of a man; just as the knowledge of angels may be called angelic. Our knowledge may be admitted to be relative to our faculties of apprehending it; but that does not make it less certain.

SUBLIME (The).—“In reflecting on the circumstances by which *sublimity* in its primitive sense is specifically distinguished, the first thing that strikes us is, that it carries the thoughts in a direction opposite to that in which the great and universal law of terrestrial gravitation operates.”—Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays, Essay on Sublime*.

A sense of grandeur and sublimity has been recognized as one of the reflex senses belonging to man. It is different from the sense of the beautiful, though closely allied to it. Beauty charms, sublimity moves us, and is often accompanied with a feeling resembling fear, while beauty rather attracts and draws us towards it.

There is a *sublime* in *nature*, as in the ocean or the thunder—in *moral* action, as in deeds of daring and self-denial—and in *art*, as in statuary and painting, by which what is *sublime* in nature and in moral character is represented and idealized.

Kant has accurately analyzed our feelings of sublimity and beauty in his *Critique du Judgment*.

Cousin, *Sur le Beau, le Vrai, et le Bon*.

Burke, *On Sublime and Beautiful*.

Addison, *Spectator*, vol. vi.

SUBSISTENTIA is a substantial mode added to a singular

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nature, and constituting a *suppositum* along with it. It means, 1. The thing itself, the *suppositum*; hence we call the three persons of the Trinity three *hypostases* or *subsistences*. 2. The mode added to the singular nature to complete its existence; this is the metaphysical sense. 3. The act of existing *per se*.

“*Subsistentia* est ‘*substantiæ completio*,’ qua carent rerum naturalium partes a reliquis divulsæ. *Subsistens* dicitur *suppositum* aut *hypostasis*. *Persona* est *suppositum* ratione præditum.”—Hutcheson, *Metaphys.*, pars. 1, cap. 5.

SUBSTANCE is “that which is and abides.”

It may be derived from *subsistens* (*ens per se subsistens*), that which subsists of or by itself; or from *substans* (*id quod substat*), that which lies under qualities—the *ὑποκειμενον* of the Greeks. But in Greek substance is denoted by *ὄντιον*—so that which truly is, or essence, seems to be the proper meaning of *substance*. It is opposed to *accident*; of which Aristotle has said (*Metaphys.*, lib. vii.) that you can scarcely predicate of it that it is anything. So also Augustine (*De Trinitate*, lib. vii., c. 4) derives *substance* from *subsistendo* rather than from *substando*. “Sicut ab eo quod est esse, appellatur essentia; ita ab eo quod est *subsistere*, *substantiam* dicimus.” But Locke prefers the derivation from *substando*. He says (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., ch. 23), “The idea, then, we have, to which we give the name of *substance*, being nothing but the supposed but unknown support of these qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist, *sine re substantive*, without something to support them, we call that support *substantia*; which, according to the true import of the word is, in plain English, standing under or upholding.”

Dr. Hampden (*Bampton Lect.*, vii., p. 337), has said, “*Substance*, in its logical and metaphysical sense, is that nature of a thing which may be conceived to remain when every other nature is removed or abstracted from it—the ultimate point in analyzing the complex idea of any object. *Accident* denotes all those ideas which the analysis excludes

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as not belonging to the mere being or nature of the object.”

Substance has been defined, *ens per se existens*; and *accident*, *ens existens non in se sed in alio*.

Our first idea of *substance* is probably derived from the consciousness of *self*—the conviction that, while our sensations, thoughts, and purposes are changing, *we* continue the same. We see bodies also remaining the same as to quantity or extension, while their colour and figure, their state of motion or of rest may be changed.

Substances, it has been said, are either *primary*, that is, singular, individual substances; or *secondary*,* that is genera and species of *substance*. *Substances* have also been divided into *complete* and *incomplete*, *finite* and *infinite*, &c. But these are rather divisions of *being*. *Substance* may, however, be properly divided into matter and spirit, or that which is extended and that which thinks.—V. ESSENCE.

Substance (The Principle of) denotes that law of the human mind by which every quality or mode of being is referred to a *substance*. In everything which we perceive or can imagine as existing, we distinguish two parts, qualities variable and multiplied, and a being one and identical; and these two are so united that we cannot separate them in our intelligence, nor think of qualities without a substance. Memory recalls to us the many modes of our mind; but amidst all these modes we believe ourselves to be the same individual being. So in the world around us the phenomena are continually varying; but we believe that these phenomena are produced by causes which remain as *substances* the same. And as we know ourselves to be the causes of our own acts, and to be able to change the modes of our own mind, so we believe the changes of matter to be produced by causes which belong to the *substance* of it. And underlying all causes, whether of finite mind or matter,

* Haureau (*Philosoph. Scolast.*, tom. i., p. 60), says that what has been called *second substance* is just one of its modes or a species.

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we conceive of one universal and absolute cause, *one substance*, in itself persistent and upholding all things.

SUBSUMPTION (*sub*, under; *sumere*, to take).—"When we are able to comprehend why or how a thing is, the belief of the existence of that thing is not a primary datum of consciousness, but a *subsumption* under the cognition or belief which affords its reason."—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note A.

SUCCESSION.—"By reflecting on the appearing of various ideas one after another in our understanding, we get the notion of *succession*."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. ii., ch. 14. He traces our notion of *duration* or *time* to the same origin; or rather he confounds *succession* and *duration*, the measure with the thing measured. According to Cousin and others, the notion of time is logically antecedent and necessary to the notion of *succession*. Events take place in time, as bodies exist in space. In the philosophy of Kant, time is not an empirical notion, but like space, a form of the sensibility.—V. DURATION, TIME.

SUFFICIENT REASON (Doctrine of).—"Of the principle of the *sufficient reason*, the following account is given by Leibnitz himself, in his Controversial Correspondence with Dr. Clarke :—"The great foundation of mathematics is the principle of *contradiction or identity*; that is, that a proposition cannot be true and false at the same time. But, in order to proceed from Mathematics to Natural Philosophy, another principle is requisite (as I have observed in my *Theodicæa*), I mean, the principle of the *Sufficient Reason*; or, in other words, that nothing happens without a *reason* why it should be so, rather than otherwise. And, accordingly, Archimedes was obliged, in his book *De Equilibrio*, to take for granted, that if there be a balance, in which everything is alike on both sides, and if equal weights are hung on the two ends of that balance, the whole will be at rest. It is because no *reason* can be given why one side should weigh down rather than the other. Now by this single principle of the *Sufficient Reason*, may be demon-

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strated the being of a God, and all the other parts of Metaphysics or Natural Theology; and even, in some measure, those physical truths that are independent of mathematics, such as the Dynamical Principles, or the Principles of Forces.”—See Reid, *Active Powers*, essay iv., chap. 9.—V. REASON (DETERMINING).

SUGGESTION (*sub-gerere*, to bear or place under, to prompt).

“It is the received doctrine of philosophers, that our notions of relations can only be got by comparing the related ideas: but it is not by having first the notions of mind and sensation, and then comparing them together, that we perceive the one to have the relation of a subject or substratum, and the other that of an act or operation: on the contrary, one of the related things, viz., sensation, *suggests* to us both the correlate and the relation.

“I beg leave to make use of the word *Suggestion*, because I know not one more proper, to express a power of the mind, which seems entirely to have escaped the notice of philosophers, and to which we owe many of our simple notions which are neither impressions nor ideas, as well as many original principles of belief.”—Reid, *Enquiry*, ch. 2, s. 7.

To this power Dr. Reid refers our natural judgments or principles of common sense. Mr. Stewart has expressed surprise that Reid should have apologized for introducing a word which had already been employed by Berkeley, to denote those intimations which are the results of experience and habit (*Dissert.*, p. 167, second ed). And Sir W. Hamilton has shown that in the more extensive sense of Reid the word had been used by Tertullian; who, speaking of the universal belief of the soul’s immortality, has said (*De Anima*, c. 2). “*Natura pleraque suggeruntur, quasi de publico sensu quo animam Deus ditare dignatus est.*”—Reid’s *Works*, p. 3, note.

The word *suggestion* is much used in the philosophy of Dr. Thomas Brown, in a sense nearly the same as that assigned to Association, by other philosophers. He calls Judgment, *relative suggestion*. Hutcheson (*Logicæ Compend.*, cap. 1),

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says, "Sensus est internus qui *suggerit* præcipue intellectiones puras; quæ Conscientia, aut reflectendi vis dicitur." It is not so properly Consciousness or Reflection which gives the new ideas, but rather the occasion on which these ideas are suggested. It is when we are conscious and reflect on one thing, some other thing related to it, but not antecedently thought, is suggested.

SUICIDE (*ἄυτοχειρία*, *sui-cædes*, self-murder)—is the voluntary taking away of one's own life. The Stoics thought it was not wrong to do so, when the pains and inconveniences of our lot exceeded its enjoyments and advantages. But the command, Thou shalt not kill, forbids *suicide* as well as homicide. It is contrary to one of the strongest instincts of our nature, that of self-preservation—and at variance with the submission which we owe to God and the duties incumbent upon us towards our fellow-creatures. All the apologies that can be offered for it are futile.

Aristotle, *Ethic.*, lib. iii., cap. 7; lib. v., cap. 11.

Herman, *Disputatio de Autocheiria et philosophice et ex legibus Romanis considerata*, 4to, Leips., 1809.

Madame de Stael, *Reflexions sur le Suicide*.

Stœudlin, *Hist. des Opinions et des Doctrines sur le Suicide*, 8vo, Goetting., 1824.

Tissot, *Manie du Suicide*.

Adams, *On Self-murder*.

Donne, *Biathanotos*.

SUPRA-NATURALISM (*supra-naturam*, above nature)—is the doctrine that in nature there are more than physical causes in operation, and that in religion we have the guidance not merely of reason but of revelation. It is thus opposed to *Naturalism* and to *Rationalism*.—*q. v.* In Germany, where the word originated, the principal Supernaturalists are Tholuck, Hengstenberg, Guericke, &c.

SYLLOGISM (*συλλογισμὸς*, a putting together of judgments, or propositions, or reasonings; from *συν* and *λογίζεσθαι*, *colligere*, to gather together).

This word occurs in the writings of Plato, in the sense

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of judging or reasoning; but not in the technical sense assigned to it by Aristotle.

According to Aristotle (*Prior. Analyt.*, lib. i., chap. 1, sect. 8), "a *syllogism* is a speech (or enunciation) (*λογος*) in which certain things (the premises) being supposed, something different from what is supposed (the conclusion) follows *of necessity*; and this solely in virtue of the suppositions themselves."

"A *syllogism* is a combination of two judgments necessitating a third judgment as the consequence of their mutual relation."—Mansel, *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 61.

Euler likened the *syllogism* to three concentric circles, of which the first contained the second, which in its turn contained the third. Thus, if A be predicable of all B, and B of all C, it follows necessarily that A is also predicable of C.

In a *syllogism*, the first two propositions are called the *premises*; because they are the things premised or put before; they are also called the *antecedents*: the first of them is called the *major* and the second the *minor*. The third proposition, which contains the thing to be proved, is called the *conclusion* or *consequent*; and the particle which unites the conclusion with the premises is called the *consequentia* or *consequence*.*

In a *syllogism*, "the conclusion having two terms, a subject and a predicate, its predicate is called the *major term*, and its subject the *minor term*. In order to prove the

* Thus:—

"Every virtue is laudable,
Diligence is a virtue;
Wherefore diligence is laudable.

"The two former propositions are the *premises* or *antecedents*, the last is the *conclusion* or *consequent*, and the particle wherefore is the *consequentia* or *consequence*.

"The *consequent* may be true and the *consequence* false.

"What has parts is divisible,
The human soul has parts;
Wherefore the human soul is divisible.

"The *consequent* may be true although the *consequence* is false.

"Antichrist will be powerful,
Therefore he will be impious.

"His impiety will not flow from his power."

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conclusion, each of its terms is, in the premises, compared with the third term, called the *middle term*. By this means one of the premises will have for its two terms the major term and the middle term; and this premise is called the *major premise*, or the *major proposition* of the *syllogism*. The other premise must have for its two terms the minor term and the middle term; and it is called the *minor proposition*. Thus the *syllogism* consists of three propositions, distinguished by the names of the *major*, the *minor*, and the *conclusion*; and although each of these has two terms, a subject and a predicate, yet there are only three different terms in all. The major term is always the predicate of the conclusion, and is also either the subject or predicate of the major proposition. The minor term is always the subject of the conclusion, and is also either the subject or predicate of the minor proposition. The middle term never enters into the conclusion, but stands in both premises, either in the position of subject or of predicate."—Reid, *Account of Aristotle's Logic*, chap. 3, sect. 2.

According to the various positions which the middle term may have in the premises, *syllogisms* are said to be of various *figures*. And as all the possible positions of the middle term are only four, the regular figures of the *syllogism* are also four; and a *syllogism* is said to be drawn in the first, second, third, or fourth figure, according to the position of its middle term.

There is another division of *syllogisms* according to their *modes*. The *mode* of a *syllogism* is determined by the *quality* and *quantity* of the propositions of which it consists. There are sixty-four modes possible in every figure. And the theory of the *syllogism* requires that we show what are the particular modes in each figure, which do or do not form a just and conclusive *syllogism*. The legitimate modes of the first figure are demonstrated from the axiom called *Dictum de omni et de nullo*. The legitimate modes of the other figures are proved by reducing them to some mode of the first.—Christian Wolf, *Smaller Logic*, ch. 6.

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Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. iv., chap. 17.

Aldrich, Wallis, Watts, and other authors on Logic.

SYMBOL.—V. MYTH.**SYMPATHY** (*συμπάθεια*, fellow-feeling).

“This mutual affection which the Greeks call *sympathy*, tendeth to the use and benefit of man alone.”—Holland, *Pliny*, b. xx., Proem.

“Sensibus reflexis annumerandus est etiam ille, qui communis dicitur; qui ex alterius rebus prosperis gaudium, ex adversis tristitiam colligit, ubi nulla simultas, odium, inimicitia, aut turpitudinis causa detestatio intervenerat.”—Hutcheson, *Metaphys.*, part 2, c. 1.

“Ut ridentibus arident, ita fientibus adfient
Humani vultus.”

“These sensitive cogitations are not pure actions springing from the soul itself, but *compassion* (*sympathy*) with the body.”—Cudworth, *Immut. Moral*, book iii., chap. 1, p. 18.

“Pity and compassion are words appropriated to signify our fellow-feeling with the sorrow of others. *Sympathy*, though its meaning was, perhaps, originally the same, may now, however, without much impropriety, be made use of to denote our fellow-feeling with any other passion whatever.—Smith, *Theory of Mor. Sentim.*, part 1, sect. 1.

Sympathy with sorrow or suffering is *compassion*; *sympathy* with joy or prosperity is *congratulation*.—V. ANTIPATHY.

SYNCRETISM (*συνκρητισμος*, from *συνκρητιζειν*, according to Plutarch, *De Fraternali amore*, to unite, like the Cretans, when all the rival towns of the island united against the common foe)—is opposed to *eclecticism* in philosophy. *Eclecticism* (*q. v.*), while it takes from various systems, does soon the principle that the parts so taken, when brought together, have a kind of congruity and consistency with one another. *Syncretism* is the jumbling together of different systems or parts of systems, without due regard to their being consistent with one another. It is told of a Roman consul that, when he arrived in Greece he called before him

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the philosophers of the different schools, and generously offered to act as moderator between them, in order to bring about an agreement. Something of the same kind was proposed by Charles V.* in reference to the differences between Protestants and Papists; as if philosophy, and theology, which is the highest philosophy, instead of being a search after truth, were a mere matter of diplomacy or compromise—a playing at protocols. But *Syncretism* does not necessarily aim at the reconciling of the doctrines which it brings together; it merely places them in juxtaposition.

Philo of Alexandria gave the first example of *syncretism*, in trying to unite the Oriental philosophy with that of the Greeks. The Gnostics tried the same thing with the doctrines of the Christian religion. About the beginning of the seventeenth century, George Calixtus, a German theologian, attempted to set down in one common creed the belief of the Papists and the Protestants; but succeeded only in irritating both. To him and his partizans the name *Syncretist* seems to have been first applied.—See Walch's *Introduction to Controversies of Lutheran Church*. Similar efforts were made to unite the metaphysics of Aristotle with those of Descartes. And the attempts which have frequently been made to reconcile the discoveries of geology with the cosmogony of Moses deserve no name but that of *syncretism*, in the sense of its being “a mixing together of things which ought to be kept distinct.” On the evils of *syncretism*, see Sewell, (*Christ. Morals*, chap. 9), who quotes as against it the text, Deut. xxii. 9, “*Thou shall not sow thy vineyard with divers seeds,*” &c.

SYNDERESIS (συν δίζησις, to divide, to tear asunder)—was used to denote the state of conviction or remorse in which the mind was when comparing what it had done with what

* After his retiring from the toils of empire, Charles V. employed his leisure in constructing time-pieces, and on experiencing the difficulty of making their movements synchronous, he is said to have exclaimed, in reference to the attempt to reconcile Protestants and Papists, “How could I dream of making two great bodies of men think alike, when I cannot make two clocks to go alike!”

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it ought to have done.—Aquinas, *Summæ Theolog.*, pars prima, quæst. 79, articulus 12.

Aquinas, *Opera*, tom. i., p. 1126.

SYNEIDESIS (συν ἔιδω, to know one thing in relation to another, joint knowledge).—Conscience, as giving knowledge of an action in reference to the law of right and wrong, was called the Witness who accused or excused. The operations of conscience were represented by the three members of a syllogism; of which the first contained the law, the second the testimony of the witness, and the third the decision of the judge. But conscience not only pronounces sentence; it carries its sentence into effect.—*V.* SYNDERESIS.

He who has transgressed any of the rules of which conscience is the repository, is punished by the reproaches of his own mind. He who has obeyed these rules, is acquitted and rewarded by feelings of complacency and self-approbation.—*V.* SYNTERESIS.

SYNTERESIS (συντήρησις, συν τηρηω, to keep together, the conservatory).—Conscience, considered as the repository of those rules, or general maxims, which are regarded as first principles in morals, was called by this name among the early Christian moralists; and was spoken of as the law or lawgiver.

SYNTHESIS (συν θεσις, a putting together, composition)—“consists in assuming the causes discovered and established as principles, and by them explaining the phenomena proceeding from them and proving the explanation.”—Newton, *Optics*.

Every *synthesis* which has not started with a complete *analysis* ends at a result which, in Greek, is called *hypothesis*; instead of which, if *synthesis* has been preceded by a sufficient *analysis*, the *synthesis* founded upon that *analysis* leads to a result which in Greek is called *system*. The legitimacy of every *synthesis* is directly owing to the exactness of *analysis*; every system which is merely an hypothesis is a vain system; every *synthesis* which has not been preceded

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by analysis is a pure imagination : but at the same time every analysis which does not aspire to a *synthesis* which may be equal to it, is an analysis which halts on the way. On the one hand, *synthesis* without analysis gives a false science; on the other hand, analysis without *synthesis* gives an incomplete science. An incomplete science is a hundred times more valuable than a false science ; but neither a false science nor an incomplete science is the ideal of science. The ideal of science, the ideal of philosophy, can be realized only by a method which combines the two processes of *analysis* and *synthesis*.—Cousin, *Hist. Mod. Phil.*, vol. i., pp. 277, 8.—V. ANALYSIS, METHOD, SYSTEM.

SYSTEM (σύστημα, συν ἵστασθαι, to place together)—is a full and connected view of all the truths of some department of knowledge. An organized body of truth, or truths arranged under one and the same idea, which idea is as the life or soul which assimilates all those truths. No truth is altogether isolated. Every truth has relation to some other. And we should try to unite the facts of our knowledge so as to see them in their several bearings. This we do when we frame them into a *system*. To do so legitimately we must begin by analysis and end with synthesis. But *system* applies not only to our knowledge, but to the objects of our knowledge. Thus we speak of the planetary *system*, the muscular *system*, the nervous *system*. We believe that the order to which we would reduce our ideas has a foundation in the nature of things. And it is this belief that encourages us to reduce our knowledge of things into systematic order. The doing so is attended with many advantages. At the same time a spirit of systematizing may be carried too far. It is only in so far as it is in accordance with the order of nature that it can be useful or sound. Condillac has a *Traité des Systemes*, in which he traces their causes and their dangerous consequences.—V. METHOD.

TASTE (POWERS OR PRINCIPLES OF).

“ His *tasteful* mind enjoys
Alike the complicated charms, which glow
Thro’ the wide landscape.”

Cowper, *Power of Harmony*, b. ii.

“ That power of the mind by which we are capable of discerning and relishing the beauties of Nature, and whatever is excellent in the fine arts is called *Taste*. . . . Like the taste of the palate, it relishes some things, is disgusted with others ; with regard to many, is indifferent or dubious ; and is considerably influenced by habit, by associations, and by opinion. . . .

“ By the objects of *Taste*, I mean those qualities and attributes of things which are, by Nature, adapted to please a good taste. Mr. Addison (*Spectator*, vol. vi.) and Dr. Aken- side (*Pleasures of Imagination*) after him, has reduced them to three—to wit, *Novelty*, *Grandeur*, and *Beauty*.”—q. v.— Reid, *Intell. Powers*, essay viii., chap. 1 and 2.

The best definition of *Taste* was given by the earliest editor of Spenser who proved himself to possess any (Mr. Hughes), when he called it a kind of *extempore judgment*. Burke explained it to be an instinct which immediately awakes the emotions of pleasure or dislike. Akenside is clear as he is poetical in the question :—

“ What, then, is *Taste* but those internal powers,
Active, and strong, and feelingly alive
To each fine impulse ? a discerning sense
Of decent and sublime, with quick disgust
From things deformed, or disarranged, or gross,
In species ? This nor gems, nor stores of gold
Nor purple state, nor culture, can bestow,
But God alone, when first his sacred hand
Imprints the secret bias of the soul.”

Pleasures of Imagination, b. iii., l. 523.

“ We may consider *Taste*, therefore, to be a settled habit of discerning faults and excellences in a moment—the mind’s independent expression of approval or aversion. It is that faculty by which we discover and enjoy the beautiful, the picturesque, and the sublime in literature, art, and nature.”

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—*Pleasures, &c., of Literature*, 12mo, London, 1851, pp. 65, 66.

The objects of *Taste* have also been classed as the *Beautiful*, the *Sublime*, and the *Picturesque*.—*q. v.* The question is whether these objects possess certain inherent qualities which may be so called, or whether they awaken pleasing emotions by suggesting or recalling certain pleasing feelings formerly experienced in connection or association with these objects. The latter view has been maintained by Mr. Alison in his *Essay on Taste*, and by Lord Jeffrey in the article *Beauty* in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

Lord Jeffrey has said, "It appears to us, then, that objects are sublime or beautiful—first, when they are the *natural signs and perpetual concomitants* of pleasurable sensations, as the sound of thunder, or laughter, or, at any rate, of some lively feeling or emotion in ourselves, or in some other sentient beings; or secondly, when they are the arbitrary or *accidental concomitants* of such feelings, as ideas of female beauty; or thirdly, when they bear some *analogy or fancied resemblance* to things with which these emotions are necessarily connected." All poetry is founded on this last—as silence and tranquillity—gradual ascent and ambition—gradual descent and decay.

Mr. Stewart has observed that "association of ideas can never account for a new notion or a pleasure essentially different from all others."—*Philosoph. of Hum Mind*, ch. 5, part 2, p. 364, 4to.

Gerard, *Essay on Taste*.

Sir Joshua Reynolds, *Discourses before Royal Society*.

Burke, *On Sublime and Beautiful*.

Payne Knight, *Enquiry into Principles of Taste*.

Hume, *Essay on Standard of Taste*.

Brown, *Lectures*, 77.

Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, part 2, *Relative to Taste*.

Sir T. L. Dick, *Essay on Taste*, prefixed to *Price on the Picturesque*, 8vo, 1842.—*V. ÆSTHETICS.*

TELEOLOGY (τέλος, an end; λόγος, discourse)—is the doctrine

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of *Final Causes*.—*q. v.* It does not constitute a particular department of philosophy; as the end or perfection of every being belongs to the consideration of that branch of philosophy in which it is included. But *Teleology* is the philosophical consideration of final causes, generally.

TEMPERAMENT (*temperare*, to moderate, to season).—

“There are only *two* species of *Temperament*. The four well-known varieties, and the millions which are less known, are merely modifications of two species, and combinations of their modifications. These are the *active* and the *passive* forms; and every other variety may be conveniently arranged under them.”*

“As character comprises the entire sphere of the educated will, so *temperament* is nothing else than the sum of our natural inclinations and tendencies. Inclination is the material of the will, developing itself when *controlled*, into character, and when *controlling*, into passions. *Temperament* is, therefore, the root of our passions; and the latter, like the former, may be distinguished into two principal classes. Intelligent psychologists and physicians have always recognized this fact; the former dividing *temperaments* into active and passive, the latter classifying the passions as exciting and depressing.

“We would apply the same statement to the affections or emotions. The *temperament* commonly denominated sanguine or choleric is the same as our active species; and that known as the phlegmatic, or melancholy, is the same as our passive one.”—Feuchtersleben, *Dietetics of the Soul*, 12mo, Lon., 1852, p. 85.

Bodily endowments, as affecting the prevailing bias of the mind, have been called *Temperaments*; and have been distinguished into the *Sanguine*, the *Choleric*, the *Melancholic*, and the *Phlegmatic*. To these has been added another,

* Lavater, Zimmerman, and Von Hildebrandt adopt a similar classification. The author of the treatise on “Diet,” included among the works of Hippocrates, takes the same view of *temperaments*; as likewise the Brunonian school, which maintained two antagonist, *sthenic* and *asthenic*, states.

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called the *Nervous Temperament*. According as the bodily constitution of individuals can be characterized by one or other of these epithets, a corresponding difference will be found in the general state or *Disposition* of the mind; and there will be a bias, or tendency to be moved by certain principles of action rather than by others.

Mind is essentially one. But we speak of it as having a constitution and as containing certain primary elements; and, according as these elements are combined and balanced, there may be differences in the constitution of individual minds, just as there are differences of bodily *Temperaments*; and these differences may give rise to a *Disposition* or bias, in the one case, more directly than in the other. According as Intellect, or Sensitivity, or Will, prevails in any individual mind, there will be a correspondent bias resulting.

But, it is in reference to original differences in the *Primary Desires*, that differences of *Disposition* are most observable. Any *desire*, when powerful, draws over the other tendencies of the mind to its side; gives a colour to the whole character of the man, and manifests its influence throughout all his temper and conduct. His thoughts run in a particular channel, without his being sensible that they do so, except by the result. There is an under-current of feeling, flowing continually within him, which only manifests itself by the direction in which it carries him. This constitutes his temper.* *Disposition* is the sum of a man's desires and feelings.

In the works of Galen (tom. iv., Leips., 1822), is an essay to show *Quod animi mores corporis temperamenta sequuntur*.

See also Feuchtersleben, *Medical Psychology*.

TEMPERANCE (*σωφροσύνη*, *temperantia*)—is moderation as to pleasure. Aristotle (*Ethic.*, lib. iii., cap. 10) confined it chiefly to the pleasures of touch, and of taste in a slight degree. Hence, perhaps, Popish writers in treating of the

* The balance of our animal principles, I think, constitutes what we call a man's *natural temper*.—Reid, *Active Powers*, essay iii., part 2, chap. 8.

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vices of intemperance or luxury, dwell much on those connected with the senses of touch and taste. By Cicero the Latin word *temperantia* was used to denote the duty of self-government in general. *Temperantia est quæ ut in rebus expetendis aut fugiendis rationem sequamur monet.*

Temperance was enumerated as one of the four cardinal virtues. It may be manifested in the government and regulation of all our natural appetites, desires, passions, and affections, and may thus give birth to many virtues and restrain from many vices. As distinguished from Fortitude, it may be said to consist in guarding against the temptations to pleasure and self-indulgence; while Fortitude consists in bearing up against the evils and dangers of human life.

TENDENCY (*tendere*, to stretch towards).—"He freely moves and acts according to his most natural *tendence* and inclination."—Scott, *Christ. Life*, pt. 1, c. 1.

"But if at first the appetites and necessities, and *tendencies* of the body, did tempt the soul, much more will this be done when the body is miserable and afflicted."—Taylor, *Of Repent.*, c. vii., § 1.—V. INCLINATION.

TERM (*ὄρος*, *terminus*, a limit).—As lines terminate a plane and constitute figure, so its *terms* are the limits of a proposition. A proposition consists of two *terms*; that which is spoken of is called the *subject*; that which is said of it the *predicate*; and these are called the *terms* (or extremes), because logically the subject is placed *first* and the predicate *last*. In the middle is the *copula*, which indicates the act of judgment, as by it the predicate is affirmed or denied of the subject.—Whately.—V. PROPOSITION, SYLLOGISM.

TESTIMONY (*testis*, a witness)—"is the declaration of one who professes to know the truth of that which he affirms."

"The difficulty is, when *testimonies* contradict common experience, and the reports of history and witnesses clash with the ordinary course of nature, or with one another."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iv., chap. 16.

If *testimony* were not a source of evidence, we must lose all

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benefit of the experience and observation of others. Much of human knowledge rests on the authority of *testimony*.

According to Dr. Reid, the validity of this authority is resolvable into the constitution of the human mind. He maintains (*Inquiry*, ch. 6, sect. 24) that we have a natural principle of Veracity, which has its counterpart in a natural principle of Credulity—that is, while we are naturally disposed to speak the truth, we are naturally disposed to believe what is spoken by others.

But says Mr. Locke (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iv., ch. 15, 16), “*Testimony* may be fallacious. He who declares a thing, 1. May be mistaken, or imposed upon. 2. He may be an impostor and intend to deceive.”

The evidence of *testimony* is, therefore, only probable and requires to be carefully examined.

The nature of the thing testified to—whether it be a matter of science or of common life—the character of the person testifying—whether the *testimony* be that of one or of many—whether it be given voluntarily or compulsorily, hastily or deliberately, are some of the circumstances to be attended to.

Testimony may be oral or written. The coin, the monument, and other material proofs have also been called *Testimony*. So that *testimony* includes Tradition and History.

Mr. Hume maintained that no amount of *testimony* can be sufficient to establish the truth of a miracle. See reply to him by Dr. Adams,* in his *Essay on Miracles*, and Dr. Campbell on *Miracles*, and Dr. Douglas on *Miracles*.

It was maintained by Craig, a celebrated English Geometrician, and by Petersen, that the value of *testimony* decreases by the lapse of time. And Laplace, in some measure, favoured this view. But if the matter of fact be

* “Hume told Caddell the bookseller, that he had a great desire to be introduced to as many of the persons who had written against him as could be collected; and requested Caddell to bring him and them together. Accordingly, Dr. Douglas, Dr. Adams, &c., were invited by Caddell to dine at his house in order to meet Hume. They came; and Dr. Price, who was of the party, assured me that they were all delighted with David.”—*Table Talk of Samuel Rogers*.

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well authenticated in the first instance, lapse of time and continued belief in it may add to the validity of the evidence.

—V. EVIDENCE.

THEISM ($\Theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$, *Deus*, God)—is oppsed to atheism. It is not absolutely opposed, by its derivation, to *Pantheism*, or the belief that the universe is God; nor to *Polytheism*, or the belief that there are many Gods; nor to *Ditheism*, or the belief that there are two Divine principles, one of Good and another of Evil. But usage, *penes quem est arbitrium et norma loquendi*, has restricted this word to the belief in one intelligent and free spirit separate from his works. “To believe that everything is governed, ordered, or regulated *for the best*, by a designing principle or mind, necessarily good and permanent, is to be a perfect *Theist*.”—Shaftesbury, *Inquiry*, book i., pt. 1, sect. 2.

“These are they who are strictly and properly called *Theists*, who affirm that a perfectly conscious understanding, being, or mind, existing from eternity, was the cause of all other things; and they, on the contrary, who derive all things from senseless matter, as the first original, and deny that there is any conscious understanding being, self-existent or unmade, are those that are properly called *Atheists*.”—Cudworth, *Intell. Syst.*, book i., ch. 4, sect. 4.

“Though in a strict and proper sense, they be only *Theists* who acknowledge one God perfectly omnipotent, the sole original of all things, and as well the cause of matter as of anything else; yet it seems reasonable that such consideration should be had of the infirmity of human understandings, as to extend the word further, that it may comprehend within it those also who assert one intellectual self-existent from eternity, the framer and governor of the whole world, though not the creator of the matter; and that none should be condemned for absolute *Atheists* merely because they hold eternal uncreated matter, unless they also deny an eternal unmade mind, ruling over the matter, and so make senseless matter the sole original of all things.”—*Ibid*, sect. 7.

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Theist and *Deist* both signify simply one who believes in God; and about the beginning of last century both were employed to denote one who believes in God independently of revelation. "Averse as I am to the cause of *Theism* or name of *Deist*, when taken in a sense exclusive of revelation, I consider still that, in strictness, the root of all is *Theism*; and that to be a settled Christian, it is necessary to be first of all a *good Theist*."—Shaftesbury, *The Moralists*, part 1, sect. 2. But from about the time of Shaftesbury, the term *Deist* has generally been applied to such as are indifferent or hostile to the claims of revelation. Balguy's *First Letter to a Deist* was against Lord Shaftesbury. His *Second Letter to a Deist* was against Tindal. All the Deistical writers noticed by Leland were unfriendly to revelation.

"The words *Deist* and *Theist* are, strictly speaking, perhaps synonymous; but yet it is generally to be observed that the former is used in a *bad*, and the latter in a *good* sense. Custom has appropriated the term *Deist* to the enemies of revelation and of Christianity in particular; while the word *Theist* is considered applicable to all who believe in one God."—Irons, *On Final Causes*, app., p. 207.

"*Theistæ* generatim vocantur, qui Deum esse tenent, sive recte sive prave cæteroque de Deo sentiant. *Deistæ* vocabantur præsertim sæculo proxime elapso philosophi, qui Deum quidem esse affirmabant, providentiam vero, revelationem, miracula, uno verbo, quidquid supernaturale audit, tollebant."—Ubaghs, *Theodiceæ Elementa*, p. 11.

THEOCRACY (Θεός κράτος, rule of God).—Government under the Mosaic dispensation is called *theocracy*.

"It will easily appear," says Lowman (*On Civil Government of the Hebrews*, chap. 7), "that the general union of the tribes as one body may be conceived after this manner—that the congregation of Israel, or the whole people enacted by themselves or their representatives; that the great council advised, consulted, proposed; that the judge presided in their councils, and had the chief hand in

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executing what was resolved in them ; and that Jehovah, by the oracle, was to assent to and approve what was resolved, and authorize the execution of it in matters of the greatest importance to the whole state, so that the general union of the whole nation may not improperly be thus expressed. It was by the command of the people and advice of the senate, the judge presiding and the oracle approving.”

Egypt, down to a certain period, was governed by priests in the name of their gods, and Peru by Incas, who were regarded as the children of the sun. Mahomet, speaking in the name of God, exercised a theocratic sway, and that of the Grand Lama in Thibet is similar.

“In the *Contrat Social* of Rousseau, the sovereignty of number, of the numerical majority, is the fundamental principle of the work. For a long time he follows out the consequences of it with inflexible rigour ; a time arrives, however, when he abandons them, and abandons them with great effect ; he wishes to give his fundamental laws, his constitution, to the rising society ; his high intellect warned him that such a work could not proceed from universal suffrage, from the numerical majority, from the multitude : ‘A God,’ said he, ‘must give laws to men.’ It is not magistracy, it is not sovereignty. . . . It is a particular and superior function, which has nothing in common with human empire.”—Guizot, *Hist. of Civilization*, vol. i., p. 387. *Contrat Social*, b. ii., ch. 8.

The term *theocracy* has been applied to the power wielded by the Pope during the Middle Ages ; and Count De Maistre, in his work *Du Pape*, has argued strenuously in support of the supreme power, temporal and spiritual, of the sovereign pontiff. But the celibacy of the Romish priests is an obstacle to their theocratical organization. “Look at Asia, Egypt ; all the great *theocracies* are the work of a clergy, which is a complete society within itself, which suffices for its own wants, and borrows nothing from without.”—Guizot, *Hist. of Civilization*, vol. i., p. 182.

THEODICY (Θ-ός, God ; δίκη, a pleading or justification)—a

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vindication of the ways of God.—This word was employed by Leibnitz, who in his *Essais de Theodicée, sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal*, published in 1710, maintained that the existence of moral evil has its origin in the free will of the creature, while metaphysical evil is nothing but the limitation which is involved in the essence of finite beings, and that out of this both physical and moral evil naturally flow. But these finite beings are designed to attain the utmost felicity they are capable of enjoying, while each, as a part, contributes to the perfection of the whole, which of the many worlds that were possible is the very best. On this account it has been called the theory of *optimism*.—*q. v.*

In Manuals of Philosophy the term *theodicy* is applied to that part which treats of the *being, perfections, and government* of God, and the *immortality of the soul*.

In the *Manuel de Philosophie, à l'usage des Collèges*, 8vo, Paris, 1846, *Theodicée*, which is written by Emille Saisset, is called Rational Theology, or the Theology of Reason, independent of Revelation. “It proposes to establish the existence of a being infinitely perfect, and to determine his attributes and essential relations to the world.” It treats of the existence, attributes, and providence of God, and the immortality of the soul—which were formerly included under metaphysics.

According to Kant, the objections which a *theodicy* should meet are: 1. The existence of moral evil, as contrary to the holiness of God. 2. Of physical evil, as contrary to his goodness. 3. The disproportion between the crimes and the punishments of this life as repugnant to his justice. He approves of the vindication adopted by Job against his friends, founded on our imperfect knowledge of God's ways.

“When the Jewish mind began to philosophize, and endeavoured to produce dialectic proofs, its *theodicean* philosophy, or *justification of God*, stopped, in the book of Job, at the avowal of the incomprehensibility of the destinies of mankind.”—Bunsen, *Hippolytus*, vol. ii., p. 7.

THEOGONY (Θεὸς γόνη, the generation of the Gods)—is that part of Pagan theology which treats of the genealogy and filiation of their deities. It is the title of a celebrated Greek poem by Hesiod, which has been commented on by M. J. D. Guignaut (*De la Theogonie d'Hesiodé*, Paris, 1835). The *Works*, and *Days*, and *Theogony* of Hesiod were translated from the Greek, with remarks by Thomas Cooke, 2 vols., 4to, Lond., 1728.

THEOLOGY (Θεὸς, God; λόγος, discourse).—"Theology, what is it but the science of things divine? What science can be attained unto without the help of natural discourse and reason?"—Hooker, *Eccles. Pol.*, b. iii., sect. 8.

"I mean *theology*, which, containing the knowledge of God and his creatures, our duty to Him and to our fellow-creatures, and a view of our present and future state, is the comprehension of all other knowledge directed to its true end, *i. e.*, the honour and veneration of the Creator, and the happiness of mankind. This is that noble study which is every man's duty, and every one that is a rational creature is capable of."—Locke, *On the Cond. of the Understand.*, sect. 22.

The word *theology* as now used, without any qualifying epithet, denotes that knowledge of God and of our duty to him which we derive from express revelation. In this restricted sense it is opposed to philosophy, and is divided into speculative or dogmatic—and moral or practical, according as it is occupied with the doctrines or the precepts which have been revealed for our belief and guidance. But the Greeks gave the name of (θεολογοί) to those who, like Hesiod and Orpheus, with no higher inspiration than that of the poet, sang of the nature of the gods and the origin of all things. Aristotle (*Metaphys.*, lib. xi., ch. 6) said that of the three speculative sciences, physics, mathematics, and *theology*—the last was the highest, as treating of the most elevated of beings. Among the Romans, from the time of Numa Pompilius to that of the emperors, the knowledge and worship of the gods was made subservient to the interests of the state. So that, according to Augustin

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(*De Civitate*, lib. vi., c. 1), there were three kinds of *theology*—the *poetical*, or that of the poets—the *physical*, or that of the philosophers—and the *political*, or that of the legislator.

Among the Greeks and Romans, there being no divine revelation, the distinction between faith and reason was not taken. Christians were long unwilling to admit that any satisfactory knowledge of God and his attributes, and of the relations between Him and his creatures could be had independently of revelation. And it was not till after Descartes that the distinction of *theology*, as *natural* and *positive*, or *revealed*, was commonly taken. The distinction is rather obscured in the *Essais de Theodicée* of Leibnitz, but clearly expressed by Wolf in the title of his work, *Theologia Naturalis Methodo Scientifica Pertractata*, 2 vols., 4to, Frankfort and Leipzig, 1736-37. He thinks it is demonstrative, and calls it (*Prolegom.*, sect. 4) “The science which has for its object the existence of God and his attributes, and the consequences of these attributes in relation to other beings, with the refutation of all errors contrary to the true idea of God;” in short, all that is now commonly included under *natural theology* or *theodicy*, or both.

Natural Theology.—This phrase has been very commonly employed, but it has been challenged.

“The name *natural theology*, which ever and anon we still hear applied to the philosophical cognition of the Divine Being and his existence, ought carefully to be avoided. Such a designation is based on a thorough misconception and total inversion of ideas. Every system of *theology* that is not supernatural, or at least that does not profess to be so, but pretends to understand naturally the idea of God, and regards the knowledge of the divine essence as a branch of natural science, or derives the idea simply from nature, is even on that account false. Missing and entirely mistaking its proper object, it must, in short, prove absolutely null and void. Properly, indeed, this inquiry needs no peculiar word, nor special division, and

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scientific designation. The name generally of philosophy, or specially of a philosophy of God, is perfectly sufficient to designate the investigation into science and faith, and their reciprocal relation—their abiding discord, or its harmonious reconciliation and intrinsic concord.”—Schlegel, *Philosophy of Life*, &c., Bohn’s edit., p. 194.

In Coleridge’s *Aids to Reflection*, *natural* is opposed to *spiritual*, as *sensuous* to *super-sensuous* or *super-natural*.

This objection might be obviated by calling that knowledge of God and of his attributes and administration which the light of reason furnishes, *Rational Theology*. But this phrase has been of late years employed in a different sense, especially in Germany. *Natural Theology* confines itself exclusively to that knowledge of God which the light of nature furnishes, and does not intermeddle with the discoveries or the doctrines of *positive* or *revealed theology*. It prosecutes its inquiries by the unassisted strength of reason within its own sphere. But *rational theology* carries the torch or light of reason into the domain of revelation. It criticizes and compares texts—analyzes doctrines—examines traditions—and brings all the instruments of philosophy to bear upon things divine and spiritual in order to reduce them to harmony with things human and rational.—V. RATIONALISM.

THEOPATHY (Θεός and πάθη, feeling of Deity)—a word used by Dr. Hartley as synonymous with *piety*, or a sense of Deity.

THEORY (θεωρία, contemplation, speculation; θεωρεῖν, to see). —*Theory* and *theoretical* are properly opposed to *practice* and *practical*. *Theory* is mere knowledge; *practice* is the application of it. Though distinct, they are dependent, and there is no opposition between them. *Theory* is the knowledge of the principles by which practice accomplishes its end. Hypothetical and theoretical are sometimes used as synonymous with conjectural. But this is unphilosophical in so far as theoretical is concerned. *Theory* always implies knowledge—knowledge of a thing in its principles or causes.

“*Theory* is a general collection of inferences drawn from

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facts and compressed into principles.”—Parr, *Sequel to a Printed Paper*.

“With Plato, θεωρεῖν is applied to a deep contemplation of the truth. By Aristotle it is always opposed to ποιεῖν, and to ποιεῖν, so that he makes philosophy *theoretical, practical, and artistical* (ποιητικὴν). The Latins and Boethius rendered θεωρεῖν by *speculare*. With us it means a learned discourse of philosophers of speculative use.”—Trendelenburg, *Elementa Log. Aristot.*, p. 76.

“Theory denotes the most general laws to which certain facts can be reduced.”—Mackintosh, *Prel. Diss.*, p. 61, Whewell’s edit.; and at p. 367, the distinctions between *hypothesis* and *theory* are thus stated:—

1. The principles employed in the explanation (of the phenomena) should be known really to exist; in which consists the main distinction between *hypothesis* and *theory*. Gravity is a principle universally known to exist; ether and a nervous fluid are mere suppositions. 2. These principles should be known to produce effects *like* those which are ascribed to them in the *theory*. This is a further distinction between *hypothesis* and *theory*; for there are an infinite number of degrees of *likeness*, from the faint resemblances which have led some to fancy that the functions of the nerves depend on electricity, to the remarkable coincidences between the appearances of projectiles on earth, and the movements of the heavenly bodies, which constitute the Newtonian system; a *theory* now perfect, though exclusively founded on analogy, and in which one of the classes of phenomena brought together by it is not the subject of direct experience. 3. It should correspond, if not with all the facts to be explained, at least with so great a majority of them as to render it highly probable that means will in time be found of reconciling it to all. It is only on this ground that the Newtonian system justly claimed the title of a legitimate *theory* during that long period when it was unable to explain many celestial appearances, before the labours of a century and the genius of Laplace at length

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completed the *theory*, by adapting it to all the phenomena. A *theory* may be just before it is complete.

“*Theory* and *hypothesis* may be distinguished thus: an *hypothesis* is a guess or supposition, made concerning the cause of some particular fact, with the view of trying experiments or making observations to discover the truth. A *theory* is a complete system of suppositions put together for the purpose of explaining *all* the facts that belong to some one science. For example—astronomers have suggested many *hypotheses*, in order to account for the luminous stream which follows comets. They have also formed many *theories* of the heavens; or in other words, complete explanations of all the appearances of the heavenly bodies and their movements. When a *theory* has been generally received by men of science, it is called a *system*; as the Ptolemaic *system*; the Copernican *system*; the Newtonian *system*.”—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

See a paper on *Theory* in *Blackwood's Mag.* for August, 1830.—V. HYPOTHESIS.

THEOSOPHISM or THEOSOPHY (Θεός and σοφία, knowledge of God).

“The *Theosophists*, neither contented with the natural light of human reason, nor with the simple doctrines of Scripture understood in their literal sense, have recourse to an internal supernatural light, superior to all other illuminations, from which they profess to derive a mysterious and divine philosophy, manifested only to the chosen favourites of heaven.”—Enfield, *Hist. of Phil.*, vol. ii.

See Tholuck (F. A. D.), *Sufismus, sive Theosophia Persarum Pantheistica*. 8vo, Berlin, 1821. App., 1838.

The *Theosophists* are a school of philosophers who would mix enthusiasm with observation, alchemy with theology, metaphysics with medicine, and clothe the whole with a form of mystery and inspiration. It began with Paracelsus at the opening of the sixteenth century, and has survived in St. Martin to the end of the eighteenth. Paracelsus, Jacob Boehm, and St. Martin, may be called popular, while

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Cornelius Agrippa, Valentine Weigelius, Robert Fludd, and Van Helmont, are more philosophical in their doctrines. But they all hold different doctrines; so that they cannot be reduced to a system.

“The *theosophist* is one who gives you a theory of God, or of the works of God, which has not reason, but an inspiration of his own for its basis.”—Vaughan, *Hours with Mystics*, vol. i., p. 45.

“Both the politics and the *theosophy* of Coleridge were at the mercy of a discursive genius, intellectually bold, but educationally timid, which, anxious, or rather willing, to bring conviction and speculation together, mooting all points as it went, and throwing the subtlest glancing lights on many, ended in satisfying nobody, and concluding nothing. Charles Lamb said of him that he had ‘the art of making the unintelligible appear intelligible.’”—Hunt, *Imagination and Fancy*, 12mo, 1844, p. 276.

THESIS (τίθημι, to lay down)—is a position or proposition, the truth of which is not plain from the terms, but requires evidence, or explanation, or proof. In the schools it was especially applied to those propositions in Theology, Philosophy, Law, and Medicine, which the candidates for degrees were required to defend.

THOUGHT AND THINKING—“are used in a more, and in a less restricted signification. In the former meaning, they are limited to the *discursive* energies alone; in the latter, they are co-extensive with consciousness.”—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 222, note.

Thinking is employed by Sir Will. Hamilton (*Discussions*, &c., append. i., p. 578) as comprehending all our cognitive energies.

By Descartes, *cogitatio*, *pensée*, is used to denote or comprehend “all that in us of which we are immediately conscious. Thus all the operations of the Will, of the Imagination and Senses, are *thoughts*.”—*Resp. ad Sec. Obj.*, p. 85, Ed., 1663. Again, in reply to the question, what is a thing which thinks? he says, “It is a thing which doubts,

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understands, conceives, affirms, desires, wills, and does not will, which imagines also and feels.”—*Medit. ii.*, p. 11.

“Though *thinking* be supposed ever so much the proper action of the soul, yet it is not necessary to suppose that it should be always *thinking*, always in action.”—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., ch. 1.

“*Thought* proper, as distinguished from other facts of consciousness, may be adequately described as the *act of knowing or judging of things by means of concepts*.”—Mansel, *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 22.—V. TRAIN OF THOUGHT.

TIME (*tempus*).—Continuation of existence is duration; duration unlimited is eternity; duration limited is *time*.

“By Aristotle,” *time* was defined to be “the measure of motion, *secundum prius et posterius*. We get the idea of *time* on the occasion when we observe first and last, that is, succession. Duration without succession would be timeless, immeasurable. But how are we to fix what is first and last in the motion of any body? By men in all ages the motions of the heavenly bodies have been made the measure of duration. So that the full definition of *time* is—‘It is the measure of the duration of things that exist in succession, by the motion of the heavenly bodies.’”—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, book iv., ch. 1.

“As our conception of space originates in that of body, and our conception of motion in that of space, so our conception of time originates in that of motion; and particularly in those regular and equable motions carried on in the heavens, the parts of which, from their perfect similarity to each other, are correct measures of the continuous and successive quantity called *Time*, with which they are conceived to co-exist. *Time*, therefore, may be defined the perceived number of successive movements; for as number ascertains the greater or lesser quantity of things numbered, so *time* ascertains the greater or lesser quantity of motion performed.”—Gillies, *Analysis of Aristotle*, chap. 2.

According to Mr. Locke (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., ch. 14), “Reflection upon the train of ideas, which

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appear one after another in our minds, is that which furnishes us with the idea of succession; and the distance between any two parts of that succession, is that we call duration." Now by attending to the train of ideas in our minds we may have the idea of succession—but this presupposes the idea of duration in which the succession takes place. "We may measure duration by the succession of thoughts in the mind, as we measure length by inches or feet, but the notion or idea of duration must be antecedent to the mensuration of it, as the notion of length is antecedent to its being measured."—Reid, *Intell. Powers*, essay iii., chap. 5.

See also Cousin (on Locke) *Cours de Philosoph.*, leçons 17, 18.

Stewart, *Philosophical Essays*, essay ii., ch. 2.

See also the *Fragments* of Royer Collard, at the end of tom. iv. of *Œuvres de Reid*.

Dr. Reid (*ut supra*) says, "I know of no ideas or notions that have a better claim to be accounted simple and original than those of Space and Time. . . . The sense of seeing, by itself, gives us the conception and belief of only two dimensions of Extension, but the sense of touch discovers three; and Reason, from the contemplation of finite extended things, leads us necessarily to the belief of an Immensity that contains them."

"In like manner, memory gives us the conception and belief of finite intervals of duration. From the contemplation of these, Reason leads us necessarily to the belief of an Eternity which comprehends all things that have a beginning and an end." In another passage of the same essay, chap. 3, he says, "We are at a loss to what category or class of things we ought to refer them. They are not beings, but rather the receptacles of every created being, without which it could not have had the possibility of existence. Philosophers have endeavoured to reduce all the objects of human thought to these three classes, of Substances, Modes, and Relations. To which of them shall we refer

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Time, Space, and Number, the most common objects of thought?"

In the philosophy of Kant, "*Time* is a necessary representation which lies at the foundation of all intuition. *Time* is given, *à priori*—it is the form of the internal sense, and the formal condition, *à priori*, of phenomena in general. Hence it will be seen that all intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena; that the things we see or envisage are not in themselves what they are taken for; that if we did away with ourselves, that is to say, the subject or subjective quality of our senses in general, every quality that we discover in *time* and *space*, and even *time* and *space* themselves would disappear. What objects may be in themselves, separated from the receptivity of our sensibility is quite unknown to us."—*Analysis of Kant's Criticism of Pure Reason*. By the Translator, 8vo, Lond., 1844, p. 10.

"One of the commonest errors is to regard *Time* as an *agent*. But in reality *Time* does nothing, and is nothing. We use it as a compendious expression for all those causes which operate slowly and imperceptibly; but unless some positive cause is in action, no change takes place in the lapse of 1,000 years: *e. g.*, a drop of water encased in a cavity of silex."—Coplestone, *Remains*, p. 123.—**V. SPACE.**

TOPOLOGY.—V. MEMORIA TECHNICA.

TRADITION.—(*tradere*, to hand down)—"is any way of delivering a thing or word to another."—Bp. Taylor, *Dissuasive from Popery*. "Tradition is the Mercury (messenger) of the human race."—Tiberghien, *Essai des Connaiss. Humaines*, p. 50.

"Tradition! oh tradition! thou of the seraph tongue,
The ark that links two ages, the ancient and the young."

Adam Mickiewitz.

Nescire quid antea quam natus sis acciderit, id est semper esse puerum.—Cicero, *Orator.*, cap. 14.

When we believe the testimony of others not given by themselves directly but by others, this is *tradition*. It is testimony not written by the witness, nor dictated by him

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to be written, but handed down *memoriter*, from generation to generation.

“According to the principle of *Tradition* (as the ground of certainty), it is supposed that God himself first imparted truth to the world, pure and unmixed from heaven. In the paradisiacal state, and during the whole period from the first man down to the Christian era, it is said by these philosophers there was a channel of divine communication almost perpetually open between the mind of man and God. Here accordingly, it is thought we lay hold upon a *kind* of truth which is not subject to the infirmity of human reason, and which coming down to us by verbal or documental *tradition* from the mind of Deity itself, affords us at once a solid basis for all truth, and a final appeal against all error.”—Morell, *Philosoph. Tenden.*, p. 17.

See Molitor (J. F.), *Philosophie de la Tradition*, 8vo, Paris, 1837.

On the necessity of *Tradition*, see *Irenæus* i., 10.

TRAIN OF THOUGHT.—“The subject of the Association of Ideas,” says Mr. Stewart (*Phil. Hum. Mind*, vol. i., chap. 5), “naturally divides itself into two parts. The *first* relates to the influence of association in regulating the *succession* of our thoughts; the *second*, to its influence on the intellectual powers, and on the moral character, by the more indissoluble *combinations* which it leads us to form in infancy and early youth.”—V. COMBINATION OF IDEAS.

While we are awake a constant succession of thoughts is passing through the mind. Hobbes calls it the *con-sequence* or train of imaginations, the *train of thoughts* and mental discourse. He says it is of two sorts. The *first* is unguided, without design, and inconstant. The *second* is more constant, as being regulated by some desire and design. That is, it is *spontaneous* or *intentional*.

In the *Train of Thought*, or the succession of the various modes of consciousness, it has been observed that they succeed in some kind of order. “Not every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently,” says Hobbes. And it has

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long been matter of inquiry among philosophers to detect the law or laws according to which the train or succession of thought is determined.

According to Aristotle, the consecution of thoughts is either *necessary* or *habitual*. By the *necessary* consecution of thoughts, it is probable that he meant that connection or dependence subsisting between notions, one of which cannot be thought without our thinking the other; as cause and effect, means and end, quality and substance, body and space. This consecution or connection of thoughts admits of no further explanation, than to say, that such is the constitution of the human mind.

The *habitual* consecution of thoughts differs in different individuals: but, the general laws, according to which it is regulated, are chiefly three, viz. :—The law of *similars*, the law of *contraries*, and the law of *co-adjacents*. From the time of Aristotle, these laws have been noticed and illustrated by all writers on the subject. But, it has been thought, that these may be reduced to one supreme and universal law; and Sir James Mackintosh expresses his surprise (*Dissert.*, p. 348, Edit. Whewell), that Dr. Brown should have spoken of this as a discovery of his own, when the same thing had been hinted by Aristotle, distinctly laid down by Hobbes, and fully unfolded both by Hartley and Condillac.

The brief and obscure text of Aristotle, in his *Treatise on Memory and Reminiscence*, has been explained as containing the universal law as to the consecution of thoughts. (Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 897). It is proposed to call this the law of *Redintegration*. "Thoughts which have, at any time, recent or remote, stood to each other in the relation of co-existence, or immediate consecution, do, when severally reproduced, tend to reproduce each other." In other words; "The parts of any total thought, when subsequently called into consciousness, are apt to suggest, immediately, the parts to which they were proximately related, and mediately, the whole of which they were co-constituent."

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Hobbes, *Leviathan*, part 1, chap. 3. *Human Nat.*, p. 17.

Reid, *Intellectual Powers*, essay iv.

TRANSCENDENT, TRANSCENDENTAL (*transcendere*, to go beyond, to surpass, to be supreme).

“To be impenetrable, discerptible, and unactive, is the nature of all body and matter, as such; and the properties of a spirit are the direct contrary, to be penetrable, indiscerptible, and self-motive; yea, so different they are in all things, that they seem to have nothing but *being* and the *transcendental* attributes of that in common.”—Glanvill, essay i.

Transcendental is that which is above the prædicamental. Being is *transcendental*. The *prædicamental* is what belongs to a certain category of being; as the ten *summa genera*. As being cannot be included under any genus but transcends them all, so the properties or affections of being have also been called *transcendental*. The three properties of being commonly enumerated are *unum*, *verum*, and *bonum*. To these some add *aliquid* and *res*: and these, with *ens*, make the six *transcendentals*. But *res* and *aliquid* mean only the same as *ens*. The first three are properly called *transcendentals*, as these only are passions or affections of being, as being.—V. UNITY, TRUTH, GOOD.

“In the schools, *transcendentalis* and *transcendens* were convertible expressions employed to mark a term or notion which *transcended*, that is, which rose above, and thus contained under it, the categories or *summa genera* of Aristotle. Such, for example, is being, of which the ten categories are only subdivisions. Kant, according to his wont, twisted these old terms into a new signification. First of all, he distinguished them from each other. *Transcendent* (*transcendens*) he employed to denote what is wholly beyond experience, being neither given as an *à posteriori* nor *à priori* element of cognition—what therefore transcends every category of thought. *Transcendental* (*transcendentalis*) he applied to signify the *à priori* or necessary cog-

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nitions which, though manifested in, as affording the conditions of, experience, transcend the sphere of that contingent or adventitious knowledge which we acquire by experience. *Transcendental* is not therefore what transcends, but what in fact constitutes a category of thought. This term, though probably from another quarter, has found favour with Mr. Stewart, who proposes to exchange the expression *principles of common sense*, for, among other names, that of *transcendental truths*."—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note A, sect. 5.

In the philosophy of Kant all those principles of knowledge which are original and primary, and which are determined *à priori* are called *transcendental*. They involve necessary and universal truths, and thus transcend all truth derived from experience which must always be contingent and particular. The principles of knowledge, which are pure and *transcendental*, form the ground of all knowledge that is empirical or determined *à posteriori*. In this sense *transcendental* is opposed to *empirical*.

"There is a *philosophic* (and inasmuch as it is actualized by an effort of freedom, an *artificial*) *consciousness* which lies beneath, or (as it were) *behind* the spontaneous consciousness natural to all reflecting beings. As the elder Romans distinguished their northern provinces into Cis-Alpine and Trans-Alpine, so may we divide all the objects of human knowledge into those on this side, and those on the other side of the spontaneous consciousness; *citra et trans conscientiam communem*. The latter is exclusively the domain of *pure* philosophy, which is, therefore, properly entitled *transcendental*, in order to discriminate it at once, both from mere reflection and representation on the one hand, and on the other from those flights of lawless speculation, which, abandoned by *all* distinct consciousness, because transgressing the bounds and purposes of our intellectual faculties, are justly condemned as *transcendent*."

—Coleridge, *Biograph. Liter.*, p. 143.

TRANSFERENCE and **TRANSLATION** are terms employed

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by the author of the *Light of Nature Pursued*, to denote the fact that our desires are often transferred from primary objects to those which are secondary or subservient; as from the desire of greatness or honour may arise, in a secondary way, the desire of wealth as a means of greatness or power. — Tucker, *Light of Nature*; chapter on *Transference or Translation*.—V. DESIRE.

TRANSMIGRATION.—V. METEMPSYCHOSIS.

TRIVIUM.—The seven *Liberal Arts* (so called because practised only by free persons) were Grammar, Rhetoric, Logic, Arithmetic, Geometry, Astronomy, and Music.

Lingua, Tropus, Ratio, Numerus, Tonus, Angulus, Astra. Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric, constituted the *Trivium—tres viæ in unum*, because they all refer to words or language. *Arithmetic, Geometry, Music, and Astronomy*, constituted the *Quadrivium—quatuor viæ in unum*, because they all refer to quantity.

“Gramm. loquitur, Dia. verba docet, Rhet. verba colorat;
Mus. canit., Ar. numerat, Geo. ponderat, Ast. eolit astra.”

The mechanical arts were the different trades and handicrafts, as weaving, sewing, baking, &c.

TRUTH has been distinguished by most metaphysical writers, according as it respects being, knowledge, and speech, into *veritas entis, cognitionis, et signi*. By others, *truth* has been distinguished as *entitative, objective, and formal*, the *truth* of signs being included under the last.

Veritas Entis—Transcendental or Metaphysical Truth.

The pillar and ground of all *truth* is in *truth* of being—that *truth* by which a thing is what it is, by which it has its own nature and properties, and has not merely the appearance but reality of being. Thus gold has *truth* of being, *i. e.*, is real gold, when it has not only the appearance, but all the properties belonging to that metal. Philosophy is the knowledge of being, and if there were no real being, that is, if *truth* could not be predicated of things, there could be no knowledge. But things exist independently of being

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known. They do not exist because they are known, nor as they are known. But they are known because they are, and as they are, when known fully.

Veritas Cognitionis.

Truth, as predicated of knowledge, is the conformity of our knowledge with the reality of the object known—for, as knowledge is the knowledge of something, when a thing is known as it is, that knowledge is formally true. To know that fire is hot, is true knowledge. Objective truth is the conformity of the thing or object known with true knowledge. But there seems to be little difference whether we say that *truth* consists in the conformity of the formal conception to the thing known or conceived of, or in the conformity of the thing as it is to true knowledge.

Veritas Signi.

The *truth* of the sign consists in its adequateness or conformity to the thing signified. If falsity in those things which imitate another consists not in so far as they imitate, but in so far as they cannot imitate it or represent it adequately or fully, so the *truth* of a representation or sign consists in its being adequate to the thing signified. The *truth* and adequacy of signs belongs to enunciation in Logic.

“Independent of the truth which consists in the conformity of thoughts to things, called *scientific*—and of that which lies in the correspondence of words with thoughts, called *moral truth*—there is a *truth* called *logical*, depending on the self-consistency of thoughts themselves. . . . Thought is valueless except in so far as it leads to correct knowledge of things; a higher *truth* than the merely logical, in subservience to which alone the logical is desirable. The reason that we sedulously avoid the purely logical error of holding two contradictory propositions is, that we believe one of them to be a fair representation of facts, so that in adopting the other we should admit a falsehood, which is always abhorrent to the mind. If we call the

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logical truth, subjective, as consisting in the due direction of the thinking subject, we may call this higher metaphysical *truth, objective*, because it depends on our thoughts fairly representing the objects that give rise to them.”—Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, sect. 81, 82.

“Veritas est adæquatio intellectus et rei, secundum quod intellectus dicit esse quod est, vel non esse quod non est.”—Aquinas, *Contra. Gent.*, i., 49.

Truth, in the strict logical sense, applies to propositions and to nothing else; and consists in the conformity of the declaration made to the actual state of the case; agreeably to Aldrich’s definition of a “true” proposition—*vera est, quæ quod res est dicit*.

In its etymological sense, *truth* signifies that which the speaker “trows,” or believes to be the fact. The etymology of the word ἀληθεῖς seems to be similar; denoting non-concealment. In this sense it is opposed to a *lie*; and may be called *moral*, as the other may be called *logical truth*.

“*Truth* is not unfrequently applied, in loose and inaccurate language, to *arguments*; when the proper expression would be ‘correctness,’ ‘conclusiveness,’ or ‘validity.’”

“*Truth* again, is often used in the sense of *reality*, τὸ ὄν. People speak of the *truth* or *falsity* of *facts*; properly speaking, they are either *real* or *fictitious*: it is the *statement* that is ‘true’ or ‘false.’ The ‘true’ cause of anything, is a common expression; ‘meaning that which may with *truth* be assigned as the cause.’ The senses of *falsehood* correspond.”—Whately, *Logic*, appendix i.

“*Necessary truths* are such as are known independently of inductive proof. They are, therefore, either *self-evident* propositions, or deduced from self-evident propositions.”—Kidd, *Principles of Reasoning*, chap. 7.

Necessary truths are those in which we not only learn that the proposition *is* true, but see that it *must* be true; in which the negation is not only false, but impossible; in which we cannot, even by an effort of the imagination, or

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in a supposition, conceive the reverse of what is asserted. The relations of number are the examples of such *truths*. Two and three make five. We cannot conceive it to be otherwise.

Contingent truths are those which, without doing violence to reason, we may conceive to be otherwise. If I say, "Grass is green," "Socrates was a philosopher," I assert propositions which *are* true, but *need* not have been so. It might have pleased the Creator to make grass blue—and Socrates might never have lived.

"There are *truths of reasoning* (reason) and *truths of fact*. *Truths* of reason are necessary, and their contradictory is impossible—those of *fact* are contingent, and their opposite is possible. When a *truth* is necessary you can find the reason by analysis, resolving it into ideas and *truths* more simple, till you come to what is primitive."—Leibnitz, *Nouveaux Essais*, iv., 2; *Monadologie*, sect. 33.

"Though the *primary truths of fact* and the *primary truths of intelligence* (the *contingent* and *necessary* truths of Reid) form two very distinct classes of the original beliefs or intuitions of our consciousness, there appears no sufficient ground to regard their sources as different, and therefore to be distinguished by different names. In this I regret that I am unable to agree with Mr. Stewart. See his *Elements*, vol. ii., ch. 1, and his *Account of Reid*, supra, p. 27, b."—Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note A, p. 743.

"*Truth* implies something really existing. An assertion respecting the *future* may be probable or improbable, it may be honest or deceitful, it may be prudent or imprudent, it may have any relation we please to the mind of the person who makes it, or of him who hears it, but it can have no relation at all to a *thing which is not*. The Stoics said, Cicero will either be consul or not. One of these is true, therefore the event is certain. But *truth* cannot be predicated of that which is not."—Coplestone, *Enquiry into Necessity*, preface, p. 15.

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“*Truth* implies a *report* of something that *is*; *reality* denotes the existence of a thing, whether *affirmed* and *reported* of or not. The thing reported either *is* or *is not*; the report is either *true* or *false*. The things themselves are sometimes called *truths*, instead of *facts* or *realities*. And *assertions* concerning matters of fact are called *facts*. Thus we hear of *false facts*, a thing literally impossible and absurd.”—Coplestone, *Remains*, p. 105. — V. FALSITY, REALITY.

TRUTHS (First) are such as do not depend on any prior truth. They carry evidence in themselves. They are assented to as soon as they are understood. The assent given to them is so full, that while experience may confirm or familiarize it, it can scarcely be said to increase it, and so clear that no proposition contradicting them can be admitted as more clear. That a whole is greater than any of its parts; that a change implies the operation of a cause; that qualities do not exist without a substance; that there are other beings in the world besides ourselves; may be given as examples of *first truths*. These truths are and must be assented to by every rational being, as soon as the terms expressing them are understood. They have been called *κοινὰ ἔννοιαι*, *communes notitiæ*, natural judgments, primitive beliefs, fundamental laws of the human mind, principles of common sense, principles of reason, principles of reasoning, &c.

. . . “To determine how great is the number of these propositions is impossible; for they are not in the soul as propositions; but it is an undoubted truth that a mind awaking out of nothing into being, and presented with particular objects, would not fail at once to judge concerning them according to, and by the force of, some such *innate principles* as these, or just as a man would judge who had learnt these explicit propositions; which indeed are so nearly allied to its own nature, that they may be called almost a part of itself. . . . Therefore I take the mind or soul of man not to be so perfectly indifferent to receive all impressions as a *rasa tabula*, or white paper.

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. . . “Hence there may be some practical principles also innate, in the foregoing sense, though not in the form of propositions.”—Watts, *Philosoph. Essays*, sect. 4 and 3.

“From the earliest records of time, and following the course of history, we everywhere find the principles of common sense, as universal elements of human thought and action. No violence can suppress, no sophisms obscure them. They steadily and unerringly guide us through the revolutions and destruction of nations and empires. The eye pierces with rapid glance through the long vista of ages amid the sanguinary conflicts, the territorial aggrandizements, and chequered features of states and kingdoms; and from the wreck of all that is debasing, glorious, or powerful, we still recognize the great and universal truths of humanity. One generation passes away after another, but they remain for ever the same. They are the life-blood of human nature; the intellectual air we breathe. Without them society could not for a single hour subsist; governments, laws, institutions, religion, the manners and customs of men, bear the indelible imprint of their universality and indestructibility. They are revealed in the daily and hourly actions, thoughts, and speech of all men; and must ever form the basis of all systems of philosophy; for without them it can only be a phantom, a delusion, an unmeaning assemblage of words.”—Van de Weyer.

On the nature, origin, and validity of *first truths*, the following authors may be consulted.

Lord Herbert, *De Veritate*.

Buffier, *Treatise of First Truths*.

Reid, *Inquiry and Essays on Intell. Powers*.

Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, Appendix, note A.—

V. COMMON SENSE, REMINISCENCE.

TYPE (τύπος, *typus*, from τύπτειν, to strike).

“Great father of the gods, when for our crimes
Thou send'st some heavy judgment on the times,—
Some tyrant king, the terror of his age,
The *type* and true vicegerent of thy rage!
Thus punish him.”—Dryden, *Persius*, sat. 3.

TYPE—

“So St. Hierome offered wine, not water, in the *type* of his blood.”—Bishop Taylor, *Of Real Presence*, sect. 6.

Among the Greeks the first model which statuaries made in clay of their projected work was called *τύπος*. *Type* means the first rude form or figure of anything—an adumbration or shadowing forth. The thing fashioned according to it was the *ectype*, and the *type* in contrast the *prototype*. But *archetype* was applied to the original idea, model, or exemplar, not copied, but of which other things were copies.

“A *type* is an example of any class, for instance, a species of a genus, which is considered as eminently possessing the characters of the class.”—Whewell, *Inductive Sciences*, viii., ii., 10.

For the meaning of a *type* in the arts of design, see Sir Edmund Head, *Hist. of Painting*, preface, p. 39.

UBIETY (*ubi*, where)—is the presence of one thing to another, or the presence of a thing in place. The schoolmen distinguished *ubiety* as,

1. *Circumscriptive*, by which a body is so in one place that its parts are answerable to the parts of space in which it is, and exclude every other body.

2. *Definitive*, as when a human spirit is limited or defined in its presence to the same place as a human body.

3. *Repletive*, as when the Infinite Spirit is present through every portion of space.

This last is sometimes called *ubiquity*, and means the Divine Omnipresence.—Leibnitz, *Nouv. Essais*, liv. ii., ch. 23, sect. 21.

UNCONDITIONED.—“This term has been employed in a twofold signification, as denoting either the entire absence of all *restriction*, or more widely, the entire absence of all *relation*. The former we regard as its only legitimate application.”—Calderwood, *Philosoph. of the Infinite*, p. 36.

—V. ABSOLUTE, INFINITE.

UNDERSTANDING.—“Perhaps the safer use of the term, for

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general purposes, is to take it as the mind, or rather as the man himself considered as a concipient as well as a percipient being, and reason as a power supervening.”—Coleridge, *Statesman's Manual*, App. B, p. 264.

“In its wider acceptation, *understanding* is the entire power of perceiving and conceiving, exclusive of the sensibility; the power of dealing with the impressions of sense, and composing them into wholes according to a law of unity; and in its most comprehensive meaning it includes even simple apprehension. Thus taken at large it is the whole spontaneity of the representing mind; that which puts together the multifarious materials supplied by the passive faculty of sense, or pure receptivity. But we may consider the *understanding* in another point of view, not as the simple faculty of thought, which produces intuitions and conceptions spontaneously, and comes into play as the mere tool or organ of the spiritual mind; but as a power that is exercised on objects which it supplies to itself, which does not simply *think* and reflect, but which examines its thoughts, arranges and compares them; and this for scientific, not for directly practical, purposes. To intellectualize upon religion, and to receive it by means of the *understanding* are two different things, and the common exertion of this faculty should of course be distinguished from that special use of it, in which one man differs from another, by reason of stronger original powers of mind, or greater improvement of them by exercise.”—Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, vol. ii., p. 38.

“The *understanding* is the medial faculty, or faculty of means, as *reason* on the other hand is the source of ideas or ultimate ends. By *reason* we determine the ultimate end; by the *understanding* we are enabled to select and adopt the appropriate means for the attainment of or approximation to, this end, according to circumstances. But an ultimate end must of necessity be an idea, that is, that which is not representable by the senses, and has no correspondent in nature, or the world of the senses. . . .

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Understanding and sense constitute the natural mind of man, mind of the flesh, *Φρόνημα σαρκός*, as likewise *Ψυχική σούσις*, the intellectual power of the living or animal soul, which St. Paul everywhere contradistinguishes from the spirit, that is, the power resulting from the union and co-influence of the will and reason—*σοφία* or wisdom."—Coleridge, *Notes on English Div.*, vol. ii., p. 338.

"The *reason* and the *understanding* have not been steadily distinguished by English writers. . . . To *understand* anything is to apprehend it according to certain assumed ideas and rules; we do not include in the meaning of the word an examination of the ground of the ideas and rules by reference to which we *understand* the thing. We *understand* a language, when we apprehend what is said, according to the established vocabulary and grammar of the language; without inquiring how the words came to have their meaning, or what is the ground of the grammatical rules. We *understand* the sense without *reasoning* about the etymology and syntax.

"Reasoning may be requisite to *understanding*. We may have to reason about the syntax in order to *understand* the sense. But *understanding* leaves still room for reasoning. Also we may *understand* what is not conformable to reason; as when we *understand* a man's arguments, and think them unfounded in reason.

"We reason in order to deduce rules from first principles, or from one another. But the rules and principles which must be expressed when we reason, may be only implied when we *understand*. We may *understand* the sense of a speech without thinking of rules of grammar.

"The reason is employed both in *understanding* and in reasoning; but the principles which are explicitly asserted in reasoning, are only implicitly applied in *understanding*. The reason includes both the faculty of seeing first principles, and the reasoning faculty by which we obtain other principles. The *understanding* is the faculty of applying

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principles, however obtained.”—Whewell, *Elements of Morality*, Introd., sect. 11.

Anselm considered the facts of consciousness under the fourfold arrangement of Sensibility, Will, Reason, and Intelligence; and showed that the two last are not identical.—Matter, *Hist. de la Philosoph. dans ses Rapports avec Religion*, p. 148. Paris, 1854.

“There is one faculty,” says Aristotle (*Eth.*, lib. 6), “by which man comprehends and embodies in his belief first principles which cannot be proved, which he must receive from some authority; there is another by which, when a new fact is laid before him, he can show that it is in conformity with some principle possessed before. One process resembles the collection of materials for building—the other their orderly arrangement. One is intuition,—the other logic. One *νοῦς*, the other *ἐπιστήμη*.” Or to use a modern distinction, one is *reason* in its highest sense, the other *understanding*.”—Sewell, *Christ. Mor.*, chap. 21.

“I use the term *understanding*, not for the *noetic* faculty, intellect proper, or place of principles, but for the *dianoetic*, or discursive faculty, in its widest signification, for the faculty of relations or comparisons; and thus in the meaning in which *verstand* is now employed by the Germans.”—Sir W. Hamilton, *Discussions, &c.*, 8vo, Lond., 1852, p. 4, note.—V. REASON, INTELLECT.

UNIFICATION is the act of so uniting ourselves with another as to form one being. *Unification* with God was the final aim of the Neo-platonicians. And *unification* with God is also one of the beliefs of the Chinese philosopher, Lao Tseu.

UNITARIAN (A) is a believer in one God. It is the same in meaning as *Monotheist*. In this large sense it is applicable to all Christians, for they all believe in the unity of the Divine nature; and also to Jews and Mohammedans. It may even include Deists, or those who believe in God on grounds of reason alone. But the name is commonly opposed to Trinitarian, and is applied to those who, accept-

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ing the Christian Revelation, believe in God as existing in one person, and acknowledge Jesus Christ as his Messenger to men.

UNITY or ONENESS ($\tau\omicron\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu$, *unum*, one)—is a property of being. If anything is, it is one and not many. *Omne ens est unum.*

Unity is defined to be that property, *qua ens est indivisum in se et divisum ab omni alio.*

Locke (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. ii., ch. 16) makes *unity* synonymous with number. But Aristotle (*Metaphys.*, lib. v., cap. 6., lib. x., cap. 1), more correctly makes *unity* the element of number, and says that *unity* is indivisibility. That which is indivisible and has no position is a *monad*. That which is indivisible, but has a position, is a *point*. That which is divisible only in one sense is a *line*. That which is divisible in two senses is a *plane*. And that which is divisible in three senses is a *body* in respect of quantity.

According to Aristotle (*Metaphys.*, lib. x., cap. 1), the modes of *unity* are reducible to four, that of continuity, especially natural continuity, which is not the result of contact or tie—that of a whole naturally, which has figure and form, and not like things united by violence—that of an individual or that which is numerically indivisible—and that of a universal, which is indivisible in form and in respect of science.

Unity has been divided into *transcendental* or *entitative*, by which a being is indivisible in itself—*logical*, by which things like each other are classed together for the purposes of science—and *moral*, by which many are embodied as one for the purposes of life, as many citizens make one society, many soldiers one army.

Unity is opposed to *plurality*, which is nothing but *plures entitates aut unitates*.

Unity is *specific* or *numerical*. The former may rather be called *similitude*, and the latter *identity*.—Hutcheson, *Metaphys.*, pars. 1, cap. 3.

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“The essential diversity of the ideas *unity* and *sameness*, was among the elementary principles of the old logicians ; and the sophisms grounded on the confusion of these terms have been ably exposed by Leibnitz in his critique on *Wissowatius*.”—Coleridge, *Second Lay Sermon*, p. 367. See also *Aids to Reflection*, p. 157.—*V. DISTINCTION, IDENTITY.*

UNIVERSALS.—“The same colour being observed to-day in chalk or snow, which the mind yesterday received from milk, it considers that appearance alone, makes it a representative of all of that kind, and having given it the name of whiteness, it by that sound signifies the same quality, wheresoever to be imagined or met with, and thus *universals*, whether ideas or terms, are made.”—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., ch. 11.

Universal terms may denote, 1. A *mathematical* universality, as all circles (no exception) have a centre and circumference. 2. A *physical* universality, as all men use words to express their thoughts (though the dumb cannot). 3. A *moral* universality, as all men are governed by affection rather than by reason.

Universal (*unum versus alia*)—means, according to its composition, one towards many. It is defined by Aristotle (*Lib. de Interpret.*, cap. 5), “that which by its nature is fit to be predicated of many.” And (*Metaphys.*, lib. v., cap. 13) “that which by its nature has a fitness or capacity to be in many.” It implies unity with community, or unity shared in by many.

Universals have been divided into, 1. *Metaphysical*, or *universalia ante rem*. 2. *Physical*, or *universalia in re*. 3. *Logical*, or *universalia post rem*.

By the first are meant those archetypal forms, according to which all things were created. As existing in the divine mind and furnishing the pattern for the divine working, these may be said to correspond with the *ideas* of Plato.

By *universals* in the second sense are meant certain common natures, which, one in themselves, are diffused over or shared in by many—as *rationality* by all men.

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By *universals* in the third sense are meant general notions framed by the human intellect, and predicated of many things, on the ground of their possessing common properties—as *animal*, which may be predicated of man, lion, horse, &c.

Realists give prominence to *universals* in the first and second signification. *Nominalists* hold that the true meaning of *universals* is that assigned in the third sense. While *conceptualists* hold an intermediate view.—Reid, *Intell. Powers*, essay v., chap. 6. Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, 2d edit., sect. 23.

In ancient philosophy the *universals* were called *prædicables* (*q. v.*), and were arranged in five classes, *genus*, *species*, *differentia*, *proprium*, and *accidens*. It is argued that there can be neither more nor fewer. For, whatever is predicated of many is predicated *essentially* or *accidentally*; if *essentially*, either of the whole essence, and then it is a *species*; of a common part of the essence, and then it is a *genus*; or of a proper part of the essence, and then it is the *differentia essentialis*; if *accidentally*, it either flows from the essence of the subject, and is its *proprium*, or does not flow from its essence, and is its *accidens*.

Or it may be argued thus—*universality* is a fitness of being predicated of many, which implies identity or sameness, or at least resemblance. There will therefore be as many classes of *universals* as there are kinds of identity. Now, when one thing is said to be the same with another, it is so either *essentially* or *accidentally*; if *essentially*, it is so either *completely* or *incompletely*; if *completely*, it gives a *species*; if *incompletely*, it is so in *form*, and gives the *differentia*, or in *matter* and gives the *genus*; if *accidentally*, it is the same either necessarily and inseparably, and constitutes the *proprium*—or contingently and separably, and is the *accidens*.—Tellez, *Summa*, pars. 1, dis. v., sect. 1. But the fivefold classification of *universals* is censured by Dero-don, *Log.*, pars. 2, cap. 6. See also Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, sect. 37.

UNIVOCAL WORDS (*una vox*, one word or meaning)—“are such as signify but one idea, or at least but one sort of thing; the words book, bible, fish, house, elephant, may be called *univocal words*, for I know not that they signify anything else but those ideas to which they are generally affixed.”—Watts, *Logic*, b. i., c. 4.

“I think it is a good division in Aristotle, that the same word may be applied to different things in three ways: *univocally*, *analogically*, and *equivocally*. *Univocally*, when the things are *species* of the same *genus*; *analogically*, when the things are related by some similitude or analogy; *equivocally*, when they have no relation but a common name.”—Reid, *Correspondence*, p. 75.

In logic, a common term is called *univocal* in respect of those things or persons to which it is applicable in the same signification, as the term “man.” Whately observes that the “usual divisions of nouns into *univocal*, *equivocal* and *analogous*, and into nouns of the *first* and *second intention*, are not, strictly speaking, divisions of words, but divisions of the *manner of employing them*; the *same* word may be employed either *univocally*, *equivocally*, or *analogously*; either in the *first intention* or the *second*.”—Whately, *Logic*, b. ii., ch. 5, § 1.

V. ANALOGOUS, EQUIVOCAL, INTENTION.

UTILITY, said Kant (*Metaphys. des Moeurs*, p. 15), “is nothing scarcely but a frame or case which may serve to facilitate the sale of a picture, or draw to it the attention of those who are not connoisseurs, but cannot recommend it to true lovers of the art, or determine its price.”

“What is useful only has no value in itself; but derives all its merit from the end for which it is useful.”—Reid, *Active Powers*, essay v., ch. 5.

“*Utility* is an idea essentially relative, which supposes a higher term.”—*Manuel de Philosoph.*, p. 344.

The doctrine of *utility* in morals is, that actions are right because they are useful. It has been held under various forms. Some who maintain that *utility* or beneficial tendency is what makes an action right, hold that a virtuous

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agent may be prompted by self-love (as Paley), or by benevolence (as Rutherford), or partly by both (as Hume). And the beneficial tendency of actions has by some been viewed solely in reference to this life (as Hume and Bentham), while by others it has been extended to a future state (as Paley), and the obligation to do such actions has been represented as arising from the rewards and punishments of that future state, as made known by the light of nature and by revelation (as Dwight).

The fundamental objection to the doctrine of *utility* in all its modifications, is that taken by Dr. Reid (*Active Powers*, essay v., ch. 5), viz., “that agreeableness and *utility* are not moral conceptions, nor have they any connection with morality. What a man does, merely because it is agreeable, is not virtue. Therefore the Epicurean system was justly thought by Cicero, and the best moralists among the ancients, to subvert morality, and to substitute another principle in its room; and this system is liable to the same censure.” “*Honestum, igitur, id intelligimus, quod tale est, ut, detracta omni utilitate, sine ullis premiis fructibusve, per seipsum jure possit laudari.*”—*De Finibus*, ii., 14.

VELLEITY (*velle*, to will)—is an indolent or inactive wish or inclination towards a thing, which leads to no energetic effort to obtain it, as when it is said, “The cat likes fish but will not touch the water.”

“The *wishing* of a thing is not properly the *willing* it, but it is that which is called by the schools an imperfect *velleity*, and imports no more than an idle inoperative complacency in, and *desire* of the end, without any consideration of the means.”—South.

V. VOLITION.

VERACITY is the duty of preserving the truth in our conversation. It is natural for us to speak as we think, and to believe that others do the same. So much so that Dr.

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Reid enumerates an instinct of *veracity* and a corresponding instinct of *credulity* as principles of human nature. Children do not distrust nor deceive. It is not till interest or passion prompts men, that they conceal or disguise the truth. The means employed for this purpose are either saying what is *false*, or *equivocation* and *reservation*.—*q. v.*

VERBAL is opposed to *Real* (*q. v.*), 1. As *name* is opposed to *thing*; and 2. As *insincere* is opposed to *sincere*. “Great acclamations and *verbal* praises and acknowledgments, without an honest and sincere endeavour to please and obey him, are but pieces of mockery and hypocritical compliment.”—Hale, *Cent. of Afflictions*.

“Sometimes the question turns on the meaning and extent of the *terms* employed; sometimes on the *things* signified by them. If it be made to appear, therefore, that the opposite sides of a certain question may be held by parties not differing in their *opinion of the matter in hand*, then that question may be pronounced *verbal*; or depending on the different senses in which they employ the *terms*. If, on the contrary, it appears that they employ the terms in the same sense, but still differ as to the application of one of them to the other, then it may be pronounced that the question is *real*—that they differ as to the opinions they hold of the *things* or questions.”—Whately.

VIRTUAL is opposed to *actual*.—“It is not, in this sense, the foundation of Christian doctrine, but it contains it all; not only in general, but in special; not only *virtual*, but *actual*; not mediate, but immediate; for a few lines would have served for a foundation general, *virtual*, and mediate.”—Bp. Taylor, *Dissuas. from Popery*, sect. 3.

A thing has a *virtual* existence when it has all the conditions necessary to its *actual* existence. The statue exists *virtually* in the brass or iron, the oak in the acorn. The cause *virtually* contains the effect. In the philosophy of Aristotle, the distinction between *δύναμις*, and *ἐντελεχεια*, or *ἐνεργεια*, *i. e.*, *potentia* or *virtus*, and *actus* is frequent and fundamental.

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“A letter of credit does not *in reality* contain the sum which it represents: that sum is only *really* in the coffer of the banker. Yet the letter contains the sum in a certain sense, since it holds its place. This sum is in still another sense contained; it is *virtually* in the credit of the banker who subscribes the letter. To express these differences in the language of Descartes, the sum is contained *formally* in the coffer of the banker, *objectively*, in the letter which he subscribed, and *eminently*, in the credit which enabled him to subscribe; and thus the coffer contains the reality *formal* of the sum, the letter the reality *objective*, and the credit of the banker the reality *eminent*.”—Royer Collard, *Œuvres de Reid*, tom. ii., p. 356.

VIRTUE.—“For if *virtue* be an election annexed unto our nature, and consisteth in a mean, which is determined by reason, and that mean is the very myddes of two things vicious, the one is surplusage, the other in lacke,” &c.—Sir T. Elyot, *The Governour*, b. ii., c. 10.

Virtus, in Latin, from *vir*, a man, and *ἀρετή* in Greek, from *ἄρης*, *Mars*, give us the primary idea of manly strength. *Virtue* then implies opposition or struggle. In man, the struggle is between reason and passion—between right and wrong. To hold by the former is *virtue*, to yield to the latter is vice. According to Aristotle, *virtue* is a practical habit acquired by doing virtuous acts. He called those *virtues intellectual*, by which the intellect was strengthened, and *moral*, by which the life was regulated. Another ancient division was that of the cardinal *virtues*—which correspond to the moral *virtues*. The theological *virtues* were *faith*, *hope*, and *charity*.

The opposite of *virtue* is *vice*.

Aristotle is quoted by Bacon in Seventh Book Of the *Advancement of Learning*, as saying,

“As beasts cannot be said to have vice or *virtue*, so neither can the gods; for as the condition of the latter is something more elevated than *virtue*, so that of the former is something different from vice.”—Moffet, *Trans.*, p. 200.

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As *virtue* implies trial or difficulty, it cannot be predicated of God. He is Holy.

Kant frequently insists upon the distinction between *virtue* and *holiness*. In a holy being the will is uniformly and without struggle in accordance with the moral law. In a virtuous being the will is liable to the solicitations of the sensibility, in opposition or resistance to the dictates of reason. This is the only state of which man is capable in this life. But he ought to aim and aspire to the attainment of the higher or holy state, in which the will without struggle is always in accordance with reason. The Stoics thought the *beau ideal* of virtue, or the complete subjection of sense and appetite to reason, attainable in this life.

V. DUTY, MERIT, OBLIGATION, RECTITUDE, STANDARD.

VOLITION (*velle*, to will)—“is an act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man, by employing it in, or withholding it from, any particular action.”—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 21, sect. 15.

“There is an error which lies under the word *volition*. Under that word you include both the *final perception* of the understanding which is passive, and also the *first operation* or exertion of the active faculty or self-motive power. These two you think to be necessarily connected. I think there is no connection at all between them; and that in their not being connected lies the difference between action and passion; which difference is the essence of liberty.”—Dr. Sam. Clarke, *Second Letter to a Gentleman*, p. 410.

Things are sought as *ends* or as *means*.

The schoolmen distinguished three acts of will, *circa finem*, *Velleity*, *Intention*, and *Fruition*. Gen. iii. 6:—When the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise (this is *velleity*), she took thereof (this is *intention*) and did eat (this is *fruition*). There are also

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three acts, *circa media*, viz., *consent*, approving of means—*election*, or choosing the most fit, and *application, use*, or employing of them.—*V.*—ELECTION, WILL.

WELL-BEING.—“This is beyond all doubt, and indisputable,” says Leighton in his *Theological Lectures*, “that all men wish well to themselves; nor can the mind of man divest itself of this propensity, without divesting itself of its being. This is what the schoolmen mean when in their manner of expression they say that ‘the will’ (*voluntas*, not *arbitrium*) is carried towards happiness, not simply as will, but as nature.’ ‘No man hateth his own flesh.’”

“One conclusion follows inevitably from the preceding position,” says Coleridge (*Aids to Reflection*, vol. i., p. 20, Edin., 1848), “namely, that this propensity can never be legitimately made the principle of morality, even because it is no part or appurtenance of the moral will: and because the proper object of the moral principle is to limit and control this propensity, and to determine in what it may be, and in what it ought to be, gratified; while it is the business of philosophy to instruct the understanding, and the office of religion to convince the whole man, that otherwise than as a regulated, and of course therefore a subordinate, end, this propensity, innate and inalienable though it be, can never be realized or fulfilled.”—*V.*

HAPPINESS.

WHOLE.—“There are *wholes* of different kinds; for, in the *first place*, there is an *extended whole*, of which the parts lie contiguous, such as *body* and *space*. Secondly, There is a *whole*, of which the parts are separated or discrete, such as *number*, which, from thence, is called *quantity discrete*. Thirdly, There is a *whole*, of which the parts do not exist together, but only by succession, such as *time*, consisting of *minutes, hours, and days*, or as many more parts as we please, but which all exist successively, or not together. Fourthly, There is what may be called a *logical*

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whole, of which the several specieses are *parts*. *Animal*, for example, is a *whole*, in this sense, and man, dog, horse, &c., are the several parts of it. And *Fifthly*, The different qualities of the same substance, may be said to be *parts* of that substance.”—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, book ii., chap. 12.

“*Whole*” (ὅλον), says Aristotle (*Metaphys.*, lib. v., cap. 26), “is applied to what is wanting in none of the parts which constitute it naturally a *whole*; or to what embraces other beings if they constitute a unity, and to the beings embraced if they form a unity.” Under this last point of view, two cases present themselves—either when each of the beings embraced is a unity, or when unity is the result of their union (*ensemble*). Thus the universal (for the universal receives the name of *whole*, when designating an *ensemble*) is universal, because it embraces several beings, to each of which it applies, and all these particular beings form a common unity, as man, horse, God, because they are all living beings. In the second case, the continuous determined is called a *whole* or *ensemble*, because it is a unity resulting from many integrant parts—above all, because these parts are in *potentia* and sometimes also in *actu*.

“Quantities having a beginning, a middle, and an end, things to which position brings no change, are called *wholes*; those which suffer change by position are called *ensemble* (παν). Those which can unite the two characters are at once *ensemble* and *whole* (και ὅλα και παν). Such are those whose nature remains the same in the displacement of their parts, but whose form varies; as wax, a dress. We apply to these objects the expression *de tout et d'ensemble*; for they have these two characters. But water, liquid bodies, numbers, receive only the denomination *de tout*. The word *ensemble* does not apply to numbers, nor to water, unless it be by metaphor. The expression παντα applies to those bodies which you would call *whole*, considering them in unity; if you consider them

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as divided, you speak in the plural. All this number—all these monads.”—*Dict. Des Sciences Philosoph.*

A *whole* is either divisible or indivisible.

Every *whole* as a *whole* is one and undivided. But though not divided, a *whole* may be *divisible* in thought, by being reduced to its elements mentally, or it may be altogether *indivisible* even in thought. This latter is what metaphysicians call *Totum perfectionale*, and is only applicable to Deity, who is wholly in the universe, and wholly in every part of it.

A *divisible whole* is distinguished as *potential*, or that which is divisible into parts by which it is not constituted, as animal may be divided into man and brute, but is not constituted by them; and *actual*, or that which is divisible into parts by which it is constituted, as man may be divided into soul and body.

An *actual whole* is either *physical* or *metaphysical*. A *physical whole* is constituted by physical composition, and is *integral* when composed of the integrant parts of matter, or *essential* when composed of matter and form. A *metaphysical whole* is constituted by metaphysical composition, which is fourfold: 1. A *whole* made up of genus and differentia is an *essential specific whole*—as man, in so far as he is a species of animal, is made up of the genus (animal) and the differentia (rational). 2. A *whole* made up of the specific nature and the individual differentia, is an *essential numerical whole*. 3. A *whole of existence* contains a singular essence and existence added. 4. A *whole of subsistence* has subsistence added to existence.—Baronius, *Metaphys. Generalis*, sect. 15.

According to Derodon (*Log.*, 3 pars., p. 70), an *essential whole* is that from which if any part be taken the being perishes—as man in respect of his body and soul. An *integral whole* is that from which, if any part be taken, the being is not entire but mutilated. Man with all his members is an *integral whole*; cut off a limb, he is not an *integral*, but still an *essential whole*.

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“A *whole* is composed of distinct parts. Composition may be *physical*, *metaphysical*, or *logical*.

“A *physical whole* is made up of parts distinct and separate and is *natural*, as a tree, *artificial*, as a house, *moral*, or *conventional*, as a family, a city, &c.

“A *metaphysical whole* arises from metaphysical composition, as potence and act, essence and existence, &c.

“A *logical whole* is composed by genus and differentia, and is called a *higher notion*, which can be resolved into notions under it, as genus into species, species into lower species. Thus, *animal* is divided into *rational* and *irrational*, *knowledge* into science, art, experience, opinion, belief.

“Of the parts into which a *whole* is divisible, some are *essential*, so that if one is wanting the being ceases, as the head or heart in man; others are *integrant*, of which if one or more be wanting the being is not entire, as in man, an eye or arms; others are *constituent*, such as concur to form the substance of the thing, as oxygen and hydrogen in water.”—Peemans, *Introd. ad Philosoph.*, p. 72.

WHY?—As an interrogative, this word is employed in three senses, viz.,—“By what proof (or reason)?” “From what cause?” “For what purpose?” This last is commonly called the “*final cause*,”—*e. g.*, “*Why* is this prisoner guilty of the crime?” “*Why* does a stone fall to the earth?” “*Why* did you go to London?” Much confusion has arisen from not distinguishing these different inquiries.—Whately, *Logic*, appendix 1.

WILL.—Some modern philosophers, especially among the French, have employed the term activity as synonymous with *will*. But the former is of wider signification than the latter. Activity is the power of producing change, whatever the change may be. *Will* is the power of producing acts of willing.—V. VOLITION.

“Every man is conscious of a power to determine,” says Dr. Reid (*Active Powers*, essay ii., ch. 1), “in things which he conceives to depend upon his determination. To this power we give the name of *will*.”

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“*Will* is an ambiguous word, being sometimes put for the *faculty* of willing; sometimes for the *act*, of that faculty, besides other meanings. But *volition* always signifies the *act of willing*, and nothing else. Willingness, I think, is opposed to unwillingness or aversion. A man is willing to do what he has no aversion to do, or what he has some desire to do, though perhaps he has not the opportunity; and I think this is never called volition.”—*Correspondence of Dr. Reid*, p. 79.

“By the term *will* I do not mean to express a more or less highly developed faculty of *desiring*; but that innate intellectual energy which, unfolding itself from all the other forces of the mind, like a flower from its petals, radiates through the whole sphere of our activity—a faculty which we are better able to feel than to define, and which we might, perhaps, most appropriately designate as the purely practical faculty of man.”—Feuchtersleben, *Dietetics of the Soul*.

“Appetite is the *will's* solicitor, and the *will* is appetite's controller; what we covet according to the one, by the other we often reject.”—Hooker, *Eccles. Pol.*, book i.

On the difference between *desiring* and *willing*, see Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., ch. 21.

Dr. Reid, *Active Powers*, essay ii., ch. 2.

Mr. Stewart, *Active and Moral Powers*, append., p. 471.

By some philosophers this difference has been overlooked, and they have completely identified desire and volition.

“What is desire,” says Dr. Priestley (*Philosoph. Necess.*, p. 35), “besides a wish to obtain some apprehended good? And is not every wish a volition? Every volition is nothing more than a desire, viz., a desire to accomplish some end, which end may be considered as the object of the passion or affection.”

“Volition,” says Mr. Belsham, “is a modification of the passion of desire.” Mr. James Mill, in his *Analysis of the Hum. Mind*, holds that the *will* is nothing but the desire that is most powerful at the time. Dr. Thomas Brown,

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in his *Lectures on Mor. Philosophy*, has not spoken of the faculty of *will* or of acts of volition as separate from our desires. And in his *Essay on Cause and Effect*, sect. 3, he has said, "Those brief feelings which the body immediately obeys are commonly termed volitions, while the more lasting wishes are simply denominated desires."

The view opposed to this is strongly asserted in the following passage:—"We regard it as of great moment that the *will* should be looked on as a distinct power or energy of the mind. Not that we mean to represent it as exercised apart from all other faculties; on the contrary, it blends itself with every other power. It associates itself with our intellectual decisions on the one hand, and our emotional attachments on the other, but contains an important element which cannot be resolved into either the one or the other, or into both combined. The other powers, such as the sensibility, the reason, the conscience, may influence the will, but they cannot constitute it, nor yield its peculiar workings. We have only by consciousness to look into our souls, as the *will* is working, to discover a power, which, though intimately connected with the other attributes of mind, even as they are closely related to each other, does yet stand out distinctly from them, with its peculiar functions and its own province. We hold that there cannot be an undertaking more perilous to the best interests of philosophy and humanity, than the attempt to resolve the *will* into anything inferior to itself. In particular it may be, and should be distinguished from that with which it has been so often confounded, the emotional part of man's nature."

According to Ritter (*Hist. of Anc. Philosoph.*, vol. iii., p. 555), "it was a principle with the Stoics that *will* and desire are one with thought, and may be resolved into it." Hence their saying, *Omne actum est in intellectu*. And hence they maintained that passion was just an erroneous judgment. But this is to confound faculties which are distinct. By the intellect we know or understand, by the

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sensitivity we feel or desire, and by the *will* we determine to do or not to do, to do this or to do that.

Intellectus est prior voluntate, non enim est voluntas nisi de bono intellecto.—Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, ii., 1, quæst. 83.

Ea quæ sunt in Intellectu sunt principia eorum quæ sunt in affectu, in quantum scilicet bonum intellectum movet affectum.—*Ibidem*, ii., 2, quæst. 7, art. 2.

In what sense the understanding moves the *will* is shown by Aquinas.—*Sum. Theol.*, ii., 1, quæst. 9, art. 1.

“Whether or no the judgment does certainly and infallibly command and draw after it the acts of the *will*, this is certain, it does of necessity precede them, and no man can fix his love upon anything till his judgment reports it to the *will* as amiable.”—South, *Sermon on Matth. x.*, 37.

On the question, whether the connection between the intellect and the *will* be direct or indirect? see Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. i., ch. 21; Jonathan Edwards, *Inquiry*, part i., sect. 2; Dr. Turnbull, *Christ. Philosoph.*, p. 196.

Will (Freedom of).—“This is the essential attribute of a *will*, and contained in the very idea, that whatever determines the *will* acquires this power from a previous determination of the *will* itself. The *will* is ultimately self-determined, or it is no longer a *will* under the law of perfect freedom, but a nature under the mechanism of cause and effect.”—Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, vol. i., p. 227.

“We need only to reflect on our own experience to be convinced that the man makes the motive, and not the motive the man. What is a strong motive to one man, is no motive at all to another. If, then, the man determines the motive, what determines the man to a good and worthy act, we will say, or a virtuous course of conduct? The intelligent *will*, or the self-determining power? True, in part it is; and therefore the *will* is pre-eminently, the spiritual constituent in our being. But will any man admit, that his own *will* is the only and sufficient deter-

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minant of all he is, and all he does? Is nothing to be attributed to the harmony of the system to which it belongs, and to the pre-established fitness of the objects and agents, known and unknown, that surround him, as acting on the *will*, though, doubtless, with it likewise? a process which the co-instantaneous yet reciprocal action of the air and the vital energy of the lungs in breathing, may help to render intelligible.”—Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, vol. i., p. 44.

“It is very true that in willing an act, or in any act of self-determination, I am or may be induced by a variety of motives or impulses—my *will* may be moved; but this does not exclude the power of origination, for the consent even to the outward inducement or stimulus, still requires this unique act of self-determination in order to the energy requisite to the fulfilment of the deed. That it is so, who shall doubt who is conscious of the power; or if he believe that he has not this consciousness he belies his own nature. The actuation of the individual *will* not only does not exclude self-determination, but implies it—implies that, though actuated, but actuated only because already self-operant, it is not compelled or acting under the law of outward causation. How often do we not see that a stern resolve has produced a series of actions, which, sustained by the inward energy of the man, has ended in its complete achievement. Contrast this with the life and conduct of the wayward, the fickle and the unsteady, and it is impossible not to find the inward conviction strengthened and confirmed, that the *will* is the inward and enduring essence of man’s being.”—Green, *Mental Dynamics*, p. 54.

“The central point of our consciousness—that which makes each man what he is in distinction from every other man—that which expresses the real concrete essence of the mind, apart from its regulated laws and formal processes, is the *will*. *Will* expresses power, spontaneity, the capacity of acting independently and for ourselves.”—Morell, *Philosoph. of Relig.*, p. 3.

“*Will* may be defined to be the faculty which is appre-

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hended in the consciousness, as the originating power of the personal self. Not that it can be seen to be an absolute power of self-origination, it is possible that it may always be determined by subtle forces which do not fall within the sphere of consciousness. But so far as apprehension can reach, the phenomena of the *will* appear to have their origin in an activity of the personal self.”—Thompson, *Christ. Theism*, book i., ch. 3.—*V. NATURE, FREE-WILL, LIBERTY, NECESSITY.*

WISDOM, says Sir W. Temple, “is that which makes man judge what are the best ends, and what the best means to attain them.”

“True *wisdom*,” says Lord Shaftesbury, “comes more from the heart than from the head.”

Wisdom is the right use or exercise of knowledge, and differs from knowledge, as the use which is made of a power or faculty differs from the power or faculty itself.

The word corresponding to *wisdom* was used among the Greeks to designate philosophy. And in our translation of the Scriptures, the word *wisdom* frequently denotes the religious sentiment, or the fear and love of God.

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
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
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












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