

REPORT BY: H. SHIMOJIMA  
5 Feb 47

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: MURAKAMI, Keisaki

Address: Was in Manchuria at the end of the war  
as a Lt. General and is now believed  
to be a prisoner of war in the custody  
of the USSR.

A check of IPS files reveals no mention of subject.

CC: 3 File  
1 Mr. Newbill

MURAKAMI, Keisaki

Request by: ARAKI, Sadao

Address: Believed to be a P.O.W. of the Soviet Union.

He was in Manchuria at the end of the war in the rank of Lt. General.

(1 of 2)

MURAKAMI, Keisaku  
Request by Araki, Sadao

Address: Believed to be a P.O.W. of the  
Soviet Union.

He was in Manchuria at the end of the  
war in the rank of Lt. General.

**Name:** MURAKAMI, Keisaku

**Date of Birth:** June 16, Meiji 22 /1885/

**Permanent Address:** Techigi Prefecture

**May 30, 1908:** Graduated from the Central Army Cadet School.

**May 31, 1908:** Appointed officer cadet. Assigned to the 3rd regiment of the Imperial Guard Infantry.

**December 1, 1908:** Entered the Military Officers' School.

**May 28, 1910:** Graduated from the Military Officers' School and returned to the regiment. Appointed probational officer.

**December 26, 1910:** Appointed second lieutenant (by the Cabinet). Attached to the 3rd regiment of the Imperial Guard Infantry.

**March 10, 1911:** Granted the 8th senior grade of the court rank.

**December 9, 1913:** Promoted to lieutenant (by the Cabinet).

**December 13, 1913:** Ordered to enter the Military Staff College. (By the War Ministry)

**February 10, 1914:** Granted the 7th junior grade of the court rank.

**November 25, 1916:** Graduated from the Military Staff College.

**August 6, 1917:** Relieved of the said assignment and assigned to the Military Technical Committee.

**March 20, 1919:** Granted the 7th senior grade of the court rank.

**April 15, 1919:** Assigned to the Military Technical Headquarters (by the War Ministry)

**May 20, 1919:** Ordered to go to Russia (by the Cabinet).

**May 20, 1919:** Relieved of the assignment to the Military Technical Committee and attached to the 3rd regiment of the Imperial Guard Infantry. (By the War Ministry)

**June 14, 1919:** Assigned to the 3rd regiment of the Imperial Guard Infantry (by the War Ministry).

**December 22, 1919:** Relieved of the said assignment and ordered to stay in Russia for study of the military affairs.

**April 9, 1920:** Promoted to captain.

- November 1, 1920: Granted the Sixth Order of Merit and received the Order of the Sacred Treasure and five hundred yen as a reward for merit in the campaign from 1915 to 1920.
- September 22, 1922: Relieved of the stay in Russia. Attached to the Military Staff College as an instructor of strategy (by the War Ministry).
- October 5, 1923: Additionally appointed staff of the general staff office (by the War Ministry).
- May 15, 1924: Granted the 6th junior grade of the court rank.
- August 7, 1925: Promoted to Major (by the Cabinet).
- November 29, 1926: Granted the Fifth Order of Merit and received the Order of the Sacred Treasure.
- September 6, 1927: Assigned to the general staff office as a staff (by the War Ministry).
- February 12, 1929: Assigned to the Military Staff College as an instructor of strategy (by the War Ministry).
- July 1, 1929: Granted the 6th senior grade of the court rank.
- August 1, 1929: Promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel (by the Cabinet).
- August 1, 1931: Appointed staff of the Army Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry in addition to the Military Staff College as an instructor of strategy (by the War Ministry).
- July 29, 1933: Assigned to attach to the Army Ordnance Central Depot (by the War Ministry).
- August 1, 1933: Promoted to Colonel (by the Cabinet).
- August 1, 1933: Appointed as Commander of the 34th regiment.
- September 4, 1933: Granted the Fourth Order of Merit and received the Order of the Sacred Treasure.
- September 1, 1933: Granted the 5th junior grade of the court rank.
- March 5, 1934: Appointed training commander of the Army Infantry School in addition to the posts as an instructor of the said school and a staff of the research section of the said school (by the War Ministry).
- August 23, 1935: Appointed chief of the military affairs section of the Army Affairs Bureau (by the War Ministry).

**MURAKAMI, Keisaku**

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- September 25, 1935: Appointed member of the Army Munitions Investigation Committee (by the Cabinet).
- October 11, 1935: Appointed chief of the army affairs section of the Army Affairs Bureau (by the War Ministry).
- October 14, 1935: Appointed administrative official of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau (by the Cabinet).
- November 13, 1935: Appointed preparatory committee of the Civil Service Normal Committee (by the Navy Ministry).
- April 29, 1934: Granted the Third Order of Merit and received the Middle Cordon of the Rising Sun. (For the merit of the incident, 1931/1934.)
- March 28, 1936: Appointed instructor of strategy of the Military Staff College in addition to the post as the director of the research section of the said college (by the War Ministry).
- April 2, 1936: Relieved of the post as a preparatory committee of the Civil Service Normal Committee (by the Navy Ministry).
- April 13, 1936: Relieved of the post as an administrative official of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau (by the Cabinet).
- April 16, 1936: Relieved of the post as a member of the Army Munitions Investigation Committee (by the Cabinet).
- August 1, 1936: Appointed director of the research institute of the Army Staff College in addition to the post as an instructor of strategy of the said college (by the War Ministry).
- August 2, 1937: Promoted to Major-General.
- August 2, 1937: Appointed exclusively instructor of strategy of the Army Staff College (by the War Ministry). Not published in the Official Gazette.
- September 1, 1937: Granted the 5th senior grade of the court rank.
- January 12, 1937: Appointed director of the research institute of the Army Staff College in addition to the post as an instructor of strategy of the said college (by the War Ministry).
- October 2, 1939: Promoted to Lieutenant-General (by the Cabinet). Relieved of the post at the General Headquarters

- of the Kwantung Army (by the War Ministry).  
Appointed Commander of the 39th Division (by  
the Cabinet). Not published in the Official  
Gazette.
- October 16, 1939: Granted the 4th junior grade of the court rank.
- November 13, 1939: Granted the Second Order of Merit and received  
the Order of the Sacred Treasure.
- April 29, 1940: Granted the First Order of Merit and received  
the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun.
- March 9, 1943: Appointed Chief of the Research Institute of  
the Total War. Granted the first grade high  
official (by the Cabinet). Granted the annual  
salary of Yen Five Thousand and Eight Hundred  
(by the Cabinet).
- March 22, 1943: Changed the permanent address to No. 25,  
Sanko Mae Machi, Makano-Ku, Tokyo City.
- December 16, 1943: Relieved of the post at my own request (by the  
Cabinet).
- November 1, 1944: Granted the fourth senior grade of the court rank.  
Appointed president of the Army School at  
Kun-chiu-liang /in Manchukuo/.
- November 22, 1944: Appointed Commander of the Third Army. Not  
published in the Official Gazette (by the  
Cabinet).

Name: MURAKAMI, Keisaku

Date of Birth: June 16, Meiji 22 / 1885 /

Permanent Address: Tochigi Prefecture

May 30, 1908: Graduated from the Central Army Cadet School.

May 31, 1908: Appointed officer cadet.

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- April 15, 1919: Assigned to the Military Technical Headquarters
- May 20, 1919: Ordered to go to Russia (By the War Ministry) (By the cabinet)
- May 20, 1919: Relieved of the assignment to the Military Technical Committee and attached to the 3rd regiment of the Imperial Guard Infantry.
- June 14, 1919: Assigned to the 3rd regiment of the Imperial Guard Infantry. (By the War Ministry)
- December 22, 1919: Relieved of the said assignment and ordered to stay in Russia for study of the military affairs.
- April 9, 1920: Promoted to captain
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- August 7, 1925 : Promoted to Major . (By the Cabinet)
- November 29, 1926 : Granted the Fifth Order of Merit and received the Order of the Sacred Treasure.
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- February 12, 1929 : Assigned to the Military Staff College as an instructor of strategy . (By the War Ministry)
- July 1, 1929 : Granted the 6th senior grade of the court rank.
- August 1, 1929 : Promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel (By the Cabinet)
- August 1, 1931 : Appointed staff of the Army Affairs <sup>(Bureau)</sup> of the War Ministry in addition to the Military Staff College as an instructor of strategy . (By the War Ministry)
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- April 13, 1936: Relieved of the post as an administrative official of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau. (By the Cabinet)
- April 16, 1936: Relieved of the post as a member of the Army Munitions Investigation Committee (By the Cabinet)
- August 1, 1936: Appointed director of the research institute of the Army Staff College in addition to the post as

- an instructor of strategy of the said college. (By the War Ministry)
- August 2, 1937: Promoted to Major-General.
- August 2, 1937: Appointed exclusively instructor of strategy of the Army Staff College. (By the War Ministry) Not published in the Official Gazette.
- September 1, 1937: Granted the 5th senior grade of the court rank.
- January 12, 1937: Appointed director of the research institute of the Army Staff College in addition to the post as an instructor of strategy of the said college. (By the War Ministry)
- October 2, 1939: Promoted to Lieutenant-General. (By the Cabinet)
- Relieved of the post at the General-Headquarters of the Kwantung Army. (By the War Ministry)
- Appointed Commander of the 39th Division. (By the Cabinet) Not published in the Official Gazette

- October 16, 1939 : Granted the 4th junior grade of the court rank.
- November 13, 1939 : Granted the Second Order of Merit and received the Order of the Sacred Treasure.
- April 29, 1940 : Granted the First Order of Merit and received the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun.
- March 9, 1943 : Appointed Chief of the Research Institute of the Total War.  
 Granted the first grade high official.  
 (By the Cabinet)  
 Granted the annual salary of Yen Five Thousand and Eight Hundred.  
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Army School at Kun-chiu-liang / in Manchou-  
kwo. /

November 22, 1944: Appointed Commander of the Third  
Army. Not published in the Official  
Gazette. (By the Cabinet)

MURAKAMI Keisaku

A Colonel attached to the Army Infantry School in Chiba,  
he was visited by ISOBE, one of the plotters of the 2-26 incident,  
to whom he gave encouragement and sympathy . . .

SOURCE: "The Brocade Banner"

R. H. Larsh

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Page DIRECT EXAMINATION OF MURAKAMI, Keisaku,  
By Col. Ivanov.

31996 \* The witness gave his name and age, and stated  
31997 that he was a lieutenant-general of the 3rd Army prior to  
the surrender, and was presently a POW. \* When shown  
exhibit 722, he identified it as his signed affidavit,  
and acknowledged that its contents were true and correct,  
and he wrote it voluntarily from his own conscience.

31998 From exhibit 722 was read a question and answer  
not previously read into the transcript. In the exhibit,  
the witness was asked the tasks of the Research Institute  
of Total Mobilization in 1943, and he replied that they  
were interested in maximum increase of aircraft production  
and factories, \* and set themselves to produce 40,000  
aircraft a year. They were also occupied with the problem  
of increasing vessels, and their goal was a total tonnage  
of 1,500,000 tons a year.

They were also interested in exports of products  
from Manchuria, Korea, and from the southern regions of  
Japan, as there was a shortage of 1,500,000 tons of rice  
yearly. The question of dispersion of the population and  
industry in case of air raids was studied, and in the  
sphere of foreign policy they had the task of studying  
the problems of consolidation of East Asia countries  
under Japanese hegemony.

31999 After this question and answer from the affidavit  
was read the witness was asked if he was Director of the  
Research Institute of Total War in 1943, and he replied  
in the affirmative. \* When shown a document, he identified  
it as his signed affidavit written in his own handwriting,  
and acknowledged that the contents were true and correct.

32008 \* Exhibit 3372, the affidavit of the witness,  
stated that from 8 March 1943 to 20 December, 1943, he was  
Director of the Research Institute of Total War in Tokyo,  
which was established by ordinance in the autumn of 1940,  
and was a government organ for research into the basic  
problems of total warfare and for training necessary  
personnel in the ministries for conducting it. The  
Institute director was under the direct control of the  
Premier.

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32009 On the day of his appointment he was received by Premier TOJO, who gave him his written appointment and told him that at present the Institute should make efforts in the study of the national ideology of the Japanese Empire, and to secure ultimate victory it was necessary for Institute students to be imbued with that ideology. In connection with this, YAMADA, Director of Jingu Kogakukan, HIRAIZUMI, \* a Tokyo Imperial University professor, and TERAMOTO, a professor of the Naval College, were invited to the Institute.

32010 The Institute received secret materials to carry on research in the problems of total war from all ministries, and students constantly received secret data from their ministries for their researches. The Institute sometimes got definite problems on total warfare from TOJO, but usually itself selected problems. The witness' predecessor as director, Vice-Admiral ENDO, told him in March 1943 that the research in administration of occupied areas of Greater East Asia was personally entrusted by TOJO. This secret research had been completed before the witness assumed the post, and he read it through. Besides this, he read the draft for the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, \* drawn up by the Institute. This provided for the establishment of a central area, including Manchuria, Soviet Maritime Province, and North China, which would be united by Japan, and a Smaller Co-Prosperity Sphere, including in addition to the above Eastern Siberia, China and Indo-China; and a Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere, which would include besides the Smaller Sphere Australia, India, and Pacific Islands.

Problems of the conduct of the war in the period from 1943 to 1944 were investigated by the Institute under the witness' direction. In his interrogation on 28 March 1946, he had stated the Institute's plans with regard to the increase in aircraft output to 40,000 planes a year, increase in vessels to 1,500,000 tons a year, and other matters.

32011 Draft plans were sent to the Premier and ministries concerned to have them carried into practice. The \* War and Navy Ministries were most closely connected with the Institute, and that was why it was headed alternately by a general or an admiral.

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When the witness was a director there were about forty students consisting of responsible officials of the ministries of a rank usually equal to major or lieutenant-colonel, and some representatives of banks and companies. At the opening ceremony in April 1943, there were present the accused SUZUKI, Minister of State without portfolio and Planning Board President; Education Minister HASHIDA; and Chief Cabinet Secretary HOSHINO, who participated in the establishment of the Institute in 1940. Department and section chiefs gave lectures.

32012

When the witness was director, theoretical researches and maneuvers were conducted to render practical assistance and data to the Cabinet and ministries. When carrying out these researches and maneuvers, the actual \* international and internal situation was strictly considered, and they were based on the real strength and resources of the state.

In the summer of 1943, at a conference of Institute advisors, matters concerning students to be accepted from the ministries in 1944 were discussed and decided on. The accused HOSHINO, as Chief Cabinet Secretary, and vice ministers were present. At the graduation ceremony in December, 1943, TOJO, HOSHINO, and SUZUKI were present, and in his speech TOJO stated that the Pacific War had entered into a decisive phase, and personnel of all ministries must make intense efforts. As regards research this term, it was only a short term and they should not be satisfied with what they had achieved. Although the students were given a firm foundation in national ideology, it should be thoroughly grasped by them. TOJO further stressed that they should endeavour to accomplish the war, firmly believing that Japan would win.

32013

\* Due to the personnel shortage, the number was cut by half in 1944, and in that year the Institute was ordered to conduct only researches considered most important by the Cabinet. The Institute closed after TOJO resigned as Premier in 1944.

When shown exhibit 690 and exhibit 688, the witness stated that he had seen them when he was director of the Institute.

Page \* CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. BLAKENEY

32017 The witness stated that during spring, summer, and autumn of 1941 he was on the front lines west of Hankow, Central China, but in September he returned to Japan. The remainder of that year he was at first attached to the army school of military science and technique as its principal from 26 September 1941.

32018 During 1941 he did not attend cabinet meetings nor was he attached to the war ministry or the foreign ministry. \* He did not attend the liaison conferences the summer and autumn of 1941. Asked how he knew so much then about Japanese-American diplomatic questions, he replied he was informed by NISHIMURA of the total war research institute in the spring of 1943 when the witness was institute director. NISHIMURA came from the foreign office and told the witness on 17 April 1941 that a reply had come from the United States that if Japan would

32019 \* withdraw her troops from China, the United States would recognize Manchukuo's independence, approve of its economic development, and use its good offices in prevailing upon Chiang Kai-shek to bring about a settlement with China.

This information was imparted at a meeting of research students, which was a sort of lecture. His informant, before coming to the institute, was with the treaty bureau of the foreign office, and he thought he was officially connected with the Japanese-American negotiations.

32020 Asked what the provisions of Article 95 of the criminal code of the R.S.F.S.R. were \* he replied he thought they corresponded with what was known in Japan as perjury. Asked what he was told by the Russian interrogator about penalties for making a false statement, he replied there was nothing said in

32021 particular, \* but he believed it was common among all nations that there was no penalty and he was testifying what he believed to be the truth without any concern with penalties whatsoever.

32022 \* Nothing in particular had occurred since he became a POW to affect his mind or memory and his health had been good. He heard that in 1942 there was a plan of attack on the Soviet Union from Manchuria when he took over his post as commander

32023 of the third army \* but he did not hear it previously.

His predecessor was General NEMOTO. From the fall of 1944 the duty of the third army was purely defensive, but previously it was to take the offensive in the direction of

Page Voroshilov, and that was all he learned. The plan up to 1944, including that for 1943, was offensive.

32024 \* He did not know what the 1943 plan provided. Asked if he meant that his predecessor told him of the 1942 plan and not the 1943 plan, he replied no. What he meant to say was the plan changed from the offensive to the defensive in 1944, and up to that year the offensive plan continued throughout several years. He knew that operations plans were drawn annually so far as demands were concerned, but he was trying to say that the general offensive policy continued through those years. Reference was made to his affidavit where it was stated that he knew in 1942 there was a plan for an attack on the Soviet from Manchuria. Asked if that was not a plan rather than a policy, he  
32025 replied it was an offensive plan, but the year 1942 \* merely cited the general standard when the plan was in effect, but didn't mean that an offensive plan was confined only to 1942.

32027 \* He thought the 1942 plan for an attack was a routine operations plan and the routine plan for 1943 similarly contemplated a plan for attack, with the third army planning an attack in the direction of Voroshilov, in accordance with the 1943 plan.

32028 \* Aside from the third army, he heard nothing about what other armies were to do under the plan. He did not think there was any time set for the attack and had never heard under any plan of a time being set, for the plan was that if hostilities broke out within the year, the plan was to go into operation and there could not possibly be a plan as to attack or not to in a certain year. The understanding and instructions were that these plans were the annual plan to go into effect in the event of hostilities for whatever cause.

32029 \* The increase in the strength of the Kwantung army took place from summer to fall of 1941. Asked how he knew of it, he replied that he did not directly participate in this plan. But while commander of the third army he inspected his area and heard explanations to that effect. He thought the Kwantung army  
32030 was reinforced in 1941 to 700,000, \* but did not know how many more were added at the time of reinforcement to bring it up to that total. Asked if this increase in strength gave the numerical superiority to the far east Soviet force, he replied he thought the Kwantung army's forces were inferior but did not know how much so.

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32031 According to rumours afloat, the strength of the Soviet forces in the far east was at least 800,000. \* After the reinforcement there were around 13 or 15 divisions in the Kwantung army. After he took command of the third army in 1944, Kwantung army strength steadily decreased in quality and quantity, and consequently there was no chance to take the offensive and they were compelled to assume the defensive. This decrease commenced from around February 1944.

32032 \* This 1941 reinforcement was the so-called Kantokuen, but he did not know if the Kantokuen resembled a war plan. The witness stated that he was a military general but had never participated in an operational plan. He was not a rather well-known author on military subjects, having only written a book on the principles of warfare entitled "Senso Yoron," quite a long time before. Asked if he wrote a book known as "Tosui Sankosho," he replied this was work \* undertaken at the war college while he was there. It was not written by him but compiled on the basis of studies made by instructors under his supervision, and was not published under his name as author.

32034 Asked if he had been a specialist on Russian matters throughout his army service, he replied that he had not once gone to the second division of the general staff headquarters in connection with a study of Russian problems, and was not a specialist but could read and speak Russian. \* When he was an instructor in military schools, he did not teach subjects connected with Russia, but only taught the history of war and tactics.

32035 \* He had not taught Russian military tactics as such, but when he taught Japanese tactics he used Russian tactics as illustration in the military staff college for example. Asked if he meant to suggest that in the staff college, instruction was not given in military history and tactics of other nations, as well as Russia's, he replied that he taught principally Russian tactics vis-a-vis the Russian army, especially in connection with the history of the Russo-Japanese war as well as the military history of Germany and Austria.

Asked if it was not a fact that instruction was given in military history and tactics of other nations, as well as

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32036 Russia, he replied, yes \* that German, Austrian, and French military history, among others, was taught. He had never given lectures on the subject of Russian questions. Asked if it was to be understood from his affidavit that his teachings were that Japan must engage in an aggression to conquer territories in future wars, he replied that that was not his meaning, what he meant to say was that fundamentally the Japanese are a peaceful people, but they could not long exist in the narrow confines of these small islands, and it was necessary that they expand overseas, particularly on the Asia continent.

32037 When influences obstructed this expansion, war broke out because of these reasons. \* Furthermore, to carry on warfare, natural resources are essential and must be utilized, as shown by the late war. It was necessary to bring from the continent large quantities of iron, coal and cereals, and as far as Japan was concerned, it was necessary that she have a strong foothold on the continent politically, economically, and militarily. Therefore Japan strategically must always point to the offensive and that was what the cold facts testified that it was on this basis he taught the history of the war.

32038 Asked if it was to be understood from his answer that his teaching was not that Japan must engage in aggression to conquer territories, he replied that as he said before, overseas expansion was necessary and, while undertaking it, war might possibly occur, if it did Japan must take the offensive and gain control of said strategical and vital areas. \* This is what he taught his classes.

32039 The Japanese army regarded the Red army as a future  
32040 enemy. There were no other land powers with modern and efficient armies so placed that they might offer the prospect of land warfare with Japan. The "Red Book" testified to was an infantry manual for combat against the Soviet. He did not have an exact recollection as to its title, but thought it was, "Method of Combat vis-a-vis the Soviet Army." \* He had forgotten the details of the contents of the book, \* but the instructions on tactics in it were applicable both to the offense and defense. He thought it was published in 1933.



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Asked if he hadn't had in his affidavit that it was founded on Soviet battle service regulations of 1936, he replied that that meant that Soviet publications were used as reference when the book was revised in 1937 or 1938.

32041 MUTO was inspector general up to September 1932. Asked if he hadn't said in his affidavit that the book was issued when he was inspector general, he replied that he did not say it was published, but that during MUTO's time the book had been prepared, publication was some time after. \*The book was published during the tenure of MUTO's successor as inspector general of military training. He had stated in his affidavit, in regard to the total war research institute, that he received instructions by TOJO, when he was appointed director he carried out these instructions.

32042 \* The witness' chief interest was in spiritual training and education, and among the lecturers, was the director of the Shinto institute and a well-known Shinto scholar. He did not mean that the institute dealt with Shintoism and Buddhism, but to understand the fundamental character of the Japanese state, it was necessary that the subject be studied from a broad angle and therefore authorities on Shintoism and Buddhism were \* invited to contribute their knowledge. All the lecturers named in the affidavit came to him and lectured 32043 by request of the institute, \* and the various state ministers 32044 mentioned came at the express request of the institute, or himself as director, and only attended on ceremonial occasions on invitation by the institute.

There were several students from various civilian organizations among the student body, commencing in April 1943. Generally they pursued the same course as the others, but they handled different subjects in accordance with their respective specialties, and this was true of all students.

32045 \* Materials were accessible to them in accordance with their personal desires. Among the students from civilian organizations were at least two from newspapers, and they also had access to the materials, secret or otherwise, of the institute. There were three students in that class from the army. One, a medical officer, and one an intendance officer. 32046\*It could not be said they had no connection with operations.

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Asked if these officers had some special function bringing them in contact with operational matters, he replied that as a question of principle, the institute did not study operational matters, but a study of various problems in connection with operations was made, and medical and intendance officers were necessary in these studies.

32047 ARISUE, who came as a lecturer at the request of the institute, was chief of the intelligence section of the general staff, \* and his lectures were on general information on the current war situation. Colonel NISHIURA, chief of the military affairs bureau, did not speak about this military situation but the war as viewed from the standpoint of military administration.

32048 The witness stated that he was captured by the Soviet forces in August 1945, and asked he had been a POW since, he replied that the Japanese government says he is not a POW but he was receiving treatment as one. He had not been tried for any crime or offense against the USSR or charged with the commission of such. \* He had not been informed he was under investigation on suspicion or committing war crimes against the USSR, and he knew of no reason why he had not been repatriated.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. BLEWETT  
Counsel for TOJO

32049 When shown exhibit 688-A, \* he stated he noticed the  
32050 word "draft" added to the title of the document, and that it stated, "only to be used inside the institute" and that, "outside of the institute to be returned as soon as possible". Asked whether this document was ever presented to the government, he replied it was dated prior to his tenure as director and he could not say, but customarily such drafts would be presented to the cabinet and government departments concerned.

He could not say whether the government took action on this document inasmuch as he was not there at the time. Asked whether from his experience he could state whether the document was prepared for the use of the students, he replied, No, this was a result of the studies made by the

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32051 \* students and later on were used as reference for future studies and as reference for organs which would carry out the matters contained in the study. The institute had no responsibility in formulating national policies but its purpose was only study and education. Whether any studies were adopted by the government depended on the government's discretion.

32052 Asked how this study came to reach the cabinet as the certificate of source and authenticity showed, he replied that such documents were not only kept in institute files, but also circulated to cabinet and government departments concerned. In the last of such documents, he believed this document too was sent to the cabinet \* and other government agencies. The witness stated he was appointed to the institute of total mobilization and warfare by the emperor.

This institute and the research institute of total war were identical. Asked if there was a different organization formed after December 1941, he replied that as far as war guidance was concerned, the total war research institute was established to make studies relating to this subject, but as to other aspects of war, he believed other organizations studied these special subjects.

32053 \* Asked if the institute practically ceased its functions before December 1941, he replied the institute was reorganized in 1943 and abolished in 1944. \* Asked if he noticed that there were three periods of study through 1940-41 when he took over his duties in 1943, he replied yes that the first period ended in 1941, the second 1942, and the third 1943, which was the last class.

32055 Asked if a practically new organization was set up after the war to aid with that war, he replied that that probably was the supreme council for the direction of war that was referred to. Asked if the institute in 1943 and 1944 was primarily interested in studies \* pertaining to the Pacific war, he replied it dealt primarily with the fundamental character of the state and the resolute prosecution of the war.

He never heard that after the abolition of the institution, its documents were sent to the Cabinet archives, but he imagined that would be the case.

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32056 After 1 November 1943 there were no additions so far as students were concerned, but there were some staff members. When he assumed control in March 1943 he thought there were about 15 staff members and after that the number fell to about 8. \* After 1944 no student was admitted and the institutions' activities ceased.

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REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY COLONEL IVANOV.

32056 \* When shown exhibits 690-A and 688-A, the witness was asked to state whether those studies were made under TOJO's direction. He replied that what TOJO requested was this document, and his request was that a general study be made as to the administration of occupied areas.

32057 \* He thought defense counsel had not questioned him regarding the document worked out in accordance with instructions by TOJO. Asked what part was played by lectures on spiritual education and what part was played by the research work carried out under his guidance, he replied that there was the question of proportion between spirit and matter, and the question of the national concept of the state was taken as a spiritual study, but from the point of view of quantity, more work was done.

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32060 \* During his tenure, research on a northern problem was not conducted, but he knew that researches regarding the administration of areas to be occupied in Siberia were carried out before he assumed his post.

32061 \* Main subjects of research were sent to the Cabinet and principal government offices, and their main results were also sent there, numbering about fifteen. He believed copies were sent to the Cabinet and the offices, and not returned.

Asked if the government had any measures in connection with drafts and plans drawn up under his supervision by the Institute in 1943, he replied he had heard that plans to increase aircraft production were taken up by the government, and that in the spring of 1944 the government realized their policies to adapt national livelihood to stringent conditions.

32062 \* Among the banks which sent representatives was the Bank of Japan, and among the companies were coal companies and chemical industries in Korea. The purpose was to utilize the experience gained in the course of their operations and to enable them to cooperate with the government after they left the Institute. He had mentioned two officers previously as being among the students, and the third was NAKAMURA, of the Military Affairs Section. There were two naval lieutenant commanders among the students in 1943.

Page                      Asked if the students had access to secret files  
32063                      of any ministry inside the ministry building, he replied  
\* all material necessary to conduct researches obtained by  
the Institute from the secret files of various offices  
was available to the students.

32064                      When he had testified previously that the Kwantung  
Army consisted of 700,000 men at the end of 1941, that  
number did not include the Manchurian National Army nor  
the Army in Korea. \* The Korean Army numbered over  
50,000, and the Manchurian National Army something under  
100,000. There were Japanese ex-servicemen in these areas,  
and if they were mobilized total strength would be  
increased. He believed there must have been over 150,000  
reservists. If these various forces were added to the  
strength of the Kwantung Army, it would come to about one  
million.

32065                      \* Asked if there were any changes in Soviet  
strength in the Far East in 1941, he replied that after  
the outbreak of the Soviet-German war, crack Soviet units  
were sent to the Western front, and they heard that to  
replace these some new soldiers were mobilized but that  
their quality was quite below par. Asked if the reserve  
corps was prepared to reinforce Kwantung Army strength  
with an additional number of men in the shortest possible  
time, he stated he had never heard of that officially, but  
as a matter of common knowledge he thought they were so  
prepared.

32066                      Asked if the proportion of armed forces in 1941  
changed in favor of Japan, he replied he could not say  
\* whether Japanese numerical strength was absolutely  
superior, but knew it was far more favorable to Japan  
than before the outbreak of the Soviet-German war.

                            Asked if he was the author of "Senso Yoron"  
(The Theory of War), published in 1925, he replied that it  
was published by the Military Staff College, and pertained  
to research he made by order of the school director.

RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. BLAKENEY.

32067                      \* Asked if the estimates he had given before on  
the strength of Soviet forces in the Far East included  
reserves, he replied he did not know whether reservists  
were included. He learned this figure from research  
materials assembled by the General Staff Department. He had  
heard that Soviet forces were still superior in aircraft and  
mechanized units, but did not remember the extent of super-  
iority.

Date: April 3<sup>rd</sup> 1947

Keisaku

Name of Witness: MURAKAMI, Keisaku

Completed as to Items Numbers: 1, 2, 3, 4

Partially completed as to Items Numbers:

If Item 9 is applicable, state briefly the nature of the investigation conducted: