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Soviet Military Posture and Policies in the Third World

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Annexes A through E

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ANNEX A

USSR'S CAPABILITIES FOR EXPANDING ITS
THIRD WORLD MILITARY PRESENCE

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USSR'S CAPABILITIES FOR EXPANDING ITS THIRD WORLD MILITARY PRESENCE

1. Soviet military potential in Third World areas is not limited to current deployments. The Soviets have naval, ground, air, and air defense forces that can be quickly deployed overseas.

2. There are, of course, limitations. The Soviets have not developed the kinds of forces that would be necessary to intervene militarily against Third World countries on a large scale, nor have they developed the infrastructure necessary to support operations against hostile shores. Soviet amphibious forces are primarily for operations on the periphery of the Soviet Union (the naval infantry force is small—some 10,000 men). Their capabilities across the open oceans are limited by the small inventory of naval infantry and amphibious ships. The present lack of long-range tactical aircraft (present tactical aircraft have limited range and cannot be refueled in mid-air) and aircraft carriers virtually rules out intervention ashore against air opposition more than a few hundred miles from a land base where Soviet or friendly fighters can be called upon for support.

3. The Soviets have demonstrated certain distant area capabilities in a number of ways. They have set up air defenses in Cuba and Vietnam; Soviet fighter pilots engaged in combat in Yemen in 1967; air defense personnel and equipment, and combat pilots were dispatched to Egypt in 1970 in response to Israeli air attacks; Soviet naval combatants began deploying to Guinea in 1970 and 1971; and the Soviets sent a naval task force to the Indian Ocean at the time of the Indo-Pakistani war. In the latter instance, the Soviets demon-

strated a willingness to deploy combatants in a demonstration of support in an area of possible confrontation. This deployment probably provided India with valuable intelligence on Western naval forces, gave highly visible backing to India, and may have limited US or UK freedom of action; in any case, the Soviets probably urged this view on the Indians.

A. Naval Forces

4. The USSR could increase considerably the number of combatants deployed in certain distant areas. The number would depend upon many variables, including the destination, purpose, and desired length of the deployment, requirements to maintain homeland defenses, and the international political climate. By drawing on all 4 of their fleets, the Soviets might deploy, for a few months, 20-25 major warships (ships displacing more than 3,000 tons) and 45-50 general purpose submarines, in addition to the forces already present in distant areas.

5. The Soviet logistic system is capable of supporting normal levels of activity even by augmented forces, but it would impose limitations in the event of a sustained high level of activity or combat operations. Water, provisions and, in some instances, fuel are available to Soviet combatants in many foreign ports. However, a logistics system dependent upon such ports could be disrupted (or enhanced) according to the whims of the local political leadership, the purpose of the Soviet operation, and the general international situation. Probably with this consideration in mind, the Soviets replenish their ships while they

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are at sea or at anchor using their own ships, even in the Mediterranean where facilities are available ashore. Although merchant and naval support ships have provided for the needs of the deployed forces there is a relative scarcity in the Soviet Navy of certain types of ships—tenders, repair, and supply ships—which would be needed to support extended task group deployments or sustained combat operations.

6. In its planning, Moscow must always recognize that deployment of these forces against significant opposition in the Third World may carry risk of escalation to a major conflict. In some circumstances, control of key points on the sea and air routes from Soviet bases might be in unfriendly, or potentially unfriendly, hands.

B. Other Forces

7. Any of the wide variety of Soviet ground, naval, and air force units could be transported by air or sea to distant areas. The equipment which might accompany such units would depend on the situation and available transportation. Certain units of the Soviet forces, by virtue of their function or equipment, are more likely than others to be tapped for use in distant areas. These include the amphibious forces, airborne divisions, and some air force and air defense components.

8. *Amphibious Forces.* The Soviet Naval Infantry (about 10,000 troops) and amphibious forces have the primary wartime task of assaults on the Eurasian periphery in support of the Soviet ground forces. The main amphibious force consists of 12 tank-landing ships of the Alligator class and 68 medium-landing ships of the Polnocny class. The Soviets built two Alligators per year in the late-1960s, but only one per year has been built since 1970. The smaller Polnocny, built in Poland, has been acquired at an average rate of about seven ships per year since the mid-

1960s. The Soviets also have several hundred small landing craft, but they do not have large amphibious ships capable of transporting these craft to distant areas. In contrast to the US Navy, whose largest amphibious ship approaches 40,000 tons displacement, the largest Soviet amphibian, the Alligator, is only about 4,500 tons. The actual capabilities of these forces would depend upon the amount of opposition. The Soviets use these forces in the Third World to represent more of a symbolic than a significant intervention capability. They have used them in joint exercises with the Egyptian and Syrian navies, to show the flag and, in the case of Guinea, as a visible show of support to a Third World government. Recently, Soviet amphibious ships have also been used to transport Moroccan ground force equipment to Syria.

9. *Airborne Forces.* There are seven airborne divisions in the USSR any one of which could be airlifted to distant areas on short notice.¹ It would take one or two days to mobilize and prepare an entire airborne division for an air assault. The first regiment of a division might be made ready in about 8 to 12 hours.

10. *Air Forces.* Substantial air forces are available for deployment to distant areas. Both naval and tactical aviation units have used bases in distant areas in the past. About 500 strike, reconnaissance, and tanker aircraft are in the naval air forces, some of which probably could be committed on short notice to distant areas. In addition, the Soviets have about 850 heavy and medium bombers in their Long Range Aviation forces. All of these aircraft have sufficient range to reach many Third

¹ A regular Soviet ground force division might be transported by air to distant areas, but most of its equipment is not suitable for airlift and its level of manning in peacetime—except for those forces already directly committed for the defense against NATO or China—is probably much less than for the airborne forces.

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World countries non-stop, but deployments to distant areas such as the Indian Ocean would require staging through forward bases and/or the right to overfly Third World countries. In considering whether or not to draw on these forces the Soviets would have to weigh diverting them from their other missions.

11. Soviet tactical aircraft now in operation lack both the range and air refueling capabilities necessary for long-range deployments without the use of intermediate bases. Ferrying would require a series of 600 to 1,300 mile hops, depending on the type of aircraft (these distances preclude ferrying across the Atlantic or Pacific). In an unopposed situation, the present support system would probably permit deployment of up to eight tactical air regiments (about 300 aircraft) in one day from bases within the western USSR to Egypt and Syria, by overflying Turkey and Iran, and refueling in Iraq. Some Soviet fighters also could reach the Middle East by staging through the southernmost part of Yugoslavia.

12. In their aid programs, the Soviet practice has been to ship disassembled tactical aircraft either by sea or air rather than to develop longer ranges for them or to rely on aerial refueling. Within one week a limited number of tactical aircraft could be transported by air to any part of the world and then reassembled, providing that the necessary overflight and logistics accommodations had been arranged (some 60 Mig-21 aircraft were airlifted to Egypt for the Soviet fighter squadrons that were there).

C. Command and Control

13. In the functioning of the most tangible elements of their command and control structure—the facilities for communicating—the Soviet system is efficient. Their communications systems appear to have kept pace with most of the requirements of their military forces. Since 1967, operational control of the

military forces of the Soviet Union has improved by the introduction of more high frequency (HF) radio communications for control of forces both in and out of the country. The capability to communicate beyond the borders of the USSR also includes the use of very low frequency broadcast systems and point-to-point HF links; and the Soviets have established military communications facilities in a few Third World countries.

14. During the past year, two Sverdlov class light cruisers, which were modified to perform the role of naval afloat command centers, made their initial deployments outside home waters. These ships are equipped with the most modern communications systems known to exist in the Soviet Navy. One of the ships served briefly as the flagship of the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet in late 1972 and again in mid-1973; the other operated in the Indian Ocean in early 1973 in the role of flagship. They have the potential for directing widespread fleet operations, or supporting military operations in many areas of the Third World.

15. In the event that the Soviets were to undertake military operations requiring extensive communications to most areas in the Third World they have adequate communications. The Soviets have emplaced long-range communications relay facilities outside the Warsaw Pact in Egypt, Cuba, and Somalia. In other areas the Soviets would have to rely on mobile communications. These can be supplied by communication satellites (which will be more effective when new satellite systems are in use) and by high-power, mobile HF radio systems.

D. Future Forces

16. Certain forces now under development in the USSR will contribute to Soviet capabilities for distant operations. The following paragraphs contain a discussion of these forces.

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17. Construction now under way in the Soviet Union on an aircraft carrier represents a development with considerable potential for operations in distant areas. The carrier, launched late last year, is now being fitted with weapons and other equipment and could be operational as early as 1975. Past Soviet experience in introducing new ship classes suggests that the Soviets may choose to operate the ship in home waters for about a year before any deployment to distant areas. Work may be forthcoming on a second carrier though it is too early to be confident of this judgment.

18. The Soviet aircraft carrier is not in the same class with any of the US aircraft carriers. Although it is about the same overall size as the smaller US carriers, it has less capacity for handling aircraft. The flight and hangar decks are considerably smaller than those of US carriers. Depending on the assumptions made about the exact size of the hangar deck and whether or not aircraft will be stored on the flight deck, the Soviet ship will be able to operate 30 or so aircraft—about one-half the number on the smallest US carriers. The carrier's lack of catapults or arresting gear restricts it to the use of vertical and short take-off and landing (V/STOL) aircraft² and helicopters. Such equipment enables US carriers to use high-performance fighters and attack aircraft with capabilities exceeding those of V/STOL aircraft.

19. Even one carrier would be a valuable addition to the Soviet fleet for certain missions. Its fighters and helicopters could reduce deficiencies in Soviet naval capabilities—air defense, reconnaissance, and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) support. The V/STOL

² A new V/STOL aircraft is under development in the USSR. It has appeared on the flight deck of a Moskva class helicopter carrier. It probably is the aircraft intended for use on the aircraft carrier. A preliminary technical assessment indicates that it is best suited for tactical strikes and reconnaissance, although it could have some air defense capability.

aircraft could also be used for strikes against surface ships, although the Soviets already have a formidable antiship capability in their shipborne cruise-missile systems. Shore targets also could be engaged by these aircraft, but the V/STOL aircraft will have limited payloads and range in comparison to Western carrier-based aircraft. In view of these considerations, this ship would be capable of projecting power ashore only in those situations where opposition was light. Nonetheless, its presence could be a distinct asset in a show of force in Third World areas.

20. Other naval construction under way in the USSR will provide cruisers and destroyers (the Kresta, Kara, and Krivak classes) which could operate in distant areas as part of a task group. These units are larger and better-armed than older ships of their respective classes, and they embody good seakeeping qualities and endurance. Conversion programs now underway will provide significant improvements to selected older naval combatants. Two of the Sverdlov cruisers, for example, have been outfitted as command ships. In all, there will be a substantial increase over the next few years in the number of surface combatants equipped with anti-ship cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and modern ASW equipment. The overall size of the Soviet surface forces, however, probably will not change significantly because of retirements of older ships.

21. Maintaining expanded naval forces in distant waters for extended deployments or combat operations would require additional replenishment capacity by ship or shorebased naval support facilities. The present patchwork of naval and merchant support ships is sufficient for present short-term crisis operations, but probably would be inadequate for higher levels of activity associated with sustained conflict. Present Soviet efforts to improve their logistics capability afloat are modest. The new Boris Chilikin and Manych

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classes of underway replenishment ships are being built at the rate of about one per year. But the Soviets could easily build more of these ships or convert others for support roles.

22. The continuing construction of amphibious ships, such as the Alligator class, will gradually add to the Soviet sealift capability. The construction program, however, is still well below the effort needed to develop a capability for sending more than token units to distant areas. The present capability to lift about 10,000 men is expected to increase by about one-third over the next five years. There is no evidence that the naval infantry is to be radically increased or that large amphibious ships, such as those in use in the US Navy, are to be developed.

23. Airlift assets potentially available for distant operations will increase somewhat over the next few years. Flight testing of the four-engine IL-76 turbofan heavy transport is continuing, but series production of these aircraft is expected soon. The An-22 turboprop heavy transport is entering service at a slow rate. Although increasing numbers of both of these aircraft will add to heavy airlift capabilities, the pace of their development indicates that the Soviets consider this a relatively low priority effort. The size of the medium transport force has leveled off. Some new civilian transport aircraft are being added to the Soviet inventory, but not in sufficient numbers to change substantially the overall Soviet airlift potential for distant operations.

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ANNEX B

SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THIRD WORLD AREAS

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SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THIRD WORLD AREAS

A. Ship Days in Distant Areas³

1. Deployments to distant areas began on a continuous basis in 1964 when the Soviets established a permanent presence in the Mediterranean Sea. During the last half of the 1960s, operations increased by about 40 percent a year (see Table B-I). The sharp increase in total ship days from 6,070 in 1965 to 35,600 in 1970 was a reflection primarily of the growth of the Soviet Mediterranean force after the Arab-Israeli war in 1967, the beginning of deployments to the Indian Ocean, and exercise "Ocean" which involved some 200 ships in 1970.

³ The cumulative total of days that Soviet naval ships spend outside home waters (Barents Sea, Baltic Sea, Black Sea, Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk, and the Kamchatka area). Activity of ballistic missile submarines, space support ships, and oceanographic/hydrographic units is not included.

2. The distribution by region of Soviet naval activity changed during the period 1965-1970, although the overall total for all areas increased. In this period, for example, activity in the Mediterranean Sea declined from about 67 percent of the total to 48 percent, while the portion for the Indian Ocean grew from 0 to 10 percent.

3. The level of Soviet naval activity in the Mediterranean Sea has remained nearly constant since 1970. Deployments to West African and Caribbean waters have increased slightly, but account for only some 6 percent of the overall activity. In the Indian Ocean, Soviet ship days—exclusive of harbor clearing operations in Bangladesh—rose about 25 percent primarily as a consequence of the augmentation of Soviet naval forces in that area during the Indo-Pakistani war. Soviet naval units engaged in the harbor clearing work at

TABLE B-I

DEPLOYMENTS OF SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE NAVAL SHIPS 1965-1972^a
(In Ship Days Per Year)

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
Mediterranean Sea	4,007	4,314	8,663	12,157	15,153	17,055	18,112	17,336
Atlantic Ocean ^b	1,150	2,320	3,349	4,201	6,065	9,129	7,871	7,555
Pacific Ocean	915	1,220	1,875	2,567	4,001	4,902	4,122	4,073
Indian Ocean	0	0	0	1,106	2,022	3,726	3,149	7,096 (4,632) ^c
West Africa	0	0	435	133	347	201	1,114	1,260
Caribbean Sea ^d	0	0	0	0	254	605	820	911
TOTALS	6,072	7,854	14,322	20,164	27,842	35,618 ^e	35,188	38,231 (35,767) ^e

^a Excluding ballistic missile submarines, oceanographic and space support operations.

^b Excluding the Caribbean Sea and waters off West Africa.

^c Total adjusted to exclude harbor-clearing operations in Bangladesh.

^d Including non-combatant rescue tugs stationed in Cuba since September 1970.

^e Includes an estimated 3,000 ship days accumulated by naval units in exercise "Ocean."

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Chittagong, Bangladesh—mostly small minesweepers and diving support craft—accounted for roughly 2,500 ship days in 1972.

B. Port Visits

4. The number of visits by Soviet naval ships to foreign ports has leveled off since 1970, after a rapid rise in the late 1960s. Until 1966 Soviet port calls amounted to 12 or less per year. With the increase in naval deployment between 1965 and 1970, these totals grew to a peak of 784 in 1970. They have stabilized at a slightly lower level (see Table B-II for an annual breakdown of these totals by ocean area). Exercise "Ocean" had an inflationary effect which caused the peak reached in 1970 (784 port visits)—after the exercise, numerous units dispersed and conducted port calls around the world to gain the maximum amount of propaganda and political effect.

5. The geographical distribution of Soviet port visits has varied markedly over the past five years. Before 1968, about 85 percent were in Mediterranean Sea ports. This proportion

has fallen to about 50 percent while port visits in the Indian Ocean, Caribbean, and West African waters have grown from virtually none to nearly 40 percent of the total. Visits to ports in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans have comprised about 10 percent of the total during the past five years.⁴

6. The relationship between operating time and port visits in each of the Soviet Navy's major operating regions varies widely, reflecting the differing complexions of Soviet activity in each of them. The Soviets spend

⁴The bulk of Soviet port visits have been concentrated in relatively few countries. Over the past 10 years, groups of Soviet ships visited Egyptian ports more than 1,200 times, Cuban ports over 100 times, and Somalia, Syrian, and Guinean ports 50 to 100 times. Between 20 and 50 port visits occurred in Algeria, Singapore, Yemen, Ceylon, Morocco, and the Canary Islands, while 10 to 20 took place in Yugoslavia, Senegal, Mauritius, Italy, Iraq, Ethiopia, and the UK. Eleven ports—in the Ivory Coast, St. Helena, Norway, France, Sierra Leone, Yemen (Aden), Pakistan, Iran, Kenya, the Maldives, and Tanzania—were visited by Soviet ships 3 to 10 times, and an additional 24 countries were visited 1 or 2 times. Eight to 13 Soviet ships were in Bangladesh continuously during the latter half of 1972.

TABLE B-II

PATTERN OF SOVIET NAVAL PORT VISITS •

	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
Mediterranean Sea	..	2	11	27	97	206	576	589	506	420
Atlantic Ocean ^b	2	1	4	..	16	24	10	9
Pacific Ocean	3	1	4	14	12	27
Caribbean Sea	12	48	27	126
Indian Ocean ^c	3	..	1	1	2	42	68	61	40	110 ^d
West Africa	3	48	41	76
TOTAL Port Visits	5	2	12	29	106	249	679	784 ^e	636	768

^a The totals reflect every entry of each Soviet naval ship into a foreign port, including oceanographic research and space support ships.

^b Excluding visits to ports in the West Africa and the Caribbean areas.

^c Since the departure of the British Navy from the Persian Gulf in 1971, information is spotty on Soviet naval visits to Yemen, Somalia, and Iraq.

^d Excluding harbor clearing activity in Bangladesh.

^e Peak caused by the large number of port calls subsequent to exercise "Ocean."

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less than 20 percent of their deployed operating time in the Indian Ocean, Caribbean, and West African waters, for example, but nearly 40 percent of their port visits take place in these areas.⁵ Many of these visits are almost certainly arranged for their political impact and have little or no relation to Soviet naval

⁵ Excluding harbor clearing operations in Bangladesh.

logistics and support. In contrast, nearly 40 percent of the USSR's deployed surface ship and submarine activity takes place in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, but it consists mainly of transit, surveillance, and exercise activity; less than 10 percent of Soviet port calls occur in these oceans. Nearly half the deployed operations of Soviet units take place in the Mediterranean Sea, and about half their port visits occur there.

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ANNEX C

SOVIET MILITARY USE OF FACILITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD

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SOVIET MILITARY USE OF FACILITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD

A. General

1. At this time, the Soviets have no bases⁶ for their military forces in any Third World country. Their naval forces use what the Soviets term "floating bases"—repair ships, oilers, and submarine tenders which presently provide virtually all the replenishment and repair services to ships in areas distant from the USSR. Such support is rendered while naval ships are moored in international waters or foreign ports, or under way at slow speed. In many instances where Soviet warships have access to facilities ashore, such as in Egypt, and Somalia, the Soviets continue to use support ships for most services.

2. The Soviets have sought, and are seeking, additional access to port facilities for use by their navy. In certain cases (in Egypt and Cuba, for example), Soviet support ships are stationed in ports which also are used freely by surface combatants and submarines; but the host country retains control of the port. Soviet combatants have been granted the use of the facilities of other ports such as at Conakry, Guinea; Berbera, Somalia; Umm Qasr, Iraq; and Latakia and Tartus, in Syria.

3. To date, Soviet military aircraft (other than transports) have operated from airfields only in Cuba, Egypt, and Guinea. Landing rights for Soviet military aircraft engaged in space support activities have been acquired in India. Overflight rights for military transport aircraft are granted routinely by Yugoslavia,

⁶ We define bases to be installations in which regular military units are stationed, to which the basing power has unrestricted access, and over which the basing power has control.

Turkey, and most Arab states. In their military flights to the Indian Ocean area the Soviets have either overflown Iran or staged through Egypt and Yemen (Aden). The Soviets might seek permission in the future to stage through Syria and Iraq to reach this area.

B. The Mediterranean Area

4. *Egypt.* Soviet warships continue to use Egyptian ports, and anchorages inside Egyptian territorial waters despite President Sadat's expulsion of Soviet military advisors from the country in July 1972. Soviet amphibious ships and a destroyer moor routinely in *Port Said*, but do not appear to make use of any of the port facilities there, not even the oil storage site leased earlier by the Soviet Navy. Surface combatants no longer stop at Alexandria for minor repairs and replenishment. Diesel submarines and support ships, including the major replenishment and repair classes, continue to use this port for these purposes. The support ships frequently go to the anchorages off Egypt to service the surface combatants. Some 80 Soviet naval technicians are still working in the El Qabbari shipyard.

5. The formerly Soviet-controlled facility at *Mersa Matruh* has reverted to full Egyptian control. Before July 1972, it was being developed as a deep water port with storage and recreational facilities for the exclusive use of the Soviet Navy. It reportedly is now being converted into a commercial port with only a small naval facility to be built in an adjoining lake. Nonetheless, a Soviet stores ship is still moored at Mersa Matruh and a naval auxiliary, or small warship, also stops there regularly. The nearby anchorage (at Ras al Kanais)

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frequently is used for the replenishment of Soviet surface combatants and diesel submarines.

6. *Syria*. Soviet warships are permitted by Syria to call routinely at the ports of *Latakia* and *Tartus*, but a permanent Soviet naval presence has not been established in the country. Some of the Soviet warships which frequently anchor off Crete and Cyprus make port calls in Syria. Soviet repair ships tie up in Tartus but they provide only minor logistics support to the combatants. The facilities at Tartus are being expanded. Improvements, including the construction of a drydock, are being made to the military section of the port which can easily accommodate 8 to 10 destroyers.

7. *Other Mediterranean Countries*. The Soviets do not have military base or facilities arrangements with *Malta*, but Soviet naval ships frequently show the flag off Malta's shores. No Soviet warships have visited Malta, as yet, but they anchor regularly at nearby Hurd Bank. *Algeria* allows Soviet warships to make occasional short visits to Algiers and Annaba. So far, Algeria has not made the port of Mers El Kebir available for such stops. The Soviets have been rebuffed in their approach to the Algerians to acquire access to naval facilities there. Infrequent visits of Soviet naval ships are permitted by *Libya*, but President Qadhafi has refused the regular Soviet use of Libyan ports and airfields. Finally, Soviet warships make infrequent visits to ports in *Yugoslavia*.

C. The Atlantic

8. *Cuba*. Part of the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba was converted in the fall of 1970 for the minor repair and provisioning of submarines and surface combatants. A recreation facility is on a small island (*Alcatraz*). The mooring and recreation facilities are separated from the Cuban naval base and appear to have been constructed for use

by Soviet ships. Despite their availability, the Soviet warships which stop in Cienfuegos continue, for the most part, to use berths in the commercial area of the port.

9. Soviet warships also call at Havana, Mariel, and Antilla. General support facilities in Havana and Mariel probably are made available to the Soviets, but only replenishment activity has been observed. Antilla, in the remote Bay of Nipe, has been used to replenish Soviet submarines including the diesel-powered, G-class ballistic missile unit which visited Cuba in April 1972.

10. We believe it unlikely that the Soviets would attempt to use the naval facilities in Cuba for forward basing of ballistic missile submarines, especially since their newer, longer-range, naval ballistic missiles will, in the future, lessen their requirement for forward basing. Nevertheless, we do not rule out future visits of Soviet ballistic missile submarines to test US reactions and perhaps to spur US/Soviet negotiations on forward-based weapon systems.

11. The Soviets activated a naval communications station near Havana in early 1972. It no doubt provides ship-to-shore relay communications for Soviet ships operating in the Caribbean Sea and western Atlantic Ocean and also serves as a link between Moscow and Soviet naval authorities in Cuba.

12. Through mid-1973, small detachments of two or three Soviet long-range naval reconnaissance aircraft (the Tu-95, Bear D) have visited Cuba on 11 occasions. During their last five visits they staged reconnaissance flights from Cuba over the Atlantic, ranging from the east coast of the US to the Azores. For these and the other flights, the Soviets have used the Marti International Airport south of Havana. Facilities at this airport were used by the Soviet aircraft for fueling and maintenance. There are 12 other airfields

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in Cuba which could accommodate these aircraft, but they do not have sufficient facilities for repair work.

13. *Guinea*. Since 1970, Soviet warships have been operating off West Africa on a nearly continuous basis (the Soviet force in the area has gone as high as five but usually consists of three ships—a destroyer, oiler, and amphibious landing ship). They have free access to Conakry but no support facilities in its port are used exclusively by Soviet warships. Often the Soviets are unable to use the port facilities because of congestion and therefore they anchor nearby. Soviet warships also have anchored near President Toure's home as a visible sign of support. At the request of the Guinean Government, the Soviets recently captured a patrol craft in which fleeing rebels were trying to escape. In July 1973, the Soviets deployed two Tu-95s (Bear Ds), and two An-12 support aircraft to Conakry for the first time. Before returning to the USSR, the Tu-95s conducted maritime reconnaissance from Guinea. The use of Conakry for naval air reconnaissance operations gives the Soviets the potential for extended coverage of the Atlantic Ocean.

D. The Indian Ocean

14. Current Soviet logistics practice in the Indian Ocean resembles the pattern established in the early years in the Mediterranean. This includes the use of anchorages in international waters and a rudimentary form of underway replenishment for supplies of fuel oil, provisions, mail, and minor repairs. Five anchorages in particular have been used for logistics functions as well as waiting positions:

a. and b. *Socotra*. Anchorages to the north and south of the island are used frequently by combatant and support ships.

c. *Cargados Carajos*. About 200 miles north-northeast of Mauritius, the anchorage is used often by space support and hydrographic research ships, but rarely by combatants.

d. *Fortune Bank*. This is one of the three anchorages in international waters where the Soviets are known to have implanted mooring buoys. (The others are in the Philippine Sea and the Chagos Archipelago.) Since the buoys were emplaced in April 1969, hydrographic research ships have used Fortune Bank, but combatants have not been detected using it.

e. *Northeast Seychelles*. About 90 miles from the nearest land, the area was used by combatant ships in 1968 and 1969, but the center of Soviet activity has shifted to other anchorages, near Socotra.

f. *Chagos Archipelago*. About 600 miles south of India. Site of the US naval communications facility on Diego Garcia. Used by Soviet warships, support ships, and research vessels.

15. *Somalia*. The Soviets are expanding the facilities at the deep water port of Berbera on the Gulf of Aden, and are now using it for the routine upkeep of their warships which deploy to the Indian Ocean. Work has been underway at the port and nearby airfield since November 1972. Improvements will include the addition of a floating pier. Petroleum, oil and lubricants storage facilities are known to be available ashore but support, at present, appears to be accomplished by Soviet naval auxiliary ships in the port. A Soviet naval communications facility is also located outside Berbera. It began operating in December 1972, and can give communications support to Soviet naval units in the Indian Ocean. When the airfield is complete it will provide the Soviets with improved logistics by airlift. The Soviets probably will use this field for

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space-event support and reconnaissance aircraft, and perhaps for maritime patrol.

16. *Iraq*. The port of Umm Qasr in the Persian Gulf is available for use by Soviet naval ships, but the Soviets have availed themselves of the facilities only irregularly. A Soviet repair ship that was present for several months in 1972 is believed to have been providing technical assistance to the Iraqi Navy.

17. *Yemen (Aden)*. Repair facilities at the former British naval base at Aden have not been used by Soviet warships, although Soviet support ships stop there for refueling and replenishment. The Soviets maintain an anchorage in international waters off Socotra Island. The half dozen or so Soviet warships routinely in the Indian Ocean spend the majority of their time at this anchorage or in nearby Berbera, Somalia. The island has no harbor suitable for use as a sea port. Some work has been done on the lengthening of its airstrip. An airfield on the island might offer some attraction to the Soviets as a forward base for maritime reconnaissance, or space support, aircraft.

18. *Other Indian Ocean Countries*. The Soviets helped build the naval port at Vizakhapatnam, *India*, and have equipped the Indian Navy with modern Soviet naval ships. However, New Delhi has not granted the Soviets free access to Indian ports. There are occasional friendship visits by Soviet

warships, but there is no pattern of regular support activity. A group of Soviet minesweepers and support ships is working to clear Chittagong, *Bangladesh*, of sunken vessels and of mines placed there during the Indo-Pakistani war. These ships are not associated with the other Soviet warships deployed to the Indian Ocean and are engaged in performing a mission of assistance rather than in creating a naval presence. Nevertheless, the Soviets have established a precedent for a continued presence and may try to use the port facilities in Chittagong to support Soviet warships in the Indian Ocean after the mines have been cleared. There is one repair ship (Amur class) in Chittagong now, and warships as large as the Kynda class ships could be accommodated in the port area. The Soviets have been making overtures to gain access to the port of *Colombo, Sri Lanka* (but not the former British naval base at Trincomalee). As yet, it has not been used on a regular basis to support Soviet warships, but Moscow has started sending in research ships, support ships, and an occasional warship probably, in part, to acclimate the Ceylonese to a Soviet naval presence. Soviet naval ships regularly call at *Singapore* as they enter and exit the Indian Ocean. Only recently, however, have repair and refitting of Soviet naval ships been permitted. Since the Soviets signed their first contract with one of the private Singapore shipyards in May 1972, approximately nine Soviet support ships have used the drydock facilities in Singapore.

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ANNEX D

SOVIET SEALIFT AND AIRLIFT CAPABILITIES

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SOVIET SEALIFT AND AIRLIFT CAPABILITIES

A. General

1. Over the past decade, the Soviets, despite some dislocations to the economy, have proven willing to utilize civilian and military sea and airlift capabilities to support their foreign policy objectives.⁷ In order to carry out a major lift, help from resources in the civilian sector would be needed. Civilian aircraft and ships have been used for limited support activity in the past when the Soviets felt it necessary to do so. Their extensive employment, however, probably would result in serious economic dislocations if they were used in military support roles for extended periods of time.

2. The following discussion of Soviet sealift and airlift capabilities for the most part is only illustrative. Many factors affect the actual capability that the Soviets could and would assemble. These include the actual number of civilian ships and aircraft that would be diverted to take part in a lift operation in the face of other national needs, the type and amount of support to be lifted, the distance from the USSR that it must cover and, in time of a potential confrontation or war, the extent and location of military forces opposing the operations.

3. *Soviet sealift capabilities* consist of naval amphibious ships and merchant shipping. The Soviet amphibious forces have missions involv-

⁷ In areas where the Soviets have had operational experience—in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia—they have conducted well-executed airlifts of arms to many countries. In 1967, they made over 600 flights to Algeria, Yemen, and Egypt after the June war. In 1970 and 1971, they airlifted most of the Soviet-manned air defense fighters to Egypt and delivered considerable aid to India.

ing the Eurasian periphery, although some of their newer landing ships permit longer-range operations. The Soviet merchant marine, fully utilized in peacetime, represents a potentially valuable adjunct for military lift operations to Third World areas. *Soviet airlift capabilities* are embodied in the Military Transport Aviation (VTA) and the civil air fleet. The VTA is tasked with air transport support for all components of the armed forces, and the civil fleet has supplemented it on occasion.

B. Forces Available

Military

4. The Soviet naval assault capability is limited because of a lack of large ships of the amphibious transport, or dock, type which carry their own landing craft internally. Their present capacity for amphibious lift is vested in the relatively small Alligator class tank landing ships, and Polnocny class medium landing ships.⁸ (A more detailed account of the Soviet naval amphibious force, and naval infantry, is found in NIE 11-14-71, "Warsaw Pact Forces for Operations in Eurasia," dated 9 September 1971.) The navy also has a fleet of some 280 auxiliary ships such as tankers and cargo ships. About two-thirds of these are poorly suited for sealift operations for reasons of size, age, speed, and capacity. These ships are needed for direct support of naval combatant forces, moreover, and therefore could not make much of a contribution to the support of other forces deploying to distant areas.

⁸ Production of the Alligator class has slowed down from its previous level of two per year. The USSR continues to purchase Polnocnys from Poland.

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5. The An-12 medium transport is the mainstay of the Soviet military airlift force (the characteristics of this and other transport aircraft currently in service are shown in Table D-I). As of mid-1973, there were 825 of these aircraft in service, with about 710 of them providing a long-range airlift capability. The growth of the An-12 fleet appears to have peaked, and a modification program to increase the payload and range capabilities of the older versions probably has ended.

6. The Soviets have not placed the same emphasis on the development of a heavy

military transport force as has the US. Although the An-22 first flew in 1965, there are only about 20 in military service. Production continues, but at the relatively low rate of about five aircraft per year.

Non-military

7. The Soviet merchant marine fleet presently consists of almost 1,500 ships totaling about 12.5 million deadweight tons (DWT). Of this total, there are some 370 cargo ships within the fleet that appear to be equipped to meet the requirements of a long-range mili-

TABLE D-I

SOVIET TRANSPORTS THAT COULD BE USED FOR OUT-OF-COUNTRY AIRLIFT • (Mid-1973)

	Year Introduced into Service	Troop Capacity	Normal Payload (pounds) ^b	Normal Radius/Range (nm) ^c	Number in VTA	Number in GPTU ^c	Number in Aeroflot
An-10 Cat	1960	90	20,600	700/1,450	1	11	80
An-12 Cub (5 variants)	1959-1966	90	9,860-21,060	850-1,950/ 1,650-3,900	710	1	200
An-22 Cock	1967	175	92,000	2,350/4,450	20	0	0
An-24 Coke	1962	49	8,100	400/1,150	3	12	600
IL-14 Crate (2 variants)	1954-1956	18/24	4,750-6,350	600/1,600	11	11	410
IL-18 Coot (3 variants)	1961-1966	95	15,000-21,400	1,650-2,200/ 3,100-4,250	0	9	400
IL-62 Classic	1967	186	26,250	2,400/4,950	0	0	45
IL-76 Candid	1975	145	34,000	2,700/5,300
Tu-104 Camel	1960	100	18,300	1,000/2,150	0	0	160
Tu-114 Cleat	1960	220	34,000	2,750/5,500	0	0	29
Tu-124 Cookpot	1962	56	13,000	750/1,600	0	6	75
Tu-134 Crusty (2 variants)	1967/1969	72/76	12,200-14,850	950/1,000/ 1,850/1,950	0	2	80
Tu-154 (Careless)	1971	200	35,700	1,700/3,200	0	0	15

• The aircraft listed have a range of at least 1,000 nautical miles (nm) when carrying a normal payload and were introduced into service since 1950. They include transports assigned to three organizations which have out-of-country operations as one of their main missions: VTA is usually referred to as "VTA-Airborne," because it supports the airborne troops as one of its main missions; there are two General Purpose Transport Units involved in diverse functions including the transport of VIPs; Aeroflot is the civil aviation flag carrier. Airlift provided by these three organizations could be augmented by some 500 transports assigned to other military transport units.

^b Normal payload is the load that can be carried along with a full internal load of fuel at maximum take-off weight. Performance shown is for normal payload with full internal fuel. Additional payload could be carried with less fuel, but to a reduced radius/range.

^c An additional 30 or so An-12s are assigned, but these have electronic countermeasures as their primary mission.

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tary sealift (these ships total over 3.9 million DWT). All are less than 20 years old, range from 5,000 to 16,000 tons, have speeds in excess of 14 knots, and have heavy lift booms with capacities of 40 to 80 tons. Included in this group are 144 ships with hatches over 50 feet in length capable of accommodating larger items of military equipment (these ships total somewhat over 1.8 million DWT—see Table D-II). Most of the remaining cargo ships could also be used for lifting military supplies, but they would be less efficient and some would be confined to short-range operations because of their small size and advanced age.

8. The suitability of Soviet *tankers* for participation in military supply operations depends largely on their size. More than 90 percent of the tanker tonnage is embodied in relatively new ships—less than 15 years old—thus age, as such, is not a constraint. There are 112 tankers best suited for supporting distant operations (3.4 million DWT), and they range in size from 15,000 to 50,000 tons. Virtually all of these ships have speeds of 15 knots or greater (see Table D-III). Most of the remaining tanker tonnage is in two groups of smaller ships used on short-haul routes such as from the Black Sea to the Middle East. The first

TABLE D-II
SOVIET SHIPS WITH LARGE HATCHES

SHIP CLASS	NUMBER OF SHIPS	UNIT DWT	HATCH SIZE (IN FEET)
Bezhitsa/Poltava	19	12,650	79 x 20
Omsk	8	12,000	76 x 36
Krasnograd	23	12,200	74 x 35
Pula	30	14,000	67 x 37
Murom	29	12,500	66 x 36
Vyborg	17	12,300	62 x 36
Simferopol	7	12,030	55 x 29
Stanislavskiy	5	5,676	55 x 22
Beloretsk	6	14,150	53 x 36
TOTAL	144	1.8 million	

group is made up of the Kazbek class (11,800-ton) tankers that have speeds of 13 knots. The 62 tankers in this group total about 730,000 DWT. The second group consists of about 50 Finnish-built tankers (between 4,300 and 5,000 tons) capable of speeds of 14 knots, and totaling about 230,000 DWT.

9. The civil air fleet has some 760 four-engine transports suitable for airlift to distant areas. The fleet includes over 70 heavy transports (IL-62 and Tu-114) and some 680 medium transports (An-10, An-12, IL-18, and Tu-154). It also includes almost 2,000 additional aircraft which can carry 20 passengers or more, but these are relatively short-range aircraft. Only the 200 civil An-12s would be useful for delivery of heavy equipment because these aircraft have large rear-loading doors. The other heavy and medium transports have small cabin openings limiting the size of equipment which can be carried. Such aircraft would be suitable only for such missions as ferrying troops to well-developed airfields, delivering small cargo, and evacuating casualties.

C. Illustrative Capabilities of the Forces

Military

10. *Amphibious Lift.* The current and projected amphibious capacity⁹ of the naval infantry in each of the four Soviet fleets is sufficient to provide military lift for the numbers of troops (with their equipment) listed below:

	WESTERN FLEETS	PACIFIC FLEET	TOTAL
1973 ...	6,900-8,300	2,200-3,000	9,100-11,300
1978 ...	7,900-10,500	3,100-3,500	11,000-14,000

The loading density and the resultant poor habitability aboard these ships on long transits

⁹ Excludes the older landing ship classes because they have not been observed being used in distant deployments.

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TABLE D-III
 SOVIET TANKERS
 (15,000 Dead Weight Tons and Larger)

Tanker Class	Units	DWT Each Unit	Total DWT	Speed (knots)	Range (nm)
Adler	2	25,250	50,500	14.7	12,000
Bauska	11	18,189	200,079	15.5	17,000
Druzhba	1	40,715	40,715	16.5	15,975
Dzhuzeppe Garibaldi	1	32,017	32,017	15.5	11,000
International	9	20,000	180,000	16.0	15,000
Leonardo de Vinci	6	48,933	293,598	17.5	30,000
Lisichansk	10	34,643	346,430	17.0	14,980
Lugansk	8	34,985	279,880	16.7	15,000
Mir	1	39,719	39,719	16.0	20,400
Pekin	7	30,900	216,300	17.5	10,500
Sofiya	21	49,370	1,036,700	17.0	10,000
Split	27	20,493	553,311	17.0	16,500
Trud	1	25,330	25,330	17.0	6,000
Velikiy Oktyabr	7	15,200	106,400	16.7	15,000
TOTAL	112		3,401,049		

might become a limitation on the readiness of the embarked troops to perform assault missions. The maximum speed of a Soviet amphibious task force is estimated to be about 15 knots.

11. *Military Airlift.* The main military airlift capacity is provided by 710 An-12s and 20 An-22s. One version of the An-12 can carry a payload of 14,500 pounds to a range of 3,310 miles, while another can carry a payload of 9,860 pounds to a range of 7,900 miles. Both versions can carry a maximum payload of 44,100 pounds, but to shorter distances. The An-22 can carry 92,000 pounds to a range of 4,450 miles, or 175,000 pounds to 2,250 miles.

12. Assuming the availability of about 85 percent of this force, some 600 An-12s and 17 An-22s would be ready at any given time for airlift operations. They could carry one airborne division and the major part of a second (with supporting equipment), prepared for a combined paratroop/airlanded operation to a

distance of about 1,200 miles and return. The one-way range would be 1,950 miles. If the force used altitudes of 32,000 feet or so, it could fly some 2,500 miles. In this case, however, troops on board would have to wear oxygen masks because the cabin of the An-12 is not pressurized. Moreover, flights in excess of 8 hours under these conditions would interfere temporarily with troop effectiveness. Flying direct routes from bases on the southern periphery of the USSR, this force could reach all of the Middle East, much of Africa, all of South Asia, and much of Southeast Asia on a one-way mission.

13. For airlifting military supplies and equipment only, the force could deliver at least 2,600 metric tons to a distance of 3,900 miles, or 13,000 tons at a distance of 500 miles. The An-22s could carry about 850 tons to a distance of 4,450 miles. The number of serviceable aircraft would decrease depending on time and the opposing forces. Table D-IV

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TABLE D-IV

MILITARY TRANSPORT AVIATION CARGO AIRLIFT*

Payload (cargo) in Metric Tons, With Given Distance (nm)	500	1,000	1,500	2,000	2,500	3,000	3,500	3,900	4,000	4,450
<i>As a Radius</i>										
An-12	11,400	8,350	5,250	...						
An-22	1,350	1,350	1,200	900						
TOTAL	12,750	9,700	6,450	900						
<i>As a Range</i>										
An-12	12,000	11,250	9,750	8,200	6,750	5,200	3,500	1,750		
An-22	1,350	1,350	1,350	1,350	1,250	1,150	1,000	870	850	700
TOTAL	13,350	12,600	11,100	9,550	8,000	6,350	4,500	2,620	850	700

*The maximum VTA airlift capability, based on a single lift using mid-1973 data.

gives a maximum lift capacity of this force to various radii and ranges.

14. The Soviets have carried out several major airlifts to the Middle East mostly following a route through Hungary and Yugoslavia, and then over the Adriatic Sea. The flight times to the eastern Mediterranean area would be shortened if overflight rights were secured from Iran, Turkey, or Greece. If the Soviets ever attempted an airlift of troops to this region, they would probably try to locate maintenance facilities staffed by Soviet technicians in Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and Yemen (Aden) to support the operation. During the first week, a task force of about 150 An-12s and 5 An-22s could lift two paratroop regiments with their weapons and most of their combat support equipment. If only troops or cargo were carried, about 30,000 troops or 20,000 paratroops, or 3,500 tons of cargo could be delivered in one week.

15. If they were permitted to use facilities in the Middle East, the USSR could institute a military airlift throughout most of central Africa. An estimated one regiment of airborne troops could be airlanded within the first

week of such an operation. An average of about 12,000 troops or 8,000 paratroops, or about 1,600 tons of cargo, could be flown in during this period.

16. Airlift operations into South and Southeast Asia are dependent on securing overflight and landing rights from India or China. Assuming that these could be obtained, slightly more than two regiments of airborne troops could be airlifted. Either 18,000 troops or 12,000 paratroops, or 2,250 tons of cargo, could be airlifted within the first week after the initiation of the lift.¹⁰

17. Airlift support of military operations in the Caribbean or Latin America would pose unique problems. A long flight over water would be involved whether the operations were staged through the North Atlantic via Cuba or by way of Africa and Brazil. Maintenance

¹⁰ The Soviets could reach Southeast Asia without overflying other countries by using a circuitous route from the southern Primorskiy Krai through the Sea of Japan, the East China Sea, the Formosa Straits, and the South China Sea. Missions to such extreme distances would place serious limitations on the loads of troops, equipment, and support weapons that could be carried.

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nance facilities to support air transport operations in this area are virtually non-existent. Unless substantial stocks were prepositioned at intermediate stops, the airlift probably would encounter major maintenance problems as was the case during the ill-fated airlift of supplies to Peru after the earthquake there in 1970. Overflight and landing rights would have to be secured from a number of countries. Cuba, for example, is barely within non-stop range of the An-22 from the USSR, making a stopover point for refueling almost mandatory. Assuming that all these problems could be overcome, about one regiment of airborne troops, or 1,500 tons of cargo could be airlifted to this area within the first week.

Merchant Marine and Civil Air

18. *Sealift.* The merchant sealift capability of the Soviet Union probably would be drawn initially from the group of the 370 cargo ships mentioned above (see paragraph 7). On the short haul route (about 1,100 miles) from Soviet ports in the Black Sea to the Middle East, it would take freighters with a total capacity of about 20,000 DWT, and tankers totalling 9,800 DWT, to sustain a lift rate of 1,000 tons per day¹¹ of dry cargo and petroleum. To

¹¹ An equally important factor as distance is the rate, in tons per day, at which deliveries are required. In a situation when all supplies are brought in by sea in wartime, the estimated requirement for a Soviet motorized rifle division and its air support, is 700 tons per day of dry cargo, and 315 tons per day of petroleum products.

conduct a lift of the same magnitude on the 14,200 mile route to Haiphong, via the Cape of Good Hope, would require about 121,000 DWT of freighters and 93,000 DWT of tankers.

19. *Airlift.* Assuming the availability of 85 percent of the civil air fleet, some 170 An-12 transports could be used to deliver at least 1,230 tons of cargo to a range of 3,300 miles; or 3,750 tons to a range of 730 miles. Used solely to move personnel without their supporting equipment, the approximately 650 serviceable medium and heavy transports of Aeroflot could lift a total of about 65,000 troops to a range of 1,400 miles. Elements of this force could be carried to varying distances up to 3,600 miles depending on the type of aircraft involved.

20. Delivery of troops by Aeroflot aircraft to the maximum possible distance on a non-stop flight would require use of IL-62 and Tu-114 heavy transports. Again assuming that 85 percent of these were available, some 64 aircraft could be used. The Tu-114s could carry about 3,500 troops to a distance of 5,500 miles. The IL-62s could carry about 4,000 troops to almost 5,000 miles. Most supporting equipment for these troops would have to be prepositioned, carried by surface transportation, or carried by other civil or military aircraft. The Soviets, however, would need to land and refuel in other countries along the route.

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ANNEX E

SOVIET MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID TO
THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

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SOVIET MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID TO
THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

A. Military Aid

1. The Soviet Union launched its military aid program in 1955—initially using Czechoslovakia as an intermediary—when it began arms shipments to Egypt. Since then, the USSR alone has *extended* almost \$8.9 billion¹² in military aid to 32 countries of the Third World (see Table E-I). Aid to Egypt accounts for almost one-third of the overall total and India, Iraq, and Syria for another third. Indonesia represents about 12 percent of the total aid extended even though it has not received Soviet military aid since 1966. By the end of 1972 an estimated \$7.1 billion—83 percent of military aid (see Table E-II) had been *drawn* or delivered. Because the Soviet program is in part a response to available opportunities and is influenced by the absorptive capacity of the recipients, the annual magnitude and direction of aid has been highly variable.

2. *Recent Extensions and Drawings.* During 1972, Moscow *extended* \$660 million in military aid—all of it to Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Iran, Syria, and Yemen (Aden). This figure is above the average of the 1960s, but well below the figures for 1970 and 1971. The extension of aid in these two years was abnormally high because of the extensive build up of Egyptian

¹² In computing the dollar totals presented in this Annex, it should be kept in mind that all values of Soviet military items are Soviet list prices, which generally are lower than prices of comparable Western equipment. Soviet dollar values do not represent the cost of producing comparable items in the US and cannot be converted into Soviet ruble costs simply by applying the official exchange rate.

TABLE E-I

SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO
THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES
(1956-1972)

YEAR	MILLION US \$	
	EXTENSIONS	DRAWINGS
1956-1960	1,284	657
1961	829	320
1962	416	800
1963	387	574
1964	872	335
1965	262	331
1966	449	455
1967	515	443
1968	462	455
1969	338	408
1970	984	926
1971	1,413	764
1972	661	697
TOTAL	8,872	7,165

NOTE: In addition to the aid extended, cash purchases or cash down payments were made by India (\$300 million), Libya (\$129 million), Nigeria (\$16 million), Indonesia (\$11 million), Sudan (\$9 million), Iraq (\$2 million), and Pakistan (\$4 million). The figures for the most recent years are preliminary and subject to revision. They represent joint CIA-DIA estimates based largely on clandestine reporting and sightings of arms shipments.

As of the end of 1972, the Soviets had shipped \$850 million worth of military aid to Cuba and \$2.1 billion worth to North Vietnam.

air defenses by the Soviets and India's requests for more equipment. About \$1.7 billion, nearly one-fourth of all Soviet military aid, was *drawn* or delivered in 1970 and 1971. Although deliveries in 1972 declined to about \$700 million worth of equipment from the peak

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TABLE E-II
SOVIET MILITARY AID, EXTENDED,
AND DRAWN
(1956-1972)

MILLION US \$		
RECIPIENT COUNTRY	EXTENDED	DRAWN
<i>Africa</i>	610	482
Algeria	395	291
Burundi	Negl.	...
Congo	14	7
Equatorial Guinea	Negl.	Negl.
Chana	10	10
Guinea	25	23
Mali	6	5
Morocco	13	13
Nigeria	9	9
Sierra Leone	Negl.	...
Somalia	60	53
Sudan	66	62
Tanzania	2	2
Uganda	10	7
<i>East Asia</i>	1,104	868
Burma	na	...
Cambodia	12	10
Indonesia	1,092	858
<i>Middle</i>	5,370	4,575
Cyprus	26	18
Egypt	2,685	2,645
Iran	571	333
Iraq	1,002	750
Lebanon	3	3
Maldiv Islands	Negl.	...
Syria	969	723
Yemen (Aden)	37	26
Yemen (Sana)	77	77
<i>South Asia</i>	1,788	1,240
Afghanistan	455	297
Bangladesh	35	...
India	1,232	921
Pakistan	64	20
Sri Lanka	2	2
Overall TOTAL	8,872	7,165

NOTE: The figures for the most recent years are preliminary and subject to revision.

level of \$925 million in 1970, they still were well above shipments averaging \$430 million annually during the 1960s.

Aid Agreements and Deliveries

3. *Egypt*. Overall Soviet military deliveries to Egypt in 1972 were valued at an estimated \$250 million. Deliveries of aircraft included 124 Mig-21 jet fighters, 9 Su-7 fighter bombers, at least 12 Su-17 swing-wing fighter bombers, and 5 Mi-8 helicopters (see Table E-III). Egypt also received one-quarter (\$150 million) of the new arms commitments that Moscow made during 1972. Of this total, \$70 million was delivered as the result of an accord signed before the expulsion order in July 1972. It included Su-17 swing-wing fighters, T-62 medium tanks, and spare parts and support equipment. The balance of \$80 million represented equipment turned over to the Egyptians by the departing Soviet forces. This included radars, air defense communications equipment, 60 Mig-21 interceptors, and Sa-6 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).

4. The level of Soviet military aid to *Syria* increased in 1972. Deliveries during the year valued at more than \$150 million represented Moscow's largest annual shipment to Syria. It included 34 Mig-21 jet fighters and three An-12 transports, and Syria's first acquisition of Sa-3 SAMs, T-62 medium tanks, ZSU-23-4 anti-aircraft guns, and Osa class guided missile patrol boats. Deliveries were stepped-up during the last half of the year.

5. During 1971, *Iraq* signed two military aid agreements with the USSR calling for shipments of about \$250 million worth of equipment—the largest annual commitment of Soviet arms aid to Baghdad. Deliveries under these accords in 1972 gave Iraq its initial shipments of the Sa-3 missile system, T-62 tanks, Osa class guided missile patrol boats, and Mi-8 and Mi-6 helicopters. Czechoslovakia also concluded an agreement with

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Iraq in 1972 involving \$80 million worth of equipment—Prague's largest agreement with a Third World country since 1956. It covered some 50 L-39 supersonic jet trainers, 100 armored personnel carriers, artillery, and support equipment.

6. *Iran* is now one of the largest recipients of Soviet military aid, already having received over half a billion dollars of arms commitments. Some \$75 million worth was delivered in 1972. Iran, however, has limited its purchases from the USSR to such non-advanced items of equipment as personnel carriers, artillery, and trucks. (The West, primarily the US, continues to provide Teheran with its major weapon systems including all its aircraft, missiles, and naval craft.)

7. *Lebanon* received its first shipment of Soviet arms during 1972—some \$3 million worth of Soviet artillery delivered under an agreement reached in 1971. In 1972, the USSR became *Yemen's* (*Aden*) chief source of arms through deliveries of about \$11 million worth of equipment. Shipments included IL-28 light jet bombers, helicopters, and small naval craft. To the north, Moscow failed to follow through on promises of new arms for *Yemen's* (*Sana*) largely Soviet-equipped military force.

8. *South Asia*. Moscow's military aid efforts in the subcontinent are concentrated in India. The Soviets committed almost \$100 million of new arms aid to India in 1972, some \$75 million of which will be used to purchase four squadrons of Mig-21 jet fighters, Mi-8 helicopters, and various weapons for the ground forces. Deliveries of an estimated \$100 million worth of equipment in 1972 included 23 Mig-21 jet fighters and two Petya class naval escorts. India also received Mi-8 helicopters, T-62 tanks, and multiple rocket launchers.

9. Recent Soviet military aid activity in other countries of the area are insignificant.

Afghanistan signed a \$107 million arms agreement with Moscow in 1971 but so far, deliveries have been minimal. *Sri Lanka* recently received a few Soviet arms. The Soviets delivered some support equipment to *Pakistan* in 1972 even though major arms shipments to Islamabad were suspended in 1969.

10. *Other Recipients*. Moscow's recent arms sales have not been pressed vigorously in other areas. A \$100 million agreement was signed with Algeria in 1971, but deliveries under it have been modest. Shipments may increase this year, however, when a large group of Algerian military personnel are scheduled to complete their training programs in the USSR. *Burma*, *Burundi*, *Equatorial Guinea*, and *Sierra Leone* received small quantities of their first Soviet arms in 1972. The arms program in *Sudan* remained dormant while *Somalia*, under an agreement signed in November 1971, received its first bombers (four IL-28s) during 1972.

11. Outside of Cuba, there is no Soviet military equipment in use or on order in Latin America. Recent inspection trips to the USSR by Chilean and Peruvian officials, and to Peru by a Russian mission, could mean that arms purchases are in the making. The Soviets already have offered a sizeable arms credit to Chile, but it has not been accepted.

Soviet Military/Technical Assistance

12. The flow of modern Soviet weapon systems to Third World countries has been accompanied by the arrival of large numbers of Soviet technicians in these countries and training programs in the USSR for members of their armed forces (see Tables E-IV and E-V). Countries receiving military aid from the USSR have paid out an estimated \$650 million for training and technical assistance since 1956. During the first half of 1972, an estimated 9,550 Soviet military technicians

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TABLE E-III

MAJOR COMMUNIST MILITARY EQUIPMENT DELIVERED, BY RECIPIENT*
(1955-1972)

	Afghan- istan	Algeria	Cam- bodia	Congo	Cyprus	Egypt	Equa- torial Guinea	Ghana	Guinea	India	Indo- nesia	Iran	Iraq	Libya
Land Armaments														
Heavy Tanks	60
Medium Tanks	487	417	32	2,625	31	880	876	285
Light Tanks (amphibious)	17	..	87	13	176	155
Self-propelled Assault Guns	48	100	250	..	10	5	156	24
Personnel Carriers, Armored and Amphibious	340	530	21	29	32	2,070	6	24	38	400	400	1,122	1,183	350
Artillery Pieces ^b	1,750	1,010	250	58	32	2,200	..	36	130	575	735	975	1,620	190
Naval Ships														
Light Cruisers	1
Destroyers	6 ^c	16
Submarines	20 ^c	4	12
Minesweepers	..	2	13	6	..	2	..
Submarine Chasers and Escort Vessels	..	6	12	7	16	..	3	..
Motor Torpedo and Missile Boats	..	21	6	56	2	8	26	..	15	..
Other, Including Auxiliary Vessels and Landing Craft	..	3	3	13	..	27	..	4	9	9	57	..	7	..
Aircraft														
Medium Jet Bombers	26	..	10	..
Light Jet Bombers	35	32	76	28	..	15	..
Jet Fighters	190	142	14	1,037	8	200 ^d	112	..	244	..
Large Transports (An-12)	1	7	..	2	..	28	2	40	6	..	11	..
Other, Including non-Jet Combat Aircraft, Trainers, Transports and Helicopters	100	68	15	3	..	550	..	5	23	205	258	..	203	..
Guided Missile Systems^e														
Air-to-Surface ^f	6	12
Air-to-Air ^g	42	36	448	69	26	..	97	..
Surface-to-Air ^h	1	1	132	20 ⁱ	8	..	4	..
Surface-to-Surface ^k	..	9	23	8	12
Antitank ^l	24	100	28	..

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TABLE E-III

MAJOR COMMUNIST MILITARY EQUIPMENT DELIVERED, BY RECIPIENT*
(1955-1972)
(Continued)

	Mali	Morocco	Nigeria	Pakistan	Somalia	Sri Lanka	Sudan	Syria	Tanzania	Uganda	Yemen (Aden)	Yemen (Sana)	Zambia
Land Armaments													
Heavy Tanks
Medium Tanks	12	122	..	825 ^a	155	..	102	1,316	63	135	..
Light Tanks (amphibious)	12	10	33	39
Self-propelled Assault Guns	..	30	150	65	..
Personnel Carriers, Armored and													
Amphibious	130	80	3	..	262	10	230	812	62	36	117	155	27
Artillery Pieces ^b	118	160	90	1,105	480	12	215	1,760	170	36	201	460	..
Naval Ships													
Light Cruisers
Destroyers
Submarines
Minesweepers	2	2
Submarine Chasers and Escort Vessels													
Motor Torpedo and Missile Boats	4	24	4	..	13	5	..
Other, Including Auxiliary Vessels and Landing Craft	3	6	8	5	27	2	..
Aircraft													
Medium Jet Bombers
Light Jet Bombers	4	4	6	2	8	..
Jet Fighters	3	12	33	161	27	5	30	376	..	5	20	18	..
Large Transports (An-12)													
Other, Including non-Jet Combat Aircraft, Trainers, Transports, and Helicopters	18	5	19	14	7	3	16	198	1	15	11	55	..
Guided Missile Systems^c													
Air-to-Surface ^f
Air-to-Air ^g	3	..	24	172
Surface-to-Air ^h	1	10
Surface-to-Surface ^k	4
Antitank ^l	30

* Other token deliveries of military materiel have been made by Communist countries to Burma, Ethiopia, Laos, and Nepal. These figures do not reflect attrition nor do they show equipment originating in Communist countries and transferred from non-Communist countries to others.

^b Including recoilless cannons and mortars over 100 mm in size. The figure for Egypt also included the delivery of six free-rocket over-the-ground launchers.

^c Including two old destroyers and five old submarines returned to the USSR in exchange for newer models.

^d Excluding those Mig-21 fighters assembled at the aircraft assembly plant at Nasik, India.

^e Data reflect numbers of aircraft, ships, and vehicles having a missile capability.

^f Indicating number of Tu-16 aircraft equipped with air-to-surface missiles (two per aircraft).

^g Indicating number of fighter aircraft equipped with air-to-air missiles (two per aircraft).

^h Indicating number of SAM firing battalions (sites—six launchers per Sa-2 site, four dual launchers per Sa-3 site).

ⁱ Algeria has received an undetermined number of SAMs, and now may have an operational capability.

^j Some of these systems may be domestically manufactured under Soviet licenses.

^k Indicating number of Komar and Osa class boats equipped with surface-to-surface missiles (two to four per vessel) and three coastal defense missile sites in Egypt.

^l Indicating number of vehicles used as launchers (three missiles per vehicle).

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TABLE E-IV
MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM THIRD
WORLD COUNTRIES TRAINED
IN THE USSR

Country	Departures*		Being Trained as of December 1972
	1956-1972	1972	
Afghanistan	2,240	200	400
Algeria	1,920	..	170
Bangladesh	250	250	250
Cambodia	30
Congo	335	..	110
Egypt	5,565	220	50
Ghana	180
Guinea	685	185	185
India	1,615	170	45
Indonesia	7,560
Iran	200	25	10
Iraq	1,835	145	225
Mali	150
Nigeria	115
Pakistan	40
Somalia	1,725	450	450
Sudan	310	..	20
Syria	2,285	530	530
Tanzania	250
Uganda	165
Yemen (Aden)	305	120	145
Yemen (Sana)	550	..	20
Zambia	25	25	..
TOTALS	28,635	2,320	2,610

*The estimated number of persons departing for training; numbers are rounded to the nearest five.

were in Third World countries. Nearly 60 percent were in Egypt and more than 30 percent in Algeria, Iraq, Somalia, and Syria. By September, the total dropped to less than 4,300 because of the expulsion from Egypt of all but about 100 Soviet military technicians.¹³ Elsewhere the Soviet training program in

¹³ An estimated 7,500 Soviet personnel assigned to regular Soviet military units in Egypt also departed. Some technicians are returning to help assemble newer equipment and train Egyptian personnel in its use.

Sudan was terminated, but additional Soviet advisers arrived in Syria and Iraq to help shore up air defenses and provide training on newly-acquired equipment. Increased numbers of Soviet technicians also are present in Afghanistan, Guinea, India, Somalia, and Yemen (Aden).

13. Since 1955, more than 28,600 military personnel from Third World countries, largely middle-grade officers, have gone to the USSR for training. The bulk (about 85 percent) have come from the Arab countries, Afghanistan, India, and Indonesia. More than 2,300 military personnel from Third World countries arrived in the USSR for military training during 1972. This was almost four times the number that were sent to the USSR in 1971. Iraq and Syria sent large numbers for six months training on the Sa-3 missile system. Bangladesh sent about 250 personnel to the USSR for pilot and aircraft maintenance training in anticipation of the first deliveries of Soviet fighter aircraft. Egyptian trainees declined, however, as Egypt withdrew almost all its military trainees from the USSR concurrently with the Soviet withdrawal from Egypt.

B. Economic Aid

14. *Extensions.* Soviet economic aid extended to Third World countries in 1971-1972 totaled nearly \$1.5 billion, raising to about \$8.3 billion the amount extended since 1954 (see Tables E-VI and E-VII). Annual Soviet aid extended during this period has ranged from a low of \$70 million in 1962 to a record \$1.3 billion in 1966. The fluctuations that occur are due to projects and development plans that require several years to implement. Recent peak years largely reflect extensions to countries which initiated new development plans; the low years indicate that major aid recipients were drawing on credits previously extended.

15. Since the mid-1960s, the Soviets have been highly selective in extending economic

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TABLE E-V
SOVIET MILITARY TECHNICIANS IN
THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES*

COUNTRY	1972
Afghanistan	170
Algeria	950
Congo	30
Egypt	5,500 ^b
Guinea	110
India	220
Iran	30
Iraq	500
Libya	20
Mali	10
Nigeria	70
Somalia	400
Sudan	100
Syria	1,130
Tanzania	...
Yemen (Aden)	210
Yemen (Sana)	100
TOTAL	9,550

* Technicians present for a period of one month or more; numbers are rounded to the nearest five.

^b Before the expulsion order of July 1972.

aid. India, Egypt, Afghanistan, and Iran account for nearly 60 percent of total Soviet aid extended since 1954 and almost 75 percent of the amount drawn. Of total Soviet aid extended during 1966-1972, more than 75 percent was allocated to the Middle East and South Asia. Africa's share of the total fell from about 30 percent to less than 15 percent.

16. *Drawings and Repayments.* More than \$4 billion of the total Soviet economic aid had been drawn by the end of 1972. Deliveries have ranged between \$300 and \$400 million since the early 1960s. *Repayment* for Soviet economic aid generally takes two forms. The largest consists of development project credits which generally call for repayment over 12 years at 2.5 percent interest, usually beginning one year after the project is completed.

The second covers trade credits with 8-10 years to repay at slightly higher interest rates. Only 5 percent of Soviet aid has been provided as grants. Repayments have risen rapidly resulting in a reduction of the net flow of Soviet aid to the developing countries. From a peak of \$315 million in 1964, the gap between drawings and repayments was reduced to \$75 million in 1972. In 1972, aid repayments equalled about three-fourths of drawings on Soviet aid during the year. Third World aid recipients have repaid about \$1 billion of their principal debt to the USSR, or slightly more than one-fourth of Soviet aid deliveries under credits.

17. Many aid agreements in recent years have been designed to increase imports of fuels, raw materials, and consumer goods and create markets for Soviet machinery and equipment. Particularly significant is Moscow's assistance to oil development in the Third World for which the Soviets have committed nearly \$1 billion of aid. The USSR supports the growth of national oil companies in these countries and hopes to develop additional sources of supply to meet its own expanding export requirements. (The USSR fills most of Eastern Europe's oil requirements but it has advised them to find other sources of oil so that larger amounts can be exported to Western Europe for hard currency.) Soviet-aided gas pipelines in Afghanistan and Iran carry natural gas to the USSR as aid repayments at the low price of about \$0.18 per 1,000 cubic feet, supplementing dwindling supplies in southern USSR. This arrangement facilitates Moscow's hard currency gas sales to about \$0.37 per 1,000 cubic feet to Western Europe.

18. Moscow also profits from aid for port facilities and fishing industries. As repayment for Soviet aid for the Alexandria shipyard, Egypt provides repair facilities for Soviet vessels and is building merchant ships for the

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USSR. Since 1960, the USSR has extended at least \$113 million in aid to 23 countries of the Third World for fishing ports, processing plants, ships and technical services. Although fisheries aid is only a small part of the Soviet aid program, its repayment in the form of services to the Soviet fishing fleet serves to extend the fleets' range and operating time. Fisheries aid also provides for Soviet fishing in the extended territorial waters claimed by many Third World countries. By 1975, Moscow plans to increase its consumer fish production nearly 50 percent above the 1970 level of 2.1 million metric tons. Since northern fishing grounds are being depleted, Soviet fisheries aid is likely to grow in the next few years particularly to Latin American nations and to countries bordering the Indian Ocean. Soviet aid to fisheries is repaid in storage and repair facilities, food, and fuel supplies, and shore privileges for Soviet crews.

TABLE E-VI

USSR: ECONOMIC AID EXTENSIONS AND
DRAWINGS TO THE THIRD WORLD
COUNTRIES BY YEAR

YEAR	EXTENSIONS	DRAWINGS
1954-1962	2,772.8	805.8
1963	239.3	344.1
1964	824.6	375.3
1965	371.7	354.1
1966	1,276.0	335.4
1967	291.1	296.8
1968	379.3	297.0
1969	483.3	321.2
1970	198.0	334.8
1971	903.3	382.8
1972	580.5	308.3
TOTAL	8,319.9	4,155.7

NOTE: As of the end of 1972, the Soviets had given \$5.1 billion in economic aid to Cuba and \$2.3 billion to North Vietnam.

TABLE E-VII

USSR: ECONOMIC AID EXTENSIONS TO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES BY YEAR

(Million US \$)

	Total	1954-1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
TOTAL	8,319.9	2,772.8	239.3	824.6	371.7	1,276.0	291.1	379.3	483.3	198.0	903.3	580.5
<i>Africa</i>	<i>1,328.9</i>	<i>429.5</i>	<i>111.8</i>	<i>211.7</i>	<i>54.1</i>	<i>83.4</i>	<i>26.2</i>	<i>5.4</i>	<i>134.8</i>	<i>56.5</i>	<i>215.5</i>	<i>0</i>
Algeria	426.4	0.6	100.0	131.5	0	3.4	0	0	0	0	188.9	0
Ethiopia	101.8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Guinea	199.7	73.1	0	0	15.0	2.7	16.7	0	92.2	0	0	0
Other	601.0	254.0	11.8	80.2	39.1	75.3	9.5	5.4	42.6	56.5	26.6	0
<i>East Asia</i>	<i>155.6</i>	<i>132.3</i>	<i>14.8</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>3.3</i>	<i>3.5</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>1.7</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>
Indonesia	113.8	110.5	0	0	3.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	41.8	21.8	14.8	0	0	3.5	0	0	1.7	0	0	0
<i>Latin America</i>	<i>465.2</i>	<i>29.0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>15.3</i>	<i>90.0</i>	<i>55.5</i>	<i>2.5</i>	<i>20.0</i>	<i>53.0</i>	<i>55.9</i>	<i>144.0</i>
Chile	238.0	0	0	0	0	0	55.5	0	0	0	38.5	144.0
Other	227.2	29.0	0	0	15.3	90.0	0	2.5	20.0	53.0	17.4	0
<i>Near East and South Asia</i>	<i>6,370.2</i>	<i>2,182.0</i>	<i>112.7</i>	<i>612.9</i>	<i>299.0</i>	<i>1,099.1</i>	<i>209.4</i>	<i>371.4</i>	<i>326.8</i>	<i>88.5</i>	<i>631.9</i>	<i>436.5</i>
Afghanistan	826.1	488.0	51.5	11.1	14.1	0.9	5.0	126.7	0	2.8	5.0	121.0
Bangladesh	160.0	15.0	0	0	34.3	25.0	0	0	12.2	0	0	73.5
Egypt	1,196.6	499.6	0	501.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	195.6	0
India	1,611.8	811.1	0	0	226.5	574.2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Iran	600.6	0	61.2	1.7	0	305.5	0	177.8	0	54.4	0	0
Iraq	553.7	183.9	0	0	0	0	4.4	0	120.7	22.5	222.2	0
Pakistan	388.8	18.2	0	11.0	15.7	60.2	0	66.9	8.0	0	208.8	0
Syria	317.6	100.0	0	0	0	133.3	0	0	0	0	0.3	84.0
Turkey	529.2	5.2	0	0	0	0	200.0	0	166.0	0	0	158.0
Other	185.8	61.0	0	87.7	8.4	0	0	0	19.0	8.8	0	0

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