

1634

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Item 12

~~24/5/57~~

Capt. EDSON T. Sullivan
Hq.s. 2nd major post
APO 503
(~~25202~~) 28

3/april
4/april
~~32087~~
25242

1634

Duplicate copies
of items 6, 7, 8, 9
14 and 20 in a
separate envelope

Original Separate
(Original analysis sheets enclosed)

^{Ultra Secret}
(Strict Secrecy)

①

Preliminary arrangement with the Army
Concerning Policy Towards China

(15 February, 1935)

Account by Morishima)

1. From about the spring in 1934, a year after the conclusion of the Truce Agreement of the North China, an irritable feeling came to be observed on our side, as the relations between Japan and China had not been improved at all. This feeling came to be indicated in two directions. One was the opinion of some of the business men concerned with China who insisted that we should be more friendly with China, in a

(2)

little more positive manner. The other was an active opinion of the young officials of the Army, ^{with} especially the view that as they could not do anything with HUANG on the other side, they must overthrow him and get such a person as WUPEIFU as their ^{partner} ~~opponent~~.

2. Neither of these opinions is right. At the request of the Navy (which considered the junior Army officers' activities dangerous) for a talk among the Foreign Ministry, Army Ministry and ^{the} Navy Ministry over the policy towards China, it was decided that the chiefs of the Chinese Section of the Army

General Staff and the Navy General Staff and I should meet for consultation. (I had already talked with certain proper persons in the Army, and thought that the contriving opinion of the young officials was nothing serious.)

3. As the basis of the above mentioned conversation, I presented an annexed paper A (25 May, 1934), agreed upon by the Vice-Minister and the Section Chief.

4. Concerning the above paper A, the Navy side had nothing to say against it and the Army also agreed with the principle. The above mentioned three, however, exchanged views, and on

21 June, I made the annexed paper B.

5. Though I understood that the Army side had no objection on the whole to the above B plan, I met NAGATA, Chief of the Bureau of Army Affairs on 25 June. After exchanging views for two hours, I ascertained that the Chief of the Bureau of Army Affairs had no objection to the principle of plan B.

6. Leaving Tokyo on June 27, I arrived at Hsingking on 29, and I saw Councillor TANI. I told him of the principle of plan B, and he entirely agreed with it. Then I saw and had a ^{friendly} ~~friendly~~ talk with OKAMURA, vice-Chief of the

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(5)

Army staff. He had no objection to the principle of plan B. Arriving on July 3 at TIENTSIN, I saw UMEZU, Commander-in-Chief and described the principle of plan B in detail. The Commander-in-Chief was ^{much} very pleased as the plan thoroughly agreed with his opinion. I went to PEIPING on July 4. Of course, ^AWAKASUGI agreed with plan B, and SHIBAYAMA, military attaché, gave a hearty support to the plan. Then I talked of the principle of plan B to NISHIDA in TSINAN on July 8, and to SAKANE in TSINGTAO on July 9. ~~In TSINAN, I saw~~ (HANAYANI) HANAYA, too. I thought he had changed a job.

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(6)

deal from what he was for a time. Anyhow, it
I felt that as
was considered that
our army in North China was firmly controlled
by its Commander-in-Chief, UMEZU, so I think
it will not misguide the general situation
could not be ~~misled~~ take a wrong course. →

7. On coming back to Tokyo on July 15, I was
told by the Army ^{gite opinion}
indicated the opinion of the Army. As the result of
further consultations, the Section Chiefs concerned
agreed in opinion on July 27, as is shown in the
annexed paper C. The question was reported to the
respective Bureaus, and it was decided that
the outcome should be treated as a description
of the points agreed upon ^{as the result of consultations} by the officials con-

cerned of the Army and Navy and of the ^{Foreign} Ministry
for Foreign Affairs under the supervision of the
respective Bureaus.

arrangement of this

8. The preliminary question, however, was left alone
after this, because of an objection from the Army
side. At the end of November, consultations were
held again. After several meetings, agreement was
reached as is shown in the attached paper D. As
to treating paper D in the same manner as the plan
of July 27 (namely the annexed paper C), an
enquiry was made to the respective Bureaus of the
^{Foreign} Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Army and ^{the} Navy

(Annexed Paper A)

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Question Concerning Policy Towards China

(Revised plan, 25 May 1935
Private view of MORISHIMA)

I. General statement

1. Concerning the international situation after the Manchurian Incident, we can say that foreign countries will never exercise an actual power upon Japan so long as she has some reserved strength, but in case she has spent all her reserve power, it is very likely that the foreign countries (especially America and the Soviet Union) will try to recover, even resorting to an actual power, the "balance of power before

the Incident. In other words, Japan is, at present,
in such a period as it is necessary for her to
prepare for a bold leap in the future, by concen-
trating her national policy on not losing her
reserve power and ^{at the same time,} by doing her utmost in
filling up her national strength.

2. Therefore, regarding the relations with
Manchukuo and China, Japan must aim at
co-operation for the sake of a sound development
of Manchukuo, and while taking care, as best
as possible, not to complicate the situation in
China at least for the coming several years.

(It is ^{also} necessary to maintain and promote our commercial interests), we should continue with a steady means, even if it may be slow, to set the Japanese-Chinese relations on a normal state and to maintain and extend our interests towards China.

II. Important points of the policy towards China

1. Towards the NANKING regime

(a)

Although the guiding principle of the National Government does not fundamentally agree with the Empire's policy towards China, it is not wise, in view of the principle of the general state

ment given above, to act in such a way as
to disturb the NANKING regime from its basis.

(b) Therefore, for the present, we must have
among ourselves a principle to keep up the
NANKING regime (When CHIANG-KAI-SHEK falls, there
will be nobody in China who can manage the
situation even to such an extent
as it is to-day, and CHIANG-KAI-SHEK himself
^{can} could not do any better than ^{he is doing} ~~he is~~ to-day in
unifying and intensifying China.) If the
NANKING regime shows a sincere attitude in
a concrete manner for a new turn in the

Japanese-Chinese relations, we ought to accept it with good-will, but we will not seek reconciliation on our own accord. In case the other party should trespass on our rights, we should take a strict and fair attitude, just as we have up to the present, and adopt necessary steps according to our own stand, so that the NAN-KING regime will be obliged to ask for friendship of Japan.

2. Towards the anti-CHIANG KAI-SHEK party

(a) The existence of anti-CHIANG KAI-SHEK power is effective in checking the attitude

of the NANKING regime towards Japan. However, we do not want the anti-CHIANG-KAI-SHEK power to develop too much, as it may cause a general disturbance in China, which we are anxious to avoid at least for the coming several years.

4. ^{we} ~~Our side~~, therefore, must act so as to

(SEINAN HA)

enable the South-West party to continue its exis-

tence mostly by itself, and we should keep

a secret

contact with it. The similar attitude should

be taken, on the whole, towards HAU FU KUEI,

YUANSI SHAU ^{and others (whit)}, possessing real power and ^{an} taking

an inreparable attitude toward the NANKING regime, as it is desirable that they should keep the

~~status quo.~~ The growth of the anti CHIANG-KAI-

~~party~~

SHEK ~~should be left to the natural change of the~~

~~political situation~~ ^{change} of China. We must not give

a positive support to it, as it may only compli-

cate the situation; ^{which} and so it will not

agree with the ^{general} principle of the general statement

stated above.

3. Towards the government in North China

(a) Our side wishes for a condition in

political influence ~~of the~~ ^{the} which the NANKING regime will not extend to

North China district, but as an actual question

in bringing about such a condition there

is no means for us except to use an enormous
actual power. For the present, we must avoid to
put such kind of power in action, so we have to
be satisfied, for the time being, with the fact
that, while pulling the wires of the NANKING
regime in North China, we gradually develop the
tendency that the political decrees of the NANKING
regime are mitigated in North China, according to
the actual circumstances.

(Accordingly)
(b) with the policy to keep up the HUANG FU
regime among ourselves at least for the time being.

(As far as we pull the wires of the NANKING regime

as is stated above (a), there is no better person than
(with necessary changes)
HUANG FU now), we should adopt the same policy
as we take towards the NANKING regime, and try to
solve the pending questions and maintain and
develop our interest. At the same time we should
plan to replace the government posts under
the influence of the North China government
which are occupied by the anti-japanese persons
such as those belonging to the former North-East
Party, with pro-japanese persons. We must
further
create an atmosphere in which the government
officials and people of ^{the} North China come to have

a preoccupied idea that they do not have anti-Japanese movement in North China. After all, by developing our interest and appointing pro-Japanese government officials, as well as by creating a general atmosphere untainted with anti-Japanese colour, we expect to bring about the condition which makes it impossible to ignore the special relations among Japan, Manchukuo and China whoever the leader of the North China government may be. Considering the principle of the above general statement, it is necessary to act gradually for the coming three years.

(Annexed Paper B)

Question concerning Policy towards China

(Tentative Plan

21 June, 1934)

I General principle

The fundamental principle of our policy towards

China is (a) to lead China to adhere to the policy of the Empire to ensure peace in East Asia, in

by means of ^{by means of} accord and with co-operation and mutual support

among Japan, Manchukuo and China with Japan

as leader, (b) and develop our commercial

interest towards China.

II In view of the present situation of China,

however, it is difficult for us to quickly

attain the object given in (a) of Article I. If we

carry out various policies in a hurry, we are likely to bring about a destructive disorder to China ^(the Empire, because of geographical proximity) which may possibly compel the ^(as best as possible) use of enormous actual power in the interior of China to save the situation. We must be careful not to fall into such a situation, because we are to ^{have} come across an internationally grave moment in 1935 and 1936, while concentrating ourselves chiefly on the construction of Manchukuo, which is the central point of the Imperial policy.

III

On the other hand, the development of our commercial right, namely, building up ⁽²²⁾ our firm

economic stand in China, forms in itself the basis of our policy ^{toward} against China. It is an effective measure, too, to control China by our influence and force her to seek to approach towards us.

(It is especially so at present when we cannot expect to have a quick effect through political measures). For the development of the commercial right given above, it is important that peace and order should be kept in various places in China, particularly in the districts which are closely connected with Japan economically.

IV. Accordingly, ^{we} our side should avoid the danger

of bringing a destructive disorder to China, by taking steps against the natural transition of the political situation of China. We had rather carry out the policy suited to the actual condition of China earnestly and persistently, with the ideas ^{above stated} lead the natural transition in our favour, until, together with an absolute deadlock in the interior administration of China which is considered a natural outcome according to the change of political situation, until China is finally brought to such a situation as it compels her to approach us.

A. Just of policy

1. General policy

(a) We should advance with the idea to impress the Chinese government officials and people all the more with our resolution that we will go along with the way we believe to be right, so long as the Chinese side will not awake to the general situation in East Asia. When the Chinese side ^{actually} shows a sincere attitude for a new turn in the Japanese-Chinese relations, we ought to accept it with good-will, whether it is shown by the central government or ^{by a} local one, but we will not seek friendship of our own accord. Moreover, if the Chinese

side should trespass on our right, we should meet
the situation with a strict and fair attitude in
taking necessary steps based on our own stand.

b) It would be inevitable, if ^{we} caused a disturbance
in the ^{Chinese} political situation in taking measures
required for the protection of our interest as is
stated above. Otherwise, we must not
act in a way which may particularly compli-
cate the situation in China. We must expect
to develop our commercial right
by ^{improving} increasing public order in various

places in China, especially in those places which have close economic relations with Japan.

(c). We must exclude ^{China's} the psychology of befriend-
ing distant states and of antagonizing neighbours

~~possessed~~ ^{and} by China which is the greatest obstacle for

Japan and China ^{friendship} to approach each other, namely,

~~that~~ ^{It is this} psychology of ~~China~~ ^{China} which makes her

trust to chance to hold Japan in check by dint

of other countries' influence, We must ^{exclude} also

her various movements based upon this

psychology as well as foreign support to

China in concert with these movements. For

To include

the above mentioned exclusion we must use

only diplomatic and economic measures.

2. Policy towards the NANKING regime

As the guiding principle of the National Govern-

ment fundamentally differs from the Empire's

policy towards China, our basic principle towards

the NANKING regime lies in bringing it, in the

end, into such a situation that the existence of

the NANKING regime depends on its showing

a sincere attitude for a new turn in

the relations between Japan and China. However,

as we deem it more according to our policy not to complicate the situation

in China as best as possible, at least, for the present,
we must not contrive the fall of the NANKING regime
of our own accord, but, instead, we should
persistently
rather adopt (a) and (b) measures given in the
general policy stated above. Particularly concern-
ing the solution of the pending questions and the
development of our interest, we must make
efforts more positively than before and lead
the NANKING regime to our advantage.

3. Policy towards the government in North
China.

Though we wish for a condition that the political influence of the NANKING regime will not extend to the ^{North China} area, it will be difficult for us to bring about such a situation unless we are determined to use an enormous actual power.

Therefore, we should aim, under the present circumstances to have the North China area contact with the NANKING regime and at the same time have the influence ~~atmosphere~~ while pulling the wires of the 7th NANKING regime mitigate in North China, ~~(atmosphere in)~~ NANKING regime in North China, which its political influence is mitigated in North China, according to the actual state of this area.

This policy should be carried out step by step.

Accordingly, ^{among ourselves} keeping the policy to continue the

HUANG FU regime at least for the time being,

^{we} our side should, on the whole, adopt the principle

stated above which we adopt for the NANKING

regime and try to solve the pending questions

and maintain and develop our interest. We

should take measures for the replacement of

the government posts under the influence of the

North China regime occupied by the former

anti-japanese persons such as ^(belonging to the) the North-Eastern

and others
party with pro-japanese people. We should
also act in such manner as we may actually
blockade the activities of these parties and create
the atmosphere in ^{which} the government officials and
people of North China area come to have
a preoccupied idea that they do not have
antijapanese movements in ^{the} North China area,
till at last we bring about the condition
that whoever may lead the government
in North China, special relations among
Japan, Manchukuo and China, ^{in North China} ought not to

be ignored, by developing our right,
appointing pro-japanese officials and grow-
ing the general atmosphere untaunted with
anti-japanese colour.

4. Policy towards the other local governments

In controlling the attitude of the NANKING regime
towards Japan, it is desirable that such local
governments as the South-Western party, HAN FUKUEI
and YUAN SI SHAU party should keep insepa-
rable relations with the NANKING regime as they
are now, we should so act towards them that

they may continue to exist by their own strength. At the same time we should maintain proper connections with these governments. The development of the local governments, however, should be left to the natural transition of the Chinese political situation. The attempt on our side to support ^{positively} the development stated above is only likely to complicate the situation and will not agree ^{with} the principle of (a) of the general policy stated above, so we must avoid to take measures for a positive support,

while bearing it mind not to

support the NANKING regime partially.

5. Policy for developing commercial interest

While enforcing each policy given above, we should try to develop our commercial interest in China. Whatever policy we may take towards each government, we should seek our object among the financial groups and people in general in order to promote economic co-operation with the nation, and also by creating the ^{general} atmosphere untainted with

an anti-Japanese colour, we should bring about
such a condition as will convince them that
the special economic relations among Japan,
Manchuria and China cannot be altered for
political and other reasons.

(Annexed Paper C)

Questions concerning Policy towards China
(Plan of 27 July 1934.)

I. General principle

1. The fundamental principle of our policy towards

China lies ^(a) in making China follow the

policy of the Empire to ensure peace in East Asia

by co-operation and mutual aid among Japan,

Manchuria and China with the Empire as centre,

as well as ^(b) in developing our commercial

rights ⁱⁿ towards China.

2. ^{However} in view of the ^{present situation in} status quo of China, however,

it is not only ^{most} difficult ^{for us to} quickly attain the

object given in (a) of Article 1, ~~by enforcing our~~
~~policy against the political situation in China,~~
 but there is also danger of bringing about a
 contrary effect, if we are to carry out such a
 policy in haste. We must try to attain
our object step by step.

3. On the other hand development of our
 commercial right in China, namely our
 building a firm economic stand in China,
 not only
 is, in itself the basis of our policy towards
 China, but also is it an effective measure

to control China with our influence and
 compel her to seek to approach us. In order to

develop the commercial right given above

attention to

we must pay the maintenance of public order

in various places in China, especially those

places which have ^{economic} close relations with Japan,

and also grow an atmosphere between the

general

government officials and people to depend on

Japan and lead the situation so as to put an

end to the anti-Japanese tendency.

4. Our side, therefore, ^{we} should avoid ^(under the present circumstances) to take

forced
measures going against the natural transition of
the Chinese political situation, we should rather
enforce earnestly and persistently the policies
which are considered necessary for us according
to the actual condition of China with the idea
to conduct the natural transition favourably
for us. Then we must expect to lead China
into such a position ^{as it} will compel her, according
to the general situation, to approach towards us
finally, ~~at the time of~~ together with an absolute deadlock
in the interior government of China which is

naturally expected to come, considering the transition of the political situation in China.

II. Line of policy

1. General policy

(a) We should act with the idea to im-

press the Chinese government officials and people

all the more with our resolution that we will

advance the way we believe to be right, so long

as ^{the} Chinese side will not awake to the general

situation ⁱⁿ East Asia, ^{and} we should ^{receive} it with good-

will, if the Chinese side actually shows us

sincerity in making a new turn for the

relations of the two countries. However, we must not seek friendship of our own accord. In case the Chinese side should trespass on our right, we should have a strict and fair attitude and take necessary steps based on ^{our} own stand.

(B). It would be inevitable, if we caused a disturbance in the political situation in China, as the result of our taking measures required for the protection of our interest as is stated above.

Otherwise, we must not act in such a way as will particularly complicate the situation.

in China. We have to bear in mind to maintain
the public peace and order in China, especially in
the districts which are closely connected with
Japan economically and try to develop our com-
mercial interest, ^{adopting a policy} by ^{develop} to ^{grow} among the
^{general} government officials and people an atmosphere
to depend on Japan and, at the same time, to put
an end to the anti-Japanese movement.

(c). We must exclude China's psychology of
befriending distant states and ^{of} antagonizing nei-
ghbours, which is the greatest obstacle for Japan.

and China to ^{friendship} approach each other, namely
the psychology which makes China trust to
chance to hold Japan in check by borrowing
foreign power, ^{we must also} exclude her various move-
ments based upon this kind of psychology,
as well as support given to China by foreign
countries in concert with these movements.

2. Policy towards the NANKING regime

As the guiding principle of the National Govern-
ment fundamentally differ from the Empire's
policy towards China, our basic principle to-

wards the NANKING regime lies in bringing it
in the end, into the situation in which the
existence of the NANKING regime depends on its
showing a sincere attitude for a
new turn in the relations between Japan and
China. Our side, however, must avoid to have
a special policy going against the general cir-
cumstances, in contriving the fall of the NAN-
KING regime of our own accord. We had rather
persistently carry out the policies given in (a) and (b) of
the general policy stated above. We should

especially request the NANKING regime to suspend the anti-Japanese movements, particularly the actions by that party. At the same time ^(than before) we should make more efforts, as to the solution of the pending problems and the development of our interest. We should try to lead the attitude of that regime in our favour, by so acting toward it that pro-Japanese persons will be appointed to the official posts under its command.

3. Policy towards the North China government

Though we wish that in the North China area the situation will take such a turn as it will not allow the political influence of the NANKING regime to be extended to this area, it will be difficult to bring about such a situation quickly, unless we are determined to use an enormous actual power. Therefore, we should aim, under the present circumstances, to intensify gradually such a condition as in which the political influence of the NANKING regime will be deprived of its influence in North China in accordance with the actual state there. This plan should be carried out step by step.

Accordingly, we are to adopt with necessary changes,
on the whole, the policy we adopt towards the NAN-
KING regime stated above toward the govern-
ment in North China as well. If the government
in question is powerful and shows sincerity,
we should deal with it with a considerable
amount of give and take principle and exert
ourselves for the solution of the pending prob-
lems and maintenance and development
of our interest, while trying, at least,
to actually ^{to} blockade the activities of the party.

III

with the pro-japanese persons
and replace the government posts, under the
influence of the North China government,
occupied by the men of anti-japanese party
belonging to the former North-East party.

We must ^{develop} grow such an atmosphere ^{that we} in which the go-
vernment officials and people in ^{the} North China area
^{would} come to possess a pre-occupied idea that they
do not have anti-japanese movements in
that area, and after all, by developing our
interest and creating the ^{general} atmosphere untainted
with the anti-japanese colour, we should

III

bring about such a situation as will make it impossible to ignore the special relations among Japan, Manchukuo and China in North China whatever the leader of the government in North China may be.

4 Policy towards the South-West Party and other local governments

It is needless to say that towards the government in ^{towards} and the other local governments in North China, we should apply with necessary changes the general policy and the policies based upon it towards the NANKING regime and the government in North China which are given above,

~~and other local governments.~~ At the same time as
in checking the attitude of the NANKING regime against Japan,
it is desirable that the South West Party, HANFU

KUEI, YUAN SISHAU and others should take an

~~reasonable~~ ^{neutral} attitude as it does now towards

the NANKING regime, we should act in such

^{would make} a way as these governments remain to

exist chiefly by themselves, If they show

goodwill towards us, we should answer them

with friendship on our side, too, and keep

proper connections with them. However, the

new growth of such local governments ought

to be left to the natural change of the political situation in China. We must avoid to apply such steps as will ^{positively} support the growth of new political governments, while bearing ⁱⁿ mind not to be partial in supporting the NANKING regime.

5. Policy in connection with developing commercial right.

While enforcing each policy stated above, ^{correspondingly} we should try to extend our commercial interest towards China. We should promote

economic co-operation with the nation, by seeking our
object ^{among} the financial circles as well as
among people in general whatever policy
we may apply towards each regime. We
must further continue to ^{develop} grow a general
atmosphere untroubled with the anti-
japanese colour, and bring about the
condition ^{which} in the special economic relations
among Japan, Manchukuo and China
cannot be altered for political and other
reasons.

(Strict Secrecy)

(Annexed Paper E)

Number 22, Secret.

First Section, Asiatic Bureau

12 ~~February~~ ^{January}, 1935

Ministers in China, PEIPING, TIENTSIN,

TSINGTAO, TSINAN, SHANGHAI, NANKING, HANKAO

FUCHOW, AMOI and CANTON

Minister HIROTA

Conference with the military authorities

concerning the Chinese problems.

As is shown in the annexed paper, we have

collected the important points agreed upon

concerning the Chinese problems,
by the chief authorities of the Army, Navy
and Foreign Ministries as the result of
which have been going on for some time
consultations under the guidance of respective
Bureaus. (We ^{will} do not give the
annexed paper here, as it is the same in
contents as the Annexed Paper C of the report of
the First Section of the Asiatic Bureau, dated
27 November, 1935, "Conference with
the Military Authorities Concerning the Chinese
Problems" which we forwarded ^{to you} ~~by~~ ^{at} a
favourable opportunity the other day.) We

hope that you will understand the above,
than before
and keep a closer contact with the Army
and the Navy in your place in taking various
measures towards China. If there is a proper
opportunity, we hope that you will in-
form the chiefs of the nearby diplomatic
establishments other than in the places to
which this letter is addressed of the principles
given in the letter.

P. S. As the Army and the Navy autho-
rities are to give instructions to their

overseas authorities that in forwarding the
principle of this letter the annexed paper
should be obtained from the Foreign Mini-
stry authorities, we hope that you will
make the copy of the above mentioned an-
nexed paper (namely, Annexed Paper C
attached to the Report of the First Section, of the
Asiatic Bureau given above) and hand
it over when the request is made by the Army
and the Navy authorities in your place.

This letter should be forwarded to

PEIPING, TIENSIN, TSINGTAO, TSINAN, SHANGHAI,

NANKING, HANKAO, FUCHOW, AMOI and

CANTON

A copy should be forwarded to

MANCHUKUO

7 Jan 1948

C E R T I F I C A T E

This is to certify that the original of IPS Document
No. 1634M for which I am charged from the Prosecution vault
has been mislaid and cannot be found.

T. C. Liu
Chinese Division
International Prosecution Section

*Signed copy
in Maxon's file*

Excerpt from Foreign Ministry File

"Important Decisions re International and National Policies"

Basic Principle of National Policy, 7 August, 1936,

Decided by Prime Minister

Foreign Minister

Finance Minister

War Minister

Navy Minister

- I. The basic principle of governing the state is to realize the ideal of the founding of the Empire, which means to solidify, based on righteousness, the national foundation inwardly and prosper outwardly, making the Empire both in name and reality a stabilizing power in East Asia, thus securing peace in East Asia, and contributing to the well-being and happiness of the whole world.

In view of the situation in and out of the Empire, the fundamental national policy to be established by the Empire is to secure the position of the Empire on the East Asia Continent by dint of diplomatic policy and national defence, mutually dependent on each other, as well as to advance and develop the Empire toward the South Seas. The basic principles are as follows:

1. It is the realization of the Imperial way to correct dominating policies of the powers and to share mutual happiness according to the real spirit of co-existence and co-prosperity. This should be our consistent guiding principle for our outward developing policy.
2. We should replete our national defence and military preparations, which are necessary to secure peace for the nation, protect its development, and to ensure the position of the Empire, which should be a stabilizing power in East Asia.
3. The fundamental principles of our continental policy are as follows: a sound development and accomplishment of Manchoukuo; intensification of national defence of Japan and Manchoukuo in order to eradicate the Soviet menace in the north and at the same time to prepare against Britain and America; and realization of a close cooperation among Japan, Manchoukuo and China for our economic development. In carrying out these policies, we should be careful to have friendly relations with other countries.

一 我對支政策ハ(イ)支那ヲシテ帝國ヲ中心トスル日滿支三國ノ提携共助ニ依リ東亞ニ施ケル平和ヲ確保セムトスルニ所屬ノ方針ニ追隨セシムト共ニ(ロ)支那ニ對スル我商權ノ伸張ヲ期スルヲ以テ根本義トス

二 然レトモ支那ノ現状ニ顧ミ同國政局ニ對スル施策ニ依リ急速ニ第一項(イ)ノ目的ヲ達成スルニ至難ナルニ止ラス我ニ於テ過急ニ斯種ノ施策ヲ行フ事ハ却テ反對ノ結果ヲ招来スルノ虞モアリ漸ク進テ左目的ノ達成ヲ期スルヲ要ス

三 一方支那ニ對スル我商權ノ伸張俾言スルハ我カガ支那ニ在リ強固ナル經濟上ノ地歩ヲ築クニトハ其ノ自体我對支政策ノ根本義ヲナスノミナラス他面我方ノ勢力カヲ以テ支那ヲ控制シ同國ヲシテ我方トノ接近ヲホムルノ關係ナキニシラシムニキ有カナル手段ナリ

而シテ在商權伸張ノ爲ニ中央及各地政權ノ批目的態度ヲ嚴ニ是正スルト共ニ支那各地就中經濟上ニ於テノ關係深キ地方ニ於テ治安維持ニ留意ニ般官民ノ間ニ對日依存ノ空氣ヲ醸成セシム事肝要ナリ

四 仍テ我方一シテハ此ノ際支那政局ノ自然ノ推移ニ逆行スル無理ナル措置固ク避ケ寧ニ在自然ノ推移ヲ我方ニ有利ニ誘導スル如ク支那ノ實狀ニ應ジ我方ノ必要ト認ムル方策ヲ執ル且執拗ニ實施シ以テ支那政局

推移上当然、歸結ト認メラル、同國內政、極端ナル行詔ト相俟
テ結局支那ヲシテ大勢カ、赴ク所遜ニ我方ニ接近ヲ求ムルノ
餘儀ナキカ如キ境地ニ立テシムルヲ期セサルヘカラス

第二 方針策要綱

一 一般方針策

(1) 支那側カ東亞ノ大局ニ覺醒セス依然東亞ノ平和ヲ破壞
スルニ政策ヲ繼續スル於テハ飽ク迄之カ是正ヲ西ニ求メテ
已マサル堅キ我方ノ決意ヲ支那官民ニ一層印象セシメ
支那側カ日支關係ノ打開ニ付現實ニ誠意ヲ示スニ
於テハ然方亦好意ヲ以テ之ヲ迎フヘキモ我方ヨリ進テ
知親ヲ求メス且支那側ニ於テ我方ノ權益ヲ侵害スル
場合ニ然方独自ノ立場ニ基キ必要ノ措置ヲ執ルヘシトノ
嚴肅公正ナル態度ヲ以テ之ヲ臨ムニト
尚彼等ノ内部抗争ヲ利用シ其ノ抗日政策ヲ更改セシ
ム事ニモ亦留意スルヲ要アリ

(2) 前記ノ如ク權益擁護ニ必要ナル我方措置ノ結果支那
政局ニ動揺ヲ生スル事アリトスモ右ハ止ムコト得サル所ナル
カ然ルニ限リ我方ニ於テ殊更支那ノ事態ヲ紛亂セシ
ムルカ如キ措置ヲ出ラサルコト。又支那各地、就中經濟
上我方トノ關係深キ地方ニ於ケル治安ノ維持ニ留意
シ一般官民ノ間ニ對日依存ノ空氣ヲ醸成セシムル共ニ
排日策動ヲ對シテハ之ヲ阻止終熄セシムル様嚴ニ
要求シ以テ我高權ノ伸張ヲ期スルコト

日支接近 最大ノ障害タル支那ノ遠交近攻的心理即チ
同國カ外國ノ力ヲ藉リテ我方ヲ抑制セムコトヲ僥
倖セムトスル心理及在心理ニ基ク各般ノ行動並ニ之ニ
策應スル外國側ノ對支援助ヲ極力排拒スルコト。是カ
返ニ主トシテ外交上及經濟上ノ万策ヲ積極的ニ実施スルコト

ニ對南京政權方策

國民政府ノ指導ノ原理ハ帝國ノ對支政策ト根本ニ於テ相容レサル
モアルヲ以テ南京政權ニ對スル方策ノ基調ハ同政權ノ
存亡ハ同政權ニ於テ日支關係ノ打開ニ誠意ヲ示スカ否
カニ懸ントスルカ如キ境地ニ至窮局ニ於テ同政權ヲ追込ムニ
トシ存スル次第ニ至テ右目的ノ為ニハ前記一般方策(イ)
及(ロ)施策ヲ執拗行ヒ殊ニ同政權ニ對シテ排日ノ停止
就中黨部ノ策動ヲ控制セムコトヲ要求シ同時ニ懸心案ノ
解決及我方權益ノ伸張ニ付テハ後來ヨリモ一層積極的
(a)ノ努力ヲナシ且同政權下ノ官職等ニ我政策遂行ニ便ナル
人物ヲ任命セシムル様仕向ケ以テ同政權ノ態度ヲ我方ニ有
利ニ誘導スルヲ期スルコト

三對北支政權方策

1-3) 我方トシテハ北支地方ニ對シ南京政權ノ政令及ハサルカ如キ
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漸ヲ追ッテ之が實現ヲ期スルコト。從テ我方トシテハ北支政權ヲ討シ之を
大体前記南京側ニ討スル方針ヲ準用シ且該政權が有力ナルモノ
ニシテ誠意ヲ示スニ如クハ我方モ亦好意ヲ以テ之ニ臨ミ、以テ
懸念ノ解決及我方權益ノ維持伸長ニ努ムルトモ甚クシク之
黨部ノ活動ヲ事實上封セシメ且北支政權下ノ官職等ヲシテ
我政策遂行上ニ便スル人物ニ置キ換ヘシムル様仕向ケ以テ北支
地方ノ官民が同地方ニ於テハ排日ハ行ハヌモノナリトノ先入的ノ
觀念ヲ持ツニ至ル様ノ空氣ヲ醸成セ行キ、結局我方權益ノ
伸張ト排日ニ昵マサル一般空氣ノ醸成トニ依リ北支政權ノ
主班が何人ナルモ北支ニ於ケル日滿支ノ特殊ノ關係ヲ無視スルコト
不可能ナルが如キ狀況ヲ招来スルニ努ムルコト。

(a)
四西南派ソノ他ノ局地的政權ニ對スル方策
西南派ソノ他局地的政權ニ對シテモ前記一般方策並之ニ基ク
討南京及北支政權方策ヲ準用スヘキ事、勿論ナルが西南派
及韓復榘、閻錫山等カ南京政權ト對立シ、亦不即
不協ノ態度ヲ執リ居ル狀態ヲ維持セシムルコトハ南京政權
對日態度ヲ牽制スル上ニ於テ望マシキニ付キ我方トシテハ
此等政權が我方ニ對シ好意ヲ示スニ於テハ我方亦之ニ
相応スル好意ヲ示シ適宜連絡ヲ維持スルコト。

但し新種地方政權、新ナル發生ハ支那政局ノ自然ノ推移ニ
委スヘク我カトシテハ南京政權ニ擁護ニ偏スルカ如キ結
果トナラサル極留意スルト共ニ積極的ニ新ニ地方政權ノ
發生ヲ助成スルカ如キ措置ハ之ヲ避クルコト

五.商權伸張ニ関スル方策

前記各方策ノ実施間之ニ適應シテ我對支商權伸
張ニ努ム之カ為各政權ヲ利導シテソノ目的達成ヲ
計ルト共ニ広ク対象ヲ實業界ソノ他一般民間ニ亦メ
國民經濟提携ヲ促進シ尙排日ニ昵マサル一般の空氣
ノ醸成ヲ計リ以テ日滿支間ノ經濟的特种關係ハ政治
的等ノ理由ニ依リ如何トモシ難キカ如キ事態ノ招来ヲ期ス
ルコト、

其後外務及陸海軍側ニ於テ右丁號ヲ「外務及陸海軍關係
課長カ各々上局ノ指導監督ノ下ニ協議シ意見ノ一致ヲ見タル
要領ヲ記述セルモノトシテ取扱フコトニ關シ夫々上局ノ承認ヲ
得タルヲ以テ當方ニ於テハ昭和十年一月十二日附亞一機密合第
ニニ号公信(別紙戊号)ヲ以テ前記各公館(香港ハ其後一月
三十日水澤總領事ニ右公信寫及前記亞一調書ヲ托送ス)
ニ對シ右丁号(即チ前記亞一調書ノ丙号)ノ趣旨ニ依リ
諸般ノ對支工作上此ノ上共出先陸海軍ト密接ナル連絡
ヲ保持スヘキ旨訓令セリ。

"The Second Ad. Policy
toward North China"
was reproduced here.
But, the original
Japanese copy
for "Supplement"
cannot be found
in the file —

Doc. No. 1634

For information &
return.

CWGP

J. Tomishige
July 2nd 1946

(5):

"The Basis of National
Policy" June 26, 1946

Original Japanese
and English trans-
lation were

extracted from
this file, by request
of Mr. Hardin.

Sept. 19, 1946.

J. Tomishige

(7) Both Japanese
original (there were
two originals) and
Eng. Translation
"The fundamental
principle of our
national policy"
were extracted from
this file, by request
of Mr. Hardin.

Sept. 19, 1946.

J. Tomislige

Miss Nomura

Matters ~~pertaining to~~ ~~the~~ ~~policy~~ ~~towards~~ ~~China~~
Matters ~~pertaining to~~ ~~the~~ ~~policy~~ ~~towards~~ ~~China~~
Pertaining (Three Principles)

4 October, 1935

Understood by

War Minister

Navy Minister

Minister for Foreign Affairs

Reference: File, "Policy towards China"

Ultra Secret
~~Strict Secrecy~~

Matters ~~pertaining to~~ ~~the~~ ~~policy~~ ~~towards~~ ~~China~~
Matters ~~pertaining to~~ ~~the~~ ~~policy~~ ~~towards~~ ~~China~~
Towards Chinese Policy

It is the foundation of our foreign policy to ensure peace and order of East Asia and to work for its development, by co-operation and mutual aid among Japan, Manchukuo and China

with the Empire as center, and here lies the aim of our policy toward China.

In order to attain the above mentioned object, it is necessary that we should act with righteousness according to the principles given below and with measures suitable for the occasion, and thereby bring about such a condition as will enable us to establish fundamental relations among the three countries, Japan, Manchukuo and China, by making ~~the Chinese side~~ (central and local governments)

adjust its relations with the Empire and Manchukuo.

~~The Chinese side~~ ^{China} will
(1) We must see that, thoroughly control anti-Japanese speech and action, and that, giving up

(3) In view of the fact that the red influence coming down from ~~the~~ outer Mongolia and other places is a common threat to Japan, Manchukuo and China, we must get the Chinese side to co-operate with various measures requested by our side for the exclusion of the menace stated above.

When the above stated principles are put into practice steadily and when we come to acknowledge the sincerity of the Chinese ~~side~~ concerning its good-will and co-operation with Japan and Manchukuo, we should first conclude an inclusive agreement between

Japan and China regarding the establishment of
friendship and joint efforts, and then make
another agreement necessary to regulate
the new relations among Japan, Manchukuo
and China.

4 October, 1935.

~~IV~~ ultra secret
~~Strict Secrecy~~

Attached Document regarding an understanding
Reached by the Ministers concerned on
4 October, 1935.

1. / ^{in carrying out the present policy,} Although we may take advantage of the political situation in China, by setting ^{off} the central and local governments in China against one another and by other means according to circumstances, it is not our true aim to do so with the object of ^{especially} promoting or interfering with the unity or disunion of China. Our aim lies in the realization of the points stated in the gist. /

2. In carrying out the present policy, close relations should always ^{be} maintained among the Foreign ~~Ministry~~, War ~~Ministry~~ and ~~the~~ Navy Ministries.

AN: this note is stem of this Dec 7

3. A note of 7 December, 1934, agreed upon by the chief authorities of the Foreign, ~~Army~~ ^{War} and Navy Ministries, shall be ~~and~~ successively effective, side by side with the Understanding of the Ministers Concerned of 4 October, 1935, until a substitute has been decided upon as the result of study in future.

4 October, 1935

Signed by

Kazuo KUWAJIMA, Chief of East-
Asia Bureau, Foreign Ministry.

Kiyoshi IMAI, Chief of Bureau of
Army Affairs, War Ministry.

Jengo YOSHIDA, Chief of Bureau
of Naval Affairs, Navy Ministry.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

5 SEPTEMBER, 1946

TO : MR. HARDIN

RE : DOCUMENT # 1634

You have been previously informed that your request of 17 July, 1946 by Mr. Mignone for Document #1634-h is being done for Lt. Col. Taranenko. This request is now 1634-i and is being done in your name.

LT. T. Wilds
Document Division

Doc. No. 1634.

Item No. 9. B.

was cut off for
reproduction, upon
request of
Elton Hyder.

第三次
北支
處理
要綱

Amendment in blue
ink was made by
Lt. Col. SONODA.

This translation
must have been
made from the
Japanese original
copy which had not
yet been amended.
But, such a copy
cannot be found
in File # 1634.

J. Tomishige,
July 2, 1946

DOCUMENTS (OTHER THAN FOREIGN RELATIONS EXCERPTS) FOR WHICH
REQUESTS HAVE BEEN MADE

- X 172 Re German collaboration with Italy and Japan--1945.
299 *Replaced by 4022*
Grew Affidavit (sent from Washington).
- 507 Memo--MATSUOKA to KONOYE, Re Reasons for need of rejecting oral statement. 1941. (KONOYE home.)
- * 699 Memo, Re: Anglo-Japanese claims in China. (22 Nov. 1940).
- Tawanne* 527 Memo. of Conversation between Ribbentrop and MATSUOKA in Berlin. (29 Mar. 1941).
- X 702 Telegrams between Japanese Foreign Office and British. (Feb. 1941).
- 713 File on Japanese-United States relations regarding abolition of U.S.-Japan Commercial Treaty 26 July 1939.
- * 766 U. S. Naval Board of Inquiry Finding on Panay sinking.
- X 847 Foreign Ministry File--Statement of F.M. ARITA 8 Dec. 1938 to British Ambassador, Re: Nine-Power Treaty and treaties with China.
- * 853 Official announcements of Japanese Government--1937. (Contains documents in English and Japanese, Re: Brussels Conf., invitation, and Jap. refusal.)
- * 854 Official Japanese Government Announcements--1937-1938. (Announcements of Japanese Govt., Re: China Incident--in English and Japanese.
- Tawanne* 1129 Notes: Salient Points in the Informal Conversations between MATSUOKA and Stahmer--1940.
- X 1131 Telegrams, Re: "Eden-SHIGEMITSU" Conversations. Feb. 1941.
- X-X 1132 Telegram: MATSUOKA to Eden. 18 Feb. 1941.
- 1133 Telegram MATSUOKA to SHIGEMITSU, Re: Japan's entry into European war.
- X 1150 Telegrams: Foreign Ministry to envoys. 13-18 Feb. 1941.
- Tawanne* 1308 Minutes of Joint Conference of army, navy, Foreign Office authorities for intensifying coalition of Japan-Germany-Italy. 12 July 1940.
- 1339 File of cables from Japanese Foreign Office.
- 1383 File of Telegrams etc. on Japanese-U.S. negotiations. 1941.
- 1392 Minutes of Joint Conference of army, navy, and Foreign Office authorities on Intensification of Coalition among Japan, Germany, and Italy. 16 July 1940.

"Our diplomatic policy"

decided by ^{the} Prime Minister, Foreign Minister,

War Minister, and Minister of Navy.

7 Aug. 1936

Our diplomatic policy.

Adhering to the national principle,

we establish our diplomatic policy in order

to attain our objects and make our

resident officials and officers keep

close connection ^{with} one another in

sympathy with our policy. Moreover,

we hope for the perfect control

of our diplomacy, ^{field,} leading our nation
suitably and actively.

We guard ~~by~~ ourselves against
~~our~~ obsequious and conservative
attitude in protecting and promoting our
just and proper rights and interests
and try to allay the suspicion or
apprehensions of foreign countries
towards us; as well as taking firm
and active attitude at all times.

Chapter I General Policy

We make it the basic policy of our diplomacy that we promote the growth of Manchentuo and solidify the special and inseparable relations between Japan and Manchentuo, while we develop toward the South Seas peacefully and realize our desires of becoming strong and stable power in the Orient as well as controlling the relations between Japan and Soviet Russia and that between

japan and China in order to establish a permanent peace in the Orient and to complete the existence and the development of our Empire.

As Soviet Russia has recently strengthened her position in national defence and diplomacy, she is increasing armed revolutionary power in the Orient and plans to infect every country with Bolshevik ideas, despatching excessive troops to the Far East, consequently we are obliged to face with an unfavourable

situation. As it is a serious matter for the achievement of our East-Asiatic policy as well as being ^{an} immediate threat for our national defence, we, for the present, attach importance of our diplomatic policy to the frustration of her aggressive plan in the East-Asia, especially to the ^{extinction} ~~dissolution~~ of her menace of military preparations and to the impediment of Bolshevike development, thus we should expect to attain our objects by foreign policy

together with the
~~with the aid of~~ completion of national
defence.

Accordingly, it is necessary for us
to think collectively the present international
situation, to regulate the relations with
the Powers, and to make our diplomatic
agencies take an active part perfectly
in order to lead us to a favourable international
situation ~~internationally~~.

~~W. K. ...~~

Chapter II

The ^{goal} ~~point~~ of our plan.

I. In consideration of ^{the present} situation

at home and abroad we guard strictly
of our own accord against stirring

up troubles with Soviet Russia and

should try to settle a long-pending

question according to a peaceful measure

i. We should plan ^{to} ~~for the~~ establishment
~~of~~ the committees of demarcation and
of settling complications regarding the

frontier from Hsingkaiku to

Tumenkiang, Moreover, we should

contrive to establish ^{an} ~~the~~ agency of

this kind concerning Soviet-Manchoukuo.

border and Manchoukuo-Mongolia

border.

ii We propose to establish ~~the~~ a

non-armed zone, if occasion calls for it.

iii When Soviet Russia wants to

conclude non-aggressive treaty with us,

we hope to conclude a treaty if we

could solve various long-pending

questions between Japan and Soviet Russia

which
include the problem concerning the
well-balanced regulation of armament
in ^{the} Far East.

IV. We should take proper measures
to prevent ~~Russian~~ ^{thought} aggression by Russia
~~thought~~ against Japan, Manchoukuo,
and China.

II. We deal with Chinese central
and local Government with grave
attitude and ^{by} fair policy,
and expect to realize China-
Japanese cooperation based

on the principle of live-and-
 let-live, leading Chinese ^{in such a way that} they are
 obliged to correct their attitude towards
 us by the aid of our economic
 construction for Chinese people.

In North China we plan ^{for} economic
 and cultural union and cooperation
 between Japan and Manchoukuo, while
 we try to make Japan, Manchoukuo and
 China ~~to~~ become a special zone where we
^{would} ~~should~~ defend ourselves against
 Bolshevick development of Soviet Russia.

We do not take any measures to promote or to obstruct the union or independence of China to another local authorities administrations.

The above-mentioned are the basic plans of our policy towards China, (reference: A written decision dated 4 Oct. 1935 concerning our policy towards China) and all measures should be ~~done~~ taken based on this plan. As an urgent counter-plan, we, at first, should make

North China to ^a be special district of
anti-communism, pro-japanese and
pro-Manchurian in consideration of
the present situation between Japan and
Soviet Russia, while we attach importance
of our policy towards China to making
all Chinese people become anti-
communistic and pro-japanese, as well
as acquiring the resources of national
defence and enlarging traffic
institutions.

(Measures which are to be taken will
be shown in another page)

III The promotion of friendly relations
between Japan and America contributes
to restraining Britain and Soviet Russia,
but America is ~~greatly~~ ^{greatly} interested in the
transition of our policy and does not
neglect to watch for us based on her
traditional Far-Eastern policy,
expanding earnestly ^{her} ~~the~~ military preparations,
consequently, we fear that America ^{will} give

assistance to China and she ^{may} still ~~more~~
 will ~~make~~ China take pro-American policy
 according to our attitude towards China
 and that we would face ~~to~~ an
 extremely unfavourable situation in
 performing our policy towards Soviet
 Russia. We, for the present, respect
 the commercial rights and interests of
 America in China and make her understand
 our fair attitude, while we promote
 friendly relations with America based on

the economic mutual reliance principle
 and should try ^{not} to make America ~~not~~
~~to~~ obstruct ~~the performance of our~~
 East-Asiatic policy.

N. As the transition of European political
 situation ~~have~~ ^{has} a great influence on
 East-Asia, we should try to lead it
 as it becomes favourable to us, and
 especially, we should try to restrain
 Soviet Russia.

16

There are many points of difference in interest
I. Britain is not consistent with Japan
between Britain and Japan
~~in the interest on many sides~~, but it
is absolutely necessary for us to promote
actively the friendly relations with Britain
for some time and to make her assume
friendly attitude towards us concerning
the relations between Japan and Soviet
Russia in consideration of the fact that
Britain has ^{the} greatest rights and
interests among the Powers in the
East-Asia, and we should relieve
and exclude ^{all} ~~an~~ obstacles ~~to~~ our

overseas expansion, as well as
restraining Soviet Russian attitude
towards us. As it is very effective
for us to regulate the relations between
Japan and Britain in China we, for
the present, make Britain recognize
that we are closely interested in China
and we take suitable measures in order
to save the situation between Japan
and Britain in China respecting British
rights and interests there, while

VII

18

we should try to adjust general relations with Britain.

However, as the

~~As it is doubtful that if Britain~~

^{might} take repressing policy towards us, making

use of the Powers, especially America,

Soviet Russia and China, we should

be precautions about it.

II ^{VII} Germany has the same interest

as ^{ours} ~~that of us~~ in the relations with

Soviet Russia, and it is convenient

for Germany to cooperate with us

in her policy of national defence.

stimulate interested countries
and should develop peacefully and
gradually, trying to get rid of their
apprehensions towards us.

As to ^{the} Philippine Islands, we expect
them to become completely independent
~~the realization of perfect independence,~~
and we are ready to guarantee them
the neutrality if ^{necessary} of ~~the~~ Philippine Islands.

Regarding
~~As to~~ our development in the
Netherlands Indies, ^{as} it is absolutely
necessary for us to ^{clear away} ~~make them~~ get
rid of their apprehensions towards us

Secret

Item (49)
Analysis

(Foreign Ministry)

Outline of our Diplomatic Policy.

June 29, 1936.

To strengthen ~~the~~ ^{our} special relation with Manchukuo and to regulate the relation with China and U.S.S.R. in order to establish permanent peace in the East and to complete our existence and development, is our fundamental diplomatic policy. In carrying the above mentioned policy, we should consider fully the present international situation and regulate the relation with the main powers, and avoid becoming isolated. Thus we should lead the situation favorable for Japan.

1. We regulate our relation with USSR in order to dissolve the threat of that country over Japan and Manchukuo, ^{to} hinder the red invasion of the country,

and to surmount obstacles for our policy in East Asia. And for this purpose we should regulate our national defense and our diplomatic system, and do our best to settle the matters with USSR.

2. By our diplomacy toward China, we should make China be conscious of her responsibility of stabilizing the peace in East Asia and rely on Japan. For the economic development of China we lead her to concert with us and not with Europe ~~and~~ and America. We also lead her not to take pro-Soviet policy. Our action in Inner Mongolia and in North China should follow the line.

3. By estimating the rights and interests in China of Britain, we form firm friendship with her and make her help us in our policy against USSR. We lead her also to ~~accept~~^{recognize} our special position in China. We regulate our economic with her relations in the world and we watch her not to cooperate with USSR or with U.S.

4. Germany and Poland have ~~the~~ common interests in the relation with USSR
with Japan. So we ~~make~~^{had better} the political understanding
with the two countries and lead them to check
USSR from behind. Of course it is necessary
to not to make Britain uneasy when we form
friendship with Germany.

see next page -

4. Germany and Poland have some common interests with Japan in the relation with USSR. Especially ~~as~~ considered from the standpoint of the special relation ~~of~~ between France and USSR the two countries are in the position that they think it favorable to concert with us in national defense and in preventing the red invasion. In this reason we ^{had better} make some ^{political} understanding with Germany, ~~and~~ improve ^{the} friendship with Poland and lead them to check USSR from behind. Indeed it is necessary not to make Britain uneasy when we form a friendship with Germany.