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4

Congress of the United States

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

January 18, 1946

Washington, D. C.

7311 to 7479

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WARD & PAUL

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TESTIMONY OF:

PAGE

KIMMEL, Rear Admiral Husband E. (Resumed)

7312

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

PEARL HARBOR REPORT

Vol. 39

(4)

S. Con. Res. 27

Friday, January 18, 1946

Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at
10:00 a.m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,
Ferguson and Brewster.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel;
Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel, and John
E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Kimmel

1
2 The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

3 When the hearing was suspended yesterday, Congressman
4 Cooper was examining Admiral Kimmel.

5 Do you have further questions, Congressman?

6 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Chairman, I just want to state
7 to Admiral Kimmel, if you got the impression that I was
8 questioning you rather closely about these matters yesterday,
9 I just want to say I also questioned Admiral Stark and
10 especially Admiral Turner very closely about these things,
11 trying to get all the information I could about this matter.

12 TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, U.S. NAVY (Ret.)

13 (Resumed)

14 Admiral Kimmel: I welcome the examination.

15 The Vice Chairman: I thank you for the information you
16 gave in response to my questions.

17 That is all, Mr. Chairman.

18 Admiral Kimmel: I have one thing I would like to present
19 to the committee this morning, if this is the time to do it.

20 The Chairman: Yes, proceed.

21 Admiral Kimmel: In connection with the orders for
22 Admiral Halsey, that were issued to him in November of 1941,
23 I would like to read the order which I gave him. I think
24 it should be in here to complete the record.

25 I have no comments to make on it except just to read

Witness Kimmel

the order.

"280447 NOV. 41 CINCPAC TO: (COMTASKFOR 2 S E C R E T
(COM 14

INFO TO: (COMPATWING 2
(COMBATFOR
(COMBASEFOR

"TWELVE PLANES MARINE FIGHTRON TWO ELEVEN ARE TO BASE WAKE
ACCORDANCE MYSER 101825 OF 10 NOVEMBER X ENTERPRISE PROVIDE
TRANSPORTATION X AFTER DEPARTURE PEARL ON 28 NOV FROM TASK
FORCE EIGHT CONSISTING OF ENTERPRISE CHESTER NORTHAMPTON
SALT LAKE CITY AND DESRON SIX AND PASS COMMAND TASK FORCE
TWO TO REAR ADMIRAL DRAEMEL WITH ORDERS TASK FORCE TWO CARRY
OUT NORMAL OPERATIONS IN HAWAIIAN AREA X PROCEED TO ARRIVE
200 MILES 070 DEGREES FROM WAKE AT 0700 ON 3 DEC X FLY OFF
MARINE PLANES THAT VICINITY AND UPON RECEIVING INFO THAT
PLANES HAVE ARRIVED WAKE RETURN PEARL X ENROUTE TO AND FROM
WAKE PASS THROUGH POINT AFIRM FOUR HUNDRED MILES SOUTH OF
MIDWAY X PATROL PLANES FROM MIDWAY AND WAKE WILL COVER YOUR
ROUTE AND PROVIDE SECURITY WHILE AT WAKE X COMMUNICATIONS
RADIO CONDITION NINETEEN GUARD NPM PRIMARY FOX CONTINUOUSLY X
COMFOURTEEN INFORM WAKE THAT PLANES EXPECTED ARRIVE THERE
0830 ON 3 DEC AND DIRECT WAKE REPORT COMFOURTEEN BY CODED
DISPATCH WHEN PLANES ARRIVE THERE X COMFOUTEEN FURNISH THIS
FINAL ARRIVAL INFORMATION TO COMTASKFOR EIGHT X WAKE SUBMARINE
PATROL TAMBOR TRITON WILL BE ADVISED X NARWHAL AND DOLPHIN

Witness Kimmel

1
2 ARE ENROUTE PEARL AT 1200 GCT ON 27 NOV THEY WERE ABOUT 300
3 MILES EAST OF WAKE."

4 That is all, sir.

5 The Chairman: Does counsel want to ask any further
6 questions?

7 Mr. Richardson: If you would pause before further
8 examination to permit us to put into the record at this time
9 a couple of small exhibits?

10 The Chairman: Yes.

11 Mr. Richardson: We would like to do it.

12 The Chairman: Proceed.

13 Mr. Masten: Mr. Chairman, we have three short dispatches
14 which we would like to read into the record in connection
15 with the last paragraph on page 96 of Admiral Kimmel's
16 statement, which is the first paragraph on page 6797 of our
17 transcript.

18 The dispatches are as follows:

19 "28 NOVEMBER 1941

TOP SECRET

20 "FROM: CINCAF

21 "ACTION: OPNAV

22 "INFO: COMSIXTEEN CINCPAC COMFOURTEEN

23 "281430

24 "FOLLOWING TOKYO TO NET INTERCEPT TRANSLATION RECEIVED
25 FROM SINGAPORE X IF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ARE ON VERGE

Witness Kimmel

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

OF BEING SEVERED FOLLOWING WORDS REPEATED FIVE TIMES
AT BEGINNING AND END OF ORDINARY TOKYO NEWS BROADCASTS
WILL HAVE SIGNIFICANCE AS FOLLOWS X HIGASHI HIGASHI
JAPANESE AMERICAN X KITA KITA RUSSIA X NISHI NISHI
ENGLAND INCLUDING OCCUPATION OF THAI OR INVASION OF
MALAYA AND N-E-I XX ON JAPANESE LANGUAGE FOREIGN
NEWS BROADCASTS THE FOLLOWING SENTENCES REPEATED
TWICE IN THE MIDDLE AND TWICE AT THE END OF BROADCASTS
WILL BE USED XX AMERICA HIGASHI NO KAZE KUMORI XX
ENGLAND X NISHI NO KAZE HARE X UNQUOTE X BRITISH AND
COMSIXTEEN MONITORING ABOVE BROADCASTS."

- - -

"1 DECEMBER 1941

TOP SECRET

"FROM: COMSIXTEEN

"ACTION: CINCAF

"INFO: CINCPAC, OPNAV, COMFOURTEEN

"ø11422

"J-V-J PRESS TONIGHT IN CLOSING SEVENTEEN HUNDRED
SCHEDULE STATED QUOTE 'ALL LISTENERS BE SURE AND LISTEN
IN AT ZERO SEVEN ZERO ZERO AND ZERO SEVEN THIRTY
TOMORROW MORNING, SINCE THERE MAY BE IMPORTANT NEWS'
UNQUOTE XX SUGGEST FREQUENCIES SEVEN THREE TWO SEVEN X
NINE FOUR THREE ZERO X AND ONE TWO TWO SEVEN FIVE X
TIMES TOKYO LCT."

Witness Kimmel

The third dispatch is from OPNAV for action of the Commandant of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts, and for the information of the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet and Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet.

It reads as follows:

"NEW TOKYO BROADCAST SCHEDULES AS FOLLOWS X J-V-J ONE TWO TWO SEVEN FIVE KC SIX PM AND SEVEN PM TO PACIFIC COAST SIX THIRTY PM TO WESTERN HEMISPHERE X J-H-L FICE ONE SIX ZERO KC EIGHT PM NINE PM AND TEN PM TO CHINA COAST X J UNIT OPTION NINE FOUR THREE ZERO KC SIX THIRTY PM TO WESTERN HEMISPHERE X J-H-P ONE ONE NINE EIGHT ZERO KC TEN THIRTY PM TO EUROPE X PROBABLY TOKYO TIME."

That is all we have.

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Chairman, these copies furnished us, I only see the first one here.

Mr. Masten: The first two have been furnished you this morning. We haven't had time to have the third duplicated.

Senator Lucas: Can counsel tell us the significance of that last message?

Mr. Masten: As I understand it, these are instructions to the monitoring stations, the last.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, may I inquire from counsel, as to the second message, that of December 1st, do

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

LaCharity Follows 10:15

Witness Kimmel

1
2 we have a memorandum of what was broadcast on the 7th?

3 Mr. Masten: We do not; not to my knowledge.

4 Senator Ferguson: Have you tried to find out?

5 Mr. Masten: These only came to my attention last night.

6 Senator Ferguson: You just received them last night?

7 Mr. Masten: They came to my attention last night.

8 Senator Ferguson: Do you know why they didn't come to
9 your attention before? They seem to be in relation to the
10 winds message.

11 Mr. Masten: I think they have been down in the office
12 in connection with getting together the documentary papers
13 on the winds exhibit that Mr. Mitchell spoke of some time ago.
14 In view of the statements made in Admiral Kimmel's statement
15 in this connection it was thought desirable to have them
16 before the committee this morning.

17 Senator Brewster: Is this the so-called winds message
18 or is it another one?

19 Mr. Masten: I understand this is the same as the
20 intercept that appears on page 15⁴ of Exhibit 1.

21 Senator Brewster: That was the initial winds message.

22 Mr. Masten: That is right.

23 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I would like to say for the
24 record that this second page about which question has been
25 asked is in the Naval Narrative. My recollection is that

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1
2 there was never anything happened on the morning of December
3 1st when there was supposed to be a special broadcast. At
4 least we never got word of any.

5 The Chairman: Mr. Cooper, are you through?

6 The Vice Chairman: Yes.

7 The Chairman: Senator George would be next, but he
8 is temporarily absent.

9 The Chair recognizes Congressman Clark.

10 Mr. Clark: Mr. Chairman, I desire to ask only one or
11 two questions to clarify some matters in my own mind.

12 In legal or legislative procedure --

13 Admiral Kimmel: I can't hear you.

14 Mr. Clark: I am sorry.

15 Admiral Kimmel: I am deaf.

16 Mr. Clark: I say, in legal or legislative procedure
17 I would probably understand what would be meant by "surprise
18 attach". I am not so sure that I do understand its full
19 significance in military parlance. Would you help me out
20 a little on that?

21 Admiral Kimmel: I know of no particular significance
22 in military parlance that isn't contained in the words
23 themselves. It is a surprise attack. They tried to get in
24 to a point of attack without being discovered, to, if possible,
25 catch people off balance. A surprise attack is just -- I

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1
2 take it the words express what it is. I know of no other
3 meaning.

4 Mr. Clark: Does it involve almost necessarily the
5 element of the unexpected?

6 Admiral Kimmel: Insofar as they are able to make it,
7 yes; yes, I would say so.

8 Mr. Clark: Now, a surprise attack had long been listed
9 as the chief danger to the base at Pearl Harbor, had it not?

10 Admiral Kimmel: I can't hear you, sir. I am sorry.

11 Mr. Clark: That is all right. I say a surprise attack
12 had long been listed or estimated to be the chief danger to
13 the military establishment at the Hawaiian Islands, had it
14 not?

15 Admiral Kimmel: Not only to the Hawaiian Islands but
16 any place in regard to the Japanese. The Japanese were
17 known to make surprise attacks whenever they could. The
18 only difference betwixt the Japanese and any other nation
19 in that respect was that they were liable to do it without
20 a declaration of war.

21 Mr. Clark: Well, could the establishment at Pearl
22 Harbor or the Hawaiian Islands have been attacked successfully
23 in your opinion otherwise than by a surprise attack?

24 Admiral Kimmel: Of course, a surprise attack always
25 give the attacking force a great advantage. We have seen

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1
2 that dozens of times.

3 Mr. Clark: Well, what I have in mind, sir, is to compare
4 the likely success of a surprise attack by air with any
5 other kind of attack that was possible at the Hawaiian Islands.

6 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, I think that other kinds of attack
7 would have been possible in the Hawaiian Islands. It depends
8 entirely on the forces they have available, and had these
9 carriers been discovered by patrol planes, had we found them,
10 it is highly probable -- well, I won't say highly probable,
11 but it is quite possible that they could have launched their
12 planes and started the attack before we could have done
13 anything about it.

14 Even if it hadn't been a complete surprise the attack
15 could have been launched.

16 Mr. Clark: Well, as between a surprise attack by air
17 and a landing attack, what would you say as to the likelihood?

18 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, well, I would say that a surprise
19 attack by land was much less possible than a surprise attack
20 by air. The very nature of air makes for the ease of a
21 surprise attack, the rapidity with which it can be delivered.
22 There is no question about that, sir.

23 Mr. Clark: I understand that in former times war
24 games were conducted there with a surprise attack by air
25 featured in the war games. Are you familiar with that?

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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Admiral Kimmel: Oh yes, we had many exercises in which we sent planes in to attack the installations on Oahu.

Mr. Clark: What time were those planes sent in usually, what time of day?

Admiral Kimmel: Well, at various times, but the early morning, the forenoon sometime, was probably the best time, primarily because that gave the carriers a chance to recover their planes during daylight and to have the following night to get away from the range of the land based aircraft and from any attacking forces, and have the night to dodge and get out.

WARD & PAUL,
WASHINGTON, D C

Hook follows

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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2 Mr. Clark: I was just a little interested, Admiral,
3 in the background upon which a surprise attack by air had
4 been fixed as the number 1 danger to our set-up at Pearl
5 Harbor.

6
7 Admiral Kimmel: A surprise attack by air was one of
8 the forms of attack that could have been made, that is all.
9 We felt, I think, that the Japanese didn't have the forces
10 nor the logistic support to send a very great number of
11 troops and train, and all that kind of thing across the
12 ocean at that particular time, and do other things that
13 they would have to do, and the air attack was one of the
14 things that they could do.

15 It was within the realm of possibility, that is what
16 I mean.

17 Mr. Clark: In your judgment is that why a surprise
18 attack by air was fixed as the No. 1 danger?

19 Admiral Kimmel: No, no, not in order of probability.
20 I thought that what they were going to do in case of war
21 in the Pacific at all, were against the United States, was
22 to have a mass submarine attack in the operating areas
23 around Pearl Harbor.

24 Mr. Clark: Why, in your judgment, did the military
25 authorities fix a surprise attack by air as the No. 1 danger
to Pearl Harbor?

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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2 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I couldn't give you exactly
3 why they fixed that as the No. 1 danger. As a matter of
4 fact, I never considered it the No. 1 danger in the order
5 of probability by any means, and I feel that the other
6 people scarcely felt that either.

7 They felt that they should be in the best case to
8 defend against air attack because a hit and run attack was
9 always within the realm of possibility.

10 Mr. Clark: I think in the course of your testimony
11 you may have said that an attack on the Philippines, or
12 Thai, or Kra Peninsula might be in the nature of a surprise
13 attack.

14 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes, I think so. It could be.

15 Mr. Clark: You wouldn't say that after the message
16 of November 27 had designated those points as likely points
17 of attack, would you?

18 Admiral Kimmel: There was many points in Thai, in
19 the Philippines and the Kra Peninsula that they could have
20 hit, anyone of which might have been a local surprise.

21 Mr. Clark: Yes, a local surprise --

22 Admiral Kimmel: That is all that a surprise attack
23 can be, is a local surprise.

24 Mr. Clark: But you wouldn't say that after an attack
25 in those directions had been forecast in this message that

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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2 then an attack in those directions would be a surprise,
3 would you?

4 Admiral Kimmel: Well, they would endeavor to make it
5 a surprise attack, yes, sir. The fact that we had forecast
6 it -- well, put it this way: If we had been convinced in
7 Pearl Harbor of the probability of an air attack in Pearl
8 Harbor, it would have still been a surprise attack, so far
9 as the Japanese, their best efforts could make it. They
10 didn't know what we thought nearly as well as we knew what
11 they thought, or at least was known in Washington.

12 Mr. Clark: You mean the Japs would have been surprised
13 to know that you were prepared for it?

14 Admiral Kimmel: No, but they would have endeavored
15 to make it a surprise attack, no matter how much we were
16 expecting it, and when you are expecting an attack over
17 months and months and weeks and weeks, no matter how alert
18 you are, it is possible for the enemy to make a surprise
19 attack, and we have seen that time without number in this
20 war, where they did make surprise attacks, after war had
21 been declared and on places where they could have expected
22 an attack. They were never less surprises in the sense
23 they hadn't done all the things they could have done if
24 they had known the attack was coming at a particular time.

25 I think that Halsey's attack on the installations in

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Clark

h4

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2 Manila and the ships, the vast number of ships that he
3 sank out there, was in the nature of a surprise attack.
4 That was after war had been going on for a couple of
5 years.

6 Mr. Clark: I think you have stated in your testimony
7 that the attack at Pearl Harbor on the 7th, was a surprise
8 to you?

9 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir, I thought they weren't
10 coming at that time.

11 Mr. Clark: Now, will you please state just what dis-
12 position you would have made of your forces, including your
13 ships and planes and the use of radar, if at any time
14 between the 27th of November, and the 6th of December you
15 had been convinced that there was going to be an air attack
16 on Pearl Harbor.

17 Admiral Kimmel: I think I have set that forth in
18 considerable detail in the statement which I have submitted.

19 Mr. Clark: Well, I listened rather carefully and it
20 didn't seem to me that it was entirely covered. That is
21 why I ask you the question now.

22 Admiral Kimmel: Well --

23 Mr. Clark: May I interrupt you just a moment?

24 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Clark: A high naval officer has testified before

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Clark

h5

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2 this committee as to what dispositions he would have made
3 had he been in command at Pearl Harbor as you were, and
4 had received the message of November 27.

5 Admiral Kimmel: Plus the information he had.

6 Mr. Clark: No, no, the question was submitted to him
7 as to what action he would have taken if he had been in
8 command under conditions then existing and had received
9 the message of November 27. He has stated what dispositions
10 he would have made.

11 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

12 Mr. Clark: By way of comparison, I would like to have
13 you state just what dispositions you would have made of
14 everything at your command if you had been reasonably sure
15 at any time between the 27th of November and the 7th of
16 December, that a surprise air attack was going to be made
17 there.

18 Admiral Kimmel: In that event, I would have considered
19 that my mission was considerably changed. I would have
20 thought that the most important thing that I could do under
21 those circumstances was to intercept and destroy this
22 Japanese detachment that was expected to come to Hawaii.
23 I would have put to sea with the fleet and I would have
24 maintained them in a position where they could be in the
25 best intercepting position. I would have used all of the

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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facilities of the patrol planes, by planes afloat. I would have kept my carriers in the Hawaiian area. I would have abandoned the overhaul of the Saratoga, which was in the nature of -- she was not entirely out of commission. She was able to get about all right.

I would have had her brought back to the area and joined up. And I would have had the three carriers, the patrol planes covering the approaches to the fleet and the approaches to Hawaii, and I would have gone ahead and exhausted the patrol planes and thereby curtailed my chance to carry out the raid on the Marshalls, because I would have considered the attack force as a primary objective at that time.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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10:35 am

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Clark

2 Mr. Clark: What use, if any, would you have made of your
3 radar?

4 Admiral Kimmel: The radar on the ships at sea would
5 have been in constant use. I have no doubt that the Army
6 would have -- if they had felt the same way that I did at the
7 time, and they probably would if I felt that way, they would
8 have used their radar to the limits of its capacity.

9 Mr. Clark: Well, as Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet
10 you would have insisted on that, would you not?

11 Admiral Kimmel: I would have advised them. I had no
12 power to insist beyond the matter of advice.

13 Mr. Clark: Did you consider the situation as between
14 the United States and Japan any more serious and any more
15 likely to break from and after the 27th of November than it
16 had been prior to that time?

17 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I think I did. The situation was
18 becoming increasingly serious. I was not convinced from the
19 information I had that Japan was going to attack the United
20 States at that time. There was that possibility and we
21 guarded against it, to what I considered the best way with
22 the information I had and my conviction at the time.

23 Mr. Clark: You tell the committee now that as this
24 situation became more tense and serious you now have the
25 feeling that you did everything that you reasonably could have

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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2 done to have anticipated and at least minimized the effect
3 of this attack?

4 Admiral Kimmel: If I had known the attack was coming,
5 if I had been convinced --

6 Mr. Clark: Admiral, I beg your pardon, sir.

7 Admiral Kimmel: I do not understand, sir. I want to
8 answer you.

9 Mr. Clark: I want to ask you this: You have said that
10 you considered the situation to be becoming more tense from
11 and after the 27th of November.

12 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Clark: Now I am asking you whether you are now
14 telling the committee that under those conditions --

15 Admiral Kimmel: Well, wait a minute. I had better
16 qualify what I said slightly.

17 Mr. Clark: All right, sir.

18 Admiral Kimmel: The message of November 27th, after I
19 received that I considered all the previous messages and that
20 the situation in the Pacific was becoming more tense. As the
21 days passed after November 27th and nothing happened within
22 the next few days I was not so certain that something was go-
23 ing to happen. I was watching every single thing I could to
24 get any indications and the indications then followed out
25 the line in the message which had come from the Navy Depart-

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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2 ment that they were probably going down into Thailand to
3 make another advance down there and see what could be done,
4 but I was not convinced, - as the days passed I was even less
5 convinced, that they were going to attack the United States.

6 Mr. Clark: Well, then, their going into Thailand had
7 been propheced or communicated, - the likelihood of that had
8 been communicated to you.

9 Admiral Kimmel: Sir?

10 Mr. Clark: I say the likelihood of their going into
11 Thailand had been communicated to you by the Chief of Staff?

12 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Clark: There was nothing in the nature of a surprise
14 about that?

15 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I thought it could be a surprise
16 even if they went there, and then there were several other
17 places that were mentioned, any one of which could have been
18 a surprise attack by the Japanese.

19 Mr. Clark: Well, we have been over that somewhat, so
20 I will get back to the other proposition.

21 Admiral Kimmel: Put it this way, sir: If they had known
22 that an attack definitely was going to come against the
23 Philippines at a certain time, the defending forces would have
24 had a great advantage because they would have known it at that
25 particular time and they could have gone out on an all-out

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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2 alert to culminate at a particular instant, you might say, and
3 so it could be at any other place.

4 Mr. Clark: I understand that. I appreciate that fully,
5 sir.

6 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Clark: But you had the record before you that the
8 armed services had classified a surprise attack as a number
9 one thing. Now what I want to ask you is, getting back to
10 my question, in the light of all the circumstances before you
11 from the 27th on you now tell this committee that you think of
12 nothing else that you could or should have done as Commander
13 of the Pacific Fleet that would have either averted or mini-
14 mized this attack on Hawaii?

15 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir, I think that is true. I feel
16 that way, yes, sir.

17 Mr. Clark: Isn't the essence of this whole controversy
18 that everybody from the higher officials here in Washington
19 on down through the Lieutenant who disregarded the radar mes-
20 sage, just muffed the situation, let the Japs out-smart them?

21 Admiral Kimmel: I think you should draw those conclu-
22 sions, sir, rather than me.

23 Mr. Clark: That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

24 The Chairman: Before the further examination of Admiral
25 Kimmel the chair wishes to make a statement.

Witness Kimmel

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Late yesterday afternoon in the absence of the chairman, who had to leave before the hearing was concluded, the suggestion was made that Mr. Winston Churchill, former Prime Minister of Great Britain, be asked to appear here as a witness. The chair does not wish at this moment to discuss the propriety of that suggestion, but wishes to state that as chairman of this committee he will neither issue a subpoena for Mr. Churchill nor sent him an invitation to appear here as a witness unless ordered to do so by the committee.

Inasmuch as the matter was brought up in a public session the chair thinks it ought to be settled in a public session and if any member of the committee desires now to make a motion instructing the chair either to subpoena Mr. Churchill or to invite him, the chair will entertain that motion at this time.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: The Senator from Michigan.

Senator Ferguson: I now move that the chairman of the committee in behalf of the committee invite Mr. Winston Churchill to appear before this committee at a time that is agreeable to him and also to the committee.

Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: The Senator from Maine.

Senator Brewster: I am not prepared to pass upon this

1 Witness Kimmel

2 myself in quite as expeditious a fashion without consideration
3 and discussion. I move to lay that motion on the table.

4 The Chairman: One of the reasons, if I may make this
5 observation, why the chair brought this matter up at this
6 time is in view of the fact that he thinks that the question
7 of whether Mr. Churchill is to be either subpoenaed or in-
8 vited here ought not to be bandied around and held in sus-
9 pense. He thinks it ought to be settled by the committee and
10 it ought to be settled promptly and that is why the chair
11 brought it up.

12 The Senator has moved to lay that motion on the table.
13 As many as favor that motion say "aye".

14 (Chorus of ayes.)

15 Those opposed "No".

16 (Chorus of noes.)

17 Senator Brewster: I would like to have a roll on that.

18 The Chairman: We will have a roll call on that. The
19 chair will call the roll.

20 Senator Brewster: Particularly in view of the fact that
21 one of the highly reliable papers in this country misquoted
22 me this morning.

23 The Chairman: I am not interested in that. That hap-
24 pens to me every day.

25 Senator Brewster: That is why I wanted it on record.

Witness Kimmel

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The Chairman: The chair will call the roll on the motion to lay the Senator's motion on the table. Senator George.

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Senator George: No.

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The Chairman: Senator Lucas.

6

Senator Lucas: No.

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The Chairman: Senator Brewster.

8

Senator Brewster: Aye.

9

The Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

10

Senator Ferguson: No.

11

The Chairman: Congressman Cooper.

12

Mr. Cooper: No.

13

The Chairman: Congressman Clark.

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Mr. Clark: No.

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The Chairman: Congressman Murphy.

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Mr. Murphy: No.

17

The Chairman: Congressman Gearhart.

18

Mr. Gearhart: No.

19

The Chairman: Congressman Keefe.

20

Mr. Keefe: No.

21

The Chairman: The motion is defeated.

22

The chair will now call the roll on the motion of the Senator from Michigan, Mr. Ferguson, to instruct the chair to invite Mr. Churchill to appear as a witness. Senator George.

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Senator George: No.

Witness Kimmel

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The Chairman: The chair wishes to vote "No" on that previous motion. Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas: No.

The Chairman: Senator Brewster.

Senator Brewster: Present.

The Chairman: Senator Ferguson:

Senator Ferguson: Aye.

The Chairman: Congressman Cooper.

Mr. Cooper: No.

The Chairman: Congressman Clark.

Mr. Clark: No.

The Chairman: Congressman Murphy.

Mr. Murphy: No.

The Chairman: Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart: Aye.

The Chairman: Congressman Keefe.

Mr. Keefe: Present.

The Chairman: The chair votes "No". The motion is lost and that settles that. Proceed with the examination. Senator George is recognized. The committee will be in order. Senator George.

Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Congressman Keefe.

Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to make this

1 Witness Kimmel

2 statement in view of the fact that I voted "Present" on this
3 resolution, that the people of the country have had an oppor-
4 tunity to see an expeditious handling and disposition of pub-
5 lic business and I hope that perhaps we may have that re-
6 flected on the floor of the Senate as well as before this
7 committee in the handling of public business also.

8 The Chairman: The chair appreciates that observation
9 and always appreciates the observations of the able member
10 from Wisconsin.

11 Senator Lucas: That might apply to the House, too.

12 The Chairman: The chair might suggest in view of that
13 that the Congressman from Wisconsin is no doubt interested in
14 the expedition of business before both houses of Congress
15 and he might exercise his influence on the Committee on Rules,
16 a body of which he is a member, to expedite business in that
17 body.

18 Mr. Keefe: I am not a member of the Committee on Rules.

19 The Vice Chairman: Exercise your great influence.

20 Mr. Keefe: I have tried to exercise my influence on that
21 great committee. I see the member of the Rules Committee on
22 our side is here and he has taken a back seat in this discus-
23 sion here. I have no influence on the Committee on Rules.

24 Senator George: Mr. Chairman.

25 The Chairman: Senator George is recognized.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. George

2 Senator George: Mr. Chairman, since I was not here at
3 the opening this morning I desire to ask Admiral only a very
4 few questions.

5 Admiral Kimmel, referring to the message of November 27th,
6 to the part of it that gave direction in the language begin-
7 ning "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment", may I
8 ask you if "deployment" or "defensive deployment" are tech-
9 nical terms within the knowledge of Naval officers?

10 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir.

11 Senator George: Do they have any special significance?

12 Admiral Kimmel: None that I know of.

13 Senator George: What, Admiral, did you understand by
14 "defensive deployment", forgetting for the time being the
15 words that follow it, which I wish to question you about,
16 because the word "preparatory" to doing something else is
17 used there, but what did you understand by "defensive deploy-
18 ment"?

19 Admiral Kimmel: I never read the "defensive deployment"
20 except in connection with the remainder of the sentence, the
21 defensive deployment in order to accomplish something and
22 that something was the attack on the Marshalls.

23 Senator George: Now, may I ask -- the language is "to
24 execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to
25 something else."

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. George

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Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir, that is exactly what I did to the best of my knowledge and belief.

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Senator George: And you understand that "appropriate" meant something that in your judgment you thought would best accomplish the order given you in this directive here?

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Admiral Kimmel: I did, indeed. The "appropriate" was left entirely to my discretion.

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Senator George: Well, now, let me ask you with reference to WPL-46.

10

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Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

12

Senator George: Where was that prepared, Admiral?

13

Admiral Kimmel: WPL-46 was prepared in the Navy Department. It was a basic war plan, Navy basic war plan.

14

15

Senator George: Here in Washington?

16

Admiral Kimmel: Here in Washington and based upon that I had prepared, as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, what we termed WPAC-46. WPAC-46 was the implementation of the war plan prepared in the Navy Department and that WPAC-46, prepared by my staff and approved by me, had been submitted to the Navy Department and had been approved by them.

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Senator George: So that the requirements of your implementing plan were known here in Washington?

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Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

25

Senator George: Known to the Navy Department?

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. George

2 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

3 Senator George: Will you say, - I believe it is in the
4 record in the form of an exhibit but I am not sure, - what
5 the main requirements of WPL-46 were? I am not asking for
6 detail. I am asking for information.

7 Admiral Kimmel: I think you will find that set forth
8 beginning on page 11 of my statement. That is a copy of the
9 basic war plan in WPL-46.

10 Senator George: The statement that you made in the
11 beginning of your testimony?

12 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

13 Senator George: WPL-46. Would you mind saying now what
14 your implementing order or plans in the main required?

15 Admiral Kimmel: My implementing plans in the main re-
16 quired the Fleet to depart immediately after hostilities com-
17 menced to conduct reconnaissance and air raids on the Mar-
18 shalls. They had other supporting things to do, but that was
19 the primary mission that we had in the Pacific Fleet at that
20 particular time.

21 Senator George: You say after hostilities commenced?

22 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

23 Senator George: Well, now, this directive was, "Execute
24 an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying
25 out the tasks assigned in WPL-46."

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. George

2 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir, that is right. That is what
3 I did.

4 Senator George: And that has been detailed in your
5 statement before the committee?

6 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir, in great detail, what I did
7 and why I did it.

8 Senator George: And that was your interpretation of
9 your own order supplementing or implementing WPL-46 which
10 had been approved here in the Naval Department?

11 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

12 Senator George: And was understood here by Admiral Stark
13 when he formulated or sent to you this message?

14 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

15 Senator George: I say "Admiral Stark." Whoever sent
16 the message to you.

17 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

18 Senator George: Now, in the message of November 24th
19 there was no specific direction to take any particular action,
20 was there, addressed to you?

21 Admiral Kimmel: I think there was one there. There was
22 one direction:

23 "Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate
24 an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action."
25 That, I think, could be termed a directive.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. George

2 Senator George: Had that appeared in any previous mes-
3 sage received by you from the Chief of Naval Operations?

4 Admiral Kimmel: You mean the injunction as to secrecy?

5 Senator George: The injunction as to secrecy.

6 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir, I think so.

7 Senator George: You think there had been previous mes-
8 sages?

9 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

10 Senator George: That carried the same injunction?

11 Admiral Kimmel: In ~~the~~ one on October 16th this sen-
12 tence occurs:

13 "In view of these possibilities you will take due
14 precautions, including such preparatory deployment as
15 will not disclose strategic intention, nor constitute
16 provocative action against Japan."

17 Senator George: Admiral, you probably covered it in your
18 general statement but you are more familiar with that state-
19 ment than any member of the committee would be from having
20 heard it or having read it.

21 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

22 Senator George: Did you have any knowledge prior to De-
23 cember 7th of the answer made by the State Department on
24 November 26th?

25 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir. The only information I had on

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. George

1 that subject I got from the newspapers.

2
3 Senator George: You had nothing by way of letter or
4 dispatch?

5 Admiral Kimmel: Not a word.

6 Senator George: Did you have any information concerning
7 the message from Tokyo to the Japanese to which the November
8 26th State Department document was a reply?

9 Admiral Kimmel: I did not know it existed. I did not
10 know until I read the testimony of Mr. Hull before this com-
11 mittee that Mr. Hull considered that a Japanese ultimatum. I
12 had no knowledge whatsoever of that message, of that note.

13 Senator George: And you had never seen any text of that
14 message or of our State Department reply of November 26th --

15 Admiral Kimmel: I had seen neither one, sir.

16 Senator George: (Continuing) -- prior to December 7th?

17 Admiral Kimmel: Prior to December 7th.

18 Senator George: Nor no summary of the contents?

19 Admiral Kimmel: No summary whatsoever.

20 Senator George: Did you have any letter from Admiral
21 Stark that gave you the contents of the November 26th reply
22 of our State Department?

23 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir, I did not.

24 Senator George: How long, Admiral, had your implementing
25 plan, that is carrying out WPL-46, how long had it been in the

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 Navy Department and when was it approved?

3 Admiral Kimmel: That was approved on September -- I will
4 get the exact date. My plan WPAC-46 was approved by the Navy
5 Department on September 9, 1941.

6 Senator George: I believe I have no other questions,
7 Admiral.

8 The Vice Chairman: Senator Lucas of Illinois will in-
9 quire, Admiral.

10 Senator Lucas: Admiral Kimmel, you have told the com-
11 mittee that your appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the
12 Pacific Fleet in January 1941 came as a complete surprise to
13 you.

14 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct, and it did.

15 Senator Lucas: You so expressed yourself very forcibly
16 along that line in a letter to Admiral Stark?

17 Admiral Kimmel: Immediately after I learned of my pros-
18 pective appointment.

19 Senator Lucas: You have told the committee in your state-
20 ment that you first met the President of the United States in
21 1918.

22 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir. If I told you any such thing
23 as that it was in error. I did not intend to tell you any
24 such thing as that. Would you like me to tell you when I
25 first met him?

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 Senator Lucas: Yes, indeed, sir.

3 Admiral Kimmel: In 1915 I was serving as fleet gunnery
4 officer in the Pacific Fleet on the staff of Admiral Thomas
5 B. Howard, who was then Commander-in-Chief. Mr. Marshall,
6 who at that time was Vice President, and Mr. Roosevelt, who
7 was Assistant Secretary of the Navy, came to San Francisco
8 to open the San Francisco and San Diego expositions which
9 were in celebration of the opening of the Panama Canal.

10 Wallace Beathoff, a Lieutenant from Admiral Howard's
11 staff, was detailed as an aide for Mr. Marshall. I was de-
12 tailed as an aide for Mr. Roosevelt.

13 Senator Lucas: What was your rank at that time?

14 Admiral Kimmel: I was a Lieutenant at that time.

15 I traveled with Mr. Roosevelt to the San Francisco Ex-
16 position and from there I went with him to San Diego. I had
17 a very pleasant time.

18 Senator Lucas: How long were you with Mr. Roosevelt?

19 Admiral Kimmel: I was with him about ten days. At the
20 end of that time I went back to my duty as fleet gunnery of-
21 ficer of the Pacific Fleet.

22 Subsequently, in 1916 I came to Washington on duty in
23 the gunnery office of the Navy Department, what is now the
24 Office of Fleet Training. I saw Mr. Roosevelt, oh, three or
25 four times during the time I was here, and in 1917 I went

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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over to the British Grand Fleet to take some gear that we had developed and subsequently I went on Admiral Rodman's staff as his gunnery officer in what became known as the Sixth Battle Squadron of the British Grand Fleet.

In September, I think it was, of 1918 Mr. Roosevelt came over to visit this detachment and he was entertained at luncheon by Admiral Rodman and I was present. I saw him then and I had no further conversations with him until June of 1941, six months after I had been appointed Commander-in-Chief.

To make the record complete, I did pass Mr. Roosevelt at the White House in a receiving line once or twice, but that is all.

Senator Lucas: Well, the last time you saw him before you saw him in June 1941 --

Admiral Kimmel: I did not understand you, sir.

Senator Lucas: The last time you saw Mr. Roosevelt before you saw him in June 1941 was in 1918 in England?

Admiral Kimmel: In the Harbor of Rosyth, which is near Edinburgh in Scotland.

Senator Lucas: Did you ever see him after that meeting in 1918 until you saw him again in 1941?

Admiral Kimmel: Except when I saw him at a White House reception, no.

Senator Lucas: You had no conversations with him during

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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all of those years or any communication, as I understand it?

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Admiral Kimmel: That is correct.

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Senator Lucas: What State are you from, Admiral?

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Admiral Kimmel: Kentucky.

6

Senator Lucas: And when were you appointed to West

7

Point?

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Admiral Kimmel: I was appointed to the Naval Academy

9

in 1900.

10

Senator Lucas: The reason I made that mistake, I read

11

somewhere that you originally wanted to go to West Point.

12

Admiral Kimmel: That is correct.

13

Senator Lucas: And finally landed in the Navy.

14

Admiral Kimmel: My father was a West Pointer. He

15

wanted me to go there.

16

Senator Lucas: As a matter of curiosity, by whom were

17

you appointed?

18

Admiral Kimmel: By Henry D. Allen.

19

Senator Lucas: And was he a Congressman?

20

Admiral Kimmel: Congressman from the Second District of

21

Kentucky.

22

Senator Lucas: Do you know whether he was acquainted

23

with the President or not?

24

Admiral Kimmel: I could not answer that question; I do

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not know.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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Senator Lucas: Well, do you recall, Admiral Kimmel --

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Admiral Kimmel: At that time I was not.

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Senator Lucas: Do you recall, Admiral Kimmel, reading in the press or hearing it rumored about that you were such a close and intimate friend of the President that he jumped over forty-six Admirals who had more seniority and grade in order to give you this job?

9

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Admiral Kimmel: I read that many times. I thought if it was to be answered it should be answered by somebody else besides me.

12

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Senator Lucas: Well, it was rumored around here at that time, and rumors and gossip are pretty free around Washington and other places, that your appointment was purely a political one and only because you were a Democrat and because you were the President's aide 'at one time.

17

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Admiral Kimmel: I know those rumors; I mean I heard those rumors. I heard -- well, I will pass it.

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Admiral Kimmel: I will say it, yes. I heard that the reason I was appointed Commander-in-Chief was because my wife was a niece of Senator Barkley and my wife had never seen Senator Barkley.

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Senator Lucas: Well, you know of the testimony before the committee here by Admiral Stark and Admiral Richardson

1921

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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2 who recommended you as one of the men to take charge of the
3 Pacific Fleet in the event anything happened to Admiral Ri-
4 chardson, you know of that testimony?

5 Admiral Kimmel: I have heard something of that kind,
6 yes, sir.

7 Senator Lucas: Well, it is obvious from the testimony
8 of yourself and others that these statements and these ru-
9 mors and this gossip that went around immediately following
10 the disaster at Pearl Harbor were false and without any founda-
11 tion in either fact or truth?

12 Admiral Kimmel: They were misrepresentations and lies.

13 Senator Lucas: Well, of course, I am talking about the
14 general proposition that you were appointed solely for poli-
15 tical reasons and because you were a Kentucky Democrat.

16 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir. You are entirely correct.

17 Senator Lucas: Well, that lays another one of these
18 false canards on the shelf.

19 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir. I am glad to have it laid.

20 Senator Lucas: Admiral, on page, I believe it is 2 or
21 3, page 3 probably, of your statement you stated:

22 "When I assumed command the decision to base the
23 Fleet in the Hawaiian area was an historical fact."

24 I presume you want the committee to understand by that
25 statement that you were in no way responsible for having the

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 Fleet in Pearl Harbor when you took command?

3 Admiral Kimmel: I hadn't that particular thing in mind
4 but it is a fact. I was not responsible. I had nothing to
5 do with basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor.

6 Senator Lucas: Before I leave the President I would like
7 to go back and ask you one more question with respect to the
8 conversation that you had with him in June 1941 when you re-
9 turned from Hawaii to Washington to discuss the Pacific situ-
10 ation. As I recall, you had quite a lengthy conversation with
11 the President.

12 Admiral Kimmel: I did, yes, sir; not very lengthy but,
13 oh, maybe an hour.

14 Senator Lucas: And one of the chief things that you dis-
15 cussed at that time with President Roosevelt was the decision
16 that the Navy Department made to take from your Fleet a divi-
17 sion of battleships and cruisers and destroyers?

18 Admiral Kimmel: I expressed myself as forcibly as I knew
19 how on that subject.

20 Senator Lucas: Will you elaborate for the committee a
21 little more as to what the President said in connection with
22 that decision that was made by the Navy Department?

23 Admiral Kimmel: My best recollection is that I brought
24 up the subject of the transfer of this detachment from the
25 Pacific to the Atlantic and protested against it and the

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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2 Mr. Keefe: Will the gentleman yield right at that point?

3 Senator Lucas: Yes, I will yield, Congressman.

4 Mr. Keefe: You asked what the Admiral meant when he used
5 the word "they". Now, in his subsequent answer he has used
6 it several times, "they wanted to divert certain parts of the
7 Pacific Fleet."

8 Senator Lucas: Yes. Who do you mean by "they" when
9 you are speaking "they wanted to divert"? Are you talking
10 about --

11 Admiral Kimmel: He did not say they wanted to divert.
12 I said he said they had told him.

13 Senator Lucas: Who are "they"?

14 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I presume he must have meant some
15 officials of the Navy Department or perhaps some of his Cabin-
16 et. He did not elaborate.

17 Senator Lucas: I see. Now, returning to your statement
18 that you made before the committee you said:

19 "My appointment was in no wise contingent upon any
20 acquiescence upon my part in the decision already made
21 many months before to keep the Fleet in the Hawaiian
22 waters."

23 "Will you elaborate just a little on that for me?"

24 Admiral Kimmel: I meant that nobody said to me that, "I
25 will appoint you if you keep the Fleet in the Hawaiian waters",

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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2 or any such thing; nothing of any description. There were
3 no conditions attached to my appointment as Commander-in-
4 Chief.

5 Senator Lucas: Admiral, in your testimony before the
6 Roberts Commission the question was asked there as to why the
7 Fleet was -- or, rather the discussion was had before that
8 committee about the Fleet being in the Hawaiian waters. There
9 had been some discussion of that between Admiral Richardson
10 and the President previous to the time that he was relieved
11 of his command.

12 Now, on page 565 of the Roberts' testimony, which is in
13 that bound volume there, - what is the number of that exhibit?

14 Mr. Masten: That is not an exhibit, sir.

15 Senator Lucas: In that bound book, on page 565 you made
16 this statement after discussions off the record:

17 "Admiral Kimmel: Why the Fleet is in Hawaiian
18 waters? All the senior officers of the Navy have recog-
19 nized the increased possibility of a surprise attack
20 against the Fleet when that Fleet is operating and based
21 in the Hawaiian waters. These facts were forcibly brought
22 to the attention of the authorities in Washington by my
23 predecessor, Admiral Richardson, in answer to a letter
24 from the Chief of Naval Operations under date of May 27th
25 reading as follows" -

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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2 and then you proceeded to give the committee what you believed
3 to be the essence of that letter.

4 Have you ever had an opportunity to examine Richardson's
5 letter since that time?

6 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, I think I have, yes.

7 Senator Lucas: It is not quite in accord with the state-
8 ment you made there, is it?

9 Admiral Kimmel: That is true, it is not.

10 Senator Lucas: In other words, Admiral Richardson at
11 that time wanted to move the Fleet back to the Pacific Coast
12 for a number of reasons?

13 Admiral Kimmel: That is true, you are quite right.

14 Senator Lucas: But the security of the Fleet was not
15 involved in any of those reasons?

16 Admiral Kimmel: It was not in his written letter.

17 Senator Lucas: That is what I am talking about.

18 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct.

19 Senator Lucas: In other words, he talked about --

20 Admiral Kimmel: That is my recollection at least.

21 Senator Lucas: Well, that is correct and I wanted to
22 call your attention to that statement.

23 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

24 Senator Lucas: Because you were apparently in error there
25 in assuming what you did before the committee and I take it

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 because of your lack of the actual knowledge as to what was
3 in that letter.

4 Admiral Kimmel: At the time I was speaking from memory.

5 Senator Lucas: Yes, sir. Now, on the next page of that
6 same document, Admiral, you state:

7 " Now, those same conditions obtained up to the time
8 of the attack here on the 7th. I knew that the Navy
9 Department and the administration in Washington insisted
10 on keeping the Fleet out there. I knew the vulnerabil-
11 ity of the Fleet here. I thought that was appreciated by
12 the Navy Department as well as by me but it was one of
13 the things that I felt it was beyond my power to change."

14 You recall, of course, making that statement, I presume,
15 before the Roberts Commission?

16 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

17 Senator Lucas: Do you care to make any further explana-
18 tion of that statement at this time, Admiral?

19 Admiral Kimmel: In all of my time as Commander-in-Chief
20 this particular thing was before me and I did all in my power
21 to remedy it and the thing that would have helped me most and
22 the thing which I time and again tried to impress on the Navy
23 Department was that what I needed out there was information,
24 I needed the information upon which to base my actions and if
25 I had had the information which was -- I recognized the vulner-

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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2 ability of the Fleet largely due to the fact that we had
3 only one base and to the limitations of fuel and other things,
4 which I have gone into here and what I hoped and believed,
5 that the information would come to us in time to at least
6 alleviate the situation.

7 Senator Lucas: Well, I presume you did not discuss the
8 question of the vulnerability of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor
9 when you came back here in June 1941?

10 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I discussed that.

11 Senator Lucas: With whom did you discuss that?

12 Admiral Kimmel: I discussed it with the Chief of Naval
13 Operations, with the Secretary and I had some conversation with
14 the President about it. I just pointed out the situation which
15 he was fully cognizant of before I told him about it, and I
16 accepted the risks. You cannot be safe; but I did not antici-
17 pate what happened by any means.

18 Senator Lucas: Well, at least you stated before the Rob-
19 erts Commission and you so state now that you knew of the vul-
20 nerability of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor as a result of what
21 was transpiring between the United States and Japan at that
22 time?

23 Admiral Kimmel: I knew of the vulnerability of the Fleet
24 in Pearl Harbor as to the physical location of the Fleet, the
25 physical environment and I did everything I could to remedy

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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that situation.

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Senator Lucas: Admiral, you have spent considerable time in explaining to the committee that the Fleet was handicapped through lack of trained men. You said you could not spare qualified officers without assuming an enormous risk.

7

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

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Senator Lucas: I take it you were making that statement based upon the fact that if the Fleet remained in tact you wanted qualified trained men to fight either a defensive or an offensive war.

12

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Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I wanted a trained Fleet ready to fight.

14

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Senator Lucas: And you wanted the complements completed on every ship?

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Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir. Now, in this situation I pointed out, I thought, as clearly and as forcefully as I knew how, certainly as clearly and as forcefully as I knew how and I think plainly, what the situation was in the Fleet and when the decisions were made here I accepted them and went ahead to do the best I could do but it was my duty to point these things out. That I did. There was one phase that I was particularly insistent on and that was that, - and I never could quite understand why we were unable to, - why they were unable to keep the numbers in the Fleet up, not the trained

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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2 men, you see, but the numbers and we never had the comple-
3 ments that we considered necessary. Now, that is not a ques-
4 tion of trained men. That is a question of numbers of green,
5 of good material, you see.

6 Senator Lucas: You stated that you had a number of men
7 on those ships who had never fired a shot in their life, is
8 that right?

9 Admiral Kimmel: From time to time, yes, and that was the
10 compelling reason why I had to maintain this training program.

11 Senator Lucas: Let me ask you, Admiral, how many men did
12 you have on the battleships that were struck at Pearl Harbor
13 on the morning of the 7th of December, roughly, if you cannot
14 give the exact figures?

15 Admiral Kimmel: The numbers?

16 Senator Lucas: Yes.

17 Admiral Kimmel: Anything I can give you would be a --

18 Senator Lucas: I think it is probably in the record.

19 Admiral Kimmel: I think you can find that. I would pre-
20 fer not to because I might be wide of the mark.

21 Senator Lucas: Well, how near were the battleships and
22 other ships that were struck in Pearl Harbor on December the
23 7th up to the complement that you desired, what percentage?

24 Admiral Kimmel: Well, unless I knew the numbers and the
25 complement I could not very well tell you that, but if what you

1831

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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are driving at is that we had sufficient men to man the ships under the conditions of repelling an attack at anchor in Pearl Harbor, we did have a sufficient number. We had a sufficient number to man the guns there at that time, but that was not the object of my setting this lack of men forth.

Senator Lucas: I understand.

Admiral Kimmel: If we had had trained crews the cost of going from a training status to an all-out security status would have been much less. Now, once you get a trained Fleet you do not have much to do to keep them polished up. Do you understand, sir?

SHAW & BURNETT
 JUN 28 1945
 S. D. MONTGOMERY
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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Senator Lucas: I understand.

You had a sufficient number of men on these battle-ships and other ships that were in the harbor to take care of them and repel the attack that was made. What you did not have was a sufficient number of men for an all-out, over-all training which would have been necessary in the event you had to go on the offensive at sea.

Admiral Kimmel: That is right. In that connection I would like to point out we did not have spare patrol plane crews out there, and we had been using our utmost endeavors to get spare patrol plane crews.

At the time, as I pointed out, we were required to supply the mainland, for distribution to other places, 12 patrol plane crews per month. So we were never able to catch up, to get the crews for the naval patrol planes.

The same thing obtained in the case of submarines. What we endeavored to do was get the spare crews for submarines, and those were the two services that were arduous, and the submarine was a very arduous service.

Senator Lucas: As I recall, you made a request from the Chief of Naval Operations for an additional 9,000 or 10,000 men.

Admiral Kimmel: No, I did not make the request. I informed him that the Fleet was 9,000 men short of comple-

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 ment, and we could use an additional 10,000.

3 When I used the term "10,000," I had in mind filling
4 up all of the training activities on shore, on the Island
5 of Oahu, and these patrol plane crews, the submarine
6 crews, and what not.

7 Senator Lucas: Let me ask you this. If those men
8 had been furnished to you, is it a reasonable assumption
9 that more men would have been lost at Pearl Harbor?

10 Admiral Kimmel: I do not think so.

11 Senator Lucas: Your battleships would have been filled,
12 would they not, with a complete complement on the morning
13 of the attack?

14 Admiral Kimmel: Well, they might have had a few more
15 men there. I do not see how you can arrive at the conclu-
16 sion that more men would have been lost.

17 Senator Lucas: Well, the more men you had on these
18 battleships and other ships that went down, the more men
19 you would probably have lost. That is the point I am
20 assuming. It may be an unwarranted assumption.

21 Admiral Kimmel: Well, it is a reasonable assumption
22 if you lose a certain percentage of your men, and you in-
23 crease the number of men and still lose the same percentage,
24 why, you would lose more men.

25 Senator Lucas: The point I am making is if you had

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 had the 9,000 or 10,000 men that you thought were necessary,
3 it would have been no aid to the defense of the harbor on
4 that particular morning.

5 Admiral Kimmel: Under those particular circumstances,
6 I told you, sir, that they had ample men to man the guns,
7 and to use all the offensive power they could inside of
8 Pearl Harbor.

9 Senator Lucas: And any additional men would not
10 have affected the case one way or the other?

11 Admiral Kimmel: On that particular morning. It might
12 have affected many other things.

13 Senator Lucas: That is the reason we are here, be-
14 cause of that particular morning.

15 Admiral Kimmel: How is that?

16 Senator Lucas: That is the reason we are here, because
17 of that particular morning on December 7th. That is what
18 we are talking about.

19 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

20 Senator Lucas: Admiral Kimmel, Senator Barkley is not
21 quite clear, and perhaps I did not make it clear myself,
22 with respect to the number of men that you requested, or
23 that you said you could use. Was it 10,000 in addition to
24 the 9,000, or was it the total of 10,000?

25 Admiral Kimmel: The total of 19,000.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Senator Lucas: Total of 19,000?

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Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

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Senator Lucas: I was not clear on that myself. Thank you, Senator Barkley.

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Now, Admiral, in this statement that you made before the committee, which is a very powerful statement, you told the committee you recognized the Pacific Fleet was inferior to the Japanese Fleet in every category of fighting ships.

11

Admiral Kimmel: I think that is an accurate statement.

12

Senator Lucas: That would be true if you wanted to consider it ship by ship and tonnage by tonnage?

13

14

Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

15

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Senator Lucas: We demonstrated, after the war started that we were inferior many times in tonnage to the Japanese Fleet, but we went on and were successful, and victorious over them.

19

Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

20

21

Senator Lucas: So it is not always a question of tonnage versus tonnage.

22

Admiral Kimmel: By no means. You are quite right.

23

24

Senator Lucas: Now, you also stated that the ships that you had were deficient in anti-aircraft weapons.

25

Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 Senator Lucas: And you have also told us that in
3 April, 1941, when the three battleships and one aircraft
4 carrier and four cruisers and 18 destroyers were detached
5 from the Pacific Fleet and sent to the Atlantic.

6 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct.

7 Senator Lucas: Now, let me ask you this question.

8 You appreciated the vulnerability of the fleet in
9 Pearl Harbor. You have told us these three things, and
10 many others.

11 Did these facts showing the inadequacy of manpower,
12 the inadequacy of ships, planes, shortage in anti-aircraft
13 guns, all of these things cause you to use more diligence
14 in providing measures for the fleet's protection from sub-
15 marine or air attack?

16 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I did everything I could to bring
17 the fleet up to fighting efficiency.

18 Senator Lucas: You were conscious, of course, of
19 these things, as you expressed, from time to time?

20 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, of course I was.

21 Senator Lucas: And it seemed to me that as a result
22 of your knowoedge of the situation, and your letters to
23 and from the Chief of Naval Operations, that it demanded
24 more diligence and more vigilence on your part, and I
25 presume you did do that very thing.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Admiral Kimmel: I did.

Senator Lucas: Let me ask you this question. You have detailed to great extent in your statement before the committee these different shortages. Do you use the inferiority of the fleet, the shortage in planes, ships, tankers and other equipment as a part of your defense for what happened at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, and particularly the mobility of the fleet.

Senator Lucas: It seems to me that these factors of weakness standing alone should have made you and your command more sensitive, and more wide awake to any kind of attack, including a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Kimmel: I did everything that I felt I could possibly do. You noted the shortages in the fleet. The most critical shortage was in planes, long range reconnaissance planes, and long range attack planes. That was the thing that I had stressed over and over again.

Senator Lucas: Do you recall now how many long-range reconnaissance planes on the morning of December 7th that were ready to make the search?

Admiral Kimmel: I think we could have mustered, according to Admiral Bellinger -- I think his figures were 49. They might have been supplemented by 6 B-17 Army bombers, and that was all.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 Senator Lucas: Do you recall now when the last time
3 was that you used any of these planes for search, reconnaissance
4 work on any wide scale basis?

5 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I used them for search in re-
6 connaissance work in the week immediately preceding Pearl
7 Harbor, covering the advance of the ships which were going
8 to Wake and Midway. There were reconnaissances made as
9 part of the training on several days of the week of December
10 6th. That is in the statement, I think. They were in the
11 north and northwest sector, or in the northwest sector.

12 Senator Lucas: But you had no regular schedule of re-
13 connaissance going out from the Island of Oahu from November
14 27 to December 6?

15 Admiral Kimmel: No, I did not.

16 Senator Lucas: Or December 7.

17 Admiral Kimmel: No. I could not maintain that re-
18 connaissance, except for a very short time, and I think that
19 is very well set forth in the statement and in the testimony
20 of the people who knew the condition of the planes at the
21 time, and I knew the condition of the planes at the time myself.

22 Senator Lucas: Under the joint plans that you had agreed
23 to with General Short it was your duty to maintain an air
24 patrol against enemy forces in the approaches of Oahu?

25 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct. And in that same

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 estimate you will find a statement that with the forces
3 available we could do that only when an attack was known,
4 within narrow limits, known to be probable within narrow
5 limits.

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7 Senator Lucas: Well, do you recall, Admiral, when you
8 were there in 1940, when Admiral Richardson was in command,
9 that he had such search planes going under an alert order
0 that was issued by the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington?

10 Admiral Kimmel: He never had any search under the
11 orders of the Chief of Naval Operations, except the search
12 which he conducted in response to the alert sent out by
13 General Marshall in June of 1940. He had, for training
14 purposes, a search made up to a distance of 180 miles, in
15 a sketchy kind of search, and that was to carry out the
16 maneuver basis under which we were operating at that time.

17 He has so testified.

18 Senator Lucas: I see.

19 Admiral Kimmel: When the alert, the order from General
20 Marshall came out to General Herron, they increased that
21 reconnaissance to 300 miles. At no time did they have, in
22 my opinion, any real reconnaissance flying from Pearl Harbor
23 that would have been successful, except by chance, in dis-
24 covering an attack in time to be of any real use.

25 Senator Lucas: Well, at least they carried out the

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 order and made the attempt to do reconnaissance work in 1940,
3 did they not? Whether it amounted to anything or not, they
4 did attempt that reconnaissance work?

5 Admiral Kimmel: They attempted that reconnaissance work
6 because they were told to be alerted, or take an alert against
7 an overseas raid, and they continued as long as that order
8 was in effect, and to them that meant that an attack was
9 imminent, an overseas raid on Hawaii was imminent, and had
10 I received such an order later I would have used every means
11 at my command to cover whatever I could cover.

12 Even at this time they had a reconnaissance out to a
13 distance of 300 miles in only a partial sector.

14 Senator Lucas: You do not believe that the war warning
15 message sent to you on November 27, in which there was the
16 request that you use the appropriate necessary defensive
17 deployment, directed you to do any reconnaissance work?

18 Admiral Kimmel: Not specifically, no. They told me
19 to take an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to
20 carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46, and that I did.

21 Now the Navy Department should have known, and did
22 know beyond doubt, that I had no means to conduct a search
23 over a considerable period.

24 Senator Lucas: I agree with you.

25 Admiral Kimmel: Now I might have made a token search

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 and I might have been able to come here and say I made a
3 token search, it was not worth anything but I made it, and
4 therefore I am all right. I did not do that. I have never
5 done that kind of thing, and I will not do it.

6
7 Senator Lucas: Not even though you were commanded to do it?

8 Admiral Kimmel: I will not do anything that I consider
9 futile and expending effort unnecessarily.

10 Senator Lucas: Did you consider it futile and expending
11 effort unnecessarily in the summer of 1940 when they did
12 carry on that reconnaissance work?

13 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I think it was ineffective. They
14 had an order to do it and they did the best they could. That
15 was a direct order.

16 Senator Lucas: Yes, I understand. Did you consider
17 the command that was given to General Short by General Marshall,
18 in which he definitely requested reconnaissance, a part of
19 your command?

20 Admiral Kimmel: My recollection -- I have not seen
21 that dispatch for sometime -- is that was to make such re-
22 connaissance as may be practicable. I think that was the
23 term that was used.

24 Senator Lucas: I have forgotten the exact wording of
25 it, sir.

"Army has sent following to Commander Western Defense

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Command quote negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment."

You saw this message, did you not?

Admiral Kimmel: Oh yes, I saw that message.

Senator Lucas: You discussed it with General Short at the time?

Admiral Kimmel: How's that?

Senator Lucas: Did you discuss it with General Short at the time?

Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes.

Senator Lucas: "If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil population," and so forth.

Now you do not consider that message which came from Marshall, which talked about reconnaissance and which under

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 the joint agreement was your duty, you did not consider it
3 was your duty to start a lengthy search at sea for any hostile
4 enemy?

5 Admiral Kimmel: I did not. I would like to call your
6 attention at this time to the fact that on the 29th I received
7 this same dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, which
8 he sent for action to the Commander of the Pacific Northern
9 Naval Coastal Frontier and Pacific Southern Naval Coastal
10 Frontier, and in it it says, "Army has sent following to
11 Commander Western Defense Command". Now that meant to me
12 that the Puget Sound area and the San Francisco area were
13 placed in the same category by General Marshall as the
14 Hawaiian area.

15 Senator Lucas: I made a slight mistake in reading to
16 you, Admiral, the message that went from the Chief of Naval
17 Operations to the Commanders on the Western Coast. I would
18 like to have the record corrected so it shows it was the
19 message of the 27th from General Marshall to the Commanding
20 General, Hawaiian Department. The language is practically
21 the same, so I will not go over it again.

22 Senator Brewster: Does the Senator yield?

23 Senator Lucas: Yes.

24 Senator Brewster: Should it not appear in the record
25 at this time that on the following day, November 28, Admiral

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 Kimmel received a copy of this Army wire containing additional
3 instructions regarding his activities? I assume that wire
4 or the radio of November 28 is in the record, but that does
5 contain the complete Army order.

6 Senator Lucas: That is right.

7 Senator Brewster: Then it contains additional instructions
8 apparently for the information of Admiral Kimmel.

9 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir, that is right. I think
10 that was the 29th, not the 28th.

11 Senator Brewster: The one we have says November 28.

12 Senator Ferguson: I think he received it the 29th.

13 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes.

14 Senator Brewster: The last part, after the "XX".

15 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

16 Senator Brewster: It apparently contains additional
17 instructions for your command.

18 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir, that is right.

19 Senator Lucas: Well, developing the point that has
20 been made here by the Senator from Maine, do you recall those
21 additional instructions that you received and whether or not
22 they changed in any way the instructions you received on
23 November 27 and November 28?

24 Admiral Kimmel: The additional instructions which I
25 received from the Chief of Naval Operations in this message

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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were WPL-52, the end of the quote, you see, just before this, and then the Chief of Naval Operations went on on his own "WPL-52 is not applicable to Pacific area and will not be placed in effect in that area except as now in force in Southeast Pacific sub-area and Panama Naval Coastal Frontier."

Now that applied to the shooting orders which were in effect in the Atlantic and in the Southeast Pacific Naval Coastal Frontier.

Now in addition it says, "Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act. Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL-46 as far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur."

Now in the first place, they told me that no shooting orders were to be issued in the Pacific, and to undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act.

Senator Lucas: That is what I was going to say. In other words, in the message of General Marshall to General Short which you discussed with General Short, it definitely said that Japan had to commit the first overt act before you could start in shooting.

Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 Senator Lucas: This does not change that phase of
3 it very much, does it?

4 Admiral Kimmel: It does not change that phase of it
5 very much, but those orders were first issued to General
6 Short, and I would have thought they applied to me without
7 this message.

8 Senator Lucas: Yes, sir.

9 Admiral Kimmel: But with this message, any doubt I may
10 have had was dispelled because the Chief of Naval Operations
11 said, for my information, "Undertake no offensive action
12 until Japan has committed an overt act," and again repeated,
13 "be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL-46 so
14 far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur."

15 Senator Lucas: Incidentally, those additional messages
16 kept talking about the serious danger with Japan, and when
17 they told you not to commit the first overt act, it was
18 a pretty fair indication that war was pretty close at hand,
19 was it not?

20 Admiral Kimmel: Not entirely, because I interpreted
21 their admonition not to make an overt act as still a desire
22 on the part of my Government to avoid hostilities with
23 Japan.

24 Senator Lucas: In other words, you construe that mes-
25 sage to be, notwithstanding all of these messages that you

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 received in the past, that not to commit an overt act
3 meant that we were still trying to retain peace with Japan?

4 Admiral Kimmel: Not to upset the applecart.

5 Senator Lucas: They upset it for us.

6 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir, very definitely. I think
7 they were finally upset, though.

8 Senator Lucas: Yes, they were, Admiral. We all agree
9 on that.

10 I want, Mr. Chairman, to read into the record just
11 briefly at this point a memorandum or two dealing with
12 reconnaissance that was used in 1940 when Admiral Richardson
13 and General Herron were in command out there.

14 Let me ask you this, Admiral:

15 Do you recall how many planes were being used for
16 reconnaissance by the Army in Hawaii in 1940?

17 Admiral Kimmel: I have no figures on that.

18 Senator Lucas: Now, on July 1, Mr. Chairman, General
19 Herron sent to the Chief of Staff in Washington this mes-
20 sage.

21 "Alert on two weeks today. All quiet locally, no ill
22 effect on command except cumulative hours on plane engines
23 and impaired overhaul facilities due to move from Fords
24 Island."

25 On July 8, another message from General Herron:

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 "Three weeks of alert completed today with no unfavor-
3 able reaction on personnel but a good deal of wear on motor
4 transportation. No developments in local situation."

5 On July 10, General Strong sent this to General Marshall
6 -- or General Strong, on the advice of General Marshall,
7 sent this to Herron:

8 "The Secretary of War directs that the following radio-
9 gram in the Chief of Staff's secret code be dispatched to
10 the Commanding General Hawaiian Department:

11 "Your five July 8. Can you not avoid undue wear on
12 motor transportation by putting present alert stations
13 on a permanent basis without unfavorable reaction
14 on convenience or morale of personnel? If this
15 meets your approval, submit an estimate for the
16 necessary construction of temporary type" --

17 and so forth.

18 On July 15, 1940, another message from General Herron
19 to the Chief of Staff:

20 "Alert entering fifth week. As now conducted, it is
21 without undue strain on personnel or materiel including
22 motors. New construction unnecessary. Navy continues
23 cooperation by outer aerial patrol."

24 Finally, Marshall advises Herron on July 16:

25 "You are authorized, at your discretion, to relax

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 alert provisions except that first, precautions against
3 sabotage will be continued on the basis of instant readi-
4 ness, and second aerial patrol measures can be reduced
5 to a training status, but so arranged as to be reestablished
6 on an alert basis on short notice."

7 Now, General Herron wrote a letter on August 21, 1940,
8 to General Marshall, in which he said, on the question of
9 alert, the following:

10 "The alert has now been on two months. The only pre-
11 sent measurable loss is in the weathering of the hundreds
12 of miles of field wire in place, largely for anti-aircraft
13 purposes, but that is probably worthwhile."

14 This is all in Exhibit 52, from which I am reading.

15 On September 6, General Herron wrote to General Marshall
16 the following:

17 "Dear George:

18 "Your note of August 28th has just reached me
19 here, where I have come to collect my wits and obtain
20 a little perspective. Wish you could do the same!

21 "My absolutely frank and honest opinion is that
22 'the alert' as now carried on here, does not dull
23 the keen edge, or exhaust morale. I think that
24 our real power accumulates and that the season of
25 individual target practice and instructions is about

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 over, the maneuvers of numerous small units camped
3 along the beaches will build up naturally and
4 easily the effectiveness of the alert."

5 I would like also, Mr. Chairman, at this point to
6 call attention to page 4462 of the record, in which the
7 Navy Department --

8 The Vice Chairman: The record in this hearing?

9 Senator Lucas: The record in this hearing in which
10 the Navy Department furnished the Senator from Illinois the
11 number of planes that were attached to the Pacific Fleet
12 in 1940 and 1941, that were capable of running a long
13 distance reconnaissance.

14 In that tabulation without going into the number of
15 planes that they had, I direct the committee's attention
16 to this one fact: In addition to whatever Army planes were
17 doing search work at that time, and apparently they were,
18 under the letter that I have read into the record here sent
19 by General Herron to General Marshall, Admiral Richardson
20 also had out security patrol from Barber's Point as of June
21 30, 1940, in a 300-mile circle, 180 degrees running north
22 and south in a circle that went to the northwest and south
23 from that point.

24 Now, it is true that he only had six patrol planes that
25 were in operation, and each plane each day covered a total

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Senator Lucas: For whatever good it was?

Admiral Kimmel: Well, you can always carry on a search as long as you have one plane.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Senator Lucas: Let me ask you this question: What is a dawn patrol?

Admiral Kimmel: Well, we started these searches of the operating areas near dawn and that was the dawn patrol. It went out a distance, oh, I think, about 300 miles.

Senator Lucas: What time would they leave in the morning?

Admiral Kimmel: Just about dawn; depending upon the season of the year.

Senator Lucas: Did you have such a dawn patrol in operation at any time during the first week in December there?

Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes.

Senator Lucas: Was it operating on the 6th and on the 7th?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

Senator Lucas: In what direction?

Admiral Kimmel: The southern although over the operating areas which we considered it necessary to search.

Senator Lucas: But there were no long distance reconnaissance planes, such as have been testified to here two or three times, either on the 6th or the 7th?

Admiral Kimmel: They went out the 300 miles, and you have frequently referred to this patrol that Admiral Richardson and General Herron established, as a long distance patrol, and that was to 300 miles.

Senator Lucas: Let me ask you, how many reconnaissance

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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planes were operating on the search on the morning of the 6th and the morning of the 7th?

Admiral Kimmel: I haven't those exact figures, but I think about 5 or 6, and in addition on the morning of the 7th I recall there were several patrol planes out operating with the submarines.

The Chairman: The Chair announces that the hour of twelve has arrived. In view of pending matters in the Senate some members of the committee from the Senate have indicated that they would like to be on the floor from twelve on.

In view of that the committee will recess here until 2:00 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:03 o'clock p.m., a recess was taken until 2:00 o'clock p.m. of the same day.)

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 p.m.

The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

Senator Lucas, will you proceed with the examination of the Admiral.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL

(Resumed)

Senator Lucas: Admiral Kimmel, before the recess for lunch we were discussing the question of reconnaissance by Army and Navy planes in and about Pearl Harbor the week preceding the attack.

I should like to ask you whether or not you had any conversations with General Short following the receipt of the war warning message on November 27 with respect to long-range reconnaissance to be carried on by the Navy?

Admiral Kimmel: I presume I discussed that with General Short. If you ask me specifically what I said to him and what he said to me, I could not answer you.

Senator Lucas: Yes.

Admiral Kimmel: You must understand, sir, that we had had an agreement over a considerable period of time and that agreement, and the limitations of the agreement, were perfectly well-known to General Short and to me, and the point in that was that we were not going to institute a long-range reconnaissance until such time as we knew, within narrow time

WARD & BYRNE WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1
2 limits, the time that the attack was to be expected.

3 Senator Lucas: Was that contained in the agreement, with
4 respect to the narrow limit of the time?

5 Admiral Kimmel: Well, that was stated in the estimate
6 of the situation, which might be termed a part of the agreement,
7 yes. It was a question of forces that we had available, and
8 until the number of planes was, we will say, multiplied by
9 about four, we would be unable to conduct any long-range re-
10 connaissance over a long period of time.

11 In connection with all this patrol affair I would like
12 to invite your attention to the fact that on Monday, Tuesday,
13 Wednesday and Thursday of the week preceding the attack we
14 did, in fact, send out patrol planes in the northwestern
15 sector to a distance of about 400 miles. After that time
16 these patrol planes required overhaul and upkeep, and they
17 were taken in for that purpose.

18 I stated in my statement that these were new planes,
19 54, as I recall the number, and all of them had been supplied
20 to us within the month preceding the attack.

21 These new planes were experiencing shakedown difficulties.
22 They had no spare parts. They had some trouble with broken
23 engine sections, and there were certain alterations required
24 in the planes before they were fully ready for war service.

25 Those alterations had not been completed by December 7.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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When we got these new planes we sent back the planes which we had had out there, and these planes relieved them.

Now reverting again to Richardson's patrol, which we touched on here this morning. In 1940, June of 1940, General Herron received this order from the Chief of Staff to alert his command against an overseas raid, or words to that effect. Of course that was a specific order and Richardson was asked to cooperate in this. Richardson had no other orders except to cooperate against an overseas raid.

Naturally he used every facility he had to do the best he could with it. My orders were very different. My orders were to take a defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the raids in the Marshalls. Richardson's orders at that time, or General Herron's orders, had no implication and nothing in his orders beyond conducting a reconnaissance.

I just wanted to point that out, and I think that makes considerable difference.

Hook follows

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 Senator Lucas: That may be true, Admiral. As I
3 understood you to say this morning, on the question of an
4 appropriate defensive deployment, it did not necessarily
5 mean, in your opinion at that time, that you should use
6 these planes for reconnaissance and search?

7 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir. I might say that the "appro-
8 priate defensive deployment," and "defensive deployment"
9 used in that letter, I mean that dispatch, was a strategic
10 matter, not a tactical matter. It was a strategic defensive
11 deployment -- I mean our understanding was -- and that was
12 primarily to make sure that when we deployed the fleet,
13 or put them in any position that they would not take on
14 an offensive character or anything that the Japanese could
15 consider as offensive.

16 That, coupled, with the other admonitions that I had
17 about doing nothing, to commit no overt act or anything
18 that could be construed as such, meant, in other words,
19 that I was not go down to the Marshalls and sit right on
20 them right away.

21 Senator Lucas: Now, when this war warning message came
22 on November 27, did you discuss the question of long range
23 reconnaissance with the key officers of the fleet?

24 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, I am quite sure I did. We dis-
25 cussed that so many times, and our policies were so well

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 known, that very little discussion was required. We had
3 gone up and down this scale dozens of times. We knew what
4 we could do.

5 Senator Lucas: Did you discuss that with General Short?

6 Admiral Kimmel: I could not say I did, specifically,
7 no.

8 Senator Lucas: In the hearings before the Roberts Com-
9 mission, the Chairman of that commission asked General Short
10 this question:

11 "When you had your discussion, sir, from November 27
12 to December 7, with the Navy commanders, were you informed
13 of what scouting forces they had out?"

14 "General Short: No, sir. I usually knew they had task
15 forces out. They usually talked about it.

16 "The Chairman: There was no discussion about increas-
17 ing the patrol?

18 "General Short: No, sir.

19 "The Chairman: Was there any call upon you for addi-
20 tional planes?

21 "General Short: NO. There was no time when we refused
22 planes to them. They understood perfectly well they would
23 be made available if necessary, if we had them."

24 Now, at any time, did you call on General Short for
25 planes to carry on any long-range reconnaissance?

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 Admiral Kimmel: Not during that period. Furthermore,
3 I reported to the Chief of Naval Operations, in a dispatch
4 of the 28th of November, I think it was that there were
5 just six Army B-17 bombers that were in operating condition
6 on the Island of Oahu at the time, and those were the
7 only planes that General Short had which were suitable for
8 long-range reconnaissance, and I knew it.

9 Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman yield?

10 Admiral Kimmel (continuing): And furthermore, I might
11 add at this time that Admiral Bellinger received a daily
12 report on the availability of planes from General Martin,
13 and General Martin received a daily report of availability
14 of planes from Admiral Bellinger, and I was kept reasonably
15 well informed of the status of the planes.

16 I do not mean in detail, but in general.

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1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 Senator Lucas: Did the Congressman want to say some-
3 thing?

4 Mr. Murphy: My impression was that you were going to
5 send them away from Oahu entirely.

6 Admiral Kimmel: What is that, sir?

7 Mr. Murphy: Wasn't there a communication that you were
8 going to send the 12 B-17's away from Oahu, but only six
9 were in condition to run?

10 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, it came up, to be sure, in connec-
11 tion with our plans to use the B-17 bombers if and when
12 they became available on the Island of Midway, Johnston,
13 Palmyra and Wake, and we had hoped to get those B-17's
14 out there to augment our forces; particularly we were hoping
15 to be able to get some B-17's to operate from Wake to make
16 the reconnaissance of the Marshall Islands.

17 The B-17's were very much faster, had a higher ceiling
18 and were in every way more suitable for reconnaissance than
19 were the patrol planes.

20 It is quite true that this report was made in connec-
21 tion with that. Nevertheless, what I was trying to point
22 out was my knowledge of the B-17's at the time, and the
23 fact that the Navy Department had that same knowledge avail-
24 able.

25 Senator Lucas: Admiral Kimmel: Leaving the recon-

Witness Kimmel

questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 naissance for a moment, I take it it goes without saying
3 that you knew that Pearl Harbor was our most important
4 outpost in the Pacific?

5 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

6 Senator Lucas: You also knew that Pearl Harbor and
7 the fleet was the hub of our Pacific strategy?

8 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

9 Senator Lucas: And you knew that the Fleet was the
10 most important cog in our defensive and offensive war
11 machine in the Pacific?

12 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir, I think that is true.

13 Senator Lucas: And you also knew that it was the
14 greatest single factor in the protection of our possessions
15 as well as the United States?

16 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir, and I was planning to so
17 use them as rapidly as I could.

18 Senator Lucas: Now, you went into command of the
19 Pacific Fleet in February, 1941?

20 Admiral Kimmel: February 1, 1941.

21 Senator Lucas: February 1, 1941, with that thorough
22 knowledge and understanding?

23 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir. I had had that full know-
24 ledge and understanding for a long time before I became
25 Commander in Chief.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 Senator Lucas: As Commander in Chief of the Pacific
3 Fleet, it was your sole responsibility to take every pre-
4 cautionary measure under all circumstances to properly
5 protect that fleet?

6 Admiral Kimmel: That I did.

7 Senator Lucas: You were Commander of the Fleet long
8 enough to know and properly evaluate the Fleet's strength
9 and its possibilities both on the offensive and defensive?

10 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir, and I found that strength
11 leaving much to be desired.

12 Senator Lucas: With all of these facts, Admiral,
13 admitted, do you want the committee to understand that
14 every consideration was given the Fleet, that the Fleet
15 had received every consideration at your hands when Naval
16 strategy was being discussed, from November 27 to December
17 7, 1941?

18 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir. Not only from November 27
19 to December 7, but from the time I became Commander in Chief
20 and long before that.

21 Senator Lucas: You want that to include from the time
22 you became Commander in Chief?

23 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

24 Senator Lucas: When you became Commander in Chief of
25 the Pacific Fleet, there was an operating schedule of ships

Witness Kimmel Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 that had been ordered by Admiral Richardson, whereby one
3 half of the fleet was in Pearl Harbor and one-half of
4 the fleet would be at sea?

5 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct.

6 Senator Lucas: When you took over and became Commander
7 of the Fleet you changed that operation schedule?

8 Admiral Kimmel: No, I didn't. I changed that operating
9 schedule after I found that even operating one-half the
10 fleet out and one-half in, that I was depleting the oil
11 reserves at Pearl Harbor. I couldn't keep up the oil reserves
12 with the means I had to transport oil from the coast, and
13 do the various other things we had to do with the tankers.

14 Senator Lucas: Do I understand now that you want the
15 committee to know that the reason for the changing of the
16 schedule was due to the reserve supply of oil on the Island
17 of Oahu?

18 Admiral Kimmel: That was one of the principal factors
19 in the decision.

20 Senator Lucas: What were the other factors, if I may
21 inquire?

22 Admiral Kimmel: The other factors were the necessity
23 for having the fleet in port a little more to make these
24 alterations which were rapidly coming on from our war exper-
25 ience.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 Senator Lucas: In other words, due to the stress
3 of the deteriorating conditions between Japan and this
4 country, there was a continuous change in connection
5 with attempting to get the fleet more ready for war, and
6 that caused the ships to be in port more than otherwise;
7 am I correct in my understanding?

8 Admiral Kimmel: I tried to balance everything. I tried
9 to get the most out of the time that we had. And the fuel
10 situation alone would have demanded that I do what I did.
11 The other factors were to be considered, and we took full
12 advantage of the fact that the fuel situation demanded
13 we keep them in port.

14 Senator Lucas: It so happens that on the morning of
15 December 7, two-thirds of the fleet were in Pearl Harbor.

16 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I am not sure as to the numbers
17 that were in Pearl Harbor. I think that is a little high.
18 I think a little over half.

19 Senator Lucas: Well, all I have is the records that
20 I have examined, Admiral.

21 Admiral Kimmel: Perhaps you are correct.

22 Senator Lucas: I may be in error about that. If I
23 am you can correct it upon further investigation. But it
24 is my understanding from reading the record that two-thirds
25 of the fleet that was based at Pearl Harbor was in the

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 harbor was in the Harbor on the morning of December 7,
3 when the attack came.

4 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I haven't those figures in
5 front of me, but I think that is not entirely accurate.

6 Senator Lucas: It may not be, sir, and if so, you
7 may correct it. I should be glad to have it that way.

8 Now, after you received the war warning on November 27,
9 did it occur to you to change the operation schedule in any
10 way whereby fewer ships might be in the harbor?

11 Admiral Kimmel: We did change the operating schedule
12 to the extent of carrying out those tasks which we thought
13 were demanded at that time.

14 Senator Lucas: With respect to the carrying out of
15 those tasks which you say were demanded at that time, as
16 I recall those messages that came from the Chief of Naval
17 Operations, they placed the direct responsibility upon you
18 to say whether or not those movements were feasible and
19 practicable, did they not?

20 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct. And with the informa-
21 tion I had, I thought they were. Otherwise, I would not
22 have done it.

23 Senator Lucas: But I rather reached the conclusion
24 from your statement that you read to the committee, Admiral,
25 that you assumed that that was a direct command from the

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 Chief of Naval Operations here in Washington.

3 Admiral Kimmel: Well, in naval circles, and I think
4 military circles, a suggestion from a senior is little
5 short of a command. I realized that I had discretion in
6 the matter. I thought his suggestion was good, and therefore
7 I carried it out. And I wouldn't have hesitated to differ
8 with him had I seen any good reason for doing so.

9 Senator Lucas: Those two messages that came directing
10 you to take the task forces to Wake and Midway in the event
11 you believed it impracticable and not feasible, came after
12 the war message?

13 Admiral Kimmel: Came, I think, on the same day.

14 Senator Lucas: I understood you to say in your direct
15 statement those two messages were taken into consideration
16 by you, and rather qualified the war warning message.

17 Admiral Kimmel: Yes. My recollection is that those
18 messages, one of them came in before the war warning, 23
19 hours, I think I figured up, and the other one was the day
20 after the war warning, in connection with the transfer of
21 planes.

22 However, that is easy enough to check on. It was
23 almost simultaneously.

24 Senator Lucas: I was under the impression both came
25 after the war warning message. I may be in error, and you

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Witness Kimmel

questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 may be right. I am not sure.

3 Admiral Kimmel: I have got time groups on each one
4 of these.

5 Senator Lucas: It may not be so important, although
6 I thought it was.

7 Admiral Kimmel: The only thing I have here is the
8 time of origin. I haven't the time I received it, but it
9 would be only a matter of hours at the most.

10 Just one moment, sir.

11 The two of them, the time of origin of the two messages
12 in regard to sending these reinforcements to the Islands
13 were just about 23 hours before the war warning message.

14 Senator Lucas: That is the date of them?

15 Admiral Kimmel: All of them are on the 27th. The
16 time group on the first of the Island messages was 0040
17 and the time group on the second one of the Island messages
18 was 0038, and the time group on the war warning message is
19 2337.

20 Senator Lucas: Would it have made any difference in
21 your plans out there for defense or offense if those mes-
22 sages came before the war warning, or after?

23 Admiral Kimmel: They came so close together -- no,
24 it wouldn't have made any difference. The three messages
25 stood. They all originated on the same day as it happened.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Whether one came in just ahead or just afterward, I think
 would have made no difference.

Senator Lucas: When you sent the task forces out
 on these two missions, before you sent them, you had given
 consideration to the war w arning message of the 27th?

Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes; yes. And I reported to
 the Chief of Naval Operations on the 28th, after he knew
 I had received the war w arning in regard to sending the
 planes to Wake and also told him that I was going to send
 them later to Midway.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Senator Lucas: My thought was that the reason perhaps that they used the words "practicable" and "feasible" was due to the fact that he had already sent you the war warning message and because the war warning message was there it was up to you to determine whether or not you thought under those circumstances those task forces should go out.

Admiral Kimmel: Well, he must have known that I couldn't very well get these movements underway before I would have the war warning message anyhow.

Senator Lucas: Now, Admiral Kimmel, after you received the war warning message of November 27, was there any change at all in the movement or the operation of these ships in and out of Pearl Harbor, outside of the two task forces?

Admiral Kimmel: You mean any change from the ones we had scheduled for?

Senator Lucas: Yes. You had a regular schedule, as I understand it.

Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

Senator Lucas: Was that routine of ships entering and leaving Pearl Harbor changed any in any way after you received the war warning message, other than the two task forces we have been talking about?

Admiral Kimmel: Well, I couldn't answer that but there was no major change.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1
2 Senator Lucas: In other words, the war warning message
3 that you received did not cause you to change in any way
4 the movement of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor?

5 Admiral Kimmel: Except for these task forces.

6 Senator Lucas: Except for the task forces.

7 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

8 Senator Lucas: Will you tell the committee where
9 Halsey's task force was when Pearl Harbor was struck?

10 Admiral Kimmel: To my recollection he was about 200
11 miles west of Pearl Harbor.

12 Senator Lucas: He was on his way home?

13 Admiral Kimmel: On his way to Pearl Harbor.

14 Senator Lucas: On his way to Pearl Harbor after having
15 carried out the assignment that had been given to him by
16 you on the 28th -- was it?

17 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct.

18 Senator Lucas: There is a rumor, one of those rumors
19 that you hear all the time, there is a rumor that Halsey's
20 task force was delayed in coming back because of some engine
21 trouble, or some other trouble, out at sea. Do you know
22 anything about that?

23 Admiral Kimmel: Never heard of it.

24 Senator Lucas: Nothing to it. You would have heard of it?

25 Admiral Kimmel: I think I would.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 Senator Lucas: Assuming Halsey's task force had
3 arrived in Pearl Harbor on the night of the 6th, would they
4 have been anchored in there too?

5 Admiral Kimmel: Halsey's task force needed fuel. I
6 would have brought him in for fuel if they arrived because
7 they needed fuel. And, as a matter of fact, I kept Halsey
8 out and he had to send his destroyers in for fuel and I
9 had to send out other destroyers to him to take the places
10 of the ones he had, and after about, oh, not more than two
11 or three days of operation, I had to bring Halsey in to
12 fuel his carrier.

13 Senator Lucas: Where would Newton's task force have
14 been if you had not given him the order to go to Midway on
15 the morning of the 7th?

16 Admiral Kimmel: Well --

17 Senator Lucas: They left on December 6th, they left
18 Pearl Harbor on December 6th.

19 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

20 Senator Lucas: Do you know what the operational schedule
21 of those particular ships was in the regular routine on the
22 afternoon of December 6th?

23 Admiral Kimmel: I can't recall that at the present time,
24 sir.

25 Senator Lucas: But is it a near assumption that they

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1
2 might have been in Pearl Harbor on the night of December 6
3 had they not carried this mission out to Midway?

4 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, no, they would have been at sea.

5 Senator Lucas: They would have been at sea?

6 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

7 Senator Lucas: Why do you say that?

8 Admiral Kimmel: Because that is my recollection.

9 Senator Lucas: I see.

10 There is another question that I want to ask you
11 about the task forces as a result of the colloquy which
12 took place on yesterday.

13 Halsey's task force, as I understand it, went out fully
14 armed and prepared to shoot and sink anything they saw?

15 Admiral Kimmel: He so informed me after he returned.

16 Senator Lucas: Did he have the power or authority to
17 do that under the order that you gave him and which you
18 read into the record this morning?

19 Admiral Kimmel: You better ask Admiral Halsey when he
20 comes, sir.

21 Senator Lucas: Well, I will ask Admiral Halsey when
22 he comes, but you were the Commander in Chief of this Fleet,
23 in a pretty serious time.

24 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

25 Senator Lucas: This --

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Admiral Kimmel: And I didn't want Halsey to get caught, and I hoped he wouldn't, and I knew Halsey.

Senator Lucas: You didn't have to give the Admiral any orders?

Admiral Kimmel: Well, he knew the situation thoroughly.

Senator Lucas: I know that, but I am just now talking about your responsibility out there as Commander of the Fleet in giving orders to men on task forces of this kind.

Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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2 Senator Lucas: Now, I was wondering whether or now
3 under the order that you read in the record this morning and
4 the order that you read yesterday to Admiral Brown, whether
5 or not under those orders these men would have the right and
6 the authority to arm themselves to the teeth for the purpose
7 of sinking or shooting down anything that they might run
8 across that they thought was an enemy?

9 Admiral Kimmel: When you send a man on an expedition of
10 any kind and particularly an Admiral, you have got to trust
11 him to do the things which the situation demands. I had no
12 authority to give him any shooting orders and I had been en-
13 joined not to put shooting orders into effect in the Pacific
14 but I did not want them to get caught, either one of them.

15 Senator Lucas: Well, I can appreciate what you were up
16 against at that particular time, Admiral.

17 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

18 Senator Lucas: The only thought that I had in mind in
19 asking you these questions was to discover, if I could, the
20 reason why Admiral Halsey sailed under one set of orders and
21 Admiral Newton sailed apparently under another set of orders.

22 Admiral Kimmel: Admiral Halsey made his own interpre-
23 tation of my suggestion that he use his common sense when he
24 asked me how far to go and in view of everything I think he
25 made a pretty good selection.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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Senator Lucas: Under any circumstances --

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Admiral Kimmel: Excuse me. Another point, though, that I have tried to indicate was that Halsey was going about two thousand miles out.

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Senator Lucas: Yes, I know it.

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Admiral Kimmel: That Newton was going only seven hundred miles and the chances of trouble that Halsey might get into were very much greater than anything that Newton had.

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Senator Lucas: Well, under any circumstances and regardless of how they interpreted those orders, Admiral Kimmel was the man who had to be held responsible in the final analysis for whatever they did.

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Admiral Kimmel: I think I have been held responsible.
Senator Lucas: Now, in your statement to the committee on page 63 you said the following:

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"The sending of the carrier task forces to Wake and Midway did more than re-inforce the air defenses of the islands. It permitted a broad area to be scouted for signs of enemy movement along the path of the advance of these task forces to the islands and their return to Oahu. In addition, they were in an excellent position to intercept any enemy force which might be on the move."

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Now, do you believe that Newton's task force was in a position, assuming his testimony is correct, was in a position

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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to intercept any enemy force?

Admiral Kimmel: Well, regardless of his testimony the location in which he was and the track that his course followed put him in a position where he was to the westward, a little bit north of west of Oahu and any force coming to Oahu or on its way there, having once been discovered, Newton could have been directed to take an intercepting course and that is what we endeavored to do with him on the morning of December 7th. The only trouble was that we made a mistake due to the information we received and thought the Japanese attack force was down to the southward instead of the northward.

Senator Lucas: But the point I am making --

Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Senator Lucas: Yes, I will yield, Congressman.

Mr. Keefe: Just for clarification. In one of your questions referring to the Newton task force I understood you to say that that sailed on the 6th of December. My understanding has been up to this time that it sailed on the 5th of December.

Admiral Kimmel: They did sail on the 5th.

Mr. Keefe: So that the record may be clear on this point in connection with this cross examination --

Admiral Kimmel: I did not notice that.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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Mr. Keefe: (Continuing) -- the testimony is that it sailed on the 5th. Is that correct?

Admiral Kimmel: That is correct, sir. I had not noticed that.

Senator Lucas: I thank you, Congressman. That is correct.

The point that I was attempting to make, though, Admiral, and only using your statement to the committee to do so, was whether or not Newton, assuming his testimony was correct, if he was just coasting along on routine duty, as to whether or not he was in a position to intercept anybody in the event he had met a hostile enemy?

Admiral Kimmel: He was fully fueled, he was fully armed, he was zig-zagging against submarines, he had up an air patrol and I presume that he could have gone into action in a matter of, oh, a couple of minutes at most.

Senator Lucas: Well, if this statement is correct, and I read it into the record yesterday, on that mission he was given no special orders regarding the arming of planes or regarding preparation for war other than the ordinary routine and the only point I am trying to make is whether or not, if that is correct, whether or not his force would not have been destroyed before he could have gotten into action?

Admiral Kimmel: We had had orders in effect for a long

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 time about the arming of planes and I presumed Admiral Newton
3 was carrying those orders out.

4 Senator Lucas: Well, if Newton's testimony is correct
5 the task force undoubtedly --

6 Admiral Kimmel: I beg your pardon, sir. May I make an
7 observation?

8 Senator Lucas: Certainly.

9 Admiral Kimmel: I think you are not quoting from New-
10 ton's testimony. You are quoting from a --

11 Senator Lucas: I am quoting from the Appendix to the
12 Narrative Statement of Evidence at the Navy Pearl Harbor In-
13 vestigation.

14 Admiral Kimmel: That is right. I think you would get a
15 more accurate presentation if you wanted to get Newton's orig-
16 inal testimony.

17 Senator Lucas: Well, that may be true, but is there any
18 doubt in your mind now from Newton's testimony that I take it
19 you have read, that he testified that on that mission he gave
20 no special orders regarding the arming of planes or regarding
21 the preparation for war other than ordinary routine? Is there
22 any question about that?

23 Admiral Kimmel: Well, of course, my contention is that
24 the ordinary routine should have been sufficient under the
25 orders under which he was operating.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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Senator Lucas: You think he should have been prepared then in every way?

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Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

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Senator Lucas: Then if there is any question of failing to perform the duty under the order that you gave him, then it is on Admiral Newton?

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Admiral Kimmel: I should say so.

9

Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman yield at that point?

10

Senator Lucas: I will yield for a question.

11

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Mr. Murphy: I was wondering if the responsibility would lie on Admiral Newton under those circumstances, if it was Colonel Bundy's duty and General Gerow's duty to check the Short reply, why the gentleman feels that the responsibility lies on General Marshall?

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Senator Lucas: On General Marshall? Well, I don't want to get into that argument right now.

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Now, one other question, Admiral, or two. You spent considerable time explaining to the committee how you made a daily memorandum from November 30th on as to what should be done within the next 24 hours.

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Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

Senator Lucas: And you were really on a 24-hour war alert after November the 27th, were you not?

25

Admiral Kimmel: I do not quite understand what you mean

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 by that.

3 Senator Lucas: Well, something in that war message on
4 November the 27th caused you from that time on to issue a
5 daily 24-hour memorandum of some kind.

6 Admiral Kimmel: I prepared, - I had prepared a memorandum
7 on the steps which we would take immediately that hostilities
8 commenced. I did that as a precautionary measure and I think
9 it was a wise thing.

10 Senator Lucas: I agree with you, Admiral, and the only
11 point that I am making is that you went on that 24 hour basis
12 immediately following the war warning message that you received
13 on November the 27th.

14 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, yes.

15 Senator Lucas: And that was the first time that you had
16 gone on a 24 hour warning basis of this kind or --

17 Admiral Kimmel: No, no. We had done it but not quite as
18 systematically as I insisted on doing it at that time. We
19 always had a summary of what we were going to do but I re-
20 duced it to, - well, to a little better system, that is all.

21 Senator Lucas: Well, you had not been writing out a
22 message or a memorandum up to that time, had you?

23 Admiral Kimmel: No, I had not been writing out a memo-
24 randum, but they had been keeping it in the War Plans. About
25 the only difference here was to be sure that the Staff Duty