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INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2117

20 June 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ U.S.S.B.S.
Interrogation No. 505

Date: Nov 1945 Original () Copy (x) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)
Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Hq, U.S.S.B.S., Washington, D.C.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: U.S.S.B.S.

PERSONS IMPLICATED: HOSHINO, Naoki; AIKAWA, Katsuroka;
TOJO, Hideki

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Economic Aggression,
Manchuria

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

HOSHINO discusses Manchurian Industrial Development Corporation, Cabinet Planning Board, and preparation of war, productive.

Analyst: W.H.Wagner

Doc. No. 2117

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED FORCES
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

26 July, 1946

TO: DUPLICATION CONTROL

Attached is Document No. 2117D for Hauphurst.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

II

24 July, 1946

JUL 24 1946

TO: TRANSLATION CONTROL

Attached is Document No. 2117 d for Haushurst.
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Excerpts from Interrogation of Hoshino, Naoki dated 19, 22, 28, Nov.
1945.

Excerpts attached.

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Document No.

2117 d

Translation Section No.

II

2117d Ev 2 - 9 u H. A. 19.22.28
U.S.S.B.S. INTERROGATION NO. 505
OF
HOSHINO, NAOKI
XXX
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Doc. 2117d

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EXCERPT FROM INTERROGATION OF HOSHINO, Naoki, DATED 19,22,28 NOV 45

- Q. My question is - did you believe that if a war came with the United States, you could win such a war?
- A. Rather than the thought of whether we would win or not, the big thing was that we would try to settle the issues with America and there was considerable feeling that the thing could be settled. Of course, I suppose we thought if we did go to war we could probably win.
- Q. Did you have any exact plan as to how you expected to win?
- A. Of course, about those specific things, you would have to talk with the War and Navy Ministers because I was not in on the details or plans they had. However, from my own viewpoint and perhaps others, I felt that in the early stages of the war, Japan would be able to occupy a great deal of the Far East and with the materials such as oil and other things which we would thus acquire, it was felt we would be able to carry the war on for a long time and hold on to the countries we had occupied. There was never any thought of course of gaining a decisive victory over America, i.e., of landing on the American continent and bringing America to her knees - we felt that America, for her part, would be unable to subdue the Far East and that eventually we would work out some sort of an understanding in a sort of negotiated peace.
- Q. Would you have felt that such a termination would be possible had you known that Germany would be defeated by Russia and the rest of the Allies?
- A. No, I don't think we would have held the same opinions.
- Q. Why didn't Japan wait until it saw whether or not the Germans would actually capture Moscow and defeat Russia before attacking the U. S.?
- A. I don't think that at that time Japan was relying too much on Germany and while it is true that plans might have been different had Germany's defeat been foreseen, the question seemed to center around the issues between Japan and America, and it was accelerated by the American attitude toward China.
- Q. But you did say, as I understand it, that had you believed that Germany would be defeated, you would not have believed it possible to bring the war to a successful conclusion through a negotiated peace. If that is so, I will have to repeat my question - Why did not you wait and make sure?

A. While it was not felt necessarily that Germany would gain an immediate victory over Russia, neither did anyone think that Germany would be knocked-out so easily.

Q. Is it a fact then that you expected there would be a long continued European war which would tend to keep the U. S. worried about the situation in Europe, as well as the situation in the Far East, and thus prevent the U. S. from bringing its full weight to bear against Japan?

A. There was undoubtedly more or less that kind of thinking.

(Page 22)

Q. Was there any other kind of thinking in regard to it also? I don't want you to say "Yes" because I put the question in that form if you do not really mean that. If you have something else in mind, that is what I would like.

A. Yes, there was undoubtedly that feeling.

Q. Was that an important factor?

A. Yes, it probably was an important factor.

Q. Was it a determining factor? Would they have been willing to go to war had they felt the situation would have been different?

A. I don't think this was a decisive factor. It is true that in any discussions or thought of winning the war, such a proposition would be taken into consideration. I think the question of primary importance was that Japan felt that she was fighting for her own existence and if that were threatened, she would fight regardless of other factors.

Q. That is, whether she thought she would win or lose, she would fight rather than retire from China?

A. Yes, that is the situation.

* * *

(Page 25)

Q. You were Cabinet Secretary from the beginning of the Tojo Cabinet until its fall, as I understand it?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. I wonder if you could give us for each year beginning with 1942, the major problems of the Japanese war economy? In detail - not merely saying shipping or something like that, but what particular thing worried them the most?

A. 1942 was a period of positive advance in the war and our biggest problem during that year was the question as to how we would make the most effective use of the resources that

we acquired in the territories that we occupied. The mobilization of these materials progressed very smoothly in the early stages of that program but after the battles of Midway and Guadalcanal, the mobilization did not progress as smoothly as we would like.

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- Q. Were the plans which had been prepared in advance found to be appropriate for the development of those areas - Did you find it was necessary to bring in more resources from Japan or less than you had figured?
- A. Up until August 1942 the mobilization of these newly acquired resources exceeded expectations.

* * *

- Q. If everything had gone better than you expected in taking over the N.E.I. and Malaya and the Philippines, why wasn't your consumption of military products less rather than you had figured it would be?
- A. We did get along very nicely at first and our plans worked out famously but particularly after the battle of Guadalcanal the interference with our holding of these newly captured resources to Japan was interfered with by submarines and other means, and that is one reason why our plans did not develop as nicely as we had expected. There is another reason and that was this: The battles of Guadalcanal and other battles at that time consumed a great deal more in the line of ammunition and ships, etc. than we had planned.
- Q. Was the expenditure of military products in the early campaigns, during which they captured the Philippines, Malay and the N.E.I., greater or less than anticipated?
- A. The only thing that exceeded our expectations was the importation of raw materials from newly acquired territory - otherwise, there was no improvement in the war situation over what we had planned.

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四頁

問、滿洲國ノ初期、ザット一九三一年ヨリ一九三六年マデノ間、滿洲國ノ生産、殊ニ工業生産ニハ大シク變化ハナカツタ。此ノ初期ノ數年間ノ工業的發展ノ缺除ノ主ナル理由トシテアナタハ何ヲアゲルカ、

答、是ニハ幾ツモ理由ハアルデアラウガ多分、最大ノ理由ハ此ノ期間中、尨大ナル準備ガナサレツ、アツタ。其ノ爲、多額ノ生産ヲ見ナカツタ事ト思フ。

問、是等一般の準備ハ如何ナル特殊方面ニ及ンダカ、
答、此處ニ精確ナル數字ヲ持チ合ハセテキナイ爲、是等全テノ詳細ナル理由ヲ探索スル事ハ出來ナイガ、是等準備ハ昭和製鐵所ノ如キ工業ノ創設ヲ含ンデ居タ。又金鑛山ノ發見、採鑛有望地發見等、ヲモ含ンデ居タ。此ノ方面ニ於テ日本ハアメリカ程速ニ進歩シナイノデ、工業生産ノ基礎ヲ置クノニ相當ノ時日ヲ要シタノデアアル。

問、此ノ間ノ發展企業ニ於テ資本ノ不足ハナカツタカ、
答、唯、金錢的バカリデナク、必要ナル物品、資材ヲモ資本ノ中ニ考ヘルナラバ、我々ハ勿論困難ノ一部分ヲ滿洲國ニ於ケル資本ノ不足ニ歸スル事ガ出來ル。

問、必要ナル資本ヲ何處ヨリ仰イダカ、

答、我々ハ先ヅ、日本ニ頼ツタ。然シ、日本自体ニモ投資スルニ充分ナル程ノ財源ハナカツタノデ必要ノ資本ヲ外國ニ頼ラントシタノデアアル。滿洲産業開發會社ガ設立セラレタ時、我々ハアメリカヨリ資本ヲ得ント豫定シテ居タガ種々ノ理由ノ爲、我々ノ計畫通りニハ實現出來ズ、我々ハ日本國內ニ於テ得ラレルダケノ資本デヤツテ行ク事ヲ余儀ナクサレタ。

× × × × (四訊問省略)

五頁

問、初期ニ於テ我々ノ言フ初期トハ一九三七年以

前ノ事デアアル誰ガ資本ヲ投資シタノカ、其レハ何處カラ來タモノカ、其レハ地方資本デアッタノカ、ソレトモ日本ヨリ仰イダノデアアルカ、其レハ殆ンド全テ日本カラ仰イダモノデアアル。

答、今、言及シテキル期間中、滿洲國ヨリノ投資ハ問題ニスルニ足ラヌモノデアツタ。

問、日本ニ於ケル如何ナル財源ガソレヲ給與シタノカ、

答、今モ申シタ通り、充分ニ滿洲國ヲ潤ホスト言フノデハナカツタガ幾分カハアツタノデアツテ是等ハ勿論、種々様々ナ出所ヲ有シテキタ。一例ヘバ種々、産業組合、財閥トノ連繫、個人資本家ヤ小額投資者等、其レハ全ク多クノ財源カラ集メラレタモノデアツタ。初期ニ於テハ是等

ノ多クハ南滿洲鐵道ヲ通シテ投資セラレタ事ハ
言ヲ待タナイ。

問、一九三七年ニ始マリ、以後滿洲國ニ於ケル工業
生産ハ速カナル生長ヲ遂ゲテキル。此ノ生産高
ノ非常ナ擴大ノ理由ハ何デアルカ、

答、生産ノ異常ナル増大ノ説明トシテハ第一ニ種々
ナル事業、例ヘバ昭和製鐵ノ如キモノガ完成セ
ラレタ事、炭坑ガ充分運轉シ得ルヤウニナツタ
事ト生産ノ時期ガ到來シタ事等ニ由ルノデア
ル。ト同時ニ更ニ發展ノ計畫ガ立テラレ、其レ故
爾後、此ノ生産ニ於ケル著シイ發展ヲ見ル事ガ出
來ル。

問、此ノ發展ハ鮎川ト彼ノ工業經驗及ビ設備ヲ登用
シタ事ニドノ程度依ルモノデアルカ、

答、第一ニ、滿洲國政府ハ此ノ事全体ニ關シテ、モ
ット實際的ナ確實ナ態度ノトラレル事ヲ望ンデ
居タ。即チ、政府ハ日本ノ資本家ガ疑ト嫌惡ト
ヲ忘レテ本當ニ資本ヲ投資シテ、物事ヲモット
確固タル地盤ノ上ニ礎ク事ヲ望ンダノデア
ル。

問、鮎川ハ日本資本家ノ中デ非常ニ特殊ナ型ノ人物
デアツタ。何故政府ハ彼ヲ選ンダノカ、

答、今其レヲ申上ゲマス。先ヅ第一歩ヲ申上ゲタト
コロナノデスカラ、其レカラ、滿洲國民ハ援助
ヲ歡迎スル態度ヲ取り、日本資本家ハ滿洲國ニ

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對シヨリ明確ナル觀心ヲ持ツニ到リ、此ハ資本ノ注入ヲ導イタ。此ノ時マデ、南滿洲鐵道ハ或程度マデ種々ノ事業ヲ實施シテ居タガ、事業ノ進展ト共ニ鐵道會社ニハ余リノ負擔トナリ、此ノ發展ノ益テヲヨリ高キ水準ニ高メル必要ガ感じラレタ。同時ニ滿洲國ハ資本以外ニ必要ナモノガアツタ。經營能力モ又必要デアツタ。當時鮎川ヲ招聘シタ理由ハ此處ニアツタノデアアル。鮎川ヲ招イタモウ一ツノ理由ハ滿洲國ニ於ケル是等ノ事業ヲ最大限ニ發展セシメルニハ是等ノ事業ヲ幾分國際的基礎ノ上ニ立タセ、從ツテ財政的援助ヲ日本以外ノ地ヨリ仰ギ得ルヤウニシタ方ガ良イト言フ氣持デアツタ。

× × × × × (三訊問省略)

立頁

問、貴方ノ滿洲國ニ於ケル第一期ノ公務ハ一九四〇年ニ終了シタ。ソレハ滿洲國ノ第一回五ヶ年計畫ノ終リノ頃デアツタ。ソノ計畫ハ如何ナル方面ニ於テ最モ成功シタカ、

答、何一ツトシテ精確ニ計畫通りニハ行カナカツタ。ソシテ大シタ成功ヲオサメ得タト言フ事ハ困難デアアル。然シ、オソラク、石炭産出ト鋼鐵業トニ於テハ比較的良好ナル進歩ヲ示シタト思フ。水力電氣開發ノ方面デハ、其ノ期間中ノ計畫ハ達成シナカツタガ堰堤ハ完成サレ、將來ノ發展

ノ基礎ガ据エラレタノデアアル。故ニソノ方面ニ於テモ我々ハ幾分成功ヲ得タト言ヘルデアラウ。私ハ航空機製作トカ自動車工業ニ關シテハ全然、何等ノ成功モ見ナカツタト言ツタ方ガヨカロウ。

× × × × × (八訊問省略)

問、滿洲國總務廳長官デアツタ時、貴方ハ關東軍ト、ドノ程度ニ緊密ニ連絡ヲ保ツタカ、

答、關東軍ト非常ニ緊密ナ連繫ヲ保ツテ居タ。

問、關東軍司令官トドノ位屢々會合シタカ、

答、我々ハ屢々會ツタケレドモ定マツタ會合ト言フモノハナカツタ。關東軍司令官トハ一ヶ月ニ一回カ二回會ツタト思フガ、他ノ役人トハモツト屢々會ツタ。

問、貴方ガ關東軍司令官ト通常論議シタ問題ハ普通ドンナモノデアツタカ。戰略的問題デアツタカ、ソレトモ概シテ經濟的ナモノデアツタカ、

答、全然戰略的ナモノハナカツタ。我々ハ概シテ或ル種ノ經濟問題ト民間行政問題ニツイテ語ツタノデアアル。

問、貴方等ハ平常ドンナ問題ヲ論ジ合ツタカ、

答、我々ハ經濟問題ノ殆ンド全ユル問題、殊ニ開發ヲ含ム問題、言ヒ換ヘレバ滿洲國ノ經濟的發展ニ關スル問題ヲ特ニ取り上げタノデアツタ。

問、五ヶ年計畫ト言フ様ナモノノ進歩ニ付イテノ細

密ナ論議ヲモ含ンデ居タノカ、

答、勿論サウデス。

問、貴方ガ其ノ地ニ居タ期間即チ一九三二年ヨリ一九四〇年ノ間ノ經濟發展ノ主ナル障礙ハ何デアツタト思フカ、制限ハ如何ナルモノデアツタカ、

答、發展ヲ遲ラセタ最大原因ノ一ツハオソラク良イ設備ノ不足デアツタト思フ。

問、ト言フノハ機械トカ機具ノ事カ、
答、サウデス。

「ドール」中尉ニヨル訊問

問、星野氏ハ日本ハ滿洲へ如何ナル理由ノモトニ滿洲國へ侵入シテ行ツタカ、ソシテ又、何ヲ滿洲國ヨリ得ントシテキタカニツイテ星野氏ノ考ヘヲ自分ノ言葉ヲ述ベテモラヒタイ、

ハ頁

答、一言ニシテ言ヘバ日本ガソコへ進駐シテカラハ、

我々ノ政策ハ第一ニ日本ノ工業ニ原料ヲ供給シ、第二ニハ我が國ノ増大スル人口ノハケ口トシテ滿洲國ヲ建設スル事ニアツタ。

問、滿洲國ヲ取ツタト言フ事ハ戰爭勃發マデノ間原料品ノ源泉ヲ確保スルト言フ事ニ於テドノ程度成功シタト考ヘルカ、

答、原料品ト言フ事ニ關スル限り有益デアツタラウト言ヒ得ル。然シ、貴殿ノ質問ニ答ヘルノハ仲

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々困難デアル。

問、デハ特ニ鐵鑛ヲ考ヘテ見テハドウカ、

答、滿洲國ノ鐵鑛デサヘモ日本ノ工業需要ヲ充タス

ニハ足ラナカツタ。然シ、三分ノ一位ハソレデ

供給サレタデアラウ。

問、ト言フノハ、日本ノ計畫ヲ完成シタト假定シテ

モソレデモ尙國家的要求トシテ計畫シタ鐵鑛ノ

三分ノ一シカ得ラレナイト言フノカ、貴方ノ言

フノハ其ノ意味カ、

答、ソノ點ニ關シテモ精確ニ言フ事ハ又困難デアアル。

然シ、私ハ我々ノ計畫ガ成功シテ居タトシテモ

最モ良ク見ツモツテモ此ノ方面ノ源泉カラハ我

々ノ必要料ノ三分ノ一以上ハ求メラレナカツタ

ト思フ。

問、石炭ニツイテハドウデアツタカ、

答、石炭ニ關スル限り、多分我々ハ我々ノ欲スルダ

ケ、イクラデモ得ル事ガ出來タト思フ。滿洲國

カラ石炭ヲ得ル事ニ關シテハ、ソレガ最モ有利

デアアルカ否カハ別問題デアアル。

問、食物ニ關シテハドウデアアルカ、

答、若シ、我々ノ計畫ガ實行セラレタナラバ其ノ源

泉カラ充分ナル食糧ノ補給ヲ得ル事ガ出來タデ

アラウ。

問、日本ノ輸入ノ必要額ヲ充タスニ足りタト思フカ、

答、多分足りタ事ト思フ。

問、鐵鑛石以外ニ日本が必要デアルト考ヘタ原料品
デ滿洲國カラ充分ニ得ル事ガ出來ナイト發見シ
タモノガアルカ、日本ノ國家的發展ニ重要ナル
モノト考ヘルモノデ、

答、澤山アル。第一ニ石油ト「アルミニウム」デス。

問、滿洲國ニハ石油モ「アルミニウム」モ兩方産出
シ得ル頁岩ガアツタノデハナイカ、

答、採掘スレバ我々ノ必要ヲ充タシタカモ知レナイ
頁岩ヤ「アルミニウム」産出頁岩ノ鑛床ガアル。

勿論、石炭カラ人造石油ヲ産出スル事ガ出來ル
ガ其ノ資源開發ハ多大ノ努力ト出費トヲ要スル
モノデ早急ニハ實現シ得ナカツタ。

問、何故、其ノ支出ヲセザル事ニ決定シタノカ、

答、彼等ハ多少ハ開發シタノデアアルガ其レハ必要ニ
適合シナカツタ。最後ニハ十万吨位ノ人造石
油ヲ生産シテ居タノダラウト思フガ、計畫ハ五
十万吨ノ要求シテ居タノデアアル。ソレハ非常ニ
困難ナ仕事デアツタ。ソシテ人造燃料ニ關スル
限り恐ラク全部デ十万吨以上ハ出ナカツタト
思フ。十年カ廿年後ニハ何トカ發展スルカモ知
レナイガ、現在ノトコロデハ問題ニハナラナイ。

× × × × × (三訊問省略)

九頁 問、日本ガ滿洲國ヲ引キ受ケタイト望ンダ理由ノ一

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ツハ日本ノ工業用トシテ原料品ヲ得ル爲デアツ
タト言フノカ、

答、其ノ通りデス。

問、然シ、其ノ代リニ滿洲國ハ現地デ原料品ヲ處理
スル工業ヲ設立スル事ヲ始メタ。原料品ハ日本
ヘハ送ラレナカツタデアラウ。サウデハナイカ、
答、先程、私ハ日本ト言フ語ヲ限定的ニ使用シタカ
モ知レヌガ私ハ其ノ代リニ日本圈内ト言フ言葉
ヲ用ヒルベキデアツタト思フ。何故ナラバ私ハ
日本ト滿洲國トヲ一緒ニ考ヘテ居タカラ。

問、日本ヘ多量ノ原料品ヲ持チ込マネバナラヌ所ノ
經濟ヲ所有シ、然モ其處ニ處理ノ便宜ヲ有シナ
ガラ大陸ニ新タナル生産設備ヲ設立シヤウトシ
タノカ、其レハ何故デアルカ、

答、前ニモ述べタ通り、我々ノ目的ハ全日本圈ヲ開
發スル事ニアツタ。其レ故、我々ハ開發ヲ日本
本國ニノミ限定シナカツタノデアアル。其ノ觀點
カラ、最モ有効ニ地方原料品ヲ使用シ得ル地ニ
工業ヲ發達セシメル事ガ我々ニハ有利ナノデア
ツタ。其ノ爲原料品ノ源泉地ニ近イ滿洲國ニ是
等工業ガ發達サセラレタノデアアル。

問、現實ニハ食糧生産ノ計畫ガ日本ノ必要ヲ充タシ
タノニ實際ハ日本ハ眞珠灣攻撃以前ハ他ノ地方
ヨリ食糧ヲ依前トシテ輸入シテ居タノデハナイ

2117c-10

カ、

答、其ノ通り、相當量輸入シテ居タ。

問、若シ滿洲國ヲ占有スル目的ガ日本ヲ独立的ニスル事デアツタナラバ食糧ニ關スル限り失敗デアツタ。

答、通狀ノ状態及ビ條件ニ於テハ日本ハ朝鮮ト滿洲ト共ニ互ヒニ助け合ツテ、各國共必要トスル食糧ヲ全部生産シ得ルハズデアツタ。然シ、農作物ハ常ニ豫想通りニ出來ルモノデハナク、其ノ爲ニ食糧ノ輸入ガ必要トナツテ來ル。

農作物ハ非常ニ變動スルモノデアル。例へバ一九三四年ニハ滿洲國テハ非常ニ澤山ノ大豆ガ出來、ソレヲドウ處理シテ良イカ解カラナカツタ事ノアツタノヲ私ハ記憶シテ居ル。實際機關車ノ火ヲ焚クノニ石炭ノ代リニ大豆ヲ用ヒル研究サヘ行ハレタ程デアツタ。當時、日本へ大豆ヲ輸入スル際關稅ヲ課スル事モ考ヘラレ、此レハ滿洲國ニトツテハ大問題トナツタノデアツタ。

× × × × × (互訊問省略)

十頁

問、日本ガ、滿洲へ進出シテ行ツタ理由ノ一ツハ日本國民ノ爲居住地ヲ確保スルニアツタト貴方ハ述ベタガ、其ノ方面ニ關シ滿洲國ノ取得ハ下ノ程度ニ役立ツタカ、

答、今マデノ所、大キナ役割ヲ果シタトハ言ヘナイ。

實際ヤツト始メラレタバカリデス。

問、然シ一九四一年ニ於テハ日本ガ期待シ豫期シテ居タ事ハ果サレナカツタノカ、

答、我々が期待シタ程良好ニハ進捗シナカツタ。

「コール」大佐ニヨル訊問

問、滿洲國進出ノ二ツノ理由ヲ聞イタ。他ニ一二ノ理由ガナカツタカドウカ聞キタイ。例ヘバ軍隊ノ方ノ、

答、今申シ上ゲタ理由以外ニ軍隊ガ他ニ大キナ理由ヲ持ツテキタカハ知ラナイ。

問、日本ニ於テ當時、軍隊ハ政治的ニ非常ニ強力デアッタ。軍部ハ其ノ望ムトコロヲ遂行シ得タノデアアル。何故軍部ハ滿洲國へ進出スル事ヲ望ンダカ、

答、私ガ出來ル解釋トシテハ彼等ノ目的モ又多分私ガ申述ベタニツノ理由ニ他ナラナイト思フ。

「ピソン」氏ニヨル訊問

問、貴方ハ滿洲進出ニハ戰略的目的ハナカツタト言フツモリカ、

答、是等自体幾分カ戰略的意義アリト視ラレルノデハナカラウカ、其レ以外ニ他ニ特別ナ目的ヲ知ラナイ。

× × × × (四訊同省略)

問、

關東軍ハ滿洲國ニ於ケル彼等ノ投資ニ對シ、ヨリ多クノ支配力ヲ彼等ニ與ヘタト言フノカ、

答、

私ガ「安全」ト言ツタノハ經濟的立場カラデア
ル。即チ彼等ハ其レガ有利デアルト言フ事ニ氣
ヅイタノデアアル。其レハ最早冒險デハナクナツ
タノデアツタ。

問、

サウ、然シ、滿洲國發展ニ對スル關東軍ノ獨占
的支配ニ變更ガアツタノデハナイカ、

答、

然リ、關東軍ハ多少、彼等ノ支配力ヲ緩和サセ
タ。少シ緩ヤカニナツタ。

「コーヘン」中尉ニヨル訊問

問、「滿洲國ガ物ヲ必要トスル」トカ「滿洲國ノ何々ト」トカ言フノハ勿論貴方ハ關東軍ノ事ヲ意味スルノダラウ

答、私ガ「滿洲國」ト言フノハ私ハ「滿洲國政府」ヲ意味シテ居ル勿論關東軍ト滿洲國政府トハ非常ニ密接ナ關係ガアリ通常ソノ政府ハ軍隊ノ意見ヲ多ク代表シテキル

「ピソン」氏ニヨル訊問

問、貴方ハ一九四〇年七月ヨリ一九四一年四月マデ企畫院總裁デアツタガ、其ノ期間中貴方ノ企畫院ニ於ケル行政上何が主ナル仕事デアツタカ、一今考ヘテ見テ何が重要ナ活動デアツタト思フカ

答、多分、其ノ當時ノ最モ顯著ナ問題ハ日本ニ於ケル計畫的經濟デアツタト思フ

××××××××××（一訊問省略）

問、企畫院ノ計畫セル是等動員計畫ハ、我々ノ理解スル所デハ滿洲國生産ヲ日本ノソレニ適合スル様ニ目論マレタ如クニ思ハレルガソノ解釋ハ正シイカ

答、勿論計畫ハ日本自身ノ爲ニ立テラレタガ兩國ノ間ニ非常ニ密接ナ關係ガアツタ爲、計畫ハ

通常圏内全部ヲ包含スル事トナツタノデア
ル

問、日本ニ於ケル企畫院ハ滿洲國ニ於テ採用セラ

レテキルプログラムヲ變更スル事ガ出來ルカ

答、權限ノ制限ト言フ考ヘカラデハナク寧ロ計畫

ハ協力シテ行フニアツタノデ、我々ノ必要ヲ

充タス爲ニ計畫スルニ當リ滿洲國カラノ割當

ヲ考慮シ又一方滿洲國ハ日本ノ設備ノ輸入ヲ

計畫シ、カクテ我々ハ共同ニ計畫ヲ立テル事

ガ常ニ必要デアツタ。ソレ故オ互ヒノ計畫ヲ

修正スル必要ハナカツタ

問、各項目ニ關シ、ソノ量ヲ決定スル最後の責任

當局ハ誰デアツタカ、例ヘバ日本ガ滿洲國カ

ラ送達シテクレル以上ノ銑鐵ヲ望ンダ場合此

ノ争ヒハ如何様ニ解決サレルカ

答、斯ル問題ハ滿洲國ノ指導者及ビ日本カラノ責

任當局トニヨツテ構成セラレテ居タ日滿經濟

委員會ガ決定シタ

問、滿洲國ノ指導者トハ誰デアツタカ

答、財政部長、商工部長其ノ他ノ人々デアツタ

問、日本側デハ

答、日本大使館參事官ト對滿事務局長デアツタ

××××××××（一三訊問省略）

問、一九四一年（昭和十六年）秋ノ終リ、或ヒハ

年ノ暮頃、當時日本ガ考慮シテ居タ戰略的計

查ニ對シテトノ程度ノ經濟的準備ガ出來テキ
タカ

答、是レハ非常ニムツカシイ問題デアル。確カニ
經濟的ニハ余リ良好ナ條件ノ下ニハ居ナカツ
タ、確カニ多クノ困難ガアツタ

問、特定ノモノニツイテ語ラウ。一例ヘバ石油ノ
問題デアハ一必要ヲ充タス爲ニドレ程ノ貯蔵ガ
アツタト概算スルカ

答、海軍ハ勿論秘密ノ豫備ヲ有シテ居タ。オソラ
ク陸軍モ同様デアツタラウ、ガ我々企登院ノ
者ハ結局彼等ガ他ノ地區カラ石油ヲ手ニ入レ
ル事ガ出來ルマデ彼等ノ必要ヲ充タスニハ充
分ダト考ヘテキタト言フ以外ドレ程アツタカ
ハ知ラナカツタ。石油ニ關スル限り、其ノ頃
ハ明ラカニ充分ナ見込ミガアツタノデアツタ

×××××× (三訊問省略)

問、此ノ遮斷サレルカモ知レヌト言フ強力ナ可能
性ノ代リニ何カ特別ナ考慮ガ拂ハレタ他ノ項
目ハナカツタカ

答、我々ハアルミニウム及ビ鐵鑽石ノ不足ヲ隨分
心配シタノデアツタ

×××××× (六訊問省略)

十四頁
問、石油ノ問題ハ陸海軍ト共ニ討議シ彼等ハドレ
程手持ガアルカ言ハナカツタガ、彼等ハ心配

ナイト言ヒ、ソノ時持ツテ居タモノヲ使ヒ果シテシマウ前ニ石油ノ新タナ産地ヲ取得シ得ルト言ツタノデアルカ

答、私ガ貴殿ノ言葉ヲ誤解シタカ、サモナケレバ貴殿ガ私ヲ誤解シテ居ル。我々ノ經濟上ノ不足トカ問題トカニ關シテ訊ネタ諸質問中ノ初メノ方ノ一ツニ對スル答トシテ私ハ石油ハ重大問題デアリ外部産地カラ遮斷サレタ時ノ備トシテ何トカセネバナラナカツタト言フ事ヲ言ツタノデアル。當時、我々ノ石油産額ハ三十万噸ニ對シテ必要量ハ二百万噸デアリソレハ我々が非常ニ憂慮シタ事デアリ企畫院ノ仕事ノ中デモ重要視セラレタ事デアツタ。據テ、此ノ石油問題ハ別個ノ觀點カラ來タモノデ、企畫院總裁トシテノ私ノ仕事トハ關係ガ無カツタ。一九四一年（昭和十六年）ノ秋ニ彼等ガ計畫シテキタカモ知レヌ戦争ノ爲ニ充分ノ石油ヲ有シテ居ルト日本軍部ガ考ヘテ居タカドウカニ私ノ意見ヲ聞カレタガ、ソレニ對シテ私ハ彼等ガ南方産ノ石油ヲ取得スルマデ續クダケノ充分ナル補給量ヲ有シテ居ルト考ヘテ居タ様ダト答ヘタノデアル。是ハ私ノ企畫院ト何等關係ノ無イ事デアツタ

×××××（一四訊問省略）

2117c-17

十七頁

同、鮎川ヲシテソノ目的ヲ達成セシメル事ヲ妨ゲ
タカモ知レヌト思ハレル、滿洲國ニ於テ發生
シタ特定ナ困難ハ何デアツタカ

答、何邊モ繰リ返シ述べタ通り滿洲國ニ於ケル鮎
川ノ使命ハ資本ヲ流入サセル計畫ニ關聯シ、
彼ノ考ヘハ皆、長期ニワタル發展ヲ中心トシ
テ居タ。トコロガ、丁度ソノ頃日支事變ガ勃
發シ、形勢ハ長期ノ發展ヲ許サズ、速カニ遂
行セネバナラヌ事ガ益々明ラカトナツテ來タ
鮎川ハ確カニ此ノプログラムノ變更ヲ試ミル
事ニ見當ラツケル事ガ出來ナカツタ、要求セ
ラレタル如ク速進サセル事ハ不可能ト考ヘタ
ソシテ此ノ長期計畫ノ展開ヨリモ、モツト手
近カナ仕事ガ先ニ爲サレネバナラヌ事ハ明ラ
カデアツタノデ彼ハ其ノ任ニ非ズトシテ退イ
タ

×××××× (七訊同省略)

同、鮎川ガ財閥デアルト言フ理由デ反對ガアツタ
ノカ

答、ソナ事ハ無カツタト思フ

同、鮎川ハ關東軍ニ好意ヲ寄セテキタ。恐ラク貴
方トノ關係モ又良カツタ事ト思フ。ソレニモ
拘ラズ彼ノ計畫ヲ實施スルニ相當ノ困難ガア
ツタノカ

答、鮎川ニ對スル反對ハ多分二期ニ別ケ得ルト思フ。初期ニ於ケル反對ハ主トシテ國際資本ガ滿洲國ニ注入セラレル事ニ反對デアツタ連中ニヨツテナサレタ。次ニ資本が入ラナカツタ時、彼等ハ彼ヲ嚴シク批難シ始メタ。此ノ反對ハ南滿洲鐵道側ヨリ起ツタ。ソノ理由ハソノ計畫ニヨルト彼等ノ事業ノ大部分ガ滿洲産業開發會社ノ手ニ移ツテシマウカラデアツタ後期ニ於ケル反對ハ中流官吏ニヨリ爲サレタ。ソレ等ハ純粹ノ官公吏デアツタノカ、ソレトモ關東軍軍人デアツタノカ

答、是等ノ中位官公吏ハ多少關東軍軍人デアツタラウガ大部分ハ民間人デアツタ。彼等ハ自由行動權ヲ與ヘル事ニ反對シタノデアツタ。彼等ハ直接支配ノ方ガヨリ能率的ト考ヘタノデアツタ

××××× (二三訊問省略)

問、極ク簡單ニ且一般的ニ滿洲國ニ居タ時ノ貴方ト東條トノ關係ヲ語ツテモライタイ

答、私ハ一九三二年(昭和七年)滿洲國ニ渡リ、最初財政部ノ次官デアツタ。其當時、東條ハ關東軍憲兵司令官デアツタ。彼ハ私ノ居タ新京ニ居テ、私ハ彼ニ始メテ其處デ合ツタ、然シ我々ノ間ニハ職務上ノ接觸ハ殆ドナカツタ

2117c-19

廿三

後、一九三六年（昭和十一年）私ハ總務廳長
官ニ任命サレ、翌年、東條ハ日東軍參謀長ト
ナツタ、其ノ資格ニ於テ、我々ハ屢々接觸モ
シ共ニ仕事ヲシタ

×××××（二〇訊問省略）

中ロハ主トシテ日本ノ生産品ノ有力ナ市場ト見
ナサレタカ、ソレトモ主トシテ原料品ノ供給源ト目ザレタカ

答、兩方デアアル

問、日本ガ軍隊ヲ中國ニ駐屯セシメナクトモ何ガ
中國ニ於ケル日本ノ賣買ヲ妨ゲルカ

答、當時、兩國間ニ事實上ノ交戦状態ガ存在シテ
キタ、カ、ル状態デ日本ハ支那カラ無條件撤
去スル事ヲ嫌ツタ

2107C-20

××××××（一九四二訊問省略）

問、蘭領東印度、「マレー」「フィリッピン」ノ占領ガ豫想ヨリモ良ク行ハレタトスレバ何故ニ日本ノ軍需生産ノ消耗ハ貴方ノ計算ヨリモ少クハナカツタノカ、

答、最初ハ非常ニ良ク行キ、我々ノ計畫ハ立派ニ實現シテ行ツタガ特ニ「グアドルカナル」ノ戦闘以來、日本ガ之等ノ新タナル資原地ヲ領有スル事ニ對シ潜水艦其ノ他ノ方法ニヨリ妨害ヲ加ヘラレタ。コレガ我々ガ豫期セル程ニ計畫ガ遂行セラレナカツタ理由ノ一ツデアル。他ニモウ一ツ理由ガアツタガ、ソレハ「ガダルカナル」其ノ他ニ於ケル戦闘ハ我々ガ計畫シタヨリ遙カニ多クノ彈藥、艦船ヲ消耗シタノデアツタ。

問、其ノ間「フィリッピン」諸島「マレー」蘭領印度諸島ヲ占領セシ初期ノ戦役ニ於テ軍需品ノ消費ハ豫想ヨリモ多カツタカ少カツタカ、
答、我々ノ豫想ヲ超エタ唯一ノモノハ新タニ取得シタ地區カラノ原料品ノ輸入デアツタ。然レノ點テハ戦局ニ我々ガ計畫シタ以上ノ進歩ハ見ラレナカツタ。

××××××（四二訊問省略）

世ノ問、將來、ボーキサイト輸入ガ斷絶サレルカモ知レ

又ト言フ豫想ノモトニ滿洲國ノアルミニウム
頁岩ノ輸入増加ハ考慮セラレナカツタカ、

答、日本へ持つて來ルヨリモ滿洲國ノ資源ヲ滿洲國

テ使用スル事ヲ計畫シテ居タ。此ノ鑽石ヲ多分

山東省張店ヨリ輸入スル計畫ハ立テ、ハ居タ。

×××××××× (三訊問省略)

問、一クエゼリン一陷落後豫期シテ居タボーキサイ
ト不足ガ實際現シタノカ、

答、我々ノ第一計畫ハ補給ニ先ンズル様ニ南太平洋

ノ凡ユル可能ナ地カラボーキサイト輸入ヲ急グ

事デアツタ。第二ノ計畫ハ華北ノ頁岩ヲ利用ス

ル事デアツタ。第三ノ計畫ハ日本本土ニ於テ取

得出來ルアルミニウム含有量ノ少イ頁岩ヲ利用

スルコトデアツタ。

問、内閣ハ日本アルミニウム工業カラ、華北ノ頁岩

ガ彼等ニヨツテ處理出來ルト知ラサレタノカ、

答、ソレガ使用出來ルトハ一般ノ意見デアツタト思

フ。

問、ソレハ適確ナ應答デハナイ、ソノ事ニ關シテ公

式考慮ガ拂ハレソシテ其ノ基礎ノ上ニ實行出來

ルト言フ確定的決議ヲ見タノカ、

答、然リ、ソノ様ナ決議ガナサレタ。

×××××××× (六訊問省略)

21170-22
世二頁

問、滿洲國ニ於ケル頁岩石油ヲ一層ノ開發スル爲ニ如何ナル考慮ガ拂ハレタカ、

答、豫テ是ノ研究ガナサレテ居タ、ソシテソレガ一朝ニシテ促進セシメル事ガ出來ナカツタガ尙コレガ開發ノ材料ニ對シ上位ノ優先權ヲ與ヘル事ニヨツテ生産増加ガ計畫サレタ。

問、滿洲國頁岩石油ニ對スル材料獲得ノ優先權ハ戰時中變更セラレタカ、

答、戰前ニモコレハ優先項目表ノ上位ニアツタガ、戰爭中ハ尙更高メラレタ。

×××××(四二訊問省略)

世七頁

問、一九四四年(昭和十九年)ニハ日本ノ軍需工業

ガ砲、彈藥ノ生産ヲ削減セネバナラナカツタ時、滿洲國ニ於テハ新工場建設及ビ商業用並民需用ノ爲ニ滿洲國産ノ饒鐵及ビ鋼鐵ノ約四十パーセントガ使用セラレタ。日本本國ヘノ滿洲國産ノ鐵及ビ鋼ノヨリ大ナル割當ヲ確保スル爲ニ如何ナル努力ガ爲サレタカ、

答、貴殿ノ言ハレル四十パーセントノ事ハ私ハ知ラナイ。滿洲國産品ノ使用ニツイテハ通常兩國ノ話合ヒテ決定サレ、滿洲國産品ノ大部分ハ戰爭遂行ノ爲ニ使用セラレタカラ、多分此ノ民需用ノ四十パーセントモ亦間接的ニ戰爭目的ノ爲ニ

使用セラレタモノデハナカラウカト思フ、故ニ
實際滿洲ノ爲ニ使用セラレタモノハ取ルニ足ラ
ナイ。

問、貴方ノ意見デハソレガ事實ダト言ツタノカ、
答、ソレガ現状ダツタト思フ。

問、貴方ノ知ル限り滿洲國經濟ハ全ク日本戰時經濟
ニ統合セラレ、不足セル資材ノ分配ハ全ク日本
ニヨリ支配セラレテ居タト言フノカ、

答、戰爭ガ進展スルト共ニ日本及ビ滿洲國經濟ノ統
合ハ益々確定的トイツタガ私ハ日本ガ專斷的ニ
決定ヲ爲シタトハ言ハナイ、ナゼナラバ是等決
定ハ常ニ兩國間ノ相談ノ上議決セラレタノデア
ルカラ。シカシ日本ガ益々切迫シテ來タノデ滿
洲國ハ戰爭ノ要求ノヨリ大ナル負擔ヲ擔フベク
ヨリ大ナル努力ヲナシタノデアツタ。

問、滿洲國資源ノ利用ニ關シテ意見ノ相違ハ起ラナ
カツタカ、

答、此ノ問題ニ就イテ議論ハアツタ、殊ニ日本國內
ニ於テ。

問、論議ニヨツテ意見ノ相違ガマトマラナカツタ時
誰ガ最後の決定權ヲ有ツテキタカ、

答、先日説明シタ通り意見ノ相違ハ日滿共同經濟委
員會テ調停スルノデアツタ。

2117C-24

問、委員會ノ各關係國ハ議決權ヲ幾ツ所有シテ居タカ、

答、各々四ツデアツタ。

問、五分、五分ノ議決ノ時ハ一度モナカツタカ、

答、ナカツタ。

問、議決ハ常ニ滿場一致デアツタカ、

答、大概最後の決定ハ滿場一致ハ言フ所マデ論議ガ

進メラレタノデアル。

問、換言スレバ滿洲國ノ資源ヲ戦争遂行ニ用ヒル事

ニ關シ、各關係國ノ完全一致ニヨリ解決セラレ

ザル論争ハナカツタト言フノカ、

答、是等ノ審議ニ關スル限りソレハ正シイ解釋ダ。

問、其限定ハ何ヲ意味スルカ、

答、是等ノ最後の決定ニ到ルマデ、勿論多クノ議論

ガアツタ。

問、ソシテ日本ハ滿洲カラ得ラレルモノハ凡テ得テ

居ルト貴方ハ常ニ満足シテ居タカ、

答、然リ、私ハ満足ニ思ツテ居タ滿洲國ハ全幅ノ援

助ヲシタト私ハ思フ、勿論日本ガ實際ノ戦争ヲ

シタノダガ、滿洲國ハ滿洲國ノ立場カラ出來得

ル限りノ事ヲシタノデアル。

問、ソシテ滿洲國ノ民間經濟ハ日本ノソレト同様ニ

切り下ゲラレタノカ、

答、オソラク日本程切り下ゲラレタトハ思ハナイガ
滿洲國ガ直接戰鬪ニ參加シテ居ナカツタ故ニ多
分滿洲國ガ行ツタ範圍ハ期待シ得ル最大限デアッ
ツタト思フ。然シ滿洲國モ又直接或ハ間接ニ相
當ナ經濟的切り下ゲヲ受ケタ事ハ事實デアル。
問、日本本國ガ爲シタト同等ノ貢獻ヲ爲スベシトハ
期待ヤカカツタカ、
答、ソノ通りデス。

(以下十三訊問省略)

證 明 書

私、E. E. DANLRY (E. E. DANLRY) ハ茲ニ
左記ノ事實ヲ證明ス、

一私ハ聯合國最高指揮官、總司令部、國際檢察部ニ
於ケル文書課長ニシテ、右檢察部ノ入手ニ係ル文
書ノ原本又ハ寫シヲ所持、保管、管理ニ當ル者ナ
ル事

二文書二一七八一九四五年(二十年)十一月十九
日、二十二日、二十八日、日本東京ニ於テ、司令
部、米國爆撃作戰調査所(基本)ニ依リ訊問セラ
レタル星野直樹ノ訊問書、五〇五ニ相當セルモノ
ナル事

三前述ニ依ル訊問書ノ寫シハ米國爆撃作戰調査所カ
ラ公ケノ資格ニ於ケル私ニ交付セラレ、又私ニ交
付セラレタル其ノ寫シハ聯合國最高指揮官、總司
令部、國際檢察部、文書課長トシテノ私ノ所持ノ
中ニ尚ニ有ルモノナル事ヲ茲ニ證明ス

一九四六年(昭和二十一年)八月五日 日附

E. E. DANLRY (E. E. DANLRY) (署名)

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文書二一七〇

一九四五年昭和二十年十一月十九。二十二。
二十八日ノ星野直樹ノ訊問書ヨリノ抜萃

二十一頁

「問」私私ノ質問ハ若シモ米國トノ戦争ガ始マツ
タ場合ニアナタハ其ノ戦争ニ勝ツ事ガ出
来ルト信ジテキタカドウカトイフ事デア
ル。

「答」吾々が勝ツトカ負ケルトカイフ考ヨリモ
寧ロ大事ナ事ハ吾々がアメリカトノ間題
ヲ解決シヨウト努力シタ事又其ノ間題
ハ解決出来ルトイフ可成強イ氣持ガアツ
タ。勿論若シ戦争ニナツテモ吾々ハ多分
勝ツ事ガ出来ルドラウトハ皆考ヘテキタ
デアラウ。

「問」貴下ガ勝ツト期待シタノハ何方正確ナ計
劃デモ持ツテキタカラカ。

「答」勿論サキカラ特殊ノ事ニ就テハ貴方ハ陸
海軍大臣ト話サネバナラナイドラウ。
何故ナラ私ハ彼等ノ抱イテキタ計劃ヤ其

Ex 954A

ノ細目ニ就テハ與ツテキナカツタカラ。
 併シ乍ラ私自身ノ考ヘ方カラスルト、多
 分他ニモサウ思ツテ居タ人モ居ルダロウ
 ガ私ハ戦争ノ初期ノ段階ニ日本ハ東亞ノ
 大部分ヲ占領スル事が出來斯クテ得ラレ
 タ油其ノ他ノ資源ニ依ツテ長期戦ヲ遂行
 スル事が出來、占領シタ國々ヲ維持シテ
 行ク事が出來ルデアラウト思ツテキタ。
 勿論アメリカニ決定的勝利ヲ得ルトイフ
 概ナ考ヘ即チアメリカ大國ニ上陸シテ
 アメリカヲ屈從セシメルトイフ概ナ考ヘ
 ハ決シテ持ツテキナカツタ。吾々ハアメ
 リカトシテモ東亞ヲ屈從セシメル事ハ出
 來ズ結局吾々ハ一種ノ平和協定ヲ何トカ
 シテ結ブ様ニナルダラウト思ツテキマシ
 タ。

「問」

アナタガ若シモ勿逸ガロシヤ其ノ他
 ノ聯合國ニ依ツテ破ラレルダラウト解ッ
 テキタナラ斯ル終結ガ可能ダト思ツタデ
 アラウカ。

「答」

否、ソナ考ヘハ持タナカツタダラウ。

「問」

何故日本ハアメリカヲ攻撃スル前ニ獨逸
ガ實際ニモスコーヲ占領シテロシヤヲ
破ルカドウカガ解ル迄待タナカツタノカ。

「答」

私ハ其ノ當時日本ハ獨逸ヲ余リ當テニシ
テ居タトハ思ハナイ。又若シモ獨逸ガ負
ケルトイフ事ガ豫見サシテキタナラバ計
劃ガ違ツテキタカモ知レヌトイフ事ハ確
デアルガ問題ハ日米ヲ中心トシテ居タ様
ニ思ハレ、ソシテ中華民國ニ對スル、
アメリカノ態度ニ依ツテ早メラレタ様ニ
思ハレル。

「問」

併シ私ノ理解シタ所デハ貴下ハ若シ獨逸
ガ敗ケタナラ平和協定ニ依ツテ戦争ヲ成
功裡ニ終結サセル事ハ出来ナイト信ジテ
キタト言ツタ様ニ思フ。若シサウナラ私
ハ又「何故貴方ハ待ツテ確カメナカツタ
ノカ」トイフ問ヲ繰返サネバナラヌ。

「答」

獨逸ガロシヤニ對シ直ニ勝利ヲ得ルトハ
必ズシモ感ジテハキナカツタガ又サウ簡
單ニ参ツテシマフトハ誰モ考ヘナカツタ。

「問」

ソレデハ貴下ガ歐州戦争ガ長イ間續イテ

アメリカヲ東亞ノ狀勢デ悩マセルト同様ニ、ヨーロッパノ狀勢デ悩マセ、斯クシテアメリカガ日本ニ其ノ益力ヲ傾注スルノヲ防止出來ルモノト期待シテキタノハ事實カ。

「答」 確ニ多カレ少カレサウイフ氣持ハアリマシタ。

二十二頁

「問」 ソノ事ニ就イテハ外ノ考ヘ方モアツタカ。私ガ貴下ニ斯ル質問ヲシタカラト云ツテ本當ニサウダト思ツテ居ナケレバ「然リ」ト答ヘテ賞ヒ度クナイ。若シモ貴下ガ心ノ中ニ何か他ノ考ヘヲ持ツテキルノナラバ私ハソレヲ聞キ度イ。

「答」 然リ。確ニサウイフ氣持ハアリマシタ。

「問」 ソレハ重要ナ原因デアツタカ。

「答」 ハイ、多分重要ナ原因ダラウト思ヒマス。

「問」 ソレハ決定的ナ原因ダツタノカ。彼等ガ若シ狀勢ガ進ツテ來ルダラウト感じテキタナラバ自ら進ンデ競争ヲ始めタデアラウカ。

「答」私私ハコレガ決定的原因デアツタトハ思ハ
ナイ。戦争ニ勝ツトイフ如何ナル議論デ
モ考ヘデモ斯ル意見ヲ考慮ニ入レルト云
フ事ハ事實デアル。日本ハ自存ノ爲ニ戦
ツテキルノデアツテ若シモソレガ力サ
レレバ他ノ原因ニ關セズ戦フト日本ハ思
ツテキタガ私ハ之ガ最モ重要ナ問題デア
ソツタト思フ。

「問」ト云フノハ、負ケヨウガ勝タウガ支那ヨ
リ手ヲ引クヨリハ戦フト日本ガ思ツテキ
タトイフ事カ。

「答」然リ、サウイフ状態デシタ。

× × ×

二十五頁

「問」私ノ知ツテキル所デハ貴下ハ京係内閣ノ
始カラ總辭職迄内閣書記官長デアツタト
思フガ。

「答」其ノ通り。

「問」一九四二年昭和十七年ニ始リ、以後各年
ノ日本戦争経済ノ主要ナ問題ヲ吾々ニ問

カセテ買へナイグラウカ。詳シク話シテ
賞ヒ度イ。單ニ船舶トカサウ云フ瓜ナ事
デハナクテ、幣ニドシナ事ニ最モ信マサ
レタカト云フ事ヲ知ラセテ賞ヒ度ロ。

「答」

一九四二年昭和十七年ハ戦争ノ積極的前
進期デアツテ其ノ年ノ我々ニ攻ツテ最モ
重要ナ問題ハ戦争デ占領シタ地域デ獲得
シタ資源ヲ最モ有効ニ利用スルト云フ事
デアツタ。之等ノ物資ノ動員ハ其ノ計劃
ノ初ノ段階デハ大變順調ニ進ンダガ、ミ
ツドウニ一ガダルカナルノ戦後ハ
吾々が欲スル如ク順調ニハ行カナカツタ。

二十六頁

「問」

前以テ準備シテライタ此ノ計劃ハ之等
地域ノ開發ニ適當デアツタカ。ツマリ貴下
が見積ツタヨリモツト多クノ材料ヲ日本
ヨリ持込マネバナラナカツタカ、ソレトモモ
ツト少クテヨカツタカ。

「答」

一九四二年昭和十七年八月迄ハ之等新獲
得資源ノ動員ハ期待以上デアツタ。

X X X

2117D-7

「問」 荷領東印度ヤ馬來半島ヤ比律賓ヲ引繼グ
ノニ萬事ガ貴下ノ恩ツテキタヨリ旨ク行
ツタノナラ何故貴下ガ見積ツタヨリ軍用
品ノ消耗ガ大キカツタノカ。

「答」

最初ハ大變工合良ク行キ立派ニ計劃ヲ成
就シタガ ガダルカナルノ戰國後急ニ之
等新占領地域ノ資源ヲ吾々が日本ノ爲ニ
確保スル事ガ潜水艦其ノ他ニ依リ妨害セ
ラレル故ニナツタ。其レガ吾々が期待シ
タ程吾々ノ計劃ガ工合良ク行カナカツタ
一ツノ原因デアアル。モウ一ツノ原因ガア
ルガソレハ口チ ガダルカナル其ノ他ノ
當時ノ戰國デ彈藥、船舶ナド吾々が予定
シテキタヨリズツト多ク消耗シテシマツ
タトイフ事デアアル。

「問」

初期ノ作戰、即チ比律賓、馬來半島、荷
領東印度ヲ占領シタ頃ノ軍用品ノ消費ハ
豫想ヨリ多カツタカソレトモ少カツタカ。

「答」

吾々ノ期待ヲ超エタ唯一ノモノハ吾々ノ
新タニ獲得シタ地域カラ得ラレタ原料ノ
輸入品デ其ノ外ニツイテハ吾々ノ計劃シ
タ以上ノ戰局ハ見ラレナカツタ。

Documents No 2117

RUSH

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Translated by
K. Hori
checked by
M. SADAHASHI

505-4

向、滿洲の初期、サト一九三三年ヨリ一九三九年ニテ、内、滿洲の

生産、殊ニ工業生産ニ大シク變化ハナカッタ。此、初期、数年間

ノ工業的發展、欠除ノ主ナル理由トシテ、ナク、何ヲアケルカ、

答、~~是~~ニ、茲クモ理由アルテアラウガ多ク、最大ノ理由、此、期間中、

最大ノ準備ガナサレバ、~~其~~其ノ為、多額ノ生産ヲ見ナカッタ

事ト思フ。

由、~~是~~并一般ノ準備ハ如何ナル特殊方面ニ及~~シ~~シカ。

答、以處ニ、精確ナル数字ヲ持テ合ハセテ斗ナイガ、~~是~~是等全テ、詳

細ナル理由ヲ探索スルコトハ出来ナイガ、~~是~~是等準備ハ昭和製

鉄所、如キ工業未、創設ヲ含ニテ居タ。又、金鉱山ノ発見、採

銅有望地ノ発見、ヲ含ニテ居タ。

~~此~~此ノ方面ニ於テ日本ハ

アメリカ經濟ニ佳境シナクテ、工業生産ノ基礎ヲ置クニ

相当ノ時日ヲ要シタノテアル。

由以、同、美、農、業、ニ、於、テ、資、本、不、足、ハ、ナ、カ、ワ、タ、カ、

答、唯、金、錢、的、ハ、カ、リ、テ、ナ、ク、必、要、ナ、ル、物、品、資、料、ヲ、モ、資、本、中、ニ

考、ル、ナ、ラ、バ、我、々、ハ、勿、論、困、難、ノ、一、部、分、ヲ、滿、洲、^ニ資、本、

不、足、ニ、歸、ス、ル、可、カ、出、来、ル、

問、必、要、ナ、ル、資、本、ヲ、何、處、ヨ、リ、仰、イ、タ、カ、

答、我、々、ハ、先、ヅ、日、本、ニ、頼、リ、タ、ク、然、レ、日、本、自、身、ニ、モ、投、資、ス、ル、ニ、充、分

ナル、程、ノ、財、源、ハ、ナ、カ、ワ、タ、ノ、テ、必、要、ノ、資、本、ヲ、外、方、ニ、頼、ラ、ン、ト

シ、タ、ノ、テ、アル。滿、洲、~~ニ~~産、業、開、發、會、社、ガ、設、立、セ、ラ、レ、タ、~~ル~~時、我

々、ハ、ア、メ、リ、カ、ヨ、リ、資、本、ヲ、得、ン、ト、豫、定、シ、テ、居、タ、カ、~~種、々、ノ~~

理由、為我々、計画通りニ實現出来ズ、我々、日本国内ニ

於テ得ラレルカケ、投資本テヤワテ以テ、余儀ナラザレタ。

× × × × × ×

(四訊向者略)

事テアル

505-5

由、初期ニ於テ、我々、言ハル、~~初期~~一九三七手以前、~~初期~~

~~非~~ | 誰カ投資本ヲ投資員シタノカ、其レハ何處カラ来ナタモノカ、

其レハ地方投資本テアワタノカ、ソレトモ日本ヨリ~~仰イタ~~ノテアルカ、

答、其レハ~~強シド~~全テ日本カラ~~仰イ~~得ダモノテアル、~~仰イタ~~今、言及シテキル

~~非~~ 期向中、滿洲~~ヨリ~~、投資員ノ問題、ニスルニ足ラヌモノテアワタ。

尚、日本ニ於ケル如何ナル財源カソレヲ給與シタノカ、

答、今モ申シタ通り、~~人~~ニ滿洲~~ヨリ~~ヲ調オスト言フノテハ、ナカワタカ

恐分カハ、アワタノテアワテ以テ、勿論、種々標々ト出所ヲ有

シテ、~~非~~ | 例ハ種々ノ産業組合、財團トノ連繫、個人

資本家や小額投資者等。其の金が多ク、財源カラ集

ムラシクモノテマツタ。初期ニ於テハ此等ノ多クハ南滿洲鐵道

ヲ通シテ投資セラルタリト云フ待タナシ。

由、一九三七年ニ始マリ、以テ、滿洲ニ於ケル工業生産ハ速カナル

生長ヲ遂ゲテナル。此、生産高ノ非常ニ拡大ノ理由ハ何ナリ。

答、生産ハ異常ナル増大ノ説明トシテハ第一、僅々ナル中産

例ハバ昭和製鉄ノ如キモノカ完成セラレタリ、炭坑カ充テ

運轉シ得ルヤウニナリタリ、ト生産ノ時期カ到来シタリ等ニ

由ルノテアル。ト同時ニ更ニ發展ノ計画カ立テラレ、其レ故

爾故、此ノ生産ニ於ケル~~見~~蓄シテ~~見~~見ん事カ出来ル。

由、此ノ發展ハ鮎川ト彼ノ工業未経験及ビ設備ヲ登用シタリ

ニトノ程交依
~~ハモフテ~~ハカ
~~ハカ~~

答 第一、滿洲子政府ハ此ノ中全体ニ関シテモソト實際的ナ
確實ナ態勢ノトラレル中ヲ望ンテ居タ
即チ政府ハ

日本ノ投資本家が疑ト嫌惡トヲ忘レテ本當ニ投資布ヲ投

資ンテ物ヲモソト確固タル地盤ノ上ニ礎クヲヲ望ンカノテ居ル

由 鮎川ハ日本投資本家ノ非常ニ特殊ナ型ノ人~~物~~デアワタ
何故

政府ハ彼ヲ望ニカノカ

答 今其レヲ申シケマス 先ヅ第一歩カラ申シケタトコロナリテスカラ

其レカラ、滿洲國民ハ援助ヲ歡迎ス能ク取リ、日本投資
迎

本家ハ滿洲子ニ對シヨリ明確ナル觀心ヲ持ツニ到リ、此ハ

投資本ノ注入ヲ導サケタ 此ノ時マデ、南滿洲鐵道ハ或程云

三種ノ事業ヲ実施シテ居タガ、事業ノ進展ト共ニ

鉄道会社ニ余リノ負擔トナリ、此ノ發展ノ全テヲヨリ高

キ水準ニ高メル必要ガ感じラレタ。同時ニ滿洲ノ本

以外ニ必要ナモノカアツタ。經營能力モ又必要ナリテアツタ。

當時鮎川ヲ招聘シテ理由ハ此處ニアツタノデアリ。鮎川ヲ招イ

タ^は理由ハ滿洲ニ於ケル~~是~~等ノ事業ヲ最大限ニ發

展セン^是ルニ^是ハ^是幾分實際的基礎^是ニ上ニ立タセ^是。從^是ツテ

財政的援助ヲ日本以外ノ地ヨリ仰^是ガ得ルヤウニシタ方が良イト

言フ氣持^是テアツタ。

X X X X X X (三 訊 向 者 略)

505-6 由、貴方ノ滿洲ニ於ケル第一期ノ公務ハ一九四〇年ニ終了シタ。

ソレハ滿洲ノ第一回五年計畫ノ終リノ頃デアツタ。ソノ計畫ハ

如何ナル方面ニ於テ最モ成
~~功ヲ~~ ^シタカ
タカ

答 何一ツトシテ精確ニ一計
重通リニハ切カトカワタ
ソシテ大シタ

成功ヲオサ得タト言フ
ハ固難ニアリ。然シ、オソ
ラク、石炭

産出ト 鋼鉄甚末トニ
於テハ比較的良好ナル
進歩ヲ示シタ

ト思フ。水力電氣開發ノ
~~方面~~ ^{方面}ニハ、其、期
向中ノ計画ハ

達成~~ス~~シナカワタガ
堰堤ハ完成サレ、将来ノ
發展ノ基礎カ

据エラレタノデアリ。故ニ
ソノ方面ニ於テモ我々ハ
幾分~~ク~~成功ヲ

得タト言フルデアルウ。
私ハ航空機製作トカ自
動車工

業ニ関シテハ、全然、何等
ノ成功モ見ナカワト言
~~ハル~~ ^ハツク方がヨカリ、
ハ

× × × × × × × × × ×
(八訊肉省略)

505-7
向、滿洲子總務廳長官
ニアツタ時、貴方ハ
南東軍トトノ

程~~ハ~~ニ緊密~~ニ~~連
絡ヲ保ツタカ、

答 南東軍 ~~方~~ ト非常ニ緊急ニ連 繋ヲ保ツテ居タ。

問 南東軍司令官トトノ位 層 会合シタカ。

答 我々層 会ワタケレトモ定期 ^{定期} 会合ト言フ ^{モノ} ハナカッタ。南東

軍司令官ト一ヶ月ニ一回カニ回会ワタト思フガ、他ノ役 ~~人~~

トハモツト層 会ツタ。

問 貴方が南東軍司令官ト通常論議シタ問題ハ普通トシ

ナモノデアワタカ。 戦略的 ^{問題} デアワタカ、ソレトモ概シテ経済的

ナモノデアワタカ。

答 全然戦略的ナモノハナカッタ。 我々ハ概シテ或ル種ノ経済的

題ト民間行政問題ニツイテ語ツタノデアル。

問 貴方等ハ平常トシテ問題ヲ論ジ合ワタカ。

答 我々~~内閣~~、經濟問題 ^{強シク} 全ユル ^{強シク} 問題、殊ニ開發ヲ含ム

問題 ^{強シク} 言ヒ滿洲ノ經濟的發展ニ關スル問題ヲ特ニ取り

ヒゲタノテアワタ

向 五ヶ年計畫ト言フ極ナモノノ進歩ニ付イテノ細密ナ論議

ヲモ含ニテ居タノカ

答 勿論サウテス

向 貴方カ其ノ地ニ居タ期間 即チ一九三三年ヨリ一九四〇年向

ノ經濟發展ノ主ナル障碍ハ何テアワタト思フカ 制限ハ如

何ナルモノテアワタカ

答 發展ヲ遲ラセタ最大原因ノ一ツハオソラク~~カ~~良~~ク~~設備

ノ不足テアワタト思フ

問. ト言フノハ機械トカ 機具ノ事カ.

答. サウデス.

ト一也中尉ニヨル 訊問.

問. 日生野氏ハ日本ハ滿州へ如何ナル理由ノモトニ滿州子へ侵入シテ行

ワタカ、ソシテ又、何ヲ滿洲子ヨリ得ントシテキタカニツイテ星

野氏ノ考ヘヲ自分ノ言葉ヲ述ベテモラヒタイ.

答. 一言ニシテ言フバ日本カソコへ進駐シテカラハ、我々ノ政策ハ

亦ニ日本ノ工業ニ原料ヲ供給シ、亦ニハ我カ事ノ増大スル

女口、ハケロトシテ ^{滿州} 事ヲ建設スル事ニアワタ.

問. 滿州子ヲ取ツタト言フ事ハ戦争勃發ニテノ内、原料品ノ

源泉ヲ確保スルト言フ事ニ於テトノ程完成シタト考ヘルカ.

答 原料品ト云フ中ニ南スル限り有~~益~~^益テアワタラウト言ヒ得ル。

然レ、貴殿ノ真向ニ答ヘルハ仲々困難ニアル。

因、テハ特ニ鉄鉱ヲ考ヘテ見テハトウカ。

答 滿洲ノ鉄鉱ニサヘモ日本ノ工業需要ヲ充タスニハ足ラ

ナカウカ。然レ、三分ノ一位ハソレテ供給サレタテアラウ。

尚、ト言フハ、^{日本}鐵~~鉄~~ノ計画ヲ成~~成~~^完シタト假定シテモ^{カレテモ尚}鐵~~鉄~~ノ不

衆的要求トシテ計画シタ^鉄取^鉄ノ三分ノ一シカ得ラレナイト言クイカ。

貴方ノ言フノハ其ノ意味カ。

答 ソノ真ニ南^北シテ~~北~~精確ニ言フ事ハ又困難ニアル。然レ、私ハ

我々ノ計画加減巧シテ居タトシテモ最モ良ク見ツモワテモ

此ノ方面ノ源泉カラハ我々ノ必要料ノ三分ノ一以上ハホメラレナ

カワタト思フ。

肉 石灰ニツイテハトシテアワタカ。

答 石灰ニ関スル限り、多分我々ハ我々、欲スル^{如ク、イララテモ}得ルヤガ

出来タト思フ。 満洲ヨカラ石灰ヲ得ルヤニ関シテハ、ソレガ

最モ有利ナルカ否カハ別問題ナル。

肉 食物ニ関シテハトウナルカ。

答 若シ、我々、計画ガ美クセラレタナラバ其、源泉カク充分

ナル食糧、補給ヲ得ルヤガ出来タテアラウ。

肉 日本ノ輸入ノ必要額ヲ~~充~~ス^{ニ足りタト思フカ。}

答 多分足りタト思フ。

肉 鉄、鉛石以外^{日本}ニ~~補給~~必要ナルト考ヘタ原料品テ滿洲國カラ

充分 ~~水~~ 得ル事か出来ナイ ~~水~~ 発見シタ ~~水~~ ^毛 ~~水~~ 加アルカ、 日本 徳

國家的發展ニ重要ナルモノト考ヘルモノデ。

答. 澤山アル第一ニ石油トアルミニウムデス。

由. 滿洲國ニハ石油モアルミニウムモ兩方産出シ得ル頁岩カアツタ、

テハナイカ。

答. 採掘スレバ我々ノ必要ヲ充タシタカモ知レナイ頁岩ヤアルミニウム

産出頁岩ノ鉱床カアル。 勿論、石炭カラ人造 石油ヲ産

出スルヲか出来ルガ 其ノ資源 ~~源~~ 開發ハ多大ノ努力ト出費トヲ

~~得ル~~ ~~モノ~~ ~~ヲ~~ ~~早~~ ~~急~~ ~~ニ~~ ~~ハ~~ ~~実~~ ~~現~~ ~~シ~~ ~~得~~ ~~ル~~ ~~モノ~~ ~~ニ~~ ~~ハ~~ ~~ナ~~ ~~カ~~ ~~ツ~~ ~~タ~~。

由. 何故 其ノ支出ヲセザルヲニ決定シタノカ、

答. 彼等ハ多少ハ開發シタノテアルガ 其レハ必要ニ適合シナカツタ。

最故ニ十万吨位ノ人造石油ヲ生産シテ居タノケラウト思フガ。

計画ハ五十万吨ノ要求シテ居タル。ソレハ非常中ニ困難

ナ仕事ヲアワタ。ソレテ人造燃料ニ関スル限リ~~全部~~テ十万吨

以上ハ出サカフタト思フ。十年カ廿年以ニハ何トカ發展スルカ

モ知レナイガ、現在ノトコロテハ尙難ニハナラナイ。

×××××

(三 汎内者略)

~~日本~~ノ工

505-9.

日本ガ滿洲ヲ引キ受ケタイト望ニテ理由ノ一ツハ

答 其ノ通りテス。

尙 然シ、其ノ代リニ滿洲ノハ~~現地~~テ原料品ヲ處理スル工業業

ヲ設ニスルヲ始メタ。原料品ハ日本ヘハ送ラレサカフタテ

アラウ。サウテハナイカ。

答. 先程私ハ日本ト言フ語ヲ限定的ニ使用シタカモ知レヌガ

私ハ其ノ代リニ日本圈ト言フ言葉ヲ用ヒルベキデアワタト

思フ. 何故ナラバ私ハ日本ト滿洲國トシテ一緒ニ考ヘテ居タカ。

向. 日本一多量ノ原料品ヲ持テ込マネハナラヌ所ノ經濟ヲ所

有シ. 然レモ其處ニ處理ノ便宜ヲ有シナカラ 大陸ニ新タテ

生産設備ヲ設置シヤリトシタノカ. 其レハ何故デアルカ.

答. 先ニ述ベタ通り. 我々ノ目的ハ全日本圈ヲ開發スルニ

アツタ. 其レ故. 我々ハ南發ヲ日本本邦ニノミ限定シ

テカツタノデアイル. 其ノ觀兵カラ. 最モ有効ニ地方原料

品ヲ使用シ得ル地ニ工業業ヲ發達シメルヲ我々ニハ有利ナ

ノデアワタ. 其ノ為ニ理由有リ. 滿洲國ニ原料品ノ源泉

地ニ近ク 滿洲國 等ノ工業未カ發達シテアル。

尙、現實ハ食糧生産、計畫カ日本、必要ヲ充タシタノニ實際

ハ日本ハ真珠湾以テ他ノ地方ヨリ食糧ヲ以テ輸

入シテ居タノテハナイカ

答、其ノ通り、相当量輸入シテ居タ。

尙、若シ滿洲國ヲ占有スル目的カ日本ヲ独立的ニスルヲテアワタ

ナラバ食糧ニ關スル限リ失敗テアワタ。

答、通狀ノ状態及ビ條件ニ於テハ日本ハ朝鮮、滿洲ト共ニ

互ヒニ助ケ合ワテ、各國共 必要トスル食糧ヲ全部生産シ得ル

ハズデアワタ。然シ、農作物ハ常ニ豫想通りニ出來ルモノテハ

ナク、其ノ為ニ食糧ノ輸入カ必要トナワテ來ル。

農作物ハ非常ニ變動スルモノナル。例ヘバ一九三四年ニハ滿

洲子テハ非常ニ沃山ノ大豆カ出来。ソレヲドウ處理シテ良イ

カ鮮カラナカワタリ、アワタノヲ私ハ記憶シテ居ル。實際

機關車ノ火ヲ禁クニ石炭ノ代リニ大豆ヲ用ヒル研究サヘ

行ハレタ程テアワタ。當時、日本ヘ大豆ヲ輸入スル際、関稅ヲ

課スルヲモ考ヘラレ、此レハ滿洲子ニトワテハ大豆問題トナワタ

ノテアワタ。

X X X X X (五汎内者略)

505-10

由 日本が滿洲へ進出シテ行ツタ理由ノ一ツハ **日本** 國民ハ

居住地ヲ確保スル者 **ト** アワタト貴方ハ述ベタガ、其ノ

方面 **ハ** 滿洲子ノ取得 **ト** 程交 **ハ** 役立ツタカ。

以テ、今マテノ所、大キナ援助カアワタトハ言ヘナイ。實際、ヤワト始メラ

役割ヲ果シタ

~~トハ言ヘナイ~~

レタハカリテス

由 然レ一九四一年ニ於テハ日本ガ希待レ豫期レテ居タ事ハ

~~結果~~ 果
ザレナカワタカ

答 我々ガ希待レタ程良好ニ進捗レナカワタ

ニール大佐ニヨル訊問

由 滿洲不進出ノ理由ヲ聞ク。 他ニ一ニ理由ガナカワ

タカトウカ南キタイ。 例ハ軍隊ノ方

答 今申レトケタ理由以外ニ 軍隊ガ他ニ大キナ理由ヲ持ツテ

中タカハ知ラナイ

由 日本ニ於テ當時 軍隊ハ非常に強力ヲアツタ。 何故 軍隊ガハ滿洲

政治的

軍部

胡心ト云フ事ヲ遂行シ得タノヲアル。

予へ進出スルヲ望ンタカ

答 解見私か出来ル解釋トシテハ 征等ノ目的モ又私か申、亦

ヘタニソ理由ニ他ナラナイト思フ。

ヒソシニ氏ニヨル訊問

尙貴方ハ滿洲進出ニハ戰略的^{ツモリカ}目的ハナカワタト言フ

答 ~~以是~~ 是 并自作。殘分カ戰略的意義アリト視ラレルノテハナカラウ

カ。其レ以外ニ特別^{他ニ}ノ目的ヲ知ラナイ。

××××××× (四訊問者略)

505-11. 尙 南東軍ハ滿洲國ニ於テ~~也~~ 彼等ノ投次員ニ対シヨリ多クノ

支配力ヲ征等ニ與ヘタト言フノカ。

哈 弘カ「守全」ト言フタノハ經濟^{的立場カラ}ナル。即チ征等ハ其

レカ有利ナルト言フ事ニ氣ツイタナル。其レハ最早

2117c

冒險テハナクナワタノデアラフ。

由、サウ、然シ、滿洲予發展ニ対スル南東軍ノ独占的支配ニシテ

変更カ~~解~~行使セヨ~~テ~~ハナクイカ。

~~南東軍~~行使セヨ~~テ~~ハナクイカ。

南東軍

然リ、~~南東軍~~ハ多少、征等、支配力ヲ緩和サセタ。

~~南東軍~~少シ緩カニナワタ。

コヘニ申尉ニヨル訊問

由、~~南東軍~~滿洲予カ物ヲ必要トスルトカ、滿洲予の何カニシト

カ言フ~~テ~~、勿論貴方ハ南東軍ノ事ヲ意味スルノカラウ。

答、私カ~~南東軍~~滿洲國ト言~~フ~~、私ハ~~南東軍~~滿洲予政府ヲ意味シテ居ル。

勿論南東軍ト滿洲予政府ト非常ニ密接ナ關係ガ

アリ、通帯ソノ政府ハ軍隊ノ意見ヲ多ク代表シテ中々

コリン氏ニ訊問

問、貴方ハ一九四〇年七月ヨリ一九四一年四月迄テ企画院總裁テア

ツタガ、其ノ期間中貴方ノ企画院行政上、何かニ於ケル主ナル位ヲ

テアツタカ、一今考ヘテ見テ何か重要ナル活動テアツタト思フカ。

答、多分、其ノ当時、最モ顯著ナル問題ハ日本ニ於ケル計画的經濟デ

アツタト思フ。

× × × × × (一訊問者略)

505-11. 問、企画院ノ計畫セル以是等動員計畫ハ、我々ノ理解スル所デハ

滿洲國生産ヲ日本ノソレニ適合スル様ニ目論ミレタ如クニ思

ハレルガソノ解釈ハ庄シイカ。

答、勿論、計畫ハ日本自身ノ為ニ立テラレタガ、西國向ニ非常

ニ密接ナル係アツタ存在ス。計畫ハ通常、圈内全部ヲ

包含スルモノナツタトデアル。

由、日本^{ニ加ヘン} 企画院ハ滿洲國ニ於テ採用セラレテ本ルプログラムヲ

変更スルコトガ出来ルカ。

答、権限ノ制限ト言フ考ヘカラテハナク、^{審言} 計画ハ協カシテ行フニ

アツタノデ、我々、必要ヲ充タス為ニ計画スル時^{ニ當リ} 滿洲子カラ

ノ割当ヲ考慮シ、又一方、滿洲子ハ日本ノ設備ノ輸入ヲ計

画シ、カクテ^自 我々ハ共ニ計画ヲ之テル中カ必要テアツタ。

ソレ故、^才 互ヒ、計画ヲ修正スルハ必要ハナカツタ。

ソノ結果

責任當局

向、各項目ニ関シ、^自 何程ト言フモヲ決定スル最終的權威者ハ

ハ誰デアツタカ、^自 例ヘバ日本ガ滿洲子^{カウ} 送達シテタレル以上

一、^自 鐵鉄ヲ望ミ^{ンダ場合}、以、争ヒハ如何様ニ解決^{セルカ、} せんカ。

答、^自 某様ノ問題ハ^自 滿洲經濟^自 委員會^自 在リ決定セヨリタリ

答 問

日本側テハ
日本大使館考事官ト対滿事務局長テアツタ。

難 滿州予ノ指導者及セ日本、責任當局トニヨリ

ワテ構成セラレテ居タ日滿經濟委員會ガ決定ニテ

問 滿州予ノ指導者トハ誰デアツタトイフカ。

答

財政部長

部長

大藏大臣 商工大臣 其他、人々デアツタ。

× × × × × ×

(一三 汎向省略)

505-13

問

(昭和十六年)

一九四四年秋ノ終リ、或ヒハ年ノ暮頃、當時日本ガ考慮シテ

居タ戰略的計畫ニ対シテトノ程ニ經濟的準備ガ出来テ

本夕トイフカ。

是

答 此ハ非常ニムツカシイ問題ゾカ。確カニ余、經濟的ニ良好

ナ條件ノ下ニハ居ナカッタ。確カニ多クノ困難ガアツタ。

問 特定ノモノニツイテ話ラウ。一 例ハ石油ノ問題ニハ一 伊西サヲ

トレ

充タス為ニ如何程ノ貯藏ガアツタト概算スルカ。

答、海軍ハ勿論秘密ノ豫備ヲ有シテ居タ。オソラク陸軍モ同

格デアワタラウ。カ我々企画院ノ者ハ、^{結局}彼等カ他ノ地区カラ石

油ヲ年ニ入レル中カ出来ルマデ彼等ノ必要ヲ充タヌニハ充分

ナト考ヘテホタト言フ以外トシ程アワタリハ知ラナカワタ。石

油ニ南スル限り、其ノ頃ハ明ラカニ充分ナ見込ニガアワタリテアタ。

× × × × × × (三訊問者略)

向此、~~遮断~~サレルカモ知レ又ト言フ強カナ可能性、代リニ何カ特

別ナ考慮ガ拂ハレタ他ノ項目ハナカワタカ。

答、我々ハアルミニウム~~不足~~及ビ鉄磁石ノ不足ヲ随分~~ハ~~心配シタ、

テアワタ。

× × × × × (二訊問者略)

505~114
由 石油ノ由題ハ陸海軍ト共ニ討議シ、~~彼等ハ~~程^{手持}權保

ガアルカ

~~言ハ~~言ハナカワタガ、~~征等ハ~~征等ハ心配~~ナ~~イト言ヒ、~~征等ハ~~

ノノ時持ツテ居タモノヲ使ヒ果シテシマウ前ニ石油ノ新タナ
産地ヲ取得シ得ルト言フタノテアルカ。

答 和加賞殿、言モオヲ誤解シタカ、サモナケレハ賞殿カ和

ヲ誤解シテ居ル。我々ノ經濟上ノ不足トカ肉題トカニ関

シテ訊ネタ諸貴肉中ノ初メノ方ノ一ツ答トシテ和ハ石

カラ遮断

油ハ重大肉題デアリ外部産地ト切離サレタ時ノ備ト

シテ何トカセネハナラテカワタト言フヲ言フタノ者、当時

デアリ。

我々ノ石油産額ハ三十万トシテ、必要量ハ二百万

噸^噸ニアリ、~~噸~~我々が非常ニ憂慮シタマデアリ企

画院ノ仕可ノ申テモ重要視セラレタマデアワタ。扱テ、

此、石油肉題ハ別個ノ觀矣カラ来タモノデ、企画院

總裁トシテノ私ノ仕アト南南ノ係が
無カワタ。 一九四一年

昭和十六年
ノ秋ニ彼等ガ計画シテ中タカモ知レヌ戦争ノ為ニ由本軍部ガ

充カ、石油ヲ有シテ居ルト考ヘテ居タカトウカヤ
日本軍部ガ

南南ノ意見ヲ南カレタガ、
私ハ彼等ガ南

方ノ石油郡地ヲ取得スルニテ續クタケノ充カナル補給

量ヲ有シテ居ルト考ヘテ居タ答ヘタノテアル。 是ハ

何等ノ企画院ノ関係ノ無イコトデアワタ。

505-16.
由 鮎川 ~~ヲ~~ ~~テ~~ ~~ソ~~ ~~ノ~~ ~~意~~ ~~見~~ ~~ヲ~~ ~~南~~ ~~カ~~ ~~レ~~ ~~タ~~ ~~ガ~~ ~~、~~ ~~私~~ ~~ハ~~ ~~彼~~ ~~等~~ ~~ガ~~ ~~南~~ ~~南~~ ~~ノ~~ ~~係~~ ~~ガ~~ ~~無~~ ~~カ~~ ~~ワ~~ ~~タ~~ ~~。~~ ~~一~~ ~~九~~ ~~四~~ ~~一~~ ~~年~~ ~~。~~

洲子ニ於テ ~~南~~ ~~南~~ ~~ノ~~ ~~意~~ ~~見~~ ~~ヲ~~ ~~南~~ ~~カ~~ ~~レ~~ ~~タ~~ ~~ガ~~ ~~、~~ ~~私~~ ~~ハ~~ ~~彼~~ ~~等~~ ~~ガ~~ ~~南~~ ~~南~~ ~~ノ~~ ~~係~~ ~~ガ~~ ~~無~~ ~~カ~~ ~~ワ~~ ~~タ~~ ~~。~~ ~~一~~ ~~九~~ ~~四~~ ~~一~~ ~~年~~ ~~。~~

答 何編モ深ク及ン述ベキ ~~南~~ ~~南~~ ~~ノ~~ ~~意~~ ~~見~~ ~~ヲ~~ ~~南~~ ~~カ~~ ~~レ~~ ~~タ~~ ~~ガ~~ ~~、~~ ~~私~~ ~~ハ~~ ~~彼~~ ~~等~~ ~~ガ~~ ~~南~~ ~~南~~ ~~ノ~~ ~~係~~ ~~ガ~~ ~~無~~ ~~カ~~ ~~ワ~~ ~~タ~~ ~~。~~ ~~一~~ ~~九~~ ~~四~~ ~~一~~ ~~年~~ ~~。~~

使命ハ資本ヲ流入サセル ~~南~~ ~~南~~ ~~ノ~~ ~~意~~ ~~見~~ ~~ヲ~~ ~~南~~ ~~カ~~ ~~レ~~ ~~タ~~ ~~ガ~~ ~~、~~ ~~私~~ ~~ハ~~ ~~彼~~ ~~等~~ ~~ガ~~ ~~南~~ ~~南~~ ~~ノ~~ ~~係~~ ~~ガ~~ ~~無~~ ~~カ~~ ~~ワ~~ ~~タ~~ ~~。~~ ~~一~~ ~~九~~ ~~四~~ ~~一~~ ~~年~~ ~~。~~

塔 長期ニワタル發展ヲ中心トシテ居タ。トコロカ、下交、頃

日支子変カ勃發シ、形執カハ長期、發展ヲ許サズ、速カニ

遂行セ

~~進展~~ ~~カ~~ ~~ハ~~ ~~ナ~~ ~~ラ~~ ~~ヌ~~ ~~ア~~ ~~カ~~ ~~揚~~ 明ラカトナワテ来タ。 鮎川ハ此、

見當ヲ

プログラムノ變更ヲ試ミルト ~~事~~ ~~ヲ~~ ~~ニ~~ ~~確~~ ~~カ~~ ~~シ~~ ~~テ~~ ~~進~~ ~~路~~ ~~ヲ~~ ~~的~~

ワケル事カ

~~確~~ ~~定~~ ~~カ~~ ~~ル~~ ~~事~~ ~~カ~~ ~~出~~ ~~来~~ ~~ナ~~ ~~カ~~ ~~ワ~~ ~~タ~~。 要セラレタル如ク速進サセ

ル中ハ不可能ト考ヘタ、ソレテ此ノ長期計畫ノ展開ヨリモ、

モット半所カナ仕可カ先ニ考サレハナラヌ中ハ唯ラカデアワ

タノテ彼ハ其ノ任ニ適サズトシテ退 ~~任~~ ~~ス~~ ~~ル~~ ~~事~~ ~~カ~~ ~~ハ~~ ~~非~~ ~~ズ~~

×××××× (七 汎向者略)

向、鮎川ガ財閥デアルト言フ ~~程~~ ~~由~~ ~~テ~~ ~~及~~ ~~對~~ ~~カ~~ ~~ア~~ ~~ワ~~ ~~タ~~ ~~カ~~ ~~カ~~。

505-17.

答、~~ソ~~ ~~ン~~ ~~大~~ ~~事~~ ~~ハ~~ 無カワタト思フ。

ニ好意ヲ寄セテ其の地ヲリ

向 鮎川ハ南東軍ト親密ナリタ。 亦、貴方トノ関係モ

ソレニモ拘ラス

相當

又良カワタアト思フ。 ~~其~~ 彼ノ計画ヲ實施スルニ 難カ

難カアワタカ。

答 鮎川ニ対スル反對ハ多分二期ニ別ケ得ル事ト思フ。初期

ニ於ケル反對ハ主トシテ國際的資本カ滿洲子ニ注入セラ

レル事ニ反對アワタ連中ニヨフテナサレタ。 其次ニ次資本

カ入ラナカワタ時 彼等ハ彼ヲ嚴シク批難シ始メタ。 此ノ反

ソノ理由ハ

対ハ南滿洲鐵道側ヨリ起ツタト事トソノ計画ニヨ

ルト彼等ノ事業ノ大部分カ滿洲産業開發会社

後期

ニ於テ移ワテシマウカラデアワタ。 ~~其~~ 期 ~~中~~ 期ニ於テ

反對ハ ~~其~~ 爲サレタ。

中流官公吏側 ~~中~~ 期

周 ~~其~~ 等ハ地籍 ~~中~~ 官公吏デアワタカ、ソレトモ南東軍

軍人ニアワタリカ。

答、~~是~~位、~~是~~中權官公吏ハ、~~我~~少、~~是~~南東軍軍人デアワタラウ

加大概郵信ハ、民間人デアワタリ。征等ハ自由行動権ヲ與ヘル

アニ反対レタニアワタ。征等ハ直接支配ノ方カ痛車ト
多純率的

ト考ハタニアワタ。

××××××××
(二三訊内者略)

505~20
ト考ハタニアワタ。

向、極ク簡單ニ一般的ニ業方~~が~~滿洲子ニ居タ

時ノ貴方ト東條ト、關係ヲ語ワテモラヒタイ。

答、私ハ一九三三年滿洲子ニ依リ、最初財政屬~~部~~次官デアワタ。

其、当时、東條ハ南東軍憲兵隊長デアワタ。征ハ私
司令官

ノ居タ新京ニ居テ、私ハ征ニ始メテ其處テ会ワタ。然ッレ

我々ハ ~~...~~ 職務上、接触 ^{強ト} ハナカワタ。後、一九三六

昭和十一年 ~~...~~ 手ハハ 總務局長官ニ任命サレ、翌年、東條ハ廣東

軍參謀長トツタ。其ノ 職掌ニ於テ、我々ハ屢々 接触モ

シ共ニ仕マセシタ。

105-23. 向、^{中國} ~~...~~ 其ノハ ~~...~~ 日本、生産品、有力ナ市場ト見ナサレタ、

カソレトモ、^{五トシテ} 原料品、資源源域ト目サレタノカ、^{供給源}

答、両方、テアル。

向、日本カ軍隊ヲ ^{中國} 某處ニ駐屯 セシメナクトモ 何か ~~...~~

^{中國} 其邦ニ於ケル 賣買ヲ妨ケルカ、^{日本ノ}

答、當時、両方、向ニ平実上、敵対的状態ガ存在シテタタ。其 ^{交戦} ^{カハル}

~~...~~ 状態デ日本ハ ~~...~~ 支那カラ撤去スルヲ ^{無條件} ^{ヲ嫌}

ツタ

2117c

××××××× (五洲内者略)

505-26

内 蘭領東印交ゴレシ、フリッヒン、占領が豫想ヨリモ良ク

行ハカトスレバ、^{何故ニ日本}軍^{軍需}生産目、消耗ハ貴方

ノ計算ヨリモ少クナカフタノカ

答 最初ハ^{非常ニ}佳ク行キ、我々ノ計画ハ之依ニ実現シテ行ツタヲ持

日本が之等ノ

二 アガルカナル、戦術以來、日本~~軍~~新タル資源地ヲ領

ニ好シ

あり妨礙ヲ加へ

有スルヲ、~~衝突~~が潜水艦 其、他ノ方法ニ~~手~~指シラレタ。

コレが我々が豫期セル程ニ~~計~~計画が遂行セラレナカフタ

理由ノ一ツデアル。 他ニモ^何理由がアツタカソレハ~~水~~あり

カタルカナル。其、他ニ於ケル戦術ハ我々が計画シタヨリ~~遙~~遙カニ

多クノ~~彈藥~~ 艦船ヲ消耗シタノデアツタ。

其間、フィリピン諸島、マレー、蘭領印支ヲ占領セン初期、

諸島
消費

戦役ニ於テ軍需品、其半ハ豫想ヨリモ多カッタカカッタ。

容、我々豫想ヲ超エタキ、唯、ノモノ、新タニ取得^ニ地区多ノ原料品

ノ輸入デアッタ。他ノ点ヲハ我々計画シタ以上、戦争、不能ニ

見ラレナカッタ。
何等進歩モナカッタ。

×××××××× (四ニ訊由者略)

505-31
向、将来、ボキサイトノ輸入が断絶サレルカモ知レ又ト言フ豫想

ノモトニ、滿洲ノアルミニウム、頁岩ノ輸入増加ハ考慮セラレ

ナカッタカ。

答、日本へ持つテ来ルヨリモ、滿洲ノ資源ヲ、滿洲不テ使用スル

ヲ計画シテ居タ。此、鉾石ヲ多分、山東省、張店ヨリ輸

入スル計画ハ立テ、ハ居タガ。

× × × × × (三訊内者然)

由、~~ク~~セリシ陥落故豫期シテ届タホーキサイト不足が實際兼

現 ~~キ~~シタスカ

我々

答、一、計画ハ補給ニ先ナル程ニ南太平洋ノ ~~金~~ニル可能ナ地カ

ラ、ホーキサイト輸入ヲ急グテアツタ。 ~~二~~二、計画ハ北支那

ノ頁岩 ~~備~~ヲ利用スルヲテアツタ。 三、計画ハ日本本土

於テ取得出来ルアルミニウム含有量ノ少ク ~~覺~~頁岩ヲ利用スル

事、テアツタ。

由、内閣ハ日本アルミニウム工業カラ、北支 ~~北~~ノ頁岩ガ彼等 ~~事~~ニシテ處理

知ラサシタスカ

出来 ~~得~~ルト ~~事~~ ~~助~~カ

答、~~兼~~等ガ使用出来 ~~得~~ルト ~~事~~ ~~事~~ハ一般ノ意見テアツタト思フ。

由、ソレハ通確 ~~ナ~~ ~~答~~ ~~テ~~ ~~ハ~~ ~~ナ~~イ。 ソノ事ニ関シテ ~~事~~ ~~考~~ ~~慮~~ ~~カ~~ ~~ナ~~カ

公式

拂ハレ

其ノ基礎ニ^{中集}ニ^ト実行^ト言フ確定^ト的決議ヲ見タカ。

答 然リソノ極^中テ決議^中カ^中ナサレタ。

×××××× (ハ訊問省略)

505~32 由 滿洲子ニ於ケル頁岩石油^{一層}ヲ^上南發^ス為ニ如何ナル考慮カ拂

ハレタカ。

答 豫テ~~是~~是ノ研究^中ガナサレテ^中居タソレテソレガ一朝^中ニシテ^中進^中セシ

ナル^中ガ出来^中テ^中カ^中ツ^中タ^中カ^中南發^中ノ^中最^中優^中先^中權^中ヲ

契^中ヘル^中子^中ニ^中ヨ^中フ^中テ^中生^中産^中増^中加^中カ^中計^中画^中サ^中レ^中居^中タ

由 ~~戦軍中~~ 滿洲^中不^中負^中岩^中石^中油^中ニ^中対^中ス^中ル^中^{材料獲得}優^中先^中權^中ハ^中戦^中時^中中

変更^中セ^中ラ^中レ^中タ^中カ。

答 戦^中前^中ニ^中モ^中コレ^中ハ^中優^中先^中項^中目^中表^中ノ^中上^中位^中ニ^中ア^中ツ^中タ^中カ^中戦^中軍^中中^中ハ^中尚^中更

高^中メ^中ラ^中レ^中タ^中。

×××××××× (四ニ汎向省略)

砲

由 一九四四年ニ日本ノ軍需工業業カ

昭和十九年

建設及ビ

削減セヌハナラナカワタ時、滿洲予ニ於テハ新工場、商業用

需用

並民由申建~~築~~物ノ為ニ滿洲予産ノ銑鉄及ビ鋼鉄、約四

十パーセントカ使用セラレタ。日本本予今滿洲予産ノ鉄及ビ

鋼ノヨリ大ナル割当ヲ確保スルニ如何ナル努力カ為サレタカ。

答 貴殿、言ハレル四十パーセントノ率ハ私ハ知ラナイ。滿洲予産品

ノ使用ニツイテハ通常~~國~~國ノ適合ヒテ決定~~ス~~。滿洲予

産品ノ大部分ハ戦争~~途~~途~~ノ~~ノ為ニ使用セラレタカラ、多分

毛亦

此ノ民需用ノ四十パーセント~~ト~~ト~~キ~~直接的ニ戦争目的、

為ニ使用セラレタモノデハナカラワカト思フ。故ニ實際滿洲

取ルニ足ラ

ノ為ニ使用セラレタモノハ由~~題~~題~~ト~~トナシ。

内. ツレがる実ト言フノカ貴方ノ意見^ヲハ

答. ソレカ現状カワタト思フ.

由. 貴方ノ知ル限り満洲ノ經濟ハ全ク日本戰時經濟ニ統合

セラレ不足^{セル}資材^ヲノ分配ハ全ク日本ニヨリ支配セラレテ

居タト言フノカ.

答. 戰爭カ發展スルト共ニ日本及ビ滿洲ノ經濟ノ統合ハ^{益々}確定

的トイワタガ^私決定ハ日本カ專斷的ニ為シタトハ言ハナイ. ナゼ

ナラバ^是此等決定ハ^西常ニ^上國內ノ相談ノ^上議決セラレタノテ

アルカラ. ^{急々}ソレ日本カ^{切迫}據^{シテ}來タノテ滿洲^ノハ^戰戰爭

ノ要求ノヨリ大ナル^{負擔}ヲ^負擔^スベクヨリ大ナル^力力ヲナシ

タ^テテ^アワタ.

由 滿洲予資源ノ利用ニ付テ意見ノ相違ハ起ラナカッタカ。

答 此ノ問題ニ付テ議論ハアワタ、殊ニ日本予内ニ於テ。

由 論議ニヨツテ意見ノ相違ガモトモラナカッタ時、誰カ最良的決定

権ヲ有シテアワタカ。

共同 委員会

答 此日復明シテ通り意見ノ相違ハ日滿聯合經濟會議デ

調停スルノテアワタ。

505-38

由 季負会ノ各員ハ各關係國ハ
議決権ヲ幾ソ所有シテ居タカ。

答 各 四ツテアワタ。

由 五分五分ノ議決ノ時ハ一夜モナカッタカ。

答 ナカッタ。

由 議決ハ常ニ満場一致デアワタカ。

答 大概、最良的決定ハ滿場一致ト言フ所ニテ論議カ佳ク

ラレタリテアル。

南緯國

向 滿洲資源ヲ戰爭遂行ニ用ヒル事ニ關シ、各派、完全一致ニヨ

換言スレバ

國

リ 決定セラレザル論争ハナカワタト言フノカ。

答 是 審議ニ關スル限リソレハ正シイ解釈ダ。

由 其、限定リル~~ル~~ 意味~~ハ~~スルカ。

答 是 最良的決定ニ到~~ル~~ 多クノ議論~~ハ~~ 有~~ル~~カ。

待~~テ~~カ アツタ。

得~~ル~~モノハ凡~~テ~~

由 ソレテ日本得~~ル~~モノ~~ハ~~ 全~~ク~~ 滿洲カ~~ニ~~ 得~~ル~~テ 居~~ル~~ト~~モ~~ 貴

貴方~~ハ~~ 常ニ 満足シテ 居~~タ~~カ。

私ハ

答 然~~リ~~、~~貴~~ 満足ニ思~~フ~~テ 居~~タ~~。 滿洲國ハ 全~~ク~~ 援助ヲ~~シ~~タト~~モ~~ 私

ハ思フ。勿論日本が實際に戦争ヲシタノ如ク、滿洲子ハ滿洲子ノ立場カラ出来得ル限りノヲランタノテイル。

由ソレテ滿洲民由經濟ハ日本ノソレト同様ニ切り下ケラレタノカ。

答、日本程切り下ケラレタトハ思ハナイが、滿洲子カ直接戦闘ニ

参加シテ居ナカフタ故ニ多分滿洲子カ**行ツ** ~~事~~ 範因

ハ ~~期~~ 待シ得ル最大限デアツト思フ。然レ滿洲子モ又直

接或同接ニ相当ナ經濟的切り下ケヲ受ケタノ事 ~~事~~ 実デアル。

由、日本本子がなシタト同等ノ貢獻ヲ為スベレトハ ~~事~~ 待サレテ

カフタノカ。

答、ソノ通りテス。

(以下十三記問省略)

bc

EXCERPT FROM INTERROGATION OF HOSHINO, Naoki, DATED 19,22,28 Nov 45

XXX

Q. During the early period in Manchuria - roughly 1931 to 1936 there was no great change in Manchurian production, especially industrial production. What would you give as the main reasons for the lack of industrial development during those early years.

A. There might be a number of reasons for this; perhaps, the greatest one is that during that period a large amount of preparation was under way, so that there was no large amount of production.

Q. In what specific fields were these general preparations?

A. I don't have the exact figures at hand here, and cannot explore the minute reasons for all of this, but these preparations involved the setting-up of industries such as the Showa Steel Mills, and also involved the location and prospecting of gold fields. Since Japan does not advance as fast as America along those lines, it took considerable time to lay the foundation for industrial production.

Q. Was there a shortage of capital during this period for development work?

A. If you think of capital not only in terms of money but also in terms of necessary goods and materials, then surely we can attribute part of the difficulties to a lack of capital in Manchuria.

Q. Where did you look to for the necessary capital?

A. We looked first of all to Japan for capital, but there were not sufficient sources from which to draw in Japan itself, and so we looked to foreign countries for the necessary capital. When the Manchurian Industrial Development Corporation was established, we expected to get some capital from America, but due to various circumstances, that did not work out according to our plans and so we were forced to make out with what capital we could develop within Japan itself.

XXX

Q. In the early period - in the first period we are referring to before '37 - who invested the capital; where did it come from; was it local capital, or did it come from Japan?

A. It came practically all from Japan; during the period in question the investment from Manchuria was negligible.

Q. What sources in Japan supplied it?

A. As I said, while the capital did not flow to Manchuria in a

great stream, there was some, of course, and this came from various sources - from various industrial associations, from connections with Zaibatsu, and from private capitalists and small investors - it was collected from quite a number of sources. In the early period, a great deal of this, of course, was invested through the South Manchuria Railway.

Q. Beginning 1937, you have a much sharper growth in industrial production in Manchuria - what were the reasons for this greater expansion in output?

A. The first explanation for such an increase in production could be attributed to the fact that the various enterprises such as the Showa Steel Works, had been completed, the coal mines had become fully operable, and the period of production had arrived. At the same time, the plans for increased expansion had also been developed, so that from then on we can witness this sharp increase in production.

Q. To what extent was this development based on the bringing in of Aikawa with his industrial experience and equipment?

A. For one thing, the Manchurian Government desired that a more realistic and positive attitude be taken toward the whole matter. That is, they wanted the Japanese capitalists to forget their suspicion and reluctance and really get some capital in and put things on a strong basis.

Q. Aikawa was a very special type of Japanese capitalist - why did they choose him?

A. I am coming to that - I have just started in with the first step. Then, the Manchurians took an attitude of welcoming help and the Japanese capitalists began to take more of a definite interest in Manchuria and that led to an inflow of capital. Up to this time, the South Manchuria Railway had, been to some extent carrying on various enterprises, but as the enterprises grew, it became too much for the Railway Company and a need was felt to push the whole development to a higher level. At the same time, Manchuria needed more than capital. Administrative ability was also needed. These reasons for the bringing in of Aikawa at that time. Another reason for calling Aikawa was the feeling that to develop these enterprises in Manchuria to the utmost, the thing should be put somewhat on an international basis so that financial aid could be brought in from outside Japan.

XIX

Q. Your first period of service in Manchuria, ended in 1940. That was about the end of the first Five-Year plan in Manchuria. In what lines was that plan most successful?

A. Nothing went according to plan exactly and it is difficult for

me to say that we made any great success. However, possibly in the field of coal production and steel works, we made some relatively good progress. In the field of hydro-electric development, while we did not accomplish what we had outlined for the period, still dams were completed and the basis laid for future development so that in that field also it might be said we achieved some success. And, I might as well say that as far as aircraft production or automobile manufacturing was concerned, we did not succeed at all.

XXX

Q. How closely did you, when you were head of the "Manchoukuo" General Affairs Board, keep contact with the Kwantung Army?

A. I kept a very close connection with that Army.

Q. How often did you meet with the Commander of the Kwantung Army?

A. There were no regular meetings, although we did meet together often. I suppose I met the Commander of the Kwantung Army once or twice a month, but I met oftener than that with other officials.

Q. What was the normal range of subjects that you discussed with the Commander of the Kwantung Army? Were they strategic subjects or were they largely economic?

A. There were no discussions along strategic lines at all. We took up certain economic affairs and civil administrative affairs largely.

Q. What problems did you normally discuss?

A. We took up practically all types of economic questions, particularly some of those involving development, i.e., the economic development of Manchuria.

Q. Did that include careful discussion of the progress of such a thing as the Five Year Plan?

A. Yes, of course.

Q. What did you think, in the period when you were there in 1932-1940, were the major obstacles to economic development - what were the limitations?

A. One of the biggest reasons for the lack of development possibly was the lack of good equipment.

Q. Which is machinery and machine tools?

A. Yes.

Q. Can Mr. Hoshino give us a statement in his own words, as to what his conception is as to what Japan went into Manchuria for and what it expected to get out of it?

A. Well, in a word, I would say that after Japan occupied the country, then our policy was to try to build it up, first as a source of raw materials for our industries and second, as a place for our expanding population to go to.

Q. How successful does he feel the taking of Manchuria was for securing a source of raw materials up to the outbreak of the war?

A. Well, I can say I think it was a profitable thing as far as raw materials are concerned; but, it is rather difficult to answer your question.

Q. Well take iron ore specifically?

A. Even the Manchurian iron ore was not enough to satisfy Japan's industrial needs. Perhaps, she could provide up to one-third, however.

Q. That is, assuming they fulfilled their plans, they would still not get more than one-third of what they had planned as a national requirement for iron ore? Is that what you mean?

A. Again, I say it is a little bit difficult to be accurate on that. However, I do feel that even had our plans succeeded, at best we could not have looked for more than one-third of our requirements from that source.

Q. How about coal?

A. As far as coal is concerned, we could probably get all we wanted. In getting coal from Manchuria, the question of whether it would be most advantageous, is another question.

Q. How about food.

A. If our plans were carried out we could get ample food supplies from that source.

Q. Enough to take care of Japan's import needs?

A. I think probably we could have.

Q. Are there any raw materials which they felt they needed which they discovered they could not get in sufficient quantities in Manchuria except iron ore? Any they felt were essential to their national development?

A. There are many, first of all, there is oil and aluminum.

Q. Didn't they have shale in Manchuria which could produce both oil and aluminum?

A. There are deposits of shale and aluminum producing shale which if exploited, might supply our needs. Of course, it would be possible to produce synthetic oil from the coal, but development of its sources would depend upon a great outlay of effort and expense and could not be realized immediately.

Q. Why did they decide not to make that outlay?

A. Well, they did develop them somewhat but that did not fit the needs. I think at the very last they did produce something like 100,000 tons of shale oil but the plan called for 500,000. It was a very difficult proposition. And, as far as synthetic fuel is concerned, probably altogether they did not produce more than 100,000 tons. In another 10 or 20 years, they might be developed into something, but at the present state it is negligible.

XXX

Q. You say that one of the reasons Japan wanted to take over Manchuria was to get raw materials to use in her own industries.

A. Yes, that is right.

Q. However, instead of that, Manchuria proceeded to set up an industry to process the raw materials on the spot - the raw materials were not sent back to Japan were they?

A. Perhaps I used Japan in a rather limited sense a while ago, and instead, I should have said within the Japanese sphere because I was thinking of Japan and Manchuria together.

Q. Although you had an economy where you had to bring in large quantities of raw materials into Japan and you had processing facilities there, you chose to build up new processing facilities on the continent? Why was that?

A. As I said before, our purpose was to develop the whole Japanese sphere. Therefore, we were not limiting our development to Japan proper. From that standpoint, it was advantageous to us to develop industry where it could make the best use of local raw materials, and for that reason, these industries were developed near the source of the raw materials in Manchuria.

Q. Actually, although the plan for food production would have taken care of Japan's needs, Japan in fact continued to import food from other areas, did it not, prior to Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, there was considerable of that.

Q. Well, if the purpose in taking Manchuria was to make Japan independent, then it was a failure as far as food was concerned.

A. Under ordinary circumstances and conditions, Japan with Korea and Manchuria, should have been able, by helping each other, to produce all their own required foods. However, crops do not always come up to expectations and for that reason it becomes necessary to import foods. Crops fluctuate a great deal - for instance, I recall in 1934 that Manchuria produced so many soy beans she did not know what to do with them. In fact, they even gave study to the use of soy beans instead of coal for firing locomotives. At that time, there was also some thought of imposing a customs duty on the importing of soy beans into Japan and this became quite a problem to Manchuria.

1201

Q. Now you said that one of the reasons Japan went into Manchuria was to secure additional living space for its people. To what extent did the acquisition of Manchuria accomplish what had been hoped in that respect?

A. I cannot say that any great help has come so far. In fact, just a beginning has been made.

Q. But, as of 1941 it had not accomplished what Japan had hoped and expected?

A. No, it had not proceeded as well as we had hoped.

Colonel Cole

Q. We have heard two reasons for going into Manchuria. I would like to inquire if there were not one or two other reasons - perhaps the Army?

A. I do not know that the military had any other great reason beyond those mentioned.

Q. Well, the Army was very strong at that time in Japan, politically. It was able to implement its wishes. Why did the Army wish to go into Manchuria?

A. Well, it would seem to me, as near as I can analyze it, that their purposes were largely the two that I have mentioned.

Mr. Bisson

Q. You mean there were no strategic objectives in going into Manchuria?

A. Wouldn't these things themselves be considered somewhat as

having strategic significance? Outside of that, I do not know of any other specific objectives.

XIX

Q. Did that mean the Kwantung Army gave them more control over their investments in Manchuria?

A. What I meant by "safe" was from an economic standpoint. - i.e., they realized it would be profitable. It was no longer a risk.

Q. Yes, but was there a modification of the exclusive control by the Kwantung Army of Manchurian development?

A. Yes, they somewhat relaxed their controls - eased up on them.

Lt. (JG) Cohen

Q. When he speaks of "Manchuria wanting things" and "Manchuria's so-and-so" you mean, of course, the Kwantung Army?

A. When I said the Manchurians, I meant the Manchurian government. Of course, there is a very close connection between the Kwantung Army and the Manchurian Government and usually it represented pretty much the opinion of the army.

Mr. Bisson

Q. You were Chief of the Planning Board from July 1940 to April 1941. In your administration of the Planning Board during that period, what were the major tasks - major activities - as you see them now?

A. At that time, perhaps, the outstanding problem was that of a planned economy for Japan.

Q. In these mobilization plans that the Planning Board drew up, our understanding is that they scheduled Manchurian production to fit in with Japanese production. Is that correct?

A. Plans were drawn up for Japan itself of course, but since there was such a close connection between the two countries, the plans usually took in the whole sphere.

Q. Could the Planning Board here change the program adopted in Manchuria?

A. Rather than any idea of a limitation of authority, the plan was to work jointly so that in planning for our needs, we made allotments from Manchuria and, on the other hand, Manchuria

planned for the importing of Japanese equipment and thus it was necessary always for us to make the plans together, so there was not any modification of each other's plans.

Q. Who was the final authority who decided how much of each item? Suppose Japan wanted more pig iron than Manchuria wanted to send - how would that conflict be worked out?

A. Such problems as that were decided in a Japanese-Manchurian Economic Association, made up of leaders in Manchuria and responsible authorities from Japan.

Q. Who would be the leaders in Manchuria?

A. The Minister of Finance and the Minister of Commerce and Industry and such men.

Q. And, on the Japanese side?

A. The Counselor to the Japanese Embassy and the head of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau.

XXX

Q. In the late autumn of 1941, or toward the end of the year, would you say to what extent economic preparations were adequate for the strategic plan that Japan envisaged at that time.

A. This is a very difficult problem. You certainly was not in a very favorable position economically. Certainly there were plenty of difficulties.

Q. Let's make it specific - on the oil problem - how much did you calculate you had in reserve to cover needs?

A. The Navy, of course, had secret reserves, and probably the military did as well, but we of the Cabinet Planning Board did not know how much, except that they ultimately felt that there was a supply ample enough to take care of their needs until they could obtain oil from other areas. There were evidently ample prospects at that time, as far as oil was concerned.

XXX

Q. Were there any other items which were given special consideration in lieu of this strong possibility of being cut off?

A. Well, we were worried considerably over the lack of aluminum and also of iron ore.

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Q. The question of oil was discussed with the Army and the Navy,
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and although they did not state how much they had on hand, they did state that they were not worried and that they would be able to take over new sources of oil before they ran out of what they had?

A. I must have mis-understood, or else you misunderstood me. In regard to one of the first questions you asked me as to the shortages or problems in our economics, I mentioned the fact that oil was the big problem and we were having to do something to prepare against being cut off from outside sources. At that time our own production of oil was a mere 300,000 tons while our needs were two million tons, and that was something that gave us great concern, and figured large in the work of the Planning Board. Now, this oil question came up from another standpoint and was not in connection with my work as Chairman of the Planning Board. You asked me my opinion as to whether or not the Japanese military thought they had sufficient supplies of oil for the war they might be planning in the fall of 1941, and I told you that it seemed to be the understanding that they had ample supplies to last them until they could get their hands on the oil in the south. This had no connection whatsoever with my Planning Board.

XXX

Q. What were the specific difficulties that developed in Manchuria which may have prevented Aikawa from accomplishing his objective?

A. As I have mentioned a number of times, Aikawa's mission in Manchuria was connected with a plan to bring in capital and all his ideas were centered around a long period of development. However, at about this time, the China-Japanese incident occurred, and it became more and more evident that the situation would not permit of a long period development but would have to be speeded up. Aikawa could not see his way clear, apparently, to try to make such a change in the program; he did not think it was possible to speed it up as was demanded, and since it was evident that tasks more close at hand would have to be taken up first rather than the development of this long-term program, he felt he was not the man for the job and dropped out.

XXX

Q. Was there opposition to Aikawa because he was a Zaibatsu?

A. I don't think there was.

Q. Aikawa was friendly to the Kwantung Army - presumably his relation with you were also good - and still there was considerable difficulty in putting his program into effect?

A. The opposition of Aikawa could probably be divided into two periods - in the early period the opposition was mainly on the

part of those who felt that international capital should not be brought into Manchuria. In the second place, when the capital did not come, then they began to criticize him severely. This opposition arose on the part of the South Manchuria Railway, since the plan was that much of their work would pass into hands of the Manchurian Industrial Development Co. Then, in the latter part of the period, the opposition arose in the middle ranks of officialdom.

Q. Was that purely the civil officials or was it also the Kwantung Army officials?

A. These middle-rank officials, mostly civilian although possibly some in the Kwantung Army, opposed the giving of a free hand - they felt direct control would be more efficient.

XXX

It. Dorr

Q. I wonder whether you could tell us very briefly and generally what your relationship was with Tojo when you were both in Manchuria?

A. I went to Manchuria in 1932, and at first was Vice-Minister of the Financial Dept. At that time, Tojo was Commander of the Kwantung Army's military police. He was located in Hsinking where I was, and I first met him there. However, we had practically no official contacts. Later, in 1936, I was made Chief of the General Affairs Board, and the next year, 1937, Tojo was made Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army. In that capacity, we did have a number of contacts and did work together.

XXX

Q. Was China thought of primarily as a potential market for Japan's manufactured goods or primarily as a source of raw materials?

A. Both.

Q. And, what would prevent Japan from buying and selling in China, even though she did not have her army there?

A. At that time, a virtual state of hostility existed between the two countries and with the situation as it was, Japan was loath to withdraw from China unconditionally.

XXX

Q. If everything had gone better than you expected in taking of the N.E.I. and Malaya and the Philippines, why wasn't your con-

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sumption of military products less rather than you had figured it would be?

A. We did get along very nicely at first and our plans worked out famously but particularly after the battle of Guadalcanal the interference with our holding of those newly captured resources to Japan was interfered with by submarines and other means, and that is one reason why our plans did not develop as nicely as we had expected. There is another reason and that was this: The battles of Guadalcanal and other battles at that time consumed a great deal more in the line of ammunition and ships, etc. than we had planned.

Q. Was the expenditure of military products in the early campaigns, during which they captured the Philippines, Malay and the N.E.I., greater or less than anticipated?

A. The only thing that exceeded our expectations was the importation of raw materials from newly acquired territory - otherwise, there was no improvement in the war situation over what we had planned.

XXX

Q. Was any consideration given to increasing imports of Manchurian aluminous shale with the thought that bauxite imports might be cut off at some time in the future?

A. We were planning on using Manchurian supplies in Manchuria rather than bringing them over to Japan. We did have a plan to bring in this ore from probably Choton, which is in Shantung.

XXX

Q. The expected shortage of bauxite did develop after the fall of Kwajalein?

A. The first plan we laid was to speed up our imports of bauxite from all possible places in the South Pacific, to get ahead in supplies and the second plan was to make use of supplies of shale in North China. And, the third plan was to make use of certain low-quantity aluminous shale available in Japan proper.

Q. Was the Cabinet advised by the Japanese aluminum industry that the North China shale could be processed, by them?

A. I think the opinion was in general that it could be used.

Q. That is not quite responsive - was there some official consideration of the matter and an affirmative decision that it would be possible to operate on that basis?

A. Yes, there was such a decision.

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Q. What consideration was given to further development of Manchurian shale oil?

A. Previously, a study had been given to this, and while it could not be speeded up overnight, still an increased production was planned through the giving of high priorities to supplies for these developments.

Q. Was the priority given to supplies for Manchurian shale oil changed during the war?

A. This was high on the priority list even before the war but it was further increased at this time.

XXX

Q. During 1944, about 40% of Manchurian-produced pig iron and steel went into the building of new plants and commercial and civilian uses in Manchuria at a time when the Japanese war industries had already been forced to cut down on the production of guns and ammunition. What efforts were made to secure for Japan proper a larger share of Manchurian iron and steel?

A. I don't know about this 40% of which you speak. The use of Manchurian production was generally determined through talks between the two countries and most of Manchurian production would go into the war effort, so I wonder if this 40% to civilian production was not used indirectly also in the war effort so that actually what went into Manchuria was negligible.

Q. Is it your opinion that that is a fact?

A. I think that is the situation.

Q. So far as you knew, the Manchurian economy was completely integrated with the Japanese war economy and the distribution of scarce materials was controlled completely from Japan?

A. As the war developed, the integration between Japanese and Manchurian economies became more and more definite, but I would not say that decisions were made arbitrarily in Japan, for these decisions were always reached in conversations between the two countries, but as Japan became more and more pressed, Manchuria would make a greater effort to bear a greater share of war demands.

Q. Did any differences of opinion arise as to the use of Manchurian resources?

A. Yes, there were discussions on this matter, particularly within Japan.

Q. Where a difference of opinion could not be settled by discussion, who had the final word?

A. As I explained the other day, such differences of opinion were settled by the Joint Japanese-Manchurian Economic Conference.

Q. How many votes did each of the parties on the Committee have?

A. Four each.

Q. Were there never times when the vote was 50-50?

A. No, there was not.

Q. Was the vote always unanimous?

A. Generally, the discussions were carried to the point where the final agreement was unanimous.

Q. In other words, there were no issues which arose over the use of Manchurian resources in the war effort which could not be settled by complete agreement of all parties?

A. That is right as far as these deliberations went.

Q. What does the qualification mean?

A. Well, there were, of course, many discussions which led up to these final decisions.

Q. And, you were always satisfied that Japan was getting everything out of Manchuria which could be got?

A. Yes, I was satisfied. I think that Manchuria rendered full help. Of course, Japan was actually in the fighting but Manchuria did what she could from her standpoint.

Q. And, the Manchurian civilian economy was cut down as much as the Japanese?

A. Manchuria probably was not cut down as much as Japan but inasmuch as she was not directly engaged in the fighting, perhaps the extent in which she engaged was all that could be expected. But, it is true, that either directly or indirectly, Manchuria, too, suffered considerably cut-down in her economy.

Q. But, she was not expected to make the same kind of contribution as Japan proper made?

A. Yes, that is right.

Tokyo, Japan
5 August 1946

I, T. A. Bisson, do hereby certify that I was connected with the Headquarters, U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), an agency of the United States of America, and that in such capacity I was present at the interrogations of HOSHINO, Naoki in Tokyo on the 19th, 22nd, and 28th November 1945;

I do hereby certify that I was one of the interrogators and that the attached copy of said interrogations number 505 is a copy of the interrogations now on file in Washington, D. C. with the War Department.

-s- T. A. Bisson
T. A. BISSON

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, E. E. Danly, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G.H.Q., S.C.A.P., and as such have possession, custody and control of original or copies of documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That Document 2117 contains the interrogation, No. 505, of Hoshino, Naoki, by the Headquarters, U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Basic) at Tokyo, Japan, on 19, 22, 28 November 1945.

3. I do hereby certify that a copy of the interrogation above referred to was delivered to me in my official capacity from the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey and that the copy so delivered to me has at all times been in my possession as Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G.H.Q., S.C.A.P.

Dated, August 5, 1946

/s/ E. E. Danly
E. E. DANLY

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EXCERPT FROM INTERROGATION OF HOSHINO, Naoki, DATED 19,22,28 NOV 45

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- Q. My question is - did you believe that if a war came with the United States, you could win such a war?
- A. Rather than the thought of whether we would win or not, the big thing was that we would try to settle the issues with America and there was considerable feeling that the thing could be settled. Of course, I suppose we thought if we did go to war we could probably win.
- Q. Did you have any exact plan as to how you expected to win?
- A. Of course, about those specific things, you would have to talk with the War and Navy Ministers because I was not in on the details or plans they had. However, from my own viewpoint and perhaps others, I felt that in the early stages of the war, Japan would be able to occupy a great deal of the Far East and with the materials such as oil and other things which we would thus acquire, it was felt we would be able to carry the war on for a long time and hold on to the countries we had occupied. There was never any thought of course of gaining a decisive victory over America, i.e., of landing on the American continent and bringing America to her knees - we felt that America, for her part, would be unable to subdue the Far East and that eventually we would work out some sort of an understanding in a sort of negotiated peace.
- Q. Would you have felt that such a termination would be possible had you known that Germany would be defeated by Russia and the rest of the Allies?
- A. No, I don't think we would have held the same opinions.
- Q. Why didn't Japan wait until it saw whether or not the Germans would actually capture Moscow and defeat Russia before attacking the U. S.?
- A. I don't think that at that time Japan was relying too much on Germany and while it is true that plans might have been different had Germany's defeat been foreseen, the question seemed to center around the issues between Japan and America, and it was accelerated by the American attitude toward China.
- Q. But you did say, as I understand it, that had you believed that Germany would be defeated, you would not have believed it possible to bring the war to a successful conclusion through a negotiated peace. If that is so, I will have to repeat my question -- Why did not you wait and make sure?
- A. While it was not felt necessarily that Germany would gain an immediate victory over Russia, neither did anyone think that Germany would be knocked-out so easily.

- Q. Is it a fact then that you expected there would be a long continued European war which would tend to keep the U. S. worried about the situation in Europe, as well as the situation in the Far East, and thus prevent the U. S. from bringing its full weight to bear against Japan?
- A. There was undoubtedly more or less that kind of thinking.

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- Q. Was there any other kind of thinking in regard to it also? I don't want you to say "Yes" because I put the question in that form if you do not really mean that. If you have something else in mind, that is what I would like.
- A. Yes, there was undoubtedly that feeling.
- Q. Was that an important factor?
- A. - Yes, it probably was an important factor.
- Q. Was it a determining factor? Would they have been willing to go to war had they felt the situation would have been different?
- A. I don't think this was a decisive factor. It is true that in any discussions or thought of winning the war, such a proposition would be taken into consideration. I think the question of primary importance was that Japan felt that she was fighting for her own existence and if that were threatened, she would fight regardless of other factors.
- Q. That is, whether she thought she would win or lose, she would fight rather than retire from China?
- A. Yes, that is the situation.

* * *

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- Q. You were Cabinet Secretary from the beginning of the Tojo Cabinet until its fall, as I understand it?
- A. Yes, that's right.
- Q. I wonder if you could give us for each year beginning with 1942, the major problems of the Japanese war economy? In detail - not merely saying shipping or something like that, but what particular thing worried them the most?
- A. 1942 was a period of positive advance in the war and our biggest problem during that year was the question as to how we would make the most effective use of the resources that

we acquired in the territories that we occupied. The mobilization of these materials progressed very smoothly in the early stages of that program but after the battles of Midway and Guadalcanal, the mobilization did not progress as smoothly as we would like.

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- Q. Were the plans which had been prepared in advance found to be appropriate for the development of those areas - Did you find it was necessary to bring in more resources from Japan or less than you had figured?
- A. Up until August 1942 the mobilization of these newly acquired resources exceeded expectations.

* * *

- Page 26 Q. If everything had gone better than you expected in taking over the N.E.I., and Malaya and the Philippines, why wasn't your consumption of military products less rather than you had figured it would be?
- A. We did get along very nicely at first and our plans worked out famously but particularly after the battle of Guadalcanal the interference with our holding of these newly captured resources to Japan was interfered with by submarines and other means, and that is one reason why our plans did not develop as nicely as we had expected. There is another reason and that was this: The battles of Guadalcanal and other battles at that time consumed a great deal more in the line of ammunition and ships, etc. than we had planned.
- Q. Was the expenditure of military products in the early campaigns, during which they captured the Philippines, Malay and the N.E.I., greater or less than anticipated?
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