

Doc. 2253 Evid.

Folder 14

(11)

2253

INTERROGATION OF 29 Feb 1946

I do not recall the subject Sadeo Araki was Inspector for the War
 Minister to visit the Navy Minister to discuss the troops from a landing
 battle. The objective of the visit was to drive away the Nicobara
 Date and Time: 19 February 1946, 1345-1630 Hours
 Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan
 Present : Sadeo Araki
 Elton M. Hyder, Interrogator
 Tashio Saiki, Interpreter

Oath of Interpreter administered by Mr. Hyder.

BY MR. HYDER: Mr. Saiki, do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you
 will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into
 Japanese and from Japanese into English, as may be required of you, in
 this proceeding?

BY MR. SAIKI: I do.

After I became War Minister, I discussed the policy of the occupation
 of General CHANG's four provinces to clear up the Manchurian situation. After
 I had made the plan up myself with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister,
 and the Finance Minister, all agreed with me. The Prime Minister approached
 the Privy Council for approval.

The Japanese naval commander ordered the landing of troops in Shanghai
 on January 28, 1932. I do not remember discussions in the Cabinet. The
 Cabinet could not recall the troops because the battle was going on. I do
 not think the attack was to cripple the Chinese boycott. I do not remember
 that it was discussed in the Cabinet. They did discuss the means of ending
 the incident. The naval commander in Shanghai reported the landing to the
 Navy Minister who reported it to the Cabinet, and that was the first time I
 heard of it. Since the Navy Minister said it could be settled quickly, no
 one was worried. On February the 2nd or 3rd, the Navy Minister came to me
 and stated that due to the hard fight, the naval forces might be destroyed
 and could the army send some forces. I conferred with the Cabinet and it was
 agreed that the army would send supporting forces quickly. Troops were sent
 the following day on destroyers to Shanghai.

At the Cabinet meeting, the Foreign, Finance, Prime, War and Navy Ministers
 at least were there. I think it was agreed to send one and one-half divisions.
 These were sent. Approximately ten thousand men. It was after the Cabinet
 approval that I ordered that troops be sent and also that the incident be
 localized. The troops were sent as support for the Navy, the Navy waging a
 losing war against the Chinese Nineteenth Route Army.

58-50

MAR 6 1946

Interrogation of Sadeo Araki

19 Feb 1946

I do not know the object of the Navy. It was improper for the War Minister to tell the Navy Minister to withdraw its troops from a losing battle. The mistake of the army troops was to drive away the Nineteenth Route Army or disarm its troops, because the Navy and the Chinese army were at war. After this was done, the Japanese government (War, Navy, and Foreign Affairs Ministers) planned to talk to the Nanking government to decide whether they wanted Japanese troops to remain in that area (Shanghai) until security was restored or to withdraw them to Japan.

The first division I sent was under General UEDA, but since he suffered great losses and was having difficulties, I sent another supporting division and when the Nineteenth Army heard of this, they started to withdraw and at that time General SHIRAKAWA either talked to the Nanking government or with the Nanking Army and urged that fighting cease. Just before the supporting division landed, the battle was concluded. After this conclusion, a representative of the League of Nations, a representative from Japan and from China came to an agreement that Japan should have one Japanese brigade remain in that area, but I thought all troops should be withdrawn from China.

CERTIFICATE OF INTERPRETER

I, Tashio Saiki, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the statements from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English, and that the above statements, consisting of one and one-half pages are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this ____ day of February, 1946.

Tashio Saiki
Elton M. Hyder, Civilian
Duly Detailed Investigating Officer
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP

CERTIFICATE OF INTERROGATOR

I, Elton M. Hyder, certify that on the 19th day of February 1946 personally appeared before me Sadeo Araki, and according to Tashio Saiki gave the foregoing statements set forth therein.

Elton M. Hyder
Elton M. Hyder, Civilian

CHARGE OUT SLIP

DATE JUL 1 - 1946

EVIDENTIARY LOC. NO. 2253

TRIAL BRIEF _____

EXHIBIT NO. 187-F

BACKGROUND LOC. NO. _____

SIGNATURE Sackett

ROOM NO. 328

*Original presented
in court*

EXHIBIT NO. 2220

Doc. No. 2253-C

Page 1

Extract from Interrogation of Sadao Araki, 19 February 1946,
1345-1630 hrs, p. 1.

After I became War Minister, I discussed the policy of the occupation of General CHANG's four provinces to clear up the Manchurian situation. After I had made the plan up myself with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the Finance Minister, all agreed with me. The Prime Minister approached the Privy Council for approval.

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

一九四六年／昭和二十一年／二月十九日

自午後一時四十五分

至午後四時三十分

荒木貞夫ニ對スル訊問ヨリノ抜萃

第一頁

私ガ陸軍大臣ニナツテ後私ハ滿洲情勢ヲ明カニスル爲張將軍ノ四省ノ占領政策ヲ論議シマシタ。私自身總理大臣、外務大臣及ビ大藏大臣ト相談シテ計畫ヲ作成シマシタ。ソシテ一同ハ私ニ同意シマシタ。ノ斯クシテ／總理大臣ハ承認ヲ得ル爲樞密顧問會議ニ交渉シマシタ。

EX 2220 Doc 2253c

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EX 2221

Excerpts from ARAKI, Sadao Interrogation, 19 February 1946

The Japanese naval commander ordered the landing of troops in Shanghai on January 28, 1932. I do not remember discussions in the Cabinet. The Cabinet could not recall the troops because the battle was going on. I do not think the attack was to cripple the Chinese boycott. I do not remember that it was discussed in the Cabinet. They did discuss the means of ending the incident. The naval commander in Shanghai reported the landing to the Navy Minister who reported it to the Cabinet, and that was the first time I heard of it. Since the Navy Minister said it could be settled quickly, no one was worried. On February the 2nd or 3rd, the Navy Minister came to me and stated that due to the hard fight, the naval forces might be destroyed and could the army send some forces. I conferred with the Cabinet and it was agreed that the army would send supporting forces quickly. Troops were sent the following day on destroyers to Shanghai.

At the Cabinet meeting, the Foreign, Finance, Prime, War and Navy Ministers at least were there. I think it was agreed to send one and one-half divisions. These were sent. Approximately ten thousand men. It was after the Cabinet approval that I ordered that troops be sent and also that the incident be localized. The troops were sent as support for the Navy, the Navy waging a losing war against the Chinese Nineteenth Route Army.

.....

The first division I sent was under General UDEN, but since he suffered great losses and was having difficulties, I sent another supporting division and when the Nineteenth Army heard of this, they started to withdraw and at that time General SHIRAKAWA either talked to the Nanking government or with the Nanking Army and urged that fighting cease. Just before the supporting division landed, the battle was concluded. After this conclusion, a representative of the League of Nations, a representative from Japan and from China came to an agreement that Japan should have one Japanese brigade remain in that area, but I thought all troops should be withdrawn from China.

FILE COPY
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Doc 2253 B

書類第二二五三一B號


× × × × ×

日本海軍ノ指揮官ハ一九三二年一月二十八日上
海ニ於テ軍隊ノ上陸ヲ命令シタ。私ハ閣議ニ於ケ
ル論議ヲ記憶シテキナイ。戦鬪カ進行シテキタノ
テ、内閣ハ軍隊ヲ呼ビ戻スコトガ出来ナカツタ。
私ハソノ攻撃ガ中國ノ日貨「ボイコット」ヲ敢行
セシメル爲デアツタトハ思ハナイ。私ハ閣議テソ
ノコトガ論議サレタトハ記憶シテキナイ。閣議テ
ハ事變終結ノ方法ガ論議サレタ。上海ノ海軍指揮
官カ上陸ヲ海軍大臣ニ報告シ、海軍大臣ハソレヲ
閣議ニ報告シタ。ソシテ私ガソノコトヲ耳ニシタ
ノハソレカ初メデアツタ。海軍大臣ガ、ソレハ
速カニ解決サレ得ルト言ツタノテ誰モ心配シナカ
ツタ。二月ノ二日カ三日ニ海軍大臣ガ私ノトコロ
へ來テ、苦戦ダカラ海軍ノ兵力チハ破レルカモ知
レナイ。陸軍テ若干兵力ノ派遣カ出来ルカト言ツ
タ。私ハ閣議ニ語リ、陸軍カ速カニ増援隊ヲ派遣
スルコトニ意見ノ一致ヲ見タ。軍隊カ翌日曠逐艦
テ上海向ケ派遣サレタ。
閣議ニハ少クトモ外務、大藏、總理、陸軍、海軍
ノ各大臣カ出席シテキタ。

一個師團半ヲ派遣スルコトニ意見カ儘ツタヤソニ
思フ。コレカ派遣サレタ。約一萬ノ兵員デアツタ。
私カ軍隊ヲ派遣セヨト命令シ同時ニ事變ヲ局地化
セヨト命令シタノハ閣議承認ヲ待タ後デアツタ。
軍隊ハ中國第十九路軍ニ對シテ敗ケ戦ラシテキタ
海軍ノ増援隊トシテ派遣セラレタノデアツタ。

× × × × ×

私カ派遣シタ最初ノ師團ハ植田將軍ノ指揮下ニ
アツタガ植田ハ大損害ヲ喫シテ難局ニ立到ツタノ
デ、私ハモウ一個師團増援ニ派遣シタ。ソシテ十
九路軍ハ此ノコトヲ耳ニシテ撤退ヲ始メタ。ソシ
テソノ頃ニ白河將軍カ南京政府或ハ南京軍ト語合
ツテ戦闘中止ヲ勸告シタ。増援師團ガ上陸スル直
前ニ戦闘ハ終結シタ。之ガ終結後國際聯盟代表ト
日本ト中國ノ代表ニヨリ、日本ハソノ地域ニ日本
軍一個旅團ヲ殘留セシムベシトノ協定ガ成立シタ、
併シ私ハ全軍隊ヲ中國カラ撤退スベキデアルト考
ヘタ。



INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2248 to 2257 inclusive

26 June 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Interrogation of ARAKI, Sadao

Date: See below Original Copy Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Document Division

PERSONS IMPLICATED: ARAKI, Sadao

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Date of Interrogation</u>	<u>Exhibit No.</u>
2248	12 March 1946	290
2249	8 February 1946	230
2250	7 February 1946	232
2251	15 February 1946	290
2252	13 February 1946	290
2253	19 February 1946	290
2254	11 February 1946	290
2255	8 March 1946	290
2256	21 February 1946	290
2257	7 March 1946	290

Analyst: C. W. J. Phelps

Doc. Nos. 2248 to 2257
inclusive

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2253

Date 26 June 46

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Transcript, Interrogation of
ARAKI, Sadao

Date: 19 Feb 46 Original Copy Language: Eng

Has it been translated? Yes No
Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Doc. Div.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: I. P. S. (see our Case File # 58)

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

ARAKI, Sadao.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Interrogation of ARAKI by Mr. Hyder.

Analyst:

CW Phelps

Doc. No.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

26 June 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. JOHN DARSEY
FROM : Calhoun W. J. Phelps, Asst. Chief,
Document Division
SUBJECT : Re-numbering of Interrogations of ARAKI,
Sadao.

1. Due to the necessity of presenting to the Tribunal single copies of each interrogation, in the original, the following system of numbering of such interrogations has been set up and cross-reference should be made to your document numbers (10,001 to 10,008):

<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Date of Interrogation</u>
2249	8 Feb 46
2250	7 Feb 46
2251	15 Feb 46
2252	13 Feb 46
2253	19 Feb 46
2254	11 Feb 46
2255	8 Mar 46
2256	21 Feb 46
2257	7 Mar 46

2. It is suggested that subsequent to the initial presentation of these interrogations, you refer to them by the Tribunal exhibit number.

Calhoun W. J. Phelps
CALHOUN W. J. PHELPS

6 CC: 1-Mr. Eugene Williams
1-Capt. Salmons
1-Lt. Alexander
1-Miss Brunner
1-S/Sgt. Overfelt
1-Mr. Buckho
(9)-1 cy. ea. file.