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HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO: 8

PLACE: Tokyo
DATE : 4 October 1945
TIME : 1000

Division of Origin: Civilian Defense

SUBJECT: 1. Population Control and Statistics
2. Operation and Damage Reports
3. Chemicals (Gas Warfare)

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Mr ODACHI, Shigeo. Positions held:
April 1942 to July 1943 - Mayor of Singapore
July 1943 to July 1944 - Mayor of Tokyo
July 1944 to April 1945 - Minister of Home Affairs

Where interviewed: Meiji Building

Interrogator : Col J. B. Warden

Interpreter: Lt. O Cary, USNR

Allied Officers Present: Lt F. H. Lewis, USNR

SUMMARY:

Civilian Defense was turned over to Air Defense Headquarters in the Ministry of Home Affairs, 1943 when it became apparent that the job was too big for the Air Defense Bureau. When Mr ODACHI returned to Tokyo in July 1943 there was still no evidence of defense preparation. Execution of air defense edicts was the responsibility of the governors of prefectures who were allowed latitude in their interpretation. The various functions of the Civilian Defense Section and General Affairs Section were not clearly delineated by Mr ODACHI, who suggests HOTTA, Takeo, formerly head of the Business Section as a source of information regarding Civilian Defense organization.

Some government financial aid was granted to prefectures to assist in defense and for the purchase of fire fighting equipment. In the spring of 1944 critical materials were no longer allocated to fire fighting equipment. The government did not aid in the construction of air raid shelters. High loss of life was not anticipated until after the first incendiary raid on Tokyo in which those shelters which did exist afforded little protection. Following a raid the Home Affairs Ministry made efforts to provide victims with medical aid. Nothing was done to provide emergency housing and little was done to provide food.

No defense was organized against possible gas attacks by the Allies. Camouflage of non-military factories, a responsibility of Ministry of Home Affairs, was not undertaken. Training of Civilian Air Defense personnel came under Ministry of Home Affairs. Mr ODACHI believed that measures taken by the national government for civilian protection were adequate until a year ago and since that time the government did all it could. He feels that the measures were, in some degree, effective. Damage and casualty statistics for Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki are appended.

INTERROGATION

Symbols: Q - Question by the interrogator.
A - Answer by the witness
AI - Answer supplied by the interpreter.

- Q. Prior to 1943, which Bureau of the Ministry of Home Affairs handled Civilian Defense?
- A. Prior to the present set up, it was handled by BOKUKYOKU - the Air Defense Bureau.
- Q. About what time did the Air Defense Bureau undertake the planning of national civilian defense?
- A. This division was incorporated in the City Planning Bureau. The Ministry of Home Affairs has undertaken civilian defense for a great many years. There was established something of a centralized bureau which did the planning for city defense. This begun just previous to the China Incident, about 1934. They had mock air raid drills, etc.
- Q. Will Mr ODACHI examine this chart and confirm its accuracy? (Chart shown in Appendix "A").
- A. Mr ODACHI feels that the governors should come under each of the various boards. In almost every department the governors took orders from such departments.
- Q. Can he prepare, or secure, for me a table of organization chart of the Ministry of Home Affairs? Is there anyone who could give us such a chart for the period for the period in which Mr ODACHI was a member of the Cabinet?
- A. Yes, Mr ODACHI can secure such a chart.
- Q. We would like to have the overall table of organization of the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Air Defense General Headquarters breakdown, specifically in detail?
- A. Mr ODACHI says that he can get such a chart.
- Q. What effect did the first raid on Tokyo (the Doolittle raid) have on civilian defense planning and execution of instructions, etc?
- A. Mr ODACHI was in Singapore at the time of the raid, so he is not sure that any changes were made, but when he arrived back he was surprised at how little preparations had been made. He would estimate that perhaps some documents were turned out as to how to prepare for raids, but nothing much. He attributes that largely to the fact that the government was loath to have the people build shelters because they get excited about such things. He is almost sure that absolutely nothing had been done.
- Q. What was the plan or reason for abandoning the Air Defense Bureau and establishing the Air Defense Headquarters in the Ministry of Home Affairs?
- A. Because of the final realization of the fact that they would have to maintain liaison with the Ministry of Welfare, the Ministry of Agriculture and forestry, etc., which would be so great and they were not prepared to cope with it.

They realized that it was not just a job putting out fires, but also one of rationing and labor, so they had to increase the stature of general civilian defense so that it could deal with the proper ministry in the proper way. They just got set up when the air raids started.

- Q. What was the responsibility of the governors of the prefectures with regard to the execution of civilian defense plans?
- A. Their responsibility was complete in their areas. The whole thing was up to the governors, except for the Tokyo municipal area, which was a sort of dual setup with the police department. It was the responsibility of the governors to carry out the edicts of civilian defense protection that emanated from the national level.
- Q. Did the governors possess any discretionary power as to the application of these measures for the conduct of their people? Was there any elasticity allowed in the execution of these orders? Could they place their own interpretation on edicts having to do with the conduct of their people?
- A. The edicts were direct orders from Tokyo and there were other general orders issued, but the method of realization was left up to each governor.
- Q. Then each governor could put his own interpretation on the orders received from Tokyo?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What was the general function of the General Affairs Section under the Civilian Defense Bureau?
- A. Personnel, planning, and all the work keeping records.
- Q. Did they recruit the personnel for the staffing of the offices on a national level, or just what was the set-up?
- A. No, they just secured personnel within the Defense Headquarters.
- Q. Did the General Affairs Section recommend the required manning tables for each prefecture and city establishment of civilian defense organizations?
- A. No. That was left to the judgment of the local political subdivisions.
- Q. Just what did the planning consist of?
- A. Mr ODACHI is not sure to what extent the planning division was broken down. Their main problem was taking care of what buildings to tear down, which ones to leave standing; how to diminish personnel in cities by means of evacuation, and how to secure food supplies for cities after a raid. Those seemed to be their main problems.
- Q. Did this section also plan post-raid care of people and post-raid payment of claims?
- A. That was not one of their primary concerns; however, they did attempt some advisory work along those lines.

- Q. Was that the responsibility of the local city administration?
- A. Yes, it was.
- Q. What is the name of the individual who headed this section under Mr ODACHI's regime?
- A. NAGANO, Hisamatsu.
- Q. Who was head of the General Affairs Section?
- A. The same man, NAGANO, Hisamatsu.
- Q. Under the Civilian Defense Section, who was the responsible person in charge under Mr. ODACHI's regime?
- A. KUMAGAI, Ken.
- Q. When Mr ODACHI had a deputy director who did most of the work?
- A. Yes, that was KUMAGAI, Ken, who is now the governor of Hokkaido.
- Q. What was the function of the Civilian Defense Section?
- A. He is not too sure that there was a Civilian Defense Section as such, but he can get hold of a "TQ" for us, showing the names of each person.
- Q. Can he give us a simple breakdown or a guide to work on regarding the function of the Civilian Defense Section?
- A. Evidently the General Affairs Section is over all the other Sections, and he thinks there was a Policy Section instead of a Civilian Defense Section, and yet most of the work was done in the General Affairs Section, just the printing-up and that sort of work was done elsewhere. He is not sure of the administrative section.
- Q. What was the function of the business section?
- A. By a large part this Section took care of the ration problems and getting food back in after raids, and liaison with the Welfare Ministry.
- Q. Were they in charge of the rationing of the total populace?
- A. Just emergency rationing after the raids.
- Q. What other functions did they perform?
- AI. He is not sure. When he gets hold of the chart he has in mind he will be able to tell us.
- Q. What was the name of his principal deputy who handled these subjects?
- A. Everyone of section head level is a governor now, and KUMAGAI is well informed on this, but is now "farmed out" as a governor and is not located in the city. HOTTA, Takeo, former head of the Business Section, is now the head of the Bureau of Roads, and is now in town.

- Q. Would he be familiar with the whole setup of the Civilian Defense Division?
- A. Yes, he would.
- Q. What bureau of government set up the air raid warning system?
- AI. He is not sure. He estimates that it was a military function and the whole system was set up by the military.
- Q. Did the national government appropriate any funds to assist the prefectures of the cities in establishing civilian defense protection?
- A. There was a certain amount of aid given from national funds.
- Q. Specifically, for what purposes and how much money?
- AI. He is not at all certain of the exact figure. There was no limit to what they could ask for from the Ministry of Finance and what was given to each city.
- Q. Did they expend any funds for the purchase of fire-fighting equipment to augment apparatus already in use?
- AI. Yes, they did. Whatever they felt necessary they would give.
- Q. Did they buy any protective equipment for the individual cities such as sand pails, shovels, stirrup pumps, gas masks, or other items?
- A. Yes, they bought what they could.
- Q. Was the contract let by the national government and then turned over to the various cities; how was it done?
- AI. They would help them out on contracts for various equipment especially bigger fire-fighting equipment. Through the various ministers they would get the contracts and the rights to certain amounts of material and often it was on a subsidization basis. Locally, they would supply a certain percentage or the Ministry of Finance would supply so much.
- Q. Did they grant a certain priority to purchase a piece of fire-fighting apparatus during war time?
- A. The priority to manufacture was determined by the Munitions Ministry and they held the materials in various warehouses and they also held the fire-fighting equipment which they would issue to the cities, and the government paid for it. They could not get much fire-fighting equipment because the Munitions Ministry needed the material for other purposes.
- Q. At what period of the war did they make the decision not to use critical materials for fire protection equipment?
- A. Some time during the spring of last year (1944).
- Q. On what basis was the fire-fighting equipment given to the city; was it a loan or an outright grant?

A. The equipment was given over completely as an outright grant.

Q. Can Mr ODACHI have prepared for me a statement giving the approximate contribution of the national government for the purpose of protective equipment, and a list of the types of equipment; such as fire pumps, hose, ladders, and all other supplemental items?

AI. Yes, he can do so.

Q. I would like to have the approximate distribution to the larger cities; in other words, how was this equipment allocated?

AI. Mr ODACHI can supply that information.

Q. What was the air raid shelter policy during his regime?

A. There was no policy and they recommended no policy. Mr ODACHI says it is a rather embarrassing story. They ran into many obstacles, especially in regard to the military. The military stepped in and told them what to do and how to dig shelters, etc., but there was no definite policy laid down. They did recommend that tops be put on all the shelters.

Q. Did the national government assist in the financing of the construction of these shelters?

A. No.

Q. What was the reason that they did not have a policy for protection of the citizens? Was it because of the low value they place on human life, couldn't they finance it, or just what was the reason?

AI. It was taken for granted that the thing to do was to save human lives, but how to go about it in the case of air raids and fire bombing was a question they never went into until the raids actually occurred, and after that it was too late and they just had to get by with what they had.

Q. Was manpower so plentiful that they could afford to hazard the loss of so many people in one raid?

A. They attribute the loss of life to two things; (1) that because Tokyo lies in a very flat plain and the fire spread rapidly, and (2) because of the high winds that were generally blowing during fire bombings. As far as the shelters themselves were concerned, the people didn't put much faith in them after the first fire bombing. Mr ODACHI points out that in one of the best shelters in Tokyo the occupants were burned six deep.

Q. Were the Japanese working under the assumption that they were immune from devastating air raids by our forces, or that we would be unable to get close enough to them to strike?

AI. They were not expecting to be raided. It was just that the raids finally did come and then the only instructions were to dig a shelter.

- Q. After the Yawata raid, did the government undertake any intensified planning for complete protection of the public?
- AI. No materials, especially cement, were allocatable; however, after the Yawata raid, and the raids coming after that, they did advise that shelters be dug, and they did dig extra shelters at government expense and advised that tops be put on all the shelters.
- Q. Then there was some cognizance taken of the danger and some planning done?
- A. Yes.
- Q. To what extent was the planning successful; did they just have a plan and recommend it and never follow it through to prosecution?
- AI. The general conclusion is that there were enough shelters before the Yawata raid, but it was easily realized that they were not deep enough. It would have been difficult to build more shelters then, because most of the ruins had shelters in them and the people were still killed.
- Q. What was the attitude of his Imperial Majesty, the Emperor, toward protection of the people in shelters? Was it brought to his attention?
- A. After the results of the first raid had been submitted to him, he showed great concern for his subjects, and always wanted the maximum of care to be taken. Upon other occasions when the other ministers visited him he voiced as much concern.
- Q. We understand that they did not prepare to any great extent for the use of poison gas; is that correct?
- AI. Due to a lack of materials they did not bother to make gas masks.
- Q. Did they expect the Americans to use poison gas on them?
- AI. They weren't sure, and wanted to question the military about that particular problem, but the military never gave any information on the subject.
- Q. Wasn't the matter discussed at the cabinet level as to whether or not we would use poison gas?
- AI. Not while Mr ODAKI was a member of the cabinet.
- Q. What was their reason for not preparing for gas other than the lack of material?
- A. They had no other reason. The public had been indoctrinated to a certain extent by pamphlets, but inasmuch as they had no masks there was no preparation.
- Q. Were they prepared to accept the inevitable result if our forces had used poison gas to a large degree?
- AI. Yes, they were.
- Q. Were the problems of the development and use of an atomic bomb before its use ever discussed in a cabinet meeting?

A. No.

Q. Had they discussed with the Emperor the possibility of such a weapon?

AI. No.

Q. In the Home Affairs Ministry, what plans were laid to take care of bombed or burned out people following a raid; such as emergency housing, emergency mass feeding and emergency medical care?

AI. Maximum efforts were made in the way of procuring medical supplies and equipment. Negotiations had been made in the line of procuring doctors and nurses. In the way of housing, nothing concrete was done, and regarding food, it was left to the time, place and intensity of the bombing.

Q. Did they dispatch doctors and nurses to the scene of the raids, and were they prepared to take care of the people who had been bombed out?

AI. The situation was able to be taken care of locally at all times, but they had no emergency relief set up.

The interview was adjourned at 1200 hours.

The interview with Mr ODACHI was resumed at 1400, 4 Oct 45.

Q. Did the Japanese have any confidence in camouflage preparations which we have noticed throughout Japan?

A. They had very little confidence in camouflage as such, and employed it only in a haphazard fashion.

Q. Did they abandon the idea of camouflaging buildings and structures at any time during the war?

AI. The only abandonment of any scheme was at first they were responsible for camouflaging the entire country; then when they worked on it they found that the Munitions Ministry was going to take care of camouflaging factories, etc., and the result was that they did not bother with much of anything. The factories were entirely within the scope of the Munitions Ministry.

Q. Was all factory protection under the Munition Ministry's care or did it come under Mr ODACHI's Ministry?

AI. There were two types of factories; the factories which were under the responsibility of the Munitions Ministry, and the non-military factories, which did not get very far. It was the Ministry of Home Affairs responsibility to camouflage the latter, but they did not get started on them.

Q. Was it up to management to defray the expense of camouflaging their plants?

A. Yes, it was up to the individual concern to provide camouflage.

Q. Did the Ministry of Home Affairs devise any plan for factory protection or organization of workers into a protective organization in the plant?

A. Yes, they were organized into protection teams.

Q. In what phases of air raid protection were they organized; did they have air raid wardens, etc?

AI. When Mr ODACHI came back to the Empire, procedure along that line; rules, edicts, etc., had already been laid down, and often the people would stay at the factory overnight, living in the dormitories there. The organization was worked up along those channels. There were definite protection teams to take care of whatever might come up in the factory.

Mr ODACHI further explained that in Tokyo, local fire-fighting units were organized in factories under the police department with a 24 hour watch in shifts and their primary purpose was to put out fires and secondary purpose was to treat wounded and to keep food coming. On the other hand, in prefectural localities the same organizations carry out the same function under the prefectural governors and not the police. There is - or was - a sort of dual setup here in the Tokyo municipal area.

Q. Can you tell us just exactly what authority and where in the Civilian Defense organization, the police, on the national down to the local level, took part? What part did the police play in the plan of civilian defense?

AI. Generally speaking the police had responsibility only during the raid, but the department in Tokyo played a much more vital part.

Q. Who was in charge of training civilian defense personnel and what training measures were enunciated from a national level?

A. That was the responsibility of the police department.

Q. Who was in charge of training on the national level? What training measures were enunciated on the national level for use by the prefectures, cities, etc?

AI. It came under the Ministry of Home Affairs on a national level.

Q. Who had charge of this section under Mr. ODACHI's regime?

A. His name is FURUI, Yoshimu, at present the vice-minister of Home Affairs.

Q. What instructions did they issue from a national level on the evacuation of people from a city prior to a raid?

AI. That again was the responsibility of the Air Defense General Headquarters at which place they would work out the various problems of reimbursing people for travel, of sending out the orders to various local governors to evacuate to such and such an extent certain cities.

Q. Who, during Mr ODACHI's regime, handled the evacuation policy?

A. The #2 man in charge was NAGANO, Misanatsu.

Q. What measures did they take to mitigate the effect of our propaganda leaflets which were dropped on the cities?

AI. They were to be turned in to the police immediately. After the Suzuki cabinet was set up and Mr ODACHI got out of office there was much more trouble along that line, but the same rule held; they were to be turned over to the police immediately.

Q. During his time, did they attempt to counter with an explanation of them over the radio to the people, and what counter-measures were taken, if any?

AI. While Mr ODACHI was Minister there was none of that. The theory was that no one saw the leaflets.

Q. Does Mr ODACHI have any knowledge of any action taken by the "Thought Control Section" of the police department in regard to these leaflets?

AI. No, he does not know of any policy.

Q. Does he consider the measures taken for the protection of the people, in light of the subsequent attacks, adequate and all that could be expected from the national government?

AI. At first, or at least up until a year ago, they felt they were adequate, and since then have felt they did all they could.

Q. As a former cabinet member, does he feel that the measures taken were effective to a certain degree and did prevent some loss of life and property?

A. Yes, he definitely agrees.

APPENDIX A

THE RECORD OF THE SPECIAL AIR-RAID DAMAGE

CITY OF TOKYO

Referring to the result of the air-raid which caused a great deal of damage to the city, the following is the record of damage of Tokyo district:

- (1) Number of the big air-raids..... 6
- (2) Total of the dead..... 93,056
- (3) Total of the wounded..... 59,633
- (4) Total of the houses completely destroyed and burnt down 744,895
- (5) Total of the sufferers.....2,890,820

On the air-raid of March 9, 1945:

- (1) Time.....4 hours (from 11:30 PM on March 9 till 3:30 AM on March 10).
- (2) Kind and number of the planes..... B-29 380
- (3) Damage:
 - a. The destroyed area 12 ward of the central 35 ones of the city, such as Honyo, Fukagawa, Asakusa, Shitaya, Kanda, Nihonbashi, Joto, Ebogawa, Mukojima, Arakawa, Hongo and Adachi.
 - b. Total of the dead..... 78,660
 - c. Total of the wounded..... 42,380
 - d. Total of the houses completely destroyed and burnt down.....272,210
 - e. Total of the sufferers.....1,500,000

Of all the air raids of Tokyo, this one was the most severe and it destroyed the center of the city almost entirely. The reasons for causing such a great damage are presumed as follows:

- (1) Owing to the extremely bad weather, the big fire broke out very soon in broad area.
- (2) As the most of the area are surrounded by rivers and also face to the sea, it was extremely difficult for people to take refuge.

THE RECORD OF THE ATOMIC BOMB DAMAGE

HIROSHIMA

The following is the detail of the raid of Hiroshima with the atomic bomb:

- (1) Date.....about 8:16 AM on Aug 6 1945, after calling off the air-raid alarm.
- (2) Kind and number of the plane.. B-29 1.
- (3) Number of the dropped bomb.... 1 (atomic bomb)
- (4) Point.....At an altitude of 800 m. to 1000 m. at the south of Aioi Bridge in the center of the city.
- (5) Damage on the civilians reported to date:
 - (a) Total of the dead..... 63,600 round nos.
 - (b) Total of the wounded..... 64,670 " "
 - (c) Total of the houses completely destroyed and burnt down.....71,950 " "
 - (d) Total of the sufferers..... 335,650 " "

So the city of Hiroshima has been wiped out and moreover considerably many of the wounded has died afterwards, so it seems that the number of the dead is increasing still. As for the destructive power of the atomic bomb, you will have the following report:

1. Within a radius of 1 km: All the houses were completely destroyed and burnt down and all the humans and animals were killed instantly.
2. Within a radius of 2 km: All the houses were completely destroyed and burnt down and some humans and animals were killed instantly, while most of them were injured seriously or slightly.
3. Within a radius of 4 Km: Most houses were half destroyed, and some humans and animals were injured seriously or slightly.
4. Within a radius of 8 km: Most houses were half or partially destroyed and some humans and animals were injured seriously or slightly by the scattered things.
5. Within a radius of 15 km: The windowpanes, doors, and "Shoji's (Paper sliding doors) were broken down.

THE RECORD OF THE ATOMIC BOMB DAMAGE
NAGASAKI

The detail of the air raid of Nagasaki with the atomic bomb is as follows:

- (1) Date.....about 11:50 AM on Aug 9, 1945,
(during the air-raid alarm).
- (2) Kind and number of the planes..... B-29 3
- (3) Number of the dropped bomb..... 1 (atomic bomb)
- (4) Point.....At the north of the city
- (5) Damage on the civilians reported to date:
 - (a) Total of the dead..... 19,240 round nos.
 - (b) Total of the wounded..... 23,730 " "
 - (c) Total of the houses completely
destroyed and burnt down..... 14,140 " "
 - (d) Total of the sufferers..... 89,780 " "

So the important producing area and the northern part of the city were completely destroyed.