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STAFF PAPER PREPARED FOR
THE STEYN COMMISSION ON
ALLEGED DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES
OF SADF COMPONENTS

DECEMBER 1992

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OF SADF COMPONENTS**

INTRODUCTION

1. **Background.** Annexure A (attached) was compiled from various sources of information, and the document has already been handed to Lt-Gen Steyn. Based on the allegations contained in the document, the following has surfaced:
 - a. Some members, contractual workers and co-workers of certain SADF components were involved. In some instances they are still involved in illegal and unauthorised activities that are detrimental to the safety, interests and welfare of the state.
 - b. To a great extent some members of the senior command structure are trapped in the momentum of activities of the past, activities which are being subjected to prominent negative publicity at present. However, it cannot be ruled out that other members might be furthering an own agenda.
2. The conclusion reached after an all-inclusive examination of the information picture reflected in Annexure A, is that a revolutionary intervention will be required to eradicate all identified corrupt practices at once.
3. **Instruction.** Chief Director CI has instructed that the above information as well as other relevant information/intelligence be evaluated with a view to submit meaningful recommendations to the Steyn Commission.
4. **Aspects that will affect the execution of the assignment**
 - a. **Unverified information.** The greater part of the information available is unverified allegations that need to be substantiated/refuted before proper evaluation is possible. However, indications and weight of allegations were of such a nature that the all-inclusive information picture, as reflected by the allegations, could serve as point of departure in the argument.

- b. **Period.** The short period allowed for a very comprehensive assignment might have a negative effect on the quality and evaluation.
- c. **Manpower.** The sensitive nature of the matter has required that only one person could handle the matter.

OBJECTIVE

- 5. The purpose of the document is to make recommendations for action in respect of alleged precarious activities of components/individuals in the SADF on the basis of an evaluation of available information.

AREA

- 6. The report is structured as follows:
 - a. Evaluation/summary of/comment on information of precarious activities as contained in Annexure A. Details appear in Annexure B.
 - b. Evaluation/summary of/comment on information of individuals mentioned in Annexure A and detailed in Annexure C.
 - c. Summary of other relevant information/intelligence at the disposal of Division Intelligence (SDCI) that has been submitted to the Steyn Commission, and of which particulars are contained in Annexure D, E and F.
 - d. List of general conclusions.
 - e. Comment on possible actions.
 - f. Recommendations.

EVALUATION/SUMMARY OF/COMMENT ON INFORMATION OF PRECARIOUS ACTIVITIES OF SADF COMPONENTS

- 7. Annexure A is a complete base document containing precarious activities of SADF

b. Allegation regarding DCC

- i. Allegedly, especially members of the Terrorism Section are involved in destabilisation actions against the ANC on own initiative and in cooperation with Brig Ferdie Van Wyk of GS2, Col Mielie Prinsloo of Directorate Reconnaissance (Special Forces) and Col Eugene De Kock of the SAP. A specific group of persons is said to include individuals whose agenda includes the discrediting of the AN; instigation of violence; facilitation for the failure of negotiations with the Government, etc. Alternatively, previous approved projects/actions are continued in a self-perpetuating manner or extended on own initiative to maintain an official slant.
- ii. A proper evaluation of alleged activities on the basis of a "miscalculation table" ("verrekeningblad ???") with a view to come to a meaningful conclusion, is not feasible without further investigations and knowledge of normal duties of those involved. Whether additional alleged activities have been officially sanctioned or not (including instructing PAC members to murder AN members in Transkei; involvement to overthrow Holomisa; the training and arming of IFP members and involvement in SAP Col Eugene De Kock's Askaris), they are not in line with the Government's political objectives. This could create a serious credibility problem for the SADF and the Government.
- iii. Allegedly various DCC members are involved in corruption or criminal activities, which likewise might lead to serious embarrassment for the SADF and the Government. It would appear that individuals involved in the above agendas integrate them in such a way with activities of an official nature that not only court-related evidence is being hampered, but those concerned might also implicate the SADF as "partner" (which is not the case).
- iv. Conclusions
 - (1) An incisive investigation of the mandate and objectives of Section Terrorism is required. Other official instructions to individuals (such as an alleged assignment to Col At Nel to render intelligence support for discrediting actions), as well as their activities in this regard also require incisive investigation.

components, compiled from source reports. Further details of the events appear in Annexure B.

8. Essential aspects regarding the SADF components can be summarised as follows:

a. **Directorate Reconnaissance (Special Forces)**

- i. It would appear that Project Pastoor had served as a peg for nearly all official operations/activities of Directorate Reconnaissance. In terms of the Project's objectives, it would appear that the Project had come into being in view of the conventional threat. However, the Project is still running. At the same time, it would appear that individuals are abusing Project Pastoor for activities not in line with Government policy, e.g. alleged weapons caches in Portugal for utilisation during an internal uprising, weapons caches in the RSA and Southern Africa, and clandestine transport of weapons by means of a modified aeroplane; alleged instruction to murder two Portuguese operators in detention; alleged training provided to resistance movements of other countries; alleged involvement in violence on the East Rand and alleged involvement in train murders in cooperation with Transnet's communications network.
- ii. Even if the initial objective of Project Pastoor would have been kosher and would remain needful, it apparently developed and/or had been distorted to such a degree that even unauthorised and self-initiated actions of individuals are regarded as having been authorised by those concerned themselves.
- iii. **Conclusion.** Project Pastoor and all other related projects/operations must be investigated in detail in terms of :
 - (1) Desirability to continue with the project in this point of time.
 - (2) Possible deviations from the original objective, with special reference to possible self-initiated actions under official pretext.

- (2) All allegations of corruption and criminal activities by members of DCC must be referred to the SAP or Directorate Provoos for investigation.

c. **Army Intelligence (GS2)**

- i. Allegations mainly pertains to BEVKOM's involvement in discrediting campaigns against the ANC and a possible misrepresentation by the Bevkom component of the nature and extent of the threat in reports compiled by Brig Van Wyk. Should this be the case (which an evaluation of his reports might prove), it would indicate that Brig Van Wyk has his own agenda and that he uses Bevkom's existing mandate (whatever it is), for that purpose.
- ii. Once again it would appear that authorised and official matters have been integrated with self-initiated objectives that high-hierarchy decision-makers had lost track of the initial objectives and real mandate. However, an investigation is required to confirm or refute these conclusions.
- iii. Other alleged GS2 activities focuses on the allegation of intelligence support to VR's pseudo-capability in actions against the internal structures of the ANC and the PAC. These operations, whether they have been authorised or not, are also not in line with the Government's current political policy.
- iv. It is also being alleged that Lt-Genl Miring gave instruction that Directorate Reconnaissance should not collect information on the right wing or on right-wing organisations, and that he wants to be informed of who stands where in Directorate Reconnaissance. In this regard Lt-Gen Miring's instruction would probably be in line with particular contingency planning. Directorate Reconnaissance plays an important role in this matter, and the conclusion arrived at is that Lt-Gen Miring wanted to make sure what the position was with regard to the authority (mandate) for the utilisation of power. This conclusion also corresponds with other information that Lt-Gen Miring is an avowed realist concerning reform initiatives in the RSA, as well as a supporter of these initiatives. Furthermore, one should guard against the wrong interpretation of his remark concerning the execution of a possible coup, should it be necessary. The remark was probably intended to refer to

official emergency action in case of an attempted coup d'etat from either the left or the right wing.

v. **Conclusion**

- (1) All aspects of Bevkom's mandate and instruction must be subjected to incisive investigation, and their desirability or not must be deliberated in view of the Government's political policy.
- (2) Monthly reports and motivations for Bevkom's activities must be investigated to determine whether they do not serve as basis to obtain official approval for a self-initiated programme.

d. **7 Med Bn Gp**

- i. The core aspects in respect of alleged activities of 7 Med Bn Gp centre on the privatisation of the chemical and biological warfare programme. The fact that the programme is still in the process of privatisation allegedly involves great risks for the SADF and the Government.
- ii. Furthermore, information pertaining to activities of Brig (Dr) Wouter Basson in respect of an alleged chemical attack on Frelimo soldiers in Mozambique, an alleged poison disrepute action against the ANC, alleged execution of SADF elimination instructions and that he lives beyond the means linked to his rank.
- iii. If these allegations are true, it is unlikely that these actions have been authorised because they are against the spirit of the current political process. Had these allegations been false, they would have the potential to cause unprecedented damage to the SADF and the Government because:
 - (1) Brig (Dr) Basson is indeed involved in chemical research: (And what is more, he is said to be related to Gen Lothar Neethling).
 - (2) The public would find it hard to accept the opposite in the light of previous official denials of other events (such as Ferdi Barnard's attachment to the SADF), linked to Brig (Dr) Basson's and the SADF's real involvement in chemical and biological research.

iv. Without considering other facts, on the surface it would appear that Brig (Dr) Basson had adapted and developed an initial Project with pure objectives to a stage that self-initiated actions are the order of the day, which could only lead to embarrassment of a serious nature.

v. **Conclusions**

(1) Although aspects of Brig (Dr) Basson's project is being investigated by the Auditor-General, an incisive investigation regarding the desirability of the Programme in its totality, including cover firms, is required if it had not been done by this time.

(2) Instructions and mandates to Brig (Dr) Basson must be investigated and evaluated against alleged activities as to identify double agendas.

9. **General Conclusion.** The assignments, mandates, objectives, projects and submissions for activities of Directorate DCC (mainly Section Terrorism), Directorate Reconnaissance, Bevkom and 7 Med Bn Gp (which must include Brig (Dr) Basson), must be subjected to incisive investigation.

EVALUATION/SUMMARY/COMMENT OF/ON INFORMATION REGARDING INDIVIDUALS

10. Annexure A, which is a summary of allegations concerning risk activities of SADF components, contains names of various SADF members that require further explanation. Annexure C contains the explanation. Summarised, these individuals can be divided in three categories, i.e.

a. Individuals in positions of command who wear an albatross of the past round the neck as an inescapable burden.

i. Gen Kat Liebenberg

ii. Lt-Gen C.P. Van der Westhuizen

iii. Individuals who can be discredited for activities by subordinates by virtue of their command positions. Individuals in this regard are:

iv. Lt-Gen G. Meiring

v. Gen-Maj H.J. Roux

- vi. Brig J.C. Swart
- vii. Brig Tolletjie Botha

b. Individuals involved in apparent self-initiated activities against the interests of the state (not necessarily consciously). Individuals in this regard are:

- i. Brig Ferdi Van Wyk
- ii. Brig (Dr) Wouter Basson
- iii. Brig Oos Van der Merwe
- iv. Col At Nel
- v. Col H.A.P. Potgieter
- vi. Col Mielie Prinsloo
- vii. Col Bert Sachse
- viii. Col Hannes Venter
- ix. Comdt Anton Nieuwoudt
- x. Comdt Henry Van der Westhuizen

11. If the allegations (mainly unsubstantiated information) of SADF components' activities (Annexure B) are judged in general, the impression (no substance) is gained that:

- a. there is a possibility that certain general staff and senior officers had lost sight of the initial mandate, and approved objectives of projects, and that they approve/accept/initiate actions that in actual fact involve additional unauthorised objectives and do not necessarily serve the interests of the State;
- b. projects afford members the opportunity to follow a self-initiated agenda under an official cover.

12. Significantly, the individuals involved in the alleged activities are the same persons who have been mentioned in most of the alleged risk activities described in Annexure A and B.

13. General Conclusion

- a. SADF components that must be subjected to incisive investigation (as indicated in the previous conclusion), must be investigated by an independent SADF working group to attain true refinement of mandate, assignments, objectives and to re-establish credibility.

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- b. It is unlikely that mandate refining itself would bring about credibility in "the SADF and future continuous "clean" SADF actions". A ridding of incumbents from SADF components may also be required. In this regard, those individuals referred to in the three categories mentioned in Par 10, would be affected. The three categories are :
 - i. Individuals in positions of command who wear an albatross of the past round the neck as an inescapable burden.
 - ii. Individuals who could be discredited by virtue of their positions of command, for actions by their subordinates.
 - iii. Individuals involved in apparent self-initiated activities against the interests of the state (not necessarily consciously).
- c. In addition to the cleansing of posts, further investigation into the alleged activities/possible double agendas of individuals whose names appear in Annexure B, is required.

INFORMATION/INTELLIGENCE MADE AVAILABLE TO LT-GEN STEYN

14. For the sake of completeness, documents concerning OP CRUSEN and OP WIDOW, which have been made available to Lt-Gen Steyn, are attached as Annexure D and E (Crusen) and F (Widow). The purpose of their inclusion is
 - a. to have a consolidated document at command;
 - b. to utilise it as reference when necessary.
15. To sum up, the following information is contained in the documents:
 - a. Annexure D (Op Crusen) : Individuals allegedly employed by or having contact with Division Intelligence and who act suspiciously, whether in connection with violence or criminal actions. (The documents contain recommendations regarding action.)

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- b. **Annexure E.** Individuals not in direct contact with the SADF with potential concealed agendas and/or possibly involved in activities that can relate to acts of violence. (Recommendations for action have been proposed.)
- c. **Annexure F.** Former BSB and SADF members (of whom some serve in the DCC), who might be involved directly or indirectly in activities that could have a bearing on acts of violence. (Recommendations for action have not been made.)

LIST OF CONCLUSIONS

- 16. Project Pastoor and all other related projects/operations must be investigated in detail in terms of:
 - a. Desirability to continue with the project in the present dispensation.
 - b. Possible deviations from the initial objective, with specific reference to possible self-initiated actions under official cover.
- 17. The mandate and objectives of Section Terrorism must be investigated incisively. Other official instructions to individuals (such as an alleged instruction to Col At Nel to render intelligence support for discrediting actions), and their activities in this respect, must also be investigated incisively.
- 18. All allegations of corruption and criminal activities by DCC members must be referred to the SAP and / or D Provoos for investigation.
- 19. All aspects of Bevkom's mandate and instruction must be investigated incisively, and its desirability, whether or not, must be deliberated in the light of the Government's political policy.
- 20. Monthly reports and motivations for Bevkom actions must be investigated to determine whether official approval for a self-initiated programme had not been sought.
- 21. Although aspects of Brig (Dr) Basson's Project has already been investigated, an incisive investigation is also required if it has not been done as yet, concerning the desirability for the continuation of the Programme in its entirety, including cover firms.

22. Instructions and mandates to Brig (Dr) Basson must be investigated and matched against alleged activities to identify double agendas.
23. **General conclusions**
- a. SADF components to be subjected to incisive investigation must be investigated by an independent SADF working group to attain a true refinement of mandate, assignments, objectives and re-establishment of credibility.
 - b. It is unlikely that mandate refining by itself would bring about credibility "in the SADF and future "clean" SADF actions". A ridding of incumbents from SADF components might also be required. In this regard, those individuals referred to in the three categories mentioned in Par. 10, would be affected. The three categories are:
 - i. Individuals in positions of command who wear an albatross of the past round the neck as an inescapable burden.
 - ii. Individuals who could be discredited by virtue of their positions of command, for actions by their subordinates.
 - iii. Individuals involved in apparent self-initiated activities against the interests of the State (not necessarily consciously).
 - c. In addition to the cleansing of posts, further investigation into the alleged activities / possible double agendas of individuals whose names appear in Annexure B, is required.

REACTION ON POSSIBLE DRASTIC ACTION

24. It is unlikely that a few adjustments would clean the record, in the light of the current credibility crisis of the Defence Force and the balance of allegations (albeit unconfirmed), regarding SADF components who apparently act outside their mandate, individuals attached to components who apparently exceed their mandate and / or pursue own agendas under official pretext, along with individuals in positions of command who have lost pace with true objectives. The only alternative would be drastic intervention.

25. It is expected that the reaction of various groups with regard to drastic intervention in the SADF, would be experienced differently. Intervention may include refining of mandate, objectives and role; curtailment / cancellation of assignments; rationalisation of functions; large scale post transformations and retrenchments.
26. **General.** The timing for such measures and the manner the issue is to be approached, are regarded as crucial factors in determining the eventual reaction. Factors such as the general security situation, the Government's position with regard to moral high ground, the progress of the process of transition and the economic prospects will have to be considered in the timing. It is anticipated therefore, that the general reaction would coincide with the positive and / or negative general mood in the country.
27. **Anticipated reactions**
- a. **Individuals who would be affected as a result of albatrosses of the past or possible discrediting due to activities of subordinates.** The most important factors that would affect their reaction are anticipated to be the manner in which it is to be performed and the acceptability of the motivation for the action. Individuals in these categories are regarded as realists who probably would accept the situation if it is handled correctly.
 - b. **Individuals involved in double agendas.** Among these individuals are two categories who would react differently:
 - i. **Those involved in alleged criminal activities.** No matter the circumstances, they would probably find fault with the dispensation, and would probably join particularly opposing right-wing groups.
 - ii. **Those who pursue self-initiated objectives under official pretext.** They probably believe that they act within their mandate and would feel aggrieved. The majority would probably join opposing right-wing groups.

Remark: Both categories would probably threaten to expose actions of the past, and might even proceed to expose them. However, that would be counterproductive because that would not only incriminate them, but would prompt the need for intervention for that very reason.

- c. **SADF components affected (including Division Intelligence).** Members of SADF components who might be affected by intervention, could react according to their political affiliation. The reaction would probably be less intense than that of members whose components might be closed down or drastically scaled down or be accommodated elsewhere in the SADF. Since the majority of SADF members are being regarded as apolitical and are professional soldiers, a realism prevails that the SADF should regain its credibility one way or the other. Should a drastic intervention be motivated as a solution, it would probably be accepted.
- d. **The broad population.** The three respective categories that might react differently.
 - i. **Leftist grouping.** There will definitely be a propagandistic exploitation of the situation. The degree would be determined by the level of the transitional process. It can be expected that the more intense the reaction, the more negative the general reaction would be.
 - ii. **Right-wing grouping.** Intense reaction is expected, which would increase the right-wing threat potential for future violent actions. This will reinforce their ranks.
 - iii. **Central grouping.** It is expected that although the reaction would be negative, the intervention may be accepted with the correct motivation and the manner in which it to be executed and the timing.

28. **Procedure.** It is anticipated that :

- a. In the light of the current negative mood, a sudden drastic intervention would harm stability.
- b. An appropriate peg, such as the results of the Steyn investigation, would be the most acceptable action within a positive climate.

RECOMMENDATIONS

29. In the light of the above, it is recommended that :

- a. Para. 16 to 22, which serve as conclusions, be implemented as recommendations.

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- b. A drastic intervention, as recommended by the Counterintelligence Community and supported in the conclusions contained in the document, be considered. (Vide par. 24).
- c. Should the proposed intervention be accepted as desirable, that it be performed in such a manner that it would have the least effect on stability. Individuals who would be affected for the time being are mentioned in Annexure C.
- d. Actions as indicated in Annexure B be performed. Included are the allegations that require further internal investigation and / or committal to the Goldstone Commission, the SAP and D Provoos.

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ANNEXURE A
STAFF PAPER
DD DECEMBER 1992

RISK ACTIVITIES OF SADF COMPONENTS

This document represents source information and conclusions that have been made available to Lt-Gen Steyn. In addition to other information available, the intelligence picture has been used as basis for the Staff Paper.

1. An analysis of information available indicate that some members, contractual members and co-workers of the SADF were involved, and in some instances are still involved in illegal and unauthorised activities that harm the security, interests and welfare of the State. The spectrum of these activities includes murders, deeds of terrorism, disruption and influencing activities, destabilisation activities abroad, corruption, promotion of factional party political objectives and blatant disregard of Government policy.
2. The motives of individuals involved are diverse and vary from personal gain, reprisal, personal political agendas and pursuit of strategic and tactical objectives in conflict with Government policy. However, some role players are caught up in activities of the past that are unacceptable in this era.
3. Evidence at the disposal of the Counterintelligence Community on which the above statements rest, are based on facts, both confirmed and unconfirmed information from reliable sources, and indications are that these are true. The information is also based on evidence submitted in court and at other investigation forums.
4. A cursory examination of the information indicates that the above activities were mainly centralised at certain Defence components, i.e. the Directorate Covert Collection (DCC) of Division Intelligence, Army Foundation (GS2), and certain components of Special Forces and 7 Medical Battalion.

5. Summarised the intelligence picture pertaining to the above Defence components is as follows:

a. Directorate Covert Collection (DCC)

- i. Destabilisation of the internal political situation by means of planning and executing coups in self-governing territories and manipulation of important political role players.
- ii. The instigation of unrest through murder, providing political factions with arms and executing intimidation activities.
- iii. Members' involvement in planning to ruin the Government's reform initiatives through the escalation of violence.
- iv. Corruption among members by means of illegal trading in weapons.
- v. Involvement in planning and committing murders with major political consequences (e.g. FLORES case).

b. Army Intelligence (GS2)

- i. Discrediting activities against the ANC and other political opponents.
- ii. Influencing activities and perception creation in the mass media as well as in the SADF.
- iii. Intelligence support for destabilisation operations.
- iv. Members' participation in coup-related planning.
- v. The dissemination of disinformation.

c. Special Forces

- i. Participation in destabilisation operations in black townships.
- ii. Creation of arms caches and the development of operational launching positions in neighbouring countries.
- iii. Training of military wings of internal political groups (e.g. Inkatha), as well as training to resistance movements in other African countries, including RENAMO.

d. 7 Medical Battalion

- i. Involvement in the SADF's chemical and biological warfare programmes.
- ii. Involvement in the so-called "Poison murders".
- iii. Involvement of some members in corruption for personal gain.
- iv. Involvement in Chemical attack on Frelimo.
- v. Handling of drugs for operational utilisation.

6. When analysing the intelligence picture, it would appear that the senior command structure of the above Defence Force components are controlled by Lts-Genl G Meiring and C.P. Van der Westhuizen, who in turn are under the command of the Head of the SADF, Gen Kat Liebenberg. To a high degree, Generals Liebenberg and Van der Westhuizen are caught up in the momentum of activities of the past, which at present, receive prominent negative publicity, whilst Gen Meiring promotes a personal agenda against the interests of the State.

7. At executive level and in varying degrees, the following senior officers are linked to the above activities as a result of their positions of command or their personal involvement in the said activities.

- a. Brig Jake Swart
- b. Gen H Roux

- c. Gen Chris Thirion
- d. Brig Ferdi Van Wyk (GS2)
- e. Brig Tolletjie Botha (DCC) - Directorate Covert Collection
- f. Col At Nel (DCC)
- g. Brig Wouter Basson (7 Med) - 7 Medical Batallion
- h. Col H.A.P. Potgieter (Special Forces)
- i. Brig Oos Van der Merwe
- j. Col Mielie Prinsloo (GS2)
- k. Col Anton Nieuwoudt (DCC)
- l. Col Bert Sachse (5VR) - 5 Reconnaissance Regiment/Commando
- m. Col Hannes Venter (4VR) - 4 Reconnaissance Regiment/Commando
- n. Comdt Henry Van der Westhuizen (DCC)

- 8. Strong interaction exist between the above four Defence Force components, which results in the major role players being relatively restricted.
- 9. The availability of secret funds, virtually unchecked delegated authority and the Total Onslaught Syndrome has led to a situation where these Defence Force components has become self-generating and self-perpetuating. New entry into the ranks of these components have soon declined in the pattern that have been brought about by their predecessors. The leadership and the unique milieu has afforded individuals of one mind the opportunity to move upward in the hierarchy order. This in turn, has resulted in these components having been caught up in particular value systems and ways of thinking.
- 10. With analysis of the information it has become apparent that an informal structure has been created, of which the major role players pursue the same agenda, which harm the State's interests.
- 11. It has also become evident that controlling officers of the said SADF components were either involved in malpractices at executive level or were aware of these practices. On the other hand, if they had performed their duty, they had to be aware of these malpractices.
- 12. It will not be feasible to mould this information into a suitable product that can be utilised in court-related actions, other legal proceedings or disciplinary hearings because

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- a. Evidence has already been destroyed and is still being destroyed on large-scale.
 - b. Existing evidence has been acquired in an extremely sensitive manner and would expose agents to retaliation.
 - c. The powers of the members and groups involved are such that the life of a witness would have no value.
 - d. The role players protect each other.
13. The security situation and the delicate stage negotiations for a new constitutional dispensation has reached, compel a revolutionary intervention to eradicate the malpractices that have been identified forthwith. This will not exclude court-directed or other administrative proceedings.

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Ser No	Alleged activities	Individuals involved	Information supplied by sources	Evaluation	Nature of Information/Intelligence				Further action
					Vague allegation	Strong allegation	Probably true	Confirmed	
	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i
1	Special Forces: 1. Establishment of arms caches and development of operational launching positions in neighbouring countries	Serving members: Gen Kat Liebenberg Lt-Gen G Meiring Brig JC Swart Col Mielie Prinsloo Brig (Df) W Basson Brig Tollefjie Botha <i>(Documentary)</i>	DCC maintains close ties with Project Pastoor. There are joint projects, such as arms caching in Portugal that are being linked to arms caches for internal uprisings when required (so-called Palmeira Project). DCC and Pastoor share cover offices in Malawi <i>(Documentary as well as sources)</i>	Apparently Brig JC Swart is in command of Operation Pastoor (previously Operation Phantom), under the control of the SADF and Army. The operation is being staffed by members of Special Forces and old BSB members. Objectives are: i. Conducting warfare on an irregular basis ii. Establishing bases in Africa as launching positions for future operations. iii. Establishing arms caches abroad. iv. Development of Malawi as support country into the rest of Africa <i>(Documentary)</i>			X		Internal investigation into desirability of Project
			Arms caching is managed from and into the RSA. One of Pastoor's aircraft has been modified to stow weapons <i>(Reliable sources)</i> .	It would be a deviation from its initial objective if arms caching into the RSA takes place under Operation Pastoor			X		Internal investigation

Ser No	Alleged activities	Individuals involved	Information supplied by sources	Evaluation	Nature of Information/Intelligence					Internal investigation
					Vague allegation	Strong allegation	Probably true	Confirmed	Internal investigation	
			Two Portuguese operators of Pastoor have recently been exposed and arrested. Brig (Dr) W Basson instructed that the persons detained were to be murdered if they could not be relieved. <i>(Reliable source, confirmed by another source.)</i>	Allegedly Brig Basson travelled overseas for this purpose. If this was the case, actions probably were self-initiated beyond Project Pastoor's domain and mandate.			X			Internal investigation into Pastoor
			Fronts of Operation Pastoor are in Kenya, Zambia and Mauritius, mainly in the nature reserve area. Strong contact with the British SAS exists. <i>(Documentary)</i>	Probably true. The question is whether this was or was not an authorised project. Further investigation is required.				X		Internal investigation
	ii. Training of military wings of internal political groups (e.g. Inkatha), as well as training to resistance movements in other African countries, inter alia Renamo.	Col Bert Sachse Shaun Gullen Rod Rodrigues Roelie Roelofse Sergeant Americo	Members of 1 Recon Reg and 5 Recon Reg (RR) present training to resistance movements in 8 countries. <i>(Various agents)</i> . Individuals involved in training are Gavin Christie, Col Bert Sachse, Shaun Gullen, Rod Rodrigues, Roelie Roelofse & Serg America of 4RR & 5RR <i>(Various sources)</i>				X			Internal investigation
	iii. Participation in destabilisation operations in black townships		Operation Pastoor is involved in violence on the East Rand. <i>(Technical collection)</i> . Concrete facts not available, but concluded from teleph conversations, evacuations & transfers	If this was the case, actions are beyond Operation Pastoor's domain. Further investigation is required.						Internal investigation

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Ser No	Alleged activities	Individuals involved	Information supplied by sources	Evaluation	Nature of Information/Intelligence				Further action
					Vague allegation	Strong allegation	Probably true	Confirmed	
			A discreditation action was directed at the ANC to link the ANC to the use of poison. The young interrogators who had questioned the ANC member, were transferred to Pastoor to maintain control over them. This is a clear indication of the mutual relation between GS2, DCC and Pastoor (<i>Allegations by agent</i>)	Reporting of this case is obscure. However, if this was the case, actions are beyond Operation Pastoor's domain.		X			Internal investigation
		<p>Serving member: Col Mielie Prinsloo</p> <p>Former members: Brig Archie Moore Col Daan Kershoff Nick Liebenberg Nick Basson Maj Buks Buys</p>	Spoonmet's intelligence network comprised former members of special Forces, i.e. Buks Buys, Nick Liebenberg, Nick Basson or Bosman, Archie Moore and Daan Kershoff, with the object to instigate violence by means of train murders. Buys, Liebenberg, Bosman resigned and established their own business. Nick Liebenberg often (the last time in March 1992) reported beforehand to Col Mielie Prinsloo where and when train murders were to take place, and implied that Special Forces are involved. (<i>Source reports and another Intelligence Service.</i>)	If the allegation was the truth, it probably was self-initiated. This is definitely not part of the Government's political policy. According to other information, it would appear that the ANC is in possession of similar information, but for one or other reason does not utilise it. However, the allegations have the potential of serious embarrassment for the SADF and the State.			X		Goldstone

Ser No	Alleged activities	Individuals involved	Information supplied by sources	Evaluation	Nature of Information/Intelligence				Further action
					Vague allegation	Strong allegation	Probably true	Confirmed	
2.	DCC i. Destabilisation of the internal political situation through planning and execution of coups in self-governong territories, and manipulation of major political tole players.	Planners are: Brig F van Wyk Col At Nel Col Mielie Prisoos Tinus Hamman Comdt Henry van der Westhuizen <i>(Reliable source)</i> Possibly also Capt Pamela du Randt <i>(Reliable source)</i> Executive at operational level are: Comdt Anton Nieuwoudt Col Eugene de Kock (SAP) Comdt Henry van der Westhuizen <i>(Reliable source)</i> Probable co-workers at operational level: Brian Davis (London) Van Greunen Verne Lange Jimmy Nieuwoudt <i>(Various sources)</i>	Individuals involved in suspicious activities are members of Section Terrorism. The agenda of this group of individuals is: i. Discrediting of the ANC. ii. Instigation of public violence. iii. The failure of talks with the Government. iv. Increase in violence. v. De facto coup by the SADF to restore order. vi. Establishment/development and armament of Inkatha, and the creation of alternative right-wing political alliances. <i>(Allegations and reliable source)</i>	Should this be the case, these allegations would be an indication of an own agenda that may have the potential of serious implications. This matter requires further urgent investigation.			X		Internal investigation thereupon Goldstone
			The planning group meet clandestinely at a lodge (West stadium) at Loftus. Pamela du Randt is present often. <i>(Source reports and technical collection)</i>	Further collection is essential.			X		Internal investigation

Ser No	Alleged activities	Individuals involved	Information supplied by sources	Evaluation	Nature of Information/Intelligence				Further action
					Vague allegation	Strong allegation	Probably true	Confirmed	
		Col At Nel Comdt Anton Nieuwoudt AO2 Clive Brink	The Ciskei Intelligence Service, controlled by Comdt Anton Nieuwoudt and AO2 Clive Brink. The coup and murder of Sebe was a planned action by Col At Nel and Comdt Anton Nieuwoudt (<i>Reliable source</i>)	Although Nieuwoudt controlled the Ciskei Intelligence Service, it has not been confirmed that he had planned Sebe's murder. However, according to a recent report, he is concerned about the fact that a judicial commission in the Ciskei is attempting to "hang" the murder on Sebe round his neck (implicate him?)			X		Goldstone
			DCC is involved in Mozambique through agents Craig Williamson, Sakkie van Zyl and Celeste who are strongly linked to Renamo armament (<i>Various sources</i>) DCC continues with planning to overthrow Holomisa and to substitute him with pawns. (Various agents and technical collection.) Individuals involved allegedly are Col At Nel and Comdt Anton Nieuwoudt.	A number of DCC members maintain contact with Craig Williamson, who, according to some reports, is involved in smuggling activities. According to another report, Nieuwoudt handles Col Duli of the TDF, and he along with Eugene De Kock and Chris Nel (alias Derek Louw) had planned to carry out a coup d'etat. Thus, the allegations have been confirmed and clearly point to self-initiated efforts to work against the policy of the Government.			X		Goldstone

Ser No	Alleged activities	Individuals involved	Information supplied by sources	Evaluation	Nature of Information/Intelligence				Further action
					Vague allegation	Strong allegation	Probably true	Confirmed	
	ii. Participation of members in planning to ruin the Government's reform initiatives through the escalation of violence.	JC Prinsloo (DCC in Durban)	DCC agents are involved in the training of IFP members, whereupon they are placed at security firms (under IFP and SADF control), fully armed. Ex-Rhodesians wit Right-wing radical viewpoints control the security firms COIN, Shield and Hullets. (Allegations by independent sources.)	Allegedly, JP Prinsloo of the DCC's Durban office may be responsible for liaison wrt the training. If this proves to be true, it would probably be in pursuance of a self-initiated agenda.		X			Goldstone
		Col De Kock Leon Flores Steve Bosch Col At Nel	DCC has full control over the Zulu faction's participation in talks with the Government. Allegedly the infrastructure is such that 24 000 Zulus can be armed in the PWV area within 24 hours. <i>Various independent sources.)</i>	Further collection is essential for meaningful evaluation.		X			Goldstone
			The former 8-member "hit squad" of Vlakplaas was under the command of Col Eugene de Kock, Leon Flores and Steve Bosch, of whom the latter two became DCC members. Col de Kock maintains close ties with Col At Nel. (Source reports and Technical collection)	There were various accounts of contact between Col de Kock (SAP) and certain DCC members. From the veiled use of words, it could be concluded that the combination was involved in activities that harmed the interests of the State.				X	Goldstone

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Ser No	Alleged activities	Individuals involved	Information supplied by sources	Evaluation	Nature of Information/Intelligence				Further action
					Vague allegation	Strong allegation	Probably true	Confirmed	
	iii. Instigation of unrest through murder, arming of political factions and execution of intimidation activities.	Col Eugene de Kock Leon Flores Col At Nel Steve Bosch HenryvdWesthuizen Rich Verster	12 former Vlakplaas askaris of Col Eugene de Kock (SAP) are still involved in operations and are handled by De Kock. All of them are fully equipped with weapons and supplied with arms caches, ammunition and supplies. Some of the askaris are hidden on DCC's holding (Olymus 73). <i>(Confirmed by various agents.)</i> Until recently Flores assisted the handling of askaris. His own weapons are cached on the holding of Tryon alias Trix alias Leonard. <i>(Reliable source)</i>	As mentioned above, the contact between Col De Kock (SAP) and DCC members is disturbing, and it would appear that a combination of individuals are pursuing an own self-initiated agenda.			X		Goldstone
	iv. Involvement in planning and committing of murders with serious political consequences (eg the Flores incident)	Brig (Dr) Basson Brig F van Wyk & probably Col At Nel	DCC in conjunction with Brig Ferdi van Wyk turned an ANC member to give evidence that the ANC uses chemical weapons in Mozambique. (This was just after the chemical attack on the Frelimo group in Mozambique, vide section on 7 Mcd Bt Gp) <i>(Allegations by reliable source)</i>	Although the reporting is not clear, it would appear that an operation involving chemical weapons was launched in Mozambique, and that Col At Nel, Brig F Van Wyk & Brig (Dr) Basson were involved. The British organisation Chemical & Biological Defence Establishments investigated the area, and found that chemical weapons had definitely been used. It would appear that there were attempts to lay the blame on the ANC.		X			Internal investigation

Ser No	Alleged activities	Individuals involved	Information supplied by sources	Evaluation	Nature of Information/Intelligence				Further action
					Vague allegation	Strong allegation	Probably true	Confirmed	
		Col At Nel & probably also Comdt Anton Nieuwoudt	The caching of terrorist weapons in Swaziland are being planned by Cois Eugene de Kock and At Nel, and pointed out to the Swazi police, whereupon discreditation takes place. (<i>Technical collection & reliable source</i>)	Apparently this is being done in pursuance of a self-initiated agenda or an existing assignment is conducted on own initiative but beyond limits. These allegations, linked to the allegations mentioned elsewhere in this document, which maintain that DCC members continue to plan a coup d'etat in Transkei, once again are indicative of a self-initiated agenda conducted by certain DCC members.			X	X	Internal investigation Goldstone

Ser No	Alleged activities	Individuals involved	Information supplied by sources	Evaluation	Nature of Information/Intelligence				Further action
					Vague allegation	Strong allegation	Probably true	Confirmed	
	v. Corruption among DCC members by means of illegal weapons trade.	Col At Nel Comdt Anton Nieuwoudt Comdt Henry vdWesthuizen Rich Verster Jeff Price Col Eugene de Kock (SAP) Piet Botha (SAP) Willie Nortje (SAP) Chappies Klopper (SAP)	The delivery of arms to the SAP located by so-called sources. Funds go to fictitious sources. (<i>Allegations</i>)	According to additional reporting, Col At Nel does not register internal sources anymore, and presumably they are remunerated from funds obtained from the delivery of weapons. It has also been alleged that munition depots are declared only partially. Allegedly, the remainder is hidden elsewhere. Consequently, there is a possibility that other activities too might be funded. This is also an example of how as official responsibility, such as covert collection could be misused for own profit or for pursuance of a self-initiated agenda under official banner.					Investigation by D Provos, whereupon investigation by Goldstone
3	GS2 Discrediting actions against ANC and other political opponents	Brig F Van Wyk Col At Nel	Disclosure concerning Winnie Mandela's disappearance of funds was a Ferdi Van Wyk/Col At Nel project. (<i>Allegations by source</i>)	If it was an official project in line with the State's political programme, it would be bona fide different. However, if it was self-initiated, then it would have a high-risk potential for embarrassment.			X		Internal investigation

Ser No	Alleged activities	Individuals involved	Information supplied by sources	Evaluation	Nature of Information/Intelligence				Further action
					Vague allegation	Strong allegation	Probably true	Confirmed	
		Brig F Van Wyk	The discrediting of the ANC and other political opponents against the Government is managed from the office of the Command. (Various sources)	On the basis of various reports, it would appear that official authorisation did exist. However, it would appear that Brig Van Wyk pursues more objectives that are self-initiated or that he attempts to convince his superiors to approve activities that are not always in the interest of the State. This will have to be investigated though.			X		Internal investigation
	ii. Influencing activities and creation of perceptions at the mass media and the SADF	Brig F Van Wyk	The emphasis on violence in Brig F Van Wyk's report in a certain manner may establish misperceptions. (Reliable source)	It would appear that motivations for actions might be intensified to guarantee action. However, this is only a conclusion and needs to be investigated further.			X		Internal investigation

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Ser No	Alleged activities	Individuals involved	Information supplied by sources	Evaluation	Nature of Information/Intelligence				Further action
					Vague allegation	Strong allegation	Probably true	Confirmed	
	iii. Intelligence support to destabilisation operations	ColHerman van Niekerk (leader) Tinus VStaden (OpsOffice) Jimlaferty - ex-Rhodesian MikeKennedy - ex-Rhodesian MarkVDMerwe - ex-Rodesian	<p>The pseudo capability of 5Reconnaissance Regiment receives intelligence support from GS2 to be applied to the ANC's and PAC's internal structures. (<i>Source reports and Technical collection</i>). According to report received on 14Dec1992, an ANC member was to give evidence at the Goldstone Commission to the effect that members of 5ReconReg 1ReconReg were to perform operations in Kwazulu. The vehicle registrations to be used for this purpose were checked by OATI. These can be trailed to 5ReconReg. (SAP)</p> <p>Rumours are that a pseudo group of 5ReconReg are involved in train murders along with members of the Rhodesian Selous Scouts under Herman VNiekerk (<i>Allegations</i>)</p>	If this was the case, activities would not be in line with Government policy, and this might lead to serious embarrassment. This matter requires urgent investigation.			X		Goldstone ?
				This is probably the same group who were, in the above allegation, involved in pseudo operations in Kwazulu. The allegations require further urgent investigation.					Goldstone

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Ser No	Alleged activities	Individuals involved	Information supplied by sources	Evaluation	Nature of Information/Intelligence				Further action
					Vague allegation	Strong allegation	Probably true	Confirmed	
	iv. Participation of members in coup-related planning	Lt-Gen G Meiring	Gen Meiring instructed SpecialForces to determine which members of the present DefenceForce, the previous DefenceForce and the BSB are on "his" side, to enable him to know whom he could call up when it was necessary. He furthermore instructed that SpecForces was not allowed to collect information on right-wingers and rightwing organisations (<i>Reliable source</i>)	Since SpecForces would play an important role in countering a coup d'etat, it seems probable that GenMeiring would have wanted to know who were apolitical for utilisation. His behaviour is therefore evaluated as normal i/o contingency planning.					None
		ColMieliePrinsloo	The selective leakage of information from ColMielie Prinsloo's group to Rightwing groups, especially early warnings against possible actions (<i>Confirmed by various independent sources</i>)	The evaluation was that Col Prinsloo is sympathetically disposed towards the Right Wing. This fact may endorse the other allegations contained in the document of his possible involvement in an own agenda directed against the ANC. This requires further investigation.				X	Internal investigation

Ser No	Alleged activities	Individuals involved	Information supplied by sources	Evaluation	Nature of Information/Intelligence				Further action
					Vague allegation	Strong allegation	Probably true	Confirmed	
4	7MED BN GP i. Involvement in the chemical and biological warfare programme of the SADF	Brig Wouter Basson	There are several chemical firms that operate as private institutions in support of the chemical and biological warfare programme of the SADF. The privatisation of these firms is transparent, which might become serious risks for the SADF and the State in future. The firms are Rooodeplaats Research Laboratory, Rooodeplaats Tile firm, Delta-G, Protechnics, Ecotex. The activity is headed by Brig(Dr) Wouter Basson. <i>(Documentary)</i>	The programme is performed under Project Jota. Privatisation does indeed take place. However, the allegation that the privatisation is transparent and might hold serious risks for the SADF and the State requires further investigation.			X		Internal investigation

Ser No	Alleged activities	Individuals involved	Information supplied by sources	Evaluation	Nature of Information/Intelligence				Further action
					Vague allegation	Strong allegation	Probably true	Confirmed	
ii.	Involvement in chemical attack on Frelimo	Brig W Basson Brig Van Wyk Col At Nel	Allegedly the chemical attack on Frelimo soldiers in Mozambique (vide ser no 3.iv) was a practical training session. An small unmanned reconnaissance bomber was located shortly before the attack on Komatiport. The toxic substance used in the attack was manufactured and stored by Petrotechnics. (Confirmed, and individuals involved are known)	Allegedly, the aircraft was tested shortly before the attack on Komatiport. As stated, a British team of scientists established that chemical weapons were used in the attack on the Frelimo soldiers (finding - January 1992). According to this and other information in this respect, DCC and GS2 members as well as Brig Basson directed a discrediting campaign against the ANC implicating the ANC as having a chemical warfare capability, is indicative of an attempted cover-up of either an own agenda or an authorised operation which had failed. However, this requires further investigation.				X	Internal investigation
iii.	Involvement in so-called poison murders	Brig W Basson Gen Lothar Neethling	Members of Charl Naudé's old group (SpesForces/BSB) formed a group under leadership of Brig W Basson responsible for all SADF elimination instructions. Gen Lothar Neethling was intimately involved. (Evidence of members involved can be obtained)	Vide all the info in the previous column. The allegation prompts many questions that first need to be answered before a meaningful evaluation can be made. Consider-ing the weight of allegations, it would appear that some of them might be true. According to reports received in Dec 1992, there was rummaging among certain DCC members at the time of Goldstone's visit to their offices because some beer tins had been "doctored" with poison. This has been confirmed.		X			
			Johan Theron (4VR - Recon. Regim.) And Johan Truter - financial manager (RN Lab), was also involved with the above. At Nel and Johan Theron have close						

Ser No	Alleged activities	Individuals involved	Information supplied by sources	Evaluation	Nature of Information/Intelligence				Further action
					Vague allegation	Strong allegation	Probably true	Confirmed	
		GenKatl.jebenberg	GenKatl.jebenberg has been kept posted during the course of events. Allegedly, until 1989 he himself was also involved in the planning. (Evidence can be obtained from a person who was involved.)	Recently it has also been reported that D VerK/Recoimn?(Spec Forces)had received toxic substances from 7 Med BnGp, which might be utilised for operational purposes, inter alia a poisonous substance which is a "new product" that can be administered in nearly any manner. Allegedly, Brig Basson made it available. However, a meaningful evaluation is not possible before affidavits are obtained and further investigations are completed.		X			
		Name can be obtained	A BSB operator was involved in elimination activities, and disposes of information which directly implicates GenL.jebenberg in the murders. (Member has already prepared an affidavit.)			X			
		Allegedly Col Atnel CndtAntonNieuwoudt CndtHenryvdWest-huizen are involved	Recently there was an attempt to bring the person under the control of the "generals" by offering a contract to supply poisoned beer to Zulus in Transkei. Wouter Basson furthermore offered him 100 000 tablets per month for one year. (Allegations)				X		

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Ser No	Alleged activities	Individuals involved	Information supplied by sources	Evaluation	Nature of Information/Intelligence				Further action
					Vague allegation	Strong allegation	Probably true	Confirmed	
			<p>The above person is a key figure and is part of the group BSB members who instituted legal proceedings against the SADF. (Sworn affidavit can be obtained)</p> <p>The death of one Holzhausen who was involved in the SADF's ivory/wood/diamond smuggling trade with Angola might point to this group. (Alligation)</p> <p>It is known that Wouter Basson's direct supervisor had no control over him and that he pursued his own agenda. (Technical sources of conversation with subordinates who made arrangements.)</p>				X		
							X		
							X		

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Ser No	Alleged activities	Individuals involved	Information supplied by sources	Evaluation	Nature of Information/Intelligence				Further action
					Vague allegation	Strong allegation	Probably true	Confirmed	
	iv. Some members' involvement in corruption for personal gain		<p>Corruption</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Brig Wouter Basson has free access to the Lear Jet of Special Forces for private flights to rugby matches and buying sprees in foreign countries (Allegation - various sources) - Brig Basson invites others along and makes use of the most expensive accommodation. He has recently bought a house in France as well as corporate membership at a golf club in France (Allegation by reliable source) 	<p>Various reports have been received in respect of Brig Basson's misuse of official resources and the fact that that he lives exceptionally extravagant. Aspects are being investigated by the AG (Auditor-General/Attorney-General ??)</p>				X	AG
								X	AG

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INDIVIDUALS MENTIONED IN ANNEXURE A

ANNEXURE C OF STAFF REPORT
DD DECEMBER 1992

Serial no	Individual	Allegations & circumstances wrt individuals, supplied by individuals		Remarks	Conclusion
		a	b		
1	Brig Jake Botha	- Supervises Recon (Special Forces) - Entangled in the past & its momentum - Will not be able to detach himself from the past	- Controls Project Pastoor - Supervises Reconnaiss Regiments - Ought to be aware of activities that might lead to embarrassment	It cannot be ruled out that he might be discredited in future due to alleged activities of subordinates	Ought to be included in the intervention
2	Gen-Maj HJ Roux		- Controls Project Pastoor - Supervises Reconnaiss Regiments - Ought to be aware of activities that might lead to embarrassment	Might be caught up in the momentum of activities that were acceptable in the past	Ought to be included in the intervention
3	Gen-Maj Chris Thirion		- In his current post he should be aware of DEC activities that might lead to embarrassment - Should be aware of possible misuse of Operation Pastoor for possible unauthorised activities	After having followed up allegations/ circumstances supplied by sources they were found to be based on wrong conclusions. It was concluded that he (Thirion) had taken over Gen Joubert's association with Project Pastoor when he had succeeded the latter.	NOT affected by possible intervention

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4	Brig Ferdi V Wyk	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Commands Bev Com (?) - Was aware of Flores' assignment - Arranged clandestine visit of a foreign journalist via RSA to discredit ANC, but referred him to Gen-Maj Tienie Groenewald - Involved in discrediting activities iro political opponents 	May be subjected to serious discrediting actions in future	Ought to be included in intervention
5	Brig Tolleje Botha	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Have direct command over DCC - Was aware of Flores' double agenda 	Was discredited	Ought to be included in intervention
6	Col At Nel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Took initiative in various activities that might have led to embarrassment, such as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Discrediting campaigns ii. Attacks by PAC members on ANC members in Transkei 	Was discredited and allegedly involved in several other activities that may lead to embarrassment	Ought to be included in intervention
7	Brig Wouter Basson	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Involved on poison murders - Involved in chemical attack on Frelimo - A founder of the underground organisation "Binneking" ("Inner Circle") 	His alleged activities are of such a nature that they might lead to serious embarrassment. They also have the potential to seriously harm the State	Ought to be included in intervention
8	Col HAP Potgieter	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Involved in destabilisation activities (probably unauthorised) 	May be discredited. Allegedly pursuing own agenda.	Ought to be included in intervention

9	Brig Oos VD Merwe	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Laid down intelligence requirements regarding the guard system at the SP's residence. - Said that he might be prepared to launch a coup to restore order. 	May be discredited. Is to retire. Works against Government policy.	Ought to be included in intervention.
10	Col Mielie Prinsloo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Involved in destabilisation operations on own initiative - Provides intelligence support, of which the official nature is being queried - Involved in coup-related planning/statements 	May be seriously discredited. Allegedly pursues personal agenda or twists existing mandate for self-initiated objectives	Ought to be included in intervention
11	Comdt Anton Nieuwoudt	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Was involved in Ciskei coup and Sebe murder - Controls Askaris (probably unauthorised) - Involved in destabilisation activities (probably own initiative) - Involved in coup planning/statements 	Was discredited and may still be discredited. May involve the SADF in his own alleged double agenda, which may lead to serious embarrassment (whether true or not)	Ought to be included in intervention
12	Col Bert Sachse	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Involved in training of resistance movements in neighbouring countries - Allegations of smuggling of rhino horns 	May be discredited. Probably pursuing a personal agenda	Ought to be included in intervention
13	Col Hannes Venter	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Involved in destabilisation operations (probably own initiative) 	May be seriously discredited and may involve the SADF	Ought to be included in intervention

14	Comdt Henry VD Westhuizen	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Involved in destabilisation activities (probably own initiative)- Handles agents with questionable backgrounds	Allegedly pursues a personal agenda and allegedly entwined his official duties with his personal agenda	Ought to be included in intervention
15	Gen Kat Liebenberg	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- In full command of SADF- Exposed to blackmail as result of previous involvement in unauthorised BSB activities- Allegedly involved in ivory smuggling (confirmed by independent sources)- Direct superior of Brig Wouter Basson, therefore he ought to know of the latter's probable unauthorised activities (Allegations by independent sources)	Probably caught up in albatrosses of the past that can result in him being discredited	Ought to be included in intervention

16	Lt-Gen G Meiring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Full command of GSS2 and Special Forces - Authorised Flores' visit and itinerary abroad - Gave instruction iro efforts to determine Rightwing support within Special Forces in order to ensure selective summons when required - Forbade collection by Special Forces on rightwingers or rightwing organisations - Told an inner circle that he was prepared to launch a coup if necessary (Reliable source) 	<p>May be discredited due to the Flores case. Wrt the allegation iro Rightwing, his activities are evaluated as part of contingency planning. Since he has full command of the Army, he might not be able to escape the responsibility, should it be found that that the existing mandate/assignments were developed for other objectives</p>	Ought to be included in intervention
17	Lt-Gen CP VD Westhuizen	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In view of his position as commander of the DI and DCC he had to be aware of malpractices at these offices. - He has albatrosses round his neck from which he cannot escape, e.g. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Goniwe ii. Hammer Forces iii. Train murders caused by members under his command 	<p>Probably caught up in albatrosses of the past that are inescapable</p>	Ought to be included in intervention

INDIVIDUALS ALLEGEDLY ATTACHED TO OR IN CONTACT WITH DIVISION INTELLIGENCE

Annexure D
of Staff report
dated December 1992

Serial No	Individual	Affiliation	Activities	Status			Remarks
				Uncertain	Above suspicion	Criminal activities	
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h
1	JF Verster (Rich) i. ID no [REDACTED] ii. Alias [REDACTED] iii. [REDACTED]	Member of Company	Allegedly individual is involved in: i. The smuggling of (1) drugs (2) ivory (3) gem stones (4) weapons (5) foreign currency (6) counterfeit money ii. Car and lorry theft			X	Information regarding the smuggling & vehicle theft has been handed to the SAP (MID) for further investigation
2	JA Nieuwoudt (Comdt) i. J Nel; J Buitendag	SADF ex-Ciskeian Intelligence Service	i. Allegedly the individual is involved in cycad smuggling ii. Allegedly the individual is involved in organising an underground structure to serve as an alternative structure should the negotiation process fail	X		X	The origin of the information is extremely sensitive and might compromise a total source network. Utilisation of the information must be cleared with the handler


3	<p>H VD WESTHUIZEN</p> <p>i. [REDACTED]</p>	<p>Member of Company</p> <p>ex-SADF (DI)</p>	<p>i. Allegedly the individual is involved in the smuggling of</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) eyecads (2) gem-stones (3) counterfeit money <p>ii. Allegedly the individual is involved in activities probably related to violence</p>	X	X X X	X	<p>information to confirm the allegations could not be obtained. In view of the nature of his position he was concerned with collection on MK</p>
4	<p>G Janse Van Rensburg</p> <p>i. [REDACTED]</p> <p>ii. Alias: Steven van Lill</p> <p>iii. [REDACTED] Str</p>	<p>Member of Company</p> <p>ex-NI</p>	<p>Allegedly the person is involved in the smuggling of drugs and Red Mercury</p>	X	X	<p>To date confirmation for allegations could not be obtained</p>	

[REDACTED]



5	<p>Tony Oosthuizen</p> <p>i. Aliases (1) Tobie Esterhuizen (2) Michael O'Kelly (3) MJ Olivier</p> <p>ii. [REDACTED]</p>	<p>Member of Company ex-NI</p>	<p>Alleged agent for MI6</p>		X		<p>There were investigations in this regard. The allegations could not be confirmed.</p>
6	<p>AM VD Berg (Maj)</p> <p>i. [REDACTED]</p> <p>ii. [REDACTED]</p>	<p>SADF</p>	<p>Allegedly the said person misused official contacts for personal gain, and he is involved in an extramarital relationship</p>	X			<p>The allegations regarding the misuse of official contacts are being investigated by an RVO (?). Substantiation could not be obtained.</p>
7	<p>GD Price</p> <p>i. ID No [REDACTED]</p> <p>ii. Alias: A Wiltshire</p> <p>iii. [REDACTED]</p>	<p>Member of Company ex-Rhodesian</p>	<p>Alleged agent for MI6</p>		X		<p>To date allegations have not been substantiated</p>

[REDACTED]

8	RI Wishart	Member of Company ex-Rhodesian	Alleged agent for MI6	X		X		Allegation not substantiated to date
9	HJM Widdowson (Cmdr) i. Force No [REDACTED] ii. Address [REDACTED]	SADF	Allegedly involved in theft of an R4 as well as espionage on behalf of a foreign intelligence service	X		X		Allegation not substantiated to date
10	HD Terblanche (Maj) i. Force No [REDACTED] ii. Address [REDACTED]	SADF	Allegedly involved in smuggling of gem-stones			X		There are good indications that the individual is indeed involved in smuggling of diamonds
11	Stefan Snyders (Comdt)	SADF	Allegedly involved in smuggling of diamonds and emeralds			X		Snyders maintains very close contact with Henry VD Westhuizen
12	Vernon Lange ii. Alias P Page	Member of Company ex-BSB	Allegedly involved in smuggling activities	X		X		Nature and extent of activities not known

13	JG Nieuwoudt i. Alias Neuman	ex-BSB Member of Company	Allegedly involved in extramarital relationship	X				No further negative information is known
14	JP Du Preez i. Alias J Du Plooy	ex-BSB Member of Company	Allegedly the said person has or had in his possession a number of unlicensed weapons of one Owen, ex-BSB member	X		X		No further negative information is known
15	LA MAREE (Chappies) i. ID No 	ex-BSB Member of Company	This person still has regular contact with former BSB members. No further information is known regarding his activities	X				The only negative information available about this person is speculation regarding the Webster murder
16	RL Smit (Maaj)	SADF	Allegedly he is involved in i. the smuggling of weapons; and ii. the smuggling of Red Mercury	X		X	X	Not enough information available to substantiate the allegations. His involvement in arms transactions might be a result of his official duties

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17	<p>DH Fourie</p> <p>i. ID No </p> <p>ii. Address </p>	<p>Company member ex-BSB</p>	<p>Allegations regarding this person are the following:</p> <p>i. He was retrenched by the SADF, and he threatens to go to court.</p> <p>ii. He is involved in the training of people in Ciskei, inter alia in VIP protection.</p> <p>iii. He maintains regular contact with former BSB members.</p> <p>iv. He made contact with one Chris VD Merve in Windhoek with a view to the possibility to establish a cover firm in Windhoek that can be utilised by Fourie to import arms and ammunition to the RSA.</p>	<p>X</p>			<p>X</p>	<p>Although there are indications, the information is inadequate to substantiate allegations wrt any BSB type of activities. It is possible that the cover firm can be used to evade existing sanctions against the RSA. Allegedly Fourie was the operational manager of the BSB and had to approve all tasks.</p>
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[Redacted]

18	DF du T. Burger (Stan)	Member of Company ex-BSB	Allegations regarding Burger are as follows: i. He was dismissed by the DCC but he refuses to accept his dismissal and threatens with a court case. ii. He is involved in an extramarital relationship. iii. Involved in the smuggling of drugs, red Mercury, gold and diamonds. iv. Involved in suspicious special projects. However, the nature and extent are unknown. v. Maintains regular contact with former BSB members.	X		X	X	Existing information is inadequate to substantiate allegations
19	WJ Basson i. ID No [REDACTED] ii. Aliases (1) WJ Bester (2) M Barnard (3) M Reyneke (4) Christo Brits	Member of Company ex-BSB	No negative information wrt Basson has been obtained through monitoring actions. However, it clearly appears that he maintains contact with former BSB members and that he closely follows the investigations concerning the Webster murder	X				


20	Mrs S De Beer ii. ID No [REDACTED]	Member of Company ex-BSB		X				No negative information is known regarding the activities of this person
21	Calla Botha	ex-BSB	He had contact with Rich Verster (a DCC member)	X				Nature and extent of activities not known at present
22	Ferdi Barnard i. Alias Lanco Heins	ex-BSB	i. He was utilised as a source by the DCC, but was dismissed in December 1991. However, he still maintains contact with members of the DCC, including Rich Verster, Wally Wilsenach, Frans Smit and Geoff Price ii. Allegedly he is involved in the smuggling of diamonds, Red Mercury and Ivory			X		It is not known if the contact is official or not. However, it would appear that the contact might pertain to criminal activities

[REDACTED]

23	Leon Flores	Former company member	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Flores has regular contact with BSB members, inter alia with Col Eugene de Kock (Vlakplaas) ii. Reports indicate that Flores might be involved in smuggling activities, possibly drugs (an amount of R120 000 for 60 gm was mentioned) iii. Allegedly he still operates from Vlakplaas offices iv. Flores maintains good contact with Henry VD Westhuizen v. Flores allegedly made available information to the press 	X		X	X	As a result of an incident in Britain, Flores was dismissed from the SADF. His continued contact with Eugene De Kock is suspicious
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ANNEXURE E
OF STAFF REPORT
DD DECEMBER 1992

Ser No	Individual	Affiliation	Activities	Status				Remarks
				Uncertain	Above suspicion	Criminal activities	Goldstone Commission	
	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h
1	<p>Anthony James Christopher White (Ant)</p> <p>i. ID No [REDACTED]</p> <p>ii. Aliases</p> <p>(1) Anthony Greenstone</p> <p>(2) Anthony Greenwood</p> <p>(3) Anthony Greenway</p> <p>(4) James White</p> <p>(5) Abe White</p>	Alleged ex-BSB	<p>i. Allegedly, White, in cooperation with Mac Calloway and George Mitchell, smuggled arms (AK47s and AKMs) from Mozambique to KwaZulu where they were sold. Allegedly, SAO members were also involved in the matter</p> <p>ii. White also had contact with Craig Williamson</p> <p>iii. Allegedly White was also involved in ivory and rhinoceros-horn smuggling</p>				X	

2	Mike Drummond	Alleged ex-BSB	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Drummond allegedly assists Art White and Mac Calloway in the smuggling of weapons. Amongst other things he delivered weapons to Naas Van Zyl (Mossagas) ii. Drummond was also involved in insurance fraud by reporting a vehicle as stolen to have the insurance amount paid out iii. Allegedly Drummond is also involved in the smuggling of gold and shrimps 	X	Drummond owns an aircraft that is used for special assignments
3	Joe Verster i. Address 	ex-BSB ex-SADF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. During July 1992, Verster allegedly recruited individuals in the Johannesburg area. <i>Remark:</i> It is not known for what purpose recruiting was done ii. Verster maintains contact with Eugene De Kook iii. Verster has access to large sums of money and is organising an unknown action. There is talk of an amount of R100 million iv. Verster allegedly maintains contact with "Terror" Lekota of the ANC v. Verster has established a business which is concerned with a security firm as well as a firm which transports goods to the so-called Frontline States 	X	Although the information that is available does not point to Verster being involved in incongruities, there are clear indications that he is busy with a type of "BSB" action. He was managing director of the former BSB

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4	Glen Gorman	Alleged ex-BSB	<p>Statements by Gorman indicate that he is involved in an organisation that may be involved in violence. Gorman maintains contact with inter alia Pieter Van Zyl, Rocky Van Blek and Dr Vernon Joynt. The said individuals all have BSB connections</p>	X	Gorman has not been positively identified to date
5	Eugene De Kock	SAP	<p>i. Allegedly, De Kock was to leave the SAP at the end of 1992 to join an organisation of Joe Verster. <i>(Remark:</i> The nature of the organisation is not known.) Allegedly, various former SAP colleagues of De Kock and Leon Flores were to join the organisation. It was alleged that De Kock would have brought with him to the organisation a large number of weapons cached in and outside the RSA. According to Ferdi Barnard, De Kock did not leave the SAP but was to take over underground structures of the SAP's D Section.</p> <p>ii. Allegedly De Kock is involved in smuggling trade, including Ferdi Barnard's alleged smuggling activities</p> <p>iii. De Kock has close contact with Henry VD Westhuizen, Ferdi Barnard and Leon Flores</p>	X	
6	Col Jan Breytenbach	ex-SADF	<p>Allegedly Breytenbach is engaged in recruitment for/creation of a resistance structure. Current as well as former members of the Security Forces allegedly are involved in the organisation</p>	X	No further information regarding the resistance structure is available

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7	<p>AB Stander (Riaan)</p> <p>i. Employed at Intercol Pty Ltd. Directors of this company are Craig Williamson, Stander And Ant White</p>	<p>Alleged ex-BSB</p>	<p>i. Stander maintains contact with Staal Burger. The nature of the contact is unknown.</p> <p>ii. Allegedly, Stander is involved in discrediting activities directed against the RSA Government</p> <p>iii. Allegedly, Stander is involved in currency fraud</p> <p>iv. During a recent search at his house/business concern (Kastech - Eastech ??), a large number of arms and ammunition was found.</p> <p>v. His business concern, Kastech - Eastech??? may have connections with the CIA</p>	<p>X</p>	<p>X</p>	<p>X</p>	<p>Stander's activities are investigated by the SAP</p>
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