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HAK/Gromyko et al
July 10 (Dinner)



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoli G. Kovalev, Deputy Foreign Minister and Chief of Soviet Delegation to CSCE (at end)
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States

Georgi M. Korniyenko, Chief of the American Department and Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mikhail D. Sytenko, Chief of the Near East Department and Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Vasili G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the Foreign Minister

Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)

Oleg M. Sokolov, Chief, American Section of the American Department

Yuri E. Fokin, Special Assistant to the Foreign Minister

Vladimir Ya. Plechko, Special Assistant to the Foreign Minister

Leonid S. Chernyshev, Deputy Chief of Protocol

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the USSR

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff

Ambassador Albert W. Sherer, Jr., Chief of U.S. Delegation to CSCE (at end)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/90, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY llc, NARA, DATE 10/27/03



~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (B) (1, 3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.

Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of
State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
William G. Hyland, Director, INR
Jan M. Lodal, NSC Staff
Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Mark Garrison, Director, Office of Soviet Union
Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PWR*

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, July 10, 1975
10:15 pm - 12:00 Midnight
(Dinner Meeting)

PLACE: Soviet Mission, Geneva

SUBJECT: CSCE

[Mr. Sonnenfeldt and Mr. Garrison go out to take a phone call from Ambassador Sherer at the CSCE Conference. They return. Mr. Sonnenfeldt gives a report as follows:]

Sonnenfeldt: At 7:00 p.m. the Finnish Foreign Minister called Mintoff. He said he would make no problem.

Fifteen minutes ago the Maltese delegate Kingswell announced that there would be no answer from Mintoff until 11:00 a.m. tomorrow, and that Malta would probably seek amendments, that would be substantive.

The Soviet head of delegation, Deputy Foreign Minister Kovalev, pointed out that we are being subjected to blackmail and "humiliated." This represents an attempt by Malta to blackmail the other 34 countries.

The Romanian delegation has been urging Maltese reconsideration. It is ridiculous for the rest to sit around awaiting unacceptable amendments.

Mintoff is reported to have said the time element is not important. One more day is not important after the two years we have spent negotiating this.

Kissinger: [to Sonnenfeldt] What should we do?

Sonnenfeldt: I have dictated a message which you can look at.



Kissinger: [to Garrison] What do you think? It's your department.

Garrison: I'd get a message ready.

Kissinger: I'm afraid it would inflate his ego.

Sonnenfeldt: Previously he's gone to the edge and then veered off.

Kissinger: It's purely a practical question. We're not dealing with exactly a rational man. It's not a substantive question.

Sonnenfeldt: We could talk to his representative here, who was impressed with your message earlier.

Kissinger: Really?

Sonnenfeldt: I could have Sherer talk to the Italian here.

Kissinger: That would get more countries involved. Do that. Tell him I think it would be a good idea to have the Italians talk to Mintoff. [Garrison goes out.]

* * *

Kissinger: Were there very long discussions in Moscow for SALT discussions? In our case we certainly would have. [Gromyko nods yes.]

* * *


Kissinger: I remember a dinner given by U Thant in 1970 for the 25th anniversary of the UN. He gave a speech pointing out how Asians were superior.

[To Dobrynin] We shouldn't compete for the Third World. All they do is kick us around. We're not competing with you. Nor are we anti-Soviet.

Rodman: It's good we don't have Idi Amin in the European Security Conference.

Kissinger: It's good we don't have Idi Amin. [Laughter]

Gromyko: A not less interesting personality. [Laughter]



Kissinger: What time should we meet tomorrow? 10:00? 10:30? What subjects should we discuss?

Gromyko: The Middle East. We will have a detailed presentation of your proposals and position on the Middle East.

Kissinger: Sisco is coming tomorrow. He has it.

Gromyko: Your predecessor had the Rogers Plan. What will your plan be called?

Kissinger: Not the Kissinger Plan.

Sonnenfeldt: Kissinger's Rogers Plan.

Gromyko: When will you announce it?

Kissinger: I'm saving it for the election. Two weeks before the election I'll say, "Peace is at hand."

Sonnenfeldt: It will carry New York State.

Dobrynin: Sadat said in his interview that there is an agreement.

Kissinger: I read in the press that Sadat said an agreement is imminent. I don't know how he knows unless he and the Israelis are in direct contact. My impression is the opposite.

Gromyko: If I said Sadat doesn't throw his words to the wind, would you agree?

Kissinger: No. [Laughter]

Gromyko: I will make no comment. [Laughter] He praises you.

Kissinger: That shows he has good judgment. I can't say that of the Israeli Government. They're not saying good things often.

I think Anatol has more contact with the Israelis than I do.

Gromyko: The Israelis used to praise you. Now they've switched places with the Egyptians. They don't praise you and the Egyptians do.



Korniyenko: Maybe it's camouflage.

Kissinger: I'd never have thought of that. It adds a whole new dimension. To mask the intensity of their affection.

To show you the Israeli mentality -- they're building a Hilton Hotel in Jerusalem. I usually stay at the King David. Four weeks before I came there in March, the manager of the King David wrote to my father saying I can't move from the King David. My father didn't even know I was going to Jerusalem. When I arrived, he said, "You can't check out of the King David." I said, "I'm checking into the King David Hotel. I have no intention of checking out." Four weeks later, he wrote me, saying, "The question of moving to the Hilton has two aspects. One is the merits. I believe the King David is better. But the second aspect is the fact that you've been here before. So, to switch now is an act of aggression." [Laughter] I have the letter.

Rabin once gave us eight points, the eighth of which depended on the other seven. So I said, "I'll consider your seven points. They said, eight. I said, "I know what you're thinking. You think I've already cheated you out of one point." [Laughter]

I'll be glad to let you have that aspect of my chores.

* * *

[There was a discussion of the Suez Canal]

Atherton: The income is less than before the closing.

Saunders: I don't think the first month is a fair test.


Rodman: Even though they doubled the rates?

Atherton: The income is less.

Kissinger: [To Gromyko] Have you seen the Aswan Dam?

Gromyko: Twice.

Kissinger: It's a magnificent achievement. It avoided droughts that would have occurred. Twice. But it changed the ecology. That was totally unpredicted.



[Mr. Garrison returns.]

Garrison: The two Ambassadors will come here and report.

Kissinger: Is that all right with you?

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: Is there any indication?

Garrison: The Soviets have floated a consensus-minus-one proposal, but the Italians have rejected it.


Kissinger: That's what I thought.

[Minister Kovalev and Ambassador Sherer arrive at 11:15 p.m.]

Kovalev: The situation at the Conference in the last several hours has become very acute. At first, the Maltese said they'd give a reply in an hour, then they said another hour. They recently said they'd get a reply from Mintoff tomorrow, but not until 11:00 a.m. Valletta does not like the text that was reported to you earlier today, and thought that new amendments would be required and would be more or less substantive. The Maltese are not giving a favorable reply to the Canadian proposal and for tonight are blocking.

Immediately after the Maltese interim response, there was a meeting of the heads of the more influential delegations -- including the United States, the Soviet Union, West Germany, France, and others. The Finns regard Malta's action as an attempt to torpedo the holding of the third stage and that seems to be a justified assessment. All the delegations that took part in this meeting have taken note of two facts. First, indignation at the actions of the Maltese, regarded it as blackmail and completely irresponsible, as an attempt to humiliate all the 34 other participating countries. That was stated by all the delegations -- neutral, Western, and Socialist. And the second fact is that the 34 delegations are in favor of the Canadian proposal with one minor amendment, which is acceptable to all -- that is, they support convening the third stage on July 30 and all the other provisions of the Canadian proposal.

There was discussion of possible modes of action in this situation. The first suggestion was that at the next meeting of the Coordinating Committee, at 11:55 tonight, we will start to gain the maximum possible support



for the Canadian proposal, including the July 30 date. The Finns are earnestly requesting this be done because they feel that every lost hour eventually tends to destroy the chances of convening on July 30.

The second mode of action, which doesn't rule out the first, but adds to it -- and in this the Finns are interested -- is that after the meeting of the Coordinating Committee, if a consensus can't be reached because of the opposition of the Maltese, outside the hall of the Coordinating Committee, all 34 representatives hand over to the chairman of the Finnish delegation the Canadian draft proposal on a bilateral basis, thus symbolizing their agreement to it. That would not be a violation of the consensus rule because outside the meeting hall the countries are free to meet bilaterally. But that would be symbolic of their goodwill, and the Finnish delegation would gain assurance that the 34 delegations would arrive in Finland on July 30. It would make it easier for Finland to begin immediate preparations for July 30.

That in brief is the situation in the conference, and Mr. Sherer may probably want to add to it.

Kissinger: [To Sherer] What is your view of the Western side?

Sherer: This is where I would reluctantly disagree with the Minister. He's absolutely right; all the delegations feel we are being humiliated. They all feel shabbily treated by the Maltese; it's a purposeful third-country maneuver. But some of them feel they did have communications problems -- Mintoff was off on the beach or riding somewhere. I doubt we could get a consensus... isolate Malta as we proposed. I was at a pickup meeting of 12-15 delegations; I was called out twice for long telephone conversations. But I doubt we can do it because there will be a natural tendency of some of the small countries to support Malta against what seems to be big power pressure.

Kissinger: Did you ask the Italian Ambassador to make a representation to Malta?

Sherer: I did not, sir, because the Italians here were among the most reluctant to put pressure on Malta.

I drafted a letter for your consideration.

Kissinger: A letter?



Sherer: To Malta. I think a letter from you would have a good effect.

Kissinger: It might also have the opposite effect. [To Sonnenfeldt] Let's go out a minute.

[Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt, and Sherer leave the room to confer, then return.]

Kissinger: On the procedure, Mr. Foreign Minister, we'll be glad to join this 11:55 meeting and to join with any resolution that's agreed.

I'm not inclined to go along with handing over the Canadian proposal to the Finns, because it would be treated as an issue of principle by many Western delegations. I'd be prepared to issue a joint statement that we're prepared to go July 30.

Gromyko: I'm worried about how the others would react to our joint declaration, saying, "Here's collusion again."

Kissinger: I'd be prepared to say it as a unilateral statement.

Gromyko: That sounds more positive.

Kissinger: I'll be prepared to do that.

Gromyko: Because otherwise there may be people here who'll say you can't tread on Mintoff. But after all, you can't sacrifice the conference for this because this principle was designed to buttress the success of the conference. Principle should serve policy, not policy serve principle.

Kissinger: I'm worried about sending a letter to Mintoff because it would give him a tremendous ego trip.

Gromyko: It is really hard for one to talk you out of it or into it [sending a letter] because if you think it will have the opposite effect.... Maybe you could try getting in touch with the Italians.

Kissinger: That I'll be glad to do.

Gromyko: Because it's not substance but a real pathology.

Kissinger: I'll be glad to send a message to Rome.



Gromyko: There's this Malta that gets the idea it can hold up all the others. A real travesty. That's democracy?

Kissinger: I can say nothing in defense of Malta because we should be concluding stage two today.

[Sonnenfeldt goes around the table to confer with Kissinger to show him a draft of proposed statement.]

As I said, I'll be glad to make a statement -- when I go into the hotel, there will undoubtedly be press there -- that we support the Canadian proposal.

Stoessel: You'll be asked if this is the Foreign Minister's view.

Kissinger: I'll have to say, "ask him."

What is going to happen at five to twelve?

Sherer: There will be another meeting of the Coordinating Committee. I suppose the chair will ask if there is support for the Canadian proposal, and if Malta is there, I'd expect Malta to say, "we don't accept." Others will say we have to have 35 years. Malta will say, "Our Prime Minister will be in touch with us at 11:00 tomorrow."

Kissinger: When was the Canadian proposal submitted? Yesterday?

Sherer: Yes, sir.

Gromyko: Can you talk to your allies about acting outside of the conference on a bilateral basis to support the Canadian proposal?

Kissinger: I think it would be counterproductive. [To Sherer:] Don't you?

Sherer: I agree.

Kissinger: I think many countries -- Italy, the Dutch and others -- would see it as a matter of principle. When I go to the hotel I'll say we're prepared to join with the others in support of the Canadian proposal, and that I spoke to the French President. I said this today in Paris and I'll say it again. I'll also get in touch with the Italians. This will show them we have an interest.

When will we hear from Mintoff? Noon?



Sherer: He said 11:00, but today he said an hour and it dragged on.

Kissinger: Did you talk to the Maltese Ambassador? What did he say?

Sherer: I did. I think he took it very seriously and was very impressed with it. He then said he had changes to make in the compromise proposal that I submitted on your behalf, and these would be substantive.

Kissinger: [To Gromyko] I think they'll cave tomorrow, don't you?

Kovalev: What do the Maltese want?

Gromyko: It is impossible to give an analysis of their proposal. What do they want? To declare war on the US? The Soviet Union?

Kovalev: First of all, they want to humiliate all the participants. Second, for Mintoff to be in the world's limelight.

Gromyko: If that is so, he must be doing that with the blessing of someone else, because this Mintoff couldn't do it alone.

Kissinger: I don't know who else would be giving their blessing.

I think his strength is that he's doing it on his own. If someone else were doing it, it would be easy to do.


He's a good friend of the Chinese. I don't know if they're doing it.
[Confers with Sonnenfeldt.]

I'm having Sherer talk to all the Western delegations today, so tomorrow we'll know better.

Gromyko: Can you add one sentence to your statement, that the United States is ready to go on the 30th?

Kissinger: Oh, yes. That is what it says. [Reading the draft statement:] "The United States supports the consensus that has developed that the last stage of the Conference should take place on July 30 as proposed by Canada and I have instructed our Ambassador to join this consensus."

Gromyko: Would it be possible to say, "The United States is prepared for a resumption on the 30th?"



Kissinger: Oh, yes, that's easy. And I'll say we believe the decision should be made as soon as possible so the Finns can begin preparations.

Gromyko: Good.

Kissinger: So, 10:30 tomorrow.

I think the less attention we pay to him the better. If he doesn't tomorrow, I'll be seeing the Germans and the English. It would be better to do something joint. Rather than a frantic letter tonight.

Sonnenfeldt: We couldn't get it delivered.

Kissinger: So by Monday morning we'll know.

What we discussed tonight: I'll get in touch with the Italians; I'll make a statement, and tell our Ambassador to get in touch with the allied delegates by 10:30 tomorrow.


And to the press we'll say we discussed SALT and Europe and the results were constructive and the atmosphere was cordial.

If asked if progress was made, we can say, yes.

Gromyko: Just a general formula.

[The meeting ended. The Foreign Minister escorted the Secretary and his party down to the front door.]

[The Secretary's remarks to the press, made in the lobby of the Intercontinental Hotel on his return, are attached.]



DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

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FROM US DEL SECRETARY GENEVA CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:
ACTION:

N/A
OVIP: KISSINGER, HENRY A.
COMMENTS TO PRESS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AFTER MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO AT SOVIET MISSION, GENEVA, ON JULY 10, 1975.

SECSTATE WASHDC - IMMEDIATE

INFO: ALL CSCE CAPITALS - IMMEDIATE
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SECTO 06028

DEPARTMENT PASS NSCE FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND NESSEN

1. Following is transcript of subject comments:
Quote. Well, we had very extensive talks, very constructive and conducted in a cordial atmosphere. We concentrated on the European Security Conference and mostly on Salt. With respect to the European Security Conference, the United States supports the consensus that has developed that the last stage of the conference should take place on July 30 as proposed by Canada, and we are prepared to bring this to as rapid a conclusion as possible in order to permit the Finnish hosts to make

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DRAFTED BY: Robert Meyer [Signature] DRAFTING DATE: 7/11/75 TEL. EXT. CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: S/S Rick Sherman [Signature]

CLEARANCES:

Ambassador Robert Anderson [Signature]



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CLASSIFICATION

their preparations. With respect to Salt we had extensive discussions which will be continued tomorrow and progress was made. Thank you.

Question: Mr. Secretary, have you heard anything from Malta? Since the meeting is still on, they are still waiting down there.

Secretary Kissinger: I understand that the only country that has not yet joined the consensus is Malta, and that they are waiting to hear from them either tonight or tomorrow morning.

Question: Did Mr. Gromyko give you anything resembling a new proposal on verification that would help reach agreement?


Secretary Kissinger: I cannot go into the details of a discussion that is still going on, but as I pointed out progress has been made.

Question: The Middle East?


Secretary Kissinger: The Middle East will be discussed tomorrow. We have not yet discussed the Middle East.

Tomorrow we will continue our discussions on Salt and then we will turn to the Middle East. We will meet here at 10:30. We have been meeting off and on with the ambassadors to the European Security Conference. Thank you. Unquote.

KISSINGER



HAK/Gromyko et al
July 11 (morning)



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:


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Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State
 Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
 Amb. Albert W. Sherer, Jr., Chief of U.S. Delegation to CSCE
 Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
 Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PMR*

DATE AND TIME:

Friday, July 11, 1975
10:45 a.m. - 1:07 p.m.



DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12068, SEC. 3.5
 NSC MEMO, 11/24/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
 BY bls, NARA, DATE 10/21/03

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
 SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5(b)(3)
 AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.

PLACE: Carnival Bar
Intercontinental Hotel
Geneva

SUBJECT: CSCE; Middle East

[Photographers and press came in to photograph.]

CSCE

Kissinger: Twice I've given briefings in bars in Moscow in the Intourist Hotel.

Mr. Foreign Minister, first let me welcome you to -- I can't say our place. Could we have our Ambassadors here? I see Ambassador Kovalev. Where is Sherer?

[He looks over draft of joint statement.]

Gromyko: Mr. Secretary, you are the chairman. You didn't know you were elected?

Kissinger: Oh. I thought Mr. Kovalev would give us a report.

Kovalev: We've just received a reply from the Maltese. They are prepared to accept the entire text of yesterday of the Canadian proposal, including the date of July 30, to register all the understandings except the one on the Mediterranean which was the subject of discussion yesterday between the Foreign Minister and Secretary Kissinger. Let me read the text .

Kissinger: To whom did they communicate this?

Kovalev: We received it just now from Mintoff's special representative, Kingswell.

Kissinger: Did we get it too?

Kovalev: It was virtually two minutes ago.

Sherer: I was probably at the hotel.



Kovalev: "In order to advance the objectives set forth above, the Participating States also declare their intention of maintaining and amplifying the contacts and dialogue as initiated by the CSCE with the nonparticipating Mediterranean States to include all the States of the Mediterranean, with the purpose of contributing to peace"-- the amendment is "reducing armed forces in the region" -- "strengthening security," and so on.

Kissinger: The only amendment is "reducing armed forces in the region?"

Kovalev: Right.

Kissinger: Do you have any problem with this?

Gromyko: Why don't we talk for a minute?

[Kissinger and Gromyko get up and go to corner of the room to confer alone, from 10:57 - 10:59. Kissinger then confers with Sonnenfeldt, Stoessel, Sisco and Sherer to 11:02.]

Kissinger: I assume if we now accept this, you will not be calling for a nuclear-free zone or disarmament.

Gromyko: [Laughs] Nothing.

Kissinger: I will instruct Ambassador Sherer to call the NATO caucus and discuss it. I foresee no problem. If there is, we can discuss it.

Sherer: There will be no problem.

Kissinger: We should know, say, within an hour. Then we can conclude it today.

[Sherer leaves. Kovalev gets up and talks to Gromyko.]

Gromyko: I'm telling him [Kovalev] to grab Sherer by the coattails.

Kissinger: He's joining the NATO caucus?

Gromyko: He will be active among our friends and the neutrals.

Kissinger: I think it will be settled in the next hour.



Kovalev: [in English] Goodbye.

Kissinger: Goodbye, Thank you.

Middle East

Gromyko: Maybe we could now go over to the Middle East.

Kissinger: Great eagerness.

Gromyko: I expect it, greatly expect it.

Maybe you would like to give your assessment of the present situation and give your considerations on the problem. Perhaps you might have some sort of plan to put forward. I say this because at the last meeting you said you would be prepared at the next meeting -- this one -- to speak in this vein.

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, I had told your Ambassador that things have moved somewhat more slowly, both in our internal deliberations and in policy, than we had anticipated.

The situation we face is as follows: Egypt and Israel, as is known publicly, are engaged in attempting to see if some agreement can be reached. Contrary to the newspapers, it has not been reached yet. I am seeing the Israeli Prime Minister tomorrow, who will give me the latest Israeli thinking. But with no concreteness. The clarifications Israel is seeking concern mostly our bilateral relations. The basic issue has to do with the lines in the passes and access to the oil fields, in return for whatever can be done for UN forces and passage through the Canal and other similar matters. It will become clear in the next two or three weeks. I am not planning any extended trip in the area. I will let your Ambassador know Tuesday or Wednesday.

The question then is, if there is an interim agreement, how to move to a more comprehensive consideration. We believe we should then move to a more comprehensive consideration of all the issues. We might begin with Syrian matters if that is the preference, but it will be comprehensive.

How to do this raises questions of procedure as well as of substance, as well as of participation. It involves the question of relations of the Middle East



countries and our joint conduct. This is my assessment. Do you want to add anything, Joe? [Mr. Sisco, who had been traveling all night, declines.]

This is a preliminary comment.

Gromyko: You know, there is a book by the German author Erich Maria Remarque, which is very popular in our country: On the Western Front, No Changes.

Kissinger: All Quiet on the Western Front. In German it's Im Westen Nichts Neues.

Sukhodrev: In Russian, No Change on the Western Front.

Kissinger: That's wrong too. It is a line from their communiques.

Gromyko: It is my guess this translation was agreed on with the author when it was published originally.


In any case, this expression I think is applicable to the Middle East today. In the Middle East there are no changes. In our view the situation in the Middle East is a dangerous one. Although there is no smell of gunpowder in the air, it could flare up at any time. It is similar to the period before the last flareup, when we gave a warning but were not heeded. I don't say it is imminent, but it could happen. We are not prophets.

Kissinger: You think we are in a similar situation to 1973?

Because in retrospect...we didn't heed the warnings of the General Secretary.

Gromyko: I say this because there are two basic issues which are not yet resolved. First is the complete withdrawal of Israel from all occupied territories, and second is the recognition of Palestinian rights, which in our view is the formation of a state by the Palestinian Arabs. The third issue is that the agreement must be reached by all the parties concerned to guarantee to Israel the right to free and independent existence.

Of the questions on which we believe agreement must be reached today, these are the following:



At present, the current and most important task is this: Should there be a continuation of the step-by-step policy? Or should there be a joint consideration of all the problems at hand as was agreed upon in the past, at the Geneva Conference? Our view has not changed. The step-by-step approach cannot yield a radical solution to the problem. Steam can be let out of the boiler, but the pressure cannot be ended. You may read in the press that the Soviet Union somewhat abated its interest in Geneva. I can reply this is not so. We are always interested in the work of the Geneva Conference being resumed. We are in favor of its serious work -- not as a protocol function or to ratify separate partial steps taken outside the conference and in circumvention of the Conference. It is the comprehensive issues we believe should be discussed -- broad ones, and certain narrow ones can be resolved through the Conference too. We don't see why the U.S. is so apprehensive of the Conference resuming its work.

It is also true we don't understand all the steps taken by Sadat. This is not a complaint to you about Sadat but a statement of the facts. We say it to Sadat too.

The General Secretary said this to you and I too: If the Soviet Union were to set itself the goal, it could paralyze all the step-by-step attempts. It would suffice merely to supply the requisite quantities of arms to the relevant Arab countries and they would understand what it was in reference to. It is true we supply some arms, but not a great deal. You may read that the Soviet Union is supplying billions of dollars of arms to, say, Libya, but as usual, the sources are Arab sources, and you are quite right in not raising this issue before us and quite right in not paying attention to these quite erroneous reports. We believe you should appreciate our restraint and our cool and level-headed approach in the Middle East. We could supply unlimited arms and we could outdo the United States in this regard, but we are not setting ourselves that task.

In the past you have said you appreciate the restraint and level-headed approach we have taken; lately you have not said this, probably for reasons of your own.

Let me say a few words on the Geneva Conference.

We believe, especially bearing in mind the fact that all previous deadlines for the resumption of the Geneva Conference have passed, it would be correct if in the nearest possible future the Conference be resumed to consider any questions the parties want to raise; they could include broad or partial or narrower issues at hand. There is a forum for discussion of all these issues and we simply cannot understand why apprehension exists about the discussion of this at Geneva. Let me repeat, even narrow and partial issues could be raised.



As for the Palestinians, we have been in favor of their participation from the beginning. As you know, there is an authoritative and capable organization capable of representing them, and you know of the Arab decision about this. We would accept any concerted Arab decision, and of other participants, with respect to their participation in the Conference.

Israel, which has the opportunity to obtain an effective guarantee, is dodging the issue and balking at appropriate ideas and proposals on the subject. Whether it is the result of arrogance or thirst to keep their hands on the Arab territory they have seized, that we don't know. In the future, people will appear in Israel who can weigh and assess the decisions taken by those in power with respect to the possibility to obtain a guarantee for their existence, and to judge responsibility for those decisions. But that is a matter for the future. The question now is of the Palestinians and their participation in the work of the Conference.

Kissinger: Let me make a few observations on your remarks, Mr. Foreign Minister.

First with respect to the general Soviet attitude. I think it is on the whole characterized by restraint. I have said so on occasions and I have never said the contrary. I think this restraint isn't a favor you do to us but reflects common interests. Because the absence of restraint wouldn't solve the problem but would leave us in the same situation, only after another war. So I think both of us have an interest in exercising restraint. But I agree, the Soviet Union has not done all it could do to exacerbate the situation, and we appreciate this.

As for the step-by-step approach, I have not in recent months spoken on behalf of it with any great intensity. In recent months it is the parties who came to us rather than us encouraging it.

Second, we never saw it as a substitute for a comprehensive approach. We saw it as perhaps a way to make Geneva easier. You put it perhaps right: it lets the steam out of the boiler but doesn't end the difficulty.

So there is not a big difference between us. Either there will be a step before Geneva or there will be no step before Geneva; there will not be two steps before Geneva. Whether it will be one more step or no step will probably be decided by the time the General Secretary and the President meet at the European Security Conference. Then will be the time for an overall consideration of the issues in any case.



So this is the issue with respect to the step-by-step policy, and we have no difficulty keeping you informed. But we don't have to, because the Israeli press keeps you informed. In fact, the Israeli press keeps us informed, because we often hear more about the Israeli Cabinet than from the Israelis themselves.

Your Ambassador follows the situation in the United States, and you can see from the statements by the President and me that we share your view that a stalemate means continuing risks for everyone and there must be progress. And I agree with your remark: For Israel it is a big decision to make peace now with adequate guarantees, or risk a new military conflict.

You say, why are we reluctant to have Geneva? We are reluctant to have Geneva because to go there in conditions of frustration, there will be a tremendous pressure to do something rapidly that we may not be able to do. It is hard enough to deal with them individually; all together they intoxicate each other. With the Palestinians, the Syrians, all in the same room. But it has to be faced. If it turns into the kind of discussion we had with your North Vietnamese allies at Avenue Kleber, that also has problems for us, both of us.

With respect to the Palestinians, if you think Israel is trying to gain time through our elections, I can think of no issue better suited for this than the Palestinian issue. In our debate we have turned it to more consideration of the overall issue than at any time since '67. But the Palestinian issue would enable them to rally again. It would immediately lead to a protracted stalemate. This is a fact; I'm not making it as a judgment. This is why we always thought the Palestinian issue should be faced later, when more progress has been made and the parties have a commitment to the outcome.

But nevertheless we believe the time is approaching when we believe the process has to be started. About the Palestinian question, I have no answer, except that if it is put on the agenda at the beginning, it will be months before we have progress.

Sisco: Even if it becomes too acute at the UN, this will be true.

Kissinger: Yes. I would be interested to hear the considerations of the Foreign Minister, assuming Geneva starts, how we would move it to progress concretely. If an interim agreement succeeds between Egypt and Israel, we will have to face it. There will be no other step.



Gromyko: [Speaks at length in Russian. Before the translation, rain and lightning start.]

Kissinger: Mrs. Stoessel is on the lake right now taking a boat ride.

The situation outside is what the situation in the Middle East looks like. [Laughter] Can we get a light on? [Mr. Sonnenfeldt goes out to find the lights. A few lights over the bar and a pink light over the dance floor come on.]

Partial measures.

Sukhodrev: [Translating the Foreign Minister's earlier remarks] Now we see more possibility for the Geneva Conference to resume. The participating countries meet and put forward whatever ideas they want to advance for a solution of the Middle East problem. These proposals should relate to the vacating of occupied territories, an end to the war, use of the Canal especially by the Israelis, and use of demilitarized zones and other ideas if necessary -- in short, any proposals relating to the evacuation of territories. In addition, proposals relating to the Palestinian state. There is a basis: There are territories not belonging to either Israel or Jordan, namely Gaza and the Right Bank.

Sisco: West Bank. The Right Bank would be the East Bank!


Kissinger: It depends on how you look at it. [Laughter] This is the sort of discussion that goes on at our staff meetings.

Sukhodrev: [Resumes translating] Israel of course would have every right to put forward its proposals on the guarantees it wants.

Kissinger: That would start a war right there.

Sukhodrev: The Soviet Union is and always has been in favor of such guarantees. These should be participated in by the Big Powers. Whether by some or all of the Big Powers, could be discussed, but we believe certainly the United States and Soviet Union should be participants. We are prepared for our part to participate in providing those guarantees.

There is another question that arises with respect to the Geneva Conference but we don't understand why when we raise it you have bypassed it. The Geneva Conference can and should discuss radical issues, broad issues, because they have to be solved somehow. Ready-made solutions won't just rain on us from the sky. Maybe our statesmen will find them up there, but if not, the states must do it.



Kissinger: We would not reject them if they did find them there.

Sukhodrev: But the Geneva Conference could consider partial steps...

Gromyko: If considered appropriate.

Sukhodrev: ...steps that you keep wanting. So on no account do I exclude the Geneva Conference taking these up. So alongside the discussion of radical, broad issues, there could be a discussion of partial steps, to contribute to a "de-tensioning" of the situation.

Gromyko: Which ones -- that would be discussed.

Sukhodrev: In the context of the overall. In what measure in the context of the overall, could be decided when we discuss. But you invariably ignore our remarks to that effect.

If that approach is taken, then all the parties would be taking a clean approach, a pure one. But we hear some saying "the Soviet Union wants to get in, and we don't want that."

That is what I wanted to say, taking account of your considerations.

One other remark: At the Geneva Conference the Soviet Union would act as a moderating factor, and that includes consideration of the Palestinian problem. You know the various trends and currents that exist within the Palestinian movement, so if Israel sees in the Soviet Union a force to which it wants to attribute solely intimidating and negative properties, it is making a mistake. The Soviet Union at the Conference would be carrying out a policy of principle but a moderating policy to a great extent, and this would be a support of Israel's security -- its real security, not illusory security.

Kissinger: Let me say first, I consider your statement a constructive approach.

I would like to ask a few clarifying questions: You said each country should be asked to put forward its proposal of the whole totality of it. Does it mean the Soviet Union and the United States should make a proposal with respect to the totality of it, or should we first ask the parties to make their proposal and then we would do it?



Gromyko: We believe that on this question too we could engage in some preliminary consultation or exchange of views to reach a common position. There are two possibilities: we could hear initially what the parties want to say and propose, and then we could weigh and assess their proposals and maybe put forward our own viewpoints. Or secondly, they could make their proposals -- and they are the appropriate ones to do so since they are the parties directly involved -- and the United States could make its viewpoints known, perhaps concerted, and we could put forward our own. These possibilities could be the subject of exchanges of views between us. After all, we have agreed on occasion to consult on these things, and included this in many documents. So we are flexible on this.

Kissinger: We have two approaches that either of us could pursue. Either of us could compete at this Conference to drive out the influence of the other, for advantage. This would, one, have an effect on our relations and two, would immediately produce a stalemate. Or, we could be a moderating influence. The parties have enough complexities without our adding to them. My view tends to be to let the parties put forward their ideas, and we could consult to try to put forward a common viewpoint. This would be the most constructive approach. Because a stalemate would serve neither of our interests.

CSCE

[Kovalev and Sherer return at 12:19 p. m.],


Kissinger: Should we hear from our Ambassadors first?

Gromyko: Can we guess what they have? Augurs used to guess from looking at them.

Kissinger: I think it is now humanly impossible to make the European Security Conference fail. [Laughter].

Sherer: It took a little time to assemble the NATO chiefs of delegation. They were aware of the Maltese amendments. I polled the room to find out how people felt and I think without exception the major powers have to seek instructions before giving any opinion at all.

Kissinger: You should have said that too.



Sherer: And the countries almost all took a generally negative view.

Kissinger: Which? Italy?

Sherer: Italy, France, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Germany.

Kissinger: Does Germany have forces in the Mediterranean?

Sherer: They all spoke in a generally skeptical way.

Kissinger: Let me talk to Mr. Sherer for a minute.

[Kissinger, Sherer, Sisco, Sonnenfeldt and Stoessel confer in the corner until 12:37 p.m. and then return to the table.]

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, on the European Security Conference first, as I understand it from Mr. Sherer, all the NATO delegations are asking for instructions and the answer is expected to be negative. I am asking Sherer to ask the delegations to hold an answer until I have a chance to confer with Schmidt and Callaghan, and I can get in touch with the French.

I think the Conference will take place on July 30. It is only a question of tactics. It's a stupid. . . . We are only committed to maintain contacts and dialogue on these questions.

Sisco: It is not operative.

Kissinger: We are not committed to do anything. I will recommend to them that we stay in low gear on this. [To Sherer] Tell them we construe this only as a commitment to a dialogue, that we don't construe it as calling for a reduction, and we have no intention on our part to reduce our forces. And I don't detect a burning desire by my Soviet colleagues to reduce. No, you speak for yourself.

[The Secretary confers with Sherer]

Sherer will proceed as I indicated. I am seeing Genscher tonight and Schmidt tomorrow and Callaghan. I will call Sauvagnargues tonight or tomorrow. I think the Finns should proceed as if it will go forward on the 30th. It is inconceivable to me that it should fail at this late date.

I'm told the Finns are proceeding anyway on the assumption that it will go forward.



And our two Ambassadors will stay in touch and we will let you know everything we are doing. We will let Vorontsov know Saturday night or Sunday morning what the results are.

Gromyko: All right. I think evidently somebody somewhere seems to be not too aware of the consequences of what is going on.

Kissinger: You are talking about the European Security Conference?

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: I think it has become an industry in each Foreign Office working on the European Security Conference. No one asks himself what the purpose is.

I think of all the countries, Turkey is the most difficult one on this question of reducing forces.

[Gromyko confers with Kovalev]

Gromyko: Yesterday they agreed with the Canadian proposal.

Kissinger: Yes. But on the Maltese addition.

Gromyko: We don't know, since the NATO countries discussed it.

Sherer: The Turks here will consult their government, but the delegation here had a generally negative attitude.

Kissinger: We could cut off arms to them.

[To Sherer] Will they be able to get instructions by this afternoon?

Sherer: The Turks will take a while.

Kissinger: All of them.

Sherer: They are all phoning now.

Kissinger: Let me know the lineup before I leave.

Sherer: All right

[Exeunt Sherer and Kovalev].



Middle East:

[Gromyko and Sukhodrev confer].

Gromyko: I was just recapping my last remarks on the Middle East: You said we should discuss whether we should concert to put forward proposals of our own or not.

Kissinger: What is your reaction?

Gromyko: That is a possible mode of action.

We can talk over these questions, but what do we do with the Geneva Conference?

Malta is not a factor.

Kissinger: Wait until your Syrian friends go into action. They will drive us all crazy.

[Sonnenfeldt shows him a draft of the joint statement of the meeting].

I was prepared to add "constructive talks in a friendly atmosphere." "Cordial." I would prefer "cordial."

Gromyko: "Friendly".

Kissinger: We will do "friendly."

Gromyko: Do you have any idea when the Conference should be convened?

Kissinger: We will have a more precise idea when the General Secretary and the President meet in Helsinki, because we will know whether there will be an interim agreement or not. It will probably be some time in the course of the fall, but a more precise date we will know perhaps by then.

Can I ask, for my understanding, one or two other questions?

You said there is a possibility of partial settlements coming out of Geneva. I have no fixed view on it. Should they be made as stages of an overall -- that is, first we agree on the overall and then we agree on these as steps in it? Or can there be a partial agreement and then overall?



Gromyko: On this or that partial measure, there could be an agreement on a partial step before there is agreement on a comprehensive.

Kissinger: Suppose there is agreement on an overall, or when there is one, you would also envisage the possibility that it could be carried out in stages?

Gromyko: It is a possibility.

Kissinger: Months, or years?

Gromyko: That is subject to consideration.

Kissinger: We don't have to agree now.

Some of my colleagues heard you say the Soviet Union would not insist on participating in all phases of partial discussions at Geneva.

Gromyko: Who? The Soviet Union is a participant at the Conference.

Kissinger: It was an unusual statement from the Soviet Foreign Minister. I didn't think so. You know your view. My colleagues wrote me a note saying they heard this.

Sisco: You said "Some say the Soviet Union wants to be in all of it, but we don't."

Sukhodrey: That was a quote. He said "Some say this" that "we" -- that is, they -- "don't want the Soviet Union in."

Kissinger: I understood.

The Palestinian question will be a problem.

Gromyko: On that question, the Arabs themselves should reach prior accord, and we would support whatever proposal they put forward. We ourselves are in favor of their participation from the beginning, but there is as yet no Arab proposal before us. They say there will be a meeting soon between Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinians. Maybe you have proposals from them.



Kissinger: No. In any event, the two leaders should discuss it in Helsinki. The two topics I think they should discuss are the Middle East and SALT.

Gromyko: Whether or not you keep us abreast of the partial measures is up to you. You know our view of it.

SALT should be a topic of discussion.

Kissinger: In any event, there should not be a debate about partial measures versus Geneva. It will be this and Geneva, or no step and Geneva. It will not be many more.

Gromyko: The next step in Helsinki?

Kissinger: The next stage of discussion should be at Helsinki. And you and I could meet, if necessary, while the meetings are going on. While Mintoff is speaking. Our Chiefs have to stay there but we don't.

I fell asleep at the NATO meeting. Did you see those photos? The thing is, I knew the cameras were on me and I knew I was falling asleep, but I couldn't do anything about it.

[The meeting ended. The Joint Statement later released is at Tab A].



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TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJ: TEXT OF JOINT STATEMENT ON TALKS BETWEEN SECRETARY KISSINGER AND SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO IN GENEVA JULY 10-11, 1975

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SUBJECT STATEMENT WHICH IS EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE AT 7:00 P.M. GENEVA TIME (7:00 P.M. BONN TIME; 9 PM MOSCOW TIME; 2:00 P.M. EDT) ON FRIDAY, JULY 11, 1975:

QUOTE: IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN EARLIER AGREEMENT, A MEETING WAS HELD ON JULY 10-11 IN GENEVA BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES AND ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, HENRY A. KISSINGER, AND MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR, ANDREI A. GROMYKO.

IN FURTHERANCE OF THE CONVERSATIONS HELD PREVIOUSLY, THEY CONTINUED THEIR EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON MATTERS OF BILATERAL US-SOVIET RELATIONS.

PARTICULAR ATTENTION WAS GIVEN TO ISSUES RELATED TO WORKING OUT A NEW LONG-TERM AGREEMENT ON THE FURTHER LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ON THE BASIS OF THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED BETWEEN PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD AND GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU, L.I. BREZHNEV, AT THEIR MEETING IN VLADIVOSTOK IN NOVEMBER, 1974.

IN REVIEWING THE INTERNATIONAL ISSUES OF INTEREST TO BOTH SIDES, THEY HELD A THOROUGH DISCUSSION, IN PARTICULAR, ON QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE HOLDING OF THE FINAL STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE AT THE SUMMIT LEVEL IN HELSINKI. THEY ALSO CONTINUED THEIR EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON MATTERS OF ACHIEVING A JUST AND LASTING PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF RESUMING THE GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE.

THE TALKS WERE CONDUCTED IN A FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE AND BOTH SIDES BELIEVE THAT THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WAS CONSTRUCTIVE AND USEFUL FROM THE STANDPOINT OF FURTHER DEVELOPING US-SOVIET RELATIONS IN CONFORMITY WITH THE COURSE THEY HAVE EMBARKED ON TOGETHER AND THE CONCRETE AGREEMENTS REACHED DURING THE US-SOVIET SUMMIT MEETINGS. UNQUOTE. DALE

UNQUOTE. INGERSOLL

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HAK/Gromyko (private)
July 11 (afternoon)



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo
of the Central Committee of the CPSU and
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Interpreter)

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PMR*

DATE AND TIME: Friday, July 11, 1975
1:10 - 2:02 p.m.

PLACE: Secretary Kissinger's Bedroom
Intercontinental Hotel

SUBJECTS: Brezhnev Oral Message; SALT; UNGA;
China and Japan; FRG-Brazil Nuclear Deal;
Bilateral Relations

Gromyko: [to Sukhodrev in Russian] Give me the letter.

Mr. Secretary, I wish to hand to you an oral message from General Secretary Brezhnev to President Ford in connection with the repeated utterances made by your Defense Secretary Schlesinger. We have called your attention to it. Frankly, we are surprised at this, and all the Soviet leadership, including General Secretary Brezhnev, are concerned at this.

Let me repeat: This is an oral message. Let me give you an official Russian text and a working translation. [Tab A].

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 8.5

NBC MEMO, 11/18/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY tda, NARA, DATE 10/21/03



CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5(b) (1, 3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.

Kissinger: [reads it] It will be brought to the immediate attention of the President. Speaking frankly, it is not unhelpful that you sent this because they don't reflect the views of the President. Frankly, they reflect an attempt by a Cabinet member to play politics in an election year. But it is not unhelpful.

Gromyko: I would like just to express my hope -- and I know this is what the General Secretary would want me to say -- that it will be treated with utmost seriousness.

Kissinger: It would not be inappropriate for the General Secretary to raise it with the President at Helsinki, and it will be treated with utmost seriousness.

Gromyko: Our delegations are continuing their talks here on the Strategic Arms Limitation problem. According to the information I have received from Semenov -- I don't know if it is your information -- since certain matters of principle are still open -- and this is first and foremost what we discussed yesterday -- they do not touch them. And it is appropriate that matters of principle be taken up at the appropriate level. And we agreed these important matters of principle will be discussed by General Secretary Brezhnev and President Ford at Helsinki; this is well and good. But Semenov tells me the American delegation is reluctant to discuss even other matters until there is an agreement on the matters of principle that we discussed. So the factual situation is that the delegations have practically nothing to discuss. We think other matters should be discussed by the delegations here, and shouldn't be kept on ice.

Kissinger: I agree with you. Could we agree on what should be discussed? Or should we have Johnson and Semenov come here after lunch and agree on what they should discuss?

Gromyko: Maybe it would be better if you gave instructions to your representative and I'd give instructions to Semenov, because there are many questions to discuss. If you want to call him, all right, but we can do it.

Kissinger: All right. I'll give instructions and I'll let you know Monday what subjects should be agreed.

Gromyko: The important thing is to give instructions. I have already instructed Semenov.



Kissinger: Let's discuss it with Sonnenfeldt before lunch. Definitional questions, for example, should be discussed.

Gromyko: All right. There are many such questions strewn throughout the drafts -- some regarding definitions and other matters.

Kissinger: I agree.

Gromyko: Then there is this question: Just before this year's Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly there will be a Special Session devoted to international economic problems, continuing the discussions in the UN framework on these topics. What in your view should be discussed there? And would it be a good idea to have consultations on what should be discussed? This is not by way of a positive statement.

Kissinger: No, I understand. I'll give a speech next week warning against confrontation tactics in the UN, and specifically not regarding the Soviet Union but the new countries. We will be making proposals on raw materials, and so on, which we are prepared to discuss with you. We believe we should not let the new countries dictate on these questions. But we will put forward our proposals -- and we will not move from these positions, I can tell you.

Will you be there?

Gromyko: This is what I want to ask.

Kissinger: I will probably be there. I will not speak twice. I'll speak either at the Special Session or at the Regular Session.

Gromyko: Probably I'll be at the Regular Session. It is not a formal decision, but probably.

Kissinger: Being in America, it's hard for me not to come.

When you visit the UN, of course, you will come to Washington and visit the President. He would be happy to see you.

Gromyko: Thank you.

Earlier you remember we spoke about the possibility of Vietnam joining the UN. You remember?

Kissinger: Yes.



Gromyko: What is your view: What do you think about both joining the UN -- the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and South Vietnam?

Kissinger: If both Koreas join, we would be in favor of it.

Gromyko: This is still your position?

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: If it is done, what about just South Vietnam?

Kissinger: [thinks] I don't totally exclude this. Let me think about it.

Gromyko: In the Asiatic area, what is happening? With your friends the Chinese and Japanese?

Kissinger: The Chinese are very anxious to have the President go there. We are thinking now of November or December, maybe late November, and before then I will go there before the President. Six weeks before.

Gromyko: Will there be negotiations with Mao?

Kissinger: We don't expect any spectacular results.

Gromyko: Will it be a short or long visit?

Kissinger: We haven't discussed it. They would like a week. We may cut it, less than a week.

Gromyko: Do you have any information about the possibility of an agreement or no agreement between the Chinese and Japanese on friendship? Earlier we discussed what is the intention of the Japanese on this question of....

Kissinger: Hegemony.

Gromyko: Hegemony, and what the Chinese have in mind on this question.

Kissinger: My prediction is -- and this is not based on information -- is that they will probably make this.

Gromyko: Make this?

Kissinger: Make this agreement.



Gromyko: So the Chinese will succeed.

Kissinger: This is not based on information but on the Japanese character.

Gromyko: The Japanese Prime Minister is not strong?

Kissinger: He is not strong. He will visit Washington in August. We are not encouraging any excessively close ties between China and Japan.

Gromyko: It strikes the eye that Miki rather underrates the sharp edge that China wants to direct against the Soviet Union -- you know best the situation as regards the United States.

Kissinger: We have no interest in this.

Gromyko: This surprises us. We have no idea why Miki underrates this. We would have no objection -- although we don't request it -- if you could mention our view to the Japanese Prime Minister when you see him. Japan has relations with its other neighbors including the Soviet Union, and it would seem that that would be a factor the Japanese would take into due account. But it seems he is not.

It isn't that we are so alarmed by this. We have been frightened and frightened again and we can stand up for ourselves! But we would like to have normal friendly relations with Japan, and we think it would be the best interest for Japan.

Kissinger: I've told you it is important for our two countries to keep a long-term perspective in mind. I am convinced that by the 1980's the identity of interest will become self-evident. Now it is self-evident with respect to nuclear weapons; by the 1980's it will be true of many political issues. We shouldn't lose sight of this fact.

Second, we consider it dangerous to have too close relations between China and Japan. Not normal relations, but an axis between the two would be dangerous.

Third, the hegemony clause could be used some day against us. It doesn't name the country. I don't exclude that our relations with the Chinese will be more difficult in five years, certainly in ten. It is a historical accident that our relations with the Chinese are somewhat better now than yours.

Gromyko: Somewhat!



Kissinger: But as China grows stronger, it can become more difficult for us too.

Gromyko: I listened to that with great interest. And I do believe here that we are faced with serious problems, serious both for our leadership and for the United States, and these are questions which should interest the United States too, if you really want to look into the future of your relations with nations of Asia. And I'm sure in your position you do.

Our attention has been drawn to one fact, and trying to assess the significance of that fact we cannot come to any optimistic conclusion -- and that is the agreement between West Germany and Brazil to provide nuclear reactors and other equipment. Our assessment is like that of others -- that Brazil is on the path to the production of nuclear weapons and wants to use the help provided by West Germany. Am I right that this isn't a theoretical problem but a problem of practical policy? It concerns our two states as parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Incidentally, Germany is party to the NPT, but Brazil is not.

You are located closer to Brazil geographically and politically. And we believe you are more aware of how West Germany is breathing in this matter.


Kissinger: We don't believe Brazil has decided to build nuclear weapons but this deal creates the possibility and we are concerned for the future. When a complete fuel cycle is provided, it provides the possibility to obtain fuel. But we are concerned and have expressed our concern publicly.

We had hoped this suppliers' conference would agree on safeguards. But if it doesn't, we would be prepared to exchange views bilaterally, because it is a dangerous development.

Gromyko: We would be prepared for an exchange of views.

Kissinger: All right. Shall we have lunch?

Gromyko: As regards our bilateral relations, I remember very well what you said to me in Vienna, and I expressed my views and don't want to repeat myself. We are continuing the line that developed particularly at the two summit meetings. True that there are occasional statements made in the U.S. that are not quite in accord with that line, but the President and you on behalf of the President have reemphasized that that line is the same. This cannot but evoke a positive response on our part. We believe if we



continue on the course, our two nations can look confidently into the future and advance confidently on the path we have taken in recent years. It would be in the interests not only of the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union, but of all nations. In fact, not even Mintoff could distract us from that. I wanted to repeat this view.

Kissinger: We appreciate this. We, too, believe this is in the interests of peace, and the necessity for it will grow, as I said, in the coming years. The position of our President is growing stronger, almost by the week, so by the time President Ford leaves office, in 1981, it will be a permanent feature of the world scene.

Gromyko: You are optimistic.

Kissinger: All the polls show that if elections were held now, he would win overwhelmingly. Unless there is a collapse of the domestic situation. All our people say it is improving.

Gromyko: What is the situation in the Democratic Party?

Kissinger: Humphrey is mentioned. Jackson is still a possibility; Kennedy is mentioned as a possible compromise.

Gromyko: But he has not announced himself. Is it possible?

Kissinger: I don't think it's possible, but I don't exclude it. I think he is waiting for 1980. They will hurt themselves by fighting among themselves while the President is conducting his office.

[Everyone gets up]

Gromyko: For the conference to be finished would make possible many things.


Kissinger: I've instructed our Ambassador to tell the other delegations that after two years of effort, to permit one clause to hold it up makes no sense.

Gromyko: What does it mean -- "contacts?" Everybody has contacts all the time. Nobody can take decisions.

Kissinger: I agree.

Gromyko: This was a good meeting.

[At 2:02 p.m. the conversation ended and the party joined the rest for luncheon].



Handed to HAK by Gromyko
Geneva July 11, 1975

Unofficial translation
of oral message

Esteemed Mr. President,

I have to address you once again on a question which has already been the subject of an exchange of views between us in Vladivostok and in subsequent correspondence.

I am referring to statements made by high United States officials, particularly by your Secretary of Defense, which are not only whipping up the arms race but also envisaging a possible use of nuclear weapons by the United States against the Soviet Union and other states-members of the Warsaw Treaty.

Despite the assurances to the opposite received by us, statements of that kind, far from ceasing, are becoming ever more frequent and ever more challenging. The US Defense Secretary is tinkling almost incessantly like a bell. Hardly a day passes without him saying something on that score. Now he talks about using tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, now about making "selective strikes" against the Soviet Union. Finally, a few days ago he bluntly announced the possibility of the United States being the first to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union.

You will agree, Mr. President, that the picture thus emerging looks more than strange. Is it not high time to put an end to that?


On one hand, we are setting ourselves the common goal of preventing a nuclear-missile war and have concluded a fundamental agreement on this matter. In Vladivostok we agreed to regard precisely this direction of mutual efforts by our countries as the central one in Soviet-American relations for the future as well.

llm.

BY *h* NARA DATE 10/21/03

STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

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On the other hand, statements are being made in the United States by leading officials who are openly impressing upon the public the idea of a possibility, and almost the inevitability, of such a war. After all, your Defense Secretary is speaking day after day precisely about laying down rules for the conduct of a nuclear war, not about preventing such a war.

Do not such statements testify to a desire to proceed in a direction which runs counter to the one our countries have decided to follow?

We have been given various kinds of explanations in connection with these statements. But the fact remains that such statements--and surely there is a definite policy behind them--are still being made.

The question is how are we to react to these statements. It does not seem hard to understand what it would mean both for our mutual relations and for the state of affairs in the world at large if statements like those by the United States Defense Secretary began to be made in the Soviet Union, too.

This question is, I repeat, very serious, it deals with matters of principle, with the intentions of our countries toward each other. That is why complete clarity here is very much in order.

Both my colleagues and I hope, Mr. President, that you will treat the considerations we have set forth with all the attention this entire matter deserves.



HAK/Gromyko et al
July 11 (Luncheon)



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDSMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:


Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo
of the Central Committee of the CPSU and
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoli G. Kovalev, Deputy Foreign Minister and
Chief of Soviet Delegation to CSCE
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the U. S.
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Chief of the American
Department and Member of the Collegium,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mikhail D. Sytenko, Chief of the Near East
Department and Member of the Collegium,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Vasili G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the
Foreign Minister
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
Oleg M. Sokolov, Chief, American Section of the
American Department

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador
to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counsellor of the Department
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of
State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
William G. Hyland, Director, INR
Jan M. Lodal, NSC Staff
Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PRR*

DATE AND TIME:

Friday, July 11, 1975
2:15 - 2:58 p. m. (Luncheon)

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5(b) (1.3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 2.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY lala, NARA, DATE 10/21/03

PLACE: Intercontinental Hotel
Geneva

SUBJECT: Indochina; Somalia; CSCE

Kissinger: Will Sihanouk go to Cambodia?

Gromyko: We don't know. We have no Embassy there.

Kissinger: They treated your people roughly, didn't they?

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: Will North Vietnam and South Vietnam reunite?

Gromyko: I answered that in Vienna.

Kissinger: You said they will remain separate for a while.

Gromyko: Only for a while.

Kissinger: Your naval base at Cam Ranh Bay -- was it arranged with North or South Vietnam?

Gromyko: If they suggested it, we wouldn't accept.

Kissinger: The Chinese told us you have a naval base there. They wouldn't mislead us. [Laughter]


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Gromyko: Your group of correspondents -- more than correspondents, also a Congressional delegation -- inspected this place in Somalia. What did they find? Boxes, and Russian sailors. You can see a few Russian sailors anywhere.

Sonnenfeldt: National means of verification.

* * * *

Gromyko: I want to thank you and your colleagues. It was a good opportunity to exchange views. It was useful for our common cause.



Kissinger: It was a good exchange of views. It is good these meetings are regular now.

Gromyko: The Conference should be settled. It is important.

Kissinger: It's inconceivable it won't be solved.

Sonnenfeldt: It's conceivable, but it will be solved.

Kissinger: All right, Sonnenfeldt can conceive that it fails, but he joins my prediction.

[The meeting ended at 2:58 p.m. and the Secretary accompanied Foreign Minister Gromyko downstairs to the press room. Their remarks to the press are at Tab A.]



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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: COMMENTS BEFORE THE PRESS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO AT THE CONCLUSION OF THEIR GENEVA MEETINGS JULY 10 AND 11, 1975.

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS COMMENTS:

QUOTE.

MINISTER GROMYKO: MR. SECRETARY OF STATE, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, LET ME BE VERY BRIEF. WE HAVE HAD A WONDERFUL LUNCH THAT WAS ARRANGED IN OUR HONOR BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE, A FACT WHICH YOU KNEW WOULD BE TRUE, BUT I GUESS THAT IS NOT THE FIRST THING THAT INTERESTS YOU. WE HAVE HAD DISCUSSIONS ON SEVERAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, BILATERAL RELATIONS. WE TOUCHED UPON EUROPEAN MATTERS, AND WE HAD AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON SEVERAL CONCRETE QUESTIONS WHICH WERE USEFUL TO THE CAUSE. THERE WAS A THOROUGH EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF CONCLUDING A NEW STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT BASED UPON THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING REACHED BY U.S. PRESIDENT FORD AND GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, LEONID BREZHNEV. AND THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THAT QUESTION WAS VERY CONSTRUCTIVE. WE ALSO EXCHANGED VIEWS ON THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND IF YOU THINK IT IS SO EASY TO CHOOSE THE WORDS TO USE IN CHARACTERIZING THE RESULTS OF THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THAT QUESTION YOU WOULD BE WRONG. BUT AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THAT QUESTION WAS INDEED NECESSARY. AND MOST PROBABLY WE WILL BE MEETING WITH THAT QUESTION ON THE CROSSROADS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS MORE THAN ONCE IN THE FUTURE. WE TALKED, I WOULDN'T SAY AT GREAT LENGTH, BUT WE DID TALK IN A PRINCIPAL WAY ON BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION. AND THE RESOLVE OF THE TWO SIDES WAS CONFIRMED TO GO ON FOLLOWING THE LINE THAT HAS TAKEN SHAPE, THAT HAS BEEN DEFINED AND THAT WAS FORMULATED IN RECENT YEARS AND ESPECIALLY AND MOST PARTICULARLY AS A RESULT OF THE SOVIET-AMERICAN SUMMIT MEETINGS.



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AID I WISH TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EMPHASIZE ONCE AGAIN AND MOST STRONGLY THAT THE ENTIRE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND PERSONALLY GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV ARE FULLY DETERMINED TO CONTINUE TO PURSUE THE LINE THAT WE HAVE BEEN TAKING IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND IN INTERNATIONAL POLICIES GENERALLY, AND THAT IS A LINE AIMED AT PEACE, AT FURTHER DETENTE, AT THE FURTHER IMPROVEMENT OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, AND WE WILL DO ALL IN OUR POWER TO CREATE A STILL MORE FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE IN THE WORLD AT LARGE. AND LET ME SUM UP WHAT I HAVE SAID: ON THE WHOLE OUR MEETINGS AND DISCUSSIONS WERE VERY USEFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE. LET ME END ON THAT NOTE. MAYBE I HAVE TAKEN A FEW SECONDS OF SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER'S TIME BUT HE WILL NOT BE IN DEBT FOR TOO LONG.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I WOULD LIKE TO JOIN THE PRECISE, DETAILED AND ILLUMINATING COMMENTS MADE BY MY SOVIET COLLEAGUE. THE MEETINGS WERE CONSTRUCTIVE AND USEFUL AND COVERED THE RANGE OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS, WITH ESPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS AND ON THE MIDDLE EAST, AS WELL AS THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE AND BILATERAL RELATIONS. THESE REGULAR MEETINGS, WHICH ENABLE OUR TWO COUNTRIES TO EXCHANGE VIEWS, HAVE BECOME A FEATURE THAT HELPS PROMOTE THE PURPOSES OF DETENTE AND REPRESENT THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED ON ITS PART TO PURSUE THE LINE OF POLICY THAT HAS BEEN LAID DOWN IN RECENT YEARS. WHY DON'T WE TAKE ONE OR TWO QUESTIONS.

Q: MR. SECRETARY. WHAT DID YOU DECIDE ON STRATEGIC ARMS?
 SECRETARY KISSINGER: I WAS WAITING FOR THAT QUESTION. WE REVIEWED THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN A NUMBER OF CATEGORIES, AND PROGRESS WAS MADE IN NARROWING THE DIFFERENCES AND IN UNDERSTANDING EACH OTHER'S POSITION. WE WILL WORK EARNESTLY AND WITH SOME OPTIMISM FOR CONCLUDING AN AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE VLADIVOSTOK PRINCIPLES THIS YEAR.

Q: MR. SECRETARY. HAVE YOU BEEN ABLE TO SEE EYE-TO-EYE WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON THE MEANS OF VERIFYING THE PRESENCE OF MULTIPLE WARHEADS IN MISSILES?
 SECRETARY KISSINGER: THE PROBLEM OF VERIFICATION WAS ONE OF THE ISSUES THAT IS BEFORE US AND DISCUSSIONS ON THAT AS WELL AS ON OTHER ISSUES WILL CONTINUE.

Q: DID YOU MAKE PROGRESS ON THAT ISSUE?
 SECRETARY KISSINGER: I HAD INDICATED THAT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON THE WHOLE COMPLEX OF ISSUES.

Q: DO YOU EXPECT YOU MADE ENOUGH PROGRESS TO EXPECT TO REACH AN EARLY AGREEMENT BY EARLY FALL SO THAT AN AGREEMENT MAY BE READY FOR SIGNING IF AND WHEN MR. BREZHNEV GOES TO WASHINGTON IN OCTOBER?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WELL, I THINK IT IS PREMATURE TO

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SET A PARTICULAR DEADLINE. BUT I WOULD THINK THAT AS A RESULT OF THE DISCUSSIONS THAT HAVE BEEN HELD IN RECENT DAYS THE PROSPECTS OF REACHING AN AGREEMENT HAVE BEEN IMPROVED.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, WHAT CAN YOU TELL US OF YOUR DISCUSSIONS OF THE MALTA PROBLEM WITH THE SECURITY CONFERENCE?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WELL, WE BELIEVE THAT THE DISCUSSIONS AT THE SECURITY CONFERENCE HAVE REACHED A POINT WHERE A FINAL STAGE SHOULD BE AGREED TO IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CANADIAN PROPOSAL, THAT IS TO SAY, THAT THEY THIRD STAGE SHOULD BEGIN ON JULY 30. THERE IS A CONSENSUS TO WHICH 34 OF THE NATIONS HAVE AGREED. MALTA HAS INTRODUCED A PARTICULAR MODIFICATION WHICH IS NOW UNDER DISCUSSION, BUT AS FAR AS THE UNITED STATES IS CONCERNED, WE HOPE THAT THIS CONSENSUS OF ALL 35 NATIONS CAN BE REACHED QUICKLY.

QUESTION: MR. FOREIGN MINISTER, CAN YOU TELL US, SIR, WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION IS NOW PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF ON-SITE INSPECTION IN A FUTURE THRESHOLD NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY?

FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO: WELL THERE IS UNDERSTANDING WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON THAT QUESTION. AND WE PROCEED FROM THAT UNDERSTANDING. THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE MOVEMENT FORWARD TOWARDS BRINGING THAT UNDERSTANDING TO THE POINT OF AN AGREEMENT. AND I AM REFERING HERE TO THE QUESTION OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. AND THEREFORE WE TAKE AN OPTIMISTIC VIEW OF THE POSSIBILITY OF BRINGING THIS ENTIRE QUESTION TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION AND TURNING IT INTO AN AGREEMENT. BUT BY AND LARGE THE SOVIET UNION IS IN FAVOR OF A BAN ON ALL TYPES OF ALL KINDS OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES. BUT WE HERE ARE DEALING WITH THE QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL ACCORDS. IF WE WERE THINKING IN TERMS OF CONCLUDING AN AGREEMENT WITH OUR OWN SELVES, THAT WOULD BE NO PROBLEM, WE WOULD JUST SIGN IT.

QUESTION: MR. FOREIGN MINISTER, THE QUESTION IS, DOES THE UNDERSTANDING INCLUDE ON-SITE INSPECTION?

FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO: WELL, GENERALLY SPEAKING, WE BELIEVE THAT NATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION ARE QUITE ADEQUATE TO THE TASK OF CONTROLLING SUCH AN AGREEMENT. THIS IS NO NEW IDEA ON OUR PART AND WE BELIEVE THERE EXISTS ALL GROUNDS FOR US TO TAKE THAT POSITION, ALTHOUGH WE ARE, OF COURSE, AWARE THAT CERTAIN OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE THEIR OWN CONSIDERATIONS IN THAT REGARD.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WE'LL TAKE ONE MORE QUESTION.

QUESTION: MR. KISSINGER, IS THERE SOMETHING MORE PRECISE ON THE MIDDLE EAST THAN AN EXCHANGE OF POINTS OF VIEW ON THIS QUESTION?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WELL, I AM REALLY OFFENDED THAT

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YOU CONSIDER OUR MUTUAL EXPLANATIONS NOT PRECISE.
(LAUGHTER) THERE WAS A REVIEW OF THE MIDDLE EAST
SITUATION, AS WELL AS THE PROSPECTS FOR COMPREHENSIVE
AS WELL AS PARTIAL SOLUTIONS, BUT BEYOND THAT WE
CANNOT GO.

END QUOTE DALE

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